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
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COMMENTARIES
ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,
AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA.

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"Chancery is ordained to supply the Law, not to subvert the Law."—LORD BACON.

"His ergo ex partibus juris, quidquid aut ex ipsa re, aut ex simili, aut ex majore, minoreve, nasci videbitur, attendere, atque elicere, pertentando unamquamque partem juris, oportebit."—
CIC. De Invent. Lib. 2, cap. 22.

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BY

MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, PH.D.

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COMMENTARIES

ON

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE.

CHAPTER XVII.

PECULIAR REMEDIES IN EQUITY. — DISCOVERY. — CANCELLATION AND DELIVERY OF INSTRUMENTS.

688. WE shall now proceed to the consideration of the other branch of concurrent jurisdiction, — that in which the peculiar remedies afforded by Courts of Equity constitute the principal although not the sole ground of jurisdiction.

689. And here we may begin by adverting to that large class of cases where the remedy of a DISCOVERY constitutes the main ground, and in many cases the sole ground, upon which a bill in equity is maintainable in point of jurisdiction. Every original bill in equity may in truth be properly deemed a bill of discovery, for it seeks a disclosure of circumstances relative to the plaintiff's case. But that which is usually and emphatically distinguished by this appellation is a bill for the discovery of facts resting in the knowledge of the defendant, or of deeds or writings or other things in his custody, possession, or power, but seeking no relief in consequence of the discovery, although it may pray and often does pray for a stay of proceedings at law until the discovery shall be made.¹ Wherever therefore such a discovery alone is

¹ Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 53, 183 to 185; post, § 1483; Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 4, p. 58; Id. ch. 3, § 3, p. 188; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2, ch. 1, pp. 257, &c.; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 3, § 1, &c.; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 160, &c.; Story on Equity Plead. §§ 311, 312, 315.

sought without asking any relief, Courts of Equity have a complete jurisdiction to compel the discovery, if the plaintiff is entitled to it according to the general principles which govern the subject. Courts of Law are incompetent by their very structure to compel such a discovery, and therefore it properly falls under the head of the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of Equity, where the nature and limits of the right to a discovery will be fully examined.¹

690. But the class of cases designed to be treated of in this place are cases where relief is sought as consequent upon the discovery of facts, and where but for the want of such discovery the case would be perfectly remediable at law. The necessity of obtaining a discovery in such cases therefore constitutes the sole ground of equity jurisdiction; and if upon such a bill no discovery is obtained, the cause fails and the bill must be dismissed. If on the other hand the discovery is obtained, then, as we have already seen, Courts of Equity in many cases will proceed to give entire and full relief. This subject has been already treated somewhat at length in the preliminary part of these Commentaries,² and therefore the ground of this jurisdiction may be briefly summed up in the language of Mr. Fonblanque, in a passage from which a short quotation has been already made: 'This concurrence of jurisdiction [by Courts of Equity],' says he, 'may in the greater number of cases in which it is exercised be justified by the propriety of preventing a multiplicity of suits; for as the mode of proceeding in Courts of Law requires the plaintiff to establish his case without enabling him to draw the necessary evidence from the examination of the defendant, justice could never be obtained at law in those cases where the principal facts to be proved by one party are confined to the knowledge of the other party. In such cases therefore it becomes necessary for the party wanting such evidence to resort to the extraordinary powers of a Court of Equity, which will compel the necessary discovery. And the court, having acquired cognizance of the suit for the purpose of discovery, will entertain it for the purpose of relief in most cases of fraud, account, accident, and mistake.'³

¹ Post, §§ 1480 to 1505.

² Ante, §§ 64 to 74; post, § 1483; Story on Eq. Plead. §§ 311 to 316.

³ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, note (*f*), p. 12.

691. We have already seen that there is a difference between the English and the American courts in regard to the extent of the jurisdiction attaching for relief as consequent upon discovery.¹ But whichever doctrine ought upon principle to prevail, there is no doubt of the two propositions above stated, — first, that the necessity of a discovery in a Court of Equity furnishes a just foundation of jurisdiction in a great variety of cases;² and secondly, that if the discovery is totally denied by the answer, the bill must be dismissed and the relief denied, although there might be other evidence sufficient to establish a title to relief; for the subject-matter is under such circumstances exclusively remediable at law. With these few remarks the further consideration of this subject may be dismissed in this place.

¹ Ante, § 71.

² See Lord Eldon's remarks in *Kemp v. Pryor*, 7 Ves. 248, 249. In *Pearce v. Creswick*, 2 Hare's R. 293, Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram said: 'The first proposition relied upon by the plaintiff in support of the equity of his bill is this, — that the case was one in which the right to discovery would carry with it the right to relief. And undoubtedly dicta are to be met with tending directly to the conclusion that the right to discovery may entitle a plaintiff to relief also. In *Adley v. The Whitstable Company*, 17 Ves. 324, Lord Eldon says: "There is no mode of ascertaining what is due except an account in a Court of Equity; but it is said the party may have discovery, and then go to law. The answer to that is, that the right to discovery carries along with it the right to relief in equity." In *Ryle v. Haggie*, 1 J. & W. 236, Sir Thomas Plumer said: "When it is admitted that a party comes here properly for the discovery, the court is never disposed to occasion a multiplicity of suits by making him go to a Court of Law for the relief." And in *M'Kenzie v. Johnson*, 4 Madd. 373, Sir J. Leach says: "The plaintiff can only learn from this discovery of the defendants how they have acted in the execution of their agency, and it would be most unreasonable that he should pay them for that discovery, if it turned out that they had abused his confidence; yet such must be the case if a bill for relief will not lie." Now in a case in which I think that justice requires the court if possible to find an equity in this bill, to enable it once for all to decide the question between the parties, I should reluctantly deprive the plaintiff of any equity to which the dicta I have referred to may entitle him. But I confess that the argument founded upon these dicta appears to me to be exposed to the objection of proving too much. They can only be reconciled with the ordinary practice of the court by understanding them as having been uttered with reference in each case to the subject-matter to which they were applied, and not as laying down any abstract proposition so wide as the plaintiff's argument requires. I think this part of the plaintiff's case cannot be stated more highly in his favor than this, — that the necessity a party may be under (from the very nature of a given transaction) to come into equity for discovery is a circumstance to be regarded in deciding upon the distinct and independent question of equitable jurisdiction. Further than this I have not been able to follow this branch of the plaintiff's argument.'

692. Another head of equity jurisdiction, founded upon the like circumstance of a peculiar remedy, embraces that large class of cases where the RESCISSION, CANCELLATION, or DELIVERY UP of agreements, securities, or deeds is sought, or a SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE is required of the terms of such agreements, securities, or deeds as indispensable to reciprocal justice. It is obvious that Courts of Law are utterly incompetent, by their general organization, to make a specific decree for any relief of this sort;¹ and without it the most serious mischiefs may often arise to the parties interested. The subject naturally divides itself into two great branches, — in the first place, what are the cases in which Courts of Equity will undertake to rescind, cancel, or direct a surrender of contracts, securities, and deeds; and in the second place, what are the cases in which Courts of Equity will enforce a specific performance of them. (*a*)

693. Before proceeding to the consideration of these distinct and important subjects it may be proper to suggest that the application to a Court of Equity for either of these purposes is not, strictly speaking, a matter of absolute right, upon which the court is bound to pass a final decree. But it is a matter of sound discretion to be exercised by the court, either in granting or in refusing the relief prayed, according to its own notion of what is reasonable and proper under all the circumstances of the particular case.² Thus for instance a Court of Equity will sometimes refuse to decree a specific performance of an agreement which it will yet decline to order to be delivered up, cancelled, or rescinded.³ On the other hand a specific performance will be decreed upon the application of one party, when it would be denied upon the application of the other. And an agreement will be rescinded or cancelled upon the application of one party when the court would decline any interference at the instance of the other.⁴ So that we are here to understand that the interference

¹ *Bromley v. Holland*, 7 Ves. 18.

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 9, note (*i*); 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, pp. 464, 465, 466; *Mortlock v. Buller*, 10 Ves. 293; s. c. 2 Dow, R. 518.

³ See *M'Leod v. Drummond*, 17 Ves. 167; *Savage v. Brocksopp*, 18 Ves. 335; *Mortlock v. Buller*, 10 Ves. 305, 308; *Turner v. Harvey*, Jacob, R. 178; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, pp. 454, 455.

⁴ *Cooke v. Clayworth*, 18 Ves. 12; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 206.

(*a*) Some remarks upon this subject will be found in the editor's note to § 33.

of a Court of Equity is a matter of mere discretion, not indeed of arbitrary and capricious discretion, but of sound and reasonable discretion, *secundum arbitrium boni judicis*.¹ And in all cases of this sort where the interposition of a Court of Equity is sought, the court will in granting relief, impose such terms upon the party as it deems the real justice of the case to require; and if the plaintiff refuses to comply with such terms, his bill will be dismissed.² The maxim here is emphatically applied, — He who seeks equity must do equity.

694. In the first place then let us consider in what cases a Court of Equity will direct the DELIVERY UP, CANCELLATION, or RESCISSION of agreements, securities, deeds, or other instruments. It is obvious that the jurisdiction exercised in cases of this sort is founded upon the administration of a protective or preventive justice. The party is relieved upon the principle, — as it is technically called, — *quia timet*; that is, for fear that such agreements, securities, deeds, or other instruments may be vexatiously or injuriously used against him when the evidence to impeach them may be lost, or that they may now throw a cloud or suspicion over his title or interest.³ A fortiori the party will have a right to come into equity to have such agreements, securities, deeds, or other instruments delivered up and cancelled where he has a defence against them which is good in equity, but not capable of being made available at law.⁴ (a) We have already had occasion to take notice of a great variety of cases in which agreements, securities, deeds, and other instruments have been set aside and decreed to be delivered up on the ground of accident, mistake, and fraud.⁵ (b) Under the two former heads

¹ *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 188; *Buckle v. Mitchell*, 18 Ves. 111; *Revell v. Hussey*, 2 B. & B. 288; post, §§ 742, 769.

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 4, note (a); Id. B. 1, ch. 2, § 11, note (p).

³ *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 34, pp. 493, &c.; post, §§ 700, 701; *Pettit v. Shepherd*, 5 Paige, R. 493.

⁴ *Reed v. Bank of Newburgh*, 1 Paige, R. 215, 218.

⁵ Ante, §§ 161, 439; *Willan v. Willan*, 16 Ves. 72; *Underhill v. Horwood*, 10 Ves. 225; *Ware v. Horwood*, 14 Ves. 28, 31, 32.

(a) *Carroll v. Brown*, 28 Gratt. 791. to his principal, may be ground, where the agency is special, for cancelling the instrument. *Holden v. Phelps*, 135 Mass. 61. And this though the consideration was adequate. *Id.* Con-

(b) Want of authority on the part of an agent to execute an instrument, e. g. to assign a mortgage belonging

it will readily be perceived upon the slightest examination that a rescission or cancellation of the agreements, securities, deeds, or other instruments would not in a great many cases be an appropriate, adequate, or equitable relief. The accident or mistake may be of a nature which does not go to the very foundation and merits of the agreement, but may only require that some amendment, addition, qualification, or variation should take place to make it at once just and reasonable and fit to be enforced.¹ But it can rarely be said that in cases of fraud, actual or constructive, the same observations properly apply. If there is actual fraud, there seems the strongest ground for the interference of a Court of Equity to rescind a contract, security, or other instrument. And if the fraud be constructive, still for the most part it ought to draw after it the same consequences, either as a breach of trust or an abandonment of duty, or a violation of public policy.² But although fraud may in all these cases furnish a sufficient ground to rescind a contract in *jure strictissimo*, yet there may be circumstances which may justly mitigate the rigid severity of the law, or may place the parties in *pari delicto*; (*a*) or may require a Court of Equity, from the demerit of the plaintiff in the particular transaction, to abstain from the slightest interference; or may even induce it, if it should rescind the contract, to do so only upon the terms of due compensation and the allowance of the countervailing equities of the plaintiff.³ (*b*)

695. Without attempting to go over the different classes of cases of fraud (which have been already enumerated), it may be stated that Courts of Equity will generally set aside, cancel, and

¹ See Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 127, 128, 129, and note (*u*); Skillern's Executors v. May's Executors, 4 Cranch, 137; Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 210.

² Thompson v. Graham, 1 Paige, R. 384.

³ Ante, § 50; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, note (*h*); Holbrook v. Sharpey, 19 Ves. 131; Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. R. 125, 126.

cerning the effect of the existence of a defence at law in such cases, see Fuller v. Percival, 126 Mass. 381; Commercial Ins. Co. v. McLoon, 14 Allen, 351; Hoare v. Bremridge, L. R. 8 Ch. 22; Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616. The last-named case is opposed to what appears to be the better view. See the editor's note to § 33, vol. i.

(*a*) As where a note and mortgage are given to compound a felony. Atwood v. Fisk, 101 Mass. 363; Gotwalt v. Neal, 25 Md. 434. But see Porter v. Jones, 6 Coldw. 313.

(*b*) Tantum v. Miller, 3 Stockt. 551; Thigpen v. Pitt, 1 Jones, Eq. 49.

direct to be delivered up agreements and other instruments, however solemn in their form or operation, where they are voidable and not merely void, under the following circumstances: First, where there is actual fraud in the party defendant, in which the party plaintiff has not participated. (a) Secondly, where there is a constructive fraud against public policy, and the party plaintiff has not participated therein. Thirdly, where there is a fraud against public policy, and the party plaintiff has participated therein, but public policy would be defeated by allowing it to stand. And lastly, where there is a constructive fraud by both parties, but they are not in *pari delicto*.¹

695 *a*. The first two classes of cases seem scarcely to require any illustration, since it is manifestly a result of natural justice that a party ought not to be permitted to avail himself of any agreement, deed, or other instrument procured by his own actual or constructive fraud, or by his own violation of legal duty or public policy, to the prejudice of an innocent party. The third class may be illustrated by the common case of a gaming security, which will be decreed to be given up, notwithstanding both parties have participated in the violation of the law; because public policy will be best subserved by such a course.² The fourth class may also be illustrated by cases where, although both parties have participated in the guilty transaction, yet the party who seeks relief has acted under circumstances of oppression, imposition, hardship, undue influence, or great inequality of age or condition; so that in a moral as well as in a legal point of view his

¹ See *ante*, §§ 298 to 381; Mitford, *Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 128, 129, and notes; 3 Wooddes. *Lect.* 58, pp. 458, 459, and note; *Hanington v. Du Chatel*, 1 Bro. Ch. 124; s. c. 2 Dick. 581; s. c. more full, 2 Swanst. R. 159, note; *St. John v. St. John*, 11 Ves. 535, 536; *Wynne v. Callander*, 1 Russ. Rep. 293; *Jackman v. Mitchell*, 13 Ves. 581, 583; *Fanning v. Dunham*, 5 John. Ch. R. 136, 142; *Earl of Milltown v. Stewart*, 3 Mylne & Craig, R. 18, 24; *ante*, § 302; *Thompson v. Graham*, 1 Paige, R. 384; *Seymour v. Delancy*, 3 Cowen, R. 445; *MacCabe v. Hussey*, 2 Dow & Clark, 440; s. c. 5 Bligh, R. 715.

² *Ante*, § 302; *Earl of Milltown v. Stewart*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 18, 24; *Wynne v. Callander*, 1 Russ. R. 293. See, as to gaming securities given in a foreign country, *Quarrier v. Colston*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 147.

(a) The mere breach of a contract upon the faith of which a mortgage is executed is not a fraud, justifying the cancellation of the mortgage. *Johnson v. Murphy*, 60 Ala. 288.

guilt may well be deemed far less dark in its character and degree than that of his associate.¹ (a)

696. But in many cases where the instrument is declared void by positive law, and also where it is held void or voidable upon other principles, Courts of Equity will impose terms upon the party if the circumstances of the case require it. Thus as we have seen in cases of usury, Courts of Equity will not interpose in favor of the borrower, except upon the payment or allowance of the debt fairly due.² (b) So in cases of the setting aside and cancellation and delivery up of annuity securities, because they are not duly registered, Courts of Equity will direct an account of all receipts and payments on each side, and require the just balance to be paid by the proper party.³ And similar principles are applied to other cases where the transaction is deemed indefensible and yet there is an equitable right to compensation.⁴

697. On the other hand, where the party seeking relief is the sole guilty party, or where he has participated equally and deliberately in the fraud, or where the agreement which he seeks to set aside is founded in illegality, immorality, or base and unconscionable conduct on his own part, — in such cases Courts of Equity will leave him to the consequences of his own iniquity, and will decline to assist him to escape from the toils which he has studiously prepared to entangle others, or whereby he has sought to violate with impunity the best interests and morals of social life.⁵ And if acts of this sort have been deliberately done under circumstances in which innocence has been betrayed, or confidence seduced, or falsehood or concealment systematically practised, a fortiori Courts of Equity could not, without staining the administration of justice, interfere to save the party from the just results of his own gross misconduct when the failure of suc-

¹ Ante, §§ 298, 300, 301.

² Ante, § 302.

³ *Holbrook v. Sharpey*, 19 Ves. 131; *Bromley v. Holland*, 5 Ves. 618; s. c. 7 Ves. 16 to 28; *Byne v. Vivian*, 5 Ves. 606, 607; *Byne v. Potter*, 5 Ves. 609.

⁴ See *Harding v. Handy*, 11 Wheat. 103, 125, 126.

⁵ See ante, §§ 298 to 305. See also *Franco v. Bolton*, 3 Ves. jr. 368 to 372; *St. John v. St. John*, 11 Ves. 535, 536; *Brackenbury v. Brackenbury*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 391; *Gray v. Mathias*, 5 Ves. jr. 286.

(a) See *Porter v. Jones*, 6 Cold. Eq. 133; *Tantum v. Miller*, 3 Stockt. 313; *Gotwalt v. Neal*, 25 Md. 434; 551.

Blossom v. Van Amringe, Phill. (N.C.)

(b) See ante, § 64 e, and notes.

cess in the scheme would manifestly be the sole cause of his praying relief.

698. A question has often occurred, how far Courts of Equity would or ought to interfere to direct deeds and other solemn instruments to be delivered up and cancelled, which are utterly void and not merely voidable.¹ The doubt has been in the first place whether, as an instrument utterly void is incapable of being enforced at law, it is not a case where the remedial justice to protect the party may not be deemed adequate and complete at law, and therefore where the necessity of the interposition of Courts of Equity is obviated.² (a) And in the next place, whether if the instrument be void and ought not to be enforced, the more appropriate remedy in a Court of Equity would not be to order a perpetual injunction to restrain the use of the instrument rather than to compel a delivery up and cancellation of the instrument.³

699. Where the party is seeking a discovery as the means of arriving at relief by the delivery up or cancellation of the void instrument, it seems somewhat difficult to understand why a Court of Equity, having acquired a full jurisdiction in the case for discovery, should not when that is obtained proceed for the purpose of preventing multiplicity of suits to make a decree for the relief sought.⁴ But where no discovery is sought, and the naked case made by the bill is for a mere delivery up or cancellation of the instrument, not averring any defect of proof but simply stating that the instrument is void; there might be more

¹ See Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 129, and note (x); 2 Swanst. 159, note (b); Bromley v. Holland, 5 Ves. 618, 619; s. c. 7 Ves. 18, 19; Simpson v. Lord Howden, 3 Mylne & Craig, R. 102, 103; Colman v. Sarrel, 1 Ves. jr. R. 50.

² Hilton v. Barrow, 1 Ves. jr. 284; Ryan v. Mackmath, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 15, 16, Mr. Belt's note (1), and Pierce v. Webb, there cited, p. 16, note 2; Jervis v. White, 7 Ves. 413, 414; Gay v. Mathias, 5 Ves. jr. 293, 294; Bromley v. Holland, 5 Ves. 618, 619; Piersoll v. Elliot, 6 Peters, R. 95, 98.

³ Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 129, and note (x); Jervis v. White, 7 Ves. 414; Hanington v. Du Chatel, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 124; s. c. 2 Dick. 581, and more fully 2 Swanst. R. 159, note.

⁴ See Newman v. Milner, 3 Ves. jr. 483; ante, §§ 64 to 74, 690, 694; post, § 1483.

(a) See Mawhorter v. Armstrong, 16 Ohio, 188; Wilkes v. Wilkes, 4 Edw. 630; post, p. 13, note.

color for some scruple in entertaining the bill.¹ Still even in the latter case the specific relief required being such as a Court of Law cannot give, and yet the instrument being from its very nature and its apparent validity calculated to throw some doubt upon the title, or being capable of future misuse, the justice of a Court of Equity would seem to require even under such circumstances an interposition to prevent serious mischiefs.²

700. But whatever may have been the doubts or difficulties formerly entertained upon this subject, they seem by the more modern decisions to be fairly put at rest, and the jurisdiction is now maintained in the fullest extent.³ (a) And these decisions are founded on the true principles of Equity Jurisprudence, which is not merely remedial but is also preventive of injustice. If an instrument ought not to be used or enforced, it is against conscience for the party holding it to retain it, since he can only retain it for some sinister purpose. If it is a negotiable instrument, it may be used for a fraudulent or improper purpose to the injury of a third person.⁴ (b) If it is a deed purporting to convey lands or other hereditaments, its existence in an uncanceled state necessarily has a tendency to throw a cloud over the

¹ See *Gray v. Mathias*, 5 Ves. 286; *Franco v. Bolton*, 3 Ves. 368.

² *Hamilton v. Cummings*, 1 John. Ch. R. 520 to 524; *Hawkshaw v. Parkins*, 2 Swanst. R. 546.

³ *Hamilton v. Cummings*, 1 John. Ch. R. 520 to 524, and the cases there cited; *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 128, 129, and notes; Mr. Swanston's note to *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 2 Swanst. R. 157, note (b); *St. John v. St. John*, 11 Ves. 535; *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 127 to 130; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 186 to 190; *Simpson v. Lord Howden*, 3 Mylne & Craig, R. 104, 105; *Mayor of Colchester v. Lowton*, 1 Ves. & Beam. 244; *Bromley v. Holland*, 7 Ves. R. 16, 19, 20, 21; *Hayward v. Dimsdale*, 17 Ves. 112; *Pierce v. Webb*, cited in Mr. Belt's edit. of 3 Bro. Ch. R. 116, note; *Williams v. Flight*, 5 Beav. R. 41. See Mr. Belt's notes to *Ryan v. Mackmath*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 15; *Chennel v. Churchman*, cited *ibid.* p. 16; *Minshaw v. Jordan*, *ibid.* p. 17; *Lisle v. Liddle*, 3 Anst. R. 649; *Piersoll v. Elliot*, 6 Peters, R. 95, 98, in which last case the doctrine was much considered.

⁴ *Minshaw v. Jordan*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 17, Mr. Belt's note; *Bromley v. Holland*, 7 Ves. 20, 21; s. c. *Cooper*, R. 9, 21; *Jervis v. White*, 7 Ves. 414; *Bishop of Winchester v. Fournier*, 2 Ves. 445, 446; *Wynne v. Callander*, 1 Russell, R. 293; *Reed v. Bank of Newburgh*, 1 Paige, R. 215.

(a) See the editor's note to § 33.

(b) But equity will not order the cancellation of a negotiable note obtained by fraud after the defrauding

party has passed it for value and without notice. *Fuller v. Percival*, 126 Mass. 381.

title.¹ (a) If it is a mere written agreement, solemn or otherwise, still while it exists it is always liable to be applied to improper purposes, and it may be vexatiously litigated at a distance

¹ *Pierce v. Webb*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 16, note, and Mr. Belt's notes; *Hayward v. Dimsdale*, 17 Ves. 111; *Byne v. Vivian*, 5 Ves. 606, 607; *Mayor of Colchester v. Lowton*, 1 Ves. & B. 241; *Attorney-Gen. v. Morgan*, 2 Russell, R. 306; *Duncan v. Warrall*, 10 Price, R. 31; *Jackman v. Mitchell*, 13 Ves. 581; *Pettit v. Shepherd*, 5 Paige, R. 493; *Van Doren v. Mayor, &c. of New York*, 9 Paige, R. 388.

(a) *Cloud upon Title*. — To remove a cloud upon the plaintiff's title to land the plaintiff must under the common statutes, when suing upon a legal title, show that he is in possession, or that the land is vacant; for it is said, if the defendant or another is in possession, the plaintiff has a remedy at law by ejectment or by writ of entry. *Allen v. Storer*, 132 Mass. 372, 376; *Russell v. Deshon*, 124 Mass. 342; *Machine Co. v. Perry*, 119 Mass. 123; *Boardman v. Jackson*, *Ib.* 161; *Sullivan v. Finnegan*, 101 Mass. 447; *Bassett v. Brown*, 100 Mass. 355 (where the defendant had obtained a deed by fraud from the plaintiff, and equity would not interfere); *Clouston v. Shearer*, 99 Mass. 209, 212; *Bunce v. Gallagher*, 5 Blatchf. 48; *Page v. Montgomery*, 46 Mich. 51; *Barron v. Robbins*, 22 Mich. 35; *Woods v. Monroe*, 17 Mich. 238; *Baines v. Barnes*, 64 Ala. 375; *Jones v. DeGraffenreid*, 60 Ala. 145; *Herrington v. Williams*, 31 Texas, 448; *Sale v. McLean*, 29 Ark. 612; *Polk v. Pendleton*, 31 Md. 118; *Burton v. Gleason*, 56 Ill. 25; *Oakley v. Hurlbut*, 100 Ill. 204; *Eldridge v. Smith*, 34 Vt. 484; *Lake Bigler Road Co. v. Bedford*, 3 Nev. 399; *Clark v. Covenant Ins. Co.*, 52 Mo. 272; *Keane v. Kyne*, 66 Mo. 216. See editor's note to § 33, ante.

But the contrary was held in *Jones v. Perry*, 10 Yerg. 59, and in *Almony v. Hicks*, 3 Head, 39, on the very intelligible ground that the relief at law would not be adequate. It might still be necessary, or at least proper and desirable, for the plaintiff after re-

covering possession to ask to have the defendant's title-deed delivered up for cancellation as a cloud, especially if the plaintiff had obtained judgment by default against a non-resident defendant. Evidence aliunde would still be required to show the invalidity of the deed. To drive the plaintiff to two actions in such a case would, it might be argued, where statute has not cut short the question, be hard and needless. See also *Marston v. Moore*, 39 Ala. 722, where relief was granted though the defendant was in possession of part of the land.

It is clear too that if the possession is vacant, the plaintiff may have his relief. *Oakley v. Hurlbut*, 100 Ill. 204; *Hardin v. Jones*, 86 Ill. 313; *Gage v. Abbot*, 99 Ill. 366. So too if the plaintiff's title or claim is equitable, or if it is a junior legal title with superior equities, he need not have possession. *King v. Carpenter*, 37 Mich. 363; *Branch v. Mitchell*, 24 Ark. 431; *Hodges v. Griggs*, 21 Vt. 280. Thus it is perhaps that a judgment creditor may have such relief, as he clearly may though not in possession, the better to enforce his judgment. *Hager v. Shindler*, 29 Cal. 47; *Stowell v. Haslett*, 5 Lans. 380; s. c. 57 N. Y. 637. So may one who seeks to restrain a sale and prevent a cloud; at least in California, such a case not falling within the statute. *Thompson v. Lynch*, 29 Cal. 189. So also of a purchaser under execution sale, upon judgment against one who has conveyed the land in question in fraud of creditors. *Gould v. Steinburg*, 84 Ill.

of time when the proper evidence to repel the claim may have been lost or obscured, or when the other party may be disabled

170; *Hager v. Shindler*, supra. It is also held that a mortgagee or his assignee may have a cloud upon the mortgage title removed, regardless of possession in himself. *Polk v. Reynolds*, 31 Md. 106; *Wofford v. Board of Police*, 44 Miss. 579.

The plaintiff must however show some title in himself deserving protection. *Hutchinson v. Howe*, 100 Ill. 11; *Emery v. Cochrau*, 82 Ill. 65; *Robinson v. Joplin*, 54 Ala. 70; *Huntington v. Allen*, 44 Miss. 654. One who has acquired title by prescription will be entitled to the relief. *Arrington v. Liscomb*, 34 Cal. 365; *Marston v. Rowe*, 39 Ala. 722; *Moody v. Holcomb*, 26 Texas, 714. And it has been held that one who has warranted title to land sold by him may in support of his warranty have a cloud removed. *Ely v. Wilcox*, 26 Wis. 91, citing *Malins v. Brown*, 4 Comst. 403; *Bennett v. Abrams*, 41 Barb. 620; *Owen v. Paul*, 16 Ala. 130. See *Chamblin v. Slichter*, 12 Minn. 276. But query if the cases cited support the doctrine. The case of *Bissell v. Kellogg*, 60 Barb. 617, 629, is contra. On the other hand an administrator cannot have a cloud removed from the title to his intestate's land even where power has been given him to sell the same for the payment of debts. *Ryan v. Duncan*, 88 Ill. 144; *Smith v. McConnell*, 17 Ill. 135; *Shormate v. Lockridge*, 53 Ill. 503; *Gridley v. Watson*, Ib. 186. See *Paine v. First Div. St. Paul R. Co.*, 14 Minn. 65.

Assuming however that the plaintiff is in a position to ask for relief, he will be entitled to it upon establishing the existence of any such facts as the following: (1) An invalid deed or instrument relating to the title to land, the invalidity of which does not appear therein; as e. g. an invalid tax-deed or certificate. *Russell v. Deshon*, 124 Mass. 342; *Sherman v. Fitch*, 98

Mass. 59, 61; *Martin v. Graves*, 5 Allen, 601; *Carroll v. Brown*, 28 Gratt. 791; *Lockett v. Hurt*, 57 Ala. 198; *Crooke v. Andrews*, 40 N. Y. 547; *Newell v. Wheeler*, 48 N. Y. 486; *Davis v. Boston*, 129 Mass. 378; *Frederick v. Ewrig*, 82 Ill. 363; *Reed v. Tyler*, 56 Ill. 288; *Gage v. Billings*, Ib. 268; *Gage v. Rohrback*, Ib. 262; *Gage v. Chapman*, Ib. 311; *Hamilton v. Fond du Lac*, 25 Wis. 490; *Brooks v. Howland*, 58 N. H. 98; *McPike v. Pen*, 51 Mo. 63; *Clark v. Covenant Ins. Co.*, 52 Mo. 272; *Lee v. Ruggles*, 62 Ill. 427. And this though the plaintiff's title was acquired since the sale. *Siegel v. Outagamie*, 26 Wis. 70. But the plaintiff must repay the amount paid by the defendant, including the amount of subsequent taxes. *Farwell v. Harding*, 96 Ill. 32; *State Railroad Tax Cases*, 92 U. S. 616; *Pritchard v. Madren*, 24 Kans. 486; *Knox v. Dunn*, 22 Kans. 683; *Montgomery v. Sayre*, 65 Ala. 564. Whether the deed or instrument was recorded or not makes no difference. *Fonda v. Sage*, 48 N. Y. 173; *Allen v. Buffalo*, 39 N. Y. 386. But it seems that it is material that the defendant has, fraudulently or not, had the deed recorded where there had been no valid delivery. *Eckman v. Eckman*, 55 Penn. St. 269. But see *Pratt v. Pond*, 5 Allen, 59. As to tax assessments, see infra. (2) A patent, apparently valid, granted by the Government on part of a lot of land, the whole of which had already been legally granted to another. *Van Wyck v. Knevels*, 106 U. S. 360. (3) A pretended title which if proved would call for an answer. *Lick v. Ray*, 43 Cal. 83. (4) An instrument which is really a mortgage but purports to be an absolute deed, payment having been made or tendered. *Shays v. Norton*, 48 Ill. 100; *Rich v. Doane*, 35 Vt. 124. (5) A mortgage which has been paid but has not been dis-

from contesting its validity with as much ability and force as he can contest it at the present moment.¹

¹ *Bromley v. Holland*, 7 Ves. 20, 21; *Kemp v. Pryor*, 7 Ves. 248, 249; *St. John v. St. John*, 11 Ves. 535; *Peake v. Highfield*, 1 Russ. R. 559; *Duncan v. Warrall*, 10 Price, R. 31; *Hamilton v. Cummings*, 1 John. Ch. R. 520 to 524.

charged of record. *Tucker v. Conwell*, 67 Ill. 553; *Redmond v. Packer-sham*, 66 Ill. 434. But see, in regard to mortgages of personalty, *Bushnell v. Avery*, 121 Mass. 148, *infra*. (6) A judgment obtained against a defendant after his death, which if valid would be a lien upon his lands. *Blodget v. Blodget*, 42 How. Pr. 19. Or a judgment of the kind, voidable for any other reason. *Smith v. Hickman*, 68 Ill. 314. (7) Voidable execution sale of land. *Anderson v. Talbot*, 1 Heisk. 407. As e. g. to one who has notice of a prior legal sale by the owner. *Phillips v. Pitts*, 78 Ill. 72. (8) A fortiori a voidable deed executed upon an invalid execution sale. *Fitts v. Davis*, 42 Ill. 391; *Stout v. Cook*, 37 Ill. 283; *Mustain v. Jones*, 30 Ga. 951; *Maxon v. Ayres*, 28 Wis. 612. (9) Judgment and sale against the legal and apparent owner of land, but not the real owner thereof. *Lownsbury v. Purdy*, 18 N. Y. 515; *Sieman v. Scharck*, 29 N. Y. 598; *Mulligan v. Baring*, 3 Daly, 75, 80. (10) Sale by an administrator of land that had been lawfully sold by the intestate himself. *Thompson v. Lynch*, 29 Cal. 189. (11) Execution levied upon land in which a bankrupt owned a reversion, suit being brought by the assignee. *Hall v. Whiston*, 5 Allen, 126; *Sherman v. Fitch*, 98 Mass. 59, 61. (12) Inquisition of lunacy of a grantor who had previously conveyed to the plaintiff without notice of the disability. *Yauger v. Skinner*, 1 McCart. 389. (13) An estate upon condition, defeated by breach thereof. *Smith v. Smith*, 23 Wis. 176. (14.) An illegal tax or assessment, in some States. *Scofield v. Lansing*, 17 Mich.

437; *Roe v. Lincoln*, 56 Wis. 66. See *Albany Mining Co. v. Auditor-Gen.*, 37 Mich. 391; *Sinclair v. Winona*, 23 Minn. 404 (injunction to restrain unauthorized publication of delinquent tax list). But see *infra* (5). For other cases of cloud see *Dart v. Orme*, 41 Ga. 376; *Larmon v. Jordan*, 56 Ill. 204; *Bartlett v. Bartlett*, 137 Mass. 156.

Facts of the following nature have been held not to constitute clouds: (1) The existence of deeds or other instruments relating to the title to land, which disclose their own invalidity, or whose invalidity will appear upon any attempt to prove title under them. *Crevier v. New York*, 12 Abb. Pr. n. s. 340, 346; *Overing v. Foote*, 43 New York, 290; *Howell v. Buffalo*, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 412; *Cohen v. Sharp*, 44 Cal. 29; *Meloy v. Dougherty*, 16 Wis. 269; *Clark v. Covenant Ins. Co.*, 52 Mo. 272; *Tyson v. Brown*, 64 Ala. 244; *Rea v. Longstreet*, 54 Ala. 291; *Alden v. Truber*, 44 Conn. 455. Contra, *Jones v. Perry*, 10 Yerg. 59, 83; *Almony v. Hicks*, 3 Head, 39; *Dart v. Orme*, 41 Ga. 376. And see *Hamilton v. Cummings*, 1 Johns. Ch. 517; *Fuller v. Percival*, 126 Mass. 381, 382; *Anthony v. Valentine*, 130 Mass. 119, 120. As a new question much could be said in support of the rule in *Jones v. Perry* and the other cases here cited with it. The invalidity of the deed or instrument in question may be matter of construction doubtful even to a lawyer, and much more so to the average layman; and yet it will be void on its face if the court on construing it so declare. Its validity again may turn upon doubtful statutory law, with the same result. In such cases

700 *a.* But where the illegality of the agreement, deed, or other instrument appears upon the face of it, so that its nullity

the instrument clouds the plaintiff's title as really as may an instrument whose invalidity can be shown only by parol. But see *Commonwealth v. Smith*, 10 Allen, 448, *infra* (10). Besides the plaintiff has in fact gained much of his point by obtaining the court's declaration to the instrument's invalidity, and this too by an indirection, — a thing he could not accomplish by a bill brought directly to have the instrument (if not a will) construed by the court. Surely it would be quite as well to grant the prayer directly and order the writing delivered up as a cloud. (2) A deed not acknowledged, and hence not entitled to record, is not a cloud. *Nickerson v. Loud*, 115 Mass. 94, 97, Wells, J. (3) So of assignments and subleases by a lessee after sale, on execution of his leasehold estate. *McNeil v. Ames*, 120 Mass. 481. (4) Sale of land on execution against one who never had any title to or interest in it. *Shelley v. Spillman*, 19 Fla. 500; *Barnes v. Mayo*, *ib.* 542; *Kuhn v. McNeil*, 47 Mo. 389; *Drake v. Jones*, 27 Mo. 428. But see *Goodell v. Blumer*, 41 Wis. 436. As where a wife's land is sold on execution against her husband. *Mulligan v. Baring*, 3 Daly, 75; *Farnham v. Campbell*, 34 N. Y. 480. But see *Woodworth v. Gorton*, 46 Mich. 324. 'Is there any case where a deed between utter strangers is held to be a cloud upon the title?' Wells, J., in *Nickerson v. Loud*, 115 Mass. 94, 97; *Kuhn v. McNeil*, *supra*. But see *Goodell v. Blumer*, *supra*. (5) An illegal tax or municipal assessment, in some States. *Loud v. Charlestown*, 99 Mass. 208; *Hunnewell v. Charlestown*, 106 Mass. 350; *Norton v. Boston*, 119 Mass. 194; *Macy v. Nantucket*, 121 Mass. 351; *Crevier v. New York*, 12 Abb. Pr. n. s. 340; *Waterbury Bank v. Lawler*, 46 Conn. 243 (whether

on real or personal property); *Arnold v. Middletown*, 39 Conn. 406; *Rowland v. First School Dist.*, 42 Conn. 30; *Montgomery v. Sayre*, 65 Ala. 564; *Alabama Ins. Co. v. Lott*, 54 Ala. 499; *Elyton Land Co. v. Ayres*, 62 Ala. 413; *Burke v. Speer*, 59 Ga. 353; *Decker v. McGowan*, *ib.* 805; *Georgia Loan Assoc. v. McGowan*, *ib.* 811; *Snyder v. Marks*, 109 U. S. 189, 193; *State Railroad Tax Cases*, 92 U. S. 575, 613. *Contra*, in other States. *Scofield v. Lansing*, 17 Mich. 437; *Roe v. Lincoln*, 56 Wis. 66; *Pier v. Fond du Lac*, 53 Wis. 421 (if the invalidity of the tax is not apparent from the record); *Mitchell v. Milwaukee*, 18 Wis. 92; *Powers v. Bowman*, 53 Iowa, 359 (but not in Iowa for a mere over assessment. *ib.*; *Nugent v. Bates*, 51 Iowa, 359); *Macklot v. Davenport*, 17 Iowa, 379; *Cattell v. Lowry*, 45 Iowa, 478; *Kimball v. Merchants' Trust Co.*, 89 Ill. 611. These cases proceed upon the ground that the assessment itself was unauthorized; but that makes no difference in the States first mentioned; there the taxes must first be paid, then redress if proper may be had at law on compliance with the statute. If a special equity intervene aside from the invalidity of the assessment, it is clear that that may be reached by a Court of Chancery, as where in the case of a tract of land to be sold in lots, the proceeding is to avoid a multiplicity of suits affecting the seller. *Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cheyenne*, 113 U. S. 516; *Crews v. Burcham*, 1 Black, 352; *State Railroad Tax Cases*, 92 U. S. 575; *Dow v. Chicago*, 11 Wall. 108; *Hannewinkle v. Georgetown*, 15 Wall. 548; *Crevier v. New York*, 12 Abb. Pr. n. s. 340; *Corrothers v. Board of Education*, 15 W. Va. 527; *Chesapeake R. Co. v. Miller*, 19 W. Va. 408. See further, as to equitable relief from improper

can admit of no doubt, the same reason for the interference of Courts of Equity to direct it to be cancelled or delivered up would not seem to apply; for in such a case there can be no danger that the lapse of time may deprive the party of his full means of defence; nor can it in a just sense be said that such a paper can throw a cloud over his right or title or diminish its security, nor is it capable of being used as a means of vexatious litigation or serious injury. And accordingly it is now fully established that in such cases Courts of Equity will not interpose their authority to order a cancellation or delivery up of such instruments.¹ (a) Upon an analogous principle Courts of Equity

¹ *Gray v. Mathias*, 5 Ves. 286; *Simpson v. Lord Howden*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 97, 102, 103, 108; *Bromley v. Holland*, 7 Ves. 16, 20, 22. See also *Piersoll v.*

tax and municipal assessments, *Pelton v. National Bank*, 101 U. S. 143; *Cummings v. National Bank*, *ib.* 153; *Litchfield v. Webster*, *ib.* 773; *Strasburgh v. New York*, 87 N. Y. 452; *Lemont v. Singer Stone Co.*, 98 Ill. 94; *Worthen v. Badgett*, 32 Ark. 496; *Greedup v. Franklin*, 31 Ark. 101; *Oliver v. Memphis R. Co.*, *ib.* 128; *Baldwin v. Tucker*, 16 Fla. 258; *Dean v. Davis*, 51 Cal. 406; *Scobey v. Decatur*, 72 Ind. 551; *Wright v. Southwestern R. Co.*, 64 Ga. 783. (6) Mere notice on the registry of deeds that one claims a trust in certain lands is not a cloud, at least if such notice is not entitled to record. *Nickerson v. Loud*, 115 Mass. 94. (7) Mere unfounded apprehension concerning the validity of one's own title, and a false and clamorous assertion of title by the defendant. *March v. England*, 55 Ala. 275; *Rea v. Longstreet*, 54 Ala. 291. (8) Assertion by a mortgagee of personalty of rights over the property after the mortgage has been paid and all conditions therein performed, the mortgagor being in possession. *Bushnell v. Avery*, 121 Mass. 148. (9) So of an attempt by an assignee of an insolvent to set aside a mortgage of personalty alleged by the plaintiff to be invalid, the defendant not having taken possession or in any way intermeddled

with the property. *Sherman v. Fitch*, 98 Mass. 59. Secus in a case of realty. *ib.* p. 61. (10) A mortgage by a corporation of its franchise, not authorized by law, against a second valid mortgage by the corporation. *Commonwealth v. Smith*, 10 Allen, 448.

Of course if the alleged cloud is supported by an equity, the court will not remove it. *Torrent v. Booming Co.*, 22 Mich. 21; *Gayne v. Boisregard*, 39 Miss. 796.

As indicated near the beginning of this note, equity will entertain a bill to prevent the creation of a cloud as well as to remove one. *Mann v. Utica*, 44 How. Pr. 334; *McPike v. Pen*, 51 Mo. 63; *Longley v. Hudson*, 4 Thomp. & C. 533; *Marsh v. Brooklyn*, 59 N. Y. 280; *Roe v. Lincoln*, 56 Wis. 66; *Goodell v. Bloomer*, 41 Wis. 436; *Tucker v. Kenniston*, 47 N. H. 270; *Porter v. Rice*, 55 Cal. 165.

(a) But see *Foley v. Kirk*, 33 N. J. Eq. 170, for important qualification of this doctrine. And see *Springport v. Teutonia Bank*, 75 N. Y. 397; *Buxton v. Broadway*, 45 Conn. 540. It is held that equity will not compel a lessee whose term for years has been sold on execution to deliver to the purchaser the counterparts of his recorded lease and subleases. *McNeil v. Ames*, 120 Mass. 481.

have refused to entertain a bill for the delivery up of a bill of exchange on which the holder had obtained a judgment at law against the plaintiff, which was satisfied, but where he retained the bill, treating it as a case in which there was scarcely a presence of danger from future litigation ;¹ for the bill was merged in the judgment.

701. The whole doctrine of Courts of Equity on this subject is referable to the general jurisdiction, which it exercises in favor of a party *quia timet*.² It is not confined to cases where the instrument having been executed is void upon grounds of law or equity. But it is applied even in cases of forged instruments which may be decreed to be given up without any prior trial at law on the point of forgery.³ (a)

702. In cases where the delivery up or cancellation of any deed or other instrument is sought on account of its being void the old course used to be, if the validity of the instrument was contested, to direct an issue or a trial at law to ascertain the fact.⁴ But this, although the common practice, was a matter in the sound discretion of the court, as the determination of a jury upon the point was not indispensable. It was merely ancillary to the conscience of the Court of Equity when administering relief, and not strictly the right of the party.⁵ At present a different and more convenient course seems to prevail (which is clearly within the jurisdiction of the court), and that is for the court itself to decide the point, without sending the matter to be ascertained at law by a jury, unless it is satisfied from the contradictory char-

Elliot, 6 Peters, R. 95, 98, 99, 100; *Van Doren v. Mayor, &c. of New York*, 9 Paige, R. 388; *Smyth v. Griffin*, 13 Simon, R. 245.

¹ *Threlfall v. Lunt*, 7 Sim. R. 627. See *Lisle v. Liddle*, 3 Anst. R. 649, where after a verdict and before judgment in favor of the original defendant, the plaintiff in equity was held entitled to a delivery up of the note. See also *Ryan v. Mackmath*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 15, 16, 17, and Mr. Belt's notes, *ibid.*; ante, § 700, and note 4.

² See *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 34, p. 493; *Viner, Abridg. Quia Timet*, A. B.; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 8, and note (y); ante, § 694; post, §§ 825 to 851.

³ *Peake v. Highfield*, 1 Russell, R. 559.

⁴ See *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 2, p. 469.

⁵ *Jervis v. White*, 7 Ves. 414.

(a) *Johnston v. Renton*, L. R. 9 Eq. 181; *Lee v. Angas*, L. R. 7 Ch. 79, n.; editor's note to § 33.

acter of the evidence or the want of clearness in the proofs that such a determination by a jury would be advisable.¹

703. Hitherto we have been considering the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to decree a delivery up or cancellation of deeds or other instruments on account of some inherent defect in their original character which renders them either voidable or void. But the powers of Courts of Equity are by no means limited to cases of this sort. On the contrary its remedial justice is often and most beneficially applied by affording specific relief in cases of unexceptionable deeds and other instruments, in favor of persons who are legally entitled to them.² (a) This indeed is a very old head of equity jurisdiction, and has been traced back to so early a period as the reign of Edward IV.³ It is a most important branch of Equity Jurisprudence, and is exerted in all suitable cases of a public or private nature in favor of persons entitled to the custody and possession of deeds and other writings. But where the title to the possession of deeds and other writings depends upon the validity of the title of the party to the property to which they relate, and he is not in possession of that property, and the evidence of his title to it is in his own power, or it does not depend upon the production of the deed or writings, of which he prays the delivery, — in such cases he must first establish his title to the property at law before he can come into a Court of Equity for a delivery of the deeds.⁴ But if his title is not disputed, relief follows of course. Thus heirs at law, devisees, and other persons properly entitled to the custody and possession of the title-deeds of their respective estates may, if they

¹ *Ibid.*; *Newman v. Milner*, 2 Ves. jr. 483; *Smith v. Carll*, 5 John. Ch. R. 118, 119.

² *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 117, 118; *Brown v. Brown*, 1 Dick. R. 62; post, § 906.

³ *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 117, note (l); *Armitage v. Wadsworth*, 1 Madd. R. 192.

⁴ *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 54, 117, 118, 128; *Armitage v. Wadsworth*, 1 Madd. R. 192; post, § 906.

(a) See post, § 906. In *Pierce v. Fairlie*, 3 Mer. 29, 30. There is nothing in the nature of the certificate of registry of a ship which excludes it from the jurisdiction of the court to decree its delivery as against a party unlawfully detaining it. *Gibson v. Moore*, 1 Sim. & S. 61; *Freeman v. Ingo*, 6 Hare, 112.

are wrongfully detained or withheld from them, obtain a decree for a specific delivery of them.¹ The same doctrine applies to other instruments and securities, such as bonds, negotiable instruments, and other evidences of property which are improperly withheld from the persons who have an equitable or legal interest in them,² or who have a right to have them preserved. This redress a Court of Common Law is for the most part incapable of affording, since the prescribed forms of its remedies rarely enable it to pronounce a judgment in rem in such cases, which is or can be made effectual.³ It is true that an action of detinue or even of replevin might in some few cases lie and give the proper remedy if the thing could be found; but generally in actions at law damages only are recoverable, and such a remedy must in many cases be wholly inadequate. This constitutes the true ground for the prompt interposition of Courts of Equity for the recovery of the specific deeds or other instruments.⁴

704. Upon similar principles persons having rights and interests in real estate are entitled to come into equity for the purpose of having an inspection and copies of the deeds under which they claim title.⁵ (a) And in like manner remainder-men and reversioners and other persons having limited or ulterior interests in real estate have a right in many cases to come into equity to have the title-deeds secured for their benefit.⁶ (b) But in all

¹ *Reeves v. Reeves*, 9 Mod. R. 128; *Tanner v. Wise*, 3 P. Will. 296; *Harrison v. Southcote*, 1 Atk. 539; *Ford v. Peering*, 1 Ves. jr. 92; *Papillon v. Voice*, 2 P. Will. 478; *Duncombe v. Mayer*, 8 Ves. 320; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 2, pp. 468, 469.

² See *Knye v. Moore*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 61; *Freeman v. Fairlie*, 3 Meriv. R. 30; post, § 906.

³ *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 127, 128; *Cooper, Eq. Pl.* 137; *Jackson v. Butler*, 2 Atk. R. 306; s. c. 9 Mod. R. 297; *Gray v. Cockeril*, 2 Atk. 114; *Duchess of Newcastle v. Pelham*, 3 Bro. Parl. Cas. 460, by Tomlins; s. c. 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 392, folio edition.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Banbury v. Briscoe*, 2 Ch. Cas. 42; 2 Eq. Abridg. 285, D.; *Reeves v. Reeves*, 9 Mod. R. 128.

⁶ *Smith v. Cooke*, 3 Atk. 382; *Banbury v. Briscoe*, 2 Ch. Cas. 42; *Ivie v. Ivie*, 1 Atk. R. 431; *Lempster v. Pomfret*, *Ambler, R.* 154; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 2, p. 469; *Freeman v. Fairlie*, 3 Meriv. R. 30.

(a) *Brown v. Wales*, L. R. 15 Eq. 142. See more at length §§ 1490 et seq. of trustees or of the court see *Jenner v. Morris*, L. R. 1 Ch. 603; *Stanford v. Roberts*, L. R. 6 Ch. 307.

(b) As to title-deeds in the hands

such cases the court will exercise a sound discretion as to making the decree; for it is by no means an absolute right of the party to have the title-deeds in all cases secured or brought into chancery for preservation. If such a practice were suffered universally to prevail, the title-deeds of half the estates in the country might be brought into court. To entitle the party therefore to seek relief it must clearly appear that there is danger of a loss or destruction of the title-deeds in the custody of the persons possessing them, and also that the interest of the plaintiff is not too contingent or too remote to warrant the proceeding.¹

705. Cases also may occur where a deed or other instrument originally valid has by subsequent events, such as by a satisfaction or payment or other extinguishment of it, legal or equitable, become *functus officio*; and yet its existence may be either a cloud upon the title of the other party or subject him to the danger of some future litigation when the facts are no longer capable of complete proof, or have become involved in the obscurities of time.² Under such circumstances, although the deed or other instrument has become a nullity, yet Courts of Equity will interpose upon the like principles to prevent injustice, and will decree a delivery and cancellation of the instrument. (*a*)

¹ *Ivie v. Ivie*, 1 Atk. R. 431; *Ford v. Peering*, 1 Ves. jr. 76, 78; *Noel v. Ward*, 1 Madd. R. 322; *Lempster v. Pomfret*, *Ambler*, R. 154; *Pyncent v. Pyncent*, 3 Atk. 571; *Joy v. Joy*, 2 Eq. Abridg. 284; *Webb v. Lymington*, 1 Eden, R. 8, and the editor's note (*a*); *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 3.

² See *Anon. Gilb. Eq. R.* 1; *Flower v. Marten*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 459.

(*a*) *Foley v. Kirk*, 33 N. J. Eq. 170. It has sometimes been held that a total failure to perform covenants of support and maintenance imposed upon the grantee of a deed may authorize a rescission on behalf of the grantor. *Bogie v. Bogie*, 41 Wis. 209; *Bishop v. Aldrich*, 48 Wis. 619; *Blake v. Blake*, 56 Wis. 392. But this, it seems, can only be true on the ground that there is in the particular case no other adequate way of protecting the grantor, as was perhaps the case in *Bogie v. Bogie*, *supra*. Clearly neither breach of contract nor failure of consideration *per se* affords ground for rescinding a contract. In Massachusetts, and elsewhere to some extent,

breach of warranty in sales affords ground for rescission, though there has been no fraud. *Bryant v. Isburgh*, 13 Gray, 607; *Dorr v. Fisher*, 1 Cusb. 271. *Contra*, *Street v. Blay*, 2 Barn. & Ad. 456; *Dawson v. Collis*, 10 C. B. 523. But breach of (affirmative) warranty is not like an ordinary breach of contract. It is not failure to perform; it is in reality false statement, and is therefore akin to fraud. In any view however this is the only case in which a breach of the contract by the one party will of itself entitle the other to a rescission.

So of failure of consideration. Such fact will prevent liability in an action on the contract; but it does not give a

This indeed is a very old head of equity, and traces of it are to be found in some of our earliest reports.¹

705 *a*. The doctrine has been applied not only to cases where the deed or other instrument is clearly established by the proofs to have become *functus officio* according to the original intent and understanding of both parties, but also to cases where it has been fairly inferable from the acts or conduct of the party entitled to the benefit of the deed or other instrument that he has treated it as released, or otherwise dead in point of effect. Thus for example, where a nephew gave a note to his uncle for a sum of money, and afterwards the uncle wrote the following entry: 'H. J. P. (the nephew) pays no interest, nor shall I ever take the principal, unless greatly distressed;' and upon his death the executors found the entry; it was held a good discharge of the note at law.² So where a son-in-law was indebted to his father-in-law on several bonds, and by his will the latter left him a legacy, and from some memoranda of the testator it was satisfactorily shown that the testator did not intend that these bonds should be enforced by the executors, it was decreed that they should not be the subject of any demand by the executors against the son-in-law.³ So where a father upon payment of the debts of his son took a bond from the latter, and it was apparent from all the circumstances that the father did not intend it as an absolute security against the son, but in some sort as a check upon his future conduct, and that he did not intend after his death that it should be treated as a debt due from his son to his estate, or to be put in force against him, it was decreed that the bond should be delivered up by the executors to be cancelled.⁴ So where a testatrix by her will forgave a debt due to her on bond by her son-in-law, and he died in her lifetime, it was held that it

¹ Cary, R. 17; ante, §§ 700, 700 *a*.

² *Aston v. Pye*, 5 Ves. 350, note (*b*). Cited also in *Flower v. Marten*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 474, 475.

³ *Eden v. Smyth*, 5 Ves. 341, 351. Cited also in *Flower v. Marten*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 474, 475.

⁴ *Flower v. Marten*, 2 Mylne & Craig, R. 459, 474, 475.

right to rescind. It gives merely a right to recover the money equivalent of what was agreed. Possibly the case may be different if that equivalent is not ascertainable, which might be

true of a covenant for support and maintenance. The natural justice of such cases as *Bogie v. Bogie* and *Bishop v. Aldrich*, supra, is at all events clear.

was a release in equity, and that the bond ought to be delivered up by her executor.¹ (a)

706. There is also a curious case of an analogous nature, which was finally decided by the House of Lords, in which the powers of a Court of Equity were applied to give relief to an extent which no Court of Law would for a moment entertain. The testator on his death-bed said to his executrix that he had the bond of B, but when he died B should have it, and that he should not be asked or troubled for it. The executrix after the death of the testator put the bond in suit, and thereupon B brought a bill for a discovery and delivery up and cancellation of the bond. And it was decreed accordingly at the hearing by the lord chancellor, and his decree was affirmed by the House of Lords.² This case carries the doctrine of an implied trust or equitable extinguishment of a debt to the very verge of the law. The case would be clearly unsupportable, as a *donatio mortis causa*; and it must stand upon the parol evidence to establish an intention to have the bond delivered up, not touched or provided for by the testator's will.³

706 a. Whether all the cases which have been cited in the last two sections, being cases of imperfect gifts or incomplete acts sought to be enforced in equity in favor of mere volunteers, are strictly maintainable or not upon the true principles which now

¹ *Sipthorp v. Moxon*, 3 Atk. 579; *Elliot v. Davenport*, 2 Vern. 521; s. c. 1 P. Will. 83. See also *Toplis v. Baker*, cited in Mr. Cox's note, 1 P. Will. 86; *Duffield v. Elwes*, 1 Bligh, R. (N. S.) 529, 530, 531, 538, 539; ante, § 433, note (4), § 607; post, § 793 a; *Richards v. Symes*, 2 Eq. Abridg. 617; s. c. 2 Atk. 319; 2 Barnard. R. 90; s. c. 1 Bligh, R. (N. S.) 537, 538, 539.

² *Wekett v. Raby*, 3 Bro. Parl. Cas. 16 [2 Bro. Parl. Cas. by Tomlins, 386]. This case was recognized in its principle by Lord Cottenham, in *Flower v. Marten*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 459, 474, 475. (b) See also *Sipthorp v. Moxon*, 3 Atk. 580, 581. But see *Tufnell v. Constable*, 8 Sim. R. 69, 70.

³ It may not perhaps be thought very easy to reconcile the case of *Tufnell v. Constable* (8 Simons, R. 69) with that of *Flower v. Marten* (2 Mylne & Craig, R. 459, 474, 475). The true difference however seems to be that in the latter case, taking all the circumstances together, the court presumed that the money advanced to the son was originally intended as a gift, or that the father subsequently treated it as a gift, and abandoned it as a debt. In the former

(a) But it is held that voluntary release. *Irwin v. Johnson*, 36 N. J. Eq. 347.

(b) And in *Leddell v. Starr*, 5 C. E. Green, 274, 283; *Otis v. Beckwith*, 49 Ill. 121, 135. See *Yeomans v. Williams*, L. R. 1 Eq. 184.

regulate the subject, may perhaps in the present state of the authorities be thought to admit of some doubt.¹ Be this as it may, they proceed upon the distinct ground that the transaction was one exclusively between the creditor and the debtor; and that taking all the circumstances together, it was clearly the intention of the creditor to treat the debt as in equity forgiven and released to the debtor himself. But cases of this sort are clearly distinguishable from purely voluntary imperfect gifts or assignments of debts or other property to third persons, and also from purely voluntary contracts inter vivos, to which however at first view they might seem to bear a very close analogy.² In respect to voluntary contracts inter vivos it is a general principle that Courts of Equity will not interfere, but will leave the parties where the law finds them.³ In respect also to gifts and assignments inter vivos Courts of Equity will enforce them only when the gift or assignment is perfected and complete, so that nothing further remains to consummate the title of the donee. (a) For if the gift or assignment is imperfect, or any further act remains to be done to complete the title of the donee, Courts of Equity, treating the donee as a mere volunteer, will not aid him to carry it into effect either against the donor or against his legal representatives.⁴ (b) But of this we shall have occasion to speak more in another place.⁵ (c)

case the assignment of the bond was purely voluntary, and it would not take effect as an assignment, not being under seal, and the act therefore imperfect. It is not perhaps so easy to reconcile *Tufnell v. Constable* with *Eden v. Smyth*, 5 Ves. R. 341. It has been already stated (ante, note (2) to this section) that *Wekett v. Raby* (2 Bro. Parl. Cas. by Tomlins, p. 386), was fully recognized in its principles, in *Flower v. Marten*. See ante, § 433, note (4), p. 433, where several of the cases on this subject are cited; and § 607 *b*, where the case of *Richard v. Symes*, 2 Eq. Abridg. 617, before Lord Hardwicke, is cited, and on which Lord Eldon commented in *Duffield v. Elwes*, 1 Bligh, R. (N. S.) 537, 538; *Callaghan v. Callaghan*, 8 Clarke & Fin. R. 374, 401.

¹ See ante, §§ 433, 706, 706 *a*; *Flower v. Marten*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 459; *Edwards v. Jones*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 226; post, §§ 787, 793 *a*.

² See ante, § 433; post, §§ 787, 793 *b*, 973, 987.

³ Post, §§ 787, 793, 793 *a*, 987.

⁴ See ante, § 433, note (4), where several of the cases are collected. See also *Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft*, 18 Ves. 91, 93, 99; *Colman v. Sarrel*, 1 Ves. jr. 52,

⁵ Post, §§ 787, 793 *a*, 973, 987, 1040 *c*.

(a) *Young v. Young*, 80 N. Y. 422.

(b) It matters not that the agreement is under seal. *Lamprey v. Lamprey*, 29 Minn. 151.

(c) As to the right of a donor or of his representative to set aside his voluntary deed see *Anderson v. Elsworth*, 3 Giff. 154; *Forshaw v. Welsby*,

707. In all these cases where a delivery up or cancellation of deeds or other instruments is sought, either upon the ground of their original invalidity, or of their subsequent satisfaction, or because the party has a just title thereto, or derives an interest under them, Courts of Equity act upon an enlarged and comprehensive policy; ¹ and therefore in granting the relief they will impose such terms and qualifications as shall meet the just equities of the opposing party. Thus for instance if the heir at law seeks a discovery and delivery of the title-deeds of the estate of his ancestor against a jointress, he will not be allowed the relief unless upon the terms of confirming her jointure.² So where there is a subsequent mortgagee without notice who has possession of the title-deeds, he will not be compelled to deliver up the deeds to the first mortgagee unless upon the terms that the latter will pay him his mortgage money.³ Cases of this sort afford a very frequent illustration of the maxim that he who seeks the aid of equity must do equity. (a)

708. There yet remains another class of cases in which the remedial powers of Courts of Equity are applied to compel a specific delivery of the thing to which another person has a clear right. We here allude to the jurisdiction to entertain bills for the delivery of specific chattels. Ordinarily in cases of chattels Courts of Equity will not interfere to decree a specific delivery,

54; *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 656; *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 39; *Minturn v. Seymour*, 4 John. Ch. R. 498, 500; *Duffield v. Elwes*, 1 Bligh, R. (n. s.) 529, 530, 531; s. c. 1 Sim. & Stu. 244, 245; *Edwards v. Jones*, 7 Simons, R. 325; s. c. 1 Mylne & Craig, R. 226, 227; *Fortescue v. Barnett*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 36; *Sloane v. Cadogan*, Sugden on Vendors, Appx. No. 26 (9th ed.); *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 132, 140; *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Simons, R. 324; ante, § 433, note (4); *Duffield v. Elwes*, 1 Bligh, R. (n. s.) 529, 530, 531; post, §§ 787, 793 a, 973; *Cunningham v. Plunkett*, 2 Younge & Coll. 245; 1 Drury & Warren, R. 308; *Ward v. Audland*, 8 Beav. R. 201.

¹ 1 Foul. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 8, and note (y).

² *Towers v. Davys*, 1 Vern. R. 479; *Petre v. Petre*, 3 Atk. 511; *Ford v. Peering*, 1 Ves. jr. 76.

³ *Head v. Egerton*, 3 P. Will. 280.

30 Beav. 243; *Toker v. Toker*, 31 Beav. 629; *Phillipson v. Kerry*, 32 Beav. 628; *Bonfield v. Hassell*, Ib. 217; *Bentley v. Mackay*, 31 Beav. 143; *May v. May*, 33 Beav. 81; *Lister v. Hodgson*, L. R. 4 Eq. 30; *Coutts v. Ocworth*, L. R. 8 Eq. 558; *Wollaston v. Tribe*, L. R. 9 Eq. 44; *Everitt v. Everitt*, L. R. 10 Eq. 405; *Hall v. Hall*, L. R. 8 Ch. 430; *Jarratt v. Al-dam*, L. R. 9 Eq. 463; *Townsend v. Toker*, L. R. 1 Ch. 446; *Morgan v. Mallison*, L. R. 10 Eq. 475.

(a) Ante, vol. i. § 64 e.

because by a suit at law a full compensation may be obtained in damages, although the thing itself cannot be specifically obtained; and where such a remedy at law is perfectly adequate and effectual to redress the injury, there is no reason why Courts of Equity should afford any aid to the party.¹ Indeed it may be truly said that the value of goods and merchandise varies so much at different times that it might not unfrequently be inequitable to decree a specific performance of contracts respecting them, since it might be wholly disproportionate to the injury sustained.²

709. But there are cases of personal goods and chattels in which the remedy at law by damages would be utterly inadequate and leave the injured party in a state of irremediable loss. In all such cases Courts of Equity will interfere and grant full relief by requiring a specific delivery of the thing which is wrongfully withheld. This may occur where the thing is of a peculiar value and importance, and the loss of it cannot be fully compensated in damages when withheld from the owner, and then relief will be granted in equity.³ (a) Thus where the lord of a manor was entitled to an old altar-piece made of silver, and remarkable for a Greek inscription and dedication to Hercules, as treasure-trove within his manor, and it had been sold by a wrong-doer, it was decreed to be delivered up to the lord of the manor, as a matter of curious antiquity which could not be replaced in value, and

¹ *Buxton v. Lister*, 3 Atk. 383; *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 118, 119; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 184, 295, 320.

² See *Barr v. Lapsley*, 1 Wheat. R. 151 and 154, note (a); *Buxton v. Lister*, 3 Atk. R. 383; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 118, 119.

³ *Jeremy, Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 2, p. 467; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 117; *Cooper, Eq. Pl. 132; Fells v. Read*, 3 Ves. jr. 70; *Walwyn v. Lee*, 9 Ves. 33; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 190, 320; *Cooper, Eq. Pl. 132.*

(a) See the editor's note to § 717, 600; *Cowles v. Whitman*, 10 Conn. infra; *Saville v. Tankred*, 1 Ves. 101; 121. But in some of these cases, as s. c. 3 Ves. 72 (box of jewels); *Jackson v. Butler*, 2 Atk. 306; *Knye v. Moore*, 1 Sim. & S. 61 (mortgage deeds); *Pattison v. Skillman*, 34 N. J. Eq. 344 (letters and documents); *Brigham v. Home Ins. Co.*, 131 Mass. 319 (surrender of a policy of insurance to an assignee in bankruptcy); *Wood v. Rowcliffe*, 3 Hare, 304; s. c. 2 Phill. 382; *Lingan v. Simpson*, 1 Sim. & S.

600; *Cowles v. Whitman*, 10 Conn. 121. But in some of these cases, as in *Wood v. Rowcliffe*, and in the last, there was a trust. See *Hill v. Rockingham Bank*, 44 N. H. 567. The following cases relating to slaves may be noticed: *Murphy v. Clark*, 1 Smedes & M. 221; *Butler v. Hicks*, 11 Smedes & M. 78; *Dudley v. Mallery*, 4 Ga. 52; *Loftin v. Espy*, 4 Yerg. 84; *Henderson v. Vaulx*, 10 Yerg. 30.

which might, by being defaced, become greatly depreciated.¹ So where an estate was held by the tenure of a horn, and a bill was brought by the owner to have it delivered up to him, it was held maintainable, for it constituted an essential muniment of his title.² The same principle applies to any other chattel whose principal value consists in its antiquity, or in its being the production of some distinguished artist, or in its being a family relic or ornament, or heirloom, such for instance as ancient gems, medals, and coins, ancient statues and busts, paintings of old and distinguished masters, and even those of a modern date having a peculiar distinction and value, such as family pictures and portraits and ornaments, and other things of a kindred nature.³

710. There are other cases where Courts of Equity have interfered to decree a specific delivery of chattels under an agreement of sale or for an exclusive possession and enjoyment for a term of years. But all these cases stand upon very peculiar circumstances, where the nature of the remedy at law is inadequate to complete redress, or where some other ingredients of equity jurisdiction are mixed up in the transaction, such as the necessity of interference to prevent multiplicity of suits or irreparable mischief.⁴ Thus for instance where on the dissolution of a partnership an agreement was made that a particular book used in the trade should be considered the exclusive property of one of the partners, and that a copy of it should be given to the other, a specific performance of the agreement was decreed as to the copy; for it is clear that at law no adequate redress could be obtained.⁵ So a decree was made against a lessee of alum works, to prevent a breach of a covenant, to leave a certain amount of stock on the premises at the expiration of the term, there being ground of suspicion that he did not mean to perform the cove-

¹ *Somerset v. Cookson*, 3 P. Will. 390.

² *Pusey v. Pusey*, 1 Vern. 273.

³ *Fells v. Read*, 3 Ves. jr. 70; *Lloyd v. Loaring*, 6 Ves. 773, 779; *Lowther v. Lowther*, 13 Ves. 95; *Pearne v. Lisle*, Amb. 77; *Macclesfield v. Davis*, 3 Ves. & B. 16, 17, 18; *Nutbrown v. Thornton*, 10 Ves. 163; *Arundell v. Phipps*, 10 Ves. 140, 148.

⁴ See *Nutbrown v. Thornton*, 10 Ves. 159, 161, 163; *Buxton v. Lister*, 3 Atk. 383, 384, 385; *Thompson v. Harcourt*, 2 Bro. Parl. R. 415; *Arundell v. Phipps*, 10 Ves. 139, 148; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 119, and notes; *Lloyd v. Loaring*, 6 Ves. 773; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 186 to 190.

⁵ *Lingan v. Simpson*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 600.

nant. So a decree was made against a landlord to restore to a tenant certain farm stock taken by the former in violation of the terms of his contract.¹ These cases all proceed upon the same principle of *quia timet* and the danger of irreparable mischief.²

711. And formerly where the court would not decree a specific performance and delivery of chattels, it would yet entertain the suit to decree compensation against the party for his omission to perform his contract. Thus for instance where there was a contract for the delivery of specific stock, the court refused to decree a specific performance, but at the same time entertained the bill for the purpose of giving compensation for the non-delivery.³ But this subject will naturally come more properly under review in the succeeding chapter.⁴

¹ *Nutbrown v. Thornton*, 10 Ves. 159; *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 6, pp. 92, 93; ante, § 701; post, §§ 825 to 851.

² *Ward v. Buckingham*, cited 10 Ves. 161.

³ *Cud v. Rutter*, 1 P. Will. 570, and Cox's notes (2 and 3); *Colt v. Netterville*, 2 P. Will. 394, 395; post, §§ 717, 718, 723, 796.

⁴ Post, §§ 717, 718, 723, 794 to 799.

CHAPTER XVIII.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF AGREEMENTS AND OTHER DUTIES.

712. HAVING thus gone over some of the principal grounds upon which Courts of Equity will interpose to decree the rescission, cancellation, or delivery up of agreements, securities, and other instruments, and the delivery of chattels to the rightful owners, we shall in the next place pass to the consideration of the other branch of our inquiries, namely, what are the cases in which Courts of Equity will interpose and decree a specific performance of agreements.

713. With reference to the present subject agreements may be divided into three classes: (1) those which respect personal property; (2) those which respect personal acts; and (3) those which respect real property. And we shall presently see that the jurisdiction now actually exercised by Courts of Equity is not co-extensive in all these classes of cases; but at the same time it may be fairly resolved into the same general principles.

714. It is well known that by the common law every contract or covenant to sell or transfer a thing, if there is no actual transfer, is treated as a mere personal contract or covenant, and as such, if it is unperformed by the party, no redress can be had except in damages. This is in effect in all cases allowing the party the election either to pay damages or to perform the contract or covenant at his sole pleasure. But Courts of Equity have deemed such a course wholly inadequate for the purposes of justice; and considering it a violation of moral and equitable duties, they have not hesitated to interpose and require from the conscience of the offending party a strict performance of what he cannot without manifest wrong or fraud refuse.¹ However

¹ See 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 286; *Alley v. Deschamps*, 13 Ves. 228, 229; *Gilb. For. Rom.* 220; *Harnett v. Yeilding*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 553.

where it has become impossible from subsequent events for the party to perform his contract, as by a subsequent sale of the subject-matter of the contract without notice, Courts of Equity will not decree a specific performance, but will (as we shall see) retain the bill for compensation.¹

715. The jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to decree a specific performance of contracts is not dependent upon or affected by the form or character of the instrument. What these courts seek to be satisfied of is that the transaction in substance amounts to and is intended to be a binding agreement for a specific object, whatever may be the form or character of the instrument. Thus if a bond with a penalty is made upon condition to convey certain lands upon the payment of a certain price, it will be deemed in equity an agreement to convey the land at all events, and not to be discharged by the payment of the penalty, although it has assumed the form of a condition only.² (a) Courts of Equity in all cases of this sort look to the substance of the transaction and the primary object of the parties; and where that requires a specific performance, they will treat the penalty as a mere security for its due performance and attainment.³

716. The jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to decree a specific performance of agreements is certainly of very ancient date, if it be not coeval with the existence of these courts in England. It may be distinctly traced back to the reign of Edward IV.; for in the Year Book of 8th Edw. IV., 4 (b), it was expressly recognized by the chancellor as a clear jurisdiction.⁴ But whatever

¹ *Greenaway v. Adams*, 12 Ves. 395, 400; post, §§ 723, 796.

² *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 4, § 2, p. 202 (7th ed.); *Newland on Contr.* ch. 17, pp. 307 to 310; *Logan v. Wienholt*, 7 Bligh, R. 1, 49, 50; *Chilliner v. Chilliner*, 2 Ves. 528; *Ensign v. Kellogg*, 4 Pick. R. 1; post, § 751.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 287; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (o); *Newl. on Contr.* ch. 6, p. 88; *Halsey v. Grant*, 13 Ves. 76. The case in 8 Edw. IV. 4 (b) was a suit in chancery; and *Genney*, of counsel for the defendant, in his argument said by way of illustration (as the text stands): 'If I promise to build a house for you, if I do not build it, you shall have a remedy by

(a) It matters not that the sum to be paid is called 'liquidated damages.' See also *Whitney v. Stone*, 23 Cal. 275; *Long v. Bowring*, 33 Beav. 585; *Fox v. Scard*, *Ib.* 327; *Coles v. Sims*, 5 DeG. M. & G. 1; *Carnes v. Nesbit*, 7 Hurl. & N. 778; *Ropes v. Upton*, 125 Mass. 258 (injunction).
Hull v. Sturdivant, 46 Maine, 34;
Hooker v. Pyncheon, 8 Gray, 550.
 Especially if the case is really one of penalty. *Daily v. Litchfield*, 10 Mich.

may be its origin and antiquity it is now clearly established, and is in daily and most beneficial exercise for the purposes of justice.¹ The ground of the jurisdiction is that a Court of Law is inadequate to decree a specific performance, and can relieve the injured party only by a compensation in damages, which in many cases would fall far short of the redress which his situation might require. Wherever therefore the party wants the thing in specie and he cannot otherwise be fully compensated, Courts of Equity will grant him a specific performance.²

subpœna;’ to which the chancellor is reported to have replied, ‘He shall.’ I cannot but think that Genney put the case not as an affirmative proposition but by way of interrogatory (would he have a subpœna?), for so the scope of his argument required. But either way, the chancellor’s remark points in favor of the jurisdiction. In cases of contract to build a house, or a bridge, a specific performance would not now be decreed. (a) See *Errington v. Aynesly*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 341, 342; *Mosely v. Virgin*, 3 Ves. jr. 185, 186; *Lucas v. Comerford*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 166, 167.

¹ Gilbert, *Lex Prætor*. 235.

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (o); *Bettesworth v. Dean of St. Paul’s*, Sel. Cas. in Ch. 68, 69; *Halsey v. Grant*, 13 Ves. 76; *Flint v. Brandon*, 8 Ves. 159, 163; *Harnett v. Yeilding*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 553; *Errington v. Aynesly*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 341; *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 112, 118, 119; *Gilb. Forum Roman.* 220; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 4, § 4, p. 190, 191 (7th ed.); *Gilb. Lex Prætorica*, 235; *Cathcart v. Robinson*, 5 Peters, R. 264; *Storer v. Great Western Railway Co.*, 2 Y. & Coll. N. R. 48, 50. In *Harnett v. Yeilding*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 552, 553, Lord Redesdale said: ‘I have bestowed a good deal of consideration upon this case, and particularly with reference to the jurisdiction exercised by Courts of Equity in decreeing specific performance of agreements. Whether Courts of Equity in their determinations on this subject have always considered what was the original foundation of decrees of this nature, I very much doubt. I believe that, from something of habit, decrees of this kind have been carried to an extent which has tended to injustice. Unquestionably the original foundation of these decrees was simply this, that damages at law would not give the party the compensation to which he was entitled; that is, would not put him in a situation as beneficial to him as if the agreement were specifically performed. On this ground the court in a variety of cases has refused to interfere, where from the nature of the case the damages must necessarily be commensurate to the injury sustained; as for instance in agreements for the purchase of stock, it being the same thing to the party where or from whom the stock is purchased, provided he receives the money that will purchase it. These cases show what were the grounds on which Courts of Equity first interfered; but they have constantly held that the party who comes into equity for a specific performance must come with perfect propriety of conduct, otherwise they will leave him to his remedy at law. He must also show that in seeking the performance he does not call upon the other party to do an act which he is not lawfully competent to do; for if he does, a consequence is pro-

717. And this constitutes the true and leading distinction in the present exercise of equity jurisdiction in England in regard to decreeing specific performance. (a) It does not proceed (as

deduced that quite passes by the object of the court in exercising the jurisdiction, which is to do more complete justice. If a party is compelled to do an act which he is not lawfully authorized to do, he is exposed to a new action for damages at the suit of the person injured by such act; and therefore if a bill is filed for a specific performance of an agreement made by a man who appears to have a bad title, he is not compellable to execute it unless the party seeking performance is willing to accept such a title as he can give; and that only in cases where an injury would be sustained by the party plaintiff in case he were not to get such an execution of the agreement as the defendant can give. I take the reason to be this among others, — not only that it is laying the foundation of an action at law, in which damages may be recovered against the party, but also that it is by possibility injuring a third person, by creating a title which he may have to contend. There is also another ground on which Courts of Equity refuse to enforce specific execution of agreements; that is, when from the circumstances it is doubtful whether the party meant to contract to the extent that he is sought to be charged. All these are held sufficient grounds to induce the court to forbear decreeing specific performance, that being a remedy intended by Courts of Equity to supply what are supposed to be the defects in the remedy given by the Courts of Law. Under these circumstances therefore I think considerable caution is to be used in decreeing specific performance of agreements; and the court is bound to see that it really does that complete justice which it aims at, and which is the ground of its jurisdiction.'

(a) *Specific performance as a Primary and as a Secondary Remedy.* — So far as the intention of the parties is concerned, there can be no doubt that the duty to perform a contract made by them is primary, and that of making compensation in lieu of performance secondary, otherwise the contract would not have been made. But a clear distinction must be observed by the student or he will be misled. The duty to perform is, in the purpose of the parties, primary; but the law may not always deem it best to enforce such duty even when it might easily do so. On the contrary the law may deem it best to reverse the case and prefer the secondary duty, treating it as really primary and not as substitutional. In other words, changing the terms 'primary' and 'secondary' from the duty to the rule of law, as will now be useful, it may

be and in fact it is a primary rule of law in many cases to refuse specific enforcement of the duty undertaken, and to permit and prefer compensation in the first instance. In such cases compensation may be spoken of with truth as a primary *remedy*, and specific fulfilment as secondary or substitutional. This may appear anomalous; it may not be defensible; but it is a fact in the English law. The two subjects, Specific Performance and Injunction (see editor's note to § 861), show this.

Indeed to a superficial view of the authorities on the English law, the very idea of specific performance appears to be opposed to the general theory of the law. That theory is often supposed to be that men may violate their duties if they will, and that it is only in peculiar and exceptional cases, where the remedy of compensation

is sometimes erroneously supposed) upon any distinction between real estate and personal estate, but upon the ground that dam-

cannot be applied, that the law will require direct performance of the contract. It would not be surprising if it should be found that the reason of this view is largely historical, being based upon the fact that, in the past, actions for damages were far more frequent than others; but another reason has come into prominence in modern times and is probably to be taken as the present ground of the view referred to. Money, the common measure of value, is an equivalent for most cases of liability; and the party wronged must, it is thought, accept the equivalent if he finds it necessary to resort to the courts. That appears to be the ordinary view. See e. g. *Port Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland R. Co.*, 13 Ohio St. 544, 559. And that implies that before a plaintiff can have specific performance it must appear that compensation cannot well or properly be made.

But specific performance, i. e. the requirement of performance of an immediate duty in distinction from paying for a violation of it, has a higher place in the English law than the first appearance of the authorities would suggest. Far from being exceptional, it has in reality a clear place in general theory as a primary remedy, as clear a place as compensation, though the fact is doubtless obscured by the peculiarity of English procedure. In the earliest times revenge for wrong done, pursued by the party wronged, appears to have been the object and the mode of redress; but when in the development of the State this gave way to the interference of courts of justice, two substitutes came into use for civil cases, to be applied according to the nature of the question, to wit, compensation and restoration, if to be had, of property taken.

See as to revenge and compensation Holmes, Common Law, Lect. 1.

Where a chattel, individual and capable of clear identification, or a piece of land, is wrongfully taken or withheld from one entitled to the possession, the wrong-doer having it in his hand may be compelled to give it up. Here is recovery of the specific thing of which the plaintiff has been deprived, and here is specific performance of the immediate duty to return the property. The wrong-doer has not the privilege of making compensation. And in giving the party wronged his property in specie the courts have simply done the natural thing. Under the practice of private revenge the property would be seized; and the courts in ordering restoration but carry out a deep instinct of human nature. There is surely nothing anomalous or exceptional in this. If not specific performance in the technical sense, this is at least the root of the doctrine. When therefore technical specific performance came first to be urged upon the chancellor, he had only to lay hold of a perfectly familiar principle of the Common-law Courts and mould it to the new use; if indeed he did not find it in his own court, as in Year Book 12 & 13 Edw. 3. Introd. p. cix by Pike, a case in full temp. Hen. V. (The reader's attention is also called to the very interesting suggestion of Mr. Pike in that connection, concerning the Chancery, p. cx.)

In the text the author says that the rule in regard to decreeing specific performance in cases of personalty and of realty 'does not proceed upon any distinction between real estate and personal estate, but upon the ground that damages at law may not in the particular case afford a complete remedy.' § 717. As applied to personal

ages at law may not in the particular case afford a complete remedy.¹ (a) Thus Courts of Equity will decree performance of

¹ *Adderley v. Dixon*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 607; *Cud v. Rutter*, 1 P. Will. 570, 571; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 295, 296; *Harnett v. Yeilding*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 553, 554; *Dean v. Izard*, and *Hollis v. Edwards*, 1 Vern. R. 159.

chattels this is true; but in regard to real property the courts have always in fact, though not always in language, proceeded upon just such a distinction. Specific performance of contracts for the sale of land is constantly enforced, and as was said in *Port Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland R. Co.*, 13 Ohio St. 544, 559, 'as a matter of course' in clear cases (*infra*, § 751); and this without regard to the question whether the loss could be properly measured in an action for damages. The land is a thing the court can lay its hand upon, and, consciously or unconsciously, following out familiar usage to a natural result, it orders the selling contractor to deliver it to the buyer. As for the converse case, of the right of the seller to enforce specific performance on the part of the buyer, that is only a concession to justice, being based on the idea that the right should be mutual. See *Hawralty v. Warren*, 3 C. E. Green, 124; *Marble Co. v. Ripley*, 10 Wall. 339, 359; *Jones v. Newhall*, 115 Mass. 244, 251; *infra*, § 723. It appears therefore that contracts for the sale of land are specifically enforceable, not because of any difficulty in measuring damages at law, but because of the nature of the property. See *Kitchin v. Herring*, 7 Ired. Eq. 190, 192; *Barnes v. Barnes*, 65 N. Car. 261, 263. And compare the remarks of Bacon, V. C., in *Greene v. West Cheshire Ry. Co.*, L. R., 13 Eq. 44, 51, on the supposed test of the remedy in damages.

Now it has never been necessary to extend this rule of equity generally to the case of chattels capable of iden-

tification, the title to which has passed to the party wronged, not because compensation is to be preferred to specific performance, but because specific performance is to be had elsewhere and in another manner, i. e. because the Law Courts have always had power in ordinary cases to require delivery or return of the same; although whenever it is necessary, equity will act, as it did in *Wood v. Rowcliffe*, 2 Phill. 382, and as it does in requiring the delivery up of instruments. *Ante*, ch. 17. See also *Western R. Co. v. Bayne*, 75 N. Y. 1. And in regard to cases in which there is only a contract to sell Courts of Equity have already advanced in the same direction as far perhaps as may be necessary. They cannot, it is considered, go the whole length and order specific performance as freely as in contracts for the sale of land; for at this point the principle of compensation, in connection with modern ideas, acquires special prominence. Wheat, corn, horses, and chattels generally are merchandise, to be bought and sold for money. Money is both the common measure of value and the thing sought; and payment of money is accordingly ordered in such cases wherever in law it answers the purpose of the chattel. Compensation is substituted as a legal equivalent for a thing which has never actually come under the ownership of the plaintiff. It is not his; it is a special object of barter for money; and money must be accepted if the will of the court is invoked. That appears to be the theory. For the proposition itself, that specific performance will not ordi-

(a) *Duff v. Fisher*, 15 Cal. 375.

a contract for land, not because of the particular nature of land, but because the damages at law, which must be calculated upon

narly be enforced in such cases, see *McGarvey v. Hall*, 23 Cal. 140, 142; *Hall v. Joiner*, 1 S. Car. 186; *Clark v. Flint*, 22 Pick. 231, 239; ante, § 708. As to shares and stocks see editor's note, *infra*, end of the next section. Compensation is here the primary remedy; and reason against its application must appear. *Waters v. Howard*, 1 Md. Ch. 112.

If however the plaintiff can show that there is no clearly accurate and certain measure of value in money in regard to the chattel contracted for, occasion arises for the application of the now secondary or substitutional principle, purely modern in this respect, of specific performance. *Falcke v. Gray*, 5 Jur. 645; *Dowling v. Betjemann*, 2 Johns. & H. 544; *Fells v. Read*, 3 Ves. 70; *Pooley v. Budd*, 14 Beav. 229; *Hall v. Joiner*, 1 S. Car. 186; *Sullivan v. Tuck*, 1 Md. Ch. 59; *McGowin v. Remington*, 12 Penn. St. 56; *Johnson v. Brooks*, 93 N. Y. 337; *Clark v. Flint*, 22 Pick. 231; ante, §§ 709-711. Thus a contract to sell bric-à-brac, such as a pair of old china jars of indeterminate pecuniary value, will be specifically enforced. *Falcke v. Gray*, *supra*. So of an agreement to sell a painting in a similar case. See *Dowling v. Betjemann*, *supra*. So too of an agreement to supply articles of merchandise, if the agreement is an open one in regard to performance, i. e. if it is not final, not to be executed immediately, but requires the doing of continuous acts, so as to make the determination of a question of damages uncertain and doubtful. *Furman v. Clark*, 3 Stockt. 307, 311; *Buxton v. Leiter*, 3 Atk. 383.

The last illustration is deserving of some remark. In the first of the two cases cited there was an agreement to furnish the plaintiff with quantities of clay, on the plaintiff's boats, from

time to time while navigation was open, for a period of seven years, on special terms with which the plaintiff had not complied. But the court declared that the contract itself was a proper one for specific performance, because there could be no adequate compensation in damages for the breach of such an undertaking; the profits whereof, depending upon future events, must have been a mere matter of conjecture.

The case of *Hall v. Joiner*, 1 S. Car. 186, is perhaps inconsistent with this, it is conceived, perfectly sound decision. In that case A had agreed to make advances to B to enable B to carry on a turpentine farm. The products were to be sent to A to be sold by him on *commission*, and the proceeds above commissions to be applied by him in payment of the advances made to B. The advances were made, but B, in violation of his contract, sent products of the farm to market and sold them himself. The court declined to enforce specific performance in favor of A, on the narrow view apparently that specific performance in respect of chattels could be demanded only when the chattel was of a peculiar nature, the value of which could not be determined by reference to market rates.

It is apprehended that in view of the fact that profits of uncertain extent were to enter into the case, it was not a case for damages at law; what the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover would have been matter of conjecture. It may however be that the case should be distinguished on the ground that there was no contract for the sale of anything to the plaintiff; the goods were to be sold on commission.

It may be too that there is a further ground of distinction between the two cases. Where the obligations to be performed are continuous and com-

the general value of land, may not be a complete remedy to the purchaser, to whom the land purchased may have a peculiar and

plex, especially if they relate to a subject-matter such that the court cannot determine what constitutes exact performance, performance will not be ordered. *Marble Co. v. Ripley*, 10 Wall. 339. 'The agreement,' said the court, 'being for a perpetual supply of marble, no decree the court can make will end the controversy. . . . The court to the end of time may be called upon to determine not only whether the prescribed quantity of marble has been delivered, but whether every block was from the right place, whether it was sound, whether it was of suitable size or shape or proportion.' (There were other grounds however for refusing the plaintiff's demand.) See further, with regard to continuous obligations, *Port Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland R. Co.*, 13 Ohio St. 544; *Wheatly v. Westminster Coal Co.*, L. R. 9 Eq. 538; *Atlanta R. Co. v. Speer*, 32 Ga. 550; *Blanchard v. Detroit R. Co.*, 31 Mich. 44, 57; *Cairo R. Co. v. People*, 92 Ill. 170.

Other cases not unlike the foregoing may be mentioned. A agreed with B to furnish a quantity of fruit-trees, and B agreed to plant and cultivate them on his own farm and to sell the fruit on joint account during the life of the trees. During that time B died, and his right passed to C, and C was now held entitled to specific performance against A. *McKnight v. Robbins*, 1 Halst. Ch. 229, 642. So where a person pledged his growing crops to his agent, who was to advance money thereon, and the person died insolvent, largely indebted to his agent, the latter obtained a decree for specific performance, the court ordering that the crops be forwarded to him. *Sullivan v. Tuck*, 1 Md. Ch. 59. See also *Starnes v. Newsom*, 1 Tenn. Ch. 239, where however the contract was considered hard and unconscionable.

In these and in all other cases of a modern origin, i. e. influenced by modern notions as distinguished from the instinctive right to take one's own, specific performance is indeed (excepting mandamus, which is really a case of specific performance), a secondary or substitutional remedy, not to be called into exercise where compensation may certainly and accurately be computed. On this ground contracts for the performance of services are not ordinarily specifically enforceable, except in so far as an injunction, if obtainable, may work an enforcement. *Port Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland R. Co.*, 13 Ohio St. 544, 550 (where it is said that this may be true even where damages would not afford adequate relief), citing *Hamblin v. Dinneford*, 2 Edw. 529; *De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti*, 4 Paige, 264; *Stocker v. Brockelbank*, 3 Macn. & G. 250. And see *Woodward v. Aspinwall*, 3 Sandf. 272. Even where an injunction against a positive violation of the terms of a contract is granted, this is not necessarily equivalent to a decree for specific performance. See the distinction luminously set forth in *Lumley v. Wagner*, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604; s. c. 5 DeG. & S. 485, the case of an opera singer who had agreed to sing at a certain theatre and not elsewhere. And see § 722 a, *infra*. But it is obvious that in some cases injunction must work specific performance; indeed it is founded upon the same theory of the right of compulsion. See the editor's note on Injunction as a Primary Remedy, post, § 861.

It is probably upon a similar ground concerning compensation that contracts for the formation thereafter of partnerships have sometimes been specifically enforced. *Birchett v. Bolling*, 5 Munf. 442; *England v. Curling*, 8 Beav. 129; *supra*, § 722. But as

special value. So Courts of Equity will not generally decree performance of a contract for the sale of stock or goods, not because of their personal nature, but because the damages at law, calculated on the market price of the stock or goods, are as complete a remedy for the purchaser as the delivery of the stock or goods contracted for, inasmuch as with the damages he may ordinarily purchase the same quantity of the like stock or goods.¹

¹ *Adderley v. Dixon*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 607, and the cases cited in the preceding note; post, §§ 717 *a*, 724. Lord Hardwicke, in *Buxton v. Lister* (3 Atk. 384), lays down the same distinction between contracts respecting chattels and contracts respecting lands. But he does not seem to give precisely the same reasons for the distinction. 'In general,' says he, 'this court will not entertain a bill for a specific performance of contracts of stock, corn, hops, &c.; for as these are contracts which relate to merchandise that vary according to

the author says (ante, § 666), the remedy of specific performance in such cases is rarely sought, — he might have added, 'and still more rarely obtained,' — because partnerships begun in mutual distrust, dissatisfaction, or enmity would not be apt to be successful. See upon this subject *Sichel v. Mosenthal*, 30 Beav. 371; *Stocker v. Wedderburn*, 3 Kay & J. 393; *Scott v. Rayment*, L. R. 7 Eq. 112; *Manning v. Wadsworth*, 4 Md. 59; *Meason v. Kaine*, 63 Penn. St. 335; *Whitworth v. Harris*, 40 Miss. 483; *Somerby v. Buntin*, 118 Mass. 279, 287. After the partnership has been formed however, specific performance of the articles may doubtless be enforced or denied upon the principle of the adequacy of a remedy in damages (ante, § 667 *et seq.*); or in case the agreement is to bring into the firm a particular piece of property belonging to the partner, it will be enforced, it is conceived, because the court can lay hold of the property. So if on the dissolution of the partnership, whether in accordance with the original articles or with special articles of dissolution, it is agreed that one of the partners shall have a specific piece of property, even personalty, belonging to the firm, such an agreement will be specifically enforced, subject of course to the rights

of creditors. *Lingan v. Simpson*, 1 Sim. & S. 600. Compare *Somerby v. Buntin*, 118 Mass. 279, 287.

This note may be closed with a quotation from the judgment of Lord St. Leonards in *Lumley v. Wagner*, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604, 619, to show how anxious great judges have been to apply the rule of requiring direct performance of duties as opposed to requiring acceptance of compensation: 'Wherever this court has not proper jurisdiction to enforce specific performance, it operates to bind men's consciences, as far as they can be bound, to a true and literal performance of their agreements; and it will not suffer them to depart from their contracts at their pleasure, leaving the party with whom they have contracted to the mere chance of any damages which a jury may give.' An injunction was accordingly granted against Miss *Wagner's* singing elsewhere than at the plaintiff's theatre, though specific performance of her engagement to sing there could not be enforced, and indeed was not asked. See *Donnell v. Bennett*, 22 Ch. D. 835, 837. See also, for a sound statement concerning specific performance, *Barnes v. Barnes*, 65 N. Car. 261, 263. Further see the editor's note on Injunction as a Primary Remedy, post, § 861.

717 a. The truth is, that upon the principles of natural justice Courts of Equity might proceed much farther and might insist upon decreeing a specific performance of all bona fide contracts, since that is a remedy to which Courts of Law are inadequate.¹ There is no pretence for the complaints sometimes made by the common lawyers, that such relief in equity would wholly subvert the remedies by actions of the case and actions of covenant; for it is against conscience that a party should have a right of election whether he would perform his covenant or only pay damages for the breach of it. But on the other hand there is no reasonable objection to allowing the other party who is injured by the breach to have an election either to take damages at law or to have a specific performance in equity, the remedies being concurrent but not coextensive with each other.² The restriction stands therefore not so much upon any general principle *ex æquo et bono* as upon the general convenience of leaving the party to his remedy in damages at law, where that will give him a clear and full compensation. And the true reason why a contract for stock is not now specifically decreed is that it is ordinarily capable of such an exact compensation. But cases of a peculiar stock may easily be supposed where Courts of Equity might still feel themselves bound to decree a specific performance upon the ground that from its nature it has a peculiar value, and is incapable of compensation by damages.³ Indeed it has been thought that on contracts for stock a bill ought now to be maintainable generally in equity for a specific delivery thereof, upon the ground that a

different times and circumstances, if a Court of Equity should admit such bills, it might drive on parties to the execution of a contract to the ruin of one side, when upon an action that party might not have paid perhaps above a shilling damage.' 'As to the cases of contracts for purchase of lands or things that relate to realties, those are of a permanent nature; and if a person agrees to purchase them, it is on a particular liking to the land, and is quite a different thing from matters in the way of trade.' It has been very properly remarked by Lord Chief Baron Richards that the reason given by Lord Hardwicke for not entertaining jurisdiction in cases of chattels would equally apply to contracts for the purchase of land, which (in the present times) sinks and rises in value in an extraordinary manner. *Wright v. Bell*, 5 Price, R. 329. See also *Doloret v. Rothschild*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 590.

¹ *Halsey v. Grant*, 13 Ves. 76, 77; *Alley v. Deschamps*, 13 Ves. 228.

² 1 Foulb. Eq. Pl. B. 1, ch. 1, §§ 5, 6, and note (r); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 3, § 2, and note (d); *Alley v. Deschamps*, 13 Ves. 228; *Gilb. For. Rom.* 220.

³ See *Lady Arundel v. Phipps*, 10 Ves. 148; post, § 724; *Forrest v. Elwes*, 4 Ves. 497.

Court of Law cannot give the property but can only give a remedy in damages, the beneficial effect of which must depend upon the personal responsibility of the party.¹ (a)

¹ *Doloret v. Rothschild*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 500; post, § 724.

(a) It appears to have become settled doctrine in England that specific performance of a contract to convey shares in a railway or other private corporation will be decreed, upon the ground that such shares are of uncertain value, and not always to be had in the market. *Duncuft v. Albrecht*, 12 Sim. 189; *Shaw v. Fisher*, 5 DeG. M. & G. 596; *Cheale v. Kenward*, 3 DeG. & J. 27. In *Shaw v. Fisher* the plaintiff only failed to obtain a decree because he had already conveyed the stock to the defendant's vendee, in ignorance that the defendant was the real purchaser; and the matter having lain by for a year, it now seemed impossible to say that the plaintiff had made or could make a good title to the stock.

The rule in *Duncuft v. Albrecht* has been approved in some of the American cases, and, so far as it applies to railway shares, rejected in others. It was approved in *Leach v. Fobes*, 11 Gray, 506, in *Todd v. Taft*, 7 Allen, 371, in *Hurley v. Brown*, 98 Mass. 545, 547, in *Cushman v. Thayer Jewelry Co.*, 76 N. Y. 365, and in *Johnson v. Brooks*, 93 N. Y. 337. See also *Hill v. Rockingham Bank*, 44 N. H. 567, which however was a case of trust. And see *Machinists' Bank v. Field*, 126 Mass. 345; *Pratt v. Taunton Copper Co.*, 123 Mass. 110, where specific performance of a duty to issue to the plaintiff a certificate of stock was enforced, though the duty did not arise by contract. See *In re Cannock Colliery Co.*, 28 Ch. D. 363. The rule in *Duncuft v. Albrecht* was rejected as to railway shares in *Ross v. Union Pacific R. Co.*, Woolw. 26, and in *Treasurer v. Commercial Mining Co.*, 23 Cal. 390. So of contracts to buy

shares in a national bank for the purpose of gaining control. *Foll's Appeal*, 91 Penn. St. 434. The cases of railway shares were put on the ground that such shares were ordinarily like shares in public corporations, of definite value and readily obtainable in the market,—a ground on which it has always been declared that specific performance of an agreement to sell public stocks would not be decreed. *Duncuft v. Albrecht*, supra; *Cheale v. Kenward*, supra. See *Leach v. Fobes*, supra. In the first two of these cases it was stated that there was no analogy between a quantity of government three per cents, or other stock of the kind, and a quantity of railway shares of a particular description, limited in number and not always to be had in the market. *Foll's Appeal* was put on the ground that the contract was against public policy.

The question of the construction and effect of contracts for transferring shares is subject to a greater or less extent, in the large cities, to the rules of the stock exchange, if the shares are bought in the market. Thus on a mortgage of shares it seems that by the custom of the English stock exchange the mortgagee is not justified in trading with the same, but must return the identical shares and all gains belonging to them or made in the use of them. *Langton v. Waite*, L. R. 6 Eq. 165. See further in regard to customs of the exchange *Shepherd's Case*, L. R. 2 Ch. 16; *Evans v. Wood*, L. R. 5 Eq. 9; *Musgrave's Case*, *Ib.* 193; *Cruse v. Paine* L. R. 6 Eq. 641; *Paine v. Hutchinson*, L. R. 3 Ch. 388; *Hawkins v. Maltby*, *Ib.* 188.

718. But although the general rule now is not to entertain jurisdiction in equity for a specific performance of agreements respecting goods, chattels, stock, choses in action, and other things of a merely personal nature,¹ (a) yet the rule is (as we have seen) a qualified one and subject to exceptions, or rather the rule is limited to cases where a compensation in damages furnishes a complete and satisfactory remedy.² (b) Cases may readily be enumerated which are and have been deemed fit for the exercise of equity jurisdiction. Thus where there was a contract for the sale of eight hundred tons of iron, to be paid for in a certain number of years by instalments, a specific performance was decreed; for such sort of contracts (it was said) differ from those which are to be immediately executed.³ (c) But the true reason probably was, that under the particular circumstances of the case there could be no adequate compensation in damages at law; for the profits upon the contract being to depend upon future events could not be correctly estimated by the jury in damages, inasmuch as the calculation must proceed upon mere conjecture.⁴

719. Lord Hardwicke has himself put several cases to illustrate the same exception. A man may contract for the purchase of a great quantity of timber, as a ship-carpenter, by reason of the vicinity of the timber, and this may be well known and understood on the part of the buyer; and then a specific performance would seem indispensable to justice.⁵ On the other hand there may be a peculiar convenience on the part of the seller, as if a man wants to clear his land in order to turn it to a particular sort of husbandry; there nothing could answer the justice of the case but the performance of the contract in specie.⁶ Upon the

¹ See 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 320.

² See Eden on Injunct. ch. 2, p. 27; Wood v. Rowcliffe, 3 Hare, R. 304.

³ Taylor v. Neville, cited in 3 Atk. 384; Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & Stu. 610.

⁴ Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & Stu. 607, 610.

⁵ Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 384, 385; Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & Stu. 607.

⁶ Ibid. So a bill has been maintained for the specific delivery of chattels. The case made by the bill was that certain specific chattels described in an

(a) See the editor's note to 239; Falcke v. Gray, 5 Jur. 645; Pooley v. Budd, 14 Beav. 229.

(b) Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. 231, (c) Furman v. Clark, 3 Stockt. 306, 311.

same general ground an agreement for the purchase of timber trees, to be paid for in six annual instalments, and eight years to be allowed for disposing of the same, and articles of agreement to be drawn up accordingly, has been thought to be a fit case for a decree for a specific performance, especially as in that case the agreement, contemplating future articles, might perhaps be deemed incomplete at law.¹ And indeed this last ground alone would be sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction;² and it has been adopted on other occasions.³

720. Other illustrations may be found in cases not merely of sales but of matters peculiarly resting in contracts of a very different nature. Thus where a covenant was made in a lease of some alum works, to leave a certain stock upon the premises, a specific performance was decreed, because the trade would be greatly damaged if the covenant was not specifically performed, contrary to the real justice of the case between the parties; and the landlord had stipulated for a sort of enjoyment of the premises after the expiration of the lease.⁴

721. Of the like nature are the common cases of covenants between landlords and tenants where injunctions in the nature of a specific performance are often decreed, as for instance covenants not to remove manure or crops at the end of a lease, covenants not to plough meadow, covenants not to dig gravel, sand, or coal. (b) In all cases of this sort, although the court acts merely by injunction to prevent the breach of the particular covenant,

inventory had been placed in the possession of A as agent of the plaintiff, and that A had, in breach of the duty of an agent, contracted to sell them to a third party. The court restrained the agent from parting with the possession. *Wood v. Rowcliffe*, 3 Hare R. 304. (a)

¹ *Buxton v. Lister*, 3 Atk. 382, 385.

² See *Doloret v. Rothschild*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 590.

³ *Wright v. Bell*, 5 Price, R. 325, 332.

⁴ *Ward v. Duke of Buckingham*, cited 3 Atk. 385; s. c. 10 Ves. 161.

(a) s. c. on appeal, 2 Phill. 382. So in general where there is a relation of trust in respect of the property. *Pooley v. Budd*, 14 Beav. 34; *Cowles v. Whitman*, 10 Conn. 121; *Hill v. Rockingham Bank*, 44 N. H. 567; *Clark v. Flint*, 22 Pick. 231; *Peer v. Kean*, 14 Mich. 354; ante, § 709, and notes.

(b) So of a covenant to use demised premises only for a certain business. *Steward v. Winters*, 4 Sandf. Ch. 587. But see *Columbia College v. Thacher*, 87 N. Y. 311. So too of an agreement not to erect a dam on the defendant's land. *Barnes v. Barnes*, 65 N. Car. 261.

it in effect secures thereby a specific performance; and it may at once be seen that such interposition is indispensable to prevent irreparable mischief.¹

721 *a*. Indeed it may be laid down as a general rule that it is competent for the court to interfere to enforce the specific performance of a contract by the defendant to do definite work upon his property, in the performance of which the plaintiff has a material interest, and one which is not capable of an adequate compensation in damages. A recent case furnishes a very satisfactory illustration of this doctrine, where a railway company undertook to build and maintain an archway on the pleasure-grounds of the plaintiff, through which the railway was to pass, upon his withdrawing all opposition, and to make it sufficient to permit a loaded carriage of hay to pass under. A specific performance was decreed.² (*a*)

722. Cases of agreements to form a partnership and to execute articles accordingly may also be specifically decreed, although they relate exclusively to chattel interests; for no adequate compensation can in such cases be made at law.³ (*b*) Upon the like ground Courts of Equity will decree the specific performance of a covenant for a lease, or to renew a lease; ⁴ (*c*) so of a contract for

¹ See *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 2, p. 27; *Id.* ch. 10, pp. 198, 199, and cases there cited; *Bathurst v. Burden*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 64; *City of London v. Pugh*, 3 Bro. Parl. Cas. 374; s. c. 4 Bro. Parl. Cas. 395, by Tomlins; post, §§ 929, 958.

² *Storer v. The Great Western Railway Co.*, 2 Y. & Coll. New R. 48, 53.

³ *Buxton v. Lister*, 3 Atk. 385; *Anon.* 2 Ves. 629; *Birchett v. Bolling*, 5 Munf. R. 442; *Story on Partnership*, §§ 188, 189; *England v. Curling*, 8 Beav. R. 129.

⁴ *Furnival v. Carew*, 3 Atk. 83, 87; *Tritton v. Foote*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 636;

(*a*) See *Wilson v. Furness Ry. Co.*, L. R. 9 Eq. 28; *Greene v. West Cheshire Ry. Co.*, L. R. 13 Eq. 44; *Hood v. Northeastern Ry. Co.*, L. R. 5 Ch. 525; *Raphael v. Thames Valley Ry. Co.*, L. R. 2 Ch. 147, reversing 2 Eq. 37; *Gregory v. Ingwersen*, 32 N. J. Eq. 199; *infra*, § 727, and notes. These cases show that specific performance may be had against a corporation as well as against an individual, if there were any room for doubt. *Desper v. Continental Meter Co.*, 137 Mass. 252, 254.

(*b*) See the editor's note to § 717, at end.

(*c*) *Clark v. Clark*, 49 Cal. 586. See *Moss v. Barton*, L. R. 1 Eq. 474; *Buckland v. Papillon*, L. R. 2 Ch. 67. But this supposes that the terms of the contract are clear and certain. *Whitlock v. Duffield*, Hoff. Ch. 110; s. c. 26 Wend. 55; *Robinson v. Kettletas*, 4 Edw. 67; *Kelso v. Kelly*, 1 Daly, 419; *Morrison v. Rossignol*, 5 Cal. 614; *Myers v. Forbes*, 24 Md. 598; *Hopkins v. Gilman*, 22 Wis. 476; *McKibben v. Brown*, 1 McCart. 13;

the sale of the good-will of a trade, and of a valuable secret connected with it;¹ so of a contract to keep the banks of a river in repair;² so of a contract to pay the plaintiff an annual sum for life, and a certain other sum for every hundred-weight of brass wire manufactured by the defendant during the life of the plaintiff;³ so of a contract for the sale of an annuity payable out of the dividends of stock;⁴ so of a covenant upon the grant of an annuity to charge the same upon all the property of which the grantor should be possessed at the death of the annuitant, if the grantor should survive him;⁵ so of a contract for the sale of debts proved under a commission of bankruptcy, where an assignment of the debt had not been already executed.⁶ (a)

s. c. 2 Cox, R. 174; *Russell v. Darwin*, cited in note, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 639; *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 6, pp. 95 to 103; 5 Vin. Abridg. 548, pl. 4.

¹ *Bryson v. Whitehead*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 74. But see *Baxter v. Conolly*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 576; *Coslake v. Till*, 1 Russell, R. 378.

² *Kilmorey v. Thackeray*, cited 2 Bro. Ch. R. 65; *Id.* 343.

³ *Ball v. Coggs*, 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 140 [296], cited 1 Sim. & Stu. R. 607.

⁴ *Withy v. Cottle*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 174. See also *Pritchard v. Ovey*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 396.

⁵ *Lyde v. Mynn*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 683.

⁶ *Adderley v. Dixon*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 607; *Wright v. Bell*, 5 Price, R. 325.

Marshall v. Berridge, 19 Ch. D. 233 (Court of App. overruling *Jaques v. Miller*, 6 Ch. D. 153); *Wyse v. Russell*, 11 L. R. Ir. 173; *Nesham v. Selby*, L. R. 7 Ch. 406; *Cartwright v. Miller*, 36 L. T. n. s. 398; *Pray v. Clark*, 113 Mass. 283; *infra*, § 764.

(a) To the foregoing category of cases for specific performance the following cases may be added: Contracts for the sale of patent rights. *Corbin v. Tracy*, 34 Conn. 325; *Ely v. McKay*, 12 Allen, 323; *Binney v. Annan*, 107 Mass. 94; *Somerby v. Buntin*, 118 Mass. 279. An agreement by a partner to offer his interest for sale to his associate before selling to a stranger. *Homfray v. Fothergill*, L. R. 1 Eq. 567. See *Vickers v. Vickers*, L. R. 4 Eq. 529. An agreement to pay gold, on depreciation of the paper currency. *Hord v. Miller*, 2 Duv. 103. But see *Howe v. Nickerson*, 14 Allen, 400. A contract for the sale of realty and personalty, where the realty is the prin-

cipal object. *Leach v. Fobes*, 11 Gray, 506. And see *Richardson v. Smith*, L. R. 5 Ch. 648. A will directing that slaves be sent to Liberia at their election. *Graham v. Sam*, 7 B. Mon. 403. A contract to discharge a judgment debt upon receipt of another's promissory note for part of the amount. *Phillips v. Berger*, 2 Barb. 609; s. c. 8 Barb. 527. Or to pay off a mortgage. *Barkley v. Barkley*, 14 Rich. Eq. 12; *Bennett v. Abrams*, 41 Barb. 619; *Weir v. Mundell*, 3 Brewst. 594. An agreement for insurance of a building which burns down before the policy is executed, the premium having been paid. *Woody v. Old Dominion Ins. Co.*, 31 Gratt. 362. A covenant by the defendant to pay over to the plaintiff's creditor money put into the defendant's hands by the plaintiff. *Woodruff v. Erie Ry. Co.*, 93 N. Y. 609. See *Johnson v. Brooks*, *Ib.* 337.

722 *a*. In like manner although where one partner contracts that he will exert himself for the benefit of the partnership, a Court of Equity cannot compel a specific performance of that part of the agreement; (*a*) yet if he has also covenanted that he will not carry on the same trade with other persons, there being a partnership subsisting, the court will restrain him from breaking that part of the agreement.¹ (*b*) So if a party covenants that he will not carry on his trade within a certain distance or in a certain place within which the other party carries on the same trade, a Court of Equity will restrain the party from breaking the agreement so made. In each of these cases the decree operates pro tanto as a specific performance.² The ground of all these decisions is the utter uncertainty of any calculation of damages, as they must in such cases be in a great measure conjectural; or that some further act is necessary to be done, to clothe the defendant with a full and effective title to support his claim.³

723. Where the specific performance of a contract respecting chattels will be decreed upon the application of one party, Courts of Equity will maintain the like suit at the instance of the other party, although the relief sought by him is merely in the nature of a compensation in damages or value; for in all such cases the court acts upon the ground that the remedy, if it exists at all,

¹ *Kemble v. Kean*, 6 Simons, R. 333.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Adderley v. Dixon*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 607; post, §§ 729, 785.

(*a*) See *Richmond v. Dubuque R. Co.*, 33 Iowa, 432.

(*b*) Compare *Lumley v. Wagner*, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604; s. c. 5 DeG. & S. 485; *Stocker v. Brockelbank*, 3 Macn. & G. 250. 'It appears to me that the tendency of recent decisions, and especially the cases of *Fothergill v. Rowland*, L. R. 17 Eq. 132, and of the *Wolverhampton Ry. Co. v. London & N. Ry. Co.*, is towards this view, — that the court ought to look at what is the nature of the contract between the parties; that if the contract as a whole is the subject of equitable jurisdiction, then an injunction may be granted in support of the contract, whether it contain or does not contain a negative stipulation. But that if on the other

hand the breach of the contract is properly satisfied by damages, then that the court ought not to interfere whether there be or be not the negative stipulation.' *Donnell v. Bennett*, 22 Ch. D. 835, 837, Fry, J. But the learned judge said that the cases appeared to show that where a negative clause was found, the court had enforced it without regard to the question whether specific performance could be granted of the entire contract. He referred to *Dietrichsen v. Cabburn*, 2 Ph. 52, and to *Lumley v. Wagner*, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604. The case of *Hills v. Croll*, 2 Ph. 60, was criticised. See also *Cott v. Tourle*, L. R. 4 Ch. 654; *Fothergill v. Rowland*, L. R. 17 Eq. 132.

ought to be mutual and reciprocal, as well for the vendor as for the purchaser.¹ (a)

724. Indeed a disposition has been evinced on various occasions to apply the jurisdiction to a much larger extent.² Thus although the doctrine seems well settled that a contract for the sale of stock will not now be decided to be specifically performed, because it is ordinarily capable of an exact compensation in damages,³ yet it is well known that as late as Lord Hardwicke's time such contracts were so decreed in chancery.⁴ And even in our own times it has been held that a bill will lie for a specific performance of a contract for the purchase of government stock in

¹ *Withy v. Cottle*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 174; *Adderley v. Dixon*, 1 Sim. & Stu. R. 607; *Forrest v. Elwes*, 4 Ves. 497; *Lewis v. Lechmere*, 10 Mod. R. 506; *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 6, p. 91; *Brown v. Haff*, 5 Paige, R. 235; *Cathcart v. Robinson*, 5 Peters, R. 264; ante, § 711; post, §§ 790, 796; *Flight v. Boland*, 4 Russ. R. 298.

² Mr. Cox, in his note to *Cud v. Rutter*, 1 P. Will. 571, note 2, says: 'But cases of this kind depend so much on their own particular circumstances that it seems no general rule can be laid down. And Lord Redesdale, in a note to his *Treatise on Equity Pleadings*, admits that it is difficult to reconcile all the cases in which the Courts of Equity have compelled the performance of agreements or refused so to do; and in some cases where performance has been denied it is difficult to reconcile the decisions with the principles of equal justice.' *Mitf. Eq. Pl.* by Jeremy, p. 119, note (q). Still perhaps the Equity Jurisprudence of England on this subject does not deserve the severe reproach of being 'the caprices of the English law in regard to specific performance.' See Mr. Austin's *Province of Jurisprudence and the Outline* appended, cited in the *English Law Magazine*, Vol. XII. p. 335. The able article in that volume on this subject did not fall under my immediate notice until the main body of these remarks was written. I am glad to find that the author takes the same view of this matter of equity jurisdiction, in cases of a specific performance of contracts respecting chattels, which is to be found in the text. It does not strike me that the doctrines maintained in equity are either incongruous or indefensible upon principle. There may be some discrepancies in the authorities, but the main doctrines stand upon the fundamental rule of Equity Jurisprudence, that there is not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law.

³ *Cud v. Rutter*, 1 P. Will. 570, 571; *Nutbrown v. Thornton*, 10 Ves. 161; *Mason v. Armitage*, 13 Ves. 37; *Dorison v. Westbrook*, 5 Vin. Abridg. 540, pl. 22; *Capper v. Harris*, Bunb. R. 135.

⁴ *Nutbrown v. Thornton*, 10 Ves. 161. See also *Gardner v. Pullen*, 2 Vern. 394; *Forrest v. Elwes*, 4 Ves. 497.

(a) *Marble Co. v. Ripley*, 10 Wall. 339, 359; *Jones v. Newhall*, 115 Mass. 244, 251; *Old Colony R. Co. v. Evans*, 6 Gray, 25; *Hawralty v. Warren*, 3 C. E. Green, 124; *Hopper v. Hopper*, 1 C. E. Green, 147; *Springs v. Sanders*, *Phill. Eq. (N. Car.)* 67. *Contra. Kauffman's Appeal*, 55 Penn. St. 383.

favor of a holder of scrip receipts, purporting to give the title to the bearer thereof, where the bill prayed for the delivery of the certificates which gave the legal title to the stock, upon the ground that a Court of Law could not give the property, but could only give a remedy in damages, the beneficial effect of which must depend upon the personal responsibility of the party.¹ (a) If this however be a sufficient ground to entertain the jurisdiction, it seems universally applicable to all bills for a specific performance. In the Supreme Court of the United States an inclination has been evinced to maintain a far more extensive jurisdiction in equity to grant relief by a specific performance in contracts respecting personal chattels than is at present exercised in the English courts.²

725. Some of the cases already stated are not purely cases respecting the sale, transfer, or enjoyment of personal chattels, but may properly be deemed to involve personal acts and proceedings. But it is difficult to separate the one class entirely from the other, and they naturally flow into each other. In regard however to contracts for personal acts and proceedings, there is some diversity of judgment in the authorities as to the cases and circumstances in which a specific performance ought to be decreed in equity. Thus for example it has been a matter of some conflict of opinion how far Courts of Equity ought to entertain a suit for the specific performance of a covenant to build or rebuild a house of a specified form and size on particular land. In the earlier cases the jurisdiction was maintained;³ and Lord

¹ *Doloret v. Rothschild*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 590. Besides the ground stated in the text, Sir John Leach added: 'I consider also that the plaintiff not being the original holder of the scrip, but merely the bearer, may not be able to maintain any action at law upon the contract; and that if he has any title, it must be in equity.' *Ibid.* p. 598; ante, §§ 717 and 717 *a*. Even in regard to stock, a specific performance is sometimes decreed in equity. As for instance if a trustee of stock sells it, *cestui que trust* has an option, either to have it replaced in stock or the money produced by it with interest. *Forrest v. Elwes*, 4 Ves. 497.

² *Barr v. Lapsley*, 1 Wheat. R. 151; *Mechanics Bank of Alexandria v. Seton*, 1 Peters, R. 305.

³ *Holt v. Holt*, 2 Vern. 322; *Allen v. Harding*, 2 Eq. Abridg. 17, Pl. 6; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 7, note (x).

(a) See also *Jackson v. Cocke*, 4 Beav. 59; *Duncuft v. Albrecht*, 12 Simons, R. 189; note to § 717 *a*. But it is doubtful whether specific performance will be decreed of the sale of scrip. *Columbine v. Chichester*, 2 Phillips, 27.

Hardwicke recognized it in its full extent at the same time that he denied that a covenant to repair a house ought to be specifically performed.¹ The ground of his opinion in the particular case (which was between landlord and tenant) was that the not building takes away the security of the landlord, but that upon the covenant to repair he might have a remedy at law.²

726. On the other hand in later cases this doctrine has been expressly denied; and it has been said that no such covenant ought to be enforced specifically in equity; for if one will not build, another may. There can be a full compensation at law in damages, and Courts of Equity ought not to undertake the conduct of a building or rebuilding any more than of repairs.³ Upon similar grounds a covenant to make good a gravel-pit at the expiration of a lease has been refused to be specifically decreed.⁴

727. Still however the doctrine as to a covenant to build or rebuild can hardly be considered even now as completely settled against the jurisdiction (although the doctrine as to repairs certainly is),⁵ since Lord Rosslyn in one of his leading judgments maintained that where the covenant to build or rebuild had a definite certainty as to size, materials, etc., it ought to be decreed in equity to be specifically performed. But if it was loose, general, or uncertain, there it ought to be left to a suit for damages at law.⁶ This decision, although questioned at the bar, has never been overruled; and indeed it has incidentally received some confirmation from the reluctance of Courts of Equity to shake it.⁷ (b)

¹ *City of London v. Nash*, 3 Atk. R. 512, 515; *Pembroke v. Thorpe*, 3 Swanst. R. 437, note; *Rook v. Worth*, 1 Ves. 461; *Mosely v. Virgin*, 3 Ves. jr. 184, 185, 186; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, p. 465.

² *Ibid.* *Hill v. Barclay*, 16 Ves. 403, 406; *Rayner v. Stone*, 2 Eden, R. 128. But see *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, p. 442.

³ *Errington v. Aynesly*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 343; *Lucas v. Comerford*. 3 Bro. Ch. R. 167; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 235. (a) But see *Mosely v. Virgin*, 3 Ves. 184, 185, 186; *Flint v. Brandon*, 8 Ves. 159, 163, 164.

⁴ *Flint v. Brandon*, 8 Ves. 163, 164.

⁵ See *Rayner v. Stone*, 2 Eden, 128, and the Reporter's notes, *ib.* 130; *Hill v. Barclay*, 16 Ves. 405, 406.

⁶ *Mosely v. Virgin*, 3 Ves. jr. 185.

⁷ *Flint v. Brandon*, 8 Ves. 159, 164.

(a) This case is disapproved in *Moore v. Greg*, 12 Jur. 952. cited at end; and compare *Brace v. Wehnert*, 25 Beav. 348; *Wilkinson v.*

(b) See *supra*, § 721 a, and cases *Clements*, L. R. 8 Ch. 96; *Phillips v.*

728. Independently of authority there are certainly strong reasons which may be adduced in favor of entertaining the jurisdiction in equity upon a covenant to build or rebuild in cases where the contract has sufficient definiteness and certainty. In the first place it is by no means clear that complete and adequate compensation can in such cases be obtained at law; for if the suit is brought before any building or rebuilding by the party claiming the benefit of the covenant, the damages must be quite conjectural, and incapable of being reduced to any absolute certainty; and if the suit is brought afterwards, still the question must be left open, whether more or less than the exact sum required has been expended upon the building, which inquiry must always be at the peril of the plaintiff.¹ In the next place such a covenant does not admit of an exact compensation in damages from another circumstance, — the changing value of the stock and materials at different times, according to the various demands of the market. In the last place it seems against conscience to compel a party at his own peril to advance his own money to perform what properly belongs to another, when it may often

¹ See *Bettesworth v. Dean of St. Paul's*, Sel. Cas. in Ch. 68, 69.

Soule, 9 Gray, 233; *Oxford v. Provand*, L. R. 2 P. C. 135; — with reference to the rule of mutuality in § 723. But query how far that rule can be applied to such cases.

Equity will not, it seems, enforce a contract to build a railroad. *Ross v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.*, Woolw. 26; *Fallon v. Railroad Co.*, 1 Dill. 121. See *South Wales Ry. Co. v. Wythes*, 1 Kay & J. 186; s. c. 5 DeG. M. & G. 880; *Kansas Constr. Co. v. Topeka R. Co.*, 135 Mass. 34, and cases cited. The chief ground appears to be that the duties are continuous, and not enforceable at once. The court cannot turn itself into a supervisor of a construction company. See *Port Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland R. Co.*, 13 Ohio St. 544; *Peto v. Brighton Ry. Co.*, 1 Hem. & M. 468; *South Wales Ry. Co. v. Wythes*, supra; *Wilson v. West Hartlepool Ry. Co.*, 11 Jur. n. s. 124; s. c. 2 DeG. J. & S. 475; and the

editor's note to § 717, ante. It could not now be said however, as was said by Mr. Justice Miller in *Ross v. Union Pacific R. Co.*, supra, that in all the cases in which building contracts have been specifically enforced the building was to be done upon the land of the person who had agreed to do it; nor that the consideration for the agreement was always the conveyance of the land to the builder. *Greene v. West Cheshire Ry. Co.* L. R. 13 Eq. 44.

It is also held that equity will not specifically enforce an agreement by a railroad company to build fences. *Cincinnati R. Co. v. Washburn*, 25 Ind. 259. Or to keep cattle-guards in repair. *Columbus R. Co. v. Watson*, 26 Ind. 50. But no satisfactory reasons are given in either case, and the first question at least deserves further consideration. See *Darnley v. London Ry. Co.*, 9 Jur. n. s. 452.

happen, either from his own want of skill or means, that at every step he may be obliged to encounter personal obstacles or to make personal sacrifices, for which no real compensation can ever be made. It would not therefore be surprising if after all the doctrine of Lord Rosslyn should obtain a firm hold in Equity Jurisprudence, as it stands well supported by analogy, as well as by high authority.¹ The just conclusion in all such cases would seem to be that Courts of Equity ought not to decline the jurisdiction for a specific performance of contracts whenever the remedy at law is doubtful in its nature, extent, operation, or adequacy.

729. In regard to many other contracts for personal acts and proceedings which are of a very different character, similar observations may apply.² Thus for instance a covenant to renew a lease will (as we have seen) be specifically decreed.³ So a covenant to levy a fine of an estate, for it may be indispensable as a muniment of title; so a covenant to invest money in lands, and settle it in a particular manner;⁴ so an agreement to settle the boundaries between two estates;⁵ so an agreement for the grant of an annuity or to charge it on land;⁶ so an agreement to indorse a bill of exchange or promissory note upon a transfer thereof, when it has been omitted by design or accident or mistake;⁷ so an assignment of an expectancy, if made upon a valuable consideration.⁸ (a) Many other cases might easily be put to illustrate the same doctrine, as the case of a covenant not to build upon a contiguous estate, to the injury of an ancient messuage;

¹ Ante, § 727.

² See Eden on Injunct. ch. 2, p. 27.

³ Ante, § 722; *Furnival v. Carew*, 3 Atk. 87; *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 6, pp. 96 to 103; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 309.

⁴ *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 6, p. 109; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 312; post, § 785.

⁵ *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 6, p. 109; *Penn v. Baltimore*, 1 Ves. 444; post, § 785.

⁶ *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 554, 579; *Lyde v. Munn*, 4 Sim. R. 505; s. c. 1 Mylne & Keen, 683.

⁷ *Watkins v. Maule*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 242; ante, § 99 b.

⁸ An assignment of an expectancy is an agreement to assign the interest. If made for a valuable consideration, it may be enforced in equity; otherwise it may not. *Meek v. Kettlewell*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 342.

(a) *Trull v. Eastman*, 3 Met. 121; St. 37; *Mastin v. Marlow*, 65 N. Car. Power's Appeal, 63 Penn. St. 443; 695. But see *Lowry v. Spear*, 7 Bush, *Bayler v. Commonwealth*, 40 Penn. 451.

of a covenant not to cut down timber trees, which are peculiarly ornamental to the mansion of the covenantee; of a covenant not to erect any noisome or injurious manufacturing establishment on an estate adjacent to that of the covenantee; of a covenant not to carry on the same trade with the covenantee in the same street or town, and of a covenant that a house to be built adjacent to other houses should correspond with them in its elevation.¹

730. Courts of Equity will upon analogous principles interpose in many cases to decree a specific performance of express and even of implied contracts where no actual injury has as yet been sustained, but it is only apprehended from the peculiar relation between the parties. This proceeding is commonly called a bill *quia timet* in analogy to some proceedings at law, where in some cases a writ may be maintained before any actual molestation, distress, or impleading of the party.² Thus (as we have seen) a surety may file a bill to compel the debtor on a bond in which he has joined, to pay the debt when due, whether the surety has been actually sued or not.³ And upon a covenant to save harmless a bill may be filed to relieve the covenantee under similar circumstances.⁴ So where property is covenanted to be secured for certain purposes and in certain events, and there is danger of its being alienated or squandered, Courts of Equity will interpose to secure the property for the original purposes.⁵ And generally it may be stated that in cases of contracts, express or implied, Courts of Equity will interpose to preserve the funds devoted to particular objects under such contracts, and decree what in effect is a specific performance, security to be given, or the fund to be

¹ *Franklin v. Tuton*, 5 Madd. 469; post, § 926 *a*.

² *Co. Litt.* 100 *a*; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 148; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 178, 179; post, §§ 825, 826, 850.

³ *Ante*, §§ 327, 722, 729; post, §§ 849, 850; *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 148; *Hayes v. Ward*, 4 John. Ch. R. 132; *Ranlagh v. Hayes*, 1 Vern. 189, 190; *s. c.* 2 Ch. Cas. 146; *Barnesley v. Powell*, 1 Ves. 283, 284; *Flight v. Cook*, 2 Ves. 619; 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 1, ch. 1, § 8, and note (*y*); *Baker v. Shelbury*, 1 Cas. Ch. 70; *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 398, 406, 407; *Lee v. Rook, Moseley, R.* 318.

⁴ *Ibid.*; post, §§ 786, 849, 850; *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 398, 406.

⁵ *Flight v. Cook*, 2 Ves. 619; *Green v. Pigot*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 108; *Brown v. Dudbridge*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 321; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 148.

placed under the control of the court.¹ This subject will present itself in some other aspects hereafter, and does not therefore require a fuller development in this place.

731. There is another sort of contract respecting which there has been no small diversity of opinion, whether a specific performance ought to be decreed or not. It is where a husband covenants that his wife shall levy a fine, or execute any other lawful conveyance to bar her right in his estate or in her own estate. There are many cases in which covenants of this sort have been decreed to be specifically performed. And on one occasion Sir Joseph Jekyll, Master of the Rolls, said: 'There have been a hundred precedents where, if the husband for a valuable consideration covenants that the wife shall join with him in a fine, the court has decreed the husband to do it; for that he has undertaken it, and must lie by it if he does not perform it.'²

732. The reason is said to be, because in all such cases it is to be presumed that the husband when he enters into such a covenant has first gained the wife's consent for that purpose.³ But this reason is a very insufficient one for so strong a doctrine; for it may be a presumption entirely against the fact; and if correct at the time, the wife may have subsequently withdrawn her consent, and refused upon very proper grounds to comply with the covenant. Let us suppose a case in which either there has been no consent or it has been thus withdrawn; it may then be asked,

¹ *Ibid.*; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 8, and note (y). Where a party has agreed to execute a mortgage on an advance of money, and has refused to perform the agreement, a Court of Equity will often, upon a bill for a specific performance, and praying for a receiver, order a receiver to be appointed. In such a case the bill is in the nature of a bill *quia timet* so far as a receiver is prayed for. *Shakel v. Duke of Marlborough*, 4 Madd. R. 463; post, §§ 845, 846, 847, 850. (a)

² *Hall v. Hardy*, 3 P. Will. 189. See also *Berry v. Wade*, Rep. Temp. Finch, 180; *Barrington v. Horne*, 2 Eq. Abridg. 17, pl. 8; *Withers v. Pinchard*, cited 7 Ves. 475; *Morris v. Stephenson*, 7 Ves. 474.

³ *Winter v. D'Evreux*, cited 3 P. Will. 189, note B.; *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 6, pp. 104, 108.

(a) As to specific performance of agreements for mortgages see *Ashton Ins. Co. v. Olmsted*, 33 Conn. 476; *St. Paul Division v. Brown*, 11 Minn. 356; *McClintock v. Laing*, 22 Mich. 212; *Dean v. Anderson*, 34 N. J. Eq. 496; *Corrigan*, L. R. 13 Eq. 76; *Hermanu v. Hodges*, L. R. 16 Eq. 18; *De Pierres v. Thorn*, 4 Bosw. 266; *City*

and indeed it has been asked, with the earnestness of great doubt, whether, if it is impossible for the husband to procure the concurrence of his wife in such a proceeding, a Court of Equity, acting according to conscience, will decree the husband to perform what it is morally impossible for him to perform.¹ It seems difficult to maintain the affirmative, especially as a full compensation may generally be obtained by returning the money with interest and damages.²

733. But there is a much stronger ground upon which the propriety of the doctrine may well be contested. It is the impolicy of endeavoring to compel the husband to use undue influence and unjustifiable means inconsistent with the harmony, peace, and confidence of conjugal life to obtain such a surrender of the rights of the wife. It is offering to him a premium to be ungenerous as well as unjust, and separating his interests as well as his good faith from hers.³ On this account Lord Cowper refused to adopt the doctrine, saying: 'It is a tender point to compel the husband by a decree to compel his wife to levy a fine, though there have been some precedents in the court for it. And it is a great breach upon the wisdom of the law which secures the wife's lands from being aliened by the husband without her free and voluntary consent, to lay a necessity upon the wife to part with her lands, or otherwise to be the cause of her husband's lying in prison all his days.'⁴

734. It is true that this reasoning has not met the approbation of some learned minds in our own times, because it is suggested creditors may, by throwing the husband into prison, compel the wife to part with her estate in the same way.⁵ But with great submission there is a great difference between a court's undertaking to enforce a contract against the policy of the law and thus sanctioning a violation of conjugal duties, and leaving all parties free to act upon such exigencies as may arise, according to their own sense of the necessities of the case. A Court of Equity may well decline to enforce a contract which it might not

¹ *Ibid.* See *Greenaway v. Adams*, 12 Ves. 395, 400.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Howel v. George*, 1 Madd. R. 9.

⁴ *Outram v. Round*, 4 Vin. Abridg. Baron and Feme, H. b, pl. 4, and marg. p. 203; *Frederick v. Coxwell*, 3 Younge & Jerv. 514.

⁵ *Morris v. Stephenson*, 7 Ves. 474, and *Withers v. Pinchard*, there cited.

under the circumstances incline to cancel. It is most manifest that the doctrine has not the support of one of the most able equity judges of England (Lord Eldon); for he has not hesitated to express a very pointed disapprobation of it. 'If this was perfectly *res integra*,' said he, 'I should hesitate long before I should say the husband is to be understood to have gained her consent, and the presumption is to be that he obtained it before the bargain, to avoid all fraud that may be afterwards practised to procure it.'¹

¹ *Emery v. Wase*, 8 Ves. 514, 515. See also *Howel v. George*, 1 Madd. R. 9; *Davis v. Jones*, 4 Bos. & Pull. 267; *Martin v. Mitchell*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 425; *Mortlock v. Buller*, 10 Ves. 305; *Innes v. Jackson*, 16 Ves. 367. The reasoning of Lord Eldon is so forcible that it deserves to be here given at large. 'Certainly the general point is of great importance, whether the contract of the husband — which however this was not intended to be, but that of the daughters — is to be executed against the husband by a Court of Equity; in effect compelling the husband to compel his wife to levy a fine, which is a voluntary act. This is brought forward in the report as the principal ground of the decree. The argument shows that point is not quite so well settled as it has been understood to be. The policy of the law is that a wife is not to part with her property but by her own spontaneous and free will. If this was perfectly *res integra*, I should hesitate long before I should say the husband is to be understood to have gained her consent, and the presumption is to be made that he obtained it before the bargain, to avoid all the fraud that may be afterwards practised to procure it. I should have hesitated long in following up that presumption rather than the principle of the policy of the law; for if a man chooses to contract for the estate of a married woman or an estate subject to dower, he knows the property is hers altogether, or to a given extent. The purchaser is bound to regard the policy of the law; and what right has he to complain if she who, according to law, cannot part with her property but by her own free will expressed at the time of that act of record, takes advantage of the *locus pœnitentiæ*? And why is he not to take his chance of damages against the husband? If cases have determined this question so that no consideration of the absurdity that must arise, and the almost ridiculous state in which this court must in many instances be placed, can prevail against their authority, it must be so. For the sake of illustration, suppose £10,000 3 per cents carried to the account of a married woman, and the husband contracts to transfer (taking it that the court had jurisdiction to decree performance of such a contract). At the hearing, what is to be done for the wife? In the two last cases the wife appears to have been left a party to the suit without affecting her under the decree. If the court cannot by the decree order an act to be done by her, the bill ought to be dismissed against her, unless some future act by her, to be ordered upon further directions, is looked to. But the principle of the decree shows that cannot be the purpose. It does not rest there. Suppose the husband procures her consent, even by the mildest means, persuades and influences her by the difficulties he has got into, or entering into an improvident contract; and she is examined here by the judge who has made the decree upon the husband; and if, upon the submission of all the considerations which ought to be submitted to her in this court

735. Where indeed there is no pretence to say that the wife is not ready and willing to consent to the act, and that defence is not set up in the answer, but the objections to the decree are put wholly upon other distinct grounds, there may be less difficulty in making a decree for a specific performance.¹ Even in such a case a Court of Equity ought not to decree in so important a matter affecting the wife's interest, without bringing her directly before the court and obtaining her consent upon full deliberation. But where the answer expressly shows an inability of the husband to comply with the covenant, and a firm refusal of the wife, it will require more reasoning than has yet appeared to sustain the justice or equity or policy of the doctrine.² (a)

and the Court of Common Pleas, she says, she thinks it, in her situation, not fit for her to part with the property, — the court must send the husband to jail, telling her she never ought to relieve him from that state. And all this for the benefit of a person who cannot have a specific performance certainly, but who may have damages, and who sets up his title to a specific performance in opposition to the policy of the law. Upon the first ground therefore there is difficulty enough to make me pause before I should follow the two last authorities. And I am not sure whether it is not proper to have the judgment of the House of Lords to determine which of these decisions ought to bind us. As to the expression used by Lord Cowper, that this jurisdiction is to be very sparingly exercised, certainly it is very dissatisfactory to be informed that it is and is not to be done.' See also the opinion of Sir Thomas Plumer in *Howel v. George*, 1 Madd. R. 9, who says: 'It could not be argued that a man should be compelled to use his marital and parental authority to compel his wife and son to do acts which ought only to be spontaneously done.' Sir James Mansfield also, in *Davis v. Jones* (4 Bos. & Pull. 267), said: 'Nothing can be more absurd than to allow a married woman to be compelled to levy a fine through fear of her husband being sued and thrown into jail, when the general principle of law is that a married woman shall not be compelled to levy a fine.' See also *Frederick v. Coxwell*, 3 Y. & Jerv. 514.

¹ *Morris v. Stephenson*, 7 Ves. 474.

² See *Howel v. George*, 1 Madd. R. 9; *Davis v. Jones*, 4 Bos. & Pull. 267; *Martin v. Mitchell*, 2 Jac. & Walk. R. 425.

(a) In accordance with the view of the author it is held that equity will not enforce an agreement on the part of the husband to convey land in which there are homestead and dower rights which the wife will not convey. *Phillips v. Stauch*, 20 Mich. 369; *Yost v. Devault*, 9 Iowa, 60. Comp. *Allison v. Shilling*, 27 Texas, 450; *Brewer v. Wall*, 23 Texas, 585. So too in a case of dower only. *Clark v. Seirer*, 7 Watts, 107; *Burk's Appeal*, 75 Penn. St. 141; *Riesz's Appeal*, 73 Penn. St. 485; *Weller v. Weyand*, 2 Grant, 103; *Hawralty v. Warren*, 3 C. E. Green, 124. See *Richmond v. Robinson*, 12 Mich. 193. But it is held in Massachusetts that a deduction in price may be made in favor of the buyer, if the wife will not release dower, and specific performance granted to him of what the husband can convey. *Davis*

736. In cases of covenants and other contracts where a specific performance is sought, it is often material to consider how far the reciprocal obligations of the party seeking the relief have been fairly and fully performed. For if the latter have been disregarded, or they are incapable of being substantially performed on the part of the party so seeking relief, or from their nature they have ceased to have any just application by subsequent events, or it is against public policy to enforce them, Courts of Equity will not interfere. Thus where two persons had agreed to work a coach from Bristol to London, one providing the horses for a part of the road and the other for the remainder, and in consequence of the horses of the latter being taken in execution the former was obliged to furnish horses for the whole road and claimed the whole profits, the court, on a bill by the party who was so in default, for an account of the profits, and to restrain the other party from working the coaches with his own horses on the whole road, refused to interfere, because the default might again occur, and subject the defendant to an action.¹ So where upon a grant of certain land with a well in it, there was a covenant by the grantees not to sell or dispose of the water from the well to the injury of the proprietors of certain water-works intended for the public supply, but not deriving their supply from the well, upon a bill for an injunction the court refused to interfere on account of the inconveniences, saying that although the court will in many cases interfere to restrain a breach of covenant, yet there was no instance to be met with of

¹ *Smith v. Fromont*, 2 Swanst. R. 330.

v. Parker, 14 Allen, 94. See *Woodbury v. Luddy*, *Ib.* 1. But see *Phillips v. Stauch*, *supra*; *Burk's Appeal*, *supra*. This appears to be opposed to English ruling that where a party agrees with husband and wife for the purchase of an estate in fee owned by the wife, in such a way that the wife is not bound, he cannot compel the husband to convey his interest with an abatement. *Castle v. Wilkinson*, L. R. 5 Ch. 534. Unless perhaps the husband held himself out to the purchaser as owner of the fee. *Barnes v. Wood*, L. R. 8 Eq. 424.

A wife on the other hand cannot, after the death of her husband, have specific performance of a contract made by her husband for the sale of her land, it seems. *Hoover v. Calhoun*, 16 Gratt. 109.

It appears to be settled in England that contracts for separation of husband and wife may be enforced specifically, certainly in regard to property. *Gibbs v. Harding*, L. R. 5 Ch. 336; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 5 H. L. Cas. 40. See *Hamilton v. Hector*, L. R. 6 Ch. 701.

such a covenant as this. For here the court must in each instance try whether the act of selling any specified quantity of water was a prejudice to the proprietors of the water-works or not; and that upon such a covenant so framed a Court of Equity ought not to entertain jurisdiction, even if there were no objection on the score of public policy.¹ (a)

737. So where a conveyance in fee had been made of certain lands in the city of London, and the feoffee covenanted not to use the land in a particular manner, with a view to the more ample enjoyment of the adjoining lands by the feoffor; and afterwards, by the voluntary acts of the feoffor and those claiming under him, the character and condition of the adjoining land had been so greatly altered that the contemplated benefits were entirely gone, the court refused to interfere to compel a specific performance by injunction, and left the party to his remedy at law on the covenant.² (b)

¹ *Collins v. Plumb*, 16 Ves. 454. This case turned upon its own special circumstances, and cannot be admitted to be an authority for any general doctrine on the subject. If the Water Works Company had derived their supply of water from the well, there is no doubt that a Court of Equity would have interfered to prevent the party from violating his covenant to the injury of the company. In the actual posture of the case then before the court the object of the covenant seemed to have been to secure to the company the monopoly of water for the supply of the inhabitants of the town, and other persons resorting thereto, against any competition by a sale of the water of the well. The case seems to have been decided upon very mixed considerations, as there are several other points before the court; and it must be admitted not to have been decided upon very satisfactory grounds.

² *Duke of Bedford v. Trustees of the British Museum*, 2 Mylne & K. 552. See also *Kepple v. Bailey*, 2 Mylne & K. 517. (c)

(a) Specific performance of a contract for supplying water to a mill will be decreed, it seems, when necessary for running the mill. *Randall v. Latham*, 36 Conn. 48.

(b) Generally speaking, mere change of value and consequent inadequacy, unless gross, are not sufficient to prevent specific performance. *Lee v. Kirby*, 104 Mass. 420; *Boote v. Scheffer*, 21 Gratt. 474; *Chubb v. Peckham*, 2 Beasl. 207; *Park v. Johnson*, 4 Al-

len, 259; *Powers v. Mayo*, 97 Mass. 180; *Turley v. Nowell*, Phill. Eq. (N. Car.) 301; *Losee v. Murray*, 57 Barb. 561; *Collier v. Mason*, 25 Beav. 200. See *Regent's Canal Co. v. Ware*, 23 Beav. 575. But change of value in a case where the vendor was at first unable to make title and afterwards became able has been treated as ground for refusing specific performance in a suit against a purchaser. *Griffiu v. Cunningham*, 19 Gratt. 571;

(c) This case, so far as it relates to covenants running with the land,

has been overruled. *Luke v. Dennis*, 7 Ch. D. 227.

738. Before proceeding to the remaining head of specific performance, that of contracts respecting real estate, which will occupy our attention to a far greater extent, it may be proper to mention that before Lord Somers's time the practice used to be on bills for a specific performance to send the party to law, and if he recovered anything by way of damages, the Court of Chancery then entertained the suit; otherwise the bill was dismissed.¹

¹ *Dodsley v Kinnersley*, Ambler, R. 406; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 288; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (e); Id. B. 1, ch. 3, § 1, note (e); *Normanby v. Duke of Devonshire*, 2 Freem. R. 217, and Mr. Hovenden's note; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, p. 425. According to Mr. Butler the old practice in Courts of Equity was, in all cases, first to send the party to law, to ascertain whether there was any remedy there or not. If there was no remedy at law, then equity would interfere. His language is: 'The grand reason for the interference of a Court of Equity is, that the imperfection of a legal remedy in consequence of the universality of legislative provisions may be redressed. Hence for a length of time after the introduction of equitable judicature into this country it was thought necessary that before equity should interfere this imperfection should be manifested by the party's previously proceeding at law, so far as to show from its result the want or inadequacy of legal redress and his claim for equitable relief. This inflicted upon him two judicial suits, and consequently a double expense. To remedy this grievance it became

Young v. Rathbone, 1 C. E. Green, 224. And if by reason of war the consideration money has become worthless at the time of payment, this will be ground for refusing to decree specific performance. *Love v. Chubb*, 63 N. Car. 324; *Hudson v. King*, 2 Heisk. 560. See *Wintz v. Weakes*, 10 Heisk. 593. But the burning down of a house on the land to be sold is not sufficient. *Brewer v. Herbert*, 30 Md. 301.

With regard to restrictions upon building it has lately been declared in accordance with the text that if the condition of the surrounding property has been so altered since the contract was made, without the defendant's act, that the restrictions are no longer applicable to the state of things, the agreement in regard to restrictions will not be enforced. *Columbia College v. Thacher*, 87 N. Y. 311.

Ordinarily however covenants of

restriction as to the use of premises will be enforced by injunction, and that too against purchasers, if with notice, whether the covenants run with the land or not. *Tulk v. Moxhay*, 13 Jur. 89; s. c. 2 Phill. 774. See *Heriot's Hospital*, 2 Dow, 301. And one grantee may enforce the covenant against another grantee from the common grantor. *Parker v. Nightingale*, 6 Allen, 341; *Linzee v. Mixer*, 101 Mass. 512; *Perkins v. Coddington*, 4 Rob. (N. Y.) 647. But it must appear that the covenant was intended for the benefit of the party seeking to enforce it. *Badger v. Boardman*, 16 Gray, 559; *Jewell v. Lee*, 14 Allen, 145. See *Clark v. Martin*, 49 Penn. St. 289. It makes no difference whether the provision is in form a condition or a restriction. *Whitney v. Union R. Co.*, 11 Gray, 359.

And hence the opinion was not uncommon that unless damages were recoverable at law no suit could be maintained in equity for a specific performance. Accordingly it was laid down in a celebrated case by Lord Chief Justice Raymond, that 'where damages are to be recovered at law for the breach of covenant, equity will compel a specific execution of such act, for the not doing of which the law gives damages; and that for this reason, as an adequate compensation is to be made on the covenant, the quantum of the damages may be very uncertain, and therefore to prevent that uncertainty equity will enforce a specific execution of the thing.'¹ At present no such practice prevails, and therefore the rule is not applied, as it certainly ought not to be applied, as a test of jurisdiction.

739. But there is very great reason to doubt if the rule ever was generally applied at any former period, for many cases must always have existed in which damages were not recoverable at law, but in which a specific performance would nevertheless be decreed.² The rule was probably confined to cases in which the party was not entitled to any remedy at law, and there was no equity to be administered beyond the law.³ Lord Macclesfield denied the existence of the rule altogether, and said: 'Neither is it a true rule which had been laid down by the other side, that where an action cannot be brought at law on an agreement for damages, there a suit will not lie in equity for a specific performance.'⁴ And accordingly in the very case then before him he gave relief, although there could be no remedy at law. It was a case where a feme sole gave a bond to her intended husband, that in case of their marriage she would convey her lands to him in fee. They afterwards married, and the wife died without issue, and then the husband died. And it was held that although the bond was void at law, yet it was good evidence

the practice, particularly from the time in which the seals were intrusted to Lord Cowper, to dispense with the previous legal suit, when the want or inadequacy of the legal remedy to be obtained by it was evident.' 1 Butler, Reminis. 39, 40.

¹ *Bettesworth v. Dean of St. Paul's*, Sel. Cas. in Ch. 68, 69; post, § 755, note.

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (e); Id. B. 1, ch. 3, § 1, note (c); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 288.

³ See Sugden on Vendors, ch. 4, § 2, pp. 201, 202 (7th edit.).

⁴ *Cannel v. Buckle*, 2 P. Will. 244.

of an agreement, and the heir of the husband could compel a specific performance against the heir of the wife.¹

740. Lord Macclesfield on that occasion put another case. If a feme infant seised in fee, on a marriage with the consent of her guardians, should covenant, in consideration of a settlement, to convey her inheritance to her husband, and the settlement were competent, a Court of Equity would decree a specific execution of the agreement, although no action at law would lie to recover damages.² Another case may also be put. If an agreement be made for the sale of an estate, and the vendor dies before the period when the estate is to be conveyed, the heir of the vendor will in equity be bound to convey, although no action lies at law against him.³

741. It has been said in a late case that it may be safely laid down as a general proposition, notwithstanding many exceptions, that an agreement in order to call for a specific performance by the decree of a Court of Equity must be such an agreement as might have been made the subject of an action at law.⁴ This language, when understood in a qualified sense, is doubtless correct; for generally if a party does not contract personally at law, equity will not create a personal obligation on his part, unless under peculiar circumstances.⁵ But the whole class of cases of specific performance of contracts respecting real estate where the contract is by parol, and there has been a part performance, or where the terms of the contract have not been strictly complied with, and yet equity relieves the party, are proofs that the right to maintain a suit in equity to compel a specific performance does not and cannot properly be said to depend upon the party's having a right to maintain a suit at law for damages.⁶

¹ Ibid. See also *Acton v. Pierce*, 2 Vern. 480.

² *Cannel v. Buckle*, 2 P. Will. 244, and Mr. Cox's note (2).

³ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 288. See also *Wiseman v. Roper*, 1 Rep. in Chan. 158; *Attorney-Gen. v. Day*, 1 Ves. 222; *Whitmel v. Farrel*, 1 Ves. 258; *Gell v. Vermedun*, 2 Freem. R. 199; *Sugden on Vendors* (7th edit.), ch. 4, § 2, p. 180; 1 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 4, § 3, n. 3, p. 321 (10th edit.); post, § 755, note.

⁴ Sir William Grant in *Williams v. Steward*, 3 Meriv. R. 491.

⁵ See Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 N. 3, Rent, which cites *Davy v. Davy*, 1 Cas. Ch. 145, *Palmer v. Whettenhall*, 1 Cas. Ch. 184, 185.

⁶ *Davis v. Hone*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 347, 348; *Lennon v. Napper*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 684; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 4, § 2, p. 192 (7th edit.); 1 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 4, § 3, n. 14, p. 330 (10th edit.); *Id.* n. 35, p. 340; *Id.* n. 59, p. 351; *Alley v. Deschamps*, 13 Ves. 228, 229.

In cases of specific performance, Courts of Equity sometimes follow the law and sometimes go far beyond the law; and their doctrines, if not wholly independent of the point whether damages would be given at law, are not in general dependent upon it. Whoever should assume the existence of a right to damages in an action at law as the true test of the jurisdiction in equity would find himself involved in endless perplexity;¹ for sometimes damages may be recoverable at law where Courts of Equity would yet not decree a specific performance; and on the other hand damages may not be recoverable at law, and yet relief would be granted in equity.² (a)

742. In truth the exercise of this whole branch of Equity Jurisprudence respecting the rescission and specific performance of contracts is not a matter of right in either party, but it is a matter of discretion in the court;³ not indeed of arbitrary or capricious discretion (b) dependent upon the mere pleasure of

¹ See Sugden on Vendors, ch. 4, § 2, pp. 200 to 202 (7th edit.); 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, p. 463; *Williams v. Steward*, 3 Meriv. R. 486.

² *Weale v. West Middlesex Water Works Company*, 1 Jac. & Walk. R. 370.

³ *City of London v. Nash*, 1 Ves. 13; s. c. 3 Atk. 512; *Joynes v. Statham*, 3 Atk. 389; *Underwood v. Hitchcox*, 1 Ves. 279; *Clowes v. Higginson*, 1 Ves. & B. 527; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 287; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 9, note (i); Sugden on Vendors (7th edit.), ch. 4, § 2, p. 191; 1 Sugden on Vendors, ch. 4, § 3, n. 14, p. 330 (10th edit.); *St. John v. Benedict*, 6 John. Ch. Rep. 111; *Seymour v. Delancey*, 6 John. Ch. R. 222; ante, § 207.

(a) 'It is true there is a maxim that equity will not enforce the specific performance of an agreement upon which an action will not lie at law for damages; and anciently it was the practice to send the party to law, there to establish the validity of the contract, before he was allowed to proceed in equity. That practice has fallen into disuse, and the maxim never meant more than that the contract must be such as the law would have recognized if sued upon in proper time and under proper circumstances. If the rule were that equity would not entertain a suit for the specific performance of an agreement, except where, at the same instant, a suit

might be sustained at law for damages, there would be no ground for the existence of another well-known maxim, that time is not of the essence of a contract in equity. Upon the efficacy of this maxim it often happens that a party, by a neglect of a strict compliance with his stipulations in a covenant or other contract, with regard to time, loses his right to sue at law, while he may yet have a remedy by a suit for a specific execution in equity. *Walker v. Allen*, 5 Jones, 58; *Falls v. Carpenter*, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 237.' Mr. Justice Battle in delivering judgment in *White v. Butcher*, 6 Jones, Eq. 231, 233.

(b) *Allen v. Woodruff*, 96 Ill. 11.

the judge, but of that sound and reasonable discretion which governs itself as far as it may by general rules and principles, but which at the same time withholds or grants relief, according to the circumstances of each particular case, when these rules and principles will not furnish any exact measure of justice between the parties.¹ (a) On this account it is not possible to lay down any rules and principles which are of absolute obligation and authority in all cases; and therefore it would be a waste of time to attempt to limit the principles or the exceptions which the complicated transactions of the parties and the ever-changing habits of society may at different times and under different circumstances require the court to recognize or consider. The most that can be done is to bring under review some of the leading principles and exceptions which the past times have furnished as guides to direct and aid our future inquiries.

743. Let us now in the next place proceed to the consideration of the remaining and far most numerous class of cases in which Courts of Equity are called upon to decree a specific performance of contracts; that is to say, contracts respecting land.² In examining this subject our attention will almost exclusively be drawn

¹ See 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, p. 466; *White v. Damon*, 7 Ves. 35; *Buckle v. Mitchell*, 18 Ves. 111; *Mason v. Armitage*, 13 Ves. 37; *Clowes v. Higginson*, 1 Ves. & Beam. 527; *Moore v. Blake*, 1 B. & Beatt. 69; *Howel v. George*, 1 Madd. R. 9; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 4, § 2, p. 191 (7th edit.); 1 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 4, § 3, n. 14, p. 330 (10th edit.); ante, § 693; post, § 769; *Wedge-wood v. Adams*, 6 Beav. R. 600.

² For the sake of brevity land only is mentioned; but the same principles will apply generally to all other real property and incorporeal hereditaments savoring of the realty.

(a) *Moore v. Crowder*, 72 Ala. 79; *Stearns v. Beckham*, 31 Gratt. 379; *Taylor v. Williams*, 45 Mo. 80; *Fish v. Lightner*, 44 Mo. 268; *Quinn v. Roath*, 37 Conn. 16; *McComas v. Easley*, 21 Gratt. 23, 29; *Hale v. Wilkinson*, *Ib.* 75, 79; *Humbard v. Humbard*, 3 Head, 100; *Anter v. Miller*, 18 Iowa, 405; *Lowry v. Buffington*, 6 W. Va. 249; *Aston v. Robinson*, 49 Miss. 348; *Sherman v. Wright*, 49 N. Y. 227.

It is not a happy use of language (unless explained, as by the author) to speak of the 'discretion' of a chan-

cellor in a matter of specific performance, for that might imply, as in other cases, that no appeal could be taken. The authorities show that the chancellor has no 'discretion' in the face of the law; he is bound by the law always. If the equity is clear, he must grant or refuse the plaintiff's prayer, according as it is within or without the law; if the equity is not clear, under all the facts and circumstances taken together, he must refuse the relief sought. There is no more 'discretion' in the latter part of the proposition than in the former.

to cases of contracts respecting land situate in the same country where the suit is brought. It may therefore be proper to premise that a bill for a specific performance of a contract respecting land may be entertained by Courts of Equity, although the land is situate in a foreign country, if the parties are resident within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The ground of this jurisdiction is that Courts of Equity have authority to act upon the person: 'Æquitas agit in personam.'¹ And although they cannot bind the land itself by their decree, yet they can bind the conscience of the party in regard to the land, and compel him to perform his agreement according to conscience and good faith.² (a) Accordingly it was held by Lord Hardwicke that

¹ *Toller v. Carteret*, 2 Vern. 495; post, §§ 899, 900; *Sutton v. Fowler*, 9 Paige, R. 280.

² Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 X. 4 W. 27; *Lord Cranstown v. Johnston*, 3 Ves. jr. 182; *Massie v. Watts*, 6 Cranch, R. 148, 158.

(a) See *Carver v. Peck*, 131 Mass. 291; *Dehon v. Foster*, 4 Allen, 545; s. c. 7 Allen, 57; *Pingree v. Coffin*, 12 Gray, 288; *Penn v. Hayward*, 14 Ohio St. 302; *Muller v. Dows*, 94 U. S. 444, 449; *Blount v. Blount*, 1 Hawks, 365, 376; *Loney v. Penniman*, 43 Md. 130, 133; *Olney v. Eaton*, 66 Mo. 563; *Keyser v. Rice*, 47 Md. 203. Thus a non-resident even, if served with process within the jurisdiction, especially after appearing and answering without objection to the authority of the court, may be compelled to perform a contract to assign a bond for the conveyance of lands in another State. *Pingree v. Coffin*, 12 Gray, 288; *Penn v. Hayward*, 14 Ohio St. 302.

But a Court of Equity cannot bind the title to lands lying in another State except according to the laws of that State. since it is for the State in which land is situated to declare how it may be conveyed. *Blount v. Blount*, 1 Hawks, 365, 376; *Waterhouse v. Stansfield*, 9 Hare, 234. See *Loney v. Penniman*, 43 Md. 130. Hence an executor in North Carolina cannot be required by the courts of that State to sell land of the testator in Tennessee,

though the will give him full authority to do so. *Blount v. Blount*, supra. For the subject of the proposed action must be such that the court can administer the relief. *Morris v. Remington*, 1 Pars. Eq. 387. It is said that a domestic corporation cannot be compelled to do acts in another State. *Port Royal Co. v. Hammond*, 58 Ga. 523.

It is no objection however to specific enforcement in general that the contract was made and is to be performed in another State. *Myres v. De Mier*, 4 Daly, 343. Provided it be one that would be enforceable where it is to be performed. *Waterhouse v. Stansfield*, 9 Hare, 234. If not so enforceable, the domestic courts will not take jurisdiction even of the proceeds of a sale of such lands, though brought within the territorial jurisdiction. *Ib.*

It is upon this ground, it seems, that a contract made by a railroad company with a construction company, both foreign corporations, and the contract performable in another State, will not be specifically enforced. Nor will a citizen of the State of the forum

the specific performance of a contract respecting the boundaries of the colonies of Pennsylvania and Maryland, entered into by the proprietaries, might be decreed by the Court of Chancery in England.¹ The like doctrine was held in the case of an agreement respecting the Isle of Man, where a specific performance was decreed by the Court of Chancery in England, although the Isle was without the realm.² In like manner in a contract respecting lands in Ireland a specific performance has been decreed.³

¹ *Penn v. Lord Baltimore*, 1 Ves. 444; *Portarlington v. Soulby*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 104.

² *Earl of Athol v. Earl of Derby*, 1 Ch. Cas. 221; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 X. 4 W. 27; *Portarlington v. Soulby*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 104; post, §§ 899, 900.

³ *Archer v. Preston*, cited 1 Vern. 77; s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. 133.

in which the suit is attempted be restrained in such a case from disposing of stock and bonds of the railroad company in violation of the terms of the contract with the construction company. The court could not 'assume to direct how, when, or where the railway shall be constructed, nor give any direction in relation thereto, nor enforce the obligations which the construction company has undertaken to perform in regard to it.' *Kansas Constr. Co. v. Topeka R. Co.*, 135 Mass. 34, 39. See *Smith v. New York Ins. Co.*, 14 Allen, 336. Nor does the fact that the defendant has appeared give the court jurisdiction for any such purpose. Case first cited.

The rule authorizing specific execution of contracts made abroad will apply a fortiori to contracts made in another county of the State in which the suit is brought, over which county the court's jurisdiction does not extend. *Davis v. Parker*, 14 Allen, 94. Provided, as in the case of proposed action in regard to property without the State, the relief sought is of such a nature that the court is able to administer the same in the given case; for the mere fact that the parties are lawfully before the court will not

of necessity give jurisdiction. *Morris v. Remington*, 1 Pars. Eq. 387; *Carteret v. Petty*, 2 Swaust. 324, note. 'All this,' said Lord Nottingham, in *Carteret v. Petty*, speaking of jurisdiction in cases of extraterritorial torts, 'is to be understood of cases where imprisonment of the person is the most proper means to effect that which is decreed to be done, viz. the payment of money, making a conveyance, and the like. But where no obedience of the person, or any act of his, can sufficiently execute such a decree, there it is in vain to hold such a plea, and thus in this case.' And this, which was said of a bill for partition of lands in Ireland, was quoted with effect in *Morris v. Remington*, 1 Pars. Eq. 387, 391, against a bill brought in Philadelphia, praying a Court of Equity there to restrain the defendant from erecting a nuisance in another county, contrary to the agreement of the parties. The court said that to give a complete remedy in such a case it must not only restrain and prevent the continuance of the nuisance, but must order its removal; and this could only be done where the locus was within the court's jurisdiction, which was not the case here.

744. The proposition may therefore be laid down in the most general form that to entitle a Court of Equity to maintain a bill for the specific performance of a contract respecting land it is not necessary that the land should be situate within the jurisdiction of the state or country where the suit is brought. It is sufficient that the parties to be affected and bound by the decree are resident within the state or country where the suit is brought; for in all suits in equity the primary decree is in personam and not in rem.¹ The incapacity to enforce the decree in rem constitutes no objection to the right to entertain such a suit.² Where indeed the lands lie within the reach of the process of the court, Courts of Equity will not exclusively rely on proceedings in personam, but will put the successful party in possession of the lands if the other party remains obstinate and refuses to comply with the decree.³

745. But to return to the class of cases where a specific performance is sought on contracts respecting land situate in the country where the suit is brought. This class may be subdivided into two heads: (1) where relief is sought upon parol contracts within the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries (as it is called); and (2) where it is sought under written contracts, not falling within the scope of that statute.

746. It has been already suggested that Courts of Equity are in the habit of interposing to grant relief in cases of contracts respecting real property to a far greater extent than in cases respecting personal property, not indeed upon the ground of any distinction founded upon the mere nature of the property as real or as personal, but at the same time not wholly excluding the consideration of such a distinction. In regard to contracts

¹ Newland on Contr. ch. 16, p. 305; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 X. 4 W. 27; Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 447, 454; Archer v. Preston, 1 Eq. Abr. 133; s. c. 1 Vern. 77, and Mr. Raithby's note; Lord Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Ves. jr. 182; Jackson v. Petrie, 10 Ves. 164; Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 589; Pike v. Hoare, 2 Eden, R. 185, and note; White v. Hall, 12 Ves. 323; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 158; Story on Conflict of Laws, §§ 544, 545; Ward v. Arredondo, 1 Hopk. R. 213; Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige, R. 402; Sutton v. Fowler, 9 Paige, R. 280.

² Earl of Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 135.

³ Earl of Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 135; Earl of Kildare v. Eustace, 1 Vern. 421; Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 454; Hide v. Pettit, 1 Ch. Cas. 91; Newland on Contracts, ch. 16, pp. 305, 306; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (y); Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 543; Stribley v. Hawkie, 3 Atk. 275.

respecting personal estate it is (as has been already intimated) generally true that no particular or peculiar value is attached to any one thing over another of the same kind, and that a compensation in damages meets the full merits as well as the full objects of the contracts. If a man contracts for the purchase of a hundred bales of cotton, or boxes of sugar, or bags of coffee, of a particular description or quality, if the contract is not specifically performed, he may generally, with a sum equal to the market price, purchase other goods of the same kind of a like description and quality, and thus completely obtain his object, and indemnify himself against loss.¹ But in contracts respecting a specific mesuage or parcel of land the same considerations do not ordinarily apply. The locality, character, vicinage, soil, easements or accommodations of the land generally may give it a peculiar and special value in the eyes of the purchaser, so that it cannot be replaced by other land of the same precise value, but not having the same precise local conveniences or accommodations;² and therefore a compensation in damages would not be adequate relief. It would not attain the object desired, and it would generally frustrate the plans of the purchaser. And hence it is that the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to decree specific performance is in cases of contracts respecting land universally maintained; whereas in cases respecting chattels it is limited to special circumstances.

747. Courts of Equity too in cases of contracts respecting real property have been in the habit of granting this relief, not only to a greater extent but also under circumstances far more various and more indulgent than in cases of contracts respecting chattels; for they do not confine themselves to cases of a strict legal title to relief. Another principle equally beneficial is well known and established, that Courts of Equity will not permit the forms of law to be made the instruments of injustice, and they will therefore interpose against parties attempting to avail themselves of the rigid rules of law for unconscientious purposes. When therefore advantage is taken of a circumstance that does not admit of a strict performance in the contract, if the failure is not in a matter of substance, Courts of Equity will interfere.³

¹ Ante, §§ 716, 717, 718 to 724.

² *Adderley v. Dixon*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 607; ante, § 718.

³ *Halsey v. Grant*, 13 Ves. 76, 77; post, §§ 775, 776, 777.

Thus they are in the habit of relieving in contracts for real property where the party from his own inadvertence or neglect has suffered the proper time to elapse for the punctilious performance of his contract, and from that and other circumstances he cannot maintain an action to recover damages at law.¹ Even where nothing exists to prevent the party's suing at law, so many circumstances are necessary to enable him to recover at law, that the mere formal proofs alone render it very inconvenient and hazardous so to proceed, even if the legal remedy would (as in many cases it would not) be adequate to the demands of substantial justice.

748. On these accounts (as has been well remarked) Courts of Equity have enforced contracts of this sort, where no action for damages could be maintained; for at law the party plaintiff must have strictly performed his part, and the inconvenience of insisting upon that in all cases is sufficient to require the interference of Courts of Equity. They dispense with that which would make a compliance with what the law requires oppressive, and in various cases of such contracts they are in the constant habit of relieving a party who has acted fairly although negligently.²

749. On the other hand as the interference of Courts of Equity is discretionary, they will not enforce a specific performance of such contracts at the instance of the vendor, where his title is involved in difficulties which cannot be removed, although perhaps at law an action might be maintainable against the defendant for damages, for his not completing his purchase.³ (a)

750. Indeed the proposition may be more generally stated, that Courts of Equity will not interfere to decree a specific performance, except in cases where it would be strictly equitable to make such a decree. There is no pretence to say that it is the

¹ Post, §§ 771, 775, 776, 777.

² Lord Redesdale, in *Lennon v. Napper*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 684.

³ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 9, note (i); post, §§ 777, 778; *Cooper v. Denne*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 80; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 565.

(a) Specific performance has been denied when the plaintiff's title, though probably good, was not so clear that the defendant ought to be compelled to take it and assume the risk of possible litigation with persons then before the court. *Butts v. Andrews*, 136 Mass. 221, following *Cunningham v. Blake*, 121 Mass. 333, and citing *Jeffries v. Jeffries*, 117 Mass. 184; *Hayes v. Harmony Grove Cem.*, 108 Mass. 400; *Pyrke v. Waddingham*, 10 Hare, 1.

doctrine of Courts of Equity to carry into specific execution every contract in all cases where that is found to be the legal intention and effect of the contract between the parties. If in any case the parties have so dealt with each other in relation to the subject-matter of a contract that the object of one party is defeated while the other party is at liberty to do as he pleases in relation to that very object, or if in fact the character and condition of the property to which the contract is attached have been so altered that the terms and restrictions of it are no longer applicable to the existing state of things, — in such cases Courts of Equity will not grant any relief, but will leave the parties to their remedy at law.¹ (a)

750 a. Upon grounds still stronger Courts of Equity will not proceed to decree a specific performance where the contract is founded in fraud, imposition, mistake, undue advantage, or gross misapprehension, or where from a change of circumstances or otherwise it would be unconscientious to enforce it.² But upon this topic we shall have occasion again to touch hereafter.³

751. Where indeed a contract respecting real property is in its nature and circumstances unobjectionable, it is as much a matter of course for Courts of Equity to decree a specific performance of it as it is for a Court of Law to give damages for the breach of it.⁴ (b) And generally it may be stated that Courts of Equity will decree a specific performance where the contract is in writing, and is certain, and is fair in all its parts, and is for an

¹ *Duke of Bedford v. British Museum*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 552, 567, 569, 571, 579; post, §§ 769, 770, 787; *Taylor v. Longworth*, 14 Peters, R. 173, 174.

² *Bank of Alexandria v. Lynn*, 1 Peters, R. 376, 382; *Cathcart v. Robinson*, 5 Peters, R. 264; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 4, pp. 125 to 135, 7th edit; *Harnett v. Yeilding*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 554, 555; post, §§ 769, 770.

³ Post, §§ 769, 770, 770 a, 775.

⁴ *Hall v. Warren*, 9 Ves 608; *Greenaway v. Adams*, 12 Ves. 395, 400; *King v. Hamilton*, 4 Peters, R. 311, 328. A specific performance will not be decreed upon a contract in favor of an infant, because the remedy is not mutual. *Flight v. Bolland*, 4 Russ. R. 298.

(a) See *Columbia College v. Thacher*, 87 N. Y. 311.

(b) *St. Paul Div. v. Brown*, 9 Minn. 157; *Port Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland R. Co.*, 13 Ohio St. 544, 559. A vendor cannot object to convey to a purchaser in parcels by sepa-

rate conveyances at one and the same time if the purchaser will bear the extra expense. *Egmont v. Smith*, 6 Ch. D. 469. But qu. whether the purchaser could require conveyances at different times. *Ib.*

adequate consideration,¹ and is capable of being performed,² but not otherwise. (a) The form of the instrument by which the contract appears is wholly unimportant. Thus if the contract appears only in the condition of a bond secured by a penalty, the court will act upon it as an agreement, and will not suffer the party to escape from a specific performance by offering to pay the penalty.³ On the other hand if Courts of Equity refuse to interfere, they inflict no injury upon the plaintiff; for no decision is made which affects his right to proceed at law for any redress by way of damages to which he may be entitled. The whole effect of the dismissal of his suit is that he is barred of any equitable relief.

751 a. Courts of Equity will also in allowing or denying a specific performance look not only to the nature of the transaction but also to the character of the parties who have entered into the contract. Thus if the purchase be made by trustees for the benefit of a cestui que trust, and there be a substantial misdescription of the premises, Courts of Equity will not enforce against them a specific performance with compensation, as being prejudicial to the cestui que trust and incapable of being ascertained.⁴

752. With these explanations in view let us now proceed to examine in the first place in what cases a specific performance will be decreed of contracts respecting lands where they are within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries.⁵

¹ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 4, § 2, p. 191 (7th edit.); *German v. Machin*, 6 Paige, 288.

² *Denton v. Stewart*, 1 Cox, R. 258; *Greenaway v. Adams*, 12 Ves. 395, 400; *Cathcart v. Robinson*, 5 Peters, R. 264.

³ See *Logan v. Wienholt*, 7 Bligh, R. 1, 49, 50; ante, § 715; *Ensign v. Kellogg*, 4 Pick. 1.

⁴ *White v. Cudden*, 8 Clarke & Fin. 766.

⁵ Throughout this discussion I have freely availed myself of Mr. Wooddeson's excellent lecture upon the same subject. See 3 Wooddes. Lect. (Lect. 57), p. 420, &c. to p. 443; of Sir Edward Sugden's learned treatise on Vendors and Purchasers, ch. 4, § 2, pp. 99 to 120 (7th edit.); 1 Sugden on Vendors, ch. 4, § 3, pp. 326 to 354 (10th edit.); of Mr. Newland on Contracts, ch. 10, and of the notes of Mr. Fonblanque (1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, notes (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)).

(a) *Moore v. Crowder*, 72 Ala. 79; *Irwin v. Baily*, Ib. 467. See post, § 769.

That statute¹ which has been generally re-enacted or adopted in America declares, 'That all interests in lands, tenements, and hereditaments, except leases for three years, not put in writing and signed by the parties or their agents authorized by writing, shall not have nor be deemed in law or equity to have any greater force or effect than leases on estates at will.' It further enacts, 'That no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage, or upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning the same, or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party or his lawful agent.' By the same statute declarations of trust created by the parties are to be in writing; but trusts resulting by implication of law are to remain as they stood before the passing of the act.²

753. The objects of this statute are such as the very title indicates, to prevent the fraudulent setting up of pretended agreements and then supporting them by perjury. But besides these direct objects there is a manifest policy in requiring all contracts of an important nature to be reduced to writing, since otherwise, from the imperfection of memory and the honest mistakes of witnesses, it must often happen either that the specific contract is incapable of exact proof, or that it is unintentionally varied from its precise original terms. So sensible were Courts of Equity of these mischiefs that they constantly refused, before the statute, to decree a specific performance of parol contracts unless confessed by the party in his answer, or they are in part performed.³

¹ 29 Car. II. ch. 3.

² 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, pp. 420, 421.

³ Greenleaf on Evidence, § 262. See *Rondeau v. Wyatt*, 2 H. Bl. 68; *Child v. Comber*, 3 Swanst. R. 423, note; *Pembroke v. Thorpe*, 3 Swanst. R. 437, note. Sir Edward Sugden, in his learned treatise on Vendors and Purchasers, ch. 4, § 2, pp. 107, 108 (7th edit.), has reviewed the cases and stated the result. I shall give it in his own words: 'There are four cases in Tothill, which arose previously to the Statute of Frauds, and appear to be applicable to the point under consideration; for equity, even before the Statute of Frauds, would not execute a mere parol agreement, not in part performed. In the first case (*Williams v. Neville*, Tothill, 135), which was heard in the 38th of Eliz., relief was denied, "because it was but a preparation for an action upon the case." In the two next cases (*Ferne v. Bullosk*, Toth. 206, 228; *Clark v. Hackwell*, *ibid.*), which came on in the 9th of Jac. I., parol agreements were

754. It is obvious that Courts of Equity are bound as much as Courts of Law by the provisions of this statute; and therefore they are not at liberty to disregard them. (a) That they do however interfere in some cases within the reach of the statute is equally certain. But they do so not upon any notion of any right to dispense with it, but for the purpose of administering equities subservient to its true objects or collateral to it and independent of it.

755. In the the first place then Courts of Equity will enforce a specific performance of a contract within the statute, not in writing, where it is fully set forth in the bill and is confessed by the answer of the defendant.¹ (b) The reason given for this

enforced apparently on account of the payment of very trifling parts of the purchase-money; but the particular circumstances of these cases do not appear. The last case reported in Tothill (*Miller v. Blandist*, Toth. 85) was decided in the 30th of Jac. I., and the facts are distinctly stated. The bill was to be relieved concerning a promise to assure land of inheritance, of which there had not been any execution, but only 55s. paid in hand, and the bill was dismissed. This point received a similar determination in the next case on the subject before the statute, which is reported in 1 Chan. Rep., and was determined in the 15th of Charles II. (*Simmons v. Cornelius*, 1 Chan. Rep. 128). So the same doctrine was adhered to in a case which occurred three years afterwards, and is reported in Freeman (*Anon.* 2 Freem. R. 128); for although a parol agreement for a house, with 20s. paid, was decreed without further execution proved, yet it appears by the judgment that the relief would not have been granted if the defendant, the vendor, had demurred to the bill, which he had neglected to do, but had proceeded to proof. The last case I have met with, previously to the statute, was decided in the 21st of Car. II. (*Voll v. Smith*, 3 Chan. R. 16), and there a parol agreement upon which only 20s. were paid was carried into specific execution. This case probably turned, like the one immediately preceding it, on the neglect of the defendants to demur to the bill. It must be admitted that the foregoing decisions are not easily reconcilable; yet the result of them clearly is, that payment of a trifling part of the purchase-money was not a part performance of a parol agreement. Whether payment of a considerable sum would have availed a purchaser does not appear. In Toth. 67, a case is thus stated: "Moyle v. Horne, by reason 200l. was deposited towards payment, decreed." This case may perhaps be deemed an authority, that prior to the statute the payment of a substantial part of the purchase-money would have enabled equity to specifically perform a parol agreement; but it certainly is too vague to be relied on.' *Id.* p. 120.

¹ *Attorney-Gen. v. Sitwell*, 1 Younge & Coll. R. 583. In such a case if

(a) *Wheeler v. Reynolds*, 66 N. Y. 227. It seems that a bill cannot be maintained to enforce the specific performance of a duty to make a contract in writing, which would otherwise be

within the Statute of Frauds. *Marcus v. Boston*, 136 Mass. 350.

(b) *Houser v. Lamont*, 55 Penn. St. 311; *Artz v. Grove*, 21 Md. 456; *Kirksey v. Kirksey*, 30 Ga. 156.

decision is that the statute is designed to guard against fraud and perjury; and in such a case there can be no danger of that sort. The case then is taken entirely out of the mischief intended to be guarded against by the statute.¹ Perhaps another reason might fairly be added; and that is that the agreement, although originally by parol, is now in part evidenced by writing under the signature of the party, which is a complete compliance with the terms of the statute. If such an agreement were originally by parol, but it was afterwards reduced to writing by the parties, no one would doubt its obligatory force.² Indeed if the defendant does not insist on the defence he may fairly be deemed to waive it; and the rule is, 'Quisque renuntiare potest juri pro se introducto.'³

the defendant should die before a decree, upon a bill of revivor against the heir a specific performance by him would be decreed (*Attorney-Gen. v. Day*, 1 Ves. 221); for the principle goes throughout, and equally binds the representative as well as the ancestor. *Ibid.*; *Lacon v. Mertins*, 3 Atk. 3; ante, § 740.

¹ *Attorney-Gen. v. Day*, 1 Ves. 221; *Croyston v. Baynes*, 1 Eq. Abridg. 19; s. c. *Prec. Ch.* 208; *Symondson v. Tweed*, *Prec. Ch.* 374; *Lacon v. Mertins*, 3 Atk. 3; *Child v. Godolphin*, 1 Dick. R. 39; s. c. cited 2 Bro. Ch. R. 564; *Gunter v. Halsey*, *Ambler*, R. 586; *Whitchurch v. Bevis*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 566, 567; *Cottingham v. Fletcher*, 2 Atk. 155; *Spurrier v. Fitzgerald*, 6 Ves. 548, 555; *Gilb. Lex Prætor.* 237, 238; *Attorney-Gen. v. Sitwell*, 1 *Younge & Coll. R.* 583; post, §§ 770, 770 b.

² Lord Bathurst however, in *Eyre v. Popham* (*Lofft's Rep.* 808, 809), held that a parol agreement not in part performed could not be carried into execution, although confessed by the answer, saying that the court could not repeal the Statute of Frauds. See *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 4, § 2, p. 99 (7th edit.). *The London and Birmingham Railway Company v. Winter*, 1 *Craig & Phillips*, 57, 62. Lord Rosslyn, in *Rondeau v. Wyatt* (2 H. Bl. 68), speaking on the subject of the cases of parol agreements, confessed by the answer of the defendant, said: 'It is said in these cases, and has been adopted in the argument, that when the defendant confesses the agreement there is no danger of perjury, which was the only thing the statute intended to prevent. But this seems to be very bad reasoning; for the calling upon a party to answer a parol agreement certainly lays him under a great temptation to commit perjury. But though the preventing perjury was one, it was not the sole object of the statute. Another object was to lay down a clear and positive rule to determine when the contract of sale should be complete.' This last reason has great force; but it is questionable if the statute had in view so much the prevention of perjury in the party defendant as the prevention of it in witnesses. There is always some temptation in the defendant to commit perjury in his answer in all cases where his interest is concerned; nevertheless he is required generally to answer on oath all facts charged in the bill. Mr. *Fonblanque's* note on this subject is very able and satisfactory. 1 *Foubl. Eq. B.* 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (d).

³ *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 10, p. 201; *Rondeau v. Wyatt*, 2 H. Bl. 68;

756. The case which we have now been considering is that of a parol agreement confessed by the answer, where the answer does not insist upon the Statute of Frauds as a defence. But suppose the answer confesses the parol agreement and insists upon the Statute of Frauds as a defence and bar to the suit; the question then arises whether Courts of Equity will allow the statute, under such circumstances, as a bar; or whether they will, notwithstanding the statute, decree a specific performance upon the ground of the confession. Upon this question there has been no small conflict of judicial opinion. Lord Macclesfield expressly decreed a specific performance where the parol agreement was confessed by the answer and the Statute of Frauds was insisted on as a defence.¹ Lord Hardwicke appears to have entertained the same opinion, although perhaps he was not called upon finally to adjudicate it.²

757. But later judges in equity have expressed a strong dissatisfaction with this opinion; and it may now be deemed to be entirely overruled, and the doctrine firmly established, that even where the answer confesses the parol agreement, if it insists by way of defence upon the protection of the statute, the defence must prevail as a competent bar.³ This doctrine seems con-

Spurrier v. Fitzgerald, 6 Ves. 548; 1 Foulb. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (d); *Flagg v. Mann*, 2 Sumner's R. 489, 528, 529.

¹ *Child v. Godolphin*, 1 Dick. 39; s. c. cited 2 Bro. Ch. R. 566; *Child v. Comber*, 3 Swanst. R. 423, note.

² *Cottington v. Fletcher*, 2 Atk. 155, 156; *Lacon v. Mertins*, 3 Atk. 3. It is not quite certain that this was Lord Hardwicke's opinion. The case of *Cottington v. Fletcher* (2 Atk. R. 156) might perhaps have turned upon a point of pleading. But the dictum in *Lacon v. Mertins* (3 Atk. 3) seems direct. Lord Loughborough, in *Moore v. Edwards* (4 Ves. 24), said: 'There is a case in Atkyns that misleads people, where Lord Hardwicke is stated to have overruled the defence upon the statute, merely on the ground that the agreement was admitted. I had occasion to look into that; and it is a complete misstatement. It appears by Lord Hardwicke's own notes that it was upon the agreement having been in part executed that he determined the case.' See also Sugden on Vendors, ch. 4, § 2, p. 100 (7th edit.); *Evans v. Harris*, 2 V. & Beam. R. 361; *Morrison v. Turnour*, 18 Ves. 175; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 265 to 268.

³ See Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 265 to 268; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 4, § 2, pp. 98, 100, 101, 102 (7th edit.); 1 Sugden on Vendors, ch. 3, § 6, n. 10, p. 197 (10th edit.); Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, p. 439; *Newland on Contr.* ch. 10, pp. 197 to 201; 1 Foulb. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (d); *Thompson v. Todd*, 1 Peters, Circuit R. 380. Mr. Baron Eyre in *Eyre v. Ivison and Stewart v. Careless*, in 1785 (cited 2 Bro. Ch. R. 563, 564), and *Walters v.*

formable to the true intent and objects of the statute; for it is difficult to perceive how a party can be legally bound by a contract which the statute declares to be invalid, when the party insists upon the objection and does not submit to waive it. It has been forcibly said by a great judge in equity that it is immaterial what admissions are made by a defendant who insists upon the benefit of the statute; for he throws it upon the plaintiff to show a complete written agreement; and it can be no more thrown upon the defendant to supply defects in the agreement than to supply the want of an agreement.¹ The same doctrine seems now fully recognized in America.² (a)

758. It follows from what has been already said that if the answer denies the existence of any parol contract, and insists upon the benefit of the statute, the case cannot be made out by parol evidence, and that the bar is complete. This would seem to be sufficiently clear upon principle. But the question having been at one time made, it is no longer a matter of mere principle, but it stands confirmed by the highest authority.³ A question however of a different sort, but connected with this subject, has also been much discussed; and that is whether to a bill for discovery and relief upon the ground of a parol agreement the statute can be pleaded as a bar to the discovery of the fact of such agreement; or in other words whether the plea must not state, not only that there was no agreement in writing, but also

Morgan, 2 Cox, R. 369, decided the point directly in favor of the bar of the statute under such circumstances. That also appears to have been the opinion of Lord Thurlow. *Whitbread v. Brockhurst*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 416, and Mr. Belt's note; and *Whitchurch v. Bevis*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 559, 568, 569. Lord Rosslyn held the same opinion. *Rondeau v. Wyatt*, 2 H. Bl. 68; *Moore v. Edwards*, 4 Ves. 23; *Cooth v. Jackson*, 6 Ves. 17. So Lord Eldon in *Cooth v. Jackson*, 6 Ves. 37, and *Rowe v. Teed*, 15 Ves. 375; and Sir William Grant in *Blagden v. Bradbear*, 12 Ves. 466, 471.

¹ *Sir William Grant in Blagden v. Bradbear*, 12 Ves. 471.

² See *Thompson v. Todd*, 1 Peters, Circ. R. 388, and the cases cited by Mr. Ingraham in his note to the American edition of Vesey, jr.'s Reports, Vol. III. pp. 38 to 40.

³ *Whaley v. Bagenal*, 6 Bro. Parl. R. 45; s. c. cited 2 Bro. Ch. R. 567, 568; *Whitchurch v. Bevis*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 567; s. c. 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. by Tomlin, 345; *Buckmaster v. Harrop*, 7 Ves. 347; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. R. 408; *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 4 East, R. 577, note; s. c. 1 Eden, R. 515; *Leman v. Whitley*, 4 Russ. R. 423; 2 Sugden on Vendors, p. 138 (9th edit.).

(a) *Lockett v. Williamson*, 37 Mo. 388. See *Auter v. Miller*, 18 Iowa, 405; ante, § 755, note (b).

that there was no such agreement by parol as is charged in the bill. Upon this point some diversity of judicial opinion has also existed, and perhaps it is not now quite put at rest. But as this is rather a matter of pleading than of jurisdiction, it properly belongs to another place.¹

¹ See Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 265 to 268; Beames, Eq. Pl. 176 to 187; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 255, 256; Newl. on Contr. ch. 10, pp. 201 to 204; Story on Equity Pleadings, §§ 763, 766. See also note to 3 Vesey, jr. R. 38 (Amer. edit.). Mr. Fonblanque's note upon this point (1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (d)), as well as upon the preceding, is so valuable that, though long, it deserves to be cited at large in this place. 'If a defendant,' says he, 'confess the agreement charged in the bill, there is certainly no danger of fraud or perjury in decreeing the performance of such agreement. But it is of considerable importance to determine whether the defendant be bound to confess or deny a merely parol agreement not alleged to be in any part executed; or if he do confess it, whether he may not insist on the statute in bar of the performance of it. The cases upon the first point are many in number, various in their circumstances, and the decisions upon them not immediately reconcilable. I shall therefore consider them in their principle rather than in detail. They who insist that the defendant is bound to confess or deny the agreement alleged, principally rely on the rule of equity that the defendant is bound to confess or deny all facts which if confessed would give the plaintiff a claim or title to the relief prayed; and that as equity would decree a parol agreement if confessed, the defendant must confess or deny it. It is certainly a general rule in equity that the defendant shall discover whatever is material to the justice of the plaintiff's case; but in applying this rule to the case of a parol agreement it is previously material to ascertain whether the Statute of Frauds has not in such case relieved the defendant from this general obligation. The prevention of frauds and perjuries is the declared object of the statute; and the decreeing of a parol agreement, when confessed by the defendant, and the statute not insisted on, is evidently consistent with such object: "Nam quisque renuntiare potest juri pro se introducto." But if the defendant be bound to confess or deny the parol agreement, his answer must be either liable to contradiction or not liable to contradiction. If the defendant's answer be liable to contradiction by evidence aliunde, the evil arising from contradictory evidence which the statute proposed to guard against would necessarily result. If the defendant's answer be not liable to contradiction by evidence aliunde, the rule would furnish a temptation to perjury, by giving the defendant a certain interest in denying the agreement, since if he confessed it he would be bound to perform it. If the defendant be bound to confess or deny the parol agreement insisted on by the plaintiff, one of the above consequences must necessarily ensue; which of the two is likely to prove the most mischievous, were perhaps difficult to decide; for though the perjury which might take place if contradictory evidence were allowed is an evil of considerable size, yet the defendant's being liable to be contradicted might operate as a check on his falsely denying that which was truly alleged. It seems however to have been the opinion of Lord Chancellor Thurlow that the only effect of the statute is to preclude the plaintiff from resorting to evidence aliunde for the purpose of substantiating a parol agreement denied by the defendant. Whit-

759. In the next place Courts of Equity will enforce a specific performance of a contract within the statute where the parol agreement has been partly carried into execution.¹ (a) The

church *v.* Bevis, 2 Bro. R. 566. See also Child *v.* Godolphin (1 Dick. R. 39), therein cited by Lord Chancellor Thurlow. Cooth *v.* Jackson, 6 Ves. 39. This rule, which, when the agreement is in no part performed, renders the defendant's answer conclusive, may certainly in some instances prevent fraud; but it is possible that in other instances it may encourage perjury. To strike out the mean by which the spirit of the statute might be preserved, without trenching on its provisions, is certainly difficult, perhaps impossible; for it is clear that the statute intended to prevent fraud as well as perjury, and it cannot be denied that the refusing to execute an agreement deliberately and fairly entered into merely because it was not reduced into writing is a fraud which a court of conscience ought to discourage, but which it cannot discourage if of such an agreement it cannot enforce a discovery. It would ill become me to pursue this point further; the difficulties which I have stated are probably sufficient to explain and justify the contrariety of opinion which has prevailed upon it. It remains however to consider whether a defendant, having confessed the agreement alleged, can protect himself from the performance of it by insisting on the statute. This, which is also *vexata quæstio*, is almost immediately dependent on the former point; for when Lord Macclesfield, in Child *v.* Godolphin, held that the defendant was bound to confess or deny the agreement, it seems to have been a necessary consequence that if the defendant confessed the agreement he should not be allowed to avail himself of the statute; for if he might avail himself of the statute, *cui bono* compel him to confess or deny the agreement? See Cottingham *v.* Fletcher, 2 Atk. 155; Lacon *v.* Mertins, 3 Atk. 1. But see Kingsman *v.* Kingsman, cited in 10 Mod. 404. But if the defendant be not bound to confess or deny the agreement it must be in respect of the statute affording him a good defence against the performance of it; and if such be the effect of the statute, it should seem to be immaterial whether he set up such defence in the shape of a plea or by his answer, the statute not having prescribed any mode in particular by which a defendant must avail himself of such defence. See Stewart *v.* Careless, cited in Whitchurch *v.* Bevis. It may be material here to observe that even the cases which most favor the opinion that Courts of Equity may compel the performance and consequently the discovery of merely parol agreements, require that the terms of such agreement should be clear, definite, and conclusive; and therefore if the courts can collect the *jus deliberandi* or *locus pænitentiae* to have been reserved, the contract shall not be considered as complete till reduced into writing or in part performed. Whaley *v.* Bagenal, 6 Bro. P. C. 45; s. c. 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 345, by Tomlins; Whitchurch *v.* Bevis, 2 Bro. R. 566; Clarke *v.* Grant, 14 Ves. 519; Mortlock *v.* Buller, 10 Ves. 311.⁷

¹ Gilb. *Lex Prætoria*, pp. 239, 240; 1 Fonbl. *Eq. B.* 1, ch. 3, § 8, and note (e).

(a) See for illustrations Potter *v.* 576; Lowry *v.* Buffington, 6 W. Va. Jacobs, 111 Mass. 32; Glass *v.* Hul- 249; Semmes *v.* Worthington, 38 Md. bert, 102 Mass. 24; Northrop *v.* Boom, 298; Pierce *v.* Catron, 23 Gratt. 588; 66 Ill. 368; Fall *v.* Hazebrigg, 45 Ind. Morgan *v.* Berger, 3 Neb. 209; Cole

distinct ground upon which Courts of Equity interfere in cases of this sort is, that otherwise one party would be enabled to practise a fraud upon the other; and it could never be the intention of the statute to enable any party to commit such a fraud with impunity. Indeed fraud in all cases constitutes an answer to the most solemn acts and conveyances; and the objects of the statute are promoted, instead of being obstructed, by such a jurisdiction for discovery and relief.¹ And where one party has executed his part of the agreement in the confidence that the other party would do the same, it is obvious that if the latter should refuse, it would be a fraud upon the former to suffer this refusal to work to his prejudice.² (a)

760. But the more difficult question is to ascertain what, in the sense of Courts of Equity, is to be deemed a part performance, so as to extract the case from the reach of the statute. It seems formerly to have been thought that a deposit, or security, or payment of the purchase-money, or of a part of it, or at least of a considerable part of it, was such a part performance as took the case out of the statute.³ But that doctrine was open to much

¹ See *Attorney-Gen. v. Day*, 1 Ves. 221; *Walker v. Walker*, 2 Atk. 100; *Taylor v. Beech*, 1 Ves. 297; *Buckmaster v. Harrop*, 7 Ves. 346; *Whitbread v. Brockhurst*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 417; s. c. 2 Ves. & B. 153, note; *Hawkins v. Holmes*, 1 P. Will. 770; *Wills v. Stradling*, 3 Ves. 378; *Morphett v. Jones*, 1 Swanst. R. 181; *Hare v. Shearwood*, 1 Ves. jr. 242; *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 41; *Mr. Raithby's note to Hollis v. Edwards*, 1 Vern. R. 159; *Newland on Contr.* ch. 10, pp. 179, 180, 181, 182; *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 266; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, notes (a), (b).

² *Ibid.*; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (e); 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, pp. 433, 434; *Newland on Contr.* ch. 10, pp. 179, 181 to 187.

³ *Hales v. Van Berchem*, 2 Vern. R. 618; *Owen v. Davies*, 1 Ves. 82; *Skett v. Whitmore*, 2 Freem. Ch. R. 281; *Lacon v. Mertins*, 3 Atk. 4; *Main v. Melbourne*, 4 Ves. 720, 724; *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 40, note (a); 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, p. 427.

v. Cole, 41 Md. 301; *Hall v. Whittier*, 10 R. I. 530; *Stratton v. Stratton*, 58 N. H. 473; *Gregg v. Hamilton*, 12 Kans. 133; *Johnson v. Skillman*, 29 Minn. 95; *Johnson v. Bowden*, 37 Tex. 621; *Wiggin v. Wiggin*, 58 N. H. 235.

It seems that in Mississippi part performance of an oral contract will not take a case out of the statute. *McGuire v. Stephens*, 42 Miss. 724.

So in Maine. *Wilton v. Harwood*, 23 Maine, 131. So formerly in Massachusetts. *Buck v. Dowley*, 16 Gray, 555; *Glass v. Hulbert*, 102 Mass. 24, 33.

(a) 'Where an agreement for valuable consideration between two parties has been partially performed, the court ought to do its utmost to carry out that agreement by a decree of specific performance.' Fry, J. in *Hart v. Hart*, 18 Ch. D. 670, 685.

controversy, and is now finally overthrown.¹ (a) Indeed the distinction taken in some of the cases between the payment of a small part and the payment of a considerable part of the purchase-money seems quite too refined and subtle; for independently of the difficulty of saying what shall be deemed a small and what a considerable part of the purchase-money, each must, upon principle, stand upon the same reason, namely, that it is a part performance in both cases, or not in either.² One ground

¹ *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 40, 41; *O'Herlihy v. Hedges*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 129; *Jackson's Assignees v. Cutright*, 5 Munf. R. 318. I am aware that this may seem strong language. But the direct decisions and dicta in some cases in former times (see 1 Freem. R. 486, Case, 664 (b); *Leak v. Morrice*, 2 Ch. Cas. 135; *Alsopp v. Patten*, 1 Vern. R. 472; *Seagood v. Meale*, Prec. Ch. 560; *Pengall v. Ross*, 2 Eq. Abr. 46, Pl. 12), and the positive decision of Lord Redesdale on the point in *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 41, 42, seem to justify it. Mr. Sugden has collected all the authorities in an able manner, with a very clear commentary, in his *Treatise on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 3, pp. 107 to 112 (7th edit.); 1 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 7, note 10, p. 202 (10th edit.), and holds the same opinion. Mr. Newland manifestly inclines to the same opinion. *Newland on Contr.* ch. 10, pp. 187 to 191. There are also other modern cases in which the contrary doctrine has been treated as doubtful. See *Buckmaster v. Harrop*, 7 Ves. 341, 346; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 234, 240; *Frame v. Dawson*, 14 Ves. 388; *Ex parte Hooper*, 1 Meriv. R. 7, 8; s. c. 19 Ves. 479, 480; 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 1*, ch. 3, § 8, note (e).

² Mr. Sugden has made some striking remarks on this subject in his *Treatise on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 3, p. 112 (7th edit.); 1 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 7, note 10, p. 209 (10th edit.), which deserves to be cited. 'On this subject,' says he, 'Sir William Grant's admirable judgment in *Butcher v. Butcher* must occur to every discerning mind. It turns on a subject so applicable to the present that his arguments, with a slight alteration, directly bear upon it. To say that a considerable share of the purchase-money must be given is rather to raise a question than to establish a rule. What is a considerable share, and what is a trifling sum? Is it to be judged of upon a mere statement of the sum paid, without reference to the amount of the purchase-money? If so, what is the sum that must be given to call for the interference of the court? What is the limit of amount at which it ceases to be trifling and begins to be substantial? If it is to be considered with reference to the amount of the purchase-money, what is the proportion which ought to be paid? Mr. Booth also was impressed with this difficulty, although his sentiments are not so forcibly expressed. Where, he asks, will you strike the line? And who shall settle the quantum that shall suffice in payment of part of any purchase-money to draw the case out of the statute, or ascertain what shall be deemed so trifling as to leave the case within it?'

(a) *Cuppy v. Hixon*, 29 Ind. 522; *Barnes v. Boston R. Co.*, 130 Mass. Ann Berta Lodge *v. Leverton*, 42 Tex. 18; *Cronk v. Trumble*, 66 Ill. 428; *Horn v. Ludington*, 32 Wis. 73; *Webster v. Gray*, 37 Mich. 37.

why part payment is not now deemed a part performance, sufficient to take a case out of the statute, is that the money can be recovered back again at law, and therefore the case admits of full and direct compensation.¹ This ground is not however quite satisfactory; for the party may become insolvent before the judgment at law can be executed. (a) Another ground has been stated which certainly has more strength in it. It is that the statute has said in another clause (that which respects contracts for goods) that part payment, by way of earnest, shall operate as a part performance. And hence the courts have considered this clause as excluding agreements for lands; because it is to be inferred that when the legislature said it should bind in the case of goods, and were silent as to the case of lands, they meant that it should not bind in the case of lands.² (b)

761. But a more general ground, and that which ought to be the governing rule in cases of this sort, is that nothing is to be considered as a part performance which does not put the party into a situation which is a fraud upon him, unless the agreement is fully performed.³ (c) Thus for instance if upon a parol agreement a man is admitted into possession, he is made a trespasser, and is liable to answer as a trespasser, if there be no agreement valid in law or equity. Now for the purpose of defending himself against a charge as a trespasser, and a suit to account for the profits in such a case, the evidence of a parol agreement would

¹ Ibid.

² *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 40, 41; *Pengal v. Ross*, 2 Eq. Abr. 46, pl. 12.

³ *Id.*; *Savage v. Foster*, 9 Mod. 37.

(a) See *Chastain v. Smith*, 30 Ga. 96.

(b) Services of a child rendered on the faith of a parol promise to give him a farm on the promisor's death are part performance. *Davison v. Davison*, 2 Beasl. 246; *Lamb v. Hinman*, 46 Mich. 112; *Cole v. Pilkington*, L. R. 19 Eq. 174, 178; *Loffus v. Maw*, 3 Giff. 592; *Lorentz v. Lorentz*, 14 W. Va. 761. See *infra*, § 763, note (c).

(c) *Purcell v. Miner*, 4 Wall. 513; *Barnes v. Boston R. Co.*, 130 Mass.

388; *Gilbert v. East Newark Co.*, 1 Beasl. 180; *Cuppy v. Hixon*, 29 Ind. 522; *Pierce v. Catron*, 23 Gratt. 588; *Glass v. Hulbert*, 102 Mass. 24; *Williams v. Evans*, L. R. 19 Eq. 547; *Peckham v. Barker*, 8 R. I. 17; *Mims v. Lockett*, 33 Ga. 9; *Wheeler v. Reynolds*, 66 N. Y. 227; *Seaman v. Aschermann*, 51 Wis. 678. The mere non-performance of a contract does not constitute fraud. *Ahrend v. Odiorne*, 118 Mass. 261; *Campbell v. Dearborn*, 109 Mass. 130, 140; *Brightman v. Hicks*, 108 Mass. 246.

seem to be admissible for his protection; and if admissible for such a purpose, there seems no reason why it should not be admissible throughout.¹ (a) A case still more cogent might be put, where a vendee, upon a parol agreement for a sale of land, should proceed to build a house on the land, in the confidence of a due completion of the contract. In such a case there would be a manifest fraud upon the party in permitting the vendor to escape from a due and strict fulfilment of such agreement.² (b) Such a case is certainly distinguishable from that of part payment of the purchase-money; for the latter may be repaid, and the parties are then just where they were before, especially if the money is repaid with interest. A man who has parted with his money is not in the situation of a man against whom an action may be brought, and who may otherwise suffer an irreparable injury.³

762. In order to make the acts such as a Court of Equity will deem part performance of an agreement within the statute, it is essential that they should clearly appear to be done solely with a view to the agreement being performed. For if they are acts which might have been done with other views, they will not take the case out of the statute, since they cannot properly be said to be done by way of part performance of the agreement.⁴ (c) On

¹ *Id.* and *Foxcroft v. Lister*, cited *Prec. Ch.* 519; 2 *Vern.* 456; *Pengall v. Ross*, 2 *Eq. Abr.* 46, Pl. 12; post, § 763.

² *Foxcroft v. Lister*, cited 2 *Vern. R.* 456; *Prec. Ch.* 519; *Wetmore v. White*, 1 *Cain. Cas. Er.* 87; *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 14 *John. Rep.* 15.

³ *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 *Sch. & Lefr.* 41, 42. See *Sutherland v. Briggs*, 1 *Hare, R.* 26.

⁴ *Gunter v. Halsey*, *Ambl. R.* 586; s. c. 1 *West. R.* 681; *Lacon v. Mertins*,

(a) See *Middleton v. Selby*, 19 *W. Va.* 167 (possession and part payment of purchase price).

(b) See *Peckham v. Barker*, 8 *R. I.* 17; *Mims v. Lockett*, 33 *Ga.* 9, as to the extent of the improvements necessary.

(c) *Knoll v. Harvey*, 19 *Wis.* 99; *Lester v. Kinne*, 37 *Conn.* 9; *Jacobs v. Peterborough R. Co.*, 8 *Cush.* 223; *Purcell v. Miner*, 4 *Wall.* 513; *Wheeler v. Reynolds*, 66 *N. Y.* 227; *Pike v. Pettus*, 71 *Ala.* 98. The acts relied upon should be such as to give a mu-

tual right to performance. *Smith v. McVeigh*, 3 *Stockt.* 239; *Irwin v. Baily*, 72 *Ala.* 467; *Moore v. Crowder*, *Ib.* 79; *Railroad Co. v. Telegraph Co.*, 38 *Ohio St.* 24; ante, § 723. And it is held that the part performance must be by the plaintiff. *Caton v. Caton*, *L. R.* 1 *Ch.* 137. Hence the fact that the defendant has made a will in pursuance of an oral antenuptial contract will not, it is considered, take the case out of the statute. *Ib.* But see *Lowe v. Bryant*, 30 *Ga.* 528. And see *Whitridge v. Parkhurst*, 20 *Md.* 62.

this account acts merely introductory or ancillary to an agreement are not considered as a part performance thereof, although they should be attended with expense. Therefore delivering an abstract of title, giving directions for conveyances, going to view the estate, fixing upon an appraiser to value stock, making valuations, admeasuring the lands, registering conveyances, and acts of the like nature, are not sufficient to take a case out of the statute.¹ They are all preliminary proceedings; and are besides of an equivocal character, and capable of a double interpretation; whereas acts to be deemed a part performance should be so clear, certain, and definite in their object and design as to refer exclusively to a complete and perfect agreement, of which they are a part execution.² (a)

3 Atk. 4; *Ex parte Hooper*, 19 Ves. 479; *Morphett v. Jones*, 1 Swanst. R. 181; *Phillips v. Thompson*, 1 John. Ch. R. 149; *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 283, 284, 285; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (e).

¹ *Hawkins v. Holmes*, 1 P. Will. 770; *Pembroke v. Thorpe*, 3 Swanst. R. 437; *Clark v. Wright*, 1 Atk. 12; *Whitbread v. Brockhurst*, 1 Bro. Ch. 412; *Whitchurch v. Bevis*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 559, 566; *Redding v. Wilkes*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 400; *Cooth v. Jackson*, 6 Ves. 17; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 3, p. 104 (7th edit.); *Stokes v. Moore*, 1 Cox, R. 219; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (c); *Newland on Contr.* ch. 10, pp. 196, 197; *Frame v. Dawson*, 14 Ves. 386.

² *Ibid.*

(a) A verbal agreement for the sale of lands or of an interest therein may be enforced in either of two cases: first, when that agreement has been partly performed; and secondly, when to declare the agreement invalid would work a fraud upon the plaintiff. To the first of these cases there is one exception, to wit, where the act of part performance consists merely in the payment of money; and the explanation of this appears to be founded on the statute itself. *Supra*, § 760, at the end. To the second case there are probably no exceptions.

The distinction between the two cases is often lost; the second case being commonly treated as the test of the right to specific performance. The question asked is, whether under the circumstances it would work a fraud upon the plaintiff to treat the contract

as invalid; and this in cases which are in the proper sense cases of part performance of the agreement. It is often said e. g. that for the purchaser to take possession is to make the oral contract good on the ground that, after such act, to treat the contract as invalid would be to expose the party who had entered to liability as a trespasser, and that would be a fraud. *Supra*, § 761. But that appears to be incorrect; for though the contract should be treated as invalid both at law and in equity, it would not be absolutely void. If void, part performance could not make it good. In reality it would simply be voidable as a contract; it would be perfectly good as a license to enter. An oral license to enter lands is as good as a written license; and hence the party could not be treated as a trespasser. The true

763. In like manner the mere possession of the land contracted for will not be deemed a part performance if it be obtained wrongfully by the vendee, or if it be wholly independent of the contract. (a) Thus if the vendee enter into possession, not under the contract but in violation of it, as a trespasser, the case is not taken out of the statute. So if the vendee be a tenant in possession under the vendor; for his possession is properly referable to his tenancy, and not to the contract.¹ (b) But if the possession

¹ *Cole v. White*, cited 1 Bro. Ch. R. 409; *Wills v. Stradling*, 3 Ves. 378; *Smith v. Turner*, Prec. Ch. 561; *Savage v. Carroll*, 1 B. & Beatt. 265, 282; *Frame v. Dawson*, 14 Ves. 386; *Lindsay v. Lynch*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 1; *O'Reilly v. Thompson*, 2 Cox, R. 271; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (e); *Morphett*

reason why entering into possession takes the contract out of the operation of the statute appears to be that it is part performance of the contract.

This is borne out by the authorities concerning continued possession. Where there is no new taking of possession, but a continuance after the contract, the presumption is that the continuance is not based on the new contract but upon the previously granted right. But this presumption may be controlled by evidence; it may be shown by evidence other than the fact of continued possession — not by that alone — that the further holding was in reality due to the new agreement entirely. *Spear v. Orendorf*, 26 Md. 37. Evidence e. g. that the lessor received the new rent upon the footing of the oral agreement, or that the tenant paid the same 'as part and parcel of the agreement' will be sufficient to avoid the statute. *Ib.*

Outlays for repairs or improvements, on the other hand, are not necessarily part performance, for the oral contract may not call for them. The possession taken before the outlays was part performance, and the outlays make a case within the second class. It would work a fraud on the purchaser who has expended money upon the estate, to be turned out; at least if he has made the expenditure

in good faith and not against the consent of the vendor, to 'improve him out of his estate.' See *Nunn v. Fabian*, L. R. 1 Ch. 35, 40, that outlays are not, properly speaking, part performance.

(a) So, it is said, if it consist merely in going on the land and ploughing a few hours. *Goetchius v. Sanborn*, 46 Mich. 330. *Contra*, *Ungley v. Ungley*, 4 Ch. D. 73, 76, *Malins*, V. C.

(b) *Rosenthal v. Freeburger*, 26 Md. 75; *Mahana v. Blunt*, 20 Iowa, 142; *Peckham v. Barker*, 8 R. I. 17; *Crawford v. Wick*, 18 Ohio St. 190; *Barues v. Boston R. Co.*, 130 Mass. 388; *Conner v. Fitzgerald*, 11 L. R. Ir. 106; *Breunan v. Bolton*, 2 Drn. & War. 354. But this inference may be controlled, as has been stated supra, note at end of § 762. *Spear v. Orendorf*, 26 Md. 37. If the verbal agreement include other premises besides those of which the plaintiff is already in possession, and he takes possession of them, that will be part performance as to all, it seems. *Nunn v. Fabian*, L. R. 1 Ch. 35. See also in regard to continued possession *Pain v. Coombs*, 1 DeG. & J. 34, 46; and compare cases of the estoppel of a tenant, on continued possession, to deny his landlord's title. *Bigelow, Estoppel*, 409-417 (3d edit.).

be delivered and obtained solely under the contract, or if in case of a tenancy the nature of the holding be different from the original tenancy, as by the payment of a higher rent, (a) or by other unequivocal circumstances referable solely and exclusively to the contract, (b) there the possession may take the case out of the statute. Especially will it be held to do so where the party let into possession has expended money in building, or repairs, or other improvements; for under such circumstances, if the parol contract were to be deemed a nullity, he would be liable to be treated as a trespasser; and the expenditures would not only operate to his prejudice, but be the direct result of a fraud practised upon him.¹ (c)

764. But in order to take a case out of the statute upon the ground of part performance of a parol contract, it is not only indispensable that the acts done should be clear and definite, and

v. Jones, 1 Swanst. R. 181; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 3, § 3, pp. 104, 105 (7th edit.); 1 Sugden on Vendors, ch. 3, § 7, n. 5 and 6, pp. 200, 201 (10th edit.); 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, pp. 424 to 426.

¹ *Butcher v. Staples*, 1 Vern. 363; *Pike v. Williams*, 2 Vern. 455; *Lockey v. Lockey*, Prec. Ch. 518; *Earl of Aylesford's case*, 2 Str. R. 783; *Binstead v. Coleman*, Bunb. R. 65; *Lacon v. Mertins*, 3 Atk. 1; *Wills v. Stradling*, 3 Ves. 378; *Kine v. Balfe*, 2 B. & Beatt. R. 348; *Denton v. Stewart*, 1 Cox, R. 258; *Gregory v. Mighell*, 18 Ves. 328; *Morphett v. Jones*, 1 Swanst. R. 172; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 3, § 3, pp. 104, 105 (7th edit.); 1 Sug. on Vend. ch. 3, § 7, n. 5 and 6, pp. 200, 201 (10th edit.); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (e); *Id.* § 9; ante, § 761.

(a) *Conner v. Fitzgerald*, 11 L. R. Ir. 106; *Spear v. Orendorf*, 26 Md. 37; *Nunn v. Fabian*, L. R. 1 Ch. 35.

(b) *In re Cooke*, 7 L. R. Ir. 99.

(c) *McDowell v. Lucas*, 97 Ill. 489; *Bohannon v. Bohannon*, *Id.* 591; *Blunt v. Tomlin*, 27 Ill. 93; *How v. Rogers*, 32 Texas, 218; *Morrison v. Peay*, 21 Ark. 110; *Watson v. Mahan*, 20 Ind. 223. It is not necessary, in order to take a case out of the statute, that a consideration should exist for the oral agreement; a volunteer who has been induced to take possession and make important outlays by the defendant's promise to convey or lease may require specific performance. *Neale v. Neales*, 9 Wall. 1; *Galbraith v. Galbraith*, 5 Kans. 402; *Kurtz v. Hibner*,

55 Ill. 514; *Bright v. Bright*, 41 Ill. 97; *Lobdell v. Lobdell*, 36 N. Y. 327; *Freeman v. Freeman*, 43 N. Y. 34; *Johnston v. Johnston*, 19 Iowa, 74; *Burkholder v. Ludlan*, 30 Gratt. 255. See *Thorne v. Thorne*, 18 Ind. 462. As where a son enters upon land of his father and makes improvements upon a promise by the father to convey the land to him. *Lorentz v. Lorentz*, 14 W. Va. 761; *Dowling v. Bergin*, 47 Mich. 188; *Willis v. Matthews*, 46 Texas, 478.

Concerning mixed possession between the parties see *Holmes v. Holmes*, 44 Ill. 168; *Watson v. Mahan*, 20 Ind. 223; *Littlefield v. Littlefield*, 51 Wis. 23.

referable exclusively to the contract; but the contract should also be established by competent proofs to be clear, definite, and unequivocal in all its terms. (a) If the terms are uncertain or ambiguous, or not made out by satisfactory proofs, a specific performance will not (as indeed upon principle it should not) be decreed. The reason would seem obvious enough; for a Court

(a) See among a multitude of cases *Lynes v. Hayden*, 119 Mass. 482; *Cunningham v. Blake*, 121 Mass. 333; *Blanchard v. Detroit R. Co.*, 31 Mich. 43; *Wright v. Wright*, *Ib.* 380; *Shropshire v. Brown*, 45 Ga. 175; *Huff v. Shepard*, 58 Mo. 242; *Allen v. Webb*, 64 Ill. 342; *Reese v. Reese*, 41 Md. 554; *McClintock v. Laing*, 22 Mich. 212; *Nichols v. Williams*, 7 C. E. Green, 63; *Potts v. Whitehead*, 5 C. E. Green, 55; *Tiernan v. Gibney*, 24 Wis. 190; *Camden R. R. Co. v. Stewart*, 3 C. E. Green, 489; *Hyde v. Cooper*, 13 Rich. Eq. 250; *Ferris v. Irving*, 28 Cal. 645; *McGuire v. Stevens*, 42 Miss. 724; *Munsell v. Loree*, 21 Mich. 491; *Whelan v. Sullivan*, 102 Mass. 204; *Carr v. Passaic Land Co.*, 7 C. E. Green, 85; *Welsh v. Bayand*, 6 C. E. Green, 186; *Gelston v. Sigmund*, 27 Md. 334; *Myers v. Forbes*, 24 Md. 598; *Goodman v. Randall*, 44 Conn. 321 (reforming defective deed); *McCarnack v. Sage*, 87 Ill. 484 (the same); *Mathews v. Jarrett*, 20 W. Va. 415; *Race v. Weston*, 86 Ill. 91.

Contracts for the making or renewal of leases afford a good illustration. All the terms of such contracts must be clear and certain. Ante, § 722, note *b*. Thus an executory agreement in writing for a lease does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds unless it can be collected on what day the term is to begin; and there is no inference that the term is to begin from the date of the agreement in the absence of language to that effect. *Marshall v. Berridge*, 19 Ch. D. 233 (overruling *Jaques v. Millar*, 6 Ch. D. 153); *Nesham v. Selby*, L. R. 7 Ch.

406; *Cartwright v. Miller*, 36 L. T. n. s. 398; *Wyse v. Russell*, 11 L. R. Ir. 173 ('If you, at the end of six months, require a lease for thirty-one years or under, you shall have it' held within the rule of *Marshall v. Berridge*); *Blore v. Sutton*, 3 Mer. 237. So where the duration of the lease is uncertain. *Myers v. Forbes*, 24 Md. 598; *Morrison v. Rossignol*, 5 Cal. 64. So too where the amount to be paid as rent is uncertain. *Howard v. Carpenter*, 11 Md. 278; *Pray v. Clark*, 113 Mass. 283; *Morrison v. Rossignol*, supra; *Hopkins v. Gilman*, 22 Wis. 476; *Tracy v. Albany Exch. Co.*, 3 Seld. 472, 474. And so where the terms of the lease (or other contract) are to be left to the agreement of the parties, or to arbitration. *Tracy v. Albany Exch. Co.*, supra; *Western Transp. Co. v. Lansing*, 49 N. Y. 499, 505; *Abeel v. Radcliff*, 13 Johns. 297; *Noyes v. Marsh*, 123 Mass. 286; *Pearl v. Harris*, 121 Mass. 390; *Vickers v. Vickers*, L. R. 4 Eq. 529; *Hopkins v. Gilman*, 22 Wis. 476; *Tobey v. Bristol*, 3 Story, 800; *McKibbin v. Brown*, 1 McCart. 13, 19; *Huff v. Shepard*, 58 Mo. 242; infra, § 767, note. So if it cannot be ascertained from the writings, where the contract is in writing, who is to be the lessor. *Williams v. Jordan*, 6 Ch. D. 517; *Warner v. Willington*, 3 Drew. 523, 530. See further *Whitlock v. Duffield*, Hoff. Ch. 110; s. c. 26 Wend. 55; *Kelso v. Kelly*, 1 Daly, 419; *Arnot v. Alexander*, 44 Mo. 25 (sed qu. as to this case; see *Tobey v. Bristol*, supra); *Hudson v. Buck*, 7 Ch. D. 682; *Rishton v. Whatmore*, 8 Ch. D. 467; *Williams v. Briscoe*, 22 Ch. D. 441.

of Equity ought not to act upon conjectures, and one of the most important objects of the statute was to prevent the introduction of loose and indeterminate proofs of what ought to be established by solemn written contracts. Yet it is certain that in former times very able judges felt themselves at liberty to depart from such a reasonable course of adjudication, and granted relief notwithstanding the uncertainty of the terms of the contract. In other words the court framed a contract for the parties *ex æquo et bono*, where it found none.¹ Such a latitude of jurisdiction seems unwarrantable upon any sound principle, and accordingly it has been expressly renounced in more recent times.² It may perhaps be true that in such cases of part performance the court will not be deterred from making an inquiry before a master into the terms of the contract by the mere fact that all the terms are not sufficiently before the court to enable it to make a final decree.³ (a) But if such an inquiry should end in leaving

¹ *Anon.* 5 Vin. Abr. 523, Pl. 40; *Id.* 522, Pl. 38; *Anon.*, cited 6 Ves. 470; *Allan v. Bower*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 149.

² See *Boardman v. Mostyn*, 6 Ves. 467, 470; *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 22, 40; *Symondson v. Tweed*, Prec. Ch. 374; *Forster v. Hale*, 3 Ves. 712, 713; *Savage v. Carroll*, 1 B. & Beatt. 265, 551; s. c. 2 B. & Beatt. 451; *Toole v. Medicott*, 1 B. & Beatt. 404; *Phillips v. Thompson*, 1 John. Ch. R. 149, 150; *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 283 to 286; *Lindsay v. Lynch*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 6.

³ *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 3, pp. 114 to 118 (7th edit.); 1 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 7, n. 19 to 32, pp. 210 to 216 (10th edit.); *Allan v. Bower*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 149, and Mr. Belt's notes, p. 151, notes (2) (3); 1 Sch. & Lefr. 33, 36, 37; *Harnett v. Yeilding*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 555; 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 1, ch. 3, § 7, note (x). I have used this language rather in deference to Sir Edward Sugden's opinion (*Sugden on Vendors*, *ubi supra*) than because I am entirely satisfied that the authorities bear out the position. Lord Manners's remarks on the subject present the contrary doctrine in a forcible manner, and his comments on the authorities are important. *Savage v. Carroll*, 2 B. & Beatt. R. 451 to 453. Mr. Chancellor Kent agrees with Lord Manners. *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 283 to 286.

(a) But see *Hammer v. McEldowney*, 46 Penn. St. 334; *Dobson v. Litton*, 5 Coldw. 616; *Myers v. Forbes*, 24 Md. 598; *infra*, § 767. In cases where the writing is not void for uncertainty, but merely of indeterminate application, parol evidence has been admitted. *Hurley v. Brown*, 98 Mass. 545; *Chattock v. Muller*, 8 Ch. D. 177; *Waring v. Ayres*, 40 N. Y. 357; *Fowler v. Redican*, 52 Ill. 405; *Purinton v. Northern Ill. R. Co.*, 46 Ill. 297; *Torr v. Torr*, 20 Ind. 118; *McMurray v. Spicer*, L. R. 5 Eq. 527. See *Mathews v. Jarrett*, 20 W. Va. 415; *Schmeling v. Kriesel*, 45 Wis. 325; *Gilbert v. Cooksey*, 69 Mo. 42. And compare the instructive opinion of Sir Thomas Plumer, M. R., in *Colpoys v. Colpoys*, Jacob, 451.

the contract uncertain, so that the court cannot say what its precise import and limitations are, then the court will withhold a final decree for a specific performance.¹

765. It must be admitted that the exceptions thus allowed do greatly trench upon the policy and objects of the Statute of Frauds; and perhaps there might have been as much wisdom originally in leaving the statute to its full operation without any attempt to create exceptions, even in cases where the statute would enable the party to protect himself from a performance of his contract through a meditated fraud. For even admitting that such cases might occur, they would become more and more rare as the statute became better understood; and a partial evil ought not to be permitted to control a general convenience. And indeed it is far from being certain that these very exceptions do not assist parties in fraudulent contrivances, and increase the temptations to perjury, quite as often as they do assist them in the promotion of good faith and the furtherance of justice. These exceptions have also led to great embarrassments in the actual administration of equity; and although in some cases one may clearly see that no great mischiefs can occur from enforcing them, yet in others difficulties may be stated in their practical application which compel us to pause, and to question their original propriety.²

¹ *Colson v. Thompson*, 2 Wheat. R. 336, 341. And see cases cited in note (b); *Lindsay v. Lynch*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 7, 8; *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John Ch. R. 283 to 286; *Harnett v. Yeilding*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 555; *Newland on Contr.* ch. 8, p. 151; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, 441.

² See 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (e). Mr. Fonblanque's able note on this subject is full of important instruction on this head. I know not where the objections are so thoroughly sifted. 'To allow a statute,' says he, 'having the prevention of frauds for its object, to be interposed in bar of the performance of a parol agreement in part performed, were evidently to encourage one of the mischiefs which the legislature intended to prevent. It is therefore an established rule that a parol agreement in part performed is not within the provisions of the statute. See *Whitchurch v. Bevis*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 566. This exception however leads to considerable difficulties. Part performance is clearly a relative term, and in stating acts of part performance the plaintiff must necessarily state the agreement to which he refers. The defendant by the above rule seems bound to consider the case stated as out of the statute. Supposing him however to deny the acts alleged to have been done in part performance, would he be bound to admit or deny the parol agreement referred to? Or, admitting such acts to have been done, supposing him to deny the agreement or the terms of the agreement to which such acts are referred in part performance, would the plaintiff, in the latter case, be at

766. Considerations of this sort have led eminent judges to declare that they would not carry the exceptions of cases from

liberty to resort to evidence aliunde in order to substantiate such parol agreement? In the first case I conceive that the plaintiff would be entitled to go into evidence to show that the acts alleged were actually done; and if he succeeded in this particular, it seems to follow, as a necessary consequence, that he might prove the agreement to which such acts referred. But suppose the plaintiff not to be able to prove the agreement, the terms of it being confined to his and the defendant's knowledge, would he be entitled to a discovery from the defendant? If the defendant be bound to discover such agreement merely because the plaintiff had alleged it to have been in part performed, the plaintiff might, by alleging what was false, be placed in a better situation than he would have been in if he had stated the truth. But it would be difficult, in a court of conscience, to maintain that falsehood can entitle to such an advantage. For the purpose of investigating the point, I will however assume, agreeably to the decision in the *Earl of Aylesford's Case*, 2 Stra. 783, and the opinion of Lord Thurlow in *Whitchurch v. Bevis*, that the defendant is bound to discover whether he entered into such parol agreement or not. Suppose the defendant to have confessed the agreement, denying however the acts alleged in part performance of it; where the plaintiff alleges part performance it is assumed that the defendant cannot plead the statute; and when the statute cannot be pleaded, it should seem that it cannot be insisted upon by the answer. But where the statute is not insisted on, it seems admitted that a parol agreement confessed shall be decreed to be performed. It would follow in the above supposed case that the plaintiff would be relieved from the necessity of proving the acts alleged in part performance; for *cui bono* put him upon proving the part performance of an agreement confessed, the admission of the agreement being alone a sufficient circumstance to entitle him to a decree. This advantage might encourage the plaintiff untruly to allege a part performance. But I know no means by which the objection can be obviated; for if the agreement be in part performed, it is but reasonable that it should be completed, and to that the defendant's discovery may be material; and whether it was or was not in part performed is a point which clearly the defendant may establish by evidence aliunde. I have adverted to another difficulty, which may arise from the rule that an agreement in part performed is not within the Statute of Frauds. The case I stated supposes the defendant to admit certain acts to have been done, but denies that they were done in part performance of any agreement, or insists that the terms of the agreement, of which they were done in part performance, were not such as stated in the bill. But see *Moore v. Edwards*, 4 Ves. 22; *Cooth v. Jackson*, 6 Ves. 27, in which the above reasoning is very fully considered. There are various acts which are considered to amount to a part performance of a parol agreement, and some of them are of a nature which necessarily imply some agreement; as where a man is let into possession, the possession must be referred to some title. But to what can it, unless to the agreement of one having right to confer a title? In such a case it might be consistent with the provisions of the statute to allow evidence to explain the agreement which led to the possession, though the defendant denied that there was any agreement upon the subject. But if the act alleged in part performance be of a more doubtful nature, as retaining possession

the Statute of Frauds farther than they were compelled to do by former decisions.¹ Lord Redesdale has strongly said: 'The statute was made for the purpose of preventing perjuries and frauds; and nothing can be more manifest to any person who has been in the habit of practising in Courts of Equity than that the relaxation of that statute has been a ground of much perjury and much fraud. If the statute had been rigorously observed, the result would probably have been that few instances of parol agreements would have occurred. Agreements would, from the necessity of the case, have been reduced to writing. Whereas it is manifest that the decisions on the subject have opened a new door to fraud; and that under pretence of part execution, if possession is had in any way whatsoever, means are frequently found to put a Court of Equity in such a situation that, without departing from its rules, it feels itself obliged to break through the statute. And I remember it was mentioned in one case, in argument, as a common expression at the bar, that it had become a practice to

after the expiration of a lease, in such case if the defendant denied having agreed to grant a new lease, or to grant it on the terms alleged, it seems very difficult to determine whether the plaintiff ought or ought not, in respect of the admission of the acts alleged, to be allowed to prove a parol agreement by evidence aliunde. See *Mortimer v. Orchard*, 2 Ves. jr. 243. This note is already drawn out to a greater length than I intended; and as the difficulties which I feel may have been judicially removed by the late decisions of the court, I shall close it with a few distinctions upon the question, what acts amount to a part performance. The general rule is, that the acts must be such as could be done with no other view or design than to perform the agreement, and not such as are merely introductory or ancillary to it. *Gunter v. Halsey*, Amb. 586; *Whitbread v. Brockhurst*, 1 Bro. R. 412. See *Wills v. Stradling*, 3 Ves. jr. 379; *Pym v. Blackburn*, 3 Ves. jr. 34. The giving of possession is therefore to be considered as an act of part performance. *Stewart v. Denton*, MSS. 4th July, 1786. But giving directions for conveyances and going to view the estate are not. *Clerk v. Wright*, 1 Atk. 12; *Whaley v. Bagnel*, 6 Bro. P. C. 45; s. c. 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. by Tomlins, 345. Payment of money is also said to be an act of part performance. *Lacon v. Mertins*, 3 Atk. 4; sed qu. But it is said that payment of money is not a part performance. See *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. R. 40; *Frame v. Dawson*, 14 Ves. 388. Query, Whether it means payment of the whole or only a part of the purchase-money? See also *O'Reilly v. Thompson*, 2 Cox, R. 272. That payment of a sum by way of earnest is not. *Seagood v. Meale*, Prec. Ch. 560; *Lord Pengall v. Ross*, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 46, pl. 12; *Simmons v. Cornelius*, 1 Ch. R. 128. But see *Voll v. Smith*, 3 Ch. R. 16; and *Anon.* 2 Freem. 128.' See *Givens v. Calder*, 2 Desaus. Ch. R. 171; *Davenport v. Mason*, 15 Mass. R. 93; *Niven v. Belknap*, 2 Johns. R. 587.

¹ *Cooth v. Jackson*, 6 Ves. 22, 27; *Lindsay v. Lynch*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. R. 5.

improve gentlemen out of their estates. It is therefore absolutely necessary for Courts of Equity to make a stand, and not carry the decisions further.'¹

767. We have already had occasion to see that parol agreements, even with part performance, will not be decreed to be specifically executed unless the whole terms of the contract are clear and definitely ascertained.² The same rule applies to cases of written contracts.³ (a) If they are not certain in themselves, so as to enable the court to arrive at the clear result of what all

¹ *Lindsay v. Lynch*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 4, 5, 7. See also *Harnett v. Yeilding*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 549; *O'Reilly v. Thompson*, 2 Cox, R. 271, 273; *Forster v. Hale*, 3 Ves. 712, 713; *Phillips v. Thompson*, 1 John. Ch. R. 149; *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 284, 285. Lord Alvanley's remarks in *Forster v. Hale*, 3 Ves. 712, 713, are striking. 'I admit,' said he, 'my opinion is that the court has gone rather too far in permitting part performance and other circumstances to take cases out of the statute, and then, unavoidably perhaps, after establishing the agreement, to admit parol evidence of the contents of that agreement. As to part performance, it might be evidence of some agreement; but of what, must be left to parol evidence. I always thought the court went a great way. They ought not to have held it evidence of an unknown agreement, but to have had the money laid out repaid. It ought to have been a compensation. Those cases are very dissatisfactory. It was very right to say the statute should not be an engine of fraud, therefore compensation would have been very proper. They have however gone further, saying it was clear there was some agreement, and letting them prove it. But how does the circumstance of a man having laid out a great deal of money prove that he is to have a lease for 99 years? The common sense of the thing would have been, to have let them bring an action for the money. I should pause upon such a case.'

² Ante, § 764.

³ Ante, § 751; *Kendall v. Almy*, 2 Sumner's R. 278; *Smith v. Burnham*, 3 Sumner's R. 435.

(a) See supra, § 764. But see *Bedford Ry. Co v. Stanley*, 2 Johns. & H. 746, that contracts with the promoters of railways for the sale of lands to a contemplated company will be specifically enforced notwithstanding the objections of vagueness, want of consideration, and want of mutuality. A contract requiring arbitration to fix one of its terms, such as value, will not be specifically enforced. Supra, note to § 764; *Noyes v. Marsh*, 123 Mass. 286; *Hopkins v. Gilman*, 22 Wis. 476; *Vickers v. Vickers*, L. R. 4 Eq. 529; *Tobey v. Bristol*, 3 Story, 800. See *Richardson v. Smith*, L. R. 5 Ch. 648. Secus if the court can ascertain the terms, the provision for arbitration being merely incidental. *Dinham v. Bradford*, L. R. 5 Ch. 519. See *Hart v. Hart*, 18 Ch. D. 670, 687. So where a 'fair price' is to be paid, specific performance may be decreed. *Van Doren v. Robinson*, 1 C. E. Green, 256. But not where the terms may be such as the parties shall agree upon. *Ib.*; *Huff v. Shepard*, 58 Mo. 242; *McKibbin v. Brown*, 1 McCart. 13; *Tobey v. Bristol*, supra.

the terms are, they will not be specifically enforced. In the first place it would be inequitable to carry a contract into effect where the court is left to ascertain the intentions of the parties by mere conjecture or guess; for it might be guilty of the error of decreeing precisely what the parties never did intend or contemplate.¹ In the next place if any terms are to be supplied it must be by parol evidence; and the admission of such evidence would let in all the mischiefs intended to be guarded against by the statute. Indeed it would be inconsistent with the general principles of evidence (although there are exceptions)² which are administered in Courts of Equity as well as in Courts of Law; for the general rule in both courts is that parol evidence is not admissible to vary, annul, or explain a written contract.³ A contract cannot rest partly in writing and partly in parol. The writing is the highest evidence, and does away the necessity and effect of the parol evidence if it is contradictory to it.⁴

768. Another exception to the statute, turning upon similar considerations, is where the agreement is intended by the parties to be reduced to writing according to the statute, but it is prevented from being done by the fraud of one of the parties.⁵ In

¹ *Lindsay v. Lynch*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 7, 8; *Colson v. Thompson*, 2 Wheat. R. 336, 341; *Harnett v. Yeilding*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 555; *Kendall v. Almy*, 2 Sumner, R. 278; *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Simons, R. 324.

² Some of these exceptions have been already considered under the heads of Accident, Mistake, and Fraud; but the full examination of the subject belongs to a treatise on Evidence. See 3 Starkie on Evidence, title Parol Evidence; and Sugden on Vendors, ch. 3, §§ 3, 4, pp. 97 to 146 (7th edit.); 1 Sugden on Vendors, ch. 3, § 3, n. 8 to 31, pp. 163 to 171 (10th edit.); Id. ch. 3, § 8, n. 1 to 28, pp. 217 to 231; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 11, note (o). For a similar reason I have omitted all notice of what are the proper proofs of a written agreement, the signature of the party, &c., within the Statute of Frauds; and indeed everything respecting the construction of the statute, which does not directly touch the jurisdiction in equity. See *Squire v. Campbell*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 480.

³ 3 Starkie on Evid. Pt. 4, pp. 995 to 1015; *Parteriche v. Powlet*, 2 Atk. 383; *Tinney v. Tinney*, 3 Atk. 8; *Lawson v. Laude*, 1 Dick. R. 346; *Townshend v. Stangroom*, 6 Ves. 328; *Rich v. Jackson*, 6 Ves. 334, note (c); *Woolam v. Hearn*, 7 Ves. 211; *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 33 to 39; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 3, § 4, pp. 123 to 134 (7th edit.); *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 283, 284; s. c. 14 John. R. 15; *Squire v. Campbell*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 480; *Carr v. Duvall*, 14 Peters, R. 77.

⁴ *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 283; s. c. 14 John. R. 15; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, pp. 436, 437.

⁵ See Newl. on Contr. ch. 10, pp. 179 to 197.

such a case Courts of Equity have said that the agreement shall be specifically executed; for otherwise the statute, designed to suppress fraud, would be the greatest protection to it.¹ Thus if one agreement in writing should be proposed and drawn, and another should be fraudulently and secretly brought in and executed in lieu of the former, in this and the like cases equity would relieve.² So if instructions are given by an intended husband to prepare a marriage settlement, and he promises to have the settlement reduced to writing, and then fraudulently and secretly prevents it from being done, and the marriage takes effect in consequence of false assurances and contrivances, a specific performance will be decreed.³ But if there has been no fraud and no agreement to reduce the settlement to writing, but the other party has placed reliance solely upon the honor, word, or promise of the husband, no relief will be granted;⁴ for in such a case the party chooses to rest upon a parol agreement and must take the consequences.⁵ And the subsequent marriage is not deemed a part performance taking the case out of the statute, contrary to the rule which prevails in other cases of contract. In this respect it is always treated as a peculiar case standing on its own grounds.⁶ So if a man should treat for a loan of money on mortgage, and the conveyance is to be by an absolute deed of the mortgagor and a defeasance by the mortgagee, and after the absolute deed is executed the mortgagee fraudulently refuses to execute the defeasance, equity will decree a specific performance.⁷ So where a father had purchased lands in fee, and on his

¹ *Montacute v. Maxwell*, 1 P. Will. 618; s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. 19; Prec. Ch. 526.

² *Ibid.*; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, p. 432; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 11. note (o).

³ *Ibid.* See Ante, §§ 331, 374, note; *Taylor v. Beech*, 1 Ves. 297, 298; Newl. on Contr. ch. 10, pp 191, 192, 194; *Redding v. Wilkes*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 400; *Dundas v. Dutens*, 1 Ves. jr. 196, 199; s. c. 2 Cox, R. 234; Gilb. Lex. Prætor. 243, 244; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, p. 432, &c.

⁴ *Ibid.* But see Ante, § 374, note.

⁵ It has sometimes been attempted to except from the statute cases where the parties have expressly agreed that their contract should be reduced to writing. But this doctrine, except in cases of fraud, has been expressly denied. *Hollis v. Whiting*, 1 Vern. 151, 159; *Whitchurch v. Bevis*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 565.

⁶ See *Taylor v. Beech*, 1 Ves. senr. 297, 298; *Dundas v. Dutens*, 1 Ves. jr. 195, 199; s. c. 2 Cox, R. 233; *Redding v. Wilkes*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 400, 401.

⁷ *Maxwell v. Montacute*, Prec. Ch. 526; *Walker v. Walker*, 2 Atk. 99;

death-bed told his eldest son that the lands were purchased with his second son's money, and that he intended to give them to him, and the eldest son promised that he should enjoy them accordingly, and the father died, and the eldest son refused to comply with his promise, it was held that the promise should be specifically performed, upon the ground of fraud, notwithstanding the objection that there ought to have been a declaration of the use or trust under the statute.¹ Other cases of a like character have occurred under the head of fraud; and similar considerations may apply in cases of accident and mistake clearly and incontrovertibly made out.² (a)

769. And here it is important to take notice of a distinction between the case of a plaintiff seeking a specific performance in equity and the case of a defendant resisting such a performance. We have already seen that the specific execution of a contract in equity is a matter, not of absolute right in the party, but of sound

Young v. Peachy, 2 Atk. 258; *Joynes v. Statham*, 3 Atk. 389. *Oldham v. Litchford*, 2 Freem. R. 284, 285; *Skett v. Whitmore*, 2 Freem. R. 281; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, p. 429.

¹ *Sellack v. Harris*, 5 Vin. Abridg. 521, Pl. 31; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, p. 438; ante, § 256; *Podmore v. Gunning*, 7 Sim. R. 644; post, § 1265.

² See ante, under the heads of Accident, Mistake, and Fraud, §§ 99, 182, 206, 256, 386; Newl. on Contr. ch. 10, pp. 179 to 181; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, pp. 436 to 438; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 3, p. 103, § 4, 154, 155 (7th edit.); 1 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 8, n. 20 to 23, pp. 225 to 231 (10th edit.); *Id.* § 11, n. 1 to 27, pp. 258 to 271; *Irnham v. Child*, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 92; *Pym v. Blackburn*, 3 Ves. 38, note (a) (Amer. edit.); *Pember v. Matthews*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 54; *Whitchurch v. Bevis*, 2 Bro. Ch. 565. See *Attorney-Gen. v. Sitwell*, 1 *Younge & Coll. R.* 583; *Attorney-Gen. v. Jackson*, 5 *Hare, R.* 355.

(a) Where A agrees verbally to purchase and pay for land on joint account of himself and B, the latter to reimburse him in half the money, and A after purchasing refuses to carry out the contract, the statute is not removed. *Levy v. Brush*, 45 N. Y. 589; *Farnham v. Clements*, 51 *Maine*, 526. See *Buck v. Dowley*, 16 *Gray*, 555; *Glass v. Hulbert*, 102 *Mass.* 24. Secus where by payment of consideration a resulting trust arises. *Nelson v. Skinner*, 20 *Iowa*, 469. So where a purchaser at decretal sale agreed by parol to buy for the defendant owner, and that the deed should stand as a mortgage, and the plaintiff paid part of the purchase price. *Green v. Ball*, 4 *Bush.* 586. See *Fluharty v. Beatty*, 4 *W. Va.* 514. So of a parol agreement to hold property of the grantor, pay his debts thereout and reconvey any surplus. *Sandfoss v. Jones*, 35 *Cal.* 481. So also of a promise by a purchaser at a tax sale to assign the certificate, relying whereon the owner allows the time for redemption to pass. *Laing v. McKee*, 13 *Mich.* 124.

discretion in the court.¹ Hence it requires a much less strength of case on the part of the defendant to resist a bill to perform a contract than it does on the part of the plaintiff to maintain a bill to enforce a specific performance.² When the court simply refuses to enforce the specific performance of a contract, it leaves the party to his remedy at law.³ An agreement to be entitled to be carried into specific performance ought (as we have seen) to be certain, fair, and just in all its parts.⁴ (a) Courts of Equity will not decree a specific performance in cases of fraud or mistake; (b) or of hard and unconscionable bargains; (c) or where

¹ Ante, § 742.

² *Vigers v. Pike*, 8 Clarke & Fin. 562, 645, and Lord Cottenham's Remarks, p. 645.

³ *Vigers v. Pike*, 8 Clarke & Fin. 562, 645. In this respect it differs greatly from the case of an executed contract; for if a court of equity should refuse to administer equities founded upon a deed executed, it would leave the party applying without a remedy. *Ibid.*

⁴ *Buxton v. Lister*, 3 Atk. 385; *Brashier v. Gratz*, 6 Wheat. R. 528; *Harnett v. Yeilding*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 554; *Ellard v. Llandaff*, 1 B. & Beatt. 250; *Seymour v. Delancey*, 6 John. Ch. R. 222; Ante, §§ 693, 742, 750, 751, 767; *Kendall v. Almy*, 2 Sumner, R. 278.

(a) *Stearns v. Beckham*, 31 Gratt. 379; *Irwin v. Baily*, 72 Ala. 467; *Moore v. Crowder*, *Ib.* 79; *Railroad Co. v. Telegraph Co.*, 38 Ohio St. 24. See *Love v. Sortwell*, 124 Mass. 446.

(b) See *Post v. Marsh*, 16 Ch. D. 395; *Tomplin v. James*, 15 Ch. D. 215; *Parker v. Taswell*, 2 DeG. & J. 559; *Taylor v. Williams*, 45 Mo. 80; *Davis v. Shepherd*, L. R. 1 Ch. 410; *Harris v. Pepperill*, L. R. 5 Eq. 1; *Wood v. Scarth*, 2 Kay & J. 33; *Higgins v. Samels*, 2 Johns. & H. 460; *Bloomer v. Spittle*, L. R. 13 Eq. 427; *Webster v. Cecil*, 30 Beav. 62; *Harnett v. Baker*, L. R. 20 Eq. 50; *Phillips v. Homfray*, L. R. 6 Ch. 770; *Denny v. Hancock*, *Ib.* 1; *Butterworth v. Walker*, 13 Week. R. 168; *Moxey v. Bigwood*, 12 Week. R. 811; *Swaisland v. Dearsley*, 29 Beav. 430; *Park v. Johnson*, 4 Allen, 259; *Boynton v. Hazelboom*, 14 Allen, 107; *Wells v. Millett*, 23 Wis. 64; *Gilroy v. Alis*, 22 Iowa, 174; *Platt v. Stonington Bank*, 46 Conn. 476; *Patterson v.*

Bloomer, 35 Conn. 63; *Pendleton v. Dalton*, Phill. Eq. (N. Car.) 119; *Magraff v. Muir*, 57 N. Y. 155; *Weise's Appeal*, 72 Penn. St. 351; *Chambers v. Livermore*, 15 Mich. 381; *White v. Williams*, 48 Barb. 222; *Patterson v. Bloomer*, 35 Conn. 57; *Hitchins v. Pettingill*, 58 N. H. 3; *Glass v. Hulbert*, 102 Mass. 24; *Davis v. Parker*, 14 Allen, 94 (full means of knowledge may justify specific performance notwithstanding mistake); ante, Vol. I. p. 155, editor's note on Mistake of Fact. It is not necessary, to defeat a bill for specific performance, to show fraud as clearly as it would be to defeat recovery on the contract at law. *Race v. Weston*, 86 Ill. 91. If the contract provide for compensation in case of mistake, specific performance may be decreed. *Hoy v. Smythies*, 22 Beav. 510.

(c) *Keeler v. Taylor*, 53 Penn. St. 467; *Harkness v. Remington*, 7 R. I. 154. See *Carson v. Percy*, 57 Miss. 97; *Stearns v. Beckham*, 31 Gratt. 379.

the decree would produce injustice; or where it would compel the party to an illegal (*a*) or immoral act; or where it would be against public policy; (*b*) or where it would involve a breach of trust; (*c*) or where a performance has become impossible; (*d*) and generally not in any cases where such a decree would be inequitable under all the circumstances.¹

770. But Courts of Equity do not stop here, for they will let in the defendant to defend himself by evidence to resist a decree where the plaintiff would not always be permitted to establish his case by the like evidence. Thus for instance Courts of Equity will allow the defendant to show that by fraud, accident, or mistake the thing bought is different from what he intended;² or

¹ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 3, § 4, pp. 125 to 135 (7th edit.); 1 Sugden on Vendors, ch. 3, § 8, n. 18 to 28, pp. 224 to 231 (10th edit.); Id. ch. 4, § 3, n. 29 to 42, pp. 337 to 343; Id. § 5, n. 3 to 15, pp. 381 to 386; King v. Hamilton, 4 Peters, R. 311; ante, § 650; Kimberley v. Jennings, 6 Sim. R. 340; Harnett v. Yeilding, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 554, 555; Jeremy on Equity Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, p. 432, &c.; Greenaway v. Adams, 12 Ves. 399, 400; Denton v. Stuart, 1 Cox, R. 258; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Peters, R. 264; Mechanics Bank of Alexandria v. Lynn, 1 Peters, R. 376; ante, § 750 *a*, 751. We have already seen that Mr. Baron Anderson, in *Attorney-Gen. v. Sitwell*, 1 Younge & Coll. R. 482, 583, expressed a strong opinion against a Court of Equity's undertaking, first upon the ground of mistake to reform a contract, and then decreeing a specific performance of it. Ante, § 161, note (1), p. 175; ante, §§ 207, 769; post, § 787. (*e*)

² *Malins v. Freeman*, 2 Keen, 25, 34.

(*a*) But the parties may not be in *pari delicto*. *Fingree v. Coffin*, 12 Gray, 288; *Freelove v. Cole*, 41 Barb. 318; *Sandfoss v. Jones*, 35 Cal. 481.

(*b*) See *Post v. Marsh*, 16 Ch. D. 395; *Oldham v. James*, 14 Ir. Ch. 81; *Flanagan v. Great Western Ry. Co.*, L. R. 7 Eq. 116; *Whitaker v. Bond*, 63 N. Car. 290; *Mortimer v. Bell*, L. R. 1 Ch. 10; *Dobson v. Swan*, 2 W. Va. 511; *Smith v. Johnson*, 37 Ala. 633; *Keeler v. Taylor*, 53 Penn. St. 467; *Foll's Appeal*, 91 Penn. St. 434.

(*c*) *Tamm v. Lavalley*, 92 Ill. 263. Or a breach of contract with another. *Willmott v. Barber*, 15 Ch. D. 96.

(*d*) *Smith v. Kelly*, 56 Maine, 64; *Love v. Cobb*, 63 N. Car. 324; *Youell v. Allen*, 18 Mich. 108; *Jerome v.*

Scudder, 2 Rob. (N. Y.) 169; *Tainter v. Cole*, 120 Mass. 162; *Milkman v. Ordway*, 106 Mass. 232; *Ferguson v. Wilson*, L. R. 2 Ch. 77. In regard to this class of cases it is laid down in *Tainter v. Cole* that if a bill is brought in good faith, and the relief defeated by inability of the defendant to perform the contract arising after the agreement was made, equity will retain the bill and give relief by ordering compensation. *Mobile v. Kimball*, 102 U. S. 691, 706. See *Wonson v. Fenno*, 129 Mass. 405. But the plaintiff must have been ignorant of the defendant's inability. *Tainter v. Cole*, supra. And this rule extends to all cases where a defect of title, right, or capacity appears. *Ib.*

(*e*) See ante, Vol. I. p. 155, note.

that material terms have been omitted in the written agreement; or that there has been a variation of it by parol; or that there has been a parol discharge of a written contract.¹ The ground of this doctrine is that which has been already alluded to, that Courts of Equity ought not to be active in enforcing claims which are not, under the actual circumstances, just as between the parties. The statute has said that no person shall be charged with the execution of an agreement who has not personally, or by his agent, signed a written agreement. But the statute does not say that if a written agreement is signed, the same exceptions shall not hold to it, as did before the statute. Now before the statute, if a bill had been brought for a specific performance, and it had appeared that the agreement had been prepared contrary to the intentions of the defendant, he might have resisted the

¹ *Joynes v. Statham*, 3 Atk. 388; *Woollam v. Hearn*, 7 Ves. 211; *Townshend v. Stangroom*, 6 Ves. 328; *Clarke v. Grant*, 14 Ves. 519; 15 Ves. 523; *Winch v. Winchester*, 1 Ves. & Beam. 375; *Price v. Dyer*, 17 Ves. 356; *Rich v. Jackson*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 514; 6 Ves. jr. 334, note; *Robson v. Collins*, 7 Ves. 130; *Ogilvie v. Foljambie*, 3 Meriv. 53; *King v. Hamilton*, 4 Peters, R. 30; *Squire v. Campbell*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 180; *The London and Birmingham Railway Co. v. Winter*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 60, 61, 68; *Pope v. Garland*, 4 Younge & Coll. 394; *Hepburn v. Dunlop*, 1 Wheat. R. 179; *Malins v. Freeman*, 2 Keen, 25, 34; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 2, note (e); 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, p. 428; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, p. 432, &c.*; ante, §§ 153, 154, 155, 750 a. The cases on this subject are very numerous, and are commented on with great care by Sir Edward Sugden, in his *Treatise on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 4, pp. 125 to 140 (7th edit.); 1 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 3, § 8, n. 18 to 28, pp. 224 to 231 (10th edit.), to which the reader is referred. I have cited only a few of the more prominent cases to support the text. Sir Edward Sugden states that whether an absolute parol discharge, not followed by any other agreement, upon which the parties have acted, can be set up, even as a defence in equity, is questionable. He gives the result of the authorities as to a parol variation as follows: '1. That evidence of it is totally inadmissible at law; 2. That in equity the most unequivocal proof of it will be expected; 3. That if it be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and be such a variation as the court will act upon, yet it can only be used as a *defence* to a bill demanding a specific performance, and is inadmissible as a ground to *compel* a specific performance; unless, 4. There has been such a part performance of the new parol agreement as would enable the court to grant its aid in the case of an original independent agreement; and then, in the view of equity, it is tantamount to a written agreement.' The case of *Omerod v. Hardman*, 5 Ves. 722, turned upon a different point. There the object of the parol evidence was, not to establish any fraud or mistake of the intention of the parties, but to add a new term to the contract by parol, which was held inadmissible, even as a defence against a specific performance. See also Newland on Contracts, ch. 10, pp. 206 to 211.

performance of it. The statute has made no alteration in this respect in the situation of the defendant. It does not say a written agreement shall bind, but only that an unwritten agreement shall not bind.¹

770 *a.* But in the case of a plaintiff seeking the specific performance of a contract, if it is reduced to writing, Courts of Equity will not (as has just been hinted) ordinarily entertain a bill to decree a specific performance thereof with variations or additions or new terms to be made and introduced into it by parol evidence; for in such a case the attempt is to enforce a contract partly in writing and partly by parol; and Courts of Equity deem the writing to be higher proof of the real intentions of the parties than any parol proof can generally be, independently of the objection which arises in many cases under the Statute of Frauds.² There are however certain exceptions to this doctrine which have been allowed to prevail; as for example where the omission has been by fraud;³ and in cases not within the reach of the Statute of Frauds where there has been a clear omission by mistake.⁴ So also where the defendant sets up in his defence to a bill for the specific performance of a written contract, that there has been a parol variation or addition thereto by the parties, if the plaintiff assents thereto he may award his bill, and at his election have a specific performance of the written contract with such variations or additions so set up; for under such circumstances there is a written admission of each party to the parol variation or addition, and there can be no danger of injury to the parties or evasion of the rules of evidence or of the Statute of Frauds.⁵ So the court may decree a specific performance in

¹ *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 39; *Ram v. Hughes*, 7 Term. R. 350, note; *Clarke v. Grant*, 14 Ves. 524.

² *Joyne v. Statham*, 3 Atk. 388; *Townshend v. Stangroom*, 6 Ves. 328; *Ramsbottom v. Gosden*, 1 Ves. & Beam. R. 165; *The London and Birmingham Railway Co. v. Winter*, 1 Craig & Phillips, R. 57, 62; ante, § 770.

³ Ante, §§ 152, 153, 154.

⁴ *Henkle v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co.*, 1 Ves. 317; *Motteux v. London Assur. Co.*, 1 Atk. R. 545; ante, §§ 152, 155; post, § 1018.

⁵ *The London and Birmingham Railway Co. v. Winter*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 57. On this occasion Lord Cottenham said: 'This is not a case within the meaning of those decisions in which the court has said that it will not specifically perform the contract with a variation. If the court finds a written contract has been entered into, and the plaintiff says, "That was agreed upon, but then there were certain other terms added or certain variations made,"

favor of the plaintiff, notwithstanding he does not make out the case stated by his bill, if he offers to comply with the contract as set forth in the defendant's answer, and as the defendant states it.¹ (a)

771. In general it may be stated that to entitle a party to

the court holds that in such a case the contract is not in the writing, but in the terms which are verbally stated to have been the agreement between the parties; and therefore refuses specifically to perform such an agreement. On the other hand it is quite competent for the defendant to set up a variation from the written contract; and it will depend on the particular circumstances of each case, whether that is to defeat the plaintiff's title to have a specific performance, or whether the court will perform the contract, taking care that the subject-matter of this parol agreement or understanding is also carried into effect, so that all parties may have the benefit of what they contracted for. That this is the rule of the court is sufficiently established in many cases, of which I will only mention three. *Joynes v. Statham*, 3 Atk. 388, by Lord Hardwicke; *Townshend v. Stangroom*, 6 Ves. jr. 328, by Lord Eldon; and *Ramsbottom v. Gosden*, 1 Ves. & Beames, 165, by Sir William Grant. In the last-mentioned case Sir William Grant put it to the plaintiff whether he would take a specific performance with the performance of the condition established by parol testimony, or whether he would have the bill dismissed. The only doubt therefore I should have had if Mr. Wigram had declined, on the part of the plaintiffs, to comply with the terms mentioned by the witness, would have been whether in this case the variation was so stated as to entitle the defendant to the benefit of it; because he does not state it in his answer, nor does he prove it, nor attempt to prove it, but it comes out on the cross-examination of the plaintiffs' witness. On such a statement, not put in issue between the parties, and which the plaintiffs had therefore no opportunity of meeting, I should certainly not have thought it right to act; but as it appears on the evidence before the court that such an understanding existed, I should probably have thought it a fit subject of inquiry, before I finally disposed of the case, if the course taken by the plaintiffs had not made it unnecessary for me to consider the point.' See ante, § 755.

¹ 1 Daniell, Ch. Pr. 513, 514, which cites *Lindsay v. Lynch*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 9; *Woolan v. Hearn*, 7 Ves. 22; *Denniston v. Little*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 11, note (2); *Ib.* 149, note (2); *Story on Eq. Plead.* § 394.

(a) See *McComas v. Easley*, 21 Gratt. 23. But where the defendant sets up in his answer a different agreement from that which the plaintiff seeks to have enforced, and the plaintiff has always repudiated the same, he cannot have this agreement specifically enforced. *Jeffery v. Stephens*, 6 Jur. n. s. 947. See *Richardson v. Goodwin*, 6 Jones, Eq. 229. If however the fulfilment has merely been waived, and the part so waived does not affect the

essential rights of the parties with regard to specific performance, performance may be decreed. *Portland R. Co. v. Grand Trunk R. Co.*, 63 Maine, 90. And of course if the contract set up by the defendant is an independent collateral agreement, not connected with the contract sued upon, neither its existence nor its non-performance will defeat the plaintiff's claim. *Stewart v. Metcalf*, 68 Ill. 109.

a specific performance he must show that he has been in no default in not having performed the agreement, and that he has taken all proper steps towards the performance on his own part.¹ If he has been guilty of gross laches, or if he applies for relief after a long lapse of time, unexplained by equitable circumstances, his bill will be dismissed; for Courts of Equity do not, any more than Courts of Law, administer relief to the gross negligence of suitors.² But this doctrine is to be taken (as we shall presently see) with some qualifications. For although Courts of Equity will not encourage laches, yet if there has not been a strict legal compliance with the terms of the contract, and the non-compliance does not go to the essence of the contract, relief will be granted.³ (a)

¹ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 2, and notes (c), (d); Gilbert, *Lex Prætor.* 240; *Colson v. Thompson*, 2 Wheat. R. 336, 341; *Kendall v. Almy*, 2 Sumner, R. 278.

² *Ibid.* and note (e); *Pratt v. Carroll*, 8 Cranch, R. 471; *Brashier v. Gratz*, 6 Wheat. R. 528; *Milward v. Earl of Thanet*, 5 Ves. 720, note; *Moore v. Blake*, 1 B. & Beatt. 68, 69; *King v. Hamilton*, 4 Peters, R. 311, 328; *Watson v. Reid*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 236; *Page v. Broom*, 4 Russ. R. 6; *Watts v. Waddle*, 6 Peters, R. 389; *McNeil v. Magee*, 5 Mason, R. 244; *Coulson v. Walton*, 9 Peters, R. 62; *Holt v. Rogers*, 8 Peters, R. 420; *Baldwin v. Salter*, 8 Paige, R. 478; *Vigers v. Pike*, 8 Clark & Fin. 650.

³ *Post*, §§ 776, 777; *Taylor v. Longworth*, 14 Peters, R. 170.

(a) It appears to be unnecessary that all the terms of the contract have become performable before suit for specific performance. See *Nives v. Nives*, 15 Ch. D. 649, where a vendor had specific performance though the purchase-price was payable in instalments, some of which were not yet due.

'It is not every breach of a covenant upon his part which prevents a man coming to a Court of Equity to have covenants enforced. Take a simple instance. A man is a lessee, with a proviso that he may purchase on a six months' notice. He does not pay his rent punctually; but that does not prevent his coming here for a specific performance of the purchase. It must not only have some connection with the matter for which specific performance is sought, but it must be

some such material and substantial breach as will enable the court to say that his conduct has been such that it ought not to interfere in his behalf at all.' *Besant v. Wood*, 12 Ch. D. 605, 628, *Jessel, M. R.* For special illustrations of the text see *Todd v. Taft*, 7 Allen, 371; *Fuller v. Hovey*, 2 Allen, 324; *Du Bois v. Baum*, 46 Penn. St. 537; *Boston R. Co. v. Bartlett*, 10 Gray, 384; *Johns v. Norris*, 7 C. E. Green, 102; *Haughwout v. Murphy*, 6 C. E. Green, 118; *Lawrence v. Lawrence*, *Ib.* 317; *Merritt v. Brown*, *Ib.* 401; *Hubbell v. Van Schoening*, 49 N. Y. 326; *Campbell v. Hicks*, 19 Ohio St. 433; *Eppinger v. McGreal*, 31 Texas, 147; *Eyre v. Eyre*, 4 C. E. Green, 102; *Andrews v. Bell*, 56 Penn. St. 343; *Cadwallader's Appeal*, 57 Penn. St. 158; *Nelson v. Hagerstown Bank*, 27 Md. 51; *Addington v. Mc-*

772. It has been laid down that if a man has performed a valuable part of an agreement, and is in no default for not performing the residue there it is but reasonable that he should have a specific execution of the other part of his contract, or at least should recover back what he has paid, so that he may not be a loser. For since he entered upon the performance in contemplation of the equivalent from the other party, there is no reason why an accidental loss should fall upon him any more than upon the other.¹ A distinction has been put upon this subject by Lord Chief Baron Gilbert, which is entitled to consideration, because it apparently reconciles authorities which might otherwise seem discordant. It is the distinction between cases in which the plaintiff is in statu quo as to all that part of his agreement which he has performed, and those cases in which he is not in statu quo. In the former cases equity will not enforce the agreement if the plaintiff cannot completely perform the whole of his part of it; in the latter cases equity will enforce it notwithstanding he is incapable of performing the remainder by a subsequent accident.²

773. Thus upon a marriage settlement A contracted to settle a manor on his wife and the heirs of their bodies, and to clear it of incumbrances, and to settle a separate maintenance on her, and likewise to sell some pensions, in order to make a further provision for her and the issue of the marriage; and his father-in-law agreed to settle £3,000 per annum on A for life, remainder to the wife for life, and so to the issue of the marriage.

¹ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 3; Gilb. Lex Prætor. 240, 241; post, §§ 775, 976.

² Gilb. Lex Prætor. 240; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 3, note (f); Newland on Contr. ch. 12, pp. 249, 250.

Donnell, 63 N. Car. 389; Thompson v. Bruen, 46 Ill. 125; Gentry v. Rogers, 40 Ala. 442; Smith v. Lawrence, 15 Mich. 499; Johnson v. Hopkins, 19 Iowa, 49; Williams v. Hart, 116 Mass. 513; Abbott v. L'Hommedieu, 10 W. Va. 677; Boone v. Missouri Iron Co., 17 How. 340; Willard v. Taylor, 8 Wall. 557; McClellan v. Darrah, 50 Ill. 249; Wass v. Mugridge, 128 Mass. 394; Howe v. Conley, 16 Gray, 552; Thorp v. Pettit, 1 C. E. Green, 488;

Beach v. Dyer, 93 Ill. 295; Cooper v. Pena, 21 Cal. 403; Martin v. Veeder, 20 Wis. 466.

For cases in which the failure or refusal of the defendant to perform is properly due to the plaintiff's own action, see Eastman v. Plumer, 46 N. H. 464; Dech's Appeal, 57 Penn. St. 467; Tomplin v. James, 15 Ch. D. 215. See also Viney v. Chaplin, 2 DeG. & J. 468.

A cleared the manor of incumbrances, and settled it accordingly, and settled also the separate maintenance; but he did not sell the pensions, nor settle the further provisions. The wife died without issue, and A brought his bill to have the £3,000 settled on him during his life. The court refused to decree it, because A was in statu quo as to all that part of the agreement which he had performed, and not having performed the whole, and the other part being now impossible, and no compensation being possible to be adjusted for it, he had no title in equity to a specific performance, since such performance would not be mutual. But the issue of A, if any, might have been relieved, because they would have been in no default. This case illustrates the first proposition.¹

774. But (which is the second case) if a man has performed so much of the agreement as that he is not in statu quo, and is in no default for not performing the residue, there he shall have a specific execution of the agreement from the other party. As if a man has contracted for a portion to be received with the wife, and has agreed to settle lands of a certain value upon the wife and her issue, free of incumbrances, and he sells part of his lands to disencumber the other lands, and is proceeding to disencumber and settle the rest, — in such a case if the wife should die without issue before the settlement is actually made, yet he shall have the portion, because he cannot be placed in statu quo, having sold part of his lands; and there was no default in him, since he was going on to perform his contract, and therefore the accident of the wife's death shall not prejudice him.²

775. Where the terms of an agreement have not been strictly complied with, or are incapable of being strictly complied with, still, if there has not been gross negligence in the party, and it is conscientious that the agreement should be performed, and if compensation may be made for any injury occasioned by the non-compliance with the strict terms, — in all such cases Courts of

¹ Gilb. Lex Prætor. 240, 241; *Feversham v. Watson*, Rep. temp. Finch, 445; s. c. 2 Freem. R. 35. But see *Hovenden's* note to 2 Freem. R. 35 (4). The case seems to have been put in the reports upon the ground that the covenants of the plaintiff were by way of condition precedent, which could not be dispensed with in equity. Rep. temp. Finch, 447; 2 Freem. R. 35. See *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 12, pp. 249, 250.

² Gilb. Lex Prætor. 241, 242; *Meredith v. Wynn*, 1 Eq. Abr. 71; s. c. Prec. Ch. 312; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 4, note (f).

Equity will interfere and decree a specific performance. For the doctrine of Courts of Equity is, not forfeiture, but compensation;¹ and nothing but such a decree will, in such cases, do entire justice between the parties.² Indeed in some cases Courts of Equity will decree a specific execution, not according to the letter of the contract, if that would be unconscientious, but they will modify it according to the change of circumstances.³

¹ *Page v. Broom*, 4 Russ. R. 6, 19; ante, § 772; post, § 776.

² *Davis v. Hone*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 347; *Lennon v. Napper*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 684; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 2, note (e); *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 460, 461; *Winne v. Reynolds*, 6 Paige, R. 407; *Taylor v. Longworth*, 14 Peters, R. 173.

³ *Ibid.*; ante, § 750 a; *Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Lynn*, 1 Peters, R. 376. On this occasion Mr. Justice Thompson, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'But the court ought not to decree performance according to the letter, when from change of circumstances, mistake, or misapprehension, it would be unconscientious so to do. The court may so modify the agreement as to do justice as far as circumstances will permit, and refuse specific execution, unless the party seeking it will comply with such modifications as justice requires.' The remarks of Lord Redesdale on this same point deserve to be cited at large. 'A Court of Equity,' said he, 'frequently decrees specific performance where the action at law has been lost by the default of the very party seeking the specific performance, if it be notwithstanding conscientious that the agreement should be performed, as in cases where the terms of the agreement have not been strictly performed on the part of the person seeking specific performance, and to sustain an action at law performance must be averred according to the very terms of the contract. Nothing but specific execution of the contract, so far as it can be executed, will do justice in such a case.' *Davis v. Hone*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 347. Again in *Lennon v. Napper*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 684, he said: 'The courts, in all cases of contracts for estates in land, have been in the habit of relieving, where the party from his own neglect had suffered a lapse of time, and from that or other circumstances could not maintain an action to recover damages at law. And even where nothing exists to prevent his suing at law, so many things are necessary to enable him to recover at law that the formalities alone render it very inconvenient and hazardous so to proceed; nor could in many cases the legal remedy be adequate to the demands of justice. Courts of Equity have therefore enforced contracts specifically where no action for damages could be maintained; for at law the party plaintiff must have strictly performed his part, and the inconvenience of insisting upon that in all cases was sufficient to require the interference of Courts of Equity. They dispense with that which would make compliance with what the law requires oppressive; and in various cases of such contracts they are in the constant habit of relieving the man who has acted fairly though negligently. Thus in the case of an estate sold by auction there is a condition to forfeit the deposit if the purchase be not completed within a certain time, yet the court is in the constant habit of relieving against the lapse of time. And so in the case of mortgages, and in many instances relief is given against mere lapse of time where lapse of time is not essential to the substance of the contract.'

776. One of the most frequent occasions on which Courts of Equity are asked to decree a specific performance of contracts is, where the terms for the performance and completion of the contract have not, in point of time, been strictly complied with. Time is not generally deemed in equity to be of the essence of the contract unless the parties have expressly so treated it, or it necessarily follows from the nature and circumstances of the contract.¹ (a) It is true that Courts of Equity have regard to time

¹ Newland on Contr. ch. 12, pp. 230 to 255; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 2, note (e); Sugden on Vendors, ch. 8, § 1, p. 359, § 4, pp. 375 to 379 (7th edit.); Wynn v. Morgan, 7 Ves. 202; Gibson v. Patterson, 1 Atk. 12; Pincke v. Curtit, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 329; Lloyd v. Collet, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 469, Tomlins's edit.; 4 Ves. R. 689, note; Omerod v. Hardman, 5 Ves. 736; Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265; Hall v. Smith, 14 Ves. 426; Savage v. Brocksopp, 18 Ves. 335; Hertford v. Boore, 5 Ves. 719; Reynolds v. Nelson, 6 Madd. R. 19, 25, 26; Newman v. Rogers, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 391; Doloret v. Rothschild, 1 Sim. & Stu. 590; Heapy v. Hill, 2 Sim. & Stu. 29; Hepburn v. Dunlop, 5 Cranch, R. 262; Brashier v.

(a) Besant v. Wood, 12 Ch. D. 605, 628, Jessel, M. R.; Parkin v. Thorold, 16 Beav. 59; Huffman v. Hummer, 2 C. E. Green, 263; Scarborough v. Arant, 25 Texas, 129; Steele v. Branch, 40 Cal. 4; Pritchard v. Todd, 38 Conn. 413; Spalding v. Alexander, 6 Bush, 160; Ashmore v. Evans, 3 Stockt. 151; Snowman v. Harford, 55 Maine, 197; De Camp v. Crane, 4 C. E. Green, 166; Mix v. Beach, 46 Ill. 311; Richmond v. Robinson, 12 Mich. 193; Morris v. Hoyt, 11 Mich. 9; Delavan v. Delavan, 49 N. Y. 485; Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407. But time, as the author has stated supra, may be made of the essence of a contract even in the view of a Court of Equity, either by express stipulation, by necessary implication, or by subsequent notice. Parkin v. Thorold, 16 Beav. 59; Macbryde v. Weekes, 22 Beav. 533; King v. Ruckman, 5 C. E. Green, 316; Stow v. Russell, 36 Ill. 18; Heckard v. Sayre, 34 Ill. 142; Quinn v. Roath, 37 Conn. 16; Sharp v. Trimmer, 24 N. J. Eq. 422; Miller v. Miller, 25 N. J. Eq. 354; Hubbell v. Van Schoening, 49 N. Y. 326; O'Fallon v. Kennerly, 45 Mo. 124; Becker v. Smith, 59 Penn. St. 469. See Steele v. Branch, 40 Cal. 4; Bullock v. Adams, 5 C. E. Green, 367; Richmond v. Robinson, 12 Mich. 193; Van Campen v. Knight, 63 Barb. 205; Atkins v. Rison, 25 Ark. 138. Time may also be made of the essence of a contract by circumstances, e. g. by the fluctuation of values. Merritt v. Brown, 4 C. E. Green, 286; Macbryde v. Weekes, 22 Beav. 533; Goldsmith v. Guild, 10 Allen, 239 (where it is said that time is generally of the essence in sales of land in this country); Booten v. Scheffer, 21 Gratt. 474. So in the following cases: Sale of a residence and growing crop. Gale v. Archer, 42 Barb. 320. See Tilley v. Thomas, L. R. 3 Ch. 61. Sale of a public house as a 'going concern.' Day v. Lubke, L. R. 5 Eq. 336; Cowles v. Gale, L. R. 7 Ch. 12. An election in favor of A to purchase land after the expiration of a lease, on condition of three months' notice and paying a certain sum at the expiration of that time. Ranelagh v. Melton, 2 Drew. & S. 278; Weston v. Collins, 11 Jur. n. s. 190. See Magoffin v. Holt, 1 Duv. 95; Mason v. Payne, 47 Mo. 517

so far as it respects the good faith and diligence of the parties. But if circumstances of a reasonable nature have disabled the

Gratz, 6 Wheat. R. 528; Taylor v. Longworth, 14 Peters, R. 173, 174; Baldwin v. Salter, 8 Paige, 473; ante, § 771. The doctrine was formerly carried to an extravagant extent in favor of relief. But in recent times Courts of Equity have endeavored to restrict it to very moderate limits. See Sugden on Vendors, ch. 8, § 1, pp. 359, 360, 361 (7th edit.); 1 Sugden on Vendors, ch. 5, § 2, n. 1 to 15, Id. § 3, n. 27 (10th edit.). Mr. Baron Alderson, in the recent case of Hipwell v. Knight, 1 Younge & Collyer, 415, has put this whole subject in its true light, and I gladly avail myself of the opportunity to quote his remarks. 'Now the first question,' said he, 'is whether time is of the essence of this agreement. After examining with as much attention as I can the various cases brought before me during the argument, it seems to me to be the result of them all that a Court of Equity is to be governed by this principle, — it is to examine the contract, not merely as a Court of Law does, to ascertain what the parties have in terms expressed to be the contract, but what is in truth the real intention of the parties, and to carry that into effect. But in so doing I should think it prudent in the first place to look carefully at what the parties have expressed; because in general they must be taken to express what they intend, and the burden ought in good reason to be thrown on those who assert the contrary. In the case of a mortgage however, which I use rather for the purpose of illustrating the principle than as at all parallel to the present case, the court, looking at the real contract, which is a pledge of the estate for a debt, treats the time mentioned in the mortgage deed as only a formal part of it, and decrees accordingly; taking it to be clear that the general intention should override the words of the particular stipulation. So in the ordinary case of the purchase of an estate and the fixing a particular day for the completion of the title, the court seems to have considered that the general object being only the sale of the estate for a given sum, the particular day named is merely formal; and the stipulation means in truth that the purchase shall be completed within a reasonable time, regard being had to all the circumstances of the case and the nature of the title to be made. But this is but a corollary from the general position, which is, that the real contract and all the stipulations really intended to be complied with literally shall be carried into effect. We must take care however that we do not mistake the corollary for the original proposition. If therefore the thing sold be of greater or less value according to the effluxion of time, it is manifest that time is of the essence of the contract; and a stipulation as to time must then be literally complied with in equity as well as in law. The cases of the sale of stock and of a reversion are instances of this. So also if it appear that the object of one

(infant reversioners); Potts v. Whitehead, 5 C. E. Green, 55.

But though time might be of the essence of the contract, the plaintiff may be unable to avail himself of the fact, as by failing punctually to perform his part of the engagement. Upperton v. Nickolson, L. R. 6 Ch. 436. So by continuing negotiations

for adjustment after the expiration of the time, at least where equities have intervened. Webb v. Hughes, L. R. 10 Eq. 281; Grigg v. Landis, 6 C. E. Green, 494. See further as to time Leaird v. Smith, 44 N. Y. 618; Reed v. Breeden, 61 Penn. St. 460; Jones v. Noble, 3 Bush, 694; Barnard v. Lee, 97 Mass. 92; Troy v. Clarke, 30 Cal. 419.

party from a strict compliance, or if he comes, *recenti facto*, to ask for a specific performance, the suit is treated with indulgence, and generally with favor, by the court.¹ But then in such cases it should be clear that the remedies are mutual;² that there has been no change of circumstances affecting the character or justice of the contract;³ that compensation for the delay can be fully and beneficially given;⁴ that he who asks a specific performance is in a condition to perform his own part of the contract;⁵ and that he has shown himself ready, desirous, prompt, and eager to perform the contract.⁶ Even where time is of the essence of the contract it may be waived by proceeding in the purchase after the time has elapsed; and if time was not originally made by the parties of the essence of the contract, yet it may become so by notice, if the other party is afterwards guilty of improper delays in completing the purchase.⁷

777. Courts of Equity will also relieve the party vendor by decreeing a specific performance where he has been unable to comply with his contract according to the terms of it, from the state of his title at the time, if he comes within a reasonable time, and the defect is cured.⁸ So if there has been no unneces-

party known to the other was that the property should be conveyed on or before a given period, as the case of a house for residence, or the like. I do not see therefore why, if the parties choose even arbitrarily, provided both of them intend so to do, to stipulate for a particular thing to be done at a particular time, such a stipulation is not to be carried literally into effect in a Court of Equity. That is the real contract. The parties had a right to make it. Why then should a Court of Equity interfere to make a new contract which the parties have not made? It seems to me therefore that the conclusion at which Sir Edward Sngden in his valuable treatise on this subject has arrived is founded in law and good sense.' See also *Coslake v. Till*, 1 Russ. R. 376; *Doloret v. Rothschild*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 590; *King v. Wilson*, 6 Beav. R. 124.

¹ *Ibid.*; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 461, 462; ante, § 771; post, § 777.

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 12, note (c), and the cases there cited.

³ *Pratt v. Law*, 9 Cranch, 456, 493, 494; *Brashier v. Gratz*, 6 Wheat. R. 528; *Mechanics Bank of Alexandria v. Lynn*, 1 Peters, R. 333; *Payne v. Meller*, 6 Ves. 349; *Taylor v. Longworth*, 14 Peters, R. 172.

⁴ *Pratt v. Law*, 9 Cranch, 456, 493, 494.

⁵ *Morgan v. Morgan*, 2 Wheat. R. 290; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 8, § 2, pp. 365 to 375 (7th edit.).

⁶ *Millard v. Earl of Thanet*, 5 Ves. 420, note; *Alley v. Deschamps*, 13 Ves. 228; *Moore v. Blake*, 1 B. & Beatt. 68, 69; *Newland on Contracts*, ch. 12, pp. 242 to 248, *King v. Hamilton*, 4 Peters, R. 311.

⁷ *King v. Wilson*, 6 Beav. R. 124.

⁸ See the cases cited in *Sngden on Vendors*, ch. 8, § 2, pp. 365 to 375 (7th

sary delay Courts of Equity will sometimes decree a specific performance in favor of the vendor, although he is unable to make a good title at the time when the bill is brought, if he is in a condition to make such a title at or before the time of the decree.¹ (a) So if the circumstances of the quality or quantity of land are not correctly described, and the misdescription is not very material, and admits of complete compensation, Courts of Equity will decree a specific performance. In all such cases Courts of Equity look to the substance of the contract, and do not allow small matters of variance to interfere with the manifest intention of the parties; and especially where full compensation can be made to the party on account of any false or erroneous description.²

778. But where there is a substantial (b) defect in the estate sold, either in the title itself, or in the representation or description, or the nature, character, situation, extent, or quality of it, which is unknown to the vendee, and in regard to which he is not put upon inquiry, there a specific performance will not be decreed against him.³ (c) Upon the like ground a party con-

edit.); *Id.* ch. 6, p. 260, § 2, p. 279, § 3, p. 290 (7th edit.); 1 Sugden on Vendors, ch. 5, § 2, n. 6, 8; *Id.* § 3, n. 1 to 9, pp. 415 to 420; *Guest v. Homfray*, 5 Ves. 818; *Newland on Contr.* ch. 12, pp. 227 to 230; *Esdaille v. Stephenson*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 122; *Wynn v. Morgan*, 7 Ves. 202; *Hepburn v. Auld*, 5 Cranch, 262; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 68, pp. 465, 466; *Jeremy on Equity Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, p. 457; *Hepburn v. Dunlop*, 1 Wheat. R. 179; ante, § 771.

¹ *Hepburn v. Dunlop*, 1 Wheat. R. 179; ante, §§ 771, 766; *Hoggart v. Scott*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 293; s. c. *Tamlyn*, R. 500.

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 2, note (e); *Calcraft v. Roebuck*, 1 Ves. jr. 221; *Calverley v. Williams*, 1 Ves. jr. 212; *Dyer v. Hargrave*, 10 Ves. 507; *Guest v. Homfray*, 5 Ves. 818; *Newland on Contr.* ch. 12, pp. 251 to 255; *Drewe v. Hanson*, 6 Ves. 675; *Halsey v. Grant*, 13 Ves. 76, 77; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 6, §§ 2, 3, pp. 279 to 300 (7th edit.); *Hovenden on Frauds*, vol. 2, ch. 16, pp. 31 to 34; *King v. Bardeau*, 6 John. Ch. R. 38; *Hanbury v. Litchfield*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 629; *Horniblow v. Shirley*, 13 Ves. 81.

³ *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 6, § 2, p. 279, &c. § 3, p. 290 (7th edit.); 1 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 7, § 3, n. 1 to 24, pp. 525 to 534 (10th edit.); *Id.* § 4, n. 1

(a) See *Dresel v. Jordan*, 104 Mass. 407; *Mussleman's Appeal*, 65 Penn. St. 480; *Christian v. Cabell*, 22 Gratt. 82; *Cook v. Bean*, 17 Ind. 504.

(b) *Wuesthoff v. Seymour*, 7 C. E. Green, 66.

(c) For recent illustrations see *Sturtevant v. Jaques*, 14 Allen, 523;

Boynton v. Hazelboom, Ib. 107; *Richmond v. Gray*, 3 Allen, 25; *Young v. Rathbone*, 1 C. E. Green, 224; *Swain v. Fidelity Ins. Co.*, 54 Penn. St. 455; *Linkous v. Cooper*, 2 W. Va. 67; *Littlefield v. Tinsley*, 26 Texas, 353; *Higgins v. Samels*, 2 Johns. & H. 460; *Hamett v. Baker*, L. R. 20 Eq.

tracting for the entirety of an estate will not be compelled to take an undivided aliquot part of it.¹

to 38, pp. 536 to 550; *Lowndes v. Lane*, 2 Cox, R. 363; *Ellard v. Landaff*, 1 B. & Beatt. 249, 250; *Grant v. Meunt, Cooper*, R. 173; *Dyer v. Hargrave*, 10 Ves. 505; *Shirley v. Stratton*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 440; *Hovenden on Frauds*, ch. 16, pp. 1 to 65. *Drewe v. Hanson*, 6 Ves. 678; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 9, note (i); *Waters v. Travis*, 9 John. R. 450; *Bowyer v. Bright*, 13 Price, 702, 703, 704; *Binkes v. Rokeby*, 2 Swanst. R. 222; *Collier v. Jenkins*, 1 Younge, R. 295; *Dalby v. Pullen*, 3 Sim. R. 29; *Portman v. Mill*, 2 Russ. R. 570; *Bowyer v. Bright*, 13 Price, R. 698; s. c. 1 McClelland, R. 479; *Wood v. Griffith*, 1 Swanst. R. 54; *Watts v. Waddle*, 6 Peters, R. 389. Lord Erskine, in *Halsey v. Grant* (13 Ves. 76, 77), said: 'If a Court of Equity can compel a party to perform a contract that is substantially different from that which he entered into, and proceed upon the principle of compensation, as it has compelled him to execute a contract substantially different and substantially less than that for which he stipulated, without some very distinct limitation of such a jurisdiction, having all the precision of law, the rights of mankind under contracts must be extremely uncertain. There is no doubt that this jurisdiction had its origin upon the foundation of a legal right, the law giving the title; but a Court of Law, from the modes in which justice is there administered, not being capable of giving a complete remedy, — all the relief to which the party was entitled. This jurisdiction began so long ago as the time of King Henry the Seventh; and though Courts of Equity then proceeded upon that principle, yet the Courts of Law thought proper to resist the jurisdiction. *Bromage v. Genning* (1 Roll's Rep. 368), in the 14th year of King James I., was the plainest case that can be stated; and the ground taken against the jurisdiction the most untenable, preposterous, and unjust. This most beneficial jurisdiction was in that instance maintained in equity. When the Courts of Equity had quieted these doubts and maintained their jurisdiction, they could not confine it to cases of strict legal title; for another principle equally beneficial is equally well known and established, — that equity does not permit the forms of law to be made instruments of injustice, and will interpose against parties attempting to avail themselves of the rigid rule of law for unconscientious purposes. Where therefore advantage is taken of a circumstance that does not admit a strict performance of the contract, if the failure is not substantial, equity will interfere. If for instance the contract is for a term of 99 years in a farm, and it appears that the vendor has only 98 or 97 years, he must be nonsuited in an action. But equity will not so deal with him; and if the other party can have the substantial benefit of his contract, that slight difference being of no importance to him, equity will interfere. Thus was introduced the principle of compensation, now so well established, — a principle which I have no disposition to shake.' See also *Morgan's heirs v. Morgan*, 2 Wheat. R. 290; *Hepburn v. Auld*, 5 Cranch, 262; *Winne v. Reynolds*, 6 Paige, R. 407.

¹ *Dalby v. Pullen*, 3 Sim. R. 29.

50; *Wells v. Millett*, 23 Wis. 64; *Magraff v. Muir*, 57 N. Y. 155; *Weise's Appeal*, 72 Penn. St. 351; *Phillips v. Homfray*, L. R. 6 Ch. 770; *Denny v. Hancock*, *Ib.* 1; *Baskcomb v. Beck-* with, L. R. 8 Eq. 100; *Hume v. Pock*, L. R. 1 Eq. 662; s. c. 1 Ch. 379; *Collier v. McBean*, L. R. 1 Ch. 81; *Mullings v. Trinder*, L. R. 10 Eq. 449; *In re Huish*, *Ib.* 5.

779. We have thus far principally spoken of cases of suits by the vendor against the purchaser for a specific performance where the contract has not been or cannot be strictly complied with. But suits may also be brought by the purchaser for a specific performance under similar circumstances where the vendor is incapable of making a complete title to all the property sold, or where there has been a substantial misdescription of it in important particulars, or where the terms as to the time and manner of execution have not been punctually or reasonably complied with on the part of the vendor. In these and the like cases, as as it would be unjust to allow the vendor to take advantage of his own wrong, or default, or misdescription, Courts of Equity allow the purchaser an election to proceed with the purchase *pro tanto*, or to abandon it altogether. The general rule (for it is not universal) in all such cases is, that the purchaser, if he chooses, is entitled to have the contract specifically performed as far as the vendor can perform it, and to have an abatement out of the purchase-money or compensation for any deficiency in the title, quantity, quality, description, or other matters touching the estate.¹ (a) But if the purchaser should insist upon such a per-

¹ *Paton v. Rogers*, 1 Ves. & B. 351; *Hill v. Buckley*, 17 Ves. 394; *Millegan v. Cooke*, 16 Ves. 1; *Waters v. Travis*, 9 John. R. 465; *Todd v. Gee*, 17 Ves. 278, 279; *Wood v. Griffith*, 1 Swanst. R. 54; *Mestaer v. Gillespie*, 11 Ves. 640; *Graham v. Oliver*, 3 Beav. 124, 128. In this last case Lord Langdale said: 'The general rule subject to some qualification undoubtedly is, that where a party has entered into a contract for the sale of more than he has, the purchaser, if he thinks fit to accept that which it is in the power of the vendor to give, is entitled to a performance to that extent. There is however a very great difficulty in all these cases, and I scarcely know how it can be overcome; though a partial performance only, it has been somewhat incorrectly called a specific performance. The sentiments of Lord Redesdale on this point, as expressed by him in two cases before him, are strongly impressed on my mind. The court has thought it right in many cases to get over those difficulties for the purpose of compelling parties to perform the agreements into which they have entered; and it is right they should be compelled to do so where it can be done without any great preponderance of inconvenience.' *King v. Wilson*, 6 Beav. R. 124.

(a) See *Phillips v. Stauch*, 20 Mich. 273; *Woodbury v. Luddy*, 14 Allen, 1; 369; *Bogan v. Daughdrill*, 51 Ala. James *v. Lichfield*, L. R. 9 Eq. 51; 312; *Jerome v. Scudder*, 2 Rob. (N.Y.) Barnes *v. Wood*, L. R. 8 Eq. 424; 169; *Covell v. Cole*, 16 Mich. 223; *Whittemore v. Whittemore*, *Ib.* 603; *Austin v. Ewell*, 25 Texas (Supp.), *Aberaman Iron Works v. Wickens*, 403; *White v. Dobson*, 17 Gratt. 262; L. R. 4 Ch. 101; *Horrocks v. Rigby*, *Wilcoxon v. Galloway*, 67 N. Car. 463; 9 Ch. D. 180. *Stockton v. Union Oil Co.*, 4 W. Va.

formance, the court will grant the relief only upon his compliance with equitable terms.¹

780. Perhaps it may be truly said that in some of the cases in which in former times the strict terms of the contract as to time, description, quantity, quality, and other circumstances of the estate sold were dispensed with, Courts of Equity went beyond the true limits to which every jurisdiction of this sort should be confined, as it amounted to a substitution, *pro tanto*, of what the parties had not contracted for.² But the tendency of the modern decisions is to bring the doctrine within such moderate bounds as seem clearly indicated by the principles of equity, and by a reasonable regard to the convenience of mankind, as well as to the common accidents, mistakes, infirmities, and inequalities belonging to all human transactions.³

781. We have hitherto been considering cases of contracts respecting lands within the reach of the Statute of Frauds. But other cases within the reach of other clauses of the Statute of Frauds have occurred, and may again occur, in which also the remedial justice of Courts of Equity ought to be exerted by decreeing a specific performance of the contemplated act of trust. Thus if a man in confidence of the parol promise of another to perform the intended act should omit to make certain provisions, gifts, or arrangements for other persons by will or otherwise, such a promise would be specifically enforced in equity against such promisee, although founded on a parol declaration creating a trust contrary to the Statute of Frauds; for it would be a fraud upon all the other parties to permit him to derive a benefit from his own breach of duty and obligation.⁴ (a) Therefore where a testator by his will gave an annuity to his nephew, and his brother (who was his executor and devisee of his real estate) promised to pay the annuity, otherwise the testator would have charged it on his lands devised, it was decreed that the executor should specifically perform it by paying the annuity, although

¹ *Paton v. Rogers*, 1 Ves. & Beam. 351; *Thomas v. Dering*, 1 Keen, R. 729, 743, 747.

² See *Halsey v. Grant*, 13 Ves. 76; *Drewe v. Hanson*, 6 Ves. 678; *Bowyer v. Bright*, 13 Price, R. 702.

³ *Newland on Contr.* ch. 12, p. 254; *Drewe v. Hanson*, 6 Ves. 678.

⁴ 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, p. 436; *ante*, §§ 64, 256, 439.

(a) *Williams v. Vreeland*, 32 N. J. Eq. 135, 736.

he had fully administered all the personal assets.¹ So where a testator intended by will to fell timber to raise portions for his younger children, but his eldest son being by desired him not to fell the timber because it would deface the estate, and promised that he would answer for the value of it to his brothers and sisters, and the testator forbore to cut the timber, and after his death the eldest son refused to perform his promise, he was held bound by it.² So where a tenant in tail was about to suffer a recovery in order to provide for his younger children, and was kept by the issue in tail from so doing by a promise to make such a provision, the issue in tail was decreed to perform the promise.³ So where an executor promised the testator to pay a legacy, and told the testator he need not put it into his will, he was decreed specifically to perform it.⁴ So where a testator was about altering his will for fear that there would not be assets enough to pay all the legacies, and his heir at law persuaded him not to alter it, promising to pay all the legacies, he was decreed specifically to perform his promise.⁵

782. These may suffice as illustrations of the class of cases calling for a specific performance which are within the purview of the Statute of Frauds. And we shall now proceed in the next place to a brief statement of the other class of cases already referred to, namely, those where relief is sought under written or parol contracts not within the Statute of Frauds. Many of these cases have already been incidentally taken notice of under the other heads, and especially under the heads of Accident, Mistake, and Fraud.⁶

783. Illustrations may easily be put of cases where no action whatsoever would lie at law between the parties. Thus if A should

¹ *Oldham v. Litchfield*, 2 Vern. R. 506; s. c. 2 Freem. R. 284; ante, §§ 64, 256.

² *Dutton v. Pool*, 2 Lev. 211; s. c. 1 Ventr. 318; s. c. cited 2 Freem. R. 285; ante, §§ 64, 256, 439.

³ 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, p. 436.

⁴ *Reech v. Kennigate*, Ambl. R. 67; s. c. 1 Ves. 123; *Barrow v. Greenough*, 3 Ves. 152, 154; *Mestaer v. Gillespie*, 11 Ves. 638; *Chamberlain v. Agar*, 2 Ves. & Beam. 262; *Devenish v. Baines*, Prec. Ch. 3.

⁵ *Chamberlaine v. Chamberlaine*, 2 Freem. R. 34.

⁶ See ante, §§ 54, 99, 152 to 157, 161, 330, 331. See also 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, pp. 471, 472; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 11, and Id. B. 1, ch. 1, § 8, note (o); *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 456, 457.

enter into a contract with B, which contract B should afterwards assign to a third person, there no action would be maintainable at law by such assignee against A, or by A against such assignee, on such contract. But a bill in equity would well lie by either of them against the other, either to enforce a specific execution of the contract, or to set it aside in the same manner and under the same circumstances, as such a bill would lie between the immediate parties to it.¹ We all know that privity of contract between the parties is in general indispensable to a suit at law; but Courts of Equity act in favor of all persons claiming by assignment under the parties independent of any such privity.²

784. Upon similar principles if a person has in writing contracted to sell land and afterwards refuses to perform his contract, and then sells the land to a purchaser with notice of the contract, the latter will be compelled to perform the contract of his vendor, for he stands upon the same equity; and although he is not personally liable on the contract, yet he will be decreed to convey the land in the same manner as his vendor.³ In other words he is treated as a trustee of the first vendee. So if a power is reserved in a marriage settlement for a feme covert to dispose of her separate property, real and personal, Courts of Equity will enforce the specific performance of it in favor of any party claiming title from her against her husband, although at law it might in many cases be difficult to prevent the latter from exercising power over it.⁴

785. The cases of contracts to grant an annuity for a life or lives, to settle the boundaries between contiguous estates, and to levy a fine, have been already mentioned as proper matters for a bill for a specific performance.⁵ So where an agreement was made by persons who were presumptive heirs to another person, to divide the estate equally between them without any reference

¹ See *Williams v. Steward*, 3 Meriv. R. 485, 486; and *Duke of Chandos v. Talbot*, 2 P. Will. 608; *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 402.

² Post, §§ 1040, 1057, 1057 a.

³ *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 402; *Potter v. Sanders*, 6 Hare, R. 1.

⁴ *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 3, § 2, pp. 207, 208; *Id.* B. 1, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 430, 431; *Rippon v. Dawding*, Ambler, R. 565; *Power v. Bailey*, 1 B. & Beatt. 49; *Fettiplace v. Gorges*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 8; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, p. 444; post, §§ 788, 789, 790.

⁵ Ante, §§ 722, 729, 730; *Nield v. Smith*, 14 Ves. 490; *Penn v. Lord Baltimore*, 1 Ves. 444.

to any will which might be made by such person, it was held valid, and that it should be specifically decreed.¹ So contracts to invest money in land, and on the other hand to turn land into money, have been held proper for a specific performance.² So a contract to make mutual wills, if one of the parties has died having made a will according to the agreement, will be decreed in equity to be specifically executed by the surviving party if he has enjoyed the benefit of the will of the other party.³ So a general covenant to indemnify a party for the purchase-money due for land upon an assignment thereof to an assignee, although it sounds only in damages, will be decreed to be specifically performed by the assignee upon the principle of *quia timet*.⁴

786. Another curious case, illustrative of the extent to which Courts of Equity will go to enforce a specific performance of contracts against parties and privies in estate, in cases where a fraudulent evasion is attempted, has been recently propounded and acted upon in the House of Lords. If a person covenants or agrees or in any other manner validly binds himself to give to A by his will as much property as he gives to any other child, he may put it out of his power to do so by giving away all his property in his lifetime. Or if he binds himself to give to A as much as he gives to B by his will, he may in his lifetime give to B what he pleases, so as, by his will, he shall give to A as much as he gives to B. But then the gifts which he makes in his lifetime to B must be out and out. For if, to defraud or defeat the obligation which he has thus entered into, he gives to B any property real or personal over which he retains a control, or in which he reserves an interest to himself, then in order to protect the agreement or obligation which he has entered into, and to defeat the fraud attempted upon that agreement or obligation, and to prevent his escaping as it were from his own contract, Courts of Equity will treat this gift to B in the same manner as if it were purely testamentary, and were included in a will; and the

¹ *Beckley v. Newland*, 2 P. Will. 182; *Id.* 608; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, p. 451; *Newland on Contr.* ch. 6, p. 110; ante, § 265.

² *Newland on Contr.* ch. 3, pp. 43, 47; ch. 6, p. 109.

³ *Dufour v. Ferrara*, cited 3 Ves. 412, 416; *Goilmere v. Battison*, 1 Vern. 48; *Newland on Contr.* ch. 6, p. 111.

⁴ *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 405, 406, and the cases there cited; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 8, and note (y); ante, § 730; post, §§ 849, 850.

subject-matter of the gift will be brought back and made the fund out of which to perform the obligation. At all events it will be made the measure for calculating and ordering the performance of and dealing with the claim arising under that agreement or obligation.¹ (a)

787. These cases are sufficient to point out the general course of remedial justice in equity in all cases of specific performance, whether they are within or without the Statute of Frauds. To go over all the doctrines applicable to the subject, in all the varieties, would require a discussion wholly incompatible with the objects of this work. The principles already expounded may serve to explain the true nature and extent of the jurisdiction at present exercised, — a jurisdiction which has been an appropriate theme of praise on all occasions in which the claims of Courts of Equity to public favor have been vindicated by their friends or assailed by their enemies.² In conclusion it may however be proper to remark that all the cases for a specific performance which we have been examining presuppose the contract to be between competent parties, and founded upon a valuable or meritorious consideration; for Courts of Equity will not, as we have seen and shall presently more fully see,³ carry into specific execution any merely nude pacts or voluntary agreements not founded upon some valuable or meritorious consideration; (b) nor between parties not sui juris or competent to contract, as such infants and femes covert; ⁴ nor (as we have already seen) any agreements which are against public policy, or are immoral, or which involve a breach of trust.⁵

¹ Logan v. Wienholt, 7 Bligh, R. 53, 54.

² Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, p. 445; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 5, § 1, and notes (a), (e); Id. § 2 (h); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 326, 327.

³ Ante, §§ 433, 706, 706 a, 750, 769; post, §§ 793 a, 973, 977, 987, 1040; Woodcock v. Bennet, 1 Cowen, C. 711; Crosbie v. McDonal, 13 Ves. 148; Wycherley v. Wycherley, 2 Eden, R. 177.

⁴ Flight v. Bolland, 4 Russ. R. 298, 301; ante, §§ 723, 751, note.

⁵ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 328; Brownsmith v. Gilborne, 2 Str. 738; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 445, 451; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 7 (x); Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 656, 662; Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. 149; ante, §§ 293, 294, 296, 297, 769.

(a) As to contracts to will property see Moorehouse v. Colvin, 21 L. J. Ch. 177; s. c. 9 Eng. L. & E. 136; Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 3 Stockt. 370; 30 Mo. 389; Frisby v. Parkhurst, 29 Md. 58; Semmes v. Worthington, 38 Md. 298; Fordy v. Williams, Ib. 493.

(b) Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422.

788. It may also be stated that in general where the specific execution of a contract respecting lands will be decreed between the parties, it will be decreed between all persons claiming under them in privity of estate, or of representation, or of title, unless other controlling equities are interposed.¹ (a) If a person purchases lands with knowledge of a prior contract to convey them, he is (as we have seen) affected by all the equities which affected the lands in the hands of the vendor.² The lien of the vendor for the purchase-money attaches to them; and such purchaser may be compelled either to pay the purchase-money, or to surrender up the land, or to have it sold for the benefit of the vendor. In this view the remedy of the vendor against such purchaser may be said to be in rem rather than in personam.³ On the other hand if the vendee under such a contract conveys the same to a third person, the latter upon paying the purchase-money may compel the vendor and any person claiming under him in privity or as a purchaser with notice to complete the contract and convey the title to him.⁴

789. The general principle upon which this doctrine proceeds is, that from the time of the contract for the sale of the land the vendor, as to the land, becomes a trustee for the vendee, and the vendee, as to the purchase-money, a trustee for the vendor, who has a lien upon the land therefor. And every subsequent purchaser from either with notice becomes subject to the same equities as the party would be from whom he purchased.⁵ (b) In

¹ See 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, pp. 468, 469, 472; Newland on Contr. ch. 2, p. 34, &c.; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 448, 449; *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 398, 402, 403; *Smith v. Hibbard*, 2 Dick. 730.

² Ante, § 784.

³ *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 398, 402.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Winged v. Lefebury*, 2 Eq. Abridg. 32, pl. 43; *Taylor v. Stibbert*, 2 Ves. jr. 437; *Daniels v. Davison*, 16 Ves. 249; s. c. 17 Ves. 433; ante, § 784.

⁵ *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 403; *Davie v. Beardsham*, 1 Ch. Cas. 39; *Green v. Smith*, 1 Atk. 572, 573; *Pollexfen v. Moore*, 3 Atk. 273; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 329, 336; *Walker v. Preswick*, 2 Ves. 622; *Trimmer v. Bayne*, 9 Ves. 209; ante, § 506.

(a) See *Ewins v. Gordon*, 49 N. H. s. c. 1 Beasl. 142; *Carrell v. Potter*, 444; *Currier v. Howard*, 14 Gray, 511; 23 Mich. 377.

Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 3 Stockt. 370; (b) See *Smith v. Lytle*, 27 Minn. 184.

cases of this sort if the original vendee dies after having sold the lands to a third person who is to pay the purchase-money, his personal representatives are entitled to proceed against such purchaser in equity to indemnify them and to pay the purchase-money.¹ On the other hand if the vendor dies, his personal representatives may enforce the lien for the purchase-money against the land in the possession of the purchaser. But who as between the heirs and personal representatives of the vendee or a subsequent purchaser is to bear the charge, that is, whether it is to be borne by the personal estate or by the land purchased, is a matter properly belonging to other branches of equity jurisdiction in which the marshalling of assets is considered.²

790. There is another consideration which is incident to this subject, and to which Courts of Equity have given an attention and effect proportioned to its importance. In the view of Courts of Law contracts respecting lands, or other things, of which a specific execution will be decreed in equity, are considered as simple executory agreements, and as not attaching to the property in any manner, as an incident, or as a present or future charge. But Courts of Equity regard them in a very different light. They treat them, for most purposes, precisely as if they had been specifically executed.³ (a) Thus if a man has entered into a valid contract for the purchase of land, he is treated in equity as the equitable owner of the land, and the vendor is treated as the owner of the money. The purchaser may devise it as land, even before the conveyance is made, and it passes by descent to his heir as land.⁴ The vendor is deemed in equity to stand seised of it for the benefit of the purchaser, and the trust (as has been already stated) attaches to the land so as to bind the heir of the vendor, and every one claiming under him as a purchaser with notice of the trust.⁵ The heir of the purchaser may come into equity and insist upon a specific performance of the contract; and unless some other circumstances

¹ *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 405, 406.

² Ante, § 558 to 580; *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 402.

³ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 9, and note (s); ante, § 64 g.

⁴ *Seton v. Slade*, 7 Ves. 264, 274; post, § 1212.

⁵ Ante, §§ 788, 789.

(a) See *Huffman v. Hummer*, 2 30 Md. 301; *Worrall v. Munn*, 38 C. E. Green, 263; *Brewer v. Herbert*, N. Y. 137.

affect the case, he may require the purchase-money to be paid out of the personal estate of the purchaser in the hands of his personal representative. On the other hand the vendor may come into equity for a specific performance of the contract on the other side, and to have the money paid; for the remedy, in cases of specific performance, is mutual,¹ and the purchase-money is treated as the personal estate of the vendor, and goes as such to his personal representatives. In like manner land articted or devised to be sold and turned into money is reputed as money, (a) and money articted or bequeathed to be invested in land has, in equity, many of the qualities of real estate, and is descendible and devisable as such, according to the rules of inheritance in other cases.² So if a trustee should take property

¹ Ante, § 723; post, §§ 796, 1212, 1214.

² Post, §§ 1212 to 1215; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, pp. 466 to 468; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1. ch. 6, § 9, and notes (s) (t); Newland on Contr. ch. 3, pp. 48 to 64; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. R. 563, 577, 578; Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 496; Doughty v. Bull, 2 P. Will. 320; Yates v. Compton, 2 P. Will. 308; Trelawney v. Booth, 2 Atk. 307; Rose v. Cunyngname, 11 Ves. 554; Kirkman v. Miles, 13 Ves. 338. As a fit illustration of the text, Mr. Fonblanque's note (1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 9, note t), containing the principal authorities, is here inserted. 'The rule,' says he, 'equally applies to money devised to be laid out in land. The authorities to show that money, agreed or directed to be laid out in land, is to be considered as land, are very numerous. The force of the rule is particularly evinced by those cases in which it has been held that the money, agreed or directed to be laid out, so fully becomes land: as, 1st, not to be personal assets; Earl of Pembroke v. Beighden, 3 Ch. Rep. 115; 2 Vern. 52; Lawrence v. Beverly, 2 Keble, 841; cited also in Kettleby v. Attwood, 1 Vern. 298, 741; 2dly, to be subject to the curtesy of the husband though not to the dower of the wife; Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2 Vern. 536; Otway v. Hudson, 2 Vern. 588; 3dly, to pass as land by will, if subject to the real use at the time the will was made. See ch. 4, § 2, note (n). See also Milner v. Mills, Mosely, 123; Greenhill v. Greenhill, 2 Vern. 679, Prec. Ch. 320; Shorer v. Shorer, 10 Mod. 39; Lingen v. Sowray, 1 P. Wms. 172; Guidott v. Guidott, 3 Atk. 254; 4thly, not to pass as money by a general bequest to a legatee; but it will by a particular description, as so much money to be laid out in land. Cross v. Addenbroke; Fulham v. Jones, cited in a note to Lechmere v. Earl of Carlisle, 3 P. Wms. 222; or by a bequest of all the testator's estate in law and equity; Rashleigh v. Masters, 1 Ves. jr. 204. But equity will not consider money as land unless the covenant or direction to lay it out in land be express; Symons v. Rutter, 2 Vern. 227; Curling v. May, M. 8, G. II. cited in Guidott v. Guidott, 3 Atk. 255. And as money agreed or directed to be laid out in land shall in general be considered as land, so land agreed or directed to be sold shall be considered and treated as money; Gilb. Lex Prætoria, 243; but

(a) See Burr v. Sim, 1 Whart. 252; Wood v. Cone, 7 Paige, 472; Wood v. Lindsay v. Pleasants, 4 Ired. Eq. 321; Keyes, 8 Paige, 365.

with absolute directions to sell and convert it into money, there, although the directions were not carried into effect during the life of the party creating the trust, the property would be deemed personalty. But if the charge is not absolute, (a) as if a testator should charge his real estate for the payment of his debts, it will retain its character as real estate, so far as the charge does not extend, until it is actually converted.¹ The like rule will apply to the case of real estate conveyed to a trustee in trust to permit a mortgagor to receive the rents and profits, and upon payment of the mortgage money to reconvey to the mortgagor, and upon default of payment to sell the premises and pay over the residue to the mortgagor after payment of the mortgage; there, if no sale should be made until after the death of the mortgagor, it will pass by his devise to his devisee, or to his heir, as real estate, and not as personalty.²

791. The ground of this latter doctrine is, that Courts of Equity will regard the substance, and not the mere form of

see *Ashby v. Palmer*, 1 Merivale, R. 296. As to from what time the conversion shall be supposed, see *Sitwell v. Bernard*, 6 Ves. 520; *Elwin v. Elwin*, 8 Ves. 547; and the creditors of the bargainer may compel the heir to convey the land. *Best v. Stanford*, 1 Salk. 154. But it must not be understood that where a testator directs his real estate to be sold for purposes which are answered out of the personal estate, the next of kin may insist upon the real estate's being sold; for "there is no equity between the next of kin and the heir; but the general principle is that the heir takes all that which is not for a defined and specific purpose given by the will." *Chitty v. Parker*, 2 Ves. jr. 271; *Ex parte Bromfield*, 1 Ves. jr. 453; *Oxenden v. Lord Compton*, 2 Ves. jr. 69; *Walker v. Denne*, 2 Ves. jr. 170; *Lord Compton v. Oxenden*, 2 Ves. jr. 361; but see *Wheldale v. Partridge*, 8 Ves. 235. And where the testator was entitled to a fund, as money or land, his real and personal representatives shall take it as money or as land, according as the testator would have taken it. See *Ackroyd v. Smithson*, and the cases there cited, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 503; see also *Hewitt v. Wright*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 86, as to Lord Thurlow's opinion that money, resulting to the heir as being produced by sale of real estate undisposed of, is to be considered as personal estate of the heir, and as such would go to his executor. *Russell v. Smythies*, 1 Cox, R. 215. But if the use and possession were not united, it would still be considered as land. *Rashleigh v. Masters*, 1 Ves. jr. 201; *Wheldale v. Partridge*, 8 Ves. 235.' The same subject is most amply discussed by Mr. Newland with uncommon care in his treatise on Contracts, ch. 3, pp. 48 to 64. See also Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 446, 447; *Craig v. Leslie*, 3 Wheat. R. 577; 2 Fonbl. on Equity, B. 1, ch. 4, § 2, note (n).

¹ *Bourne v. Bourne*, 2 Hare, R. 38; *Dalzell on the Law of Conversion*, 89.

² *Ibid.*

(a) *White v. Howard*, 46 N. Y. 144, 162.

agreements and other instruments, and will give them the precise effect which the parties intended, in furtherance of that intention. It is presumed that the parties, in directing money to be invested in land, or land to be turned into money, intend that the property shall assume the very character of the property into which it is to be converted, whatever may be the manner in which that direction is given. And no one will deny that it is competent, at least in a Court of Equity, for the owner of the fund to make land money, or money land, at his sole will and pleasure.¹ (a)

792. But although these are the general principles adopted by Courts of Equity, yet they are not without limitations and qualifications, standing upon peculiar reasons, but still consistent with those principles. Thus (as we have seen) nothing is looked upon in equity as done but what ought to be done, not what might have been done.² Nor will equity consider things as thus done in favor of everybody, but only in favor of those who have a right to pray that they might be done.³

793. Upon the ground of intention also, if it can be collected from any present or subsequent acts of the parties that it is their intention, notwithstanding any will, or deed, or other instrument, that the property shall retain its present character, either in whole or in part, Courts of Equity will act upon that intention.⁴ Thus for instance if money is directed by a will or other instrument to be laid out in land, or land is directed to be turned into money, the party entitled to the beneficial interest

¹ *Ibid.*; post, §§ 1212 to 1214.

² *Ante*, §§ 64 *g*, 790.

³ 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 9*, and note (s); *ante*, § 64 *g*; *Craig v. Leslie*, 3 *Wheat. R. 577, 578*.

⁴ See Mr. Cox's note to *Cruse v. Barley*, 3 *P. Will. 22*, note (1); *Craig v. Leslie*, 3 *Wheat. R. 577 to 585*; post, §§ 1212 to 1215, 1250; *Shadford v. Temple*, 10 *Simons, R. 184*.

(a) If the nature of real estate has been imposed upon a fund, as where it is the produce of real estate not necessary to be converted, the same will pass to the heir as such, unless something has been done to alter the equitable devolution. *Scott v. Scott*, 9 *L. R. Ir. 367, 379*. This principle is held to apply to the surplus of pro-

ceeds of sale over what was necessary for the purpose. *Ib.* But see *Steed v. Preece*, *L. R. 18 Eq. 192*. See also *Flanagan v. Flanagan*, cited 1 *Bro. C. C. 498*; *Oxenden v. Compton*, 2 *Ves. jr. 69*; *Walker v. Denne*, *Ib. 176*, and other cases considered in *Scott v. Scott*; also note 1, p. 115, *infra*.

may in either case, if he elects so to do, prevent any conversion of the property from its present state, and hold it as it is. And this election he may make as well by acts or declarations clearly indicating a determination to that effect, as by an application to a Court of Equity. It is this election however, and not the mere right to make it, which changes the character of the estate so as to make it real or personal at the will of the party entitled to the whole beneficial interest. If he does not make such an election in time to stamp the property with a character different from that which the will or other instrument gives it, the latter character accompanies it with all its legal consequences into the hands of those who are entitled to it in that character. So that in the case of the death of the party thus beneficially entitled without having made an election, the property will pass to his heirs, or personal representatives, in the same manner it would have done if the trust had been executed and the conversion had been actually made in his lifetime.¹ (a)

793 a. We have already had occasion to remark, throughout the whole of the preceding discussion respecting bills for specific

¹ *Craig v. Leslie*, 3 Wheat. R. 577, 578, 579; *Kirkman v. Miles*, 13 Ves. 338; *Edwards v. Countess of Warwick*, 2 P. Will. 171; *Roper v. Radcliffe*, 9 Mod. 167; *Cruse v. Barley*, 3 P. Will. 20, and Mr. Cox's note; *Id.* 22; *Ackroyd v. Smithson*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 503, and Mr. Belt's note; s. c. cited 3 P. Will. 22, Cox's note; *Hewitt v. Wright*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 86; *Seton v. Slade*, 7 Ves. 274. This whole subject is most elaborately considered upon all the distinctions stated in the text, in the opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Washington in *Craig v. Leslie*, 3 Wheat. R. 577 to 588, which will well reward the diligent perusal of the reader. Mr. Cox's note also to *Cruse v. Barley*, 3 P. Will. 22, note (1), contains a valuable exposition of the doctrine. The question often arises under wills, between personal representatives and real representatives, as to who are entitled; and the struggle is maintained with great pertinacity on each side. Thus if a testator should direct that his lands should be sold for the payment of his debts, or for other purposes, the question would arise whether he meant to give the produce of his real estate the quality of personalty to all intents and purposes, or only so far as respected the purposes of his will. For unless the testator has sufficiently declared his intention, not only that the realty shall be converted into personalty for the purposes of the will, but further that the produce of the real estate shall be taken as personalty whether such purposes take effect or not, so much of the real estate, of the produce of it, as may not, in the event, be required for any purposes of the will from any cause whatsoever will result to the heir at law, who will be entitled to hold it in any character which he may elect. See Mr. Cox's note, *supra*; ante, § 790; post, §§ 1212 to 1215. (b)

(a) See *In re Pedder*, 5 DeG. M. (b) See note (a), p. 114, *supra*.
& G. 890.

performance of contracts, that it has been constantly supposed that the contract was one founded upon a valuable consideration in the contemplation of law.¹ In respect to voluntary contracts, or such as are not founded in a valuable consideration, we have already had occasion to state that Courts of Equity do not interfere to enforce them, either as against the party himself or as against other volunteers claiming under him.² (a) Thus for example if a party should enter into a voluntary agreement to transfer stock to another, or to give him a sum of money, or to convey to him certain real estate, Courts of Equity would not assist in enforcing the agreement, either against the party entering into the agreement, or against his personal representatives; for the party contracted with is a mere volunteer.³ The same rule is applied to imperfect gifts, not testamentary, inter vivos, to imperfect voluntary assignments of debts and other property, to voluntary executory trusts, and to voluntary defective conveyances.⁴ A few cases may serve to illustrate this doctrine. Thus where a parent has assigned certain scrip to his daughter by a written assignment which operated as an equitable assignment only, and not as a legal transfer, a Court of Equity refused to compel the donor or his executors to perfect the gift.⁵ So where a lady by a writing assigned a bond of a third person to her niece, and

¹ Ante, § 787.

² Ante, § 433, note 4, §§ 706, 706 a, 787; 1 Fonbl. on Equity, B. I. ch. 5, § 2, note (h), § 3; *Tate v. Hilbert*, 2 Ves. jr. 112; *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Craig & Phillips, R. 136, 141; *Meek v. Kettlewell*, *The (English) Jurist* for Dec. 1843, p. 1121; s. c. 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 342.

³ *Ex parte Pye*, 18 Ves. 149; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. R. 336, 337, 338; *Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft*, 18 Ves. 98, 99; *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 39, 45, 46; *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 662; *Edwards v. Jones*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 226, 237; *Duffield v. Elwes*, 1 Bligh, R., n. s. 529, 530, 531; *Colman v. Sarrel*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 12; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. R. 50, 56; *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 138, 141; post, § 793 b.

⁴ *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 662; *Ex parte Pye*, 18 Ves. 149; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. R. 336, 337, 338; *Edwards v. Jones*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 226, 227; s. c. 7 Simons, R. 325; *Tufnell v. Constable*, 8 Simons, R. 69, 70; ante, § 433, note 1, § 706 a; 1 Fonbl. on Equity, B. 1, ch. 5, § 2, and note (h). *Callaghan v. Callaghan*, 8 Clarke & Fin. R. 394, 401; *Dillon v. Copper*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 647, 670, 671; *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 39.

⁵ *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 39, 43; ante, § 433 and note.

(a) Unless in a case of agreement upon the promise. Note at end of § 763.
to convey land the volunteer has entered and made outlays in reliance

delivered the bond to the latter, and then died, a Court of Equity refused to enforce the assignment against the executor, or to decree payment of the money by the obligor to the niece.¹ So where a testatrix drew a check on her bankers for £150 in favor of A, and verbally directed A to apply that sum, or so much of it as might be necessary, to make up to a legatee the difference in value between a legacy of £100 which she had by her will given to the legatee, and the price of a £100 share in a certain railway; the testatrix informing A that she intended to give the share instead of the legacy, but she did not think it necessary to alter her will, and the bankers gave credit to A for the £150: in a suit for the administration of the testatrix's estate it was held that there was no trust created for the benefit of the legatee in respect to the £150, as it could not be inferred from the facts that the testatrix meant to place this disposition of the £150 out of her own control in her lifetime. It was therefore not an absolute perfected gift.² (a) So where a testator to whom a party

¹ *Edwards v. Jones*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 226; s. c. 7 Simons, R. 325. Ante, § 433 and note.

² *Hughes v. Stubbs*, 1 Hare's R. 476. In this case Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram said: 'The question is whether the testatrix has so dealt with the sum of £150 in question as to make it no longer her property, but the property of Mrs. Gelding (the legatee). If a person intending to give property to another vests that property in trustees, and declares a trust upon it in favor of the object of his bounty, there are cases which establish that by such acts the gift is perfected and the author of the trust loses all dominion over it. *Colman v. Sarrel*, 3 Bro. C. C. 12; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 50; *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 656; *Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft*, 18 Ves. 84; *Ex parte Pye*, *Ex parte Dubost*, 18 Ves. 140. The principle has been extended to cases in which the author of the gift has had the legal dominion over the property remaining in him, but has completely declared himself to be a trustee of that property for the object indicated. *Ex parte Pye*, *Ex parte Dubost*. But it is clear also that a person not intending to give or to part with the dominion over his property may retain such dominion notwithstanding he may have vested the property in trustees, and have declared a trust upon it in favor of third persons. *Walwyn v. Coutts*, 3 Sim. 14; *Ganard v. Lord Lauderdale*, 3 Sim. 1; s. c. 2 R. & M. 451; *Acton v. Woodgate*, 2 Myl. & K. 492; *Gaskell v. Gaskell*, 2 Younge & J. 502. The different effects thus given by Courts of Equity to transactions similar in form necessarily give rise, in some cases, to questions of considerable difficulty. But the distinction which has been taken between the two classes of cases is founded in reason and good sense, and however refined that distinction may in some instances appear, I do not entertain a doubt but that Courts of Equity will continue to maintain it. "The distinction," as Lord Cottenham observed in *Bell v. Cureton*, 2 Myl. & K. 511,

(a) See *Price v. Price*, 21 L. J. Ch. 59; s. c. 8 Eng. L. & E. 271.

was indebted in one sum on a note, and in another on a bond, in his will bequeathed to a son a part of the entire debt, and afterwards by codicil revoked the bequest, and by an indorsement on the bond declared that he thereby acquitted the obligor of the sum, and stated that in consequence thereof he had revoked the bequest to the same amount made by the codicil; it was held that the obligor was not entitled, after the death of the testator, to come into equity for an injunction and relief against the enforcement of the bond, because he was a mere volunteer, and the acquittance was without any consideration to support it.¹ On the other hand if the transfer, assignment, trust, or conveyance is completed at law so that no further act remains to be done to give full effect to the title, there Courts of Equity will enforce it throughout, although it is derived from a mere gift or other voluntary act of the party. Thus for example if there is a gift of stock, and a transfer is actually made thereof, it will be held valid against the donor and his representatives.² So if an assignment of a debt or other property is consummate, so as to pass the title, and no further act is to be done by the donor, it will be enforced in equity.³ So if a creditor shortly before his

speaking of trusts for the payment of debts, "is adopted to promote the views and intentions of the parties. A man who without communication with his creditors puts property into the hands of trustees for the purpose of paying his debts, proposes only a benefit to himself by the payment of his debts; his object is not to benefit his creditors. It would therefore be a result most remote from the contemplation of the debtor, if it should be held that any creditor, discovering the transaction, should be able to fasten upon the property and invest himself with the character of a cestui que trust." The result of the cases is that the court looks into the nature of the transaction, and determines from the nature of the transaction what the effect of it shall be in divesting the owner of the property to which it relates.⁷

¹ *Tufnell v. Constable*, 8 Simons, R. 69.

² *Ex parte Pye*, 18 Ves. 149; *Edwards v. Jones*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 226, 237; *Fortescue v. Barnett*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 36; *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 662; ante, § 433, note; post, §§ 973 *a*, 987, 1040, 1040 *b*, 1196; *Collinson v. Patrick*, 2 Keen, R. 123, 134.

³ *Fortescue v. Barnett*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 36; *Sloane v. Cadogan*, Sugden on Vendors, Appx. 26 (9th edit.). The application of the principle in these cases must, since the remarks of Lord Cottenham on them, in *Edwards v. Jones*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 238, 239, 240, be deemed open to some doubt. But they certainly derive support from the case of *Richards v. Symes*, 2 Eq. Abridg. 617, cited ante, § 607 *b*, and commented on by Lord Eldon in *Duffield v. Elwes*, 1 Bligh, R. 538, 539. See also ante, § 433, note, and the Vice-Chancellor's remarks in *Edwards v. Jones*, 7 Simons, R. 325. See *Collinson v. Patrick*, 2 Keen, R. 123, 134; *Ward v. Audland*, 8 Beav. R. 201.

death should send a verbal message to his debtor to hold the debt in trust for a particular person, and the debtor should assent thereto, and the fact is communicated to the cestui que trust or beneficiary, there the trust, although verbal, will be held consummate, and enforced against the representatives of the creditor after his death.¹ (a)

793 *b*. It has been said that there are exceptions however to the rule, where the contract or conveyance, although voluntary, is deemed to be founded upon a meritorious, as contradistinguished from a valuable consideration; and that Courts of Equity will interfere and aid a defective conveyance, as they will the defective execution of a power against mere volunteers under the same party, where it is designed to be a provision for a wife or children; for in such cases it is treated as founded in a meritorious consideration, since the party is under a natural and moral obligation to provide for them.² And it has been added that it might be a very different question whether such a defective conveyance, or a defective execution of a power, would be enforced against the grantor or appointor himself, unless he had voluntarily entered into some contract to make a perfect convey-

¹ *M'Fadden v. Jenkins*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 153. In this case Lord Lyndhurst said some points were disposed by the vice-chancellor in this case which are indeed free from doubt, and appear not to have been contested in this court, viz. that a declaration by parol is sufficient to create a trust of personal property; and that if the testator, Thomas Warry, had in his lifetime declared himself a trustee of the debt for the plaintiff, that in equity would perfect the gift to the plaintiff as against Thomas Warry and his estate. The distinctions upon this subject are undoubtedly refined, but it does not appear to me that there is any substantial difference between such a case and the present. The testator in directing Jenkins to hold the money in trust for the plaintiff, which was assented to and acted upon by Jenkins, impressed, I think, a trust upon the money, which was complete and irrevocable. It was equivalent to a declaration by the testator that the debt was a trust for the plaintiff. The transaction bears no resemblance to an undertaking or agreement to assign. It was in terms a trust, and the aid of the court was not necessary to complete it.

² *Ante*, §§ 95, 169, 433, 706, 706 *a*; 1 Fonbl. on Equity, B. 1, ch. 5, § 2; *Fothergill v. Fothergill*, 2 Freem. R. 256; *Ellis v. Nimmo, Lloyd & Goad's Rep.* 333; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. R. 336, 337, 338; *Minturn v. Seymour*, 4 John. Ch. R. 498, 500. See also *Colyear v. Countess of Mulgrave*, 2 Keen, R. 81, 97, 98.

(a) See *Donaldson v. Donaldson*, ing cases are considered; *Otis v. Beck-Kay*, 711; *Kekewich v. Manning*, 1 with, 49 Ill. 121; *Stone v. Hackett*, DeG. M. & G. 176, where the conflict- 12 Gray, 227.

ance or to execute the power. And accordingly in a recent case it was held, on great consideration, that a voluntary contract in writing by a father to make a post-nuptial provision or settlement upon his daughter, might be enforced against him in equity, as being founded on a meritorious although not on a valuable consideration.¹ But this doctrine has been since denied, and the general rule seems now established that the court will not execute a voluntary contract, but will withhold assistance from a volunteer, whether he seeks to have the benefit of a contract, or a covenant, or a settlement.²(a) There may be a clear if not a satisfactory line of distinction drawn between cases of voluntary contracts, covenants, and settlements, where there has been a defective conveyance or execution thereof, and cases of a defective execution of a power. In the latter cases the donee of the power designs to carry into effect not merely his own objects and interests, but those of other persons, by executing the power in favor of persons who stand as volunteers upon a meritorious consideration, and for whom he is under a natural and moral obligation to provide; and his own defective execution of the power, by mistake or otherwise, not only defeats his own positive intention and moral obligation and duty to execute the trust reposed in him, but it would, if not aided, also defeat the very objects for which the power was created by third persons, whether it was created as a bounty, or upon a valuable consideration passing between the donor and donee of the power.³

¹ *Ellis v. Nimmo*, Lloyd & Goold's Rep. 333. See also *Sloane v. Cadogan*, Sugden on Vendors, Appx. No. 26 (9th edit.); *Fortescue v. Barnett*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 56; *Edwards v. Jones*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 226, 238, 239, 240; *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 39; *Minturn v. Seymour*, 4 John. Ch. R. 498, 500. See also *King's Heirs v. Thompson*, 9 Peters, R. 204. The case of *Ellis v. Nimmo* was doubted by the Vice-Chancellor (Sir L. Shadwell) in *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Simons, R. 325, and overthrown in effect in *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 138-141. But still the reasoning of Lord Chancellor Sugden deserves to be very carefully examined. It is certainly very able. See also post, §§ 973 a, 987, 1040 b, 1196.

² *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 138, 141; *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Simons, R. 325. See post, §§ 1377 a, 1415; ante, § 793 a; *Callaghan v. Callaghan*, 8 Clarke & Fin. 374, 401; *Dillon v. Coppin*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 647, 670, 671.

³ See ante, §§ 169, 170, and note.

(a) See *Studer v. Seyer*, 69 Ga. 125; *Hoig v. Adrian College*, 83 Ill. 267; *Gynn v. McCauley*, 32 Ark. 97.

Another exception, having a firmer foundation, is of cases of donations mortis causa as contradistinguished from donations inter vivos, in which, although the donation is imperfect as a complete transfer of the right of property, yet in equity it will be upheld, in order to effectuate the intention of the donor, and enforced against his executors, as it is treated as in the nature of a testamentary act. But of this sufficient has been already said in another place.¹

¹ Ante, § 433, note; § 607 *a*, note; § 607 *b*, note.

CHAPTER XIX.

COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES.

794. It is in cases of bills brought for a specific performance that questions principally (although not exclusively) arise as to compensation and damages being awarded by Courts of Equity; and therefore it is convenient in this place to consider the nature and extent of the jurisdiction exercised by Courts of Equity as to compensation and damages.¹ It may be stated as a general proposition, that for breaches of contract, and other wrongs and injuries cognizable at law, Courts of Equity do not entertain jurisdiction to give redress by way of compensation or damages where these constitute the sole objects of the bill. For whenever the matter of the bill is merely for damages, and there is a perfect remedy therefor at law, it is far better that they should be ascertained by a jury than by the conscience of an equity judge.² And indeed the just foundation of equitable jurisdiction fails in all such cases, as there is a plain, complete, and adequate remedy at law. Compensation or damages (it should seem) ought therefore ordinarily to be decreed in equity only as incidental to other relief sought by the bill and granted by the court;³

¹ The same principle of compensation and damages is applied in granting relief against penalties and forfeitures, as will be seen in a future page.

² Gilbert, For. Roman. ch. 12, p. 219; *Clifford v. Brooke*, 13 Ves. 130, 131, 134; *Blore v. Sutton*, 3 Meriv. R. 247, 248; *Newham v. May*, 13 Price, 749, 752.

³ Lord Chief Baron Alexander, in *Newham v. May* (13 Price, R. 752), said: 'The cases of compensation in equity I consider to have grown out of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity as exercised in respect to contracts for the purchase of real property where it is often ancillary, as incidentally necessary to effectuate decrees of specific performance.' And he added: 'It is not in every case of fraud that relief is to be administered in equity. In the cases for instance of a fraudulent warranty on the sale of a horse, or any fraud in the sale of a chattel, no one, I apprehend, ever thought of filing a bill in equity.' Ante, § 779.

or where there is no adequate remedy at law ;¹ or where some peculiar equity intervenes. Thus for example if, pending a suit for a specific performance of an agreement for a demise of quarries, a part of the subject-matter of the demise is abstracted, compensation may be obtained therefor by a supplemental bill.²

¹ *Newham v. May*, 13 Price, R. 752; *Ranelagh v. Hayes*, 1 Vern. R. 189; ante, § 711.

² *Nelson v. Bridges*, 2 Beav. R. 239. In this case Lord Langdale said: 'It has already been declared that the plaintiff is entitled to a specific performance of the agreement; but, pending the proceedings, the very subject of the agreement, to which the plaintiff has by the decree been declared entitled, has been abstracted. The stone or a quantity of the stone which the plaintiff had obtained a license to quarry, has actually been taken away by the defendant Wordsworth; so that while the performance of the agreement has been resisted and delayed by the defendants, they or one of them at least has taken away a portion of the very subject-matter of the suit, and the plaintiff has been thereby forever deprived of the full benefit of his contract. If that circumstance had been known at the first hearing, I cannot have the least doubt but that the court would, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, have put in a due course of investigation the question of the amount of compensation which ought to be made to the plaintiff. This matter, it appears, was not brought to the attention of the court at that time, and a supplemental bill is now filed by the plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining compensation. It is said that such compensation might originally have been had at law; or if not, that at least it might have been obtained at law by perfecting the decree for the specific performance of the agreement in some particular form. I am of opinion that it is not necessary for this court, when it has once entertained jurisdiction in a case, to resort to that circuitous mode of giving relief; I think moreover that if this matter had been before the court at the first hearing it would have been put in a proper train of investigation. Under these circumstances therefore it appears to me that the plaintiff is now entitled to relief; but the form in which that relief is to be given is certainly a matter of very serious consideration. I think that the amount of what is due to the plaintiff ought to be ascertained by means of an action at law, and I do not clearly see how it can be satisfactorily done in any other way. In this and perhaps in all cases the profit made by the defendants is not the measure of the damages done to the plaintiff; for we find that the quarry was not worked in a way to make the most of it. Mr. Bridges, thinking the validity of the license which he had given to Wordsworth to be doubtful, discouraged his working it, pending the proceedings; so that Wordsworth took only that stone which it was convenient for him to take, and he did not therefore work it in the profitable way in which the plaintiff would have worked it. It appears to me that the defendants are correct when they say that this is a case of damages and not of account, because it is to recover something which cannot be ascertained by taking an account of the profits made, — it is to ascertain the amount of the loss which the plaintiff has sustained by being prevented doing that which it has been declared he was entitled to do. I think the proper mode of assessing the amount of the damage will be to require the defendants to admit such facts as are necessary, and to allow the plaintiff to bring an action to ascertain quantum damnificatus.'

794 *a*. So strictly has the rule been construed, that it has been thought that, even in cases where no remedy would exist at law,—as for example in cases where a trustee by a breach of his trust has injured the property,—a Court of Equity would not award damages therefor, although if by reason of such breach of trust the trustee had made profits, it would make him account therefor. But it certainly may admit of some question whether, in a case of such a character, where there would otherwise be an irreparable injury and wrong, a Court of Equity ought not to grant redress to the injured party, since at law there would be no remedy.¹ (*a*)

795. The mode by which such compensation or damages are ascertained is either by a reference to a master, or by directing an issue, *quantum damnificatus*, which is tried by a jury. The latter used to be almost the invariable course, in former times, in all cases where the compensation was not extremely clear as to its elements and amount; and this course is still commonly resorted to in all cases of a complicated nature. But the same inquiries may be had before a master; and in cases where such inquiries do not involve much complexity of facts or amounts, this course is now often adopted.²

796. Wherever compensation or damages are incidental to other relief as for instance, where a specific performance is decreed upon the application of either party, with an allowance to be made for any deficiency as to the quantity, quality, or description of the property, or for any delay in performing the

¹ The corporation of *Ludlow v. Greenhouse*, 1 Blish's (N. s.) R. 18, 57, 58. In this case Lord Redesdale said: 'Is there any case in which the Court of Chancery has awarded damages for a breach of trust? Lord Keeper Coventry was of opinion that he could not. In the case of a chapel of which I am trustee Lord Coventry declared that where there was a gross breach of trust, all he could do was to make the persons who had committed it account for all the profits they had made, though the thing had received considerable damage.' See *Pratt v. Law & Cambell*, 9 Cranch, R. 456; post, § 799.

² *Gilb. For. Roman.* 219; *Denton v. Stewart*, 1 Cox, R. 258; *Greenaway v. Adams*, 12 Ves. 401, 402; *Todd v. Gee*, 17 Ves. 278, 279; *Phillips v. Thompson*, 1 John. Ch. R. 150; *Pratt v. Law*, 9 Cranch, 493, 494; *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 273, 285, 286; *Watt v. Grove*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 513; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 8, note (*b*); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 5, ch. 1, § 5, note (*s*); *Woodcock v. Bennet*, 1 Cowen, R. 711.

(*a*) See *Osgood v. Franklin*, 2 Willard's Eq. 614; *Chapman v. Chapman*, 1 Johns. Ch. 1; s. c. 14 Johns. 527; *man*, L. R. 9 Eq. 276.

contract, there it seems clear that the jurisdiction properly attaches in equity, for it flows and is inseparable from the proper relief.¹ (a) So where a bill is brought by the vendor against the vendee for a specific performance of the contract of sale, and for a payment of the purchase-money, if the decree is for a specific performance, equity will decree the payment of the purchase-money also, as incidental to the general relief, and to prevent a multiplicity of suits, although the vendor might in many cases have a good remedy at law for the purchase-money.² So where a contract for the sale of lands has been in part executed by a conveyance of a part of the lands by the vendor, but he is unable to convey the residue, equity will decree the repayment to the vendee of a proportionate part of the purchase-money with interest, if he has paid more than the part of the lands conveyed entitle the vendor to hold.³ But where a specific performance is denied, there is somewhat more difficulty in establishing the propriety of exercising a general jurisdiction for compensation or damages. It was strongly said by the Master of the Rolls,⁴ on one occasion where a specific performance was sought and refused because the vendor had rendered himself incapable of performing the contract, 'The party injured by the non-performance of a contract has the choice to resort either to a Court of Law for damages, or to a Court of Equity for a specific performance.

¹ Ante, §§ 709, 711. See *Todd v. Gee*, 17 Ves. 278, 279; *Grant v. Munt*, Cooper, Eq. Rep. 173; *Newham v. May*, 13 Price, 752 (x); *Mortlock v. Buller*, 10 Ves. 306, 315; *Dyer v. Hargrave*, 10 Ves. 507; *Howland v. Norris*, 1 Cox, R. 61; *Halsey v. Grant*, 13 Ves. 77; *Forrest v. Elwes*, 4 Ves. 497; *Hedges v. Everard*, 1 Eq. Abr. 18, pl. 7; *Hepburn v. Auld*, 5 Cranch, 278.

² See *Brown v. Haff*, 5 Paige, R. 235, 240; *Withy v. Cottle*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 174; *Adderley v. Dixon*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 607; *Cathcart v. Robinson*, 5 Peters, R. 269; ante, §§ 711, 723, 772, 775, 790.

³ *Pratt v. Law*, 9 Cranch, R. 456.

⁴ *Sir William Grant*, in *Greenaway v. Adams*, 12 Ves. 401; ante, §§ 711, 714, 723.

(a) If a man having a part interest in an estate enters into a contract of sale agreeing to sell the whole as his own, he may be compelled to transfer what he has and accept an abatement of price; and equity will not hear from him the objection that the purchaser cannot have the whole. *Mortlock v. Buller*, 10 Ves. 292, 315; *Horricks v. Rigby*, 9 Ch. D. 180; *Burrow v. Scammell*, 19 Ch. D. 175, 183, distinguishing *Wheatley v. Slade*, 4 Sim. 126, and *Price v. Griffith*, 1 D. M. & G. 80. See also *Curran v. Holyoke Water Co.*, 116 Mass. 90; *Bogan v. Daughdrill*, 51 Ala. 312.

If the court does not think fit to decree a specific performance, or finds that the contract cannot be specifically performed, either way I should have thought there was equally an end of its jurisdiction; for in the one case the court does not see reason to exercise the jurisdiction, in the other the court finds no room for the exercise of it. It seems that the consequence ought to be that the party must seek his remedy at law.' But upon the footing of authority he nevertheless proceeded to decree compensation in that case by a reference to a master.¹ (a)

¹ *Ibid.*; *S. P. Denton v. Stewart*, 1 Cox, R. 258; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 8, note (z); *Id.* ch. 3, § 8, note (b); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 5, ch. 1, § 5, note (s); ante, §§ 711, 714, 723. In *Sainsbury v. Jones*, 5 Mylne & Craig, R. 1, 3, Lord Cottenham said: 'I certainly recollect the time at which there was a floating idea in the profession that this court might award compensation for the injury sustained by the non-performance of a contract in the event of the primary relief for a specific performance failing, and I have formerly seen bills praying such relief; but that arises from my having known the profession sufficiently long to recollect the time when the decision of Lord Kenyon in *Denton v. Stewart* (1 Cox, 258) had not been formally overruled; but at that time very little weight was attached to it, and very few instances occurred in which plaintiffs were advised to ask any such relief; and for a short time Sir W. Grant's decree in *Greenaway v. Adams* (12 Ves. 395) added something to the authority of *Denton v. Stewart*, although he threw out strong doubts as to the principle of that case. This however lasted but a short time, for *Greenaway v. Adams* occurring in 1806, Lord Eldon in 1810, in *Todd v. Gee* (17 Ves. 273), expressly overruled *Denton v. Stewart*; and from that time there has not, I believe, been any doubt upon the subject. Certainly during the thirty years which have elapsed since that time I have never supposed the granting any such relief as being within the jurisdiction of this court. Indeed before that case Sir W. Grant in 1807, in *Gwillim v. Stone* (14 Ves. 128), refused to follow his own decision in *Greenaway v. Adams*, because the plaintiff did not ask a

(a) It is laid down in recent authorities that where a bill in equity for specific performance is brought in good faith, and the relief sought is defeated by inability on the part of the defendant to comply with a decree, caused after the suit or after the date of the agreement sued upon, equity will retain the bill, and afford relief by compelling compensation, provided the plaintiff brought his bill without knowledge of the disability. *Tainter v. Cole*, 120 Mass. 162; *Milkman v. Ordway*, 106 Mass. 232; *Mobile v. Kimball*, 102 U. S. 691, 706. See also *Wonson v. Fenno*, 129 Mass. 405.

The rule extends to all cases where a defect of title, right, or capacity in the defendant is developed in his answer or in the course of the hearing. *Tainter v. Cole*, supra.

But where specific performance has become impossible for want of title, the purchaser is entitled to no other damages than the amount of such expense as he has incurred by reason of the vendor's default; he cannot sue for damages sustained by the loss of his bargain. *Bain v. Fothergill*, L. R. 7 H. L. 158; *Burrow v. Scammell*, 19 Ch. D. 175, 181.

797. There is much weight in the reasoning of the Master of the Rolls; and the only assignable ground upon which the jurisdiction can be maintained in such a case is to prevent a multiplicity of suits. But that seems chiefly proper in cases where the court has already acquired a clear jurisdiction by a discovery for relief. In a later case, where a bill was framed for the delivery up of a contract upon the ground of the defective title of the defendant, with a prayer that the compensation might be made, it was refused.¹ Indeed Lord Eldon seems to have doubted the authority to decree compensation, and to have held the opinion that a Court of Equity ought not to give relief in the shape of damages, but only compensation out of the purchase-money; or at least that a Court of Equity ought not, except under very particular circumstances, upon a bill for specific performance, to direct an issue or a reference to a master to ascertain damages, as it is a matter purely at law, and has no resemblance to compensation strictly so called.² And his opinion seems to have been adopted on other recent occasions.³

798. There is however a distinction upon this subject which is entitled to consideration, and may perhaps reconcile the apparent diversity of judgment in some of the authorities. It is that Courts of Equity ought not to entertain bills for compensation

specific performance; that is, in a case precisely the same as the present; for upon this appeal the plaintiff does not ask a specific performance. Had it been supposed that this court had the jurisdiction contended for, every bill for a specific performance would have prayed compensation in the event of the vendor proving not to have a good title. It is true that in this case the compensation sought is not against the vendor, but against a person who falsely assumed authority to sell; but this places the case still wider from the principle upon which this court exercises its jurisdiction in cases of contract; because as against such agent there is no case of contract, but a mere claim for compensation, for damages arisen from their being none which the purchaser can enforce.⁷ In *Woodcock v. Bennet* (1 Cowen, R. 711) the court held that where a party has put it out of his power to perform his contract specifically, the bill for a specific performance ought to be retained, and an equivalent in damages awarded, to be assessed on reference to a master, or by a jury upon an issue of quantum damnificatus, as the circumstances may require. (a)

¹ *Gwillim v. Stone*, 14 Ves. 129.

² *Todd v. Gee*, 17 Ves. 278, 279, 280.

³ *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 25; *Newham v. May*, 13 Price, R. 749; *Kempshall v. Stone*, 5 John. Ch. R. 194, 195; *Blore v. Sutton*, 3 Meriv. R. 248. But see *Woodcock v. Bennet* (1 Cowen, R. 711), cited ante, § 796, note.

(a) See note (a), supra, p. 126.

or damages except as incidental to other relief, where the contract is of such a nature that an adequate remedy lies at law for such compensation or damages. But where no such remedy lies at law, there a peculiar ground for the interference of Courts of Equity seems to exist in order to prevent irreparable mischief or to avoid a fraudulent advantage being taken of the injured party. Thus where there has been a part performance of a parol contract for the purchase of lands, and the vendor has since sold the same to a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, — in such a case, inasmuch as a decree for a specific performance would be ineffectual, and the breach of the contract being by parol would give no remedy at law for compensation or damages, there seems to be a just foundation for the exercise of equity jurisdiction.¹

799. In the present state of the authorities, involving as they

¹ *Denton v. Stewart*, 1 Cox, R. 258; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 8, note (z); *Phillips v. Thompson*, 1 John. Ch. R. 149, 150, 151; *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 273, 286; *Deane v. Izard*, 1 Vern. R. 159; *Hatch v. Cobb*, 4 John. Ch. R. 559, 560; *Kempshall v. Stone*, 5 John. Ch. R. 193, 195; *Todd v. Gee*, 17 Ves. 273. In a case cited from Lord Colchester's MSS. (—— *v. White*, 3 Swanst. R. 109, note), and decided in the beginning of the last century, a specific performance was refused, but an issue of quantum damnificatus was awarded. In *Phillips v. Thompson* (1 John. Ch. R. 150), Mr. Chancellor Kent retained the bill, and awarded an issue of quantum damnificatus, founding himself upon the peculiar circumstances of the case before him, which he thought brought it within the reach of *Denton v. Stewart* (1 Cox, R. 258), and expressly affirming the jurisdiction. *S. P. Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 286. In another case however (*Hatch v. Cobb*, 4 John. Ch. R. 560) the learned chancellor seems to have doubted on the point, and said: 'It is doubtful how far the court has jurisdiction to assess damages merely in such a case in which the plaintiff was aware when he filed the bill that the contract could not be specifically performed or decreed. It was properly a matter of legal cognizance.' And after citing the case in 1 Cox, R. 258, 12 Ves. 395, and 17 Ves. 273, he concluded by saying: 'And though equity in very special cases may possibly sustain a bill for a specific performance, it is clearly not the ordinary jurisdiction of the court.' In a later case he expressed a still more decided opinion against the jurisdiction. *Kempshall v. Stone*, 5 John. Ch. R. 194, 195. But in *Woodcock v. Bennet* (1 Cowen, R. 711) the jurisdiction was expressly affirmed. Ante, § 796, note. The Supreme Court of the United States seem to have entertained no doubt that though a specific performance might not be decreed, an issue of quantum damnificatus would be within the competence of the court. *Pratt v. Law*, 9 Cranch, 492, 494. In *Cud v. Rutter* (1 P. Will. 570, Mr. Cox's note (3), a specific performance was denied, and yet damages were decreed by way of compensation. See also *Forrest v. Elwes*, 4 Ves. 497. Lord Hardwicke, in *City of London v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 512, 517, refused a specific performance, but he awarded an issue of quantum damnificatus.

certainly do some conflict of opinion, it is not possible to affirm more than that the jurisdiction for compensation or damages does not ordinarily attach in equity except as ancillary to a specific performance or to some other relief. If it does attach in any other cases, it must be under very special circumstances, and upon peculiar equities, as for instance in cases of fraud, or in cases where the party has disabled himself by matters *ex post facto* from a specific performance, (a) or in cases where there is no adequate remedy at law.¹ (b)

799 a. The cases however which we have been thus far considering are cases where the party sought relief in equity as a plaintiff, and not where compensation was ordinarily sought by the defendant, in resistance or modification of the plaintiff's claim. In these latter cases the maxim often prevails that he who seeks equity shall do equity. Thus for example if a plaintiff in equity seeks the aid of the court to enforce his title against an innocent person who has made improvements on land supposing himself to be the absolute owner, that aid will be given to him only upon the terms that he shall make due compensation to such innocent person to the extent of the benefits which will be received from those improvements. (c) In such a case if the plaintiff has

¹ See *Cud v. Rutter*, 1 P. Will. 570, and Mr. Cox's note (3); *Greenaway v. Adams*, 12 Ves. 395; *Hedges v. Everard*, 1 Eq. Abr. 18, pl. 7; *Errington v. Aynsly*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 341; *Deane v. Izard*, 1 Vern. 159; *Gwillim v. Stone*, 14 Ves. 129; *Todd v. Gee*, 17 Ves. 273.

(a) *Andrews v. Brown*, 3 Cush. 130.

(b) Under the Act of 21 & 22 Vict. ch. 27, § 2, equity may award damages in addition to or substitution for an injunction. *Holland v. Worley*, 26 Ch. D. 578; *Krehl v. Burrell*, 7 Ch. D. 551. Thus in a patent suit damages and an account may be ordered. *Betts v. Neilson*, L. R. 3 Ch. 429. See *Davenport v. Rylands*, L. R. 1 Eq. 302; *Betts v. Gallais*, L. R. 10 Eq. 392. So probably in this country irrespective of statute, under a suitable prayer for relief, special or general. As to damages under the act above cited in cases of easement see *Hindley v. Emery*, L. R. 1 Eq. 52; *Martin v. Headon*, L. R. 2 Eq. 425; *Senior v.*

Pawson, L. R. 3 Eq. 330. Where goods are parted with after notice of stoppage in transit, *Schotsman v. Lancashire Ry. Co.*, L. R. 1 Eq. 349; s. c. 2 Ch. 332. Wrongful working of mines, *Jegon v. Vivian*, L. R. 6 Ch. 742; *Hilton v. Woods*, L. R. 4 Eq. 432. Equity will not, it seems, add an order for assessing damages for breach of covenant after a decree for specific performance of the contract. *Hythe v. East*, L. R. 1 Eq. 630. See further *Phillips v. Thompson*, 1 Johns. Ch. 131; *May v. Leclair*, 11 Wall. 236; *Peabody v. Tarbell*, 2 Cush. 226; *Fry*, Specific Perf. 449 (2d Am. ed.).

(c) See *McLaughlin v. Barnum*, 31 Md. 425; *Sale v. Crutchfield*, 8 Bush, 636; *Troost v. Davis*, 31 Ind. 34;

fraudulently concealed his title and has thereby misled the defendant, the title to this compensation is founded in the highest justice.¹ But independently of any such fraud, if the plaintiff seeks from an innocent person an account of the rents and profits of an estate on which the latter has made improvements without any notice of any defect of his title, a Court of Equity in decreeing an account will allow him to deduct or recoup therefrom a due compensation for his improvements.² So in cases of partition between tenants in common, compensation is often allowed in equity to one of the tenants in common who has made valuable improvements thereon.³ (a)

799 *b*. It has been sometimes thought, as a matter of justice, that courts ought to go further, and in favor of a bona fide possessor of the land whose title is defective, to decree compensation for the improvements made by him upon the land in good faith against the true owner who asserts his title to it. (b) The civil law seems to have adopted this broad doctrine where the improvements were made by a bona fide possessor without notice of any adverse title. ‘Certe illud constat; si in possessione constituto ædificatore, soli dominus petat domum suam esse, nec solvat pretium materiæ et mercedes fabrorum, posse eum per exceptionem doli mali repelli; utique si bonæ fidei possessor fuerit qui ædificavit.’⁴ And this also appears to be the rule of countries deriving their jurisprudence from the civil law.⁵ But Courts of

¹ Ante, §§ 385, 388, 389. See also § 655; post, §§ 1237, 1238.

² Putnam *v.* Ritchie, 6 Paige, R. 390, 405, 406; Green *v.* Biddle, 8 Wheat. R. 1.

³ Ante, § 655; Coulter’s case, 5 Co. R. 30; Green *v.* Biddle, 8 Wheat. R. 1, 79 to 82; Southall *v.* McKean, 1 Wash. Virg. Rep. 434.

⁴ Just. Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 1, §§ 30, 35; Dig. Lib. 6, tit. 1, l. 38, 48; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 6, tit. n. 44; post, § 1239; Bright *v.* Boyd, 1 Story, R. 478, 494, 495.

⁵ Merlin, Repertoire, Amelioration; Id. Possession, § 5. Cod. Civ. de France, art. 555, 1381, 1634, 1635; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 7; Id. tit. 7, § 3, art. 5, 6; post, § 1239, and the authorities cited in Putnam *v.* Ritchie, 6 Paige, R. 403, 404.

Miller *v.* Tobie, 41 N. H. 84; Winton *v.* Fort, 5 Jones, Eq. 251; Patterson *v.* Yeaton, 47 Maine, 308; Davidson *v.* Barclay, 63 Penn. St. 406; Bacon *v.* Cottrell, 13 Minn. 194; Bomberger *v.* Turner, 13 Ohio St. 263; post, § 1237. But see Cook *v.* Craft, 3 Lans. 512; Cannon *v.* Copeland, 43 Ala. 252.

(a) Marlow *v.* Adams, 24 Ark. 109, that the compensation cannot exceed the rents.

(b) Bright *v.* Boyd, 1 Story, 478; s. c. 2 Story, 605; infra, p. 131. See Winton *v.* Fort, 5 Jones, Eq. 251; Miller *v.* Tobie, 41 N. H. 84; post, § 1237, and notes.

Equity seem not to have gone to this extent, but to have confined themselves simply to the administration of the equity in cases where their aid has been invoked by the true owner in support of his equitable claims. They have never enforced in a direct suit by the bona fide possessor his claim to meliorations of the property from which he has been evicted by the true owner.¹

¹ Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige, R. 390, 403, 404, 405. In this case Mr. Chancellor Walworth said: 'This principle of natural equity is constantly acted upon in this court where the legal title is in one person, who has made the improvements in good faith, and where the equitable title is in another, who is obliged to resort to this court for relief. The court in such cases acts upon the principle that the party who comes here as a complainant to ask equity must himself be willing to do what is equitable. I have not however been able to find any case either in this country or in England wherein the Court of Chancery has assumed jurisdiction to give relief to a complainant who has made improvements upon land, the legal title to which was in the defendant, where there has been neither fraud nor acquiescence on the part of the latter, after he had knowledge of his legal rights. I do not therefore feel myself authorized to introduce a new principle into the law of this court without the sanction of the legislature, which principle, in its application to future cases, might be productive of more injury than benefit. If it is desirable that such a principle should be introduced into the law of this State for the purpose of giving the bona fide possessor a lien upon the legal title for the beneficial improvements he has made, it would probably be much better to give him a remedy by action at law, where both parties could have the benefit of a trial by jury, than to embarrass the title to real estate with the expense and delay of a protracted chancery suit in all such cases.' Post, §§ 1237, 1238. On the other hand Mr. Justice Story in delivering the opinion of the court, in Bright v. Boyd (1 Story, R. 478, 494), said: 'The other question as to the right of the purchaser bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, to compensation for permanent improvements made upon the estate, which have greatly enhanced its value, under a title which turns out defective, he having no notice of the defect, is one upon which, looking to the authorities, I should be inclined to pause. Upon the general principles of Courts of Equity, acting ex æquo et bono, I own that there does not seem to me any just ground to doubt that compensation under such circumstances ought to be allowed to the full amount of the enhanced value, upon the maxim of the common law, "Nemo debet locupletari ex alterius incommodo;" or, as it is still more exactly expressed in the Digest, "Jure naturæ æquum est, neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiore." Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 206. I am aware that the doctrine has not as yet been carried to such an extent in our Courts of Equity. In cases where the true owner of an estate, after a recovery thereof at law from a bona fide possessor for a valuable consideration without notice, seeks an account in equity as plaintiff, against such possessor, for the rents and profits, it is the constant habit of Courts of Equity to allow such possessor (as defendant) to deduct therefrom the full amount of all the meliorations and improvements which he has beneficially made upon the estate, and thus to recoup them from the rents and profits. Ante, §§ 799 a. 799 b; post, §§ 1237,

1238, 1239; *Green v. Biddle*, 8 Wheat. R. 77, 78, 79, 80, 81. So if the true owner of an estate holds only an equitable title thereto, and seeks the aid of a Court of Equity to enforce that title, the court will administer that aid only upon the terms of making compensation to such bona fide possessor for the amount of his meliorations and improvements of the estate beneficial to the true owner. Ante, § 799 *b*, and note; post, §§ 1237, 1238. In each of these cases the court acts upon an old and established maxim in its jurisprudence, that he who seeks equity must do equity. Post, §§ 1237, 1238. But it has been supposed that Courts of Equity do not and ought not to go further, and to grant active relief in favor of such a bona fide possessor making permanent meliorations and improvements, by sustaining a bill, brought by him therefor, against the true owner, after he has recovered the premises at law. I find that Mr. Chancellor Walworth, in *Putnam v. Ritchie* (6 Paige, R. 390, 403, 404, 405), entertained this opinion, admitting at the same time that he could find no case in England or America where the point has been expressed or decided either way. Now if there be no authority against the doctrine, I confess that I should be most reluctant to be the first judge to lead to such a decision. It appears to me, speaking with all deference to other opinions, that the denial of all compensation to such bona fide purchaser, in such a case, where he has manifestly added to the permanent value of an estate by his meliorations and improvements, without the slightest suspicion of any infirmity in his own title, is contrary to the first principles of equity. Take the case of a vacant lot in a city where a bona fide purchaser builds a house thereon, enhancing the value of the estate to ten times the original value of the land, under a title apparently perfect and complete; is it reasonable or just that in such a case the true owner should recover and possess the whole, without any compensation whatever to the bona fide purchaser? To me it seems manifestly unjust and inequitable thus to appropriate to one man the property and money of another who is in no default. The argument, I am aware, is, that the moment the house is built it belongs to the owner of the land by mere operation of law, and that he may certainly possess and enjoy his own. But this is merely stating the technical rule of law by which the true owner seeks to hold what in a just sense he never had the slightest title to, that is, the house. It is not answering the objection, but merely and dryly stating that the law so holds. But then, admitting this to be so, does it not furnish a strong ground why equity should interpose and grant relief? I have ventured to suggest that the claim of the bona fide purchaser, under such circumstances, is founded in equity. I think it founded in the highest equity; and in this view of the matter I am supported by the positive dictates of the Roman law. The passage already cited shows it to be founded in the clearest natural equity. "*Jure naturæ æquum est.*" And the Roman law treats the claim of the true owner without making any compensation under such circumstances as a case of fraud or ill faith. "*Certe,*" say the Institutes, "*illud constat; si in possessione constituto ædificatore, soli dominus petat domum suam esse, nec solvat pretium materiæ et mercedes fabricorum, posse eum per exceptionem doli mali repelli; utique si bonæ fidei possessor qui ædificavit. Nam scienti alienum solum esse, potest objici culpa, quod ædificaverit temere in eo solo, quod intelligebat alienum esse.*" Just. Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, §§ 30, 32; ante, § 799 *b*; Vin. Com. ad Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, § 30, n. 3, 4, pp. 194, 195. It is a grave mistake sometimes made, that the Roman law merely confined its equity or remedial justice on this subject to a mere reduction from the

amount of the rents and profits of the land. See *Green v. Biddle*, 8 Wheat. R. 79, 80. The general doctrine is fully expounded and supported in the Digest, where it is applied, not to all expenditures upon the estate, but to such expenditures only as have enhanced the value of the estate "quatenus pretiosior res facta est" (Dig. lib. 20, tit. 1, l. 29, § 2; Dig. lib. 6, tit. 1, l. 65; Id. l. 38; Pothier, Pand. lib. 6, tit. 1, n. 43, 44, 45, 46, 48), and beyond what he has been reimbursed by the rents and profits. Dig. lib. 6, tit. 1. l. 48. The like principle has been adopted into the law of the modern nations which have derived their jurisprudence from the Roman law; and it is especially recognized in France, and enforced by Pothier with his accustomed strong sense of equity and general justice and urgent reasoning. Pothier de la Propriété, n. 343 to 353; Code Civil of France, art. 552 to 555. Indeed some jurists, and among them Cujacius, insist, contrary to the Roman law, that even a mala fide possessor ought to have an allowance of all expenses which have enhanced the value of the estate so far as the increased value exists. Pothier de la Propriété, n. 350; Vinn. ad Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, l. 30, n. 4, p. 195. The law of Scotland has allowed the like recompense to bona fide possessors making valuable and permanent improvements; and some of the jurists of that country have the benefit to mala fide possessors to a limited extent. Bell, Comm. on Law of Scotland, p. 139, § 538; Ersk. Inst. b. 3, tit. 1, § 11; 1 Stair, Inst. b. 1, tit. 8, § 6. The law of Spain affords the like protection and recompense to bona fide possessors, as founded in natural justice and equity. 1 Mor. & Carl. Partid. b. 3, tit. 28, l. 41, pp. 357, 358; Asa & Manuel, Inst. of Laws of Spain, 102. Grotius, Puffendorf, and Rutherford, all affirm the same doctrine as founded in the truest principles ex æquo et bono. Grotius, b. 2, ch. 10, §§ 1, 2, 3; Puffend. Law of Nat. b. 4, ch. 7, § 61; Rutherford, Inst. b. 1, ch. 9, § 4, p. 7. There is still another broad principle of the Roman law which is applicable to the present case. It is that where a bona fide possessor or purchaser of real estate pays money to discharge any existing incumbrance or charge upon the estate, having no notice of any infirmity in his title, he is entitled to be repaid the amount of such payment by the true owner seeking to recover the estate from him. Dig. lib. 6, tit. 1, l. 65; Pothier Pand. lib. 6, tit. 1, l. 43; Pothier de la Propriété, n. 343.' See also s. c. 2 Story, R. 605, where the doctrine was again affirmed and acted upon by the court.

CHAPTER XX.

INTERPLEADER.

800. WITH these remarks on the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity as to specific performance and compensation and damages we may dismiss the subject and proceed to another head of concurrent equitable jurisdiction, arising principally from the peculiar remedies administered therein, and that is INTERPLEADER. A learned author has treated this and one other branch of Equity Jurisprudence (that of interference in cases of irreparable mischief and injury) as not strictly belonging either to the concurrent, or the exclusive, or the auxiliary jurisdiction of Courts of Equity. Perhaps in strictness this may be correct, but it more nearly falls within the former than within either of the others.¹

801. The remedy by interpleader was not unknown to the common law, but it had a very narrow range of purpose and application. The interpleader at law was where there was a joint bailment by both claimants.² It was a common practice in the early times of the English law for parties by joint agreement to deposit title-deeds and other deeds and things in the hands of third persons to await the performance of covenants, or the doing of some other act upon which they were to be re-delivered to one or the other of the parties. It often happened under such circumstances that questions subsequently arose whether the act had been properly performed or the terms strictly complied with; and if, when either party supposed the crisis, on which the deed or thing was demandable, to have arrived, any dispute existed as to the right or as to the fact, an action of detinue (the appropriate action for such a case) became inevitable.³ Now by the common law in such a case the depositary might, if such an action

¹ Cooper, Eq. Pl. Introd. p. 35.

² *Crawshay v. Thornton*, 2 Mylne & Craig, R. 1, 21.

³ 3 Reeves, Hist. of the English Law, ch. 23, pp. 448 to 455.

was brought against him, plead for his protection the fact of such delivery or bailment upon certain conditions, and his willingness to deliver the property to the party entitled to it, and his ignorance whether the conditions were performed or not; and thereupon he might pray that a process of garnishment (that is, a process of monition or notice) might issue to compel the other depositor to appear and become a defendant in his stead. This was properly called the process of garnishment.¹

802. The process of interpleader was very nearly allied to that of garnishment, and it arose when both of the parties who concurred in a joint bailment brought several actions of detinue against the depositary under like circumstances for a re-delivery of the thing deposited. The depositary might then plead the facts of the case, and pray that the plaintiffs in the several actions might interplead with each other. This was properly the process of interpleader.² The proceeding seems highly reasonable in itself, to prevent the depositary from being harassed by suits in which he had no interest.

803. The same process was also applied to cases where the thing in controversy came to the possession of the depositary by finding, and he was sued in detinue by different persons, each claiming to be the owner in severalty.³ And it seems also to have been applied to cases of a bailment by A to the depositary to rebail to B, where both A and B sued the depositary in detinue.⁴ But if there was no privity between the parties, but each plaintiff counted upon a several independent bailment against the depositary, there it was said the plaintiffs were not compellable to interplead, for it was the depositary's own folly, and he must abide by it.⁵

804. The remedy however, such as it was, was principally confined to actions of detinue, although it was applied to a few other cases, such as writs of *quare impedit*, and writs of right of ward. But it was not allowed in any personal action except

¹ *Id.* pp. 448 to 450.

² *Id.* pp. 250 to 254; Mitford, *Eq. Pl.* by Jeremy, pp. 141, 142; Crawshay *v.* Thornton, 2 Mylne & Craig, 1.

³ 3 Reeves, *Hist. of the English Law*, ch. 23, pp. 448 to 455; Mitf. *Eq. Pl.* by Jeremy, pp. 141, 142.

⁴ 3 Reeves, *Hist. of the English Law*, ch. 23, pp. 448, 452.

⁵ 3 Reeves, *Hist. of the English Law*, ch. 23, pp. 453, 454. See Rich *v.* Aldred, 6 Mod. 216; Story on Bailments, §§ 111, 112.

detinue; and then only, as we have seen, when it was founded either in privity of contract or upon a finding.

805. From this description of the process of interpleader at the common law it is obvious that it could afford a very imperfect remedy in a great variety of cases. Indeed as the action of detinue has in modern times fallen much into disuse, and the action of trover has been substituted in its stead (in which interpleader did not lie at the common law), little or no practical advantage could be derived from it in modern times.¹ The only remedy therefore now resorted to (as we are informed from very high authority) for the relief of a person sued or in danger of being sued by several claimants of the same property, is that of filing a bill to compel them by the authority of a Court of Equity to interplead either at law or in equity.²

806. It is observable that the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to compel an interpleader follows to some extent the analogies of the law.³ It is properly applied to cases where two or more

¹ Cooper, Eq. Pl. 47, 48, 49; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, p. 48, and note H.; Id. 141, 142.

² The reader is referred to the able report of the Common Law Commissioners, made to Parliament, and printed by the order of the House of Commons, in March, 1830 (p. 24), for further information on this subject. Mr. Reeves has, in his History of the English Law (Vol. III. pp. 448 to 455), brought together some of the cases of difficulty in the proceedings of interpleader at the common law. They abundantly show the inadequacy of the remedy. Mr. Eden's valuable treatise on Injunctions contains a head of Interpleader, which I have consulted with great advantage and have freely used. Eden on Injunct. pp. 335 to 347.

³ See *Metcalf v. Hervey*, 1 Ves. 249; Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 141, 142; Cooper, Eq. Pl. Intro. 35, 36. Lord Redesdale, in his treatise on Equity Pleadings (edition by Jeremy, pp. 141, 142), gives the following description of equity jurisdiction on this subject. 'It has been mentioned,' says he, 'that where two or more persons claim the same thing by different titles, and another person is in danger of injury from ignorance of the real title to the subject in dispute, Courts of Equity will assume a jurisdiction to protect him; and that the bill exhibited for this purpose is termed a bill of interpleader, the object of it being to compel the claimants to interplead so that the court may adjudge to whom the property belongs, and the plaintiff may be indemnified. The principles upon which the Courts of Equity proceed in these cases are similar to those by which the Courts of Law are guided in the case of bailment; the Courts of Law compelling interpleader between persons claiming property for the indemnity of a third person, in whose hands the property is, in certain cases only; as where the property has been bailed to the third person by both claimants, or by those under whom both make title; or where the property came to the hands of the third person by accident;

persons severally claim the same thing under different titles or in separate interests from another person, who not claiming any title or interest therein himself, and not knowing to which of the claimants he ought of right to render the debt or duty claimed, or to deliver the property in his custody, is either molested by an action or actions brought against him, or fears that he may suffer injury from the conflicting claims of the parties. He therefore applies to a Court of Equity to protect him, not only from being compelled to pay or deliver the thing claimed to both the claimants, but also from the vexation attending upon the suits which are or possibly may be instituted against him.¹ (a)

and the Courts of Equity extending the remedy to all cases to which in conscience it ought to extend, whether any suit has been commenced by any claimant or only a claim made.' In *Pearson v. Cardon*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 613, Lord Brougham said: 'In looking at the rules of interpleader at law you discover the principles that govern this court; because I hold it to be strictly a concurrent jurisdiction, and that you can have no interpleader here, if upon principle you could not have it at law.' It is not very clear what is the precise extent to which this general remark was intended to reach. With reference to the case before his lordship it was perfectly accurate. But there certainly are cases in which an interpleader will not lie at law, but in which nevertheless it will lie in equity. Indeed if there be in the case a clear right of interpleader at law that would seem to put an end to the jurisdiction in equity, which comes in aid of the party only when there is no remedy at law, or the remedy is inadequate.

¹ Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 48, 49; 1 Eq. Abr. 80, 1 pl. 1 in marg.; *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cowen, R. 691, 703; *Eden on Injunctions*, ch. 16, pp. 335 to 343; *Moore v. Usher*, 7 Sim. 383; *Badeau v. Rogers*, 2 Paige, R. 209; *Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Co. v. Clute*, 4 Paige, R. 384, 392; *Richards v. Salter*, 6 John. Ch. R. 445. In *Glyn v. Duesbury* (11 Simons, R. 147), the Vice-Chancellor, Sir L. Shadwell, said: 'In the case of *Crawshay v. Thornton*, the Lord Chancellor, speaking of the law of interpleader, uses this language: "In equity it is defined to be where two or more persons claim the same debt or duty." It is obvious that there may be a case of interpleader where no debt or duty is claimed. Lord Redesdale, in his treatise on Pleading, twice asserts the proposition that where two or more persons claim the same thing by different or separate interests, and another person, not knowing to

(a) Generally speaking the bill should be filed before any judgment at law settling the rights of the respective parties; the object of the bill being to protect the complainant from the annoyance of defending all the suits that may be brought against him for the same property. *Cornish v. Tanner*, 1 Younge & J. 333; *Yar-*

borough v. Thompson, 3 Smedes & M. 291; *Union Bank v. Kerr*, 2 Md. Ch. 460. But a bill of interpleader may be filed after a verdict at law, if the effect of the action at law was merely to ascertain the damages due the plaintiff at law who was a defendant in the equity case. *Hamilton v. Marks*, 1 DeG. & S. 638; s. c. 19 Eng. L. & E. 321.

807. The true origin of the jurisdiction is that there either is no remedy at all at law, or the legal remedy is inadequate in the given case. If an interpleader at law will lie in the case, and it would be effectual for the protection of the party, then the jurisdiction in equity fails.¹ (a) So if the party himself seeking the aid of the court by bill of interpleader claims an interest in the subject-matter as well as the other parties, there is no foundation for the exercise of the jurisdiction; for in such a case he has other appropriate remedies.² (b) And besides a bill of inter-

which of the claimants he ought of right to render a debt or duty or to deliver property in his custody, fears he may be hurt by some of them, he may exhibit a bill of interpleader against them. p. 48 (4th edition). And again, at p. 141, he says that where two or more persons claim the same thing by different titles, and another person is in danger of injury from ignorance of the real title to the subject in dispute, Courts of Equity will assume a jurisdiction to protect him. A case of interpleader then arises where the same subject, whether debt, duty, or thing, is claimed. Now when the subject in dispute has a bodily existence, no difficulty can arise on the ground of identity; for no dispute can arise as to identity of matter. But where the subject in dispute is a chose in action, which has no bodily existence, it becomes necessary to determine what constitutes identity. Where the claims made by the defendants are of different amounts, they never can be identical; but where they are the same in amount, that circumstance goes far to determine their identity. The amount however may not be sufficient of itself to determine the identity; for the amount may be the same and the debt may be different.* See also *Sievekink v. Behrens*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 581. Lord Chief Baron Gilbert, in his *Forum Romanum* (p. 47), has supposed that a bill of interpleader bears a close resemblance to the process of intervention in the civil law. Mr. Eden, in his treatise on Injunctions (p. 336, note a), has abundantly shown that the processes are very different. The intervener, or *tertius interveniens* in the civil law, files his process upon his own independent title, asserting a right to the thing in controversy against both of the parties who are already contesting it, and insists upon his right to intervene or join in the discussion. On the contrary a party who seeks an interpleader in law or equity disclaims all title in himself, and requires other persons to engage in the controversy and to exonerate him. The bill of interpleader in equity was doubtless borrowed from the process of interpleader at the common law. It might have been a far more useful jurisdiction if it had gone to the full length of the intervention of the civil law. See *Merlin, Repertoire; Intervention*. See also *Gaill. Pract. Observ. Lib. 1, Obs. 69*, cited also by Mr. Eden.

¹ *Ibid.*, and note (h) to *Mitf. Eq. Pl.* by Jeremy, p. 49.

² *Langstone v. Boylston*, 2 Ves. jr. 103, 109; *Angell v. Hadden*, 15 Ves. 244; *Mitchell v. Hayne*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63; *Bedell v. Hoffman*, 2 Paige, Ch.

(a) *Oil Run Co. v. Gale*, 6 W. Va. U. S. 568; *Sprague v. West*, 127 Mass. 471; *Cobb v. Rice*, 130 Mass. 525.

(b) *Killian v. Ebbinghaus*, 110 231. But see *First Baptist Church v.*

pleader always supposes that the plaintiff is the mere holder of a stake which is equally contested by the other parties, and as to which the plaintiff stands wholly indifferent between them, so that when their respective rights are settled nothing further remains in controversy. (a) But that can never be truly said to be the case when the plaintiff asserts a personal right or claim which remains to be settled between him and the other parties, or the plaintiff seeks relief in the premises against either of them.¹ The true ground upon which the plaintiff comes into equity is that, claiming no right in the subject-matter himself, he is, or may be, vexed by having two legal or other processes in the names of different persons going on against him at the same time. He comes therefore into court upon the most obvious equity to insist that those persons claiming that to which he makes no claim should settle that contest among themselves and not with him, or at his expense and hazard.² If their respective titles are doubtful, there is so much the more reason why he should not be harassed by suits to ascertain and fix them; and unless under such circumstances Courts of Equity afford him protection, he will in almost every event be a sufferer, however innocent and honorable his own conduct may have been.

R. 200; *Aldrich v. Thompson*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 149; *Slingsby v. Boulton*, 1 Ves. & Beam. 334; *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cowen, R. 691, 703.

¹ *Mitchell v. Hayne*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63; *Moore v. Usher*, 7 Sim. R. 383; *Bedell v. Hoffman*, 2 Paige, R. 199, 200; *Badeau v. Rogers*, 2 Paige, R. 209; *Story on Equity Plead.* §§ 291, 292. Hence it is said that if upon a sale by an auctioneer a deposit is made by the purchaser and the auctioneer is afterwards sued for the deposit by the purchaser, and he claims a right to deduct from the deposit his commission and the auction duty, a bill of interpleader will not lie by the auctioneer against the vendor and the purchaser to ascertain their title to the deposit; because the auctioneer makes a personal claim to a part of the fund and is therefore not indifferent between the parties. *Mitchell v. Hayne*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63. But see *Fairbrother v. Prattent, Daniel*, R. 64, 70; *Fairbrother v. Nerot*, Id. p. 68, note; post, § 814, and note, as to the case of an auctioneer.

² *Langston v. Boylston*, 2 Ves. jr. 109; *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cowen, 703.

Robberson, 71 Mo. 326; *Sprague v. West*, 127 Mass. 471, or the right of a legatee to an interpleader against the executor. So if the plaintiff has lent himself in any way to further the claims of either party, or to aid one in obtaining possession to the exclusion of the others, he cannot have the relief of interpleader. *Marvin v. Ellwood*, 11 Paige, 365. See *Michigan Plaster Co. v. White*, 44 Mich. 25; infra, § 809. But the mere fact that the plaintiff might receive an indirect benefit by the proceeding would make no difference. *Oppenheim v. Wolf*, 3 Sandf. Ch. 571.

(a) *Lincoln v. Rutland R. Co.*, 24 Vt. 639.

808. In regard to bills of interpleader it is not necessary to entitle the party to come into equity, that the titles of the claimants should be both purely legal. It is sufficient to found the jurisdiction, that one title is legal and the other is equitable.¹ (a) Indeed where one of the claims is purely equitable it seems indispensable to come into equity, for in such a case there can be no interpleader awarded at law.² Thus for instance if a debt or other claim has been assigned and a controversy arises between the assignor and the assignee respecting the title, a bill of interpleader may be brought by the debtor to have the point settled to whom he shall pay.³ Where the title of all the claimants is purely equitable, there is a still broader ground to entertain bills in the nature of a bill of interpleader; for Courts of Equity in virtue of their general jurisdiction may grant relief in such cases. Nor is it necessary (as may be gathered from what has been already said) that a suit shall have been actually commenced by either or both of the conflicting claimants against the party either at law or in equity. It is sufficient that a claim is made against him, and that he is in danger of being molested by conflicting rights.⁴ (b)

809. But in every case of a bill of interpleader, the court, in order to prevent its being made the instrument of delay or of

¹ *Paris v. Gilham*, Cooper, Eq. R. 56; *Martinius v. Helmutli*, Cooper, R. 245; s. c. *Daniel*, R. 68, note; 2 Ves. & Beam. 412 (2d edit.), note; *Morgan v. Marsack*, 2 Meriv. R. 107; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B.* 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 348; *Richards v. Salter*, 6 John. Ch. R. 445; *Smith v. Hammond*, 6 Sim. R. 10; *Crawford v. Fisher*, 10 Sim. R. 479.

² *Duke of Bolton v. Williams*, 4 Bro. Ch. 309; s. c. 2 Ves. jr. 151, 152.

³ See *Wright v. Ward*, 4 Russ. 215; *Lowndes v. Cornford*, 18 Ves. 299. See *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cowen, R. 691.

⁴ *Langston v. Boylston*, 2 Ves. jr. 107; 1 Eq. Abr. 80, I. in marg.; *Morgan v. Marsack*, 2 Meriv. R. 107; *Alnete v. Bettam*, Cary, R. 65, 66; *Angell v. Haddin*, 15 Ves. 244; s. c. 16 Ves. 202; *Fairbrother v. Prattent*, 5 Price, R. 303; s. c. *Daniel*, R. 64, 70; *Fairbrother v. Nerot*, cited *Daniel*, R. 70, note; *Richards v. Salter*, 6 John. Ch. R. 445, 447; *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cowen, R. 691.

(a) The relief asked for must be equitable. *Killian v. Ebbinghaus*, 110 U. S. 568. And the plaintiff must have acted in good faith, without collusion or fault. *Michigan Plaster Co. v. White*, 44 Mich. 25; supra, p. 139.

(b) But the stakeholder can maintain the suit after an action has been

brought against him in equity by one of the claimants without joining the other claimant. *Prudential Assur. Co. v. Thomas*, L. R. 3 Ch. 74. See also as to the pendency of a suit in equity, *School District v. Weston*, 31 Mich. 86.

collusion with one of the parties, requires that an affidavit of the plaintiff should be made that there is no collusion between him and any of the other parties ; (a) and also if it is a case of money due by him, that he should bring the money into court, or at least should offer to do so by the bill.¹ (b)

810. A few cases to illustrate these doctrines may not be without use to the more full understanding of their purport and effect. Thus where A received money of B upon the terms that if so much should appear upon an adjustment of accounts to be due to C, the same should be paid to the latter, and what was not due should be repaid to B, and A gave a bond accordingly, there, B having died before any adjustment of accounts, and the creditors of B and C having severally sued A for the money, the court, on his bringing the money into court, decreed an account between the parties, and that the bond should be cancelled and a perpetual injunction awarded to the proceedings at law.² In this case the court, as we perceive, went beyond the mere decree of an interpleader, and sustained the bill for an account, as well as for other relief, without sending the parties to law.

811. So where there were several sets of annuitants who had distrained for rents upon a tenant's farm and he brought the rents into court and prayed that the annuitants might interplead, it was decreed accordingly, and referred to a master to settle their priorities.³ So where there was an entire rent charge which had been split into several parts by the owner, and there were different persons claiming the different parts, it was held that the tenant might bring a bill of interpleader to compel the parties

¹ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 142, 143; Mitford, Equity Pl. by Jeremy, 49; Id. 143; Metcalf v. Hervey, 1 Ves. 248; Dungey v. Angove, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 36; Langston v. Boylston, 2 Ves. jr. 109, 110; Errington v. Attorney-General, Bunbury, R. 303; Stevenson v. Anderson, 2 Ves. & B. 410; Warrington v. Wheatstone, Jac. R. 202; Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cowen, R. 703, 704; Shaw v. Coster, 8 Paige, R. 339.

² Hackett v. Webb, Rep. temp. Finch, 257, 258; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 T.

³ Aldrich v. Thompson, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 149, 150.

(a) See Williams v. Halbert, 7 B. Mon. 184; Mt. Holly Co. v. Ferree, 2 C. E. Green, 117; Michigan Plaster Co. v. White, 44 Mich. 25. A counter affidavit will not prevent the injunction, but the plaintiff may be put under an

undertaking as to damages. Manby v. Robinson, L. R. 4 Ch. 347.

(b) See Williams v. Walker, 2 Rich. Eq. 291; Parker v. Barker, 47 N. H. 278; Williams v. Wright, 20 Texas, 490.

to ascertain their shares respectively.¹ So where the owner of an estate upon which a rent charge had been secured filed a bill to compel the grantee and the executors of a person to whom it had been assigned to interplead, a question having arisen which of them was entitled to receive, the court sustained the jurisdiction.² So where a tenant was liable to pay rent, but there were several persons claiming title to it in privity of contract or tenure, he was held entitled to file a bill of interpleader to compel them to ascertain to whom it was properly payable.³ (a).

812. And here it may be proper to state that in the cases of tenants seeking such relief it must appear that the persons claiming the same rent claim in privity of contract or tenure, as in the case of mortgagor and mortgagee, or of trustee and cestui que trust; or where the estate is settled to the separate use of a married woman, of which the tenant has notice, and the husband has been in receipt of the rent.⁴ In cases of this sort the tenant does not dispute the title of his landlord, but he affirms that title and the tenure and contract by which the rent is payable, and puts himself upon the mere uncertainty of the person to whom he is to pay the rent. But if a claim to the rent should be set up by a mere stranger under a title paramount, and not in privity of contract or tenure (as if the stranger should bring ejection against the tenant),⁵ there the tenant cannot compel his landlord to interplead with such a stranger, for it is not a demand of the same nature or in the same right. The stranger cannot demand the rent as such;

¹ *Angell v. Hadden*, 15 Ves. 244; s. c. 16 Ves. 203; 2 Meriv. R. 164. See also *Paris v. Gilham*, Coop. Eq. R. 55.

² *Duke of Bolton v. Williams*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 297, 430; s. c. 2 Ves. jr. 138.

³ *Dungey v. Angove*, 2 Ves. jr. 310, 312; *Metcalf v. Harvey*, 1 Ves. 248; *Hodges v. Smith*, 1 Cox, R. 357; *Cowtan v. Williams*, 9 Ves. 107; *Clarke v. Byne*, 13 Ves. 383. See *Stephens v. Callanan*, 12 Price, R. 158; *Jew v. Wood*, 1 Craig & Phillips, R. 184.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Johnson v. Atkinson*, 3 Anstr. 798; Coop. Eq. Pl. Introd. 35, 36. *Crawshay v. Thompson*, 17 Sim. R. 391; s. c. 2 Mylne & Craig, R. 1.

⁵ Lord Hardwicke, in *Metcalf v. Harvey* (1 Ves. 249), said that a bill of interpleader cannot lie as to the possession of an estate, but it must lie as to the payments of some demand of money. This might be true in the case then under consideration. But a bill of interpleader will also lie as well as to chattels as to money.

(a) So if two persons are claiming same stock. *Mills v. Townshend*, 109 of a corporation dividends upon the Mass. 115.

but he has, if successful in the ejectment, only a right to damages for use and occupation, whereas the landlord claims the rent as such in privity of contract, tenure, and title. The debt or duty is not the same, and interpleader lies only when it is so and in privity.¹ (a)

813. These last cases may serve as proofs of the truth of the remark already made, that equity in bills of interpleader follows to some extent the analogies of the law; for we have seen that privity of contract is generally necessary to found a jurisdiction at law in cases of bailment upon a writ of interpleader. But in many other respects the bill of interpleader in equity differs from that at law. In all the cases above mentioned no interpleader would lie at law, for they involve no mutual or joint bailment, and no claim founded upon a finding by the plaintiff.²

813 a. So where a person is taxed in two different towns for the same property when he is only liable to be taxed in one, and it is doubtful to which town the right to tax belongs, he may file a bill of interpleader to compel the tax-collectors or towns to settle the right between themselves if there is no dispute about the amount of the tax which he is to pay.³ But if the amount

¹ *Ibid.*; *Woolaston v. Wright*, 3 Anstr. R. 801; *Smith v. Target*, 2 Anst. R. 530; *Coop. Eq. Pl. ch. 1*, pp. 48, 49. Lord Rosslyn, in *Dungey v. Angove*, 2 Ves. jr. 310, has expounded this doctrine very satisfactorily. 'The reason,' says he, 'is manifest; for upon the definition of it a bill of interpleader is where two persons claim of a third the same debt or the same duty. With regard to the relation of landlord and tenant the right must be the object of an ejectment. The law has taken such anxious care to settle their rights, arising out of that relation, that the tenant attacked throws himself upon his landlord. He has nothing to do with any claim adverse to his landlord. He puts the landlord in his place. If the landlord does not defend for him, he recovers upon his lease a recompense against the landlord. In the case of another person claiming against the title of his landlord, it is clear unless he derives under the title of the landlord he cannot claim the same debt. The rent due upon the demise is a different demand from that which some other person may have upon the occupation of the premises.' See also *Crawshay v. Thornton*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 1, 20, 21, 22; *Stuart v. Welch*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 316, 317.

² *Coop. Eq. Pl. ch. 1*, pp. 47, 48.

³ *Thomson v. Ebbets*, Hopkins, R. 272; *Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Company v. Clute*, 4 Paige, R. 384, 391.

(a) Hence if an administrator claim use and occupation during the same rent from a tenant by virtue of a parol time, a bill of interpleader will not lie lease from himself, and the heirs of as there is no privity. *Crane v. Burn-*
the late owner claim compensation for trager, 1 Ind. 165.

is in dispute and he seeks relief in respect thereto, there the appropriate remedy is (as we shall presently see) a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader.¹ (a)

813 *b*. So where a loss had occurred under a policy of insurance underwritten for a person who afterwards became insolvent and assigned the policy, and there were various creditors, some of whom claimed on the ground of special liens and others under the assignment against the underwriters on the policy, it was held that the latter might well be entitled to maintain a bill of interpleader to compel the various creditors to ascertain and adjust their rights to the fund.² So where there was a fund in the hands of an agent of a party who had become insolvent, and there were various attaching creditors, as well as the assignees of the insolvent, claiming title to the same fund, it was held that a bill of interpleader would lie to ascertain and adjust their conflicting claims.³ (b)

813 *c*. So where an insurance was procured to be made by a broker upon a ship at the request of a part-owner who was also the ship's husband, and a loss occurred under the insurance, the amount of which was received by the broker, and the ship's husband afterwards required payment of all the loss to be paid to him by the broker, and the other part-owners resisted his right to receive such payment, it was held to be a clear case for a bill of interpleader to be brought by the broker against all the part-owners.⁴

814. What the true limit of the jurisdiction upon bills of inter-

¹ *Ibid.*; post, § 824.

² *Spring v. South Car. Insur. Co.*, 8 Wheat. R. 268. See also *Paris v. Gilham, Cooper*, Eq. R. 56.

³ *Sievekings v. Behrens*, 2 Mylne & Craig, R. 581, 591, 592.

⁴ *Stuart v. Welch*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 316, 317, 319, 320, and note.

(a) See *Macy v. Nantucket*, 121 Mass. 351, criticising *Hardy v. Yarmouth*, 6 Allen, 277. See *Loud v. Charlestown*, 99 Mass. 208; *Norton v. Boston*, 119 Mass. 194.

(b) So where A, a judgment creditor, assigned all his interest in the debt to B. subject to a lien of C, notice of which lien and also of the assignment was given to the judgment debtor, and A became insolvent after-

wards, and his assignee gave notice to the judgment debtor that the estate of A was vested in him, it was held that the debtor might have a bill of interpleader to settle the rights of the claimants. *Jones v. Thomas*, 23 Eng. L. & E. 475. So also where two persons claim under the same instrument in hostility to each other, they may be compelled to interplead. *McHenry v. Hazard*, 45 N. Y. 580.

pleader is in cases where different persons claim the same specific chattel or thing from a third person upon the ground of title as owners, is not a matter perhaps settled by the authorities in a very precise manner.¹ In general bills of this sort are brought by persons standing in the situation of mere stake-holders, such as auctioneers, agents, factors, and consignees, between whom and the different claimants there is a privity of contract or duty.² (a) In one case where a banker with whom public stock was deposited for safe custody by the owner afterwards refused to deliver it up to the owner, who was sued and imprisoned under actions brought against him as a dormant partner in an insolvent mercantile house, and the banker was served with attachments by the plaintiffs in those actions, and also was held to bail in an action of trover by the owner, it was held to be a clear case for a bill of interpleader. In this case however all the parties claimed in privity under the same owner.³ (b) There does not seem any difficulty upon principle in maintaining that a bill of interpleader may be brought by a stake-holder against three persons, each claiming

¹ Where, upon a bill of interpleader, there is a priority in the different titles not incompatible with each other, so that it is apparent on the bill or answers in what order they are to be paid, there is no ground to require an interpleader. *Bowyer v. Pritchard*, 11 Price, R. 115. Mr. Baron Wood, in the same case, said: 'I certainly cannot say that I am very conversant with the doctrine of interpleader as entertained in Courts of Equity.' The meagre state of the materials to be found in the Reports leads to the conclusion that the doctrine on this whole subject is not well defined. And I cannot but regret that it is not in my power to give a more full and clear exposition of it.

² See *Martinius v. Helmuth*, Cooper, R. 245; s. c. Daniel, Rep. 68, note; 2 Ves. & B. 412; *Stevenson v. Anderson*, 2 Ves. & B. 407, note (2d edit.); *Birch v. Corbin*, 1 Cox, R. 144, 145; *Edensor v. Roberts*, 2 Cox, R. 280; *Dowson v. Hardcastle*, 2 Cox, R. 258; *Pearson v. Cardon*, 4 Sim. R. 218; *Fairbrother v. Prattent*, Daniel, R. 64, 70; *Fairbrother v. Nerot*, Id. 70, note. These latter cases do not seem in all respects entirely reconcilable with that of *Pearson v. Cardon* (4 Sim. R. 218). See ante, § 807, note; *Fenn v. Edmands*, 5 Hare, R. 314.

³ By Lord Rosslyn in *Langston v. Boylston*, 2 Ves. jr. 106, 107, 109. But see *Fuller v. Gibson*, 2 Cox, R. 24.

(a) See *Cobb v. Rice*, 130 Mass. 231.

(b) See *Desborough v. Harris*, 5 DeG. M. & G. 439, overruling *Fenn v. Edmands*, 5 Hare, 314, cited by the author, supra. Where the adverse titles are all derived from the one title

under or by which the plaintiff originally held the property, he will be entitled to his interpleader. *Fairbanks v. Belknap*, 135 Mass. 179, 185; *Providence Bank v. Wilkinson*, 4 R. I. 507; *Bell v. Hunt*, 3 Barb. Ch. 391; *Horton v. Chester Church*, 34 Vt. 309.

in a distinct and different right the same property, as well as against two persons claiming in the same manner.¹

815. In another and later case where a bill of interpleader was brought by the master of a ship against the consignee under a bill of lading, and also against a person who insisted that the master ought not to deliver the goods under the bill of lading because the consignor had acted with fraud towards him in making the consignment, it was doubted whether the bill would lie. On that occasion it was said that although a master might file a bill of interpleader where parties claimed adversely at law or in equity under the bill of lading, yet it might be doubted whether the bill would lie where the adverse claims were not under the bill of lading, but paramount to it. Delivery according to the bill of lading would fully justify the master; and those who alleged an equity paramount to the bill of lading, and against the consignor, should assert it by a bill of their own.² But in a still later case, on further consideration it was decided by the same court that the master might file such a bill, although the adverse claims were paramount to the bill of lading; as the right of possession in chattels may be in one person and the right of property in another. In this case also it is to be remarked that the bill does not seem to have been founded upon any legal adverse titles wholly independent of each other and not derived from a common source.³

816. But let us suppose that two persons should claim the same property under independent titles not derived from the same common source; the question would then arise whether a third person bona fide and lawfully in possession of the property, as the agent, consignee, or bailee of one of the parties, could maintain a bill of interpleader against the different claimants, standing in privity with one only of them. It would seem that he could not, and that the analogies of the law and the doctrines of Courts of Equity equally prohibit it.⁴

817. In the case here stated the property is supposed to be lawfully in the hands of an agent of one of the claimants. Now

¹ *Hoggart v. Cutts*, 1 Craig & Phillips, R. 197.

² Sir John Leach, in *Lowe v. Richardson*, 3 Madd. R. 277.

³ *Morley v. Thompson*, 3 Madd. Ch. R. Index, Interpleader, p. 564; *Eden on Injunctions*, pp. 339, 340. See also *Dawson v. Hardcastle*, 2 Cox. R. 278.

⁴ See *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 3, ch. 9, §§ 24, 25; *Cooper v. De Tastet*, 1 Tamlyn, R. 177; *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cowen, R. 691, 703 to 706.

the settled rule of law in such a case is that an agent shall not be allowed to dispute the title of his principal to property which he has received from or for his principal, or to say that he will hold it for the benefit of a stranger.¹ And this doctrine seems equally true in equity also; for it has been held that property put into the hands of an agent by his principal, under a bailment, is not the subject of an interpleader upon the assertion of a claim to it by a third person against the agent; but the latter must deliver it to the principal, as his possession is the possession of the principal.² (a) The like doctrine would prevail in favor of a third person to whom the principal after the bailment had transferred the right to the property in the possession of the agent, where the transfer had been recognized and assented to by the agent. For in such a case the third person by such transfer and assent would in respect to the agent be treated as the principal.³ Upon the same ground it has been held that where one person receives money for another as his agent, and the money is claimed by a third person, who gives notice of his claim, a bill of interpleader will not lie; for a mere agent to receive money for the use of another cannot by notice be converted into an implied trustee. His possession is the possession of his principal.⁴

817 *a*. But this doctrine is to be taken with its proper qualifications. For if the principal has created an interest or a lien on the funds in the hands of the agent in favor of a third person, and the nature and extent of that interest or lien is in controversy between the principal and such third person, there the

¹ *Dixon v. Hamond*, 2 B. & Ald. 313, 314; *Story on Agency*, § 217; *Cooper v. De Tastet*, 1 Tamlyn, R. 177; *Nickolson v. Knowles*, 5 Madd. R. 47; *Smith v. Hammond*, 6 Sim. R. 10; *Pearson v. Cardon*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 606, 609, 610, 612; *Crawshay v. Thornton*, 7 Sim. R. 391; s. c. 2 Mylne & Craig, 1.

² *Cooper v. De Tastet*, 1 Tamlyn, R. 177, 181, 182. But see *Pearson v. Cardon*, 4 Sim. R. 218; s. c. 2 Russ. & Mylne, R. 606, 609; *Crawshay v. Thornton*, 7 Sim. R. 391; s. c. 2 Mylne & Craig, 1.

³ *Crawshay v. Thornton*, 7 Sim. R. 391; s. c. 2 Mylne & Craig, 1, 22, 23, 24; *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cowen, R. 691, 692; *Pearson v. Cardon*, 4 Sim. R. 218; s. c. 2 Russ. & Mylne, 606.

⁴ *Nickolson v. Knowles*, 5 Madd. Rep. 47; *Dixon v. Hamond*, 2 B. & Ald. 313. See *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cowen, R. 691; *Smith v. Hammond*, 6 Sim. R. 16.

(a) *Roberts v. Bell*, 7 El. & B. 323; *Fairbanks v. Belknap*, 135 Mass. 179; *Tyus v. Rust*, 37 Ga. 574.

agent may for his own protection file a bill of interpleader to compel them to litigate, and adjust their respective titles to the fund.¹ So if an agent has possession of a fund, and an equitable assignment or arrangement has been made between the party entitled to the fund and a third person, and a controversy subsequently arises between them respecting it, the same rule will apply.² (a)

817 *b*. The true ground upon which this doctrine stands, that no bill of interpleader lies in cases of landlord and tenant and principal and agent, lies somewhat deeper than might be inferred from the mere state of the doctrine; and it is not so much to be considered as an independent rule, as a necessary consequence of all interpleading. It is essentially founded in privity of rights, or contracts between the parties. In the cases of landlord and

¹ *Smith v. Hammond*, 6 Sim. R. 10; *Wright v. Ward*, 4 Russell, R. 215, 220; *Crawshay v. Thornton*, 7 Sim. R. 391; s. c. 2 Mylne & Craig, 1, 21; *Crawford v. Fisher*, 1 Hare's R. 436, 440. In this case Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram said: 'The first question is whether the subjects of these suits are upon the pleadings proper subjects of interpleader; and I am of opinion that they are so. I admit that where a warehouseman or other depository of property receives such property as bailee for another and nothing is afterwards done by the party making the deposit before he claims to have the property restored to him, the possession of the depository must in many cases and for many purposes be considered as the possession of the party making the deposit. The relation of the parties in such circumstances may often be analogous to that of landlord and tenant, in which the latter might be precluded from disputing the title of the former, in whomsoever the legal or equitable ownership of the lands in question may really be. This is explained by Lord Cottenham in *Crawshay v. Thornton* (2 Mylne & Craig, 1), to which it is sufficient to refer. But the case assumes a widely different aspect where after the deposit is made the party making it has, by an act of his own, transferred his interest in the subject of the deposit to another. It is clear that in such a case the bailee may compel the depositor to interplead with the party to whom by the act of the depositor the property in the goods has been transferred.'

² *Wright v. Ward*, 4 Russ. R. 215, 220.

(a) Where an attorney received notes of a corporation for collection, and held in his hands the money collected, and different persons claimed the same, some as assignees of the corporation and others in part by virtue of an order from one of the very assignees, the attorney was allowed to have an interpleader. *Gibson v. Goldthwaite*, 7 Ala. 282. But it

seems that where a bailee has recognized the right of one claiming by alleged assignment from the bailor, and has agreed to act as his agent, he cannot require such assignee to interplead with the bailor who disavows the assignment. *Tyus v. Rust*, 37 Ga. 574; *Hatfield v. McWhorter*, 40 Ga. 269.

tenant, and principal and agent, rights and liabilities exist between the parties independent of the title to the property, or the debt or duty in question, and which may not depend upon the question of title.¹ (a) Hence it is that if an agent or bailee receive goods from A, who directs a delivery thereof to B, and upon the application of B the bailee agrees to hold them at the disposal of B, the bailee cannot afterwards, if a third person claims the goods under another title, file a bill of interpleader against B and such third person, because of the want of privity, and his own obligations contracted with B.² (b)

818. A distinction has also been taken upon this subject between the case of a mere private agent or bailee and that of a public agent or bailee. Thus for instance if a private warehouseman should receive goods as agent of the principal, it is said that he must account solely to the latter for them. But if the goods are deposited in a public bonded warehouse, the ware-

¹ *Crawshay v. Thornton*, 7 Sim. R. 391; s. c. 2 Mylne & Craig, 1. In this last case Lord Cottenham said: 'The case tendered by every such bill of interpleader ought to be that the whole of the rights claimed by the defendants may be properly determined by litigation between them, and that the plaintiffs are not under any liabilities to either of the defendants beyond those which arise from the title to the property in contest; because if the plaintiffs have come under any personal obligation independently of the question of property, so that either of the defendants may recover against them at law without establishing a right to the property, it is obvious that no litigation between the defendants can ascertain their respective rights as against the plaintiffs; and the injunction, which is of course if the case be a proper subject for interpleader, would deprive a defendant, having such a case beyond the question of property, of part of his legal remedy, with the possibility at least of failing in the contest with his co-defendant; in which case the injunction would deprive him of a legal right without affording him any equivalent or compensation. Such a case undoubtedly would not be a case for interpleader. A party may be induced by the misrepresentation of the apparent owner of property to enter into personal obligations with respect to it from which he may be entitled to be released by a Court of Equity; but such a case could not be a subject for interpleader between the real and pretended owners. In such a case the plaintiff would be asserting an equity for relief from a personal contract against one of the defendants with which the other would have nothing to do.'

² *Ibid.*

(a) See *Fairbanks v. Belknap*, 135 Mass. 179, 184. *Tyus v. Rust*, 37 Mass. 179, 184; *Cook v. Rosslyn*, 5 Ga. 574. But the law has been changed in England. *Attenborough v. London Dock Co.*, 3 C. P. D. 450, n. s. 267; *Tyus v. Rust*, 37 Ga. 574.

(b) *Fairbanks v. Belknap*, 135 reversing 3 C. P. D. 373.

houseman is treated as a public agent holding the same for the person who is entitled to the goods. The ground for the distinction (if it is at all maintainable) would seem to be the policy of protecting public agents, in the discharge of their duty, from the burdens of suits in which they have no interest and have undertaken no private trust; and also the propriety of treating them, as they in reality are, merely as public depositaries or stakeholders, and not in any just sense as mere agents of the parties interested.¹

819. Another case may be put, where a person is in possession of property as bailee, to which the bailor himself has no possessory title; but he is a mere tortious possessor, and the rightful owner demands it of the bailee. In such a case the question may arise whether he can compel the bailor and the rightful owner to interplead with each other. Upon principle it would seem that he cannot; for not only is there no privity between him and the rightful owner, but he is himself liable to be deemed a wrongful possessor if he should, after notice, withhold the property from the rightful owner.²

820. The true doctrine supported by the authorities would seem to be that in cases of adverse independent titles the party holding the property must defend himself as well as he can at law; (a) and he is not entitled to the assistance of a Court of Equity, for that would be to assume the right to try merely legal titles upon a controversy between different parties, where there is no privity of contract between them and the third per-

¹ *Cooper v. De Tastet*, 1 Tamlyn, R. 171, 181. Lord Brougham, in commenting on the case of *Cooper v. De Tastet*, in *Pearson v. Cardon* (2 Russ. & Mylne, 606, 609), said: 'And now, entirely adopting the doctrine of that case before the Master of the Rolls, though the report must be incorrect, or that learned judge has not in his judgment expressed himself with his usual very remarkable accuracy; for doubtless he there meant to point to the distinction between a party who was and a party who was not agent,—to the distinction between an agent and a mere stakeholder,—and not to the distinction between a public and a private agent; I have no hesitation in stating it to be clear law that an agent cannot as an agent, if there be nothing to distinguish his situation from the common case, have a bill of interpleader against his principal.' Lord Cottenham, in *Crawshay v. Thorntou*, 2 M. & Craig, 1, 22, seems to have doubted the soundness of the distinction.

² See *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 M. & Selw. 562; *Shaw v. Coster*, 8 Paige, R. 339.

(a) *Fairbanks v. Belknap*, 135 Mass. 179, 184.

son, who calls for an interpleader.¹ Whether it might not have been more wise and more consistent with the principles of equity, originally to have held that in all cases whatsoever, where the bailee was innocent and without any fault, he should have a right to a bill of interpleader, is a point into which it is now too late to inquire.

821. A bill of interpleader cannot be maintained by any person who does not admit a title in two claimants, and does not

¹ It is difficult to understand what was the particular ground upon which the Vice-Chancellor held the case of *Mason v. Hamilton*, 5 Sim. R. 19, to be a plain case of interpleader. The wharfinger there was clearly a bailee of Livermore and afterwards of Hamilton, to whom Livermore transferred the goods. But it does not appear what was the title of Emmerson, Price & Co. to the goods; whether it was in privity with Livermore, or by a paramount and adverse title. And yet this might have been most material to the question, whether it was a case for an interpleader or not. This case has since the former edition of this work been commented on by Lord Cottenham in *Crawshay v. Thornton* (2 M. & Craig, 1, 23), who treated it as no longer an authority upon the point of interpleader, not only upon its own circumstances but also upon the subsequent deliberate opinion of the Vice-Chancellor himself in another case, that of *Crawshay v. Thornton* (7 Sim. R. 391). The case of *Pearson v. Cardon* (4 Sim. R. 218), before the Vice-Chancellor, also contains some language not unattended with difficulty. That was a case where the plaintiffs, who were warehousemen, and with whom A & Co. (of which firm B was a partner) had deposited some bags of wool, which were the goods in question. A & Co. afterwards gave an order to the plaintiffs to transfer the goods to the name of B, and to be at his disposal, reserving the privilege of drawing samples from the wool in these bags. The plaintiffs accordingly transferred them in their books to B; and then C, claiming them as owner and as having put them into the hands of A & Co. as his agents, gave notice of his title thereto and denied the title of B, and offered an indemnity against B's title. The plaintiffs brought a bill of interpleader; and it was held by the Vice-Chancellor that the bill was maintainable, admitting the plaintiffs to be the agents of A & Co., for here there was a claim made by C under a paramount title. This language would seem to intimate that an agent might maintain a bill of interpleader against his principal and a third person claiming by a paramount title. When the same case came before the Lord Chancellor (Lord Brougham) he affirmed the decree upon the special ground of the reservation as to the samples (2 Russ. & Mylne, 606). But he expressly held, as we have seen (ante, § 818, note), that an agent as such could not maintain a bill of interpleader upon the ground of a claim by a stranger under a paramount title. In the case of *Crawshay v. Thornton* (2 Mylne & Craig, 1, 23), in which the decision of the Vice-Chancellor in *Pearson v. Cardon* was cited, Lord Cottenham said that there must be some mistake in the report, for interpleader as between agent and principal was admissible only where the claim was under a derivative and not under an adverse title. *Ibid.* p. 23. The cases of *Pearson v. Cardon*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 606, 609, 610, and *Crawshay v. Thornton*, 2 Mylne and Craig, 1, 22, 23, 24, have now settled the doctrine precisely as it is laid down in the text.

also show two claimants in existence capable of interpleading.¹ (a) Thus a sheriff who seizes goods on execution cannot sue a bill of interpleader upon account of adverse claims existing to the property; for as to one of the defendants he necessarily admits himself to be a wrongdoer.² (b) It is essential also in every bill of interpleader that the plaintiff should show that each of the defendants claims a right, and such a right as they may interplead for; for otherwise both the defendants may demur: the one, because the bill shows no claim of right against him; the other, because the bill, showing no claim of right in the co-defendant, shows no cause of interpleader.³

822. From the language used in some of the authorities it might perhaps be thought that in cases of bills of interpleader Courts of Equity had authority only to order the defendants to interplead at law. This would certainly be a very erroneous view of the jurisdiction. Indeed it has been so rare that interpleading bills have gone to a decree, that some doubts have been entertained as to what is the proper course. The result, upon a full examination of the subject, will be found to be that Courts of Equity dispose of questions arising upon bills of interpleader, in various modes, according to the nature of the question and the manner in which it is brought before the court. An interpleading bill is considered as putting the defendants to contest their respective claims, just as a bill does which is brought by an executor or trustee to obtain the direction of the court upon the adverse

¹ See *Metcalf v. Harvey*, 1 Ves. 248, 249; *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cowen, R. 691, 708; *Darthez v. Winter*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 536.

² *Slingsby v. Boulton*, 1 Ves. & B. 334; *Shaw v. Coster*, 8 Paige, R. 339.

³ *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, pp. 142, 143. The language of the Common Law Commissioners in the Report to Parliament, March, 1830, p. 24, is: 'The only course now resorted to for the relief of a person sued or in danger of being sued by several claimants, is that of filing a bill to compel the parties by the authority of a Court of Equity to interplead at law.' I have quoted these words in another place in the text (ante, § 805), and have added a qualification. Probably the Commissioners intended here to speak solely of legal rights.

(a) See *Browning v. Watkins*, 10 Smedes & M. 482; *Briant v. Reed*, 1 McCart. 271.

(b) As to the right of a sheriff to have an interpleader see *Fairbanks v. Belknap*, 135 Mass. 179; *Shaw v. Coster*, 8 Paige, 339; *Smith v. Critch-*

field, 14 Q. B. D. 873; *Dutton v. Furness*, 12 Jur. n. s. 386; *Child v. Mann*, L. R. 3 Eq. 806; *Ex parte Sheriff of Middlesex*, L. R. 12 Eq. 207; *Parker v. Barker*, 42 N. H. 78; *Dewey v. White*, 65 N. Car. 225.

claims of different defendants. (a) If therefore at the hearing the question between the defendants is ripe for a decision, the court will decide it; and if it is not ripe for a decision, the court will direct an issue, or a reference to a master, to ascertain contested facts, as may be best suited to the nature of the case.¹ Indeed an issue or a direction to interplead at law would be obviously improper in all cases except those where the titles on each side are purely legal. Equitable titles can only be disposed of by Courts of Equity; and even as to legal titles it is obvious that in many cases a resort to an issue or to an interpleader to be had at law would be unnecessary or inexpedient.

823. The remedy by bill of interpleader, although it has cured many defects in the proceedings at law, has yet left many cases of hardship unprovided for. No attempt has been made in America (as far as I know) to remedy these grievances. But in England, an Act of Parliament, recently passed, has given a far more expanded reach to the remedy of interpleader in the Courts of Law, and extended its benefits to many cases of honest but unavoidably doubtful litigation.² (b) The jurisdiction in

¹ *Angell v. Hadden*, 16 Ves. 203; *City Bank v. Bangs*, 2 Paige, R. 570.

² The act is the Stat. of 1 and 2 Will. IV., ch. 58. It recites that it often happens that a person sued at law for the recovery of money or goods wherein he has no interest, and which are also claimed of him by some third party, has no means of relieving himself from such adverse claims but by a suit in equity against the plaintiff and such third party, usually called a bill of interpleader. It then enacts that upon application of a defendant sued in the Courts of Law in any action of assumpsit, debt, detinue, or trover, showing that the defend-

(a) In regard to bills for instruction by the courts see *Morse v. Stearns*, 131 Mass. 389; *Stevens v. Warren*, 101 Mass. 564; *Houghton v. Kendall*, 7 Allen, 72; *Bowditch v. Soltyk*, 99 Mass. 136; *First Baptist Church v. Robberson*, 71 Mo. 326; *Sohier v. Burr*, 127 Mass. 221; *Sprague v. West*, *Ib.* 471. But while a legatee may have an interpleader against the executor, in the nature of a bill for instructions, a party in interest under a trust cannot maintain a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader against the trustee and an adverse claimant under the trust. *Sprague v. West*, *supra*.

(b) See 23 & 24 Vict. ch. 126, § 12. Under this statute Courts of Law may direct an interpleader to settle the rights of claimants in cases in which equity would do the like; but the statute does not extend to equitable claims. *Hurst v. Sheldon*, 13 C. B. n. s. 750. See also *Tanner v. European Bank*, L. R. 1 Ex. 261; *Rusden v. Pope*, L. R. 3 Ex. 269. The New York statute also permits an interpleader at law. *Hornby v. Gordon*, 9 Bosw. 656. For statutes in other States see *Nelson v. Goree*, 34 Ala. 565; *Rohrer v. Turrill*, 4 Minn. 407; *Bates v. Lilly*, 65 N. Car. 232.

equity seems however to have been left substantially upon its old foundations.

824. But although a bill of interpleader, strictly so called, lies only where the party applying claims no interest in the subject-matter, yet there are many cases where a bill, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, will lie by a party in interest to ascertain and establish his own rights, where there are other conflicting rights between third persons. (a) As for instance if a plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief against the owner of property, and the legal title thereto is in dispute between two or more persons, so that he cannot ascertain to which it actually belongs, he may file a bill against the several claimants in the nature of a bill of interpleader for relief.¹ So it seems that a purchaser may file a bill, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, against the vendor, or his assignee, and any creditor who seeks to avoid the title of the assignee, and pray the direction of the court as to whom the purchase-money shall be paid.² So if a mortgagor wishes to redeem the mortgaged estate and there are conflicting claims between third persons as to their title to the mortgage money, he may bring them before the court to ascertain their rights, and to have a decree for a redemption, and to make a secure payment to the party entitled to the money.³ In these cases the plaintiff seeks relief for himself; whereas in an interpleading bill, strictly so called, the plaintiff only asks that he may be at liberty to pay the money or deliver the property

and does not claim any interest in the subject-matter of the suit, but that the right thereto is claimed or supposed to belong to some third party who has sued or is expected to sue for the same, and that such defendant does not in any manner collude with such third party, but is ready to bring the money into court, &c., the court may make an order on such third party to appear and state his claim, &c.; and powers are given to the courts to direct an issue to try the same. See 2 Chitty's General Practice, ch. 5, § 3, pp. 342, 343, 344.

¹ *Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Company v. Clute*, 4 Paige, R. 384; *Thomson v. Ebbets*, Hopkins, R. 272: This same doctrine would apply to a case where a person was taxed in two towns for the same property, and did not know to which town tax should properly belong, and asked by his bill to have the amount of tax with which he was chargeable, as well as the persons to whom it was payable, ascertained. *Ibid.*; ante, § 813 a.

² *Parks v. Jackson*, 11 Wendell, 443.

³ See *Goodrick v. Shotbolt*, Prec. Ch. 333, 334, 335, 336; *Bedell v. Hoffman*, 2 Paige, Rep. 199; *Mitchell v. Hayne*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 146, 147; s. p. *Gilb. Eq. Rep.* 18.

(a) See note (a), p. 153, supra.

to the party to whom it of right belongs, and may thereafter be protected against the claims of both.¹ In the latter case the only decree to which the plaintiff is entitled is a decree that the bill is properly filed; or in other words that he shall be at liberty to pay the money, or bring the property into court, and have his costs, and that the defendants interplead and settle the conflicting claims between themselves.² So a bill in the nature of an interpleading bill will lie by a bank which has offered a reward for the recovery of money stolen, and a proportionate reward for a part recovered, where there are several claimants of the reward or a proportion thereof, one or more of whom have sued the bank. And in such a bill all the claimants may be made parties, in order to have their respective claims adjusted.³

¹ See ante, §§ 807, 809; *Mitchell v. Hayne*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 63; *Meux v. Bell*, 6 Sim. R. 175. See *East India Company v. Campion*, 11 Bligh, R. 158, 182, 185.

² *Anon.* 1 Vern. R. 351; *Bedell v. Hoffman*, 2 Paige, R. 200; *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cowan, R. 691; *Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Co. v. Clute*, 4 Paige, R. 384, 392; 1 Eq. Abridg. 80.

³ *City Bank v. Bangs*, 2 Paige, R. 570; *Merchants Bank of Providence v. Packard and others*, Circuit Court of Rhode Island District, November Term, 1838. See *Gray v. Pitman*, 5 Scott, R. 795.

CHAPTER XXI.

BILLS QUIA TIMET.

825. IN the next place let us proceed to the consideration of another class of cases, where the peculiar remedies administered by Courts of Equity constitute the principal although not the sole ground of jurisdiction, and that is *BILLS QUIA TIMET*. We have already had occasion in another place to explain in some measure the nature of these bills and the origin of the appellation, and to show their application to cases of covenants and contracts with sureties and others, where a specific performance is necessary to prevent future mischief.¹ They are called (as we have seen) bills quia timet, in analogy to certain writs of the common law whose objects are of a similar nature. Lord Coke has explained this matter very clearly in his Commentary on Littleton. ‘And note,’ says he, ‘that there be six writs in law that may be maintained, quia timet, before any molestation, distress, or impleading. As, (1) a man may have a Writ of Mesne (whereof Littleton here speaks) before he be distrained; (2) a Warrantia Chartæ, before he be impleaded; (3) a Monstraverunt, before any distress or vexation; (4) an Audita Querela, before any execution sued; (5) a Curia Claudenda, before any default of enclosure; (6) a Ne injuste Vexes, before any distress or molestation. And these be called brevia anticipantia, writs of prevention.’²

826. Now bills in equity quia timet answer precisely to this latter description. They are in the nature of writs of prevention, to accomplish the ends of precautionary justice. They are

¹ Ante, § 701 to 710, 730. See also 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 178, 179; Viner, Abridg. title, Quia Timet, A. and B.; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 148.

² Co. Litt. 100 a. See also Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 148.

ordinarily applied to prevent wrongs or anticipated mischiefs, and not merely to redress them when done. The party seeks the aid of a Court of Equity because he fears (*quia timet*) some future probable injury to his rights or interests, and not because an injury has already occurred which requires any compensation or other relief. The manner in which this aid is given by Courts of Equity is of course dependent upon circumstances. They interfere sometimes by the appointment of a receiver to receive rents or other income; sometimes by an order to pay a pecuniary fund into court; sometimes by directing security to be given or money to be paid over; and sometimes by the mere issuing of an injunction or other remedial process; thus adapting their relief to the precise nature of the particular case, and the remedial justice required by it.¹ (*a*)

827. In regard to equitable property the jurisdiction is equally applicable to cases where there is a present right of enjoyment, and to cases where the right of enjoyment is future or contingent. The object of the bill in all such cases is to secure the preservation of the property to its appropriate uses and ends; and wherever there is danger of its being converted to other purposes, or diminished or lost by gross negligence, the interference of a Court of Equity becomes indispensable. It will accordingly take the fund into its own hands, or secure its due management and appropriation either by the agency of its own officers or otherwise. Thus for instance if property in the hands of a trustee for certain specific uses or trusts (either express or implied) is in danger of being diverted or squandered, to the injury of any claimant having a present or future fixed title thereto, the administration will be duly secured by the court according to the original purposes, in such a manner as the court may in its discretion, under all the circumstances, deem best fitted to the end; as by the appointment of a receiver, or by payment of the fund, if pecuniary, into court, or by requiring security for its due preservation and appropriation.²

¹ Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 7, and §§ 1, 2, pp. 248 to 254; Id. B. 3, ch. 2, § 2, p. 350; post, §§ 827, 828, 829, 830, 839, 845, 847.

² Ibid.

(*a*) If the bill is founded upon a lic Works, 1 McArth. 121; Minnesota Oil Co. v. Palmer, 20 Minn. apparently valid. Harkness v. Pub- 468.

828. The same principle is applied to the cases of executors and administrators, who are treated as trustees of the personal estate of the deceased party. If there is danger of waste of the estate, or collusion between the debtors of the estate and the executors or administrators, whereby the assets may be subtracted, Courts of Equity will interfere and secure the fund; and in the case of collusion with debtors, they will order the latter to pay the amount of their debts into court.¹ (a)

829. The appointment of a receiver, when directed, is made for the benefit and on behalf of all the parties in interest, and not for the benefit of the plaintiff or of one defendant only.² (b) It may be granted in any case of equitable property upon suitable circumstances. And where there are creditors, annuitants, and others, some of whom are creditors at law claiming under judgments, and others are creditors claiming upon equitable debts, if the property be of such a nature that, if legal, it may be taken in execution, it may, if equitable, be put into the possession of a receiver to hold the same, and apply the profits under the direction of the court for the benefit of all the parties according to their respective rights and priorities.³ The same rule applies to cases where the property is legal, and judgment creditors have taken possession of it under writs of elegit; for it is competent for the court to appoint a receiver in favor of annuitants and equitable creditors, not disturbing the just prior rights, if any, of the judgment creditors.⁴ Hence the appointment of a receiver, in cases of this sort, is often called an equitable execution.⁵

¹ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 8, and note (y); *Elmsley v. Macauley*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 624; *Taylor v. Allen*, 2 Atk. 213; *Utterson v. Mair*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 277; *Mandeville v. Mandeville*, 8 Paige, R. 475; ante, §§ 422, 423, 424, 581, and note; post, § 836; Story on Equity Pleadings, §§ 178, 514.

² *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 1 Swanst. R. 83; s. c. 2 Swanst. R. 125.

³ Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, p. 248; *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 2 Swanst. R. 125, 135, 139, 145, 146, 173.

⁴ *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 1 Swanst. R. 83; s. c. 2 Swanst. R. 125, 135, 139, 140, 141, 145, 173; *White v. Bishop of Peterborough*, 3 Swanst. R. 117, 118.

⁵ *Ibid.*, and Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 248, 249.

(a) See *Haines v. Carpenter*, 1 Woods, 262. (b) *Scott v. Ware*, 65 Ala. 174, 184.

830. It has been said that the general rule of equity to appoint a receiver for an equitable creditor against a person having an equitable estate, without prejudice to persons who have prior estates, is to be understood in this limited sense, that it is to be without prejudice to persons having prior legal estates, and so that it will not prevent their proceeding to obtain possession if they think proper. And with regard to persons having prior equitable estates the court will take care, in appointing a receiver, not to disturb their prior equities; and for that purpose it will direct inquiries to determine the priorities among equitable incumbrancers, permitting legal creditors to act against the estates at law, and settling the priorities of equitable creditors.¹

831. The appointment of a receiver is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court;² (a) and the receiver when appointed is treated as virtually an officer and representative of the court, and subject to its orders.³ (b) Lord Hardwicke considered this power of appointment to be of great importance and most beneficial tendency, and he significantly said: 'It is a discretionary power, exercised by the court with as great utility to the subject as any authority which belongs to it; and it is provisional only for the more speedy getting in of a party's estate and securing it for the benefit of such person who shall appear to be entitled; and it does not at all affect the right.'⁴

832. The exercise of the power being thus discretionary, it would be difficult with any precision to mark out the limits within which it is ordinarily circumscribed, even if such a task were within the scope of these Commentaries. As however the equitable rights and incidents to such an appointment are often highly important to the parties in interest, and may affect the rights and remedies of third persons having adverse claims, it

¹ Lord Eldon, in *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 2 Swanst. R. 145, 146.

² *Skip v. Harwood*, 3 Atk. 564.

³ *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 7, pp. 248, 249; *Angel v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 338; *Hutchinson v. Massareene*, 2 B. & Beatt. 55.

⁴ *Skip v. Harwood*, 3 Atk. 564.

(a) *Battle v. Davis*, 66 N. Car. 252. Notice of the application must be given. *Vance v. Wood*, 46 Mo. 120; *Bostwick v. Isbell*, 41 Conn. 305. (b) *Crane v. McCoy*, 1 Bond, 422; *Battle v. Davis*, 66 N. Car. 252; *Bird v. Harris*, 63 Ga. 433.

will be proper in this place to state some of the principles by which this discretion is regulated.¹ (a)

833. Before doing so it may not be without use to suggest what some of those rights and incidents are; and the more so, as similar rights and incidents belong to cases of sequestration. In the first place upon the appointment of a receiver of the rents and profits of real estate, if there are tenants in possession of the premises they are compellable to attorn, and the court thus becomes virtually *pro hac vice* the landlord.² In the next place the appointment of such a receiver is generally deemed to entitle him to possession of the premises. It does not indeed in all cases amount to a turning of the other party out of possession; for in many cases, as in the case of an infant's estate, the receiver's possession is that of the infant. But where the rights are adverse in the different parties in the suit, the possession of the receiver is treated as the possession of the party who ultimately establishes his right to it.³ The receiver however cannot proceed in any ejection against the tenants of any estate except by the authority of the court.⁴ Nor will the possession of the tenants be ordinarily disturbed by the court where a receiver is appointed. But although not parties to the suit, the tenants may, and will in certain cases, be compelled to attorn to the receiver.⁵

833 *a*. In the next place a receiver when in possession has very little discretion allowed him, but he must apply from time to time to the court for authority to do such acts as may be beneficial to the estate. Thus he is not at liberty to bring or to defend actions, or to let the estate, or to lay out money, unless by the special leave of the court.⁶ (b) In the next place when such a receiver

¹ See *Angel v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 338.

² *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 248, 249; *Angel v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 338; *Silver v. Bishop of Norwich*, 3 Swanst. R. 112, note; *Id.* 117; *Sharp v. Carter*, 3 P. Will. 379, Cox's note (C).

³ *Sharp v. Carter*, 3 P. Will. 379. See *Albany City Bank v. Schermerhorn*, 9 Paige, R. 372.

⁴ *Wynn v. Lord Newborough*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 88; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 164.

⁵ *Sea Insur. Co. v. Stebbins*, 8 Paige, R. 565.

⁶ *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 252, 253.

(a) See *Blandheir v. Moore*, 11 Md. 364, where the principal rules governing the appointment of receivers are stated.

(b) He may prove against a debtor's

estate in bankruptcy, though the effect is to discharge the debtor and entitle him to a legacy which otherwise might have applied to the debt. *Armstrong v. Armstrong*, L. R. 12 Eq. 614.

is in possession under the process or authority of the court in execution of a decree or decretal order, his possession is not to be disturbed, even by an ejectment under an adverse title, without the leave of the court. For his possession is deemed the possession of the court, (a) and the court will not permit itself to be made a suitor in a Court of Law.¹ The proper and usual mode adopted under such circumstances is for the party claiming an adverse interest to apply to the court to be permitted to come in and be examined pro interesse suo. (b) He is then allowed to go before the master and to state his title, upon which he may in the first instance have the judgment of the master, and ultimately, if necessary, that of the court. And where the question to be tried is a pure matter of title which can be tried in an ejectment, the court, from a sense of convenience and justice, will generally authorize such a suit to be brought, taking care however to protect the possession by giving proper directions.²

833 b. Where a receiver is appointed and the property is in possession of a third person who claims a right to retain it, the receiver must either proceed by a suit in the ordinary way to try his right to it, or the plaintiff in equity should make such third person a party to the suit, and apply to the court to have the receivership extended to the property in his hands, so that an order for the delivery of the property may be made which will be binding upon him, and which may be enforced by process of contempt if it is not obeyed.³ And whenever the property is in possession of a third person under a claim of title, the court will not protect the officer who attempts by violence to obtain possession thereof any further than a Court of Law will protect him; his right to take possession of the property of which he has been appointed the receiver not being questioned.⁴

¹ Post, § 891; *Parker v. Browning*, 8 Paige, R. 388.

² *Angel v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 338, 339; *Brooks v. Greathed*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 178; *Bryan v. Cormick*, 1 Cox, R. 422; *Hayes v. Hayes*, 1 Ch. Cas. 223; post, § 891; *Empringham v. Short*, 3 Hare, R. 461; *Evelyn v. Lewis*, 3 Hare, 472, 475.

³ *Parker v. Browning*, 8 Paige, R. 388; *Albany City Bank v. Schermerhorn*, 9 Paige, R. 372.

⁴ *Ibid.* In *Parker v. Browning*, Mr. Chancellor Walworth said: 'It is not necessary in any case for the receiver to put himself in a situation where he is not entitled to the full protection of this court, as he is under no obligation to attempt to take property out of the possession of a third person, or even out of

(a) *Bird v. Harris*, 63 Ga. 433.

(b) See *Searle v. Choat*, 25 Ch. D. 723, under Jud. Act of 1873.

834. Let us now proceed to consider some of the cases in which a receiver will be appointed. (*a*) We have already seen that in cases of elegit and conflicting legal equitable debts and charges upon the estate it is a common course to appoint a receiver for the benefit of all concerned.¹ In cases also where an estate is held by a party under a title obtained by fraud, actual or constructive, a receiver will be appointed.²

835. But it is not infrequent for a bill quia timet to ask for the appointment of a receiver against a party who is rightfully in possession, or who is entitled to the possession of the fund, or who has an interest in its due administration. In such cases Courts of Equity will pay a just respect to such legal and equitable rights and interests of the possessor of the fund, and will not withdraw the possession of the defendant himself by force, and without an express order of the court directing him to do so. The proper course, as this court has repeatedly decided, where the defendant is directed to deliver over his property to the receiver under the direction of a master, is for the receiver or the party who wishes for an actual delivery of the property, in addition to the legal assignment thereof, to call upon the master to decide, upon the examination of the defendant, and on the evidence before him, what property, legally or equitably belonging to the defendant, and to which the receiver is entitled under the order of the court, is in the possession of the defendant or under his power and control. And it is the duty of the master to direct the defendant to deliver over to the receiver the actual possession of all such property, in such manner and within such time as the master may think reasonable. Where such a direction is given, the defendant, if he is dissatisfied with the decision of the master, must apply to the court to review the same, or he will be compelled by process of contempt to comply with that decision. And if the property is in the possession of a third person, who claims the right to retain it, the receiver must either proceed by suit, in the ordinary way, to try his right to it, or the complainant should make such third person a party to the suit, and apply to have the receivership extended to the property in his hands; so that an order for the delivery of the property may be made which will be binding upon him, and which may be enforced by process of contempt if it is not obeyed. Where the property is legally and properly in the possession of the receiver, it is the duty of the court to protect that possession, not only against acts of violence, but also against suits at law; so that a third person claiming the same may be compelled to come in and ask to be examined *pro interesse suo*, if he wishes to test the justice of such claim. But where the property is in the possession of a third person under a claim of title, the court will not protect the officer who attempts by violence to obtain possession, any further than the law will protect him; his right to take possession of property of which he has been appointed receiver being unquestioned.'

¹ Ante, § 829.

² *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 13 Ves. 105; *Stillwell v. Williams*, 6 Madd. R. 49; *s. c.* *Stillwell v. Wilkins*, Jacob, R. 280.

(*a*) See English Jud. Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. ch. 66, § 25, subs. 8; *Fuggle v. Bland*, 11 Q. B. D. 711.

it from him by the appointment of a receiver, unless the facts averred and established in proof show that there has been an abuse, or is danger of abuse, on his own part. For the rule of such courts is not to displace a bona fide possessor from any of the just rights attached to his title, unless there be some equitable ground for interference.¹ (a)

836. This principle may be easily illustrated in the common case of executors and administrators. They are by law intrusted with authority to collect and administer the assets of the deceased party, and Courts of Equity will not interfere with their management and administration of such assets upon slight grounds. Whenever therefore the appointment of a receiver is sought against an executor or administrator, it is necessary to establish by suitable proofs that there is some positive loss, or danger of loss, of the funds; as for instance some waste or misapplication of the funds, or some apprehended danger from the bankruptcy, insolvency, or personal fraud, misconduct, or negligence of the executor or administrator.² (b) Mere poverty of the party will not of itself constitute a sufficient ground, but there must be other ingredients to justify the appointment.³ (c)

837. So where there are several incumbrances on an estate, as the first incumbrancer is entitled to the possession of the estate and the receipt of the rents and profits, a Court of Equity will not deprive him of such possession and profits unless upon suffi-

¹ Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, p. 174; Id. B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 249, 250. See *Tyson v. Fairclough*, 2 Sim. & Sta. 142.

² Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 248, 249; *Mandeville v. Mandeville*, 8 Paige, R. 475; ante, §§ 422, 828.

³ Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 249, 250; *White v. Bishop of Peterborough*, 3 Swanst. R. 107; *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 2 Swanst. R. 113.

(a) A receiver of a corporation cannot, it is held, be appointed by equity in aid of a suit by a private person, unless the act is authorized by statute. *French Bank Case*, 53 Cal. 495; *Neall v. Hill*, 16 Cal. 145.

(b) *Chappell v. Akin*, 39 Ga. 177; *In re Johnson*, L. R. 1 Ch. 325. So of superseding an assignee by a receiver. *Gresham v. Crossland*, 59 Ga. 270.

(c) On the other hand as it is the business and duty of such parties to

hold and administer the property, they cannot ask for a receiver. The principle is general. Thus trustees in a mortgage of railroad property, authorizing them to take possession and operate the road on default, can enforce their rights by ejectment, and cannot have a receiver in a suit brought by them to foreclose the mortgage. *Rice v. St. Paul R. Co.*, 24 Minn. 464. *Comp. Sollory v. Leaver*, L. R. 9 Eq. 22, 25, infra, p. 164, note (a).

cient cause shown.¹ (a) But if the first incumbrancer is not in possession and does not desire it, or if he has been paid off, or if he refuses to receive what is due to him, there a receiver may be appointed upon the application of a subsequent incumbrancer.² (b) But in all cases of this sort where the court acts in favor of subsequent incumbrancers it is cautious, in thus interfering, not to disturb any prior rights or equities, and therefore before it acts finally it will endeavor to ascertain the priorities and equities of all the incumbrancers, and then it will apply the funds which are received according to such priorities and equities, in case the incumbrancers entitled thereto shall make a seasonable application for the purpose.³

838. So where the tenants of particular estates for life or in tail neglect to keep down the interest due upon incumbrances upon the estates, Courts of Equity will appoint a receiver to receive the rents and profits in order to keep down the interest; for this is but a mere act of justice to the incumbrancers, and also to those who may be otherwise interested in the estates.⁴ But here again it is to be remembered that the court will not force incumbrancers to receive their interest; and therefore if they would avail themselves of the privileges of receiving their interest, they must make a seasonable application for the purpose.⁵

839. But although Courts of Equity will not appoint a receiver except upon special grounds justifying such an interference in the nature of a bill *quia timet*, yet there are cases in which it will interpose and require money to be paid into court by a party who

¹ *Ibid.*; *Rowe v. Wood*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 554, 557; *Berney v. Sewell*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 649; *Quarrell v. Beckford*, 13 Ves. 377; *Codrington v. Parker*, 16 Ves. 469.

² *Ibid.*; *Bryan v. Cormick*, 1 Cox, R. 422; *Norway v. Rowe*, 19 Ves. 153; *White v. Bishop of Peterborough*, 3 Swanst. R. 109.

³ *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 250, 251; *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 2 Swanst. R. 145, 146; 19 Ves. 153; 1 Swanst. R. 74.

⁴ *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 251, 252; *Giffard v. Hart*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 407, note; *Bertie v. Lord Abingdon*, 3 Meriv. R. 560.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Gresley v. Adderley*, 1 Swanst. R. 579, and note; *Bertie v. Lord Abingdon*, 3 Meriv. R. 560, 566, 567, 568.

(a) Nor will equity grant a receiver in ordinary cases in favor of a first incumbrancer, since he can help himself. *Sollory v. Leaver*, L. R. 9 Eq. 22, 25. But see *Hughes v. Hatch-*

ett, 55 Ala. 631; *Warner v. Gouverneur*, 1 Barb. 36; *Bank of Ogdensburg v. Arnold*, 5 Paige, 38.

(b) See *Sollory v. Leaver*, L. R. 9 Eq. 22, 25.

stands in the relation of a trustee to the property, without any ground being laid to show that there has been any abuse or any danger to the fund.¹ (a) Thus in cases of bills brought by creditors, or legatees, or distributees against executors or administrators for a settlement of the estate, if the executors or administrators by their answers admit assets in their hands, and the court takes upon itself a settlement of the estate, it will direct the assets to be paid into court.²

840. The like doctrine has been applied to cases where an executor or administrator has lodged funds of the estate in the hands of a banker avowedly as assets. In such cases, upon the application of a party in interest, as for instance of a creditor or a legatee, the banker will be directed to pay the money into court; for it is a rule in equity to follow trust money whenever it may be found in the hands of any person who has not prima facie a right to hold it, and to order him to bring it into court. And this may be done even without making the executor or administrator a party to the suit, especially if there be a doubt of the safety of the fund.³

841. The general rule upon which Courts of Equity proceed in requiring money to be paid into court is this, that the party who is entitled to the fund is also entitled to have it secured. And this rule is equally applicable to cases where the plaintiffs seeking the payment are solely entitled to the whole fund, and to cases where they have acquired such an interest in the whole fund, together with others, as entitles them on their own behalf and the behalf of others to have the sum secured in court.⁴ Now this is precisely the case in what is commonly called a creditor's bill for the administration of an estate.⁵

¹ Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. 1, ch. 7, § 2, pp. 253, 254; Id. B. 3, ch. 2, § 2, pp. 351, 352; ante, § 549.

² *Strange v. Harris*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 365; *Blake v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 26, 27; *Yare v. Harrison*, 2 Cox, R. 377; ante, §§ 543, 544, 546. See *Mandeville v. Mandeville*, 8 Paige, R. 475.

³ See *Leigh v. Macaulay*, 1 Younge & Coll. 260; *Bogle v. Stewart*, cited *Ibid.* pp. 265, 266; *Bowsher v. Watkins*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 277; *Gedge v. Traill*, *Ibid.* 281, note.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Freeman v. Fairlie*, 3 Meriv. R. 29, 30; *Cruikshanks v. Roberts*, 6 Madd. R. 104; *Johnston v. Aston*, 1 Sim. & Stu. R. 73; *Rothwell v. Rothwell*, 2 Sim. & Stu. R. 217; *Orrok v. Binney*, Jac. R. 523.

⁵ Ante, §§ 543, 544, 546.

(a) *Vose v. Reed*, 1 Woods, 647.

842. And Courts of Equity will in cases of this sort not only order money to be paid into court, but they will also direct that papers and writings in the hands of executors and administrators shall be deposited with a master for the benefit of those interested, unless there are other purposes which require that they should be retained in the hands of the executors or administrators.¹

843. The preceding remarks are principally (but not exclusively) applicable to cases of equitable property, whether the right of enjoyment thereof be present, future, or contingent. In regard to legal property it is obvious that where the right of enjoyment is present, the legal remedies will be generally found sufficient for the protection and vindication of that right. But where the right of enjoyment is future or contingent, the party entitled is often without any adequate remedy at law for any injury which he may in the mean time sustain by the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the property in the hands of the party who is entitled to the present possession of it. Thus for instance if personal property should be given by a will to A for life, and after his death to B, there is (as we have seen) at law no remedy to secure the legacy to B, whether it be of specific chattels or of a pecuniary nature.²

844. Indeed by the ancient common law there could in general be no future right of property created in personal goods and chattels to take place in expectancy, for they were considered to be of so transitory a nature, and so liable to be lost, destroyed, or otherwise impaired, that future interests in them were not in the law treated as of any account.³ An exception was permitted at an early period as to goods and chattels given by will in remainder, after a bequest for life. But that was at first allowed only where the use of the goods or chattels, and not the goods or chattels themselves, was given to the first legatee, the property being supposed to continue all the time in the executor of the testator.⁴ That distinction has since been disregarded, and the limitation in remainder is now equally respected, whether the first

¹ Freeman v. Fairlie, 3 Meriv. R. 29, 30; Clark v. Clark, 8 Paige, R. 152.

² Ante, § 603; 1 Eq. Abridg. 360, pl. 4; Clark v. Clark, 8 Paige, R. 152.

³ 2 Black. Comm. 398; 1 Eq. Abridg. pl. 4; Fearne on Conting. Rem. by Butler (7th edit.), pp. 401 to 407; Id. 413, 414.

⁴ Ibid.; Hyde v. Parrat, 1 P. Will. 1, and cases there cited; Tissen v. Tissen, 1 P. Will. 502.

legatee takes the use, or the goods and chattels themselves for life.¹

845. In all cases of this sort where there is a future right of enjoyment of personal property, Courts of Equity will now interpose and grant relief upon a bill quia timet, where there is any danger of loss, or deterioration, or injury to it, in the hands of the party who is entitled to the present possession. We have already had occasion to take notice of the manner in which this remedial jurisdiction is applied in cases of legacies, whether pecuniary or specific, and whether vested or contingent.² (a) The same doctrine is applied to cases of annuities charged on the personal estate.³

845 a. Indeed the doctrine may now be deemed well established, that the bequest of the use of the residue of the personal estate of the testator to a legatee for life, or for a shorter period, with a bequest over to other legatees, does not give the legatee for life, or for a shorter period, the right to the possession of the fund in the mean time. But the executor is entitled to retain the fund in his own hands and to pay over the income thereof

¹ Ibid.; Anon. 2 Freem. R. 145; Id. 206; Hyde v. Parrat, 1 P. Will. 1, 6; Upwell v. Halsey, 1 P. Will. 651; Vachel v. Vachel, 1 Cas. Chan. 129, 130; Foley v. Burnell, 1 Bro. Ch. Rep. 274, 278; Co. Litt. 20 (a); Harg. note (5); Fearne on Conting. Rem. and Exec. Dev. (7th edit.), by Butler, pp. 401 to 407; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 4. This subject is discussed very much at large in Mr. Fearne's Essay on Contingent Remainders and Executory Devises, from pp. 401 to 407 (7th edit.), by Butler. There is in the same work a very valuable discussion upon the rights of the tenant for life in the goods and chattels, and how far the same may be taken in execution by his creditors. The result of the whole discussion seems to be that the creditors cannot subject the property to their claims beyond the rights of the tenant for life therein. Mr. Fearne seems to consider that the validity of executory dispositions of personal chattels (i. e. in remainder after a life estate) was originally founded and still rests on the doctrine and interposition of Courts of Equity. But he admits that in chattels real the right is recognized at law. Fearne on Conting. Rem. pp. 412, 413 (7th edit.); Matthew Manning's case, 8 Co. R. 95; Lampet's case, 10 Co. R. 47; post, § 847, note. See also 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 35, pp. 352, 353; 1 Chitty, Gen. Pract. 101; Bacon, Abridg. Uses and Trusts, G. 2, p. 109 (Gwillim's edit.); Wright v. Cartwright, 1 Burr. 282; Clark v. Clark, 8 Paige, R. 152.

² Ante, §§ 603, 694; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 2, and note (d); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 178 to 181; Fearne on Conting. Rem. p. 413 (7th edit.), by Butler; Id. 414; Covenhoven v. Shuler, 2 Paige, R. 123; Clark v. Clark, 8 Paige, R. 152.

³ Batten v. Earnley, 2 P. Will. 163; Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Will. 336, 337.

(a) Compare Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 1 Beasl. 142.

to the legatee for life, or for a shorter period, as it occurs from time to time. And at all events if he suffers the fund to go into the possession of such legatee, to enable him to enjoy the due use or income thereof, he is bound to take ample security for the safe return of the fund at the termination of the particular estate therein. If the executor omits to take such security, he may become personally responsible for any loss accruing thereby.¹

846. The same remedial justice will be applied to other cases as well as to legacies and personal annuities. Thus for instance where a future interest in personal property is assigned by the owner to his creditors, the latter may come into a Court of Equity to have the property secured to their future use.² On one occasion of this sort Lord Hardwicke said that nothing was better settled than that whenever a demand was made out of assets certainly due but payable at a future time, the person entitled thereto might come against the executor to have it secured for his benefit and set apart in the mean time, that he might not be obliged to pursue those assets through several hands. Nor is there any ground for the distinction taken between a legacy and a demand by contract.³ (a)

847. Upon the same ground, where under marriage articles the plaintiff, in case she survived her husband, had a contingent interest in certain South Sea annuities and a certain promissory note, which were specifically appointed for the payment of the same to be allowed her, and the defendant had threatened to aliene the property and securities, on a bill quia timet a decree was made that the defendant should give security to have the same forthcoming.⁴

¹ *Clark v. Clark*, 8 Paige, R. 152, 160; *Covenhoven v. Shuler*, 2 Paige, R. 122.

² *Johnson v. Mills*, 1 Ves. 282, 283.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Flight v. Cook*, 2 Ves. 619; post, § 955. This doctrine is discussed at large in *Eq. Abridg.* 360, pl. 4, and the following extract shows the gradual establishment of it: 'But what seems most proper to be inquired into under this

(a) See *Van Duyne v. Vreeland*, 1 *Beasl.* 142. So where a life interest in personalty is sold on execution against the owner of such interest, and the purchaser claims the absolute property, the remainder-man may in equity compel the purchaser to give security for the production of the property on the expiration of his interest. *McDongal v. Armstrong*, 6 *Humph.* 428; *Bowling v. Bowling*, 6 *B. Mon.* 31.

848. So where a party seised of lands in fee grants a rent-charge in fee issuing thereout, and afterwards devises the lands to A for life with remainder to B in fee, B may maintain a bill quia timet to compel A to pay the arrears during his life for fear that otherwise the whole would fall on his reversionary estate.¹ And the like principle would apply under like circumstances to a legacy payable in futuro and chargeable on land, to compel the tenant for life to pay or secure a proportion of the legacy.²

849. Another case of the application of the remedial justice of Courts of Equity by a bill quia timet is in cases of sureties of

head is, the reason and practice of limiting remainders in personal goods or chattels; for they in their own nature seem incapable of such a limitation, because being things transitory, and by many accidents subject to be lost, destroyed, or otherwise impaired, and also the exigencies of trade and commerce requiring a frequent circulation thereof, it would put a stop to all trading, and occasion perpetual suits and quarrels, if such limitations were generally tolerated and allowed. But yet in last wills and testaments such limitations over of personal goods or chattels have sometimes prevailed, especially where the first devisee had only the use or occupation thereof devised to him. For then they held the property to continue in the executors of the testator, and that the first devisee had no power to alter or to take it from them. Yet in either case, if the first devisee did actually give, grant, or sell such personal goods or chattels, the judges would very rarely allow of actions to be brought by those in remainder for recovery thereof. Hence it came to pass that it was a long while ere the judges of the common law could be prevailed on to have any regard for a devise over, even of a chattel real, or a term for years after an estate for life limited thereon; because the estate for life being in the eye of the law of greater regard and consideration than an estate for years, they thought he who had it devised to him for life had therein included all that the deviser had a power to dispose of. And though they have now gained that point upon the ancient common law by establishing such remainders, and have thereby brought that branch out of the chancery (where they frequently helped the remainder-man by allowing of bills to compel the first devisee to give security), yet it was at first introduced into the common law under the new name of Executory Devise, and took all the sanction it has since received from thence, and not as a remainder (for which vide title Devise). But as to personal goods and chattels the common law has provided no sufficient remedy for the devisee in the remainder of them, either during the life of the first devisee or after his death; therefore the Chancery seems to have taken that branch to themselves in lieu of the other, which they lost, and to allow of the same remedy for such devisee in remainder of personal goods and chattels as they before did to the devisee in remainder of chattels real, or terms for years.' See also Fearné on Conting. Rem. and Ex. Dev. pp. 401 to 415, by Butler (7th edit.); ante, §§ 843, 844; Bacon, Abridg. Uses and Trusts, G. 2, by Gwillim.

¹ Hayes v. Hayes, 1 Ch. Cas. 223.

² Ibid.

debtors and others. We have already seen that if a surety after the debt has become due has any apprehension of loss or injury from the delay of the creditor to enforce the debt against the principal debtor, he may file a bill of this sort to compel the debtor to discharge the debt or other obligation for which the surety is responsible.¹ (a) Nay it has been insisted (as we have also seen) that the surety may come into equity and compel the creditor to sue the principal and collect the debt from him in discharge of the surety, at least if the latter will undertake to indemnify the creditor for the risk, delay, and expense of the suit.²

850. So Courts of Equity will decree the specific performance of a general covenant to indemnify, although it sounds in damages only, upon the same principle that they will entertain a bill *quia timet*; and this not only at the instance of the original covenantee, but of his executors and administrators.³ (b) Thus where a party had assigned several shares of the excise to A, and the latter covenanted to save the assignor harmless in respect to that assignment, and to stand in his place touching the payments to the king and other matters, and afterwards the king sued the assignor for money which the assignee ought to have paid, the court decreed that the agreement should be specifically per-

¹ *Ante*, §§ 327, 730; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, p. 148; *King v. Baldwin*, 2 *John. Ch. R.* 561, 562; *Hayes v. Ward*, 4 *John. Ch. R.* 132; *Nisbet v. Smith*, 2 *Bro. Ch. R.* 581 (*Belt's edit.*) and note (5); *Ranelagh v. Hayes*, 1 *Vern.* 190.

² *Ante*, §§ 327, 639, 722, 729, 730; *King v. Baldwin*, 2 *John. Ch. R.* 561, 562; *Hayes v. Ward*, 4 *John. Ch. R.* 132. The cases of *Rees v. Berrington*, 2 *Ves. jr.* 540, and *Nisbet v. Smith*, 2 *Bro. Ch. R.* 578, do not seem to establish this principle of relief against the creditor. But in the case of *Wright v. Simpson* (6 *Ves.* 734), Lord Eldon seems to admit that the surety might have a right to compel the creditor to proceed against the debtor under some circumstances. But then in such a case the surety is compellable to deposit the money in court for the payment of the creditor. So that in fact it is but the case of an indirect subrogation to the rights of the creditor upon a virtual payment of the debt by such a deposit. See *Hayes v. Ward*, 4 *John. Ch. R.* 129 to 134, where this subject is much discussed, and the principles of the Roman law are fully stated.

³ *Champion v. Brown*, 6 *John. Ch. R.* 406; *ante*, § 730.

(a) *Norton v. Reid*, 11 *S. Car.* 593.

(b) *Griffin v. Orman*, 9 *Fla.* 22. So one who has subscribed for stock in his own name, but in trust for another,

may sue the cestui que trust in equity for indemnity against calls. *Hemming v. Maddick*, L. R. 7 *Ch.* 395.

formed, and referred it to a master, and directed that toties quoties any breach should happen, he should report the same specially to the court, so that the court might, if there should be occasion, direct a trial at law in a quantum damnificatus. The court further decreed that the assignee should clear the assignor from all these suits and incumbrances within a reasonable time.¹ (a) The case was compared to that of a counter bond, where, although the surety is not molested or troubled for the debt, yet after the money becomes payable the court will decree the principal to pay it.²

851. There are other cases where a remedial justice is applied in the nature of bills quia timet; as where Courts of Equity interpose to prevent the waste, or destruction, or deterioration of property, pendente lite, or to prevent irreparable mischief. But these cases will more properly come under review in our subsequent inquiries in matters of injunction.³

¹ Ranelagh v. Hayes, 1 Vern. R. 189; s. c. 2 Ch. Cas. 146; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 143.

² Ibid.; Lee v. Rook, Moseley, R. 318; Pember v. Mathers, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 53; Champion v. Brown, 6 John. Ch. R. 405, 406; ante, §§ 327, 722, 729, 849.

³ See also Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 2, pp. 353, 354; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 183, 184; post, §§ 907, 908, 912 to 920.

(a) In *Refeld v. Woodfolk*, 22 How. 318, the plaintiff had bought land which he knew was mortgaged, under a contract that on payment of the purchase-price the vendor should convey 'with general warranty of title.' He had taken possession, made valuable improvements, and paid the price; but it was held that he could not in equity compel the executor and heir of the vendor to remove the incumbrance, or make a deposit by way of indemnity.

CHAPTER XXII.

BILLS OF PEACE.

852. WE come in the next place to the consideration of what are technically called **BILLS OF PEACE**.¹ These bills sometimes bear a resemblance to bills *quia timet*, which latter (as has been already stated) seem to have been founded upon analogy to certain proceedings at the common law *quia timet*.² Bills *quia timet* however are quite distinguishable from the former in several respects, and are always used as a preventive process before a suit is actually instituted; whereas bills of peace, although sometimes brought before any suit is instituted to try a right, are most generally brought after the right has been tried at law. It is not my design in this place to enter upon the subject of the cases generally in which Courts of Equity will decree a perpetual injunction, for that will more properly be examined under another head,³ but simply to treat of bills seeking such an injunction and strictly falling under the denomination of bills of peace.

853. By a bill of peace we are to understand a bill brought by a person to establish and perpetuate a right which he claims, and which from its nature may be controverted by different persons, at different times, and by different actions; or where separate attempts have already been unsuccessfully made to overthrow the same right, and justice requires that the party should be quieted in the right if it is already sufficiently established, or if it should be sufficiently established under the direction of the court.⁴ The obvious design of such a bill is to procure repose

¹ See *Mitf. Eq. Pl.* by Jeremy, 145, 148; *Co. Litt.* 100 (*a*).

² *Ante*, § 825.

³ *Post*, §§ 873 to 958.

⁴ See *Eldridge v. Hill*, 2 *John. Ch. R.* 281, 282; *Alexander v. Pendleton*, 8 *Cranch, R.* 462, 468; 3 *Wooddes. Lect.* 56, pp. 416, 417.

from perpetual litigation, and therefore it is justly called a bill of peace. The general doctrine of public policy which in some form or other may be found in the jurisprudence of every civilized country is, that an end ought to be put to litigation, and above all to fruitless litigation; 'Interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium.' If suits might be perpetually brought to litigate the same questions between the same parties or their privies as often as either should choose, it is obvious that remedial justice would soon become a mere mockery; for the termination of one suit would only become the signal for the institution of a new one, and the expenses might become ruinous to all the parties. The obvious ground of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in cases of this sort is to suppress useless litigation and to prevent multiplicity of suits.^(a)

854. One class of cases to which this remedial process is properly applied, is where there is one general right to be established against a great number of persons. And it may be resorted to either where one person claims or defends a right against many, or where many claim or defend a right against one.¹ ^(b) In such cases Courts of Equity interpose in order to prevent multiplicity of suits;² ^(c) for as each separate party may sue or may be sued in a separate action at law, and each suit would only decide the particular right in question between the plaintiff and defendant in that action, litigation might become interminable. Courts of Equity therefore, having a power to bring all the parties before them, will at once proceed to the ascertainment of the general right; and if it be necessary, they will ascertain it by an action or issue at law, and then make a decree finally binding upon all the parties.³

¹ Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 343; *Eldridge v. Hill*, 2 John. Ch. R. 281; *Alexander v. Pendleton*, 8 Cranch, R. 462, 468.

² *Ewelme Hospital v. Andover*, 1 Vern. 266; *Hanson v. Gardiner*, 7 Ves. 309, 310; *Ware v. Horwood*, 14 Ves. 32, 33; *Dilley v. Doig*, 2 Ves. jr. 486; *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. Introd. xxxiv; *Eldridge v. Hill*, 2 John. Ch. R. 281.

³ *Eden on Injunctions*, ch. 16, pp. 358, 359, 360; *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, pp. 153, 154; *Gilb. Forum Roman.* 195; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 140, 141; 2 Eq.

(a) *Caro v. Pensacola*, 19 Fla. 766.

(c) *Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Mc-*

(b) *Sheffield Water Works v. Yeomans*, L. R. 2 Ch. 8; *Saratoga v. Dryor*, 77 N. Y. 219. *Farlan*, 31 N. J. Eq. 730; *Caro v. Pensacola*, 19 Fla. 766.

855. Bills of this nature may be brought by a parson for tithes against his parishioners; by parishioners against a parson to establish a modus; by a lord against tenants for an encroachment under color of a common right, or by tenants against the lord for disturbance of a common right; by a party in interest to establish a toll due by custom; by a like party to establish the right to profits of a fair, there being several claimants; by a lord to establish an enclosure which he has approved under the statute of Merton and which his tenants throw down, although sufficient common of pasture is left.¹

856. So where a party has possession and claims a right of fishery for a considerable distance on a river, and the riparian proprietors set up several adverse rights, he may have a bill of peace

Abridg. 172, pl. 3, 5; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 147; *Tenham v. Herbert*, 2 Atk. R. 483, 484; *Eldridge v. Hill*, 2 John. Ch. R. 281, 282; *Trustees of Huntington v. Nicoll*, 3 John. R. 566, 589, 590, 591, 595, 602, 603. The nature of this jurisdiction is thus stated by Lord Redesdale: 'Courts of Equity will also prevent multiplicity of suits; and the cases in which it is attempted, and the means used for that purpose, are various. With this view, where one general legal right is claimed against several distinct persons, a bill may be brought to establish the right. Thus where a right of fishery was claimed by a corporation throughout the course of a considerable river, and was opposed by the lords of manors and owners of land adjoining, a bill was entertained to establish the right against the several opponents, and a demurrer was overruled. As the object of such bills is to prevent multiplicity of suits by determining the rights of the parties upon issues directed by the court, if necessary for its information, instead of suffering the parties to be harassed by a number of separate suits, in which each suit would only determine the particular right in question between the plaintiff and the defendant in it, such a bill can scarcely be sustained where a right is disputed between two persons only, until the right has been tried and decided upon at law. Indeed in most cases it is held that the plaintiff ought to establish his right by a determination of a Court of Law in his favor before he files his bill in equity. And if he has not so done, and the right he claims has not the sanction of long possession, and he has any means of trying the matter at law, a demurrer will hold. If he has not been actually interrupted or dispossessed, so that he has had no opportunity of trying his right, he may bring a bill to establish it, though he has not previously recovered in affirmance of it at law, and in such a case a demurrer has been overruled.' Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 145, 146.

¹ *Ibid.*; *How v. Tenants of Broomsgrove*, 1 Vern. 22; *Ewelme Hospital v. Andover*, 1 Vern. 266; *Pawlet v. Ingres*, 1 Vern. 308; *Brown v. Vermuden*, 1 Ch. Cas. 272; *Rudge v. Hopkins*, 2 Eq. Abridg. p. 170, pl. 27; *Conyers v. Abergavenny*, 1 Atk. 284, 285; *Poore v. Clark*, 2 Atk. 515; *Weeks v. Staker*, 2 Vern. 301; *Arthington v. Fawkes*, 2 Vern. 356; *Corporation of Carlisle v. Wilson*, 13 Ves. 279, 280; *Hanson v. Gardiner*, 7 Ves. 305, 309, 310; *Duke of Norfolk v. Myers*, 4 Madd. Rep. 50, 117.

against all of them to establish his right and quiet his possession.¹ So a bill of peace will lie to settle the amount of a general fine to be paid by all the copyhold tenants of a manor. So it will lie to establish a right of common of the freehold tenants of a manor.² So it will lie to establish a duty claimed by a municipal corporation against many persons, although there is no privity between them.³

857. But to entitle a party to maintain a bill of peace, it must be clear that there is a right claimed which affects many persons, and that a suitable number of parties in interest are brought before the court; for if the right is disputed between two persons only, not for themselves and all others in interest, but for themselves alone, the bill will be dismissed, for it cannot then conclude any persons but the very defendants.⁴ (a)

858. It seems too that Courts of Equity will not upon a bill of this nature decree a perpetual injunction for the establishment or the enjoyment of the right of a party who claims in contradiction to a public right; as if he claims an exclusive right to a highway or to a common navigable river, or an exclusive right to a rope ferry across a river, for it is said that this would be to enjoin all the people of the State or country.⁵ (b) But the true principle is that Courts of Equity will not in such cases upon

¹ Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Atk. 282; Tenham v. Herbert, 2 Atk. R. 483. See New River Company v. Graves, 2 Vern. 431, 432.

² Middleton v. Jackson, 1 Ch. Rep. 18 [33]; Popham v. Lancaster, 1 Ch. Rep. [96]; Cowper v. Clerk, 3 P. Will. 157; Powell v. Powis, 1 Younge & Jerv. 159.

³ City of London v. Perkins, 4 Bro. Parl. R. 157; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 138, 139; Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Atk. R. 284; Tenham v. Herbert, 2 Atk. 483, 484.

⁴ Disney v. Robertson, Bunb. R. 41; Cowper v. Clerk, 3 P. Will. 157; Welby v. Duke of Rutland, 6 Bro. Parl. R. 575; s. c. 3 Bro. Parl. Cas. by Tomlins, 39; Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 169, 170; Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, p. 41; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 140; Weller v. Smeaton, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 572; Baker v. Rogers, 2 Eq. Abridg. 171, pl. 2; Select Cas. in Ch. 74, 75; Alexander v. Pendleton, 8 Cranch, R. 462, 468.

⁵ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 139; Hilton v. Lord Scarborough, 2 Eq. Abridg. 171, pl. 2; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 148.

(a) Moses v. Mobile, 52 Ala. 198. fringe upon his right. Letton v.

(b) But a ferryman, having an exclusive right of ferriage, may have a bill of peace against any who in- Goodden, L. R. 2 Eq. 123; McRoberts v. Washburne, 10 Minn. 23. See post, § 927.

principles of public policy intercept the assertion of public rights.

859. Another class of cases to which bills of peace are now ordinarily applied, is where the plaintiff has after repeated and satisfactory trials established his right at law, and yet is in danger of further litigation and obstruction to his right from new attempts to controvert it. Under such circumstances Courts of Equity will interfere and grant a perpetual injunction to quiet the possession of the plaintiff and to suppress future litigation of the right.¹ This exercise of jurisdiction was formerly much questioned. Lord Cowper, in a celebrated case where the title to land had been five several times tried in an ejectment and five verdicts given in favor of the plaintiff, refused to sustain the jurisdiction for a perpetual injunction, and said that the application was new and did not fall under the general notion of a bill of peace, as this was only a suit between A and B, and one man is able to contend against another. But his decision was overruled by the House of Lords, and a perpetual injunction was decreed, upon the ground that it was the only adequate means of suppressing oppressive litigation and irreparable mischief.² And this doctrine has ever since been steadily adhered to. However Courts of Equity will not interfere in such cases before a trial at law, nor until the right has been satisfactorily established at law. But if

¹ See *Trustees of Huntington v. Nicoll*, 3 John. R. 589, 590, 591, 595, 602; *Alexander v. Pendleton*, 8 Cranch, 462, 468; *Com. Dig. Chancery, D. 13*; *Earl of Bath v. Sherwin*, *Prec. Ch.* 261; *s. c.* 10 Mod. R. 1; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 143, 144; *Eden on Injunct. ch. 16, p. 356*; *Eldridge v. Hill*, 2 John. Ch. R. 281. Lord Redesdale thus describes this jurisdiction: ‘In many cases the courts of ordinary jurisdiction admit, at least for a certain time, of repeated attempts to litigate the same question. To put an end to the oppression occasioned by the abuse of this privilege the Courts of Equity have assumed a jurisdiction. Thus actions of ejectment having become the usual mode of trying titles at the common law, and judgments in those actions not being in any degree conclusive, the Courts of Equity have interfered, and after repeated trials and satisfactory determination of questions, have granted perpetual injunctions to restrain further litigation, and thus have in some degree put that restraint upon litigation which is the policy of the common law in the case of real actions.’ *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 143, 144.

² *Earl of Bath v. Sherwin*, *Prec. Ch.* 261; *s. c.* 10 Mod. 1; *s. c.* 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 266, 270 [2 Bro. Parl. Cas. by Tomlins, 217]; *Leighton v. Leighton*, 1 P. Will. 671, 672; *Trustees of Huntington v. Nicoll*, 3 John. Rep. 566, 589, 590, 591, 595, 601, 602; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 143, 144; *Gilb. Forum Roman.* 195.

the right is satisfactorily established, it is not material what number of trials have taken place, whether two only or more.¹ (a)

860. These seem to be the only classes of cases in which bills of peace, technically so called, will lie.² But there are other cases bearing a close analogy to them in which a like relief is granted, as for instance cases of confusion of boundaries, which however require some superinduced equity, and cases of quit-rents where the remedy at law is either lost or deficient.³ Cases of mines and collieries may also be mentioned where Courts of Equity will entertain bills in the nature of bills quia timet and bills of peace, where there is danger that the mine may be ruined in the meantime before the right can be established; and upon such a bill the court will grant an adequate remedy by quieting the party in the enjoyment of his right by restoring things to their old condition, and by establishing the right by a decree.⁴ Other cases also where the object of the bill is to prevent vexatious suits will occur under the head of Injunctions.⁵

¹ *Devonsher v. Newenham*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 208, 209; *Leighton v. Leighton*, 1 P. Will. 671, 672; *Tenham v. Herbert*, 2 Atk. 483; *Earl of Darlington v. Bowes*, 1 Eden, R. 270, 271, 272; *Eden on Injunctions*, ch. 16, pp. 354, 355; *Eldridge v. Hill*, 2 John. Ch. R. 281, 282; *Weller v. Smeaton*, 1 Cox, R. 102; s. c. 1 Bro. Ch. R. 573; *Alexander v. Pendleton*, 8 Cranch, R. 462, 468.

² *Eldridge v. Hill*, 2 John. Ch. R. 281, 282.

³ *Eden on Injunctions*, ch. 16, pp. 361, 362; ante, §§ 622, 684, 686; *Com. Dig. Chancery*, D. 13.

⁴ *Falmouth (Lord) v. Innys, Moseley*, R. 87, 89; post, § 929; see also *Alexander v. Pendleton*, 8 Cranch, R. 462, 468. In *Bush v. Western*, Prec. Ch. 530, the plaintiff had been in possession of a water-course upwards of sixty years, and the defendant claimed the land through which the water-course ran, under a foreclosed mortgage. The defendant obstructed the water-course, and the plaintiff brought a bill for an injunction to quiet his, the plaintiff's, possession, and it was held maintainable, notwithstanding there was a remedy at law and the title had not been established at law.

⁵ Post, §§ 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930.

(a) See *Patterson v. McCamant*, 28 Mo. 210; *Knowles v. Inches*, 12 Cal. 212.

CHAPTER XXIII.

INJUNCTIONS.

861. THE last subject which is proposed to be treated under the second head of concurrent equity jurisdiction, namely, where the peculiar remedies afforded by Courts of Equity constitute the principal although not the sole ground of jurisdiction, is that of INJUNCTIONS. A writ of injunction may be described to be a judicial process whereby a party is required to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according to the exigency of the writ.¹ (a) The most common sort of injunctions is

¹ Gilb. Forum Rom. ch. 11, p. 192, &c.; Eden on Injunct. ch. 14, p. 290, &c.; 1 Wooddes. Lect. 7, p. 206. It has been remarked by Mr. Eden that wherever a plaintiff appears entitled to equitable relief, if it consists in restraining the commission or the continuance of some act of the defendant, a Court of Equity administers that relief by injunction. In many cases it enforces it by means of the process of the writ of injunction, properly so called. But he proceeds to remark: 'But as the known forms of that remedy are by no means adapted to every case in which the court has jurisdiction to interpose, the prohibition has in numerous cases been issued and conveyed in the shape merely of an order in the nature of an injunction. And as the court treats the neglect or disobedience of all orders as a contempt, and enforces the performance of them by imprisonment, the object sought is equally attained by an order of this nature as by a writ. The distinction is consequently disregarded in practice, and these orders, though not enforced by means of the writ of injunction, have indiscriminately obtained the name of injunctions.' Eden on Injunct. ch. 14, p. 290.

(a) *Injunction as a Primary Remedy.* — The remedy of injunction, like that of specific performance, proceeds upon the theory that there are duties the performance of which, as they stand, ought to be insisted upon, — duties in regard to which an election, as an equivalent, to violate the same upon the terms of making compensation cannot be permitted; not indeed that all the duties the violation of which may be enjoined, may be enjoined without regard to the question whether damages for a violation could be accurately computed, but that there *are* duties of a peremptory nature within the operation of the remedy of injunction as well as within that of specific perform-

that which operates as a restraint upon the party in the exercise of his real or supposed rights ; and this is sometimes called

ance. These duties may here, as well as in the law of specific performance (ante, p. 30), be termed primary, since they are not substitutional.

The only difference in this respect between the two remedies is that specific performance is directed to compelling performance of an active duty, while injunction (though sometimes in a subsidiary way requiring an act to be done, § 861) is generally directed to preventing the violation of a negative one. This difference however is very great. The remedy of specific performance, relating as it does to active duties, deals in the main only with contracts; while the remedy of injunction, having to do with negative duties, deals not only with contracts, but also with torts, and with many other subjects, among them subjects of a purely equitable nature.

Indeed the difference between the two remedies is still greater. We have seen how far specific performance is a primary remedy, how far, that is, it may be applied without regard to the question whether damages could be accurately computed for a breach of the duty in question, — that this is perhaps the case only of contracts for the sale, lease, or disposal otherwise of land. Injunction on the other hand, besides being a primary remedy when sought in aid of the enforcement of a contract relating to the disposal of land, may be granted in a great many other cases without reference to the question of the computation of damages. Some of the most striking examples may be noticed here: —

1. Perhaps it is on the same ground that specific performance of contracts relating to real property, i. e. (as really seems to be the case; ante, p. 32, note), because it is real property, that an injunction may be had to restrain the removal of true fixtures from premises

without regard to the question of compensation. *Pugh v. Arton*, L. R. 8 Eq. 626; *Mather v. Fraser*, 2 Kay & J. 536.

2. Injunction is a remedy for preventing the breach of the duty not to take an unwarrantable advantage of the process of the law, — a duty partly legal and partly equitable only; and here too the remedy is in most cases primary. Thus, as the author has shown, a plaintiff in a judgment which has been compromised, or satisfied in any way, without mention of record, may be enjoined from levying execution thereon. *Infra*, § 876. So equity will restrain a threatened levy of execution upon property not subject thereto. *O'Hare v. Downing*, 130 Mass. 16; *Hinchley v. Greany*, 118 Mass. 595; *Tucker v. Kenniston*, 47 N. H. 267. Or a sale thereof after levy. *Kenyon v. Clarke*, 2 R. I. 67; *Kendall v. Dow*, 46 Ga. 607; *Marlin v. Jewell*, 37 Md. 560. So again if the injured party can show that he was prevented from making a good defence by fraud, accident, or mistake, without fault of his own. *Infra*, § 877; *Clark v. Ewing*, 93 Ill. 572.

3. The next case that may be noticed relates to the alienation of personalty. It is laid down, apparently without reference to the question whether damages might not be computed, that where the title to stock is in controversy under different wills, the transfer of it may be restrained pendente lite; so where the title to stock is controverted between principal and agent. *Western R. Co. v. Bayne*, 75 N. Y. 1. So of a wrongful attempt to transfer diamonds or other valuables. *Infra*, § 907. A striking example in this connection is found in the rule that the holder of a negotiable note, who has obtained it from the maker by fraud, may be enjoined from

the remedial writ of injunction. (a) The other sort, commanding an act to be done, is sometimes called the judicial writ, because

negotiating the same. *Infra*, § 955. Here computation of the damages of a breach of the duty enjoined is immediately at hand. Compare also *Western R. Co v. Bayne*, *supra*.

4. Another class of examples may be found in the duties of the officers of municipal or of private corporations in respect of collecting and paying out moneys and incurring debts. A taxpayer may in some states have an injunction to restrain a municipality, through its proper officers, from levying upon him an illegal tax. *Ante*, p. 13, note. Or (and this probably everywhere) from incurring indebtedness beyond that permitted by law. *Springfield v. Edwards*, 84 Ill. 626. Or from appropriating the public money to a purpose not authorized by law. *Crampton v. Zabriskie*, 101 U. S. 601, 609; *Fitzgerald v. Holmes*, 92 Ill. 372; *Terretts v. Sharon*, 34 Conn. 105; *Harrison v. McCarty*, 27 Ind. 475. But see *Johnson v. Thorn-dike*, 56 Maine, 32. Or generally from creating an illegal debt. *Crampton v. Zabriskie*, *supra*; *Hudson v. Marietta*, 64 Ga. 286. But see *Moore v. Fessenbeck*, 84 Ill. 422, a case governed by statute.

5. Among cases of duties of a purely equitable nature may be mentioned those referred to by the author in § 954; the right to enjoin sales which would be inequitable, 'as in cases of trusts and special authorities, where the party is abusing his trust or authority,' and, where there is danger of the misapplication of the proceeds

(a) Chancery has no peculiar jurisdiction over corporations to restrain them in the exercise of their powers, to control their action or to prevent them from violating their charter in the absence of fraud or breach of trust. *Pond v. Framingham R.*

of trust sales, the right to restrain the purchaser from paying over the purchase money.

These examples will be sufficient to show how wide is the range of subjects over which the law extends the remedy of injunction as a primary mode of relief; and the tendency is clearly, and, it seems, rightly on the whole, towards enlarging the jurisdiction in this respect. But the most noticeable fact is the distinction which the law has silently drawn between the two compulsory remedies under consideration. Injunction, as has been shown, has in some way far outrun the companion remedy of specific performance, and made a deep incursion into the bounds of the common-law doctrine of compensation. So far as the two remedies have run side by side, so that what would operate to make specific performance e. g. a primary remedy would operate in the same way upon injunction, as where the question concerns the conveyance of land, the course of the last-named remedy may be easily understood. But (to drop the figure) on what principle is it that an injunction may be granted as a primary remedy in other cases?

It cannot be that any such test as whether damages can be accurately computed is to be applied in all cases, consistently with what has gone before; the examples above given clearly show that. Nor can the test be the mere existence of a negative duty on the part of the person to be proceeded against; the settled course of authority

Co. 130 Mass. 194. See *French Bank Case*, 53 Cal. 495, 551. As e. g. to restrain a corporation on behalf of a creditor from making an improvident contract. *Ib.* Though the corporation be insolvent. *Pond v. Framingham R. Co.*

it issues after a decree, and is in the nature of an execution to enforce the same; as for instance it may contain a direction to the party defendant to yield up, or to quiet, or to continue the possession of the land or other property which constitutes the subject-matter of the decree in favor of the other party.¹ (a)

¹ Eden on Injunct. ch. 1, p. 1, 2; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 397; Jeremy on Equity Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 308, &c.; Gilb. Forum Rom. ch. 11, pp. 194, 195; *Stribley v. Hawkie*, 3 Atk. R. 275; *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 15 Ves. 179. This is the distinction stated by Mr. Eden in his excellent treatise on Injunctions (ch. 1, pp. 1, 2), a work of which I have made constant use in this chapter. But it may be doubted if the appellation 'judicial writ' is not strictly applicable to all writs of injunction, since they are not writs of course, but are specially ordered by the court after the suit is instituted upon a hearing of the matter. The description of the writ by Mr. Jeremy seems sufficiently accurate. 'An injunction,' says he, 'is a writ framed according to the circumstances of the case, commanding an act which this court regards essential to justice, or restraining an act which it esteems contrary to equity

concerning trespass (infra, § 928), not to mention other cases both of tort and of contract, as clearly shows that. Indeed to make the test the existence of a negative duty would be to make it possible for a plaintiff in every case of the kind to turn a civil into a quasi criminal cause of action; for a breach of the injunction would be punishable by imprisonment.

A solution of the question in general, though it will not answer for every case that has been decided, is probably to be found by considering the jurisdiction of equity over fraud, accident, and mistake. These subjects afford of themselves, at least where the suit is not for damages alone (ante, § 33, note), original and primary jurisdiction in equity; and it follows that an injunction to restrain the taking of an advantage in such cases might regularly be granted without inquiring whether damages could not be accurately computed and made a just equivalent in favor of the plaintiff. Most of the examples falling under the five classes of cases above enumerated are explainable upon this view; nearly all of them will be found to be cases in which to have allowed

the defendant to proceed to a violation of his duty would have been to allow him to perpetrate a fraud upon the plaintiff. And this too in the legal sense of the term 'fraud,' i. e. without treating every breach of contract or other duty as a fraud.

Assuming this analysis to be correct, it is apprehended that we can take one step further, and say that, in general, fraud, accident, and mistake (or practically fraud alone, for it becomes a fraud to attempt to take an undue advantage of accident or of mistake) bound the law of injunctions as a primary remedy; and if that is true, all other cases suitable for injunction, such as may be classed under the head of 'irreparable injury,' fall within the range of injunction as a secondary or substitutional remedy, — a remedy to be applied, that is to say, only upon the footing that compensation is not available or is not justly applicable.

It should be added that this note has reference only to final injunctions.

(a) See *Cole Mining Co. v. Virginia Water Co.*, 1 Sawy. 685; *Camblos v. Philadelphia R. Co.*, 4 Brewst. 563.

862. The object of this process, which is most extensively used in equity proceedings, is generally preventive and protective rather than restorative, although it is by no means confined to the former.¹ (a) It seeks to prevent a meditated wrong more often than to redress an injury already done. It is not confined to cases falling within the exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction of the court, but it equally applies to cases belonging to its exclusive and to its auxiliary jurisdiction.² It is treated of however in this place principally because it forms a broad foundation for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction in equity. In cases calling for such redress there is always a prayer in the bill for this process and relief, and hence bills of this sort are commonly called injunction bills.³

863. Indeed unless an injunction is specifically prayed for by the bill, it is the settled practice not to grant this remedial process, because (it has been said) the defendant might make a different case by his answer against the general words of the bill from what he would have done against the specific prayer for an injunction.⁴

and good conscience.⁷ Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. ch. 2, § 1, p. 307. If one were disposed to be scrupulously critical on such a subject, he might object to the apparent contrast between justice in the first part of the sentence, and equity and good conscience in the latter. The truth is that in this connection the words have the same identical meaning. See 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 104, 105, 106.

¹ Com. Dig. Chancery, D. 11, D. 13; Gilb. For. Roman. ch. 11, pp. 192, 194.

² Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 308.

³ Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 47; Story on Equity Plead. § 41.

⁴ Savory v. Dyer, Ambl. R. 60; Eden on Injunct. ch. 3, pp. 48, 49; Id. ch. 15, p. 321; Cook v. Martyn, 2 Atk. 3; Grimes v. French, 2 Atk. 141; Dormer v. Fortescue, 3 Atk. 131; Manaton v. Molesworth, 1 Eden, R. 26; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 173; Story on Equity Plead. § 41.

(a) Injunction may sometimes be employed to undo what has been done. *Smith v. Smith*, 20 Eq. 500; *Beadel v. Perry*, 3 Eq. 465; *Tucker v. Howard*, 128 Mass. 361. Thus where substantial injury has been done to an innocent plaintiff's estate by the defendant's wrongful act, as by encroaching upon a passage-way of the plaintiff by the building of a wall therein, equity will compel the defendant to restore the premises as near as may be to their former condition and pay damages and not require the plaintiff to sell his right at a valuation. *Tucker v. Howard*, supra. See *Dent v. Auction Mart Co.*, L. R. 2 Eq. 238, 246, 255; *Aynsley v. Glover*, L. R. 18 Eq. 544; s. c. L. R. 10 Ch. 283; *Krehl v. Burrell*, 7 Ch. D. 551; s. c. 11 Ch. D. 146; *Schwoerer v. Boylston Market Assoc.* 99 Mass. 285; *Creely v. Bay State Brick Co.*, 103 Mass. 514; *Nash v. New England Ins. Co.*, 127 Mass. 91; *Salisbury v. Andrews*, 128 Mass. 336.

This at least constitutes an exception from the general doctrine as to the efficacy of the prayer for general relief.¹ The granting or refusal of injunctions is however a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court; but injunctions are now more liberally granted than in former times.²

864. The writ of injunction is peculiar to Courts of Equity, although there are some cases where Courts of Law may exercise analogous powers, such as by the writ of prohibition and estrepement in cases of waste.³ (a) The cases however to which these

¹ Ibid.

² 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 104.

³ In the case of *Jefferson v. The Bishop of Durham* (1 Bos. & Pull. 105, 120 to 132), the subject of these remedies in Courts of Law, in cases of waste, is very learnedly discussed. A single passage from the opinion of Lord Chief Justice Eyre may serve to explain them, and show their inadequacy as a remedy. 'The state of the common law,' said he, 'with respect to waste has been so fully laid open by the bar that I need do little more than allude to it. At common law the proceeding in waste was by writ of prohibition from the Court of Chancery, which was considered as the foundation of a suit between the party suffering by the waste and the party committing it. If that writ was obeyed, the ends of justice were answered. But if that was not obeyed, and an alias and pluries produced no effect, then came the original writ of attachment out of chancery, returnable in a Court of Common Law, which was considered as the original writ of the court. The form of that writ shows the nature of it. It was the same original writ of attachment which was and is the foundation of all the proceedings in prohibition, and of many other proceedings in this court at this day. "Si A. B. fecerit te securum, &c. tunc pone, &c. quod sit coram justiciariis nostris, &c. ostensurus quare fecit vastam, &c. contra prohibitionem nostram, &c.'" That writ being returnable in a Court of Common Law, and most usually in the Court of Common Pleas, on the defendant appearing the plaintiff counted against him, he pleaded, the question was tried, and if the defendant was found guilty, the plaintiff recovered single damages for the waste committed. Thus the matter stood at common law. It has been said (and truly so, I think, so far as can be collected from the text-writers), that at the common law this proceeding lay only against tenant in dower, tenant by the curtesy, and guardian in chivalry. It was extended by different statutes to farmers, tenants for life, and tenants for years, and, I believe, to guardians in socage. That which these statutes gave by way of remedy was not so properly the introduction of a new law as the extension of an old one to a new description of persons. The course of proceeding remained the same as before these statutes were made. The first act which introduced anything substantially new was that which gave a writ of waste or estrepement pending the suit. It follows of course that this was a judicial writ, and was to issue out of the Courts of Common Law. But except for the purpose of staying proceedings pending a suit, there is no intimation in any of our text-writers that any prohibition could issue from those courts. By the Stat. of West. 2, the writ of prohibition from the Chancery which existed at common law is taken away, and the writ of summons substituted in

(a) See 1 Law Quarterly Rev. 461, 462.

legal processes are applicable are so few and so utterly inadequate for the purposes of justice, that the processes themselves have fallen into disuse, and almost all the remedial justice of this sort is now administered through the instrumentality of Courts of Equity.¹ The jurisdiction in these courts then has its true origin in the fact that there is either no remedy at all at law, or the remedy is imperfect and inadequate. The jurisdiction was for a long time most pertinaciously resisted by the Courts of Common Law, especially when it was applied by an injunction to stay suits and judgments in these courts.² But it was firmly established in the reign of King James the First upon an express appeal to that monarch, and it is now in constant and unquestioned exercise.³

865. It has been justly remarked by an eminent civilian that injunctions issued by the Courts of Equity in England partake of the nature of interdicts according to the Roman law.⁴ The term 'interdict' was used in the Roman law in three distinct but cognate senses. It was in the first place often used to signify the edicts made by the prætor, declaratory of his intention to give the remedy in certain cases, chiefly to preserve or to restore possession. And hence such an interdict was called edictal, 'Edictale, quod prætoris edictis proponitur, ut sciant omnes ea forma posse implorari.' Again it was used to signify his order or decree, applying the remedy in the given case before him, and then it was called decretal, 'Decretale, quod prætor pro re nata implorantibus decrevit.' And in the last place it was used to signify the very remedy sought in the suit commenced under the prætor's

its place. And although it is said by Lord Coke, when treating of prohibitions at the common law, that it "may be used at this day," those words, if true at all, can only apply to that very ineffectual writ directed to the sheriff, empowering him to take the posse comitatus to prevent the commission of waste intended to be done. The writ directed to the party was certainly taken away by the statute. At least as far as my researches go no such writ has issued even from Chancery in the common cases of waste by tenant in dower, tenants by the curtesy, and guardians in chivalry, tenants for life, &c. &c., since it was taken away by the Statute of West. 2. Thus the common-law remedy stood with the alteration above mentioned, and with the judicial writ of estrepement introduced pendente lite.'

¹ Eden on Injunct. ch. 9, pp. 158, 159, 160; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 399; Com. Dig. Chancery, D. 11.

² 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 398; 1 Wooddes. Lect. 6, p. 186; 1 Ch. Rep. App.; Eden on Injunct. ch. 3, p. 135.

³ Ibid.; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 398.

⁴ Halifax, Roman Civil Law, ch. 6, p. 102.

edict, and thus it became the denomination of the action itself.¹

866. It is in the second sense above stated that the interdict of the Roman law bears a resemblance to the injunction of Courts of Equity. It is said to have been called interdict because it was originally interposed in the nature of an interlocutory decree between two parties contending for possession until the property could be tried. But afterwards the appellation was extended to final decretal orders of the same nature. In the Institutes interdicts are thus defined. Interdicts were certain forms of words by which the prætor either commanded or prohibited something to be done, and they were chiefly used in controversies respecting possession or quasi possession. ‘*Erant autem interdicta formæ atque conceptiones verborum, quibus prætor aut jubebat aliquid fieri, aut fieri prohibebat. Quod tunc maxime fiebat, cum de possessione, aut quasi possessione, inter aliquos contendebatur.*’² They were divided into three sorts, prohibitory, restitutory, and exhibitory interdicts. Prohibitory were those by which the prætor forbade something to be done, as when he forbade force to be used against a lawful possessor; restitutory, by which he directed something to be restored, as when he commanded possession to be restored to any one who had been ejected from the possession by force; exhibitory, by which he ordered a person or thing to be produced.³ After this definition or description of the various sorts of interdicts the Institutes proceed to state that some persons nevertheless have supposed that those only can be properly called interdicts which were prohibitory, because to interdict is properly to denounce and prohibit; and that the restitutory and exhibitory interdicts should properly be called decrees; but that by usage they are all called interdicts because they are pronounced between two persons. ‘*Sunt tamen qui patent proprie interdicta ea vocari quæ prohibitoria sunt, quia interdicere sit denunciare et prohibere; restitutoria autem et exhibitoria proprie*

¹ Livingston on the Batture case, 5 American Law Journal, 271, 272; Brisson de Verb. Sig. Interdictum; Vicat, Vocab. Interdictum; Heineccii Elem. Pand. Ps. 6, §§ 285, 286.

² Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 15; Introd.

³ Instit. Lib. 4, tit. 15, § 1; Heinecc. Elem. Pand. Ps. 6 Lib. 43, §§ 285, 286, 287; Halifax on Civil Law, ch. 6, p. 101; Dig. Lib. 43, tit. 1, l. 1, 2; Pothier Pand. Lib. 43, tit. 1, §§ 1 to 16; Vicat, Vocab. voce, Interdictum.

decreta vocari. Sed tamen obtinuit omnia interdicta appellari, quia inter duos dicuntur.'¹

867. Another division of interdicts in the Roman law was into those which were (1) to gain or acquire possession, or (2) to retain possession, or (3) to recover possession.² And again another division was into those which were (1) single, in which each of the litigant parties sustained one character, that of plaintiff or actor, or defendant or reus; or (2) double, in which each of the litigant parties sustained two characters, that of plaintiff or actor and that of defendant or reus.³

868. From this summary account of the Roman interdicts, which were after a time superseded by what were called extraordinary actions, in which judgment was pronounced without any antecedent interdict, and in the same manner as if a beneficial action had been given in consequence of an interdict,⁴ it is easy to perceive that they partake very much of the nature of injunctions in Courts of Equity, and were applied to the same general purposes; that is to say, to restrain the undue exercise of rights, to prevent threatened wrongs, to restore violated possessions, and to secure the permanent enjoyment of the rights of property.

869. In the early course of chancery proceedings injunctions to quiet the possession of the parties before the hearing were indiscriminately granted to either party, plaintiff or defendant, in cases where corporeal hereditaments were the subject of the suit; the object of them being to prevent a forcible change of possession by either party pending the litigation.⁵ These injunctions bore a very close resemblance to the interdict 'Uti possidetis' of the Roman law, which was granted to either party in a suit who was then in possession, in order that he might be secured therein as the legal possessor during the litigation.⁶ 'Hoc interdictum (Uti

¹ Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 15, § 1.

² Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 15, §§ 2, 3, 4; Halifax on Roman Law, ch. 6, p. 101.

³ Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 15, § 7; Halifax on Roman Law, ch. 6, p. 101.

⁴ Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 15, § 8.

⁵ Eden on Injunctions, ch. 16, pp. 332 to 334; 2 Collect. Jurid. 196; Beames, Ord. Ch. 15, and note (49). One of Lord Bacon's Ordinances (26) is that 'Injunctions for possession are not to be granted before a decree; but where the possession hath continued by the space of three years before the bill exhibited; and upon the same title, and not upon any title by leave or otherwise, determined.' Beames, Ord. ch. 15. This was probably the origin of the Chancery Proceedings in Ireland stated in the text; post, § 870.

⁶ Halifax on Roman Law, ch. 6, pp. 101, 102.

possidetis) de soli possessore scriptum est, quem potiore prætor in soli possessione habebat; et est prohibitorium ad retinendam possessionem.'¹ 'Est igitur hoc interdictum, quod vulgo Uti possidetis appellatur, retinendæ possessionis; nam hujus rei causa redditur, ne vis fiat ei qui possidet.'² 'Hoc interdictum duplex est; et hi quibus competit et actores et rei sunt.'³

870. The practice of granting injunctions of this sort has (it is said) become obsolete in England, if not altogether, at least in so great a degree that there are few instances of it in modern times.⁴ But injunctions of the nature of an interdict, *Unde vi*, of the Roman law to restore a possession from which the party has been forcibly ejected are, under the name of possessory bills, said to be still common in Ireland.⁵ The interdict '*Unde vi*' in the Roman law was granted to restore a possession forcibly taken away; whereas the interdict '*Uti possidetis*' was granted to preserve a present possession. '*Illud (Interdictum Unde vi)*,' says the Digest, '*enim restituit vi amissam possessionem; hoc (Interdictum Uti possidetis) tuetur, ne amittatur possessio. Denique prætor possidenti vim fieri vetat; et illud quidem interdictum oppugnat possessorem; hoc tuetur.*'⁶

871. It is obviously incompatible with the object of these Commentaries to enumerate in detail (even if such a task were practi-

¹ Dig. Lib. 43, tit. 17, l. 1, § 1.

² Dig. Lib. 43, tit. 17, l. 1, § 4.

³ Dig. Lib. 43, tit. 17, l. 3, § 1. Proceedings analogous to those in the Roman law are recognized in the Scottish Jurisprudence. Ersk. Instit. p. 764, § 47.

⁴ Eden on Injunct. ch. 16, 333, 334; *Hughes v. Trustees of Morden College*, 1 Ves. 188, 189; *Anon.* 2 Ves. 415. In America injunctions of this sort are not without precedent. Thus in *Varick v. Corporation of New York* (4 John. Ch. R. 53), Mr. Chancellor Kent granted an injunction against the corporation (until they should have established their right at law) to prevent them from digging into the soil and throwing down the fences of a close which the plaintiff had possessed for twenty-five years, the acts being done by the corporation under the claim of its being a public highway. The case is a good deal like that of *Hughes v. Trustees of Morden College*, 1 Ves. 188. Why may not cases of this sort be properly referable to the doctrine of irreparable mischief or to prevent multiplicity of suits? See *Belknap v. Belknap*, 2 John. Ch. R. 463; *Agar v. Regent's Canal Company*, Coop. Eq. R. 77; *Shand v. Aberdeen Canal Co.*, 2 Cow. R. 519.

⁵ Eden on Injunct. ch. 16, p. 334; 2 Brown, Parl. Cas. by Tomlins, 28; *Anon.* 2 Ves. 415.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 43, tit. 17, l. 1, § 4; Halifax on Roman Law, ch. 6, p. 102.

cable) the various cases in which a writ of injunction will be granted in Courts of Equity. Many cases of this sort have already been incidentally taken notice of in the preceding pages, and others again will occur hereafter. What is proposed to be done in this place is to enumerate some only of the more common cases in which it is applied rather as illustrations of the nature and extent of the jurisdiction than as a complete analysis of it.

872. A learned writer whose work on this subject is in high estimation has enumerated among the most ordinary objects of the remedial writ of injunctions the following: 'To stay proceedings in Courts of Law, in the Spiritual Courts, the Courts of Admiralty, or in some other Court of Equity; to restrain the indorsement or negotiation of notes and bills of exchange, the sale of land, the sailing of a ship, the transfer of stock, or the alienation of a specific chattel; to prevent the wasting of assets or other property pending litigation; to restrain a trustee from assigning the legal estate or from setting up a term of years, or assignees from making a dividend; to prevent the removing out of the jurisdiction, marrying, or having any intercourse which the court disapproves of with a ward; to restrain the commission of every species of waste to houses, mines, timber, or any other part of the inheritance; to prevent the infringement of patents and the violation of copyright, either by publication or theatrical representation; to suppress the continuance of public or private nuisances; and by the various modes of interpleader, restraint upon multiplicity of suits, or quieting possession before the hearing, to stop the progress of vexatious litigation.' But he immediately adds: 'These however are far from being all the instances in which this species of equitable interposition is obtained. It would indeed be difficult to enumerate them all; for in the endless variety of cases in which a plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief, if that relief consists in restraining the commission or the continuance of some act of the defendant, a Court of Equity administers it by means of the writ of injunction.'¹

873. The illustrations of the jurisdiction which will be attempted in our pages will be principally limited to cases of injunctions to stay proceedings at law; to restrain vexatious suits; to restrain the alienation of property; to restrain waste;

¹ Eden on Injunct. ch. 1, pp. 1, 2. See also 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 106.

to restrain nuisances ; to restrain trespasses ; and to prevent other irreparable mischiefs. We shall then add some few instances of special injunctions in order more fully to develop the nature and extent of this most beneficial process of preventive and remedial justice. It should be premised however that injunctions when granted on bills are either temporary, as until the coming in of the defendant's answer, or until the further order of the court, or until the hearing of the cause, or until the coming in of the report of a master ; or they are perpetual, as when they form a part of the decree after the hearing upon the merits, and the defendant is perpetually inhibited from any assertion of a particular right, or perpetually restrained from the doing of a particular act.¹

874. And in the first place as to injunctions to stay proceedings at law. (a) Injunctions of this sort are sometimes granted to stay trial ; or after verdict to stay judgment ; or after judgment to stay execution ; or if the execution has been effected, to stay the money in the hands of the sheriff ; or if part only of the judgment debt has been levied by a fieri facias to restrain the suing out of another fi. fac. or a ca. sa., according to the exigency of the particular case.² This jurisdiction of granting injunctions in an especial manner met the decided opposition and hostility of the Courts of Common Law from a very early period of the exercise of Equity Jurisprudence. The common mode in which this relief was granted was after a judgment at law by enjoining the plaintiff not to sue out execution upon the judgment.³ This was supposed to trench upon the jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Law, from its tendency to destroy their conclusiveness, and to make nullities of their judgments ; since an execution is properly said to be fructus, finis, et effectus legis, and therefore is the life

¹ See 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 416 ; Gilb. Forum. Roman. ch. 11, pp. 194, 195.

² 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 406 ; post, § 886.

³ 1 Wooddes. Lect. 6, p. 186 ; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, pp. 398, 406.

(a) Under systems of law in which, as in England, the doctrines of equity have become applicable to all causes, or in which, as in Massachusetts, equitable pleas and rights are available at law, this subject of injunction to stay legal proceedings must have become narrowed. Indeed in England it appears to have been entirely remodelled. Judicature Act, 1873, s. 24, subs. 1, 5, 8 ; *Wright v. Redgrave*, 11 Ch. D. 24.

of the law.¹ The exercise of this jurisdiction however can be distinctly traced back to the beginning of the reign of Henry the Seventh,² and although it was constantly struggled against, and even constituted one of the articles of impeachment against Cardinal Wolsey in the reign of Henry the Eighth, yet it was constantly upheld by the chancellors, and was finally and conclusively established in the reign of King James in the manner already mentioned.³

875. There does not seem to be any just foundation for the opposition of the Courts of Common Law to this jurisdiction. A writ of injunction is in no just sense a prohibition to those courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction. It is not addressed to those courts. It does not even affect to interfere with them. (a). The process, when its object is to restrain proceedings at law, is directed only to the parties. It neither assumes any superiority over the court in which those proceedings are had, nor denies its jurisdiction. It is granted on the sole ground that from certain equitable circumstances, of which the Court of Equity granting the process has cognizance, it is against conscience that the party inhibited should proceed in the cause.⁴ The object therefore really is to prevent an unfair use being made of the process of a Court of Law, in order to deprive another party of his just rights, or to subject him to some unjust vexation or injury which is wholly irremediable by a Court of Law.⁵ (b)

876. One of the plainest cases which can be put of the propriety of granting an injunction to a judgment at law, is where it has been in fact satisfied, and yet the judgment creditor attempts to set it up and enforce it either against the judgment

¹ Bac. Abr. Execution, A ; Co. Litt. 289 b.

² 1 Rep. Ch. App. 1, 21 (edit. 1715); 1 Wooddes. Lect. 6, p. 186; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 398; 4 Co. Inst. 92.

³ Ante, §§ 51, 862.

⁴ Eden on Injunct. ch. 2, p. 4.

⁵ Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, pp. 127, 128, 131.

(a) Equity will not grant an injunction against the issuance of process by another court. *Tyler v. Hamersley*, 44 Conn. 419. Where the Legislature has pointed out a mode of proceeding before a magistrate, it is not, as a general rule, for another court

to stop that proceeding by injunction. *Stannard v. St. Giles*, 20 Ch. D. 190, 196.

(b) The chancellor may restrain proceedings in his own court as well as at law. *Mann v. Flower*, 26 Minn. 479.

debtor or against some person claiming under him, (a) who is thereby injured in his property or rights.¹ (b) In such cases a Court of Law would often be exceedingly embarrassed in giving the proper redress, if it could give it at all. But Courts of Equity deal with it at once, and apply the most complete remedial relief.

877. Indeed without a jurisdiction of this sort to control the proceedings, or to enjoin the judgments of parties at law, it is most obvious that Equity Jurisprudence, as a system of remedial justice, would be grossly inadequate to the ends of its institution. In a great variety of cases, as we shall presently see, Courts of Law cannot afford any redress to the party sued, although it is most manifest that he has in conscience and justice, but not at law, a perfect defence. He may be deprived of his rights by fraud, or accident, or mistake. Nay, the very facts on which he relies may be exclusively within the knowledge of the party who sues him, and without a discovery (which a Court of Law cannot grant) he may be unable to establish his defence; and if proceedings cannot in the mean time be stayed at law until a discovery can be had in equity, he will be subjected to intolerable oppression or injury.² Many cases of this sort have already been suggested under the preceding heads, and especially in cases of accident, mistake, and fraud; and others again will occur in our subsequent inquiries.³ (c)

¹ Brinckerhoff v. Lansing, 4 John. Ch. R. 65, 73.

² Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, pp. 127, 128, 130.

³ Mr. Eden has collected under this head many cases of accident, mistake, fraud, account, illegal and immoral contracts, penalties and forfeitures,

(a) See Shaw v. Dwight, 16 Barb. 536.

(b) Bowen v. Clark, 46 Ind. 405. So where satisfaction has been agreed upon. See Jordan v. Money, 5 H. L. Cas. 185. So where property attached was bailed for safe keeping by the sheriff, and the debt was afterwards paid, though not until final judgment had been recovered against the bailee. Paddock v. Palmer, 19 Vt. 581. See Keighler v. Savage Manuf. Co., 12 Md. 383. So where by fraud, accident, or mistake judgment has been entered

for an amount or in terms not intended, equity will on clear proof relieve. Katz v. Moore, 13 Md. 566. But mistake in obtaining judgment is of course a different thing; that could not be shown. Sheets v. Selden, 7 Wall. 416.

(c) Prevention of multiplicity of suits is a common case. Bishop v. Rosenbaum, 58 Miss. 84; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575.

878. A single case under each of the heads of accident, mistake, and fraud will sufficiently show the beneficial operation, nay the necessity of the interposition of Courts of Equity to restrain proceedings at law under circumstances of the most simple character. Suppose an executor or administrator should be in possession of abundant assets to pay all the debts of the deceased, and by an accidental fire a great portion of them should be destroyed, so that the estate should be deeply insolvent. In such a case he might be sued by a creditor at law, and the loss of the assets by accident would be no defence; for when he once becomes chargeable with the assets at law, he is forever chargeable, notwithstanding any intervening casualties. But Courts of Equity will enjoin proceedings at law, in cases of this sort, upon the purest principles of justice.¹

879. Suppose a party is sued at law for a debt of long standing, and a judgment is obtained against him for the amount, although he has actually paid it, but he is unable after due search to find a receipt or release which would establish the fact; and then after judgment the paper is unexpectedly found either in his own possession or in that of a third person. At law there would be no redress under such circumstances. The judgment would be conclusive. But a Court of Equity would in such a case afford relief by a perpetual injunction of the judgment.² (a) Such a suit may be brought without fraud, as by a representative of a deceased party; and therefore it may be a case of innocent mistake.

880. Suppose a judgment should be obtained at law by fraud for a sum larger than is justly due to the party, upon a mutual understanding of the parties that certain set-offs should be allowed

breaches of covenants, decrees for the administration of assets, election of remedies at law or in equity, marshalling of securities, discharge of sureties, &c., where an injunction is the appropriate remedy; and to this work, and the authorities there cited, the learned reader is referred for more full information. Eden on Injunctions, ch. 2, pp. 3 to 44. See also 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 109, 110.

¹ See ante, § 90; *Crosse v. Smith*, 7 East, 246; *Croft's Executors v. Lyndsey*, 2 Freem. R. 1.

² *Gainsborough v. Gifford*, 2 P. Will. 424.

(a) See *Rickle v. Dow*, 39 Mich. 91. This appears to be on the ground that a material fact has been 'discovered after a trial, which could not by ordinary diligence have been ascertained before.' Post, § 894.

and deducted. There would be no remedy at law; and yet a Court of Equity would not hesitate to enjoin the judgment upon due proof to the extent of the set-offs. Or suppose a party were surprised at the trial by proof of a claim of which from the nature of the declaration he could have no notice and was in no default, and thus a recovery should be had for an amount not legally due, the like relief would be granted in equity. But at law the party might be utterly without redress; for he might not be able to bring the case within the ordinary rules for granting a new trial.

881. Another case may easily be supposed where the defendant at law has a perfect defence, but where the facts upon which it depends are exclusively within the knowledge of the plaintiff in the suit. In such a case a bill of discovery is indispensable, to enable the party to make good his defence at law. But if in the mean time the plaintiff were permitted to go on at law, and to insist upon a trial before the discovery was obtained, it is obvious that the law would be an instrument of the grossest injustice. In such a case a Court of Equity would decree an injunction to stay proceedings until the discovery was duly obtained.¹ (a)

882. In some of the cases which have been above supposed the defendant would have had a complete remedy at law if at the time he had been in possession of the appropriate proofs. But the great mass of cases in which an injunction is ordinarily applied for, to stay proceedings at law, is where the rights of the party are wholly equitable in their own nature, or are incapable under the circumstances of being asserted in a Court of Law. A ready illustration of the former class may be found in the attempt of a trustee, in violation of his trust, to oust the possession of the cestui que trust of an estate to the beneficial enjoyment of which he is entitled; or of a landlord to oust the possession of a tenant with whom he has contracted for a lease, by an ejection in violation of that contract; or of a party setting up a satisfied term, or an outstanding legal incumbrance, to defeat the possession of

¹ See Eden on Injunct. ch. 2, p. 3, &c.; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 340, 341.

(a) See *Waterlow v. Bacon*, L. R. N. H. 507; *Sperry v. Gibson*, 3 W. Va. Eq. 514; *Hibbard v. Eastman*, 47 522.

another person having a better conscientious and equitable title to it. Illustrations of the latter class may be found in the common cases of bonds and mortgages (*a*) and other penal securities and covenants, where by the strict rules of law the party after forfeiture can obtain no relief; in cases of set-offs in equity, which are not recognized at all at law as such; (*b*) and in cases of partnership property, seized in execution by a creditor of one of the partners, where an injunction will be awarded to stay proceedings until an account of the partnership funds and rights is taken.

883. It seems proper too in this place to take notice of the application of this same remedial process, upon larger principles, to the case of sureties who are often discharged from their liability, according to the doctrines of Courts of Equity, when they would be held responsible upon their bond or other security at law. It is for instance well settled (as we have seen) that wherever a creditor, in pursuance of a valid agreement for such a purpose, gives time for payment to the principal debtor on a bond or other security, without the consent of the surety, the latter will be held discharged in equity, although he might still be held bound at law.¹ In such a case it is of no consequence whether the surety has sustained any actual damage or not. Nay, the arrangement may be for his benefit, and yet he will in equity be discharged; for the rights of the creditor as to his debtor have been voluntarily suspended, and of course the relation of the surety to both changed without his consent. Under such circumstances the surety has a right to restrain the creditor from proceeding at law against him to recover the debt, and a perpetual injunction constitutes the true and effectual remedy.² (*c*)

¹ Ante, §§ 324, 325, 326; *Clarke v. Henty*, 3 Younge & Coll. 187, 189.

² Ante, §§ 324, 326; *Eden on Injunctions*, ch. 2, p. 40; *Nisbet v. Smith*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 579; *Rees v. Berrington*, 2 Ves. jr. 540, 543, 544; *Boulton v.*

(*a*) Equity will enjoin a suit on a note held as collateral to the mortgage debt, pending a bill to redeem. *Walker v. Jones*, L. R. 1 P. C. 50.

(*b*) See *Hopkins v. Fechter*, 47 Mo. 331; *Tommy v. Ellis*, 41 Ga. 260.

(*c*) If a creditor fraudulently aid his principal debtor to abscond, with intent to delay a surety in recovering from his principal the sum for which he

is bound, equity will enjoin the creditor from enforcing his claim against the surety. *Smith v. Hays*, 1 Jones, Eq. 321. But equity will not in England, it seems, enjoin a suit against a surety on a bond, who was induced to sign by false representations, because he can defend the suit. *Stiff v. Eastbourne*, 17 Week. R. 428 (C. A.), reversing *Ib.* 68. See vol. i. p. 31, note.

883 *a*. But the question who is to be deemed a surety in the sense of a Court of Equity is very material to be considered; for although a person between himself and his co-obligor may be a surety only, yet as to the obligee both may be properly deemed principals and liable as such. And this, at law, must depend upon the very terms of the instrument itself; for no extrinsic evidence is admissible for the purpose. Thus for example where two persons purported on the face of a grant of an annuity to be both grantors, it was held that although as between themselves one might be a surety, yet as to the grantee both were to be deemed principals, and extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to establish the fact to be different.¹ Still however if the grantee knew that one was a surety and he dealt with the other injuriously to the interests of the former, this might raise an equity in favor of the surety entitling him to protection against the legal consequences of the instrument which he joined in executing.² (*a*) However a surety is not necessarily discharged by a dealing between the obligee and his principal which is unknown to him. But it must depend upon circumstances.³

Stubbs, 18 Ves. 20; *Samuell v. Howarth*, 3 Meriv. R. 272; *Eyre v. Bartrop*, 3 Madd R. 220; *King v. Baldwin*, 2 John. Ch. R. 554, 560; s. c. 17 John. R. 384; *Tyson v. Cox*, 1 Turner & Russ. 395, 399; *Blake v. White*, 1 Younge & Coll. 420, 422, 423, 424; *Bank of Ireland v. Beresford*, 6 Dow. R. 233.

¹ *Hollier v. Eyre*, 9 Clark & Fin. 1, 45, 57.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Hollier v. Eyre*, 9 Clark & Fin. 1, 45, 57. On this occasion Lord Cottenham said: 'Lord Eldon's observations in *ex parte Gifford* (6 Ves. 806) and in *Samuell v. Howarth* (3 Meriv. 278) must be understood with reference to the cases before him; they afford no inference that that very learned judge would have held that a surety was discharged because the principal had agreed with his creditor that only half the debt should be claimed or only a portion of the annuity paid for the future. The surety will be left to judge for himself between his original undertaking and another substituted for it; but that is not the case where the contract remains the same, though part of the subject-matter is withdrawn from its operation. In *Witcher v. Hall* (5 Barn. & C. 281), Mr. Justice Littledale puts the case of a surety for the rent of a tenant who was to hold one hundred acres, but by a subsequent agreement with his landlord held only fifty, and thinks it clear that the surety would be liable. Modern cases, such as *Hulme v. Coles* (2 Sim. 12) and *Price v. Edmunds* (10 Barn. & C. 578), have put a very rational limit to the rule that giving time to the principal discharges the surety, by holding that for that purpose such giving time must be under circumstances which at best might be injurious to the surety. The latter case also establishes that a conditional agreement for

(*a*) See *Pooley v. Harradine*, 7 El. & B. 431; and notes to Amer. edit. of 9 Clark & F. p. 1.

884. We might here also advert to the important branches of Equity Jurisprudence in the administration and marshalling of assets, and the marshalling of securities, as furnishing other appropriate illustrations of the beneficial interposition of Courts of Equity to control the rights and proceedings of creditors and others at law by the remedial process of injunction, upon principles almost purely of an equitable and conscientious nature. In most of the cases of this nature there is no pretence to assert the jurisdiction upon any of the ordinary grounds of accident, mistake, fraud, or confidence. It stands upon the more enlarged principles of general justice, and was probably derived from that great reservoir of general principles, the Roman Civil Law, where (as we have seen) equities of this sort were not unfrequently entertained.¹

885. Indeed the occasions on which an injunction may be used to stay proceedings at law are almost infinite in their nature and circumstances.² In general it may be stated that in all cases where by accident, or mistake, or fraud, (*a*) or otherwise a party has an unfair advantage in proceedings in a Court of Law, which must necessarily make that court an instrument of injustice, and it is therefore against conscience that he should use that advantage, a Court of Equity will interfere and restrain him from using the advantage which he has thus improperly gained; and it will also generally proceed to administer all the relief which the particular case requires, whether it be by a partial or by a total restraint of such proceedings. If any such unfair advantage has been already obtained by proceedings at law to a judgment, it time does not discharge the surety, when from the condition not being performed the agreement does not become binding; and in the present case it was a condition of the alteration of the arrangement that the reduced annuity should be a primary charge upon the estate, and that the title-deeds should be deposited; which condition was never performed. It is true that payment of the annuity at a reduced rate was nevertheless accepted, which, it has been said, was a waiver of the condition; but the contract to discharge a surety must be positive and distinct, and if the acceptance of the reduced annuity by the grantee was a waiver of the condition, the payment of it was conclusive evidence of the plaintiff's acquiescence in the arrangement under which the reduction had taken place.³

¹ Ante, §§ 558, &c., 633, 635, 636, &c.; Edén on Injunct. ch. 2, pp. 31, 32, 38, 39; Id. ch. 3, p. 46.

² Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 407.

(*a*) *Stanton v. Embry*, 46 Conn. 65 and 595; *Pearce v. Olney*, 20 Conn. 544. Or corruption of an arbitrator. *Malmesbury Ry. Co. v. Budd*, 2 Ch. D. 113; post, § 1452.

will in like manner control the judgment, and restore the injured party to his original rights.¹ (a)

886. The injunction is not confined to any one point of the proceedings at law; but it may, upon a proper case being presented to the court, be granted at any stage of the suit.² (b) Thus an injunction is sometimes granted to stay trial; (c) sometimes after verdict to stay judgment; sometimes after judgment to stay execution; (d) sometimes after execution (e) to stay the money in the hands of the sheriff if it be a case of a fieri facias, or to stay the delivery of possession if it be a writ of possession.³ And, as has been already intimated, the injunction may be temporary or perpetual, total or partial, qualified or unconditional.⁴

887. In regard to injunctions after a judgment at law it may be stated as a general principle that any facts which prove it to be against conscience to execute such judgment, and of which the injured party could not have availed himself in a Court of

¹ Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, pp. 127 to 133; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 166 to 173; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, pp. 406 to 410; Eden on Injunct. ch. 2, p. 3.

² Ibid.; Eden on Injunct. ch. 2, p. 44; ante, § 874.

³ See 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, pp. 406, 407, 412, 416; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 109, 110; Eden on Injunct. ch. 2, p. 44, &c.; ante, § 874.

⁴ Ibid.; ante, § 873.

(a) The fraud for which relief against a judgment will be granted must be something practised on the unsuccessful party, preventing him from exhibiting his case fully. False testimony or forged documents are not enough if the disputed matter has actually been presented. *Vance v. Burbank*, 101 U. S. 514; *United States v. Throckmorton*, 98 U. S. 91; *Metcalf v. Gilmore*, 59 N. H. 417 (foreign judgment). And in any case damage must be shown. *Dobbs v. St. Joseph Ins. Co.*, 72 Mo. 189; *Williams v. Nolan*, 58 Texas, 708 (unauthorized settlement by counsel).

(b) See *Gardner v. Hershey*, 27 Ark. 552; *Clark v. Ewing*, 93 Ill. 572; *Cairo R. Co. v. Holbrook*, 92 Ill. 297; *Miller v. Palmer*, 55 Miss. 323. The fraud necessary to setting aside a judgment should be actual. *Patch v. Ward*, L. R. 3 Ch. 203. And it should be shown, where the judgment was for

the plaintiff in the action, that the injured party had a good defence. *White v. Crow*, 110 U. S. 183; *Luckenbach v. Anderson*, 47 Penn. St. 123.

(c) Equity e. g. will, generally speaking, enjoin a suit against a receiver brought without leave of the court which appointed him. *Barton v. Barbour*, 104 U. S. 126; *Davis v. Gray*, 16 Wall. 203. See *Searle v. Choat*, 25 Ch. D. 723. But leave is not necessary to a suit against a receiver for goods wrongfully taken possession of by him. *Barton v. Barbour*, supra.

(d) See *Grant v. Lathrop*, 23 N. H. 67; *Lewis v. Denkgrave*, 24 La. An. 489; *Whitehurst v. Green*, 69 N. Car. 131; *Lesley v. Shock*, 3 Houst. 130.

(e) To restrain the sale of property illegally taken thereon. *Kenyon v. Clarke*, 2 R. I. 67; *Kendall v. Dow*, 46 Ga. 607; *Marlin v. Jewell*, 37 Md. 560; ante, p. 179, note.

Law, or of which he might have availed himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or accident, (a) unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will authorize a Court of Equity to interfere by injunction, to restrain the adverse party from availing himself of such judgment.¹ (b) Bills of this sort are usually called bills for a new trial.² (c)

888. It has been remarked by Lord Redesdale that bills of this description have not of late years been much countenanced. In general it has been considered that the ground for a bill to obtain a new trial after judgment in an action at law must be such as would be the ground for a bill of review of a decree in a Court of Equity, upon the discovery of a new matter.³ (d)

889. Courts of Equity will not only award an injunction to stay proceedings at law, but they will also, where the party is proceeding at law and in equity for the same matter at the same time, compel him to make an election of the suit in which he will proceed, and will stay the proceedings in the other court.⁴ And if after a decree in equity a party shall proceed at law for the same matter, they will interfere by way of injunction. So if a decree is made against a party upon the merits, and he afterwards brings a bill in a foreign court for the same subject-matter, a Court of

¹ *Marine Insurance Company v. Hodgson*, 7 Cranch, R. 332; *Jarvis v. Chandler*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 319; *Truly v. Wanger*, 4 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 142.

² *Mitf. Pl. Eq. by Jeremy*, 131.

Mitf. Pl. Eq. by Jeremy, 131; *Floyd v. Jayne*, 6 John. Ch. R. 479; *Woodworth v. Van Buskerk*, 1 John. Ch. R. 432.

⁴ *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 2, pp. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38; *Vaughan v. Welsh*, *Moseley*, R. 210; *Anon. Id.* 304; *Mocher v. Reed*, 1 B. & Beatt. 318, 319, 320; *Schoole v. Sall*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 176; *Rogers v. Vosburgh*, 4 John. Ch. R. 84. There are some exceptions to this doctrine. One is, that a mortgagee may proceed on his mortgage in equity and on his bond at law at the same time. But this right is not unqualified; for the mortgagor will not be compelled to pay upon his bond unless secure of his title-deeds being delivered up. *Schoole v. Sall*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 176; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 3, p. 36; *Royle v. Wynne*, 1 *Craig & Phillips*, 232.

(a) See *Fletcher v. Warren*, 18 Vt. 45; *Tysor v. Lutterloh*, 4 Jones, Eq. 247; *Devoll v. Scales*, 49 Maine, 320; *Wingate v. Haywood*, 40 N. H. 437; *Cage v. Cassidy*, 23 How. 109; *Seymour v. Miller*, 32 Conn. 402; *Starr v. Heckart*, 32 Md. 267; *Cooper v. Tyler*, 46 Ill. 462.

(b) *Crim v. Handley*, 94 U. S. 653; *Miller v. Palmer*, 55 Miss. 323; *Emer-*

son v. Udall, 13 Vt. 477; *Ocean Ins. Co. v. Field*, 2 Story, 59; post, § 1572. Thus a surety may enjoin a judgment confessed by an insolvent principal who had a defence to the action. *Costley v. Allen*, 56 Ala. 198.

(c) See post, § 1574.

(d) See *Crim v. Handley*, 94 U. S. 653.

Equity will grant an injunction against proceeding in such foreign suit.¹ Indeed wherever after a bill is filed in equity the party institutes a suit at law for the same matter, it is treated as a contempt of the court, for the jurisdiction has already attached in equity; and it is a gross oppression to vex another with a double suit for the same cause of action.²

890. Another class of cases in which injunctions are granted to proceedings at law is where there has already been a decree upon a creditors' bill for the administration of assets. (a) Such a decree is considered in equity to be in the nature of a judgment for all the creditors; and therefore if subsequently to it a bond creditor should sue at law, the Court of Equity in which the decree is made will (as we have seen) in the assertion of its jurisdiction restrain him from proceeding in his suit.³ The reason is, that Courts of Law do not take notice of a decree in equity, and therefore the Court of Equity is compelled to establish its jurisdiction over all the assets and the administration thereof, by preventing creditors from going elsewhere at law to assert their rights.⁴ An injunction in cases of this sort was formerly granted only upon a bill filed; but it may now be obtained upon motion after notice given to the creditor.⁵ And it makes no difference (it should seem), as to granting an injunction, whether the bill be brought by one or more creditors against the executor or administrator for the administration of the assets solely on his or their own behalf, or whether it be brought on behalf of themselves and all other creditors; provided that upon

¹ *Booth v. Leycester*, 1 Keen, R. 579; post, § 902.

² *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 2, pp. 34 to 38.

³ Ante, § 549; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 2, p. 31; *Morrice v. Bank of England*, Cas. temp. Talb. 217; s. c. 4 *Brown*, Parl. Cas. by Tomlins, 287; *Paxton v. Douglass*, 8 Ves. 520; *Martin v. Martin*, 1 Ves. 210, 212; *Perry v. Phelps*, 10 Ves. 34; *Clarke v. Ormonde*, Jacob, R. 122; *Thompson v. Brown*, 4 John. Ch. R. 619.

⁴ *Ibid.* But although Courts of Equity will grant an injunction in cases of this sort, they will interfere only so far as is necessary to give effect to their own decree for an administration of the assets of the deceased. But if the executor or administrator has rendered himself personally liable to the creditor, there the injunction will not restrain the creditor from proceeding personally against him, but only against the assets. *Kent v. Pickering*, 5 Sim. 569; *Price v. Evans*, 4 Sim. R. 514.

⁵ *Cleverley v. Cleverley*, cited in 8 Ves. 526; *Paxton v. Douglass*, 8 Ves. 520.

(a) Foreign administration pro- cases. *Hope v. Carnegie*. L. R. 1 Ch. proceedings may be enjoined in some 320; *Baillie v. Baillie*, L. R. 5 Eq. 175.

such a bill a general decree is made for the benefit of all the creditors. For then it is in the nature of a judgment for all the creditors, and all are entitled to have notice, and to come in and to prove their debts before the master.¹

891. Courts of Equity will not only grant an injunction restraining suits at law between parties upon equitable circumstances, but they will exercise the same jurisdiction to protect their own officers who execute their processes against any suits brought against them for acts done under or in virtue of such processes.² The ground of this assertion of jurisdiction is, that Courts of Equity will not suffer their processes to be examined by any other courts; and Courts of Law cannot know anything of their nature and effect. If they are irregularly issued or executed, it is the duty of Courts of Equity themselves to apply the proper remedy and to make satisfaction.³ And for this purpose in a proper case it will be referred to a master to ascertain and settle the proper compensation.⁴ Therefore where an arrest was made by virtue of a process which issued irregularly out of a Court of Equity, and an action for false imprisonment was brought against the officer who made the arrest, an injunction was issued restraining the suit.⁵ The same principle is applied to protect sequestrators in possession under a decree in a Court of Equity against suits brought against them; for the court will not permit itself to be made a suitor at law, but it will examine for itself the nature of any adverse title upon application of the party.⁶ The same principle is also applied, as we have already seen, to the case of receivers.⁷ (a)

¹ *Thompson v. Brown*, 4 John. Ch. R. 619, 643; *Martin v. Martin*, 1 Ves. 211; ante, § 547, and note (2), § 548; *Benson v. Le Roy*, 4 John. Ch. R. 651.

² Ante, § 833; *Parker v. Browning*, 8 Paige, R. 388; *Mackay v. Brackett*, 9 Paige, R. 437; *Albany City Bank v. Schermerhorn*, 9 Paige, R. 372.

³ *Eden on Injunct. ch. 3, p. 34*; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 407; *Bailey v. Devereaux*, 1 Vern. 269; *Frowd v. Lawrence*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 641; *May v. Hook*, 2 Dick. R. 619; s. c. cited 1 Jac. & Walk. 642, note; *Aston v. Heron*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 390; *Ex parte Merritt*, 5 Paige, R. 125.

⁴ *Chalie v. Pickering*, 1 Keen, R. 749; *Ex parte Merritt*, 5 Paige, R. 125.

⁵ *Bailey v. Devereaux*, 1 Vern. R. 269; s. c. 1 Jac. & Walk. 640, note; *Phillips v. Worth*, 2 Russ. & Mylne. 638.

⁶ *Angel v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 338; ante, § 833; *Chalie v. Pickering*, 1 Keen, R. 749.

⁷ Ante, § 833; *Parker v. Browning*, 8 Paige, 385.

(a) But equity will not protect a goods wrongfully seized by him on a sheriff from an action by an owner of writ issued out of chancery. Onyon

892. Injunctions to restrain suits at law are usually spoken of as common or special. The common injunction (as it is called) so frequently alluded to in the books of Reports and Practice, is the writ of injunction issued upon and for the default of the defendant, in not appearing to or answering the bill. It is also granted where the defendant obtains an order for further time to answer, or for a commission (commonly called a *dedimus*) to take his answer.¹ In all these cases the injunction is of course.² In its terms the writ recites that the defendant has not appeared or answered the bill, and yet is proceeding at law; and it commands the defendant to desist from all further proceedings at law, touching the matters in the bill, until he shall have fully answered the bill, cleared his contempt, and the court shall make other orders to the contrary. But the defendant is nevertheless at liberty to call for a plea, and to proceed to trial thereon, and for want of a plea to enter up judgment; but execution is thereby stayed.³ Such is the exigency of the writ. All other injunctions granted upon other occasions, or involving other directions, are called special injunctions.⁴

893. There are however cases in which Courts of Equity will not exercise any jurisdiction by way of injunction to stay proceedings at law. In the first place they will not interfere to stay proceedings in any criminal matters or in any cases not strictly of a civil nature. (a) As for instance they will not grant an injunction to stay proceedings on a *mandamus*, or an indictment, or an information, or a writ of prohibition.⁵ But

¹ Eden on Injunc. ch. 3, pp. 59 to 61; Id. ch. 4, pp. 68 to 72; Gilb. For. Roman. ch. 11, p. 194; *James v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 523.

² *Ibid.*; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 339*; *Newl. Ch. Pr. ch. 4, § 7*.

³ Eden on Injunc. Append. p. 370; *Barton's Suit in Eq.* 48, note.

⁴ Eden on Injunc. ch. 4, p. 78; Id. ch. 14, p. 290; *Vipan v. Mortlock*, 2 Meriv. R. 475; *James v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 522, 523; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 339*; *Drummond v. Pigou*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 168; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 341, 342*.

⁵ Eden on Injunc. ch. 2, pp. 41, 42; *Lord Montague v. Dudman*, 2 Ves.

v. Washbourne, 14 Jur. 497. Later goods were not the property of the however refusal to interfere has been person against whom the process is- put upon the ground that the sheriff- snerd. *Tufton v. Harding*, 6 Jur. n. s. did not apply for protection at the 116. See also *Peck v. Crane*, 24 Vt. earliest moment, and that he had no- 146. (a) See ante, vol. i. p. 19, note. tice at the time of the seizure that the

this restriction applies only to cases where the parties seeking redress by such proceedings are not the plaintiffs in equity; for if they are, the court possesses power to restrain them personally from proceeding, at the same time upon the same matter of right, for redress in the form of a civil suit and of a criminal prosecution.¹ In such cases the injunction is merely incidental to the ordinary power of the court to impose terms upon parties who seek its aid in furtherance of their rights.

894. In the next place Courts of Equity will not relieve against a judgment at law where the case in equity proceeds upon a defence equally available at law; (*a*) but the plaintiff ought to establish some special ground for relief.² The doctrine goes yet further; and it may be asserted to be a general rule that a defence cannot be set up as the ground of a bill in equity for an injunction which has been fully and fairly tried at law, although it may be the opinion of a Court of Equity that the defence ought to have been sustained at law.³ If there are any exceptions to this rule, they must be of a very special nature.⁴ But relief will be granted where the defence could not at the time or under the circumstances be made available at law without any laches of the party.⁵ (*b*) Thus for instance if a party should recover a judgment at law for a debt, and the defendant should afterwards find a receipt under the plaintiff's own hand for the very money in question, the defendant (where there was

396; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 413; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 309.

¹ Eden on Injunc. ch. 2, p. 42; Mayor of York *v.* Pilkington, 2 Atk. 302; Lord Montague *v.* Dudman, 2 Ves. 396; Attorney-Gen. *v.* Cleaver, 18 Ves. 220; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 308, 309; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, pp. 413, 414.

² Harrison *v.* Nettleship, 2 Mylne & Keen, 423; Murray *v.* Graham, 6 Paige, R. 622.

³ Marine Ins. Co. *v.* Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 336, 337; see Simpson *v.* Lord Howden, 3 Mylne & Craig, 97, 102, 103.

⁴ *Ibid.*; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 132.

⁵ Farquharson *v.* Pitcher, 2 Russell, R. 81; Murray *v.* Graham, 6 Paige, R. 622.

(*a*) Crim *v.* Handley, 94 U. S. 653; 9 Gratt. 379 (set-off); Wolcott *v.* Harris *v.* Galbraith, 43 Ill. 309; Agard Jones, 4 Allen, 367 (set-off).

v. Valencia, 39 Cal. 292; Merriman (b) Clark *v.* Ewing, 93 Ill. 572; *v.* Cannovan, 7 Cold. 571; George *v.* Cairo R. Co. *v.* Holbrook, 92 Ill. 297; Tutt, 36 Mo. 141; Hudson *v.* Kline, Brown *v.* Buena Vista, 95 U. S. 157.

no laches on his part) would be relieved by a perpetual injunction in equity.¹ So if a fact material to the merits should be discovered after a trial, which could not by ordinary diligence have been ascertained before, the like relief would be granted.² (a)

895. And this leads us to remark in the next place that relief will not be granted by staying proceedings at law after a verdict, if the party applying has been guilty of laches as to the matter of defence, or might by reasonable diligence have procured the requisite proofs before the trial.³ (b) Thus if a defendant has omitted to file a bill for a discovery of facts known to him and material to his defence, and has suffered the case to go to trial without adequate proof of such facts, he cannot afterwards claim an injunction, or a new trial from a Court of Equity; for it was his own folly not to have prepared himself with such proof, or to have filed a bill for a discovery, and to have procured a stay of the trial until the discovery.⁴ So if the facts on which the

¹ Ante, § 879; *Gainsborough v. Gifford*, 2 P. Will. 424; *Protheroe v. Forman*, 2 Swanst. 227, 232, 233; *Williams v. Lee*, 3 Atk. 224. See *Hankey v. Vernon*, 2 Cox, R. 12, 14; *Taylor v. Sheppard*, 1 Younge & Coll. R. 277, 279, 280; *Hennell v. Kelland*, 1 Eq. Abridg. 377; pl. 2; *Barbone v. Brent*, 1 Vern. 176; *Smith v. Lowry*, 1 John. Ch. R. 320, 324; *Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson*, 7 Cranch, 336, 337. The cases on this subject are not perhaps quite reconcilable with each other. But I have given in the text what seems the fair result of the leading authorities. The case of the receipt stated in *Gainsborough v. Gifford*, 2 P. Will. 424, seems to have been doubted by Lord Eldon in *Protheroe v. Forman*, 2 Swanst. R. 232, 233. But it has been recognized either absolutely or in a qualified manner in other cases. See *Williams v. Lee*, 3 Atk. 224; *Hennell v. Kelland*, 1 Eq. Abridg. 377, pl. 2; *Smith v. Lowry*, 1 John. Ch. R. 320; *Hankey v. Vernon*, 2 Cox, R. 12.

² See *Sewell v. Freeston*, 1 Ch. Cas. 65; *Jarvis v. Chandler*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 319.

³ *Protheroe v. Forman*, 2 Swanst. R. 227, 232, 233; *Curtess v. Smallridge*, 1 Ch. Cas. 43; 2 Freem. R. 178; *Tovey v. Young*, Prec. in Chan. 193; *Smith v. Lowry*, 1 John. Ch. R. 320; *Dodge v. Strong*, 2 John. Ch. R. 230.

⁴ *Sewell v. Freeston*, 1 Ch. Cas. 65; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 132;

(a) *Inglehart v. Lee*, 4 Md. Ch. 514; *Cox v. Mobile R. Co.*, 44 Ala. 611; *Harvey v. Seashol*, 4 W. Va. 115. Of course mere ignorance of facts is not enough. *Taliaffero v. Branch Bank*, 23 Ala. 755. The loss of a record, of which secondary evidence might have been given, will not justify equitable interference. *Crim v. Handley*, 94 U. S. 653.

(b) *Brown v. Buena Vista*, 95 U. S. 157; *Smith v. Walker*, 8 Smedes & M. 131; *Trevor v. McKay*, 15 Ga. 550; *Sample v. Barnes*, 14 How. 70; *Powell v. Stewart*, 17 Ala. 719; *Ricker v. Pratt*, 48 Ind. 73; *Jordon v. Corley*, 42 Texas, 284; *Taylor v. Fore*, Ib. 256; *Long v. Smith*, 39 Texas, 160; *McBride v. Little*, 115 Mass. 308.

bill is founded, although discovered since the trial, might have been established at the trial upon the cross-examination of a witness, and the party was put upon the inquiry, relief will be refused.¹ So where a verdict has been obtained at law against a defendant, and he has neglected to apply for a new trial within the time appointed by the rules of the proper Court of Law, Courts of Equity will not entertain a bill for an injunction upon an alleged ground that the original demand was unconscientious, or the subject-matter of an account, provided it was competent for the party to have laid those grounds before the jury on the trial, or before the Court of Law upon the motion for a new trial.² (a)

895 a. Indeed this doctrine is not limited to mere cases decided in the Courts of Common Law, but it is applicable to all cases where the matter of the controversy has been already decided on by another court of competent jurisdiction, even though it be a foreign court, or where it might have been made available in that court as a matter of claim or defence in a suit pending in such court. For it has been truly said not to be the practice of Courts of Equity to assume jurisdiction in favor of parties who, having had an opportunity of asserting their title in another court where the matter has been properly the subject of adjudication, have either missed that opportunity or have not thought proper to bring their title forward.³

Protheroe v. Forman, 2 Swaust. 227, 232, 233, and note (b). See also *Hankey v. Vernon*, 2 Cox, R. 12; *Williams v. Lee*, 3 Atk. 224; *Barbone v. Brent*, 1 Vern. 176; *Richards v. Symmes*, 2 Atk. R. 319; *Taylor v. Sheppard*, 1 Younge & Coll. 271, 280; *Whitmore v. Thornton*, 3 Price, 231; *Field v. Beaumont*, 1 Swaust. R. 209; *Smith v. Lowry*, 1 John. Ch. R. 320; *Barker v. Elkins*, 1 John. Ch. R. 465; *McVickar v. Wolcott*, 4 John. R. 510; *Lansing v. Eddy*, 1 John. Ch. R. 49, 51; *Le Guen v. Gouverneur*, 1 John. Cas. 436.

¹ *Taylor v. Sheppard*, 1 Younge & Coll. 271, 280.

² *Bateman v. Willoe*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 201; *Lansing v. Eddy*, 1 John. Ch. R. 49; *Smith v. Lowry*, 1 John. Ch. R. 320; *Barker v. Elkins*, 1 John. Ch. R. 465; *Simpson v. Hart*, 1 John. Ch. R. 97, 98; *Dodge v. Strong*, 2 John. Ch. R. 228; *Duncan v. Lyon*, 3 John. Ch. R. 351; *Foster v. Wood*, 6 John. Ch. R. 90; *Norton v. Woods*, 5 Paige, R. 249.

³ *Marquess of Breadalbane v. Marquess of Chandos*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 721, 732, 733; *Norton v. Woods*, 5 Paige, R. 249. A foreign judgment is now generally held to be as conclusive as a domestic judgment when it has been rendered upon the merits. But still it may be affected by fraud, and if it is sought

(a) But equity may grant a new move for one. *Knifong v. Hendricks*, trial if there was no opportunity to 2 Gratt. 212.

896. The general reasoning upon which this doctrine is maintained is the common maxim that Courts of Equity, like Courts of Law, require due and reasonable diligence from all parties in suits, and that it is sound policy to suppress multiplicity of suits. Lord Redesdale has stated it with great clearness and force. 'It is not sufficient,' said he, 'to show that injustice has been done; but that it has been done under circumstances which authorize the court to interfere. Because if a matter has been already investigated in a court of justice according to the common and ordinary rules of investigation, a Court of Equity cannot take on itself to enter into it again. Rules are established, some by the Legislature, some by the courts themselves, for the purpose of putting an end to litigation. And it is more important that an end should be put to litigation, than that justice should be done in every case. The truth is that owing to the inattention of parties and several other causes exact justice can very seldom be done.'¹ 'The inattention of parties in a Court of Law can scarcely be made a subject for the interference of a Court of Equity. There may be cases cognizable at law and also in equity, and of which cognizance cannot be effectually taken at law; and therefore equity does sometimes interfere, as in cases of complicated accounts where the party has not made defence because it was impossible for him to do it effectually at law. So where a verdict has been obtained by fraud, or where a party has possessed himself improperly of something by means of which he has an unconscientious advantage at law, which equity will either put out of the way or restrain him from using. But without circumstances of that kind I do not know that equity ever does interfere to grant a trial of a matter which has been already discussed in a Court of Law, a matter capable of being discussed there, and over which the Court of Law had full jurisdiction.'² 'A bill for a new trial is watched by equity with extreme jealousy. It must see that injustice has been done not merely through the inattention of the

to be made available here, an injunction will lie to it in the same way as it will lie to any other security or any judgment here. *Bowles v. Orr*, 1 *Younge & Coll.* 464, 473.

¹ *Bateman v. Willoe*, 1 *Sch. & Lefr.* 204; *Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson*, 7 *Cranch*, 336, 337. See also *Barker v. Elkins*, 1 *John. Ch. R.* 465.

² *Bateman v. Willoe*, 1 *Sch. & Lefr.* 205, 206.

parties, but some such reasons as those I have mentioned must exist.'¹

897. In the next place Courts of Equity will not relieve a party by an injunction to a judgment or other proceedings at law, against a mistake in pleading or in the conduct of the cause; or when he has failed in obtaining fresh evidence; or merely to let in new corroborative evidence;² or because a question of law has been erroneously decided by the Court of Law.³ (a)

898. In the next place Courts of Equity will not grant an injunction to stay proceedings at law merely on account of any defect of jurisdiction of the court where such proceedings are pending. (b) It has been said that although Courts of Equity do not profess to proceed upon the ground of any such defect of jurisdiction, yet that it is remarkable that one of the most ordinary instances of this species of interposition by the Equity Courts in England seems exclusively founded upon it; namely, where a suit is instituted in the Spiritual Court for tithes, and a modus is set up as a defence.⁴ Perhaps this criticism is a little

¹ *Ibid.* p. 206.

² *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 3, pp. 10, 11; *Stephenson v. Wilson*, 2 Vern. 325; *Blackhall v. Combs*, 2 P. Will. 70; *Holworthy v. Mortlock*, 1 Cox, R. 141; *Kemp v. Mackrell*, 2 Ves. 579; *Stevens v. Praed*, 2 Ves. jr. 519; *Ware v. Horwood*, 14 Ves. 31; *Lansing v. Eddy*, 1 John. Ch. R. 49; *Hankey v. Vernon*, 2 Cox, R. 12.

³ *Mar. Ins. Co. v. Hodgson*, 7 Cranch, 336, 337; *Simpson v. Hart*, 1 John. Ch. R. 95 to 99.

⁴ *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 7, p. 137.

(a) *Waring v. Lewis*, 53 Ala. 615; *Hunt v. Coachman*, 6 Rich. Eq. 286. Secus if there was fraud in the opposite party. *Railroad Co. v. Neal*, 1 Woods, 353.

(b) *Secor v. Woodward*, 8 Ala. 500, 767; *Walker v. Robbins*, 14 How. 584; *Stokes v. Knarr*, 11 Wis. 389; *Winterfield v. Strauss*, 24 Wis. 394; *Comstock v. Clemens*, 19 Cal. 77. But see contra *Ryan v. Boyd*, 33 Ark. 778; *Cunningham v. Taylor*, 20 Texas, 126; *Rucker v. Moore*, 1 Heisk. 726; *Ingle v. McCurry*, *Ib.* 26. Further see *Washington v. Barnes*, 41 Ga. 307; *Ricketts v. Hitchins*, 34 Ind. 348; *Owens v. Ranstead*, 22 Ill. 162; *Weaver v. Poyer*, 70 Ill. 567; *Chambers v. King Bridge Manuf.*, 16 Kans. 270. The text, as the words 'merely on account of any defect of jurisdiction' imply, probably means no more than that the party seeking the injunction should show that the judgment was unfounded on the merits as well as void for want of jurisdiction. *Colson v. Leitch*, 110 Ill. 504; *Taggart v. Wood*, 20 Iowa, 236; *Fowler v. Lee*, 10 Gill & J. 358, 363; *Stokes v. Knarr*, 11 Wis. 389; *Blackburn v. Bell*, 91 Ill. 434, 443; *Weaver v. Poyer*, *supra*; *White v. Crow*, 110 U. S. 183; *Luckenbach v. Anderson*, 47 Penn. St. 123 (foreign judgment).

too refined. The Spiritual Courts have a general jurisdiction in matters of tithes; and if the defendant should plead a modus in a suit there for tithes and the modus should be admitted, the Spiritual Courts are not ousted of their jurisdiction. But if the modus should be denied, then the Spiritual Courts cannot proceed propter triationis defectum, and a prohibition lies. The jurisdiction then attaches in equity in such cases not upon the ground of a want of original jurisdiction of the Spiritual Courts over the suit, but upon the ground of the remedy there under such circumstances not being adequate and complete; and the injunction follows as a natural result of the necessity of exercising an exclusive jurisdiction.¹ Lord Hardwicke in a case of this sort said: 'Injunctions in this court are granted upon a suggestion of something which affects the rights or convenience of the party in the proceedings in the other court, or where there is a concurrent jurisdiction.'² The same remarks apply to the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction by Courts of Equity in cases of legacies where an injunction is issued against proceedings in the Spiritual Courts.³

899. It has sometimes been made a question whether Courts of Equity have authority to stay proceedings in the courts of foreign countries. Nothing can be clearer than the proposition that the courts of one country cannot exercise any control or superintending authority over those of another country. The independence, equality, and sovereignty of every country would repudiate any such interference as inconsistent with its own supremacy within its own territorial domains. But although the courts of one country have no authority to stay proceedings in the courts of another, they have an undoubted authority to control all persons and things within their own territorial limits. When therefore both parties to a suit in a foreign country are resident within the territorial limits of another country, the Courts of Equity in the latter may act in personam upon those parties and direct them by injunction to proceed no further in such suit. In such a case these courts act upon acknowledged principles of public law in regard to jurisdiction. They do not pretend to direct or control the foreign court; but without regard to the situation of the subject-matter of the dispute, they

¹ See *Rotheram v. Franshaw*, 3 Atk. 627, 629, 630; ante, §§ 519, 520.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*; ante, §§ 595 to 602.

consider the equities between the parties and decree in personam according to those equities, and enforce obedience to their decrees by process in personam.¹ (a) Hence it is the known habit

¹ Edon on Injunct. ch. 7, pp. 141, 142; ante, §§ 743, 744; Com. Dig. Ch. 3 X.; 4 W. 27; Lord Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Ves. jr. 170, 182; Beckford v. Kemble, 1 Sim. & Stu. 7; Harrison v. Gurney, 2 Jac. & Walk. 562; Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige, R. 404; Mitchel v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606; Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 M. & Keen, 104; Bowles v. Orr, 1 Younge & Coll. R. 464. In Portarlington v. Soulby, the Lord Chancellor said: 'Soon after the Restoration, and when this like every other branch of the court's jurisdiction was, if not in its infancy, at least far from that maturity which it attained under the illustrious series of chancellors the Nottinghams and Macclesfields, the parents of equity, the point received a good deal of consideration in a case which came before Lord Clarendon, and which is reported shortly in Freeman's Reports, and somewhat more fully in Chancery Cases, under the name of Love v. Baker, 2 Freem. 125; 1 Ch. Cas. 67. In Love v. Baker it appears that one only of several parties who had begun proceedings in the court of Leghorn was resident within the jurisdiction here, and the court allowed the subpoena to be served on him, and that this should be good service on the rest. So far there seems to have been very little scruple in extending the jurisdiction. Lord Clarendon refused the injunction to restrain those proceedings at Leghorn, after advising with the other judges. But the report adds, "Sed quære, for all the bar was of another opinion;" and it is said that when the argument against issuing it was used, that this court had no authority to bind a foreign court, the answer was given that the injunction was not directed to the foreign court, but to the party within the jurisdiction here. A very sound answer, as it appears to me; for the same argument might apply to a court within this country which no order of this court ever affects to bind, our orders being only pointed at the parties to restrain them from proceeding. Accordingly this case of Love v. Baker has not been recognized or followed in later times. Two instances are mentioned, in Mr. Hargrave's collection, of the jurisdiction being recognized; and in the case of Warnton v. May, 5 Ves. 71 (see also Kennedy v. Earl of Cassillis, 2 Swans. 313; Bushby v. Munday, 5 Madd. R. 297; Harrison v. Gurney, 2 J. & W. 563; Beauchamp v. Marquis of Huntley, Jac. 546), which underwent so much discussion, part of the decree was to restrain the defendants from entering up any judgment or carrying on any action in what is called "the Court of Great Session in Scotland," meaning of course the Court of Session. I have directed a search to be made for precedents in case the jurisdiction had been exercised in any instances which have not been reported, and one has been found directly in point. It is the case of Campbell v. Houlditch, in 1820, where Lord Eldon ordered an injunction to restrain the defendant from further proceeding in an action which he had commenced before the Court of Session in Scotland. From the note which his lordship himself wrote upon the petition, requiring a further affidavit, and from his refusing the injunction to the extent prayed, it is clear that he paid particular attention to it. This precedent therefore is of very high authority. In truth nothing can be more unfounded than the doubts of the jurisdiction. That is grounded, like all other jurisdiction of the court, not upon any pretension to the exercise of

(a) Ante, p. 199, note (a).

of Courts of Equity to relieve in cases of contracts and other matters respecting lands situated in foreign countries.¹ (a)

900. Notwithstanding the clearness of the general principle, the jurisdiction to stay proceedings in suits in foreign countries by injunction in personam upon parties resident within the realm was greatly doubted in the time of Lord Clarendon; and his lordship, after taking the opinion of the judges, decided against the jurisdiction. His decision however was not satisfactory to the bar,² and the doctrine has in modern times been completely

judicial and administrative rights abroad, but on the circumstance of the person of the party on whom this order is made being within the power of the court. If the court can command him to bring home goods from abroad, or to assign chattel interests, or to convey real property locally situate abroad, — if for instance as in *Penn v. Lord Baltimore*, 1 Ves. sen. 444, it can decree the performance of an agreement touching the boundary of a province in North America; or as in the case of *Toller v. Carteret*, 2 Vern. 449, can foreclose a mortgage in the Isle of Sark, one of the Channel islands, — in precisely the like manner it can restrain the party being within the limits of its jurisdiction from doing anything abroad, whether the thing forbidden be a conveyance or other act in pais, or the instituting or prosecution of an action in a foreign court. It is upon these grounds, I must add, and these precedents, that I choose to rest the jurisdiction, and not upon certain others of a very doubtful nature, such as the power assumed in the year 1682, in *Arglasse v. Muschamp*, 1 Vern. 75, and again by Lord Macclesfield in the year 1724, in *Fryer v. Bernard*, 2 P. Wms. 261, of granting a sequestration against the estates of a defendant situated in Ireland. The reasons given by that great judge in the latter case plainly show that he went upon a ground which would now be untenable, viz., what he terms the superintendent power of the courts in this country over those in Ireland. And indeed he supports his order by expressly referring to the right then claimed by the King's Bench in England, to reverse the judgments of the King's Bench in Ireland. This pretension however has long ago been abandoned, and has indeed been discontinued by parliamentary interposition; and the power of enforcing in Ireland judgments pronounced here, and vice versa, is at the present time the subject of legislative consideration.' Ante, §§ 743, 744.

¹ *Ibid.*; ante, §§ 743, 744; *Archer v. Preston*, 1 Eq. Abridg. 133; *Earl of Arglasse v. Muschamp*, 1 Vern. 75; s. c. 2 Ch. Rep. 266; *Earl of Kildare v. Eustace*, 1 Vern. 419; s. c. 2 Ch. Cas. 188; 1 Eq. Abridg. 133; *Toller v. Carteret*, 2 Vern. 494; s. c. 1 Eq. Abridg. 134, pl. 5; *Foster v. Vassall*, 3 Atk. 589; *Penn v. Lord Baltimore*, 1 Ves. 444; *Cranstown v. Johnston*, 3 Ves. 170; *White v. Hall*, 12 Ves. 321; *Portarlington v. Soulby*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 104; *Wharton v. May*, 5 Ves. 71; *Massie v. Watts*, 6 French, 158, 160; *Briggs v. French*, 1 Sumner, R. 504; ante, §§ 743, 744.

² *Love v. Baker*, 1 Ch. Cas. 67; s. c. 2 Freem. R. 125; *Portarlington v. Soulby*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 104, 107, and the comments of the Lord Chancellor

(a) So to restrain the use abroad of a misleading trademark. *Orr v. Johnston*, 13 Ch. D. 434 (C. A.).

established the other way. It is now held that whenever the parties are resident within a country the courts of that country have full authority to act upon them personally, with respect to the subject of suits in a foreign country, as the ends of justice may require; and with that view to order them to take or to omit to take any steps and proceedings in any other court of justice, whether in the same country or in any foreign country.¹ (a) There is one exception to this doctrine which has been long recognized in America; and that is that the State courts cannot enjoin proceedings in the courts of the United States, (b) nor the latter in the former courts. (c) This exception proceeds upon peculiar grounds of municipal and constitutional law, the respective courts being entirely competent to administer full relief in the suits pending therein.² But the like doctrine has been

cited ante, § 899, note; *Bunbury v. Bunbury*, 2 Eq. Jurist (English) for 1839, pp. 104, 111.

¹ *Bushby v. Munday*, 5 Madd. R. 307, 308; *Cruikshanks v. Robarts*, 6 Madd. 104; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 7, pp 141, 142; *Beckford v. Kemble*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 7; ante, §§ 743, 744.

² *Diggs v. Wolcott*, 4 Cranch, 179; *McKim v. Voorhes*, 7 Cranch, R. 279; see also *Cruikshanks v. Robarts*, 6 Madd. R. 104. In *Mead v. Merritt* (2 Paige, R. 404, 405), Mr. Chancellor Walworth, after admitting the general principles, said that it had frequently been decided in that court (the Court of Chancery of New York) that it would not sustain an injunction bill to restrain a suit or proceeding previously commenced in a sister State or in any of the Federal Courts; that not only comity but public policy forbade the exercise of such a power. In *Mitchell v. Bunch* (2 Paige, 606) the same court not only asserted jurisdiction to decree the application of real property situate out of the jurisdiction of the court, but to compel the defendant either to bring the property in dispute within the jurisdiction of the court, or to execute a conveyance or transfer thereof, so as to vest the legal title as well as the possession according to the *lex rei sitæ*. Ante, §§ 743, 744.

(a) See *Hope v. Carnegie*, L. R. 1 Ch. 320 (foreign administration); *Baillie v. Baillie*, L. R. 5 Eq. 175 (the same); *Ex parte Tait*, L. R. 13 Eq. 311; *In re Chapman*, L. R. 15 Eq. 95; *Dehon v. Foster*, 4 Allen, 505; *Harris v. Pullman*, 84 Ill. 20; *Cole v. Young*, 24 Kans. 435; *Engel v. Scheuerman*, 40 Ga. 206; *Pearce v. Olney*, 20 Conn. 544; *Dobson v. Pearce*, 12 N. Y. 156; *Rogers v. Gwinn*, 21 Iowa, 58. For the converse case, staying domestic proceedings, to await the result of proceedings

abroad, see *Wilson v. Farrand*, L. R. 13 Eq. 362; *Liverpool Co. v. Hunter*, L. R. 3 Ch. 479.

(b) See *English v. Miller*, 2 Rich. Eq. 320; *United States v. Keokuk*, 6 Wall. 514; *Strozier v. Howes*, 30 Ga. 578; *Bryan v. Hixon*, 40 Ga. 405; *Hines v. Rawson*, *Ib.* 356; *Kendall v. Winsor*, 6 R. I. 453; *Akerly v. Vilas*, 15 Wis. 401; *Daly v. Sheriff*, 1 Woods, 175.

(c) But see *Craft v. Lathrop*, 2 Wall. C. C. 103.

recently applied by the State courts to suits and judgments in other American State courts where the latter are competent to administer the proper relief.¹ (a)

901. Another class of cases of an analogous nature to which the process of injunction is also most beneficially applied is to suppress undue and vexatious litigation.² (b) We have already seen the manner in which it is applied in cases of bills of peace.³ But Courts of Equity are not limited in their jurisdiction to cases of this sort. On the contrary they possess the power to restrain and enjoin parties in all other cases of vexatious litigation. Thus for instance where a party is guilty of continual and repeated breaches of his covenants; although it may be said that such breaches may be recompensed by repeated actions of covenant, yet a Court of Equity will interpose and enjoin the party from further violations of such covenants. For it has been well remarked that the power has in many instances been recognized at law as resting on the very circumstance, that without such interposition the party can do nothing but repeatedly resort to law; and when suits have proceeded to such an extent as to become vexatious, for that very reason the jurisdiction of a Court of Equity attaches.⁴

902. Upon the same ground Courts of Equity have interposed by way of injunction to prevent a party who has been discharged from a contract by the sentence of a foreign court from being

¹ *Mead v. Merritt*, 2 Paige, R. 402; *Bicknell v. Field*, 8 Paige, R. 440, 444.

² The prevention of multiplicity of suits is a distinct ground upon which Courts of Equity maintain jurisdiction in a variety of cases. Hence it is that where a Court of Equity has acquired a jurisdiction for a discovery it will in many cases proceed to make a final decree upon the merits in order to prevent multiplicity of suits. Ante, §§ 64, 546.

³ Ante, §§ 852 to 860; *Eldridge v. Hill*, 2 John. Ch. R. 282; *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. 153, 154.

⁴ *Waters v. Taylor*, 2 V. & Beam. 302; see also *Trustees of Huntingdon v. Nicoll*, 3 John. R. 566; *Ware v. Horwood*, 14 Ves. 33.

(a) *Grant v. Quick*, 5 Sandf. 612; *N. Y.* 156; *Bigelow*, Estoppel, 242-244 *Williams v. Ayrault*, 31 Barb. 364. (3d ed.).

But see *Pearce v. Olney*, 20 Conn. 544; *Engel v. Schuerman*, 40 Ga. 206; which are opposed to the statement of the text. See also *Rogers v. Gwinn*, 21 Iowa, 58; *Dobson v. Pearce*, 12 *N. Y.* 156; *Bigelow*, Estoppel, 242-244 (3d ed.). (b) What constitutes, see *McHenry v. Lewis*, 21 Ch. D. 202; *Ellsworth v. Hale*, 33 Ark. 633. And see *Castro v. Murray*, L. R. 10 Ex. 213; *Dawkins v. Saxe-Weimar*, 1 Q. B. D. 499.

again sued on the same contract in the Courts of Law of another State. Such a sentence if obtained upon the merits is, or certainly ought to be, conclusive between the parties, and as such there would seem to be a complete defence at law against such a new suit by the plea of *res judicata*. But Courts of Equity have deemed it right nevertheless to sustain the jurisdiction, because the nature and effect of a foreign judgment may not be without hazard and embarrassment in a suit at law, and there is great difference between domestic and foreign judgments in their forms as well as in their effects as records.¹

903. With a view to the same beneficial purpose and to suppress undue and mischievous litigation, Courts of Equity will in like manner prevent a party from setting up an unconscientious defence at law, or from interposing impediments to the just rights of the other party.² In such cases Courts of Equity act by injunction, and by that process prohibit the party from asserting such an unconscientious defence, or from setting up such an impediment to the obstruction of justice. In cases of this sort they act as ancillary to the administration of justice in other courts. Thus for instance if an ejectment is brought to try a right to land in a Court of Common Law, a Court of Equity will under proper circumstances restrain the party in possession from setting up any title which may prevent the fair trial of the right, as for example a term of years or other outstanding interest in a trustee, or lessee, or mortgagee. But this will not be done in every case; for as the court proceeds upon the principle that the party in possession ought not in conscience to use an accidental advantage to protect his possession against a real right in his adversary, if there is any counter equity in the circumstances of the case which meets the reasoning upon this principle, the court will not interfere. Thus it will not interfere against the possessor who is a *bona fide* purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice of the adverse claim at the time of his purchase.³

¹ *Burrows v. Jemino*, Sel. Cas. Ch. 69; s. c. 2 Strange, 733; *Moseley*, R. 1; ante, § 889.

² *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 16, pp. 349, 350. See *Martin v. Nicolls*, 3 Sim. R. 458; *Bowles v. Orr*, 1 Younge & Coll. 464.

³ *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 134, 135; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 16, pp. 349, 350; *Bond v. Hopkins*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 429; *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. 143; *Baker v. Mellish*, 10 Ves. 549.

904. Cases often arise in which a party may be entitled to proceed in a suit at law for damages when a complete equitable defence exists which is yet incapable of being asserted at law. In such cases the suit at law is treated as vexatious, and will be stayed by an injunction. (a) Thus for instance if a decree has been made against a vendor for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, notwithstanding the vendee has not strictly complied with the terms of the contract, and subsequently a suit is brought by the vendor against the vendee for the breach of the contract, a Court of Equity will restrain the suit as being unjustifiable and vexatious.¹ So (as has been already stated) if a creditor should give time to his debtor and should thereby release the surety in equity, and he should afterwards proceed at law against the surety, the suit would be stopped by injunction upon a similar ground.² Indeed there can scarcely be found an end to the enumeration of cases in which vexatious suits of this sort have been suppressed by injunctions when there was no redress at law, and yet when upon the principles of justice the party was entitled to complete protection against such litigation.

905. In the next place let us proceed to the consideration of the granting of injunctions to restrain the alienation of property in the largest sense of the words. The propriety of this sort of relief will at once be seen by considering a very few cases in which it is indispensable to secure the enjoyment of specific property, or to preserve the title to such property, or to prevent frauds or gross and irremediable injustice in respect to such property.

906. We have already had occasion to speak of the interposition of Courts of Equity in directing the delivery of title-deeds and other instruments to the parties properly entitled to them,³ and also in directing the delivery of chattels of a peculiar value, and not capable of compensation to the lawful owners.⁴ This remedial justice is administered by means of the process of injunction.

¹ Reynolds v. Nelson, 6 Madd. R. 290.

² Bank of Ireland v. Beresford, 6 Dow, R. 233; ante, §§ 324, 325, 326; Bowmaker v. Moore, 3 Price, R. 219. See Clarke v. Henty, 3 Younge & Coll. 187.

³ Ante, §§ 703, 704, 705.

⁴ Ante, § 709; Fells v. Read, 3 Ves. jr. 70; Nutbrown v. Thornton, 10 Ves. 160, 163; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. R. 845; Eden on Injunct. ch. 14, p. 313.

(a) Secus, it seems, where equitable pleas are allowed at law. See Rogers v. Gwinn, 21 Iowa, 58.

In regard to negotiable securities, as by their being transferred to a bona fide holder without notice the latter may be entitled to recover upon them, notwithstanding any fraud in their original concoction or the loss of them by the real owner, it is often indispensable to the security of the party against whose rights they may be thus made available, to obtain an injunction prohibiting any such transfer.¹

907. The same principle is applied to restrain the transfer of stocks. (a) Thus for instance where there is a controversy respecting the title to stock under different wills, an injunction will be granted to restrain any transfer *pendente lite*.² So an injunction will be granted where the title to stock is controverted between principal and agent,³ or where a trustee or agent attempts to transfer it for his own benefit and to the injury of the party beneficially entitled to it.⁴ So an injunction will be granted to restrain the payment of money where it is injurious to the party to whom it belongs, or where it is in violation of the trust to which it should be devoted.⁵ So it will be granted to restrain the transfer of diamonds or other valuables where the rightful owner may be in danger of losing them.⁶

908. In like manner an injunction will be granted to restrain a party from making vexatious alienations of real property *pendente lite*.⁷ So also to restrain a vendor from conveying the legal

¹ Ante, § 703; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 127; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 8, note (y); *Smith v. Haytwell*, Amb. R. 66; *Lloyd v. Gurdon*, 2 Swanst. R. 180; *King v. Hamlet*, 4 Sim. R. 223; *Patrick v. Harrison*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 476; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 14, p. 292; *Osborn v. Bank of U. States*, 9 Wheat. R. 845; *Hood v. Aston*, 1 Russell, R. 412. See *Hodgson v. Murray*, 2 Simons, R. 515.

² *King v. King*, 6 Ves. 172.

³ *Chedworth v. Edwards*, 8 Ves. 46. But see 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 128, note (e); *Osborn v. Bank of U. States*, 9 Wheat. R. 845.

⁴ *Oshorn v. Bank of U. States*, 9 Wheat. R. 844, 845; *Stead v. Clay*, 1 Sim. R. 294; *Rogers v. Rogers*, 1 Anst. 174.

⁵ See *Reeve v. Parkins*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 390; *Whittingham v. Burgoyne*, 3 Anst. 900; *Green v. Lowes*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 217.

⁶ *Ximènes v. Franco*, 1 Dick. 149; *Tonnins v. Prout*, 1 Dick. 387; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 14, p. 313.

⁷ *Daly v. Kelly*, 4 Dow, R. 440; ante, § 406; post, § 953.

(a) *Snow v. Weber*, 39 Mich. 143. though bought in good faith on the market. *Athenæum Assur. Co. v. Pooley*, 3 DeG. & J. 294.

title to real estate pending a suit for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of that estate.¹ For in every such case the plaintiff may be put to the expense of making the vendor a party to the proceedings, and at all events his title, if he prevails in the suit, may be embarrassed by such new outstanding title under the transfer.² Although the maxim is ‘pendente lite nil innovetur,’ that maxim is not to be understood as warranting the conclusion that the conveyance so made is absolutely null and void at all times and for all purposes. The true interpretation of the maxim is that the conveyance does not vary the rights of the parties in that suit, and they are not bound to take notice of the title acquired under it, but with regard to them the title is to be taken as if it had never existed. Otherwise suits would be indeterminate if one party pending the suit could by conveying to others create a necessity for introducing new parties.³

909. In the next place let us proceed to the consideration of injunctions in cases of waste.⁴ The state of the common law with regard to waste was very learnedly expounded by Lord Chief Justice Eyre in a celebrated case,⁵ and it can be best stated in his own words. ‘At common law,’ said he, ‘the proceeding in waste was by writ of prohibition from the Court of Chancery, which was considered as the foundation of a suit between the party suffering by the waste and the party committing it. If that writ was obeyed, the ends of justice were answered. But

¹ *Echloff v. Baldwin*, 16 Ves. 267; *Daly v. Kelly*, 4 Dow, R. 435; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 46, 135, 136, 137.

² *Ibid.*; see *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 135; *Story on Eq. Plead.* §§ 156, 351.

³ *Ante*, §§ 405, 406; *Metcalf v. Pulvertoft*, 2 Ves. & B. 205; *Bishop of Winchester v. Paine*, 11 Ves. 197; *Gaskeld v. Durdin*, 2 Ball & B. 169; *Bishop of Winchester v. Beaver*, 3 Ves. 314; *Moore v. Macnamara*, 2 Ball & B. 186. In some of the authorities the doctrine seems to be countenanced that a purchaser pendente lite should be made a party. See *Echloff v. Baldwin*, 16 Ves. 267; *Daly v. Kelly*, 4 Dow, R. 435. But the true doctrine seems to be that asserted in the text. If however the purchaser pendente lite be a purchaser of the legal estate and not of a mere equitable estate, it may, after the determination of the pending suit, be necessary, in order to compel a surrender of his title or to declare it void, to institute a new suit against him. *Bishop of Winchester v. Paine*, 11 Ves. 197; *Murray v. Ballou*, 1 John. Ch. R. 576 to 581; *Murray v. Lyburn*, 2 John. Ch. R. 444, 445; *Metcalf v. Pulvertoft*, 2 Ves. & B. 204, 205; *Eades v. Harris*, 1 Younge & Coll. New R. 231; *Story on Equity Plead.* §§ 156, 351.

⁴ See *Com. Dig. Chancery*, D. 11, 4 X.

⁵ *Jefferson v. Bishop of Durham*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 120.

if that was not obeyed, and an alias and pluries produced no effect, then came the original writ of attachment out of chancery, returnable in a Court of Common Law, which was considered as the original writ of the court. The form of that writ shows the nature of it. It was the same original writ of attachment which was and is the foundation of all proceedings in prohibition, and of many other proceedings in this court at this day, &c. That writ being returnable in a Court of Common Law, and most usually in the Court of Common Pleas, on the defendant appearing the plaintiff counted against him, he pleaded, the question was tried, and if the defendant was found guilty, the plaintiff recovered single damages for the waste committed. Thus the matter stood at common law. It has been said (and truly so, I think, so far as can be collected from the text-writers) that at the common law this proceeding lay only against tenant in dower, tenant by the curtesy, and guardian in chivalry. It was extended by different statutes (Stat. of Marlbridge, ch. 24; Stat. of Gloucester, ch. 5) to farmers, tenants for life, and tenants for years, and, I believe, to guardians in socage.¹ That which these statutes gave by way of remedy was not so properly the introduction of a new law, as the extension of an old one to a new description of persons. The course of proceeding remained the same as before these statutes were made. The first act which introduced anything substantially new was that (Stat. of Gloucester, ch. 13) which gave a writ of waste or estrepement pending the suit. It follows of course that this was a judicial writ, and was to issue out of the Courts of Common Law. But except for the purpose of staying proceedings pending a suit, there is no intimation in any of our text-writers that any prohibition could issue from those courts. By the Statute of Westminster 2d the writ of prohibition is taken away, and the writ of summons is substituted in its place; and although it is said by Lord Coke, when treating of prohibition at the common law, that it "may be used at this day," those words, if true at all, can only apply to that very ineffectual writ directed to the sheriff, empowering him to

¹ Mr. Reeves (Hist. of the Law, Vol. 1, p. 186, Vol. 2, pp. 73, 74, 148, note) seems to suppose that these statutes were but an affirmation of the common law. In this opinion he is opposed by Lord Coke and other great authorities; and Mr. Eden (on Injunct. ch. 8, p. 145, note) very properly considers the weight of authority decidedly against Mr. Reeves.

take the *posse comitatus* to prevent the commission of waste intended to be done. The writ directed to the party was certainly taken away by the statute. At least as far as my researches go, no such writ has issued, even from chancery, in the common cases of waste by tenants in dower, tenants by the curtesy, and guardians in chivalry, tenants for life, &c., since it was taken away by the Statute of Westminster 2d. Thus the common law remedy stood, with the alteration above mentioned, and with the judicial writ of *estrepement introduced pendente lite*.¹

910. To this luminous exposition of the state of the common law it may be added that there was by the common law another remedy of a preventive nature in the writ of *estrepement*. This lay after a judgment obtained in a real action, before possession was delivered by the sheriff, to prevent the tenant from committing waste in the lands recovered.² And the Stat-

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 121, 122. Mr. Justice Blackstone has given a very full view of the action of waste at the common law and as awarded by statute. He says: 'A writ of waste is also an action partly founded upon the common law and partly upon the Statute of Gloucester (6 Edw. I. ch. 5), and may be brought by him who hath the immediate estate of inheritance in reversion or remainder against the tenant for life, tenant in dower, tenant by the curtesy, or tenant for years. This action is also maintainable in pursuance of Statute (13 Edw. I. c. 22) Westm. 2, by one tenant in common of the inheritance against another, who makes waste in the estate holden in common. The equity of which statute extends to joint tenants but not to coparceners; because by the old law coparceners might make partition whenever either of them thought proper, and thereby prevent future waste. But tenants in common and joint tenants could not; and therefore the statute gave them this remedy, compelling the defendant either to make partition and take the place wasted to his own share, or to give security not to commit any further waste (2 Inst. 403, 404). But these tenants in common and joint tenants are not liable to the penalties of the Statute of Gloucester, which extends only to such as have life-estates and do waste to the prejudice of the inheritance. The waste however must be something considerable; for if it amount only to twelve pence, or some such petty sum, the plaintiff shall not recover in an action of waste: "Nam de minimis non curat lex." See 3 Black. Comm. 227, 228; Finch, L. 29.

² Eden on Injunct. ch. 9, p. 159; Com. Dig. Waste, A. B.; Fitz. Nat. Brev. 60; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 147, 148; 3 Black. Comm. 225 to 227. Mr. Justice Blackstone, in his Commentaries (3 Black. Comm. 225, 226), has given a much fuller account of the writ of *estrepement* than that given in the text. It is too long for insertion in this place, but the following extract corroborates the statement in the text 'Estrepement is an old French word signifying the same as waste or extirpation; and the writ of *estrepement* lay at the common law, after judgment obtained in any action real (2 Inst. 328), and before possession was delivered by the sheriff to stop any waste which the vanquished

ute of Gloucester, which gave the writ of estrepement pendente lite, also directed (ch. 5) that the tenant should forfeit the place wasted, and also treble damages.¹

911. The remedy by writ of estrepement was applicable only to cases of real actions; and when the proceeding by ejectment became the usual mode of trying a title to land, as the writ of estrepement did not apply, Courts of Equity, acting upon the principle of preserving the property pendente lite, supplied the defect and interposed by way of injunction.² (a)

912. But Courts of Equity have by no means limited themselves to an interference in cases of this sort. They have indeed often interfered in restraining waste by persons having limited interests in property, on the mere ground of the common-law rights of the parties, and the difficulty of obtaining the immediate preservation of the property from destruction or irreparable injury by the process of the common law. But they have also extended this salutary relief to cases where the remedies provided in the Courts of Common Law cannot be made to apply; and where the titles of the parties are purely of an equitable nature;³ and where the waste is what is commonly, although with no great propriety of language, called equitable waste,⁴ meaning

party might be tempted to commit in lands which were determined to be no longer his. But as in some cases the demandant may be justly apprehensive that the tenant may make waste or estrepement pending the suit, well knowing the weakness of his title, therefore the Statute of Gloucester (6 Edw. I. ch. 13) gave another writ of estrepement pendente placito, commanding the sheriff firmly to inhibit the tenant, "Ne faciat vastum vel estrepamentum pendente placito dicto indiscusso" (Regist. 77). And by virtue of either of these writs the sheriff may resist them that do, or offer to do, waste; and if otherwise he cannot prevent them, he may lawfully imprison the wasters or make a warrant to others to imprison them; or if necessity require, he may take the posse comitatus to his assistance. So odious in the sight of the law is waste and destruction.' 2 Inst. 399.

¹ Com. Dig. Waste, C. 1; Id. Chancery, D. 11; 2 Inst. 299; 3 Black. Comm. 227 to 229.

² Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 136; *Pultney v. Shelton*, 5 Ves. 261, note; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 146, 147; 3 Black. Comm. 227.

³ Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 114, 115, and cases cited in note (u); 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, pp. 399 to 406; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 114 to 121; Jeremy, Eq. Jurisp. B. 3, ch. 2, §§ 1, 327 to 344.

⁴ *Marquis of Downshire v. Lady Sandys*, 6 Ves. 109, 110, 115; *Chamberlain v. Dummer*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 166; post, § 915.

(a) *Peak v. Hayden*, 3 Bush, 125; *Markham v. Howell*, 33 Ga. 508.

acts which are deemed waste only in Courts of Equity; and where (as we have already seen) no waste has been actually committed, but is only meditated or feared to be done, by a bill *quia timet*.¹

913. In order to show the beneficial nature of the remedial interference of Courts of Equity in cases of waste, it may not be without use to suggest a few cases where it is indispensable for the purposes of justice, and there is either no remedy at all at law, or none which is adequate. In the first place there are many cases where a person is punishable at law for committing waste, and yet a Court of Equity will enjoin him. As where there is a tenant for life, remainder for life, remainder in fee, the tenant for life will be restrained by injunction from committing waste, (*a*) although if he did commit waste no action of waste would lie against him by the remainder-man for life, for he has not the inheritance; or by the remainder-man in fee, by reason of the interposed remainder for life.² So a ground landlord may have an injunction to stay waste against an under-lessee.³ So an injunction may be obtained against a tenant from year to year, after a notice to quit, to restrain him from removing the crops, manure, &c., according to the usual course of husbandry.⁴ So it may be obtained against a lessee, to prevent him from making material alterations in a dwelling-house, as by changing it into a shop or warehouse.⁵

914. In the next place Courts of Equity will grant an injunction in cases where the aggrieved party has equitable rights only; and indeed it has been said that these courts will grant it more strongly where there is a trust estate.⁶ Thus for instance in

¹ Ante, §§ 825 to 846.

² Com. Dig. Waste, C. 3; *Abraham v. Bubb*, 2 Freem. Ch. R. 53; *Garth v. Cotton*, 1 Dick. 183, 205, 208; s. c. 1 Ves. 555; *Perrot v. Perrot*, 3 Atk. 94; *Robinson v. Litton*, 3 Atk. 210; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 9, pp. 162, 163; *Davis v. Leo*, 6 Ves. 787.

³ *Farrant v. Lovell*, 3 Atk. 723; s. c. *Ambler*, R. 105; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, pp. 400, 404.

⁴ *Onslow v. —*, 16 Ves. 173; *Pratt v. Brent*, 2 Madd. R. 62.

⁵ *Douglass v. Wiggins*, 1 John. Ch. R. 335.

⁶ *Robinson v. Litton*, 3 Atk. 200; *Garth v. Cotton*, 1 Dick. 183; s. c. 1 Ves. 555; *Stansfield v. Habbergham*, 10 Ves. 277, 278.

(*a*) Not for permissive waste of course. *Powys v. Blagrove*, 4 DeG. M. & G. 448.

cases of mortgages, if the mortgagor or mortgagee in possession commits waste, or threatens to commit it, an injunction will be granted although there is no remedy at law.¹ So where there is a contingent estate, or an executory devise over dependent upon a legal estate, Courts of Equity will not permit waste to be done to the injury of such estate; more especially not if it is an executory devise of a trust estate.²

915. In the next place in regard to equitable waste, which may be defined to be such acts as at law would not be esteemed to be waste under the circumstances of the case, but which in the view of a Court of Equity are so esteemed from their manifest injury to the inheritance, although they are not inconsistent with the legal rights of the party committing them. As if the mortgagor in possession should fell timber on the estate and thereby the security would become insufficient (but not otherwise), a Court of Equity will restrain the mortgagor by injunction.³ So if there be a tenant for life without impeachment for waste, and he should pull down houses or do other waste wantonly or maliciously, a Court of Equity would restrain him; for it is said a Court of Equity ought to moderate the exercise of such a power, and pro bono publico restrain extravagant humorous waste.⁴ Upon this ground tenants for life (*a*) without impeachment for waste, and tenants in tail, after possibility of issue extinct, have been restrained not only from acts of waste to the destruction of the estate, but also from cutting down trees planted for the ornament or shelter of the premises.⁵ (*b*) In all such

¹ *Ibid.*; *Farrant v. Lovell*, 3 Atk. 723; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 9, pp. 165, 166; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 405; *Brady v. Waldron*, 2 John. Ch. R. 148; *Humphreys v. Harrison*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 581.

² *Stansfield v. Habbergham*, 10 Ves. 278; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 9, pp. 170, 171; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, pp. 399, 400; *Jeremy, Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 339.

³ *King v. Smith*, 2 Hare, R. 239.

⁴ *Abraham v. Bubb*, 2 Freem. Ch. R. 53; *Lord Barnard's case*, Prec. Ch. 454; s. c. 2 Vern. 738; *Aston v. Aston*, 1 Ves. 265.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 9, pp. 177 to 186; *Burgess v. Lamb*, 16 Ves. 185, 186; *Marquis of Downshire v. Sandys*, 6 Ves. 107; *Lord Tamworth v. Lord Ferrers*, 6 Ves. 419; *Day v. Merry*, 16 Ves. 375; *Attorney-Gen. v. Duke of*

(*a*) And their assignees. *Clement v. Wheeler*, 25 N. H. 361. 10 Eq. 465; *Briggs v. Oxford*, 8 Eng. L. & E. 194; s. c. 16 Jur. 53; *Keke-*

(*b*) See *Sowerby v. Fryer*, L. R. 8 Eq. 417; *Birch-Wolf v. Birch*, L. R. 9 Eq. 683; *Bubb v. Yelverton*, L. R. *Wich v. Marker*, 3 Macn. & G. 311; *Bailey v. Hobson*, L. R. 5 Ch. 180.

cases the party is deemed guilty of a wanton and unconscientious abuse of his rights, ruinous to the interests of other parties.

916. Upon similar grounds, although Courts of Equity will not interfere by injunction to prevent waste in cases of tenants in common, or coparceners, or joint tenants, because they have a right to enjoy the estate as they please, yet they will interfere in special cases, as where the party committing the waste is insolvent, or where the waste is destructive of the estate and not within the usual legitimate exercise of the right of enjoyment of the estate.¹

917. From this very brief view of some of the more important cases of equitable interference in cases of waste, the inadequacy of the remedy at common law, as well to prevent waste as to give redress for waste already committed, is so unquestionable that there is no wonder that the resort to the Courts of Law has in a great measure fallen into disuse. The action of waste is of rare occurrence in modern times,² an action on the case for waste being generally substituted in its place whenever any remedy is sought at law. The remedy by a bill in equity is so much more easy, expeditious, and complete, that it is almost invariably resorted to.³ By such a bill not only may future waste be prevented, but, as we have already seen, an account may be decreed and compensation given for past waste.⁴ Besides, an action on the case will not lie at law for permissive waste;⁵ but in equity an injunction will be granted to restrain permissive waste as well as voluntary waste.⁶

Marlborough, 3 Madd. R. 539, 540; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (p); 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, pp. 402, 403; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 333 to 336; Wellesley v. Wellesley, 6 Sim. R. 497.

¹ Eden on Injunct. ch. 9, pp. 171, 172; Twort v. Twort, 16 Ves. 128, 131; Hale v. Thomas, 7 Ves. 589, 590; Hawley v. Clowes, 2 John. Ch. R. 122. The Statute of Westminster 2d, ch. 22, provided a remedy for tenants in common and joint tenants in many cases of waste, by providing that, upon an action of waste, the offending party should make an election to take the part wasted in his purparty, or to find surety to take no more than belonged to his share. But this statute only applied to cases of freehold.

² Harrow School v. Alderton, 2 Bos. & Pull. 86; Redfern v. Smith, 1 Bing. R. 382; 2 Bing. R. 262.

³ Eden on Injunct. ch. 9, p. 159.

⁴ Ante, §§ 515 to 518; Eden on Injunct. ch. 9, pp. 159, 160; Id. ch. 40, pp. 206 to 219.

⁵ Gibson v. Wells, 4 Bos. & Pull. 290; Herne v. Bembow, 4 Taunt. R. 764.

⁶ Eden on Injunct. ch. 9, pp. 159, 160; Caldwell v. Baylis, 2 Meriv. R. 408; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (p).

918. The interference of Courts of Equity in restraint of waste was originally confined to cases founded in privity of title; and for the plaintiff to state a case in which the defendant pretended that the plaintiff was not entitled to the estate, or in which the defendant was asserted to claim under an adverse right, was said to be for the plaintiff to state himself out of court. But at present the courts have, by insensible degrees, enlarged the jurisdiction to reach cases of adverse claims and rights not founded in privity; (a) as for instance to cases of trespass attended with irreparable mischief, which we shall have occasion hereafter to consider.¹

919. The jurisdiction then of Courts of Equity to interpose by way of injunction in cases of waste may be referred to the broadest principles of social justice. It is exerted where the remedy at law is imperfect or is wholly denied; where the nature of the injury is such that a preventive remedy is indispensable, and it should be permanent; where matters of discovery and account are incidental to the proper relief;² and where equitable rights and equitable injuries call for redress to prevent a malicious, wanton, and capricious abuse of their legal rights and authorities by persons having but temporary and limited interests in the subject-matter. On the other hand Courts of Equity will often interfere in cases where the tenant in possession is impeachable for waste, and direct timber to be felled which is fit to be cut, and in danger of running into decay, and thus will secure the proceeds for the benefit of those who are entitled to it.³

920. In the next place let us proceed to the consideration of the granting of injunctions in cases of nuisances. Nuisances may

¹ See the cases fully collected by Mr. Eden, *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 9, pp. 191 to 196, ch. 10, pp. 206 to 214; *Livingston v. Livingston*, 6 John. Ch. R. 497; *Smith v. Collyer*, 8 Ves. 90.

² *Watson v. Hunter*, 5 John. Ch. R. 170; *Jérémy on Equity Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 327, 328; *Winship v. Pitts*, 3 Paige, R. 259.

³ See *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 10, pp. 218 to 221; *Burges v. Lamb*, 16 Ves. 182; *Mildmay v. Mildmay*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 76; *Delapole v. Delapole*, 17 Ves. 150; *Osborne v. Osborne*, 19 Ves. 423; *Wickham v. Wickham*, 19 Ves. 419, 423; *Cooper, R.* 288.

(a) The rule appears now to be well settled in England, that the want of privity is no objection; it is enough that the waste is malicious, destructive, and irreparable at law. See *Haigh v. Jagger*, 2 Coll. 231; *Talbot v. Scott*, 4 Kay & J. 96; *Neale v. Cripps*, *Ib.* 472. But see *Bogey v. Shute*, 4 Jones, Eq. 174.

be of two sorts: (1) such as are injurious to the public at large or to public rights; (2) such as are injurious to the rights and interests of private persons.

921. In regard to public nuisances the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity seems to be of a very ancient date, and has been distinctly traced back to the reign of Queen Elizabeth.¹ The jurisdiction is applicable not only to public nuisances, strictly so called, but also to purprestures upon public rights and property. Purpresture, according to Lord Coke, signifies a close or enclosure, that is, when one encroaches or makes that several to himself which ought to be common to many.² The term was, in the old law writers, applied to cases of encroachment not only upon the king but upon subjects. But in its common acceptance it is now understood to mean an encroachment upon the king, either upon part of his demesne lands, or upon rights and easements held by the Crown of the public, such as upon highways, (a) public rivers, forts, streets, squares, bridges, quays, and other public accommodations.³

922. In cases of purpresture the remedy for the Crown is either by an information of intrusion at the common law, or by an information at the suit of the attorney-general in equity. In the case of a judgment upon an information of intrusion the erection complained of, whether it be a nuisance or not, is abated. But upon a decree in equity, if it appear to be a mere purpresture, without being at the same time a nuisance, the court may direct an inquiry to be made whether it is most beneficial to the Crown to abate the purpresture, or to suffer the erections to remain and be arrented.⁴ But if the purpresture be also a public nuisance,

¹ Eden on Injunct. ch. 11, pp. 224, 225.

² 2 Inst. 38, 272.

³ Ibid.; Hale in Harg. Law Tracts, ch. 8, pp. 74, 78; Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige, R. 510, 514, 515; Commonwealth v. Wright, 3 Amer. Jur. 185; City of New Orleans v. U. States, 10 Peters, R. 662; Attorney-Gen. v. Forbes, 2 Mylne & Craig, 123; Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 Mylne & Keen, 169, 179, 180, 181; Mohawk Bridge Company v. Utica & Schenectady Railroad Company, 6 Paige, R. 554; Attorney-Gen. v. Cohoes Company, 6 Paige, R. 133.

⁴ Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 145; Eden on Injunct. ch. 11, pp. 223, 224; Hale in Harg. 81; Attorney-Gen. v. Richards, 2 Anstr. R. 603, 606; Attorney-Gen. v. Johnson, 2 Wilson, Ch. R. 101 to 103.

(a) Metropolitan R. Co. v. Chicago, 96 Ill. 620.

this cannot be done; for the Crown cannot sanction a public nuisance.¹

923. In cases of public nuisances properly so called an indictment lies to abate them and to punish the offenders. But an information also lies in equity to redress the grievance by way of injunction. (a) The instances of the interposition of the court however are (it is said) rare, and principally confined to informations seeking preventive relief. Thus informations in equity have been maintained against a public nuisance by stopping a highway. (b) Analogous to that, there have been many cases in the Court of Exchequer of nuisance to harbors, which are a species of highway. If the soil belongs to the Crown, there is the species of remedy for the purpresture above mentioned for that. If the soil does not belong to the Crown, but it is merely a common nuisance to all the public, an information in equity lies. But the question of nuisance or not must, in cases of doubt, be tried by a jury; and the injunction will be granted or not, as that fact is decided.² (c) And the court in the exercise of its

¹ Ibid.

² Attorney-Gen. v. Cleaver, 18 Ves. 217, 218; Crowder v. Tinkler, 19 Ves. 620, 622; Barnes v. Baker, Ambl. R. 158; Eden on Injunct. ch. 11, pp. 223, 224, 230, 235 to 237; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 145; Attorney-Gen. v. Forbes, 2 Mylne & Craig, R. 143; Mohawk Bridge Company v. Utica & Schenectady Railroad Co., 6 Paige, R. 554; Attorney-Gen. v. Cohoes Company, 6 Paige, R. 133.

(a) Attorney-Gen. v. Shrewsbury Bridge Co., 21 Ch. D. 752; Attorney-Gen. v. Tudor Ice Co., 104 Mass. 239; Attorney-Gen. v. Metropolitan R. Co., 125 Mass. 515. The court will not interfere in this way when the nuisance is of a nature to be removed with equal facility by other constituted authorities. Attorney-Gen. v. Metropolitan R. Co., supra; Attorney-Gen. v. Bay State Brick Co., 115 Mass. 431, 438. Further see Attorney-Gen. v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., 11 Ch. D. 449; Attorney-Gen. v. Cockermouth Board, L. R. 18 Eq. 172; Attorney-Gen. v. Ely R. Co., L. R. 4 Ch. 194. Acquittal on an indictment is no bar to proceedings to enjoin and abate a nuisance in equity. Minke v. Hopeman, 87 Ill. 450.

(b) Craig v. People, 47 Ill. 487; Attorney-Gen. v. Shrewsbury Bridge Co., 21 Ch. D. 752. See Dunning v. Aurora, 40 Ill. 481.

(c) If the legal right is doubtful, the practice appears to be to leave that question to trial at law. Afterwards an injunction may be granted. Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co., 7 De G. M. & G. 436; Attorney-Gen. v. United Kingdom Tel. Co., 5 Law T. n. s. 338; Cardiff v. Cardiff Waterworks Co., 4 De G. & J. 596; Carlisle v. Cooper, 6 C. E. Green, 576; Burnham v. Kempston, 44 N. H. 78; Bradfield v. Dewell, 48 Mich. 9. But equity will retain the bill meantime. Attorney-Gen. v. United Kingdom Tel. Co., supra. And where the plaintiff has long been in the exercise of the right, or where de-

jurisdiction, will direct the matter to be tried upon an indictment, and reserve its decree accordingly.¹

924. The ground of this jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in cases of purpresture as well as of public nuisances undoubtedly is their ability to give a more complete and perfect remedy than is attainable at law, in order to prevent irreparable mischief, and also to suppress oppressive and vexatious litigations.² In the first place they can interpose where the Courts of Law cannot, to restrain and prevent such nuisances as are threatened or are in progress, as well as to abate those already existing.³ In the next place by a perpetual injunction the remedy is made complete through all future time; whereas an information or indictment at the common law can only dispose of the present nuisance, and for future acts new prosecutions must be brought. In the next place the remedial justice in equity may be prompt and immediate before irreparable mischief is done; whereas at law nothing can be done except after a trial, and upon the award of judgment. In the next place a Court of Equity will not only interfere upon the information of the attorney-general, but also upon the application of private parties directly affected by the nuisance; (a) whereas at law in many cases the remedy is, or

¹ Ibid. But see *Earl of Ripon v. Hobart*, 1 Cooper, Sel. Cas. 333; s. c. 3 Mylne & Keen, 164, 179, 180.

² Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 144, 145; *Attorney-Gen. v. Johnson*, 2 Wilson, Ch. R. 101, 102.

³ *Attorney-Gen. v. Johnson*, 2 Wilson, Ch. R. 101, 102.

lay would be disastrous, he will not be required to establish his right at law. *Burnham v. Kempton*, supra; *Falls Village Waterpower Co. v. Tibbetts*, 31 Conn. 165. See *Coe v. Lake Co.*, 37 N. H. 254.

(a) See *Soltau v. De Held*, 9 Eng. L. & E. 104; s. c. 2 Sim. n. s. 133; *Knox v. New York*, 55 Barb. 404; *Savannah R. Co. v. Shiels*, 33 Ga. 601; *Ewell v. Greenwood*, 26 Iowa, 377; *New York v. Baumberger*, 7 Robt. 219; *Hudson River R. Co. v. Loeb*, Ib. 418. If the defendant claims a right under an act of the Legislature, he cannot be restrained on the ground of anticipated damage. *Woodman v. Kilbourn Manuf. Co.*, 1 Abb. U. S.

158. See as to statutory rights *Truman v. London Ry. Co.*, 29 Ch. D. 89; *Sellors v. Matlock Board*, 14 Q. B. D. 928; *United States v. Ruggles*, 5 Blatchf. 35; *Milhau v. Sharp*, 28 Barb. 228; s. c. 27 N. Y. 611; *Fisher v. Thirkell*, 21 Mich. 1, and cases there considered. And compare *Radcliff v. Brooklyn*, 4 Comst. 195; *Bigelow's L. C. Torts*, 549, 633

As to the nature of the damage see *Sparhawk v. Union Ry. Co.* 54 Penn. St. 401 (injunction against running cars on Sunday refused); *First Baptist Church v. Utica R. Co.*, 5 Barb. 79; *Black v. Philadelphia R. Co.*, 58 Penn. St. 249; *Higbee v. Camden R. Co.*, 4 C. E. Green, 276; *Hartshorn v. South*

may be, solely through the instrumentality of the attorney-general.¹

924 *a*. But in all cases of this sort Courts of Equity will grant an injunction to restrain a public nuisance only in cases where the fact is clearly made out upon determinate and satisfactory

¹ Eden on Injunct. ch. 11, p. 230; Crowder *v.* Tinkler, 19 Ves. 617, 623; Attorney-Gen. *v.* Johnson, 2 Wils. Ch. R. 87, 102, 103; Corning *v.* Lowerre, 6 John. Ch. R. 439; Attorney-Gen. *v.* Forbes, 2 Mylne & Craig, 129, 130. On this occasion Lord Cottenham said: 'With respect to the question of jurisdiction, it was broadly asserted that an application to this court to prevent a nuisance to a public road was never heard of. A little research however would have found many such instances. Many cases might have been produced in which the court has interfered to prevent nuisances to public rivers and to public harbors. And the Court of Exchequer, as well as this court, acting as a Court of Equity, has a well-established jurisdiction, upon a proceeding by way of information, to prevent nuisances to public harbors and public roads, and in short generally to prevent public nuisances. In *Box v. Allen* this court interfered to stay the proceedings of parties whose jurisdiction is quite as high as that of the Court of Quarter Sessions over bridges, namely, the Commissioners of Sewers. Those commissioners possess a jurisdiction founded on acts of Parliament, and they have a right, within the due limits of their authority, to do all necessary acts in the execution of their functions. Nevertheless if they so execute what they conceive to be their duty as to create or occasion a public nuisance, this court has an undoubted right to interpose. The same question occurred in *Kerrison v. Sparrow*, before Lord Eldon, in which his lordship, under the circumstances of the case, considered that he ought not to interfere; but the jurisdiction of the court was not there denied or disputed. In *Attorney-Gen. v. Johnson* the objection to the jurisdiction was attempted to be raised. The defendants in that case, the corporation of the city of London, were authorized by act of Parliament to do what was necessary to be done in the exercise of their duty as conservators of the river Thames. But in that particular instance they had assumed to themselves a right to carry on or sanction operations which created a nuisance to the king's subjects; and the court accordingly interfered to prevent them from so exercising their undoubted legal powers. To say that this court, when it interferes in such a case, is acting as a court of appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions, is anything but a correct representation of the fact. The jurisdiction is exercised not for the purpose of overruling the power of others, by way of appeal from their authority, but for the purpose of exerting a salutary control over all for the protection of the public.' See also *Spencer v. London & Birmingham Railway Company*, 8 Sim. R. 193; *Sampson v. Smith*, 8 Sim. R. 272.

Reading, 3 Allen, 501; *Manhattan Co. v. Barker*, 7 Robt. 523; *Osborne v. Brooklyn R. Co.*, 5 Blatchf. 366; *Sheboygan v. Sheboygan R. Co.*, 21 Wis. 667; *Bigelow's L. C. Torts*, 470, 471. If the injury is merely anticipated, and it is possible so to carry on the business as not to create a nuisance, it seems that an injunction will be refused even on the application of the attorney-general. *Attorney-Gen. v. Stewart*, 5 C. E. Green, 415.

evidence. For if the evidence be conflicting, and the injury to the public doubtful, that alone will constitute a ground for withholding this extraordinary interposition.¹ (a) And indeed the

¹ *Earl of Ripon v. Hobart*, 1 Cooper, Sel. Cas. 333; s. c. 3 Mylne & Keen, 169. In this last case Lord Brongham said: 'In considering more generally the question which is raised by the present motion, I certainly think we shall not go beyond what both principle and authority justify, if we lay down the rule respecting the relief by injunction as applied to such cases as this. If the thing sought to be prohibited is in itself a nuisance, the court will interfere to stay irreparable mischief without waiting for the result of a trial, and will, according to the circumstances, direct an issue or allow an action, and if need be expedite the proceedings, the injunction being in the mean time continued. But where the thing sought to be restrained is not unavoidably and in itself noxious, but only something which may according to circumstances prove so, then the court will refuse to interfere until the matter has been tried at law, generally by an action, though in particular cases an issue may be directed for the satisfaction of the court where an action could not be framed so as to meet the question. The distinction between the two kinds of erection or operation is obvious, and the soundness of that discretion seems undeniable, which would be very slow to interfere, where the thing to be stopped, while it is highly beneficial to one party, may very possibly be prejudicial to none. The great fitness of pausing much before we interrupt men in those modes of enjoying or improving their property which are *prima facie* harmless or even praiseworthy is equally manifest. And it is always to be borne in mind that the jurisdiction of this court over nuisance by injunction at all is of recent growth, has not till very lately been much exercised, and has at various times found great reluctance on the part of the learned judges to use it even in cases where the thing or the act complained of was admitted to be directly and immediately hurtful to the complainant. All that has been said in the cases where this unwillingness has appeared may be referred to in support of the proposition which I have stated; as in the *Attorney-Gen. v. Nichol*, 16 Ves. 338; *Attorney-Gen. v. Cleaver*, 18 Ves. 211; and an Anonymous case before Lord Thurlow, in 1 Ves. jr. 140, and others. It is also very material to observe, what is indeed strong authority of a negative kind, that no instance can be produced of the interposition by injunction in the case of what we have been regarding as eventual or contingent nuisance. But some authorities approach very near the ground upon which I have relied. Lord Hardwicke, in *Attorney-Gen. v. Doughty*, 2 Ves. sen. 453, speaks of plain nuisances and a plain case of nuisance as contradistinguished from others, and entitling the court to grant an injunction before answer. Lord Eldon appeared at one time (*Attorney-Gen. v. Cleaver*) to think that there was no instance of an injunction to restrain nuisance without trial. But though this cannot now be maintained, it is clear that in other cases where there appeared a doubt, as

(a) See *Upjohn v. Richland*, 46 Mich. 542, which was an attempt to enjoin the establishment of a burial-ground near the plaintiff's premises. The court declared that equity had jurisdiction to restrain a municipality from action of the kind, but only upon a clear showing that it would work a nuisance.

same doctrine is equally applicable to cases of private nuisance.¹ But when private individuals suffer an injury quite distinct from that of the public in general in consequence of a public nuisance, they will be entitled to an injunction and relief in equity, which may thus compel the wrong-doer to take active measures against allowing the injury to continue.² (a)

925. In regard to private nuisances the interference of Courts of Equity by way of injunction is undoubtedly founded upon the ground of restraining irreparable mischief, or of suppressing oppressive and interminable litigation, or of preventing multiplicity of suits.³ (b) It is not every case which will furnish a right of action against a party for a nuisance which will justify the interposition of Courts of Equity to redress the injury or to remove the annoyance. But there must be such an injury as from its nature is not susceptible of being adequately compensated by

in *Chalk v. Wyatt*, 3 Mer. 688, the injunction was said only to be granted because damages had been recovered at law. The course which has been pursued at law with respect to different kinds of obstructions and other violations of right furnishes a strong analogy of the same kind. Lord Hale, in a note to Fitzherbert's Nat. Brev. 184 a, speaking of a market holden in derogation of a franchise, says that if it be kept on the same day, it shall be intended a nuisance; but if it be on another day, it shall be put to issue whether it be a nuisance or not. And the case of *Yard v. Ford*, 2 Saund. 172, seems to recognize the same distinction.' See *Mohawk Bridge Company v. Utica and Schenectady Railroad Company*, 6 Paige, R. 559, 563; *Spencer v. London and Birmingham Railway Company*, 8 Sim. 193.

¹ *Ibid.*; *Hart v. Mayor of Albany*, 3 Paige, R. 210, 213.

² *Spencer v. London and Birmingham Railway Company*, 8 Sim. R. 193; *Catlin v. Valentine*, 9 Paige, R. 575. See *Sampson v. Smith*, 8 Sim. R. 272.

³ *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 144, 145; *Eden on Injunct. ch. 11*, pp. 231 to 238; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1*, p. 309.

(a) See *Soltau v. De Held*, 2 Sim. n. s. 133, 145, 147; *Milhan v. Sharp*, 27 N. Y. 611; *Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co.*, 13 Allen, 95, 101; *Grigsby v. Clear Lake Water Co.*, 40 Cal. 396; *Enos v. Hamilton*, 27 Wis. 256; *Houck v. Wachter*, 34 Md. 265. The meaning of the rule is that if any one of the public, or every one of the public, will suffer special, i. e. actual, damage, private relief will be given; but if the injury will only affect the public right, without producing specific damage to the individual, relief must be sought

by the public. See *Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co.*, supra; *Bigelow's L. C. Torts*, 471-475.

(b) *Kingsbury v. Flowers*, 65 Ala. 479; *Minke v. Hopeman*, 87 Ill. 450; *Burnham v. Kempton*, 44 N. H. 78; *Eastman v. Amoskeag Co.*, 47 N. H. 71; *Bassett v. Salisbury Co.*, *Ib.* 426; *Wilcox v. Wheeler*, *Ib.* 488; *Niagara Falls Bridge Co. v. Great Western Ry. Co.*, 39 Barb. 212; *Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co.*, 7 DeG. M. & G. 436.

damages at law, or such as from its continuance or permanent mischief must occasion a constantly recurring grievance, which cannot be otherwise prevented but by an injunction.¹ (*a*) Thus it has been said that every common trespass is not a foundation for an injunction, where it is only contingent, fugitive, or temporary. But if it is continued so long as to become a nuisance, in such a case an injunction ought to be granted to restrain the person from committing it.² (*b*) So a mere diminution of the value of property by the nuisance without irreparable mischief will not furnish any foundation for equitable relief.³ (*c*)

926. On the other hand where the injury is irreparable, as where loss of health, (*d*) loss of trade, destruction of the means of subsistence, or permanent ruin to property, (*e*) may or will ensue from the wrongful act or erection, — in every such case Courts of Equity will interfere by injunction in furtherance of justice and the violated rights of the party.⁴ (*f*) Thus for example where a party builds so near the house of another party as to darken his windows against the clear rights of the latter,

¹ *Fishmonger's Company v. East India Company*, 1 Dick. 163, 164; *Attorney-Gen. v. Nichol*, 16 Ves. 342; *Corporation of New York v. Mapes*, 6 John. Ch. R. 46; *Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Company v. Artcher*, 6 Paige, R. 83.

² *Coulson v. White*, 3 Atk. 21.

³ *Attorney-Gen. v. Nichol*, 16 Ves. 342; *Wynstanley v. Lee*, 2 Swanst. R. 336; *Earl of Ripon v. Hobart*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 169; s. c. 1 Cooper, Sel. Cas. 333.

⁴ *Wynstanley v. Lee*, 2 Swanst. R. 335; *Attorney-Gen. v. Nichol*, 16 Ves. 342; *Cherrington v. Abney*, 2 Vern. 646; *Earl Bathurst v. Burden*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 64; *Nutbrown v. Thornton*, 10 Ves. 163; *Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Company v. Artcher*, 6 Paige, R. 83.

(*a*) *Fisk v. Wilbur*, 7 Barb. 400; *Dana v. Valentine*, 5 Met. 8; *Ingraham v. Dunnell*, *ib.* 118; *Bruce v. Delaware Canal Co.*, 19 Barb. 378. 102; *Berkeley v. Smith*, 27 Gratt. 392; *Carlisle v. Cooper*, 6 C. E. Green, 576.

(*b*) *Gaunt v. Fynney*, L. R. 8 Ch. 8.

(*c*) *Morris R. Co. v. Prudden*, 5 C. E. Green, 530; *Harrison v. Good*, L. R. 11 Eq. 338; *Hamilton v. Whitridge*, 11 Md. 128. See p. 225, note (*a*).

(*d*) *Crump v. Lambert*, L. R. 3 Eq. 409; *Salvin v. Brancepeth Co.*, L. R. 9 Ch. 705; *Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co.*, 7 DeG. M. & G. 436; *Walter v. Selfe*, 4 DeG. & S. 315; *Beardmore v. Treadwell*, 3 Giff. 383; *Columbus Gas Co. v. Freeland*, 12 Ohio St. 392; *Huckenstine's Appeal*, 70 Penn. St.

(*e*) See *Fletcher v. Bealey*, 28 Ch. D. 688; *St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping*, 11 H. L. Cas. 642; s. c. *Biggelow's L. C. Torts*, 454, as to the effect on property necessary to constitute a nuisance; *Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co.*, 38 Mich. 46; *Gaunt v. Fynney*, L. R. 8 Ch. 8; *Sellers v. Matlock Board*, 14 Q. B. D. 928 (public urinal).

(*f*) As to threatened nuisance see *Kingsbury v. Flowers*, 65 Ala. 479; *St. James Church v. Arrington*, 36 Ala. 546; *Adams v. Michael*, 38 Md. 128; *Begein v. Anderson*, 28 Ind. 79.

either by contract or by ancient possession, Courts of Equity will interfere by injunction to prevent the nuisance as well as to remedy it if already done, although an action for damages would lie at law; for the latter can in no just sense be deemed an adequate relief in such a case.¹(a) The injury is material, and operates daily to destroy or diminish the comfort and use of the neighboring house; and the remedy by a multiplicity of actions for the continuance of it would furnish no substantial compensation.

926 *a*. The same rule will apply to cases where blocks of buildings have been erected with particular covenants respecting the enjoyment thereof, and the erection of livery stables, slaughter-houses, glue-factories, and other special privileges or inconveniences; for in such cases each purchaser or owner of one of the block will be entitled to an injunction to prevent the breach, and to enforce the observance of such covenants, since they are for the mutual benefit and protection of all the owners and purchasers in the block.²(b)

927. Cases of a nature calling for the like remedial interposition of Courts of Equity are, the obstruction (c) of watercourses,

¹ *Ibid.*; Eden on Injunct. ch. 11, pp. 231, 232; *Back v. Stacy*, 2 Russ. R. 121; post, § 927.

² *Barrow v. Richards*, 8 Paige, R. 351; *Duke of Bedford v. The Trustees of the British Museum*, 2 Sngden on Vendors, Appx. p. 361 (9th edit.); s. c. cited 8 Paige, R. 354. See *Williams v. Earl of Jersey*, 1 Craig & Phillips, R. 91; ante, § 729; post, § 959 *a*.

(a) It need hardly be said that the law of ancient lights does not prevail in the United States. For late English cases see *Bullers v. Dickinson*, 29 Ch. D. 155; *Durell v. Pritchard*, L. R. 1 Ch. 244; *Heath v. Bucknell*, L. R. 8 Eq. 1; *Tapling v. Jones*, 11 H. L. Cas. 290.

(b) *Tallmadge v. East River Bank*, 2 Duer, 614; s. c. 26 N. Y. 105; *Commonwealth v. Rush*, 14 Penn. St. 186; *Williams v. Smith*, 22 Wis. 594; infra, p. 232, note (c).

(c) *Adams v. Popham*, 76 N. Y. 410. Or pollution thereof. *Ib.*; *Fletcher v. Bealey*, 28 Ch. D. 688; *Lewis v. Stein*, 16 Ala. 214; *Wheatley v. Chrisman*, 24 Penn. St. 298; *Merrifield v. Worcester*, 110 Mass. 216. See *Lingwood v.*

Stowmarket Co., L. R. 1 Eq. 77, 336; *Attorney-Gen. v. Richmond*, L. R. 2 Eq. 306; *Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Com'rs*, L. R. 1 Ch. 349; *Attorney-Gen. v. Colney Asylum*, L. R. 4 Ch. 146; *Attorney-Gen. v. Leeds*, L. R. 5 Ch. 583; *Clowes v. Staffordshire Co.*, L. R. 8 Ch. 125; *Attorney-Gen. v. Gee*, L. R. 10 Eq. 131; *Jacobs v. Alford*, 42 Vt. 303; *Ballard v. Tomlinson*, 29 Ch. D. 115, reversing 26 Ch. D. 194. The last was a case of the pollution of underground water running in no defined channel. See *Snow v. Whitehead*, 27 Ch. D. 588; *Broder v. Saillard*, 2 Ch. D. 692; *Hurdman v. Northeastern Ry. Co.*, 3 C. P. D. 168. And see *Bigelow's L. C. Torts*, 522-526; *Upjohn v. Richland*, 46 Mich. 542.

the diversion of streams from mills, (a) the back flowage on mills, and the pulling down of the banks of rivers and thereby exposing adjacent lands to inundation or adjacent mills to destruction.¹ (b) So where easements or servitudes are annexed by grant or covenant, or otherwise to private estates, (c) or where privileges of a public nature and yet beneficial to private estates are secured to the proprietors contiguous to public squares or other places dedicated to public uses, the due enjoyment of them will be protected against encroachments by injunction.² So an injunction will be granted against a corporation to prevent an abuse of the powers granted to them to the injury of other persons.³ (d) So an injunction will be granted against the erec-

¹ *Robinson v. Byron*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 588; *Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Richardson*, 6 Ves. 706; *Lane v. Newdigate*, 10 Ves. 194; *Chalk v. Wyatt*, 3 Meriv. R. 688; *Martin v. Stiles*, Mosel. R. 145; *Gardner v. Village of Newburgh*, 2 John. Ch. R. 165; *Van Bergen v. Van Bergen*, 2 John. Ch. R. 272; s. c. 3 John. Ch. R. 282; *Hammond v. Fuller*, 1 Paige, R. 197; *Arthur v. Case*, 1 Paige, R. 448; *Belknap v. Trimble*, 3 Paige, R. 577, 600, 601; *Reid v. Gifford*, 1 Hopkins, R. 416.

² *Hills v. Miller*, 3 Paige, R. 254; *Corning v. Lowerre*, 6 John. Ch. R. 439; *Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen*, 4 Paige, R. 510, 514.

³ *Coates v. The Clarence Railway Company*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 181. This

(a) *Springfield v. Harris*, 4 Allen, 494; *Elliot v. Fitchburg R. Co.*, 10 Cush. 191; *Fisk v. Wilbur*, 7 Barb. 395; *Burden v. Stein*, 27 Ala. 104; *Frink v. Lawrence*, 20 Conn. 117; *Pollitt v. Long*, 58 Barb. 20.

(b) As to the effect of Mill Acts see *Bull v. Valley Falls Co.*, 8 R. I. 42; *Spangler's Appeal*, 64 Penn. St. 387; *Gould v. Boston Dock Co.*, 13 Gray, 442. Injunctions ought not to be granted, it is said, to regulate the rights of mill-owners on the same stream, except in clear cases of intentional violation of such rights. *Hoxsie v. Hoxsie*, 38 Mich. 77. And to enjoin the running of a flouring mill as a nuisance the injury complained of must be substantial and material. *Owen v. Phillips*, 73 Ind. 284; *Gilbert v. Showerman*, 23 Mich. 448. Indeed courts interfere by injunction against both mills and factories with great caution, and only where the injury is or will be serious and permanent.

Owen v. Phillips, supra; *Cooke v. Forbes*, L. R. 5 Eq. 166; *Harrison v. Good*, L. R. 11 Eq. 338; *Goodall v. Crofton*, 33 Ohio St. 271; *Barnes v. Calhoun*, 2 Ired. Eq. 199; *Green v. Lake*, 54 Miss. 540; *Duncan v. Hayes*, 7 C. E. Green, 25; *Adams v. Michael*, 38 Md. 123; *Huckenstine's Appeal*, 70 Penn. St. 102.

(c) The interruption being of a permanent nature. *Nash v. New England Ins. Co.*, 127 Mass. 91. But this, it is held, is upon the assumption that adequate relief cannot be had at law. *Ib.*

(d) But equity has no jurisdiction over corporations as such to restrain them in the exercise of their powers, unless there is anticipated fraud or breach of trust. *Treadwell v. Salisbury Manuf. Co.*, 7 Gray, 393; *Pond v. Framingham R. Co.*, 130 Mass. 194. And the insolvency of the corporation will make no difference. *Pond v. Framingham R. Co.*

tion of a new ferry injurious to an old established ferry.¹ (a) So an injunction will be granted in favor of a turnpike corporation to secure the due enjoyment of their privileges by preventing the establishment of short by-roads (commonly called shunpikes) to destroy their tolls.² (b) So (as we have seen) an injunction will lie to prevent the darkening or obstruction of ancient lights of a dwelling-house.³ So to prevent a party from making erections on an adjacent lot in violation of his covenant or other contract.⁴ (c) So to prevent the erection of a

principle was strongly exemplified in the case of *Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy Railroad Company*, 1 Baldwin's Cir. R. 231, where a bill was brought to prevent a railroad company from illegally appropriating the lands of the plaintiff. On this occasion Mr. Justice Baldwin said: 'The injury complained of as impending over his property is its permanent occupation and appropriation to a continuing public use which requires the divesture of his whole right, its transfer to the company in full property, and its inheritance to be destroyed as effectively as if he had never been its proprietor. No damages can restore him to his former condition; its value to him is not money, which money can replace, nor can there be any specific compensation or equivalent; his damages are not pecuniary (vide 7 Johns. Ch. 731); his objects in making his establishment were not profit, but repose, seclusion, and a resting-place for himself and family. If these objects are about to be defeated, if his rights of property are about to be destroyed without the authority of law, or if lawless danger impends over them by persons acting under color of law when the law gives them no power, or when it is abused, misapplied, exceeded, or not strictly pursued, and the act impending would subject the party committing it to damages in a Court of Law for a trespass, a Court of Equity will enjoin its commission.' In the same case it was held that although an act of the Legislature appropriating private lands to public uses without compensation first being awarded was not unconstitutional, yet a Court of Equity would issue an injunction against the actual possession of the lands until compensation was made. 1 Baldwin, Cir. Rep. 226 to 230. See also *Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Company v. Artcher*, 6 Paige, R. 83.

¹ Com. Dig. Chancery, D. 12; *Newburgh Turnpike Company v. Miller*, 5 John. Ch. R. 101, 111; *Ogden v. Gibbons*, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 159, 160.

² *Croton Turnpike Company v. Ryder*, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 615.

³ *Sutton v. Montford*, 4 Sim. R. 559; *Back v. Stacy*, 2 Russ. &c. 121; *Wynstanley v. Lee*, 2 Swanst. R. 333; *Attorney-Gen. v. Nichol*, 16 Ves. 338; *Morris v. Berkeley's Lessees*, 2 Ves. 453; *Corning v. Lowerre*, 6 John. Ch. R. 439; ante, § 926.

⁴ *Ranken v. Huskisson*, 4 Sim. R. 13; *Squire v. Campbell*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 480, 481; *Roper v. Williams*, 1 Turn. & Russ. R. 18.

(a) See *Letton v. Goodden*, L. R. 2 Eq. 123; *McRoberts v. Washburne*, 10 Minn. 23; ante, § 857, note. *Road Co. v. Douglass*, 12 Barb. 553; *Harrell v. Ellsworth*, 17 Ala. 576.

(c) See note (b), p. 230; *Peck v.*

(b) *Williams v. New York Cent. R. Co.*, 18 Barb. 222; *Matthews*, L. R. 3 Eq. 515; *Western v. McDermott*, L. R. 2 Ch. 72. Con-

statue upon a public street or square, if it be clearly in violation of a covenant or other contract.¹ So to prevent a voluntary religious association from being disturbed in their burial-ground.² So to prevent rights of possession and property being injured, obstructed, or taken away illegally by a railroad company.³ (a) So to prevent a tenant from removing mineral and other deposits from the bed of a stream running through a farm which he occupies.⁴ So an injunction will be granted in favor of parties possessing a statute privilege or franchise, to secure the enjoyment of it from invasion by other parties.⁵ In all cases of this sort, if the right be doubtful, the court will direct it to be tried at law, and will in the mean time restrain all injurious proceedings;⁶ and when the right is fully established, a perpetual injunction will be decreed.⁷ (b)

928. It is upon similar grounds that Courts of Equity interfere

¹ *Squire v. Campbell*, 1 Mylne & Craig, R. 459, 477 to 486; *Heriot's Hospital (Feoffees of) v. Gibson*, 2 Dow, R. 301, 304.

² *Beatty v. Kurtz*, 2 Peters, R. 566, 584.

³ *Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy Railroad Company*, 1 Bald. Cir. R. 231.

⁴ *Thomas v. Jones*, 1 Y. & Coll. New R. 510.

⁵ *Ogden v. Gibbons*, 4 John. Ch. R. 150; *Livingston v. Ogden*, 4 John. Ch. R. 48.

⁶ Ante, § 924 a.

⁷ *Jeremy on Eq. B. 3*, ch. 2, § 1, p. 310; *Ryder v. Bentham*, 1 Ves. 543; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 11, pp. 235, 236; *Anon.* 2 Ves. 414; *Reid v. Gifford*, 6 John. Ch. R. 46; *Osborn v. Bank of U. S.*, 9 Wheat. R. 738; *Hart v. Mayor of Albany*, 3 Paige, R. 213; *Livingston v. Livingston*, 6 John. Ch. R. 497, and the cases there cited.

structive notice of the covenant is sufficient. *Wilson v. Hart*, L. R. 1 Ch. 463. As in the case of tenancy. *Feilden v. Slater*, L. R. 7 Eq. 523; *Clements v. Welles*, L. R. 1 Eq. 200.

(a) See *Cosens v. Bognor Ry. Co.*, L. R. 1 Ch. 594; *Pell v. Northampton Ry. Co.*, L. R. 2 Ch. 100; *Munns v. Isle of Wight Ry. Co.*, L. R. 5 Ch. 414.

(b) In the case of an injunction for a nuisance equity always postpones the operation of its decree for a reasonable time to enable the defendant to take adequate measures to remove the nuisance, without doing unnecessary injury. *Breed v. Lynn*, 126 Mass.

367; *Haskell v. New Bedford*, 108 Mass. 208; *Boston Rolling Mills v. Cambridge*, 117 Mass. 396, 401. Locating near a nuisance is not a consent to its existence, so as to bar one of relief. *St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping*, 11 H. L. Cas. 642; *Hale v. Barlow*, 4 C. B. n. s. 334, 336; *Bliss v. Hall*, 4 Bing. N. C. 183; *Barnford v. Turnley*, 3 Best & S. 62, 70, 73; *King v. Morris*, 3 C. E. Green, 397. But in a doubtful question of the existence of a nuisance the plaintiff's locating near it with notice may perhaps be considered. *Upjohn v. Richland*, 46 Mich. 542.

in cases of trespasses, that is to say, to prevent irreparable mischiefs, or to suppress multiplicity of suits and oppressive litigation.¹ (a) For if the trespass be fugitive and temporary, and adequate compensation can be obtained in an action at law, there is no ground to justify the interposition of Courts of Equity. (b) Formerly indeed Courts of Equity were extremely reluctant to interfere at all, even in regard to cases of repeated trespasses. But now there is not the slightest hesitation if the acts done or threatened to be done to the property would be ruinous or irreparable, or would impair the just enjoyment of the property in future. If indeed Courts of Equity did not interfere in cases of this sort, there would (as has been truly said) be a great failure of justice in the country.²

¹ Cooper, Eq. Pl. 152, 153, 154; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 137; *Hanson v. Gardiner*, 7 Ves. 308, 309, 310; *Norway v. Rowe*, 19 Ves. 147, 148, 149; *New York Printing and Dyeing Estab. v. Fitch*, 1 Paige, R. 97; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 311, 312.

² *Hanson v. Gardiner*, 7 Ves. 306 to 308; *Courthope v. Mapplesden*, 10 Ves.

(a) *Milan Steam Mills v. Hickey*, 59 N. H. 241; *Musselman v. Marquis*, 1 Bush, 463; *Allen v. Merton*, L. R. 20 Eq. 462; *McIntyre v. Storey*, 80 Ill. 127; *Clark v. Jeffersonville R. Co.*, 44 Md. 248; *London Ry. Co. v. Lancashire Ry. Co.*, L. R. 4 Eq. 174 (obstructing access to railway); *Ryan v. Brown*, 18 Mich. 196; *Frederick v. Groshon*, 30 Md. 436; *Eckelkamp v. Schrader*, 45 Mo. 505; *De Veney v. Gallagher*, 5 C. E. Green, 33; *Phillips v. Bordman*, 4 Allen, 147; *Nash v. New England Ins. Co.*, 127 Mass. 91; *Washburn v. Miller*, 117 Mass. 376; *Wilcox v. Wheeler*, 47 N. H. 488; *Council Bluffs v. Stewart*, 51 Iowa, 385; *Sword v. Allen*, 25 Kans. 67; *Poirier v. Fetter*, 20 Kans. 47; *Ellsworth v. Hale*, 33 Ark. 623; *Boulo v. New Orleans R. Co.*, 55 Ala. 480. But the plaintiff's right to the locus must be clear; the interference being to protect the right and not to redress the trespass. *Boulo v. New Orleans R. Co.*, supra; *Ellsworth v. Hale*, supra; *Storm v. Mann*, 4 Johns. Ch. 21; *Irwin v. Dixon*, 9 How. 28. And equity will not enjoin the act

when the defendant is in adverse possession. *Felton v. Justice*, 51 Cal. 529. See *Stanford v. Harlstone*, L. R. 9 Ch. 116; *Lowndes v. Bettle*, 10 Jur. n. s. 226; 33 L. J. Ch. 451. (The law on this point has been changed by statute in England. *Judicature Act*, 1873, § 25, subs. 8. See *Stannard v. St. Giles*, 20 Ch. D. 190.) Equity will not restrain trespasses to chattel interests, however frequent. *Ellsworth v. Hale*, supra.

(b) *Neigel v. Walsh*, 45 Mo. 560; *Indianapolis Co. v. Indianapolis*, 29 Ind. 245; *Colwell v. May's Landing*, 4 C. E. Green, 245; *Laney v. Jasper*, 39 Ill. 46; *Blanchard v. Doering*, 23 Wis. 200; *Ganse v. Perkins*, 3 Jones, Eq. 177 (cutting timber for staves); *Thomas v. James*, 32 Ala. 723; *Blake v. Brooklyn*, 26 Barb. 301; *Bolster v. Catterlin*, 10 Ind. 117; *Hatch v. Vermont Cent. Ry. Co.*, 25 Vt. 49; *Cox v. Donglass*, 20 W. Va. 175; *Nash v. New England Ins. Co.*, 127 Mass. 376; *Council Bluffs v. Stewart*, 51 Iowa, 385.

929. Thus for instance where a mere trespasser digs into and works a mine to the injury of the owner, an injunction will be granted because it operates a permanent injury to the property as a mine.¹ (a) So where timber is attempted to be cut down by a trespasser in collusion with the tenant of the land.² So where

291; *Field v. Beaumont*, 1 Swanst. 207, 208; *Crockford v. Alexander*, 15 Ves. 138; *Thomas v. Oakley*, 18 Ves. 184. Lord Eldon has on many occasions alluded to this change or enlargement of equity jurisdiction, and especially in *Hanson v. Gardiner*, 7 Ves. 310, 311, and *Thomas v. Oakley*, 18 Ves. 184. In the latter case he said: 'The distinction long ago established was, that if a person still living committed a trespass by cutting timber or taking lead ore or coal, this court would not interfere, but gave the discovery, and then any action might be brought for the value discovered. But the trespass dying with the person, if he died, the court said, this being property, there must be an account of the value, though the law gave no remedy. In that instance therefore the account was given where an injunction was not wanted. Throughout Lord Hardwicke's time, and down to that of Lord Thurlow, the distinction between waste and trespass was acknowledged, and I have frequently alluded to the case upon which Lord Thurlow first hesitated. A person having a close demised to him began to get coal there, but continued to work under the contiguous close belonging to another person. And it was held that the former, as waste, would be restrained; but as to the close which was not demised to him, it was a mere trespass, and the court did not interfere. But I take it that Lord Thurlow changed his opinion upon that, holding that if the defendant was taking the substance of the inheritance, the liberty of bringing an action was not all the relief to which in equity he was entitled. The interference of the court is to prevent your removing that which is his estate. Upon that principle Lord Thurlow granted the injunction as to both. That has since been repeatedly followed, and whether it was trespass under the color of another's right actually existing or not. If this protection would be granted in the case of timber, coals, or lead ore, why is it not equally to be applied to a quarry? The comparative value cannot be considered. The present established course is to sustain a bill for the purpose of injunction, connecting it with the account in both cases, and not to put the plaintiff to come here for an injunction and to go to law for damages.' See also *Livingston v. Livingston*, 6 John. Ch. R. 497, 498, 499, where Mr. Chancellor Kent has with his usual ability commented on the cases at large.

¹ Case cited in 7 Ves. 308; *Mitchell v. Dorrs*, 6 Ves. 147; *Smith v. Collyer*, 8 Ves. 90; *Grey v. Duke of Northumberland*, 17 Ves. 281; *Falmouth (Lord) v. Inneys*, Moseley, R. 87, 89; ante, § 860.

² *Courthope v. Mapplesden*, 10 Ves. 290.

(a) The right of a landowner as such to the lateral support of his soil in its natural state may be noticed. *Humphries v. Brogden*, 12 Q. B. 739; *Hunt v. Peake*, Johns. (Eng. Ch.) 705; *Angus v. Dalton*, 6 App. Cas. 740; *Thurston v. Hancock*, 12 Mass. 220; *Bigelow's L. C. Torts*, 529, 536, 548

et seq. Whether a right by prescription can be acquired to the support of buildings is not clear. See *Hunt v. Peake*, supra, favoring such right. But see contra *Gilmore v. Driscoll*, 122 Mass. 199; *Tunstall v. Christian*, 19 Rep. 575 (Sup. Ct. Va. 1885).

there is a dispute respecting the boundaries of estates, and one of the claimants is about to cut down ornamental or timber trees in the disputed territory.¹ (a) So where a party who is in possession under articles is proceeding to cut down timber trees.² So where lessees are taking away from a manor bordering on the sea stones of a peculiar value.³ In short it is now granted in all cases of timber, coals, ores, and quarries, where the party is a mere trespasser, or where he exceeds the limited rights with which he is clothed, upon the ground that the acts are, or may be, an irreparable damage to the particular species of property.⁴

930. It is upon similar principles, to prevent irreparable mischief or to suppress multiplicity of suits and vexatious litigation, that Courts of Equity interfere in cases of patents for inventions, and in cases of copyrights to secure the rights of the inventor or author and his assignees and representatives.⁵ It is wholly beside the purpose of the present Commentaries to enter upon the subject of the general rights of inventors and authors, or to state the circumstances under which an exclusive property, in virtue of those rights, may be acquired or lost. Our observations will rather be limited to the consideration of the cases in which Courts of Equity will interfere to protect those rights when acquired, by granting injunctions.

931. It is quite plain that if no other remedy could be given in cases of patents and copyrights than an action at law for damages, the inventor or author might be ruined by the necessity of perpetual litigation, without ever being able to have a final establishment of his rights.⁶

932. Indeed in cases of this nature it is almost impossible to

¹ *Kinder v. Jones*, 17 Ves. 110.

² *Crockford v. Alexander*, 15 Ves. 138.

³ *Earl Cowper v. Baker*, 17 Ves. 128.

⁴ *Thomas v. Oakley*, 18 Ves. 184; *Livingston v. Livingston*, 6 John. Ch. R. 497; *Field v. Beaumont*, 1 Swanst. 208; *Norway v. Rowe*, 19 Ves. 147, 148, 149, 154.

⁵ *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 327; 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 1, ch. 1, § 6, note (p); *Sheriff v. Coates*, 1 *Russ. & M.* 159.

⁶ *Harmer v. Plane*, 14 Ves. 132; *Hogg v. Kirby*, 8 Ves. 223, 224; *Lawrence v. Smith, Jacob*, R. 472; *Sturz v. De la Rue*, 5 *Russ. R.* 322.

(a) The mere fact that the plaintiff against the cutting of timber by the has brought ejectment against the de- latter. *Cox v. Douglass*, 20 *W. Va.* fendant will not justify an injunction 175.

know the extent of the injury done to the party without a discovery from the party guilty of the infringement of the patent or copyright; and if it were otherwise, mere damages would give no adequate relief. For example in the case of a copyright the sale of copies by the defendant is not only in each instance taking from the author the profit upon the individual book which he might otherwise have sold, but it may also be injuring him to an incalculable extent in regard to the value and disposition of his copyright, which no inquiry for the purpose of damages could fully ascertain.¹

933. In addition to this consideration the plaintiff could at law have no preventive remedy which should restrain the future use of his invention or the future publication of his work, injuriously to his title and interests. And it is this preventive remedy which constitutes the peculiar feature of Equity Jurisprudence and enables it to accomplish the great purposes of justice. Besides in most cases of this sort the bill usually seeks an account, in the one case of the books printed, and in the other of the profits which have arisen from the use of the invention from the persons who have pirated the same. (a) And this account will in all cases where the right has been already established, or is established under the direction of the court, be decreed as incidental, in addition to the other relief by a perpetual injunction.²

¹ *Hogg v. Kirby*, 8 Ves. 223, 224, 225; *Wilkins v. Aikin*, 17 Ves. 424; *Lawrence v. Smith*, Jacob, R. 472.

² *Mitf. Eq. Pl.* by Jeremy, 138; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 313 to 327; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 12, p. 261, ch. 13, p. 364; *Hogg v. Kirby*, 8 Ves. 223, 224, 225; *Baily v. Taylor*, 1 Tamlyn, R. 295; *Cooper, Eq. Pl.* 155; *Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Richardson*, 6 Ves. 705, 706; *Baily v. Taylor*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 73; *Sheriff v. Coates*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 159; *Geary v. Norton*, 1 De Gex & Smale, R. 9. The copyright laws in England authorize the delivery up of the pirated edition to the proprietor of the copyright. A question has recently arisen whether this right existed

(a) In equity profits are a proper measure of damages for infringement of patent, though not at law. The principle is that equity converts the infringer into a trustee as to the profits, a principle appropriate in equity by reference to a master, who can examine books and papers and examine the infringer and his employees on

oath. *Root v. Railway Co.*, 105 U. S. 189, 199; *Burdell v. Denig*, 92 U. S. 716; *Packet Co. v. Sickles*, 19 Wall. 611. Where no profits are shown, equity cannot decree them by way of damages or as punishment. *Root v. Railway Co.*, supra; *Livingston v. Woodworth*, 15 How. 559.

934. In cases however where a patent has been granted for an invention, it is not a matter of course for Courts of Equity to interpose by way of injunction. If the patent has been but recently granted and its validity has not been ascertained by a trial at law, the court will not generally act upon its own notions of the validity or invalidity of the patent and grant an immediate injunction, but it will require it to be ascertained by a trial in a Court of Law if the defendant denies its validity or puts the matter in doubt.¹ (a) But if the patent has been granted for some length of time, and the patentee has put the invention into public use, and has had an exclusive possession of it under his patent for a period of time, which may fairly create the just presumption of an exclusive right, the court will in such a case ordinarily interfere by way of preliminary injunction pending the proceedings, reserving of course unto the ultimate decision of the cause its own final judgment on the merits.² And an injunc-

at the common law independent of the statutes. See Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram's observations upon this point in *Colburn v. Simms*, 2 Hare, R. 543, 553.

¹ *Martin v. Wright*, 6 Sim. R. 297; *Bramwell v. Halcomb*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 737; *Spottiswoode v. Clarke*, 2 Phillips, Ch. R. 156; *Stevens v. Keating*, Ib. 333.

² *Hill v. Thompson*, 3 Meriv. R. 622, 628; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 12, p. 260; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 113; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 316; *Cooper, Eq. Pl.* 154, 155, 156; *Universities of Oxford, &c. v. Richardson*, 6 Ves. 706, 707; *Harmer v. Plane*, 14 Ves. 130. Lord Cottenham, in *Bacon v. Jones* (4 Mylne & Craig, R. 433, 436), made the following remarks on the mode of granting injunctions in cases of patents: 'When a party applies for the aid of the court, the application for an injunction is made either during the progress of the suit or at the hearing; and in both cases, I apprehend, great latitude and discretion are allowed to the court in dealing with the application. When the application is for an interlocutory injunction, several courses are open: the court may at once grant the injunction simpliciter, without more,—a course which, though perfectly competent to the court, is not very likely to be taken where the defendant raises a question as to the validity of the plaintiff's title; or it may follow the more usual, and, as I apprehend, more wholesome practice in such a case, of either granting an injunction and at the same time directing the plaintiff to proceed to establish his legal title, or of requiring him first to establish his title at law, and suspending the grant of the injunction until the result of the legal investigation has been ascertained, the defendant in the mean time keeping an account. Which of these several

(a) It has lately been held, over- prima facie, that a patent is valid. ruling *Rollins v. Hinks*, L. R. 13 Eq. *Halsey v. Brotherhood*, 15 Ch. D. 514; 355, and *Axmann v. Lund*, L. R. 18 s. c. 19 Ch. D. 386. Eq. 330, that equity will presume,

tion will be granted not only before, but after the time limited for the expiration of a patent to restrain the sale of machines piratically manufactured in violation of the patent while it was in force.¹ (a)

courses ought to be taken must depend entirely upon the discretion of the court according to the case made. When the cause comes to a hearing, the court has also a large latitude left to it; and I am far from saying that a case may not arise in which even at that stage the court will be of opinion that the injunction may properly be granted without having recourse to a trial at law. The conduct and dealings of the parties, the frame of the pleadings, the nature of the patent-right and of the evidence by which it is established, — these and other circumstances may combine to produce such a result; although this is certainly not very likely to happen, and I am not aware of any case in which it has happened. Nevertheless it is a course unquestionably competent to the court, provided a case be presented which satisfies the mind of the judge, that such a course if adopted will do justice between the parties. Again the court may at the hearing do that which is the more ordinary course: it may retain the bill, giving the plaintiff the opportunity of first establishing his right at law. There still remains a third course the propriety of which must also depend upon the circumstances of the case, — that of at once dismissing the bill.'

¹ *Crossley v. Derby Gas Light Company*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 166, note.

(a) One may in good faith notify the world that another is infringing his patent. *Whitehead v. Kitson*, 119 Mass. 485; *Hammersmith Skating Rink Co. v. Dublin Skating Rink Co.*, Ir. R. 10 Eq. 235; *Prudential Assur. Co. v. Knott*, L. R. 10 Ch. 142, overruling in effect *Rollins v. Hinks*, L. R. 13 Eq. 355, and *Axmann v. Lund*, L. R. 18 Eq. 330. And one need not follow such notice with an action; but if as the result of a trial it is found that there has been no infringement, then it seems such party may be enjoined from publishing further notices of the kind. *Halsey v. Brotherhood*, 15 Ch. D. 514; s. c. 19 Ch. D. 386. See *Barney v. United Telephone Co.*, 28 Ch. D. 394. So if after being requested to desist or bring suit, he will not, the other party may try the right by bill for injunction, and if he succeeds on the question of infringement, he will then be entitled to an injunction. *Ib.*, explaining *Dicks v. Brooks*, 15 Ch. D. 22. See *Wren v. Weild*,

L. R. 4 Q. B. 730. And if the notifying party knows that he has no patent, or that there has been no infringement, he will be liable in damages. 15 Ch. D. 514.

Closely connected with such cases is the right of injunction against the publication of a libel upon one's business; indeed it may be the same thing. It is declared to be well settled that an injunction may be granted to restrain the publication of any libel calculated to injure the plaintiff in his business. *Hill v. Davies*, 21 Ch. D. 798; *Quartz Hill Mining Co. v. Beall*, 20 Ch. D. 501 (C. A.). See *Beddow v. Beddow*, 9 Ch. D. 89; *Shaw v. Jersey*, 4 C. P. D. 120, 359; *Day v. Brownrigg*, 10 Ch. D. 294. And this now without evidence of special damage. *Thomas v. Williams*, 14 Ch. D. 864; *Saxby v. Easterbrook*, 3 C. P. D. 339; *Thorley's Co. v. Massam*, 6 Ch. D. 582; s. c. 14 Ch. D. 748, 763. The contrary has been held in some cases. *Singer Manuf. Co. v. Domestic Sewing*

935. Similar principles apply to cases of copyright.¹ But it does not seem indispensable to relief in either case that the party should have a strictly legal title. It is sufficient that under the patent or copyright the party has a clear equitable title.² Formerly indeed Courts of Equity would not interfere by way of injunction to protect copyrights any more than patent-rights, until the title had been established at law.³ But the present course is to exercise jurisdiction in all cases where there is a clear color of title founded upon a long possession and assertion of right.⁴

936. There are some peculiar principles applicable to cases of copyright which deserve notice in this place, and are not generally applicable to patents for inventions. In the first place no copyright can exist consistently with principles of public policy in any work of a clearly irreligious, immoral, libellous, or obscene description. In the case of an asserted piracy of any such work, if it be not a matter of any real doubt whether it falls within such a predicament or not, Courts of Equity will not interfere by injunction to prevent or to restrain the piracy, but will leave the party to his remedy at law.⁵

¹ *Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Richardson*, 6 Ves. 705, 706; *Wilkins v. Aikin*, 17 Ves. 424.

² *Mawman v. Tegg*, 2 Russ. R. 385.

³ *Baron Eyre*, in *Leardet v. Johnson*, 1 Y. & Coll. New R. 527, 532, note, said: 'The ordinary relief in the case of a patent is an injunction and account. Where the right is disputed, the court expects that to be ascertained by a trial at law.' See *Spottiswoode v. Clarke*, 2 Phillips, Ch. R. 154.

⁴ *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 13, p. 284; *Tonson v. Walker*, 3 Swanst. 679; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, p. 326.

⁵ I am not unaware that Lord Eldon has held the opposite of this doctrine; and that is, that if it does admit of real doubt whether the work be irreligious, immoral, libellous, or seditious, or not, an injunction ought to be denied upon the mere ground of the doubt. It has been thought that there is great difficulty in adopting this doctrine, denying the protection of an injunction in

Machine Co., 49 Ga. 70; *Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manuf. Co.*, 114 Mass. 69, denying *Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley*, L. R. 6 Eq. 551, *Dixon v. Holden*, L. R. 7 Eq. 488, and *Rollins v. Hinks*, L. R. 13 Eq. 355. See also *Prudential Assur. Co. v. Knott*, L. R. 10 Ch. 142 (overruling the first two of these English cases); *Whitehead v. Kitson*, 119 Mass. 484; *Partridge*

v. Hood, 120 Mass. 403, 406. In *Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manuf. Co.* the right to an injunction against violating a trade mark was distinguished as resting on property in the same and an unlawful use or attempted use of it. But the English courts, it seems, would not accept this distinction. *Hill v. Davies* and *Thomas v. Williams*, *supra*.

937. It is true that an objection has been taken to this course of proceeding, that by refusing to interfere in such cases to suppress the publication, a Court of Equity virtually promotes the circulation of offensive and mischievous books. But the objection vanishes when it is considered that the court does not affect to act as a censor morum, or to punish or restrain injuries to society generally. It simply withholds its aid from those who, upon their own showing, have no title to protection, or to assert a property in things which the law will not upon motives of the highest concern permit to be deemed capable of founding a just title or property.¹

938. The soundness of this general principle can hardly admit of question. The chief embarrassment and difficulty lie in the application of it to particular cases.² If a Court of Equity under color of its general authority is to enter upon all the moral, theological, metaphysical, and political inquiries which in the past times have given rise to so many controversies and in the future may well be supposed to provoke many heated discussions, and if it is to decide dogmatically upon the character and bearing of such discussions and the rights of authors growing out of them, it is obvious that an absolute power is conferred over the subject of literary property which may sap the very foundations on which it rests, and retard, if not entirely suppress, the means of arriving at physical as well as at metaphysical truths. Thus for example a judge who should happen to believe that the immateriality of the soul as well as its immortality was a doctrine clearly revealed in the Scriptures (a point upon which very learned and pious minds have been greatly divided) would deem any work anti-Christian which should profess to deny that point, and would refuse an injunction to protect it. So a judge who should be a Trinitarian might most conscientiously decide against granting an injunction

matters of property upon mere doubts. Prima facie the copyright confers title; and the onus is on the other side to show clearly that notwithstanding the copy there is an intrinsic defect in the title. See *Lawrence v. Smith*, Jacob, R. 472.(a)

¹ *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 321, 322; *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. 157; *Walcot v. Walker*, 7 Ves. 1; *Southey v. Sherwood*, 2 Meriv. R. 435; *Lawrence v. Smith*, Jacob, R. 471; *Id.* 474, note; 6 Petersd. Abridg. Copyright, pp. 557, 560.

² *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 14, pp. 315 to 318

(a) *Ante*, p. 238, note (a); *Martinetti v. Maguire*, 1 Abb. U. S. 356.

in favor of an author enforcing Unitarian views, when another judge of opposite opinions might not hesitate to grant it.¹

939. In the next place in cases of copyright (*a*) difficulties often arise in ascertaining whether there has been an actual infringement thereof which are not strictly applicable to cases of patents. It is for instance clearly settled not to be any infringement of the copyright of a book to make bona fide quotations or extracts from it, or a bona fide abridgment of it, or to make a bona fide use of the same common materials in the composition of another work.² And a work consisting partly of compilations and selections from former works, and partly of original compositions, may be the subject of copyright.³ But what constitutes a bona fide case of extracts, or a bona fide abridgment, or a bona fide use of common materials, is often a matter of most embarrassing inquiry. (*b*) The true question in all cases of this sort is (it has been said) whether there has been a legitimate use of the copyright publication in the fair exercise of a mental operation deserving the character of a new work. If there has been, although it may be prejudicial to the original author, it is not an invasion of his legal rights. If there has not been, then it is treated as a mere colorable curtailment of the original work, and a fraudulent evasion of the copyright.⁴ But this is another mode of stating the difficulty, rather than a test affording a clear criterion to discriminate between the cases.⁵

¹ See *Lawrence v. Smith*, Jacob, R. 471.

² *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 13, pp. 280, 281; *Campbell v. Scott*, 11 Simons, R. 31.

³ *Lewis v. Fullerton*, 2 Beav. R. 6.

⁴ *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 323, 324; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 13, p. 380; *Wilkins v. Aikin*, 17 Ves. 425, 426.

⁵ See *Campbell v. Scott*, 11 Simons, R. 31; *Bramwell v. Halcomb*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 737; *Lewis v. Fullerton*, 2 Beav. R. 6. In the late case of *Folsom v. Marsh*, 2 Story, R. 100, it was held that an abridgment consisting of extracts of the essential or most valuable portions of the original work was a piracy.

(*a*) What may be copyrighted see *Drury v. Ewing*, 1 Bond, 540; *Cox v. Land Co.*, L. R. 9 Eq. 324; *Low v. Ward*, L. R. 6 Eq. 415; *Greene v. Bishop*, 1 Cliff. 186; *Dicks v. Yates*, 18 Ch. D. 76; *Maple v. Junior Army Stores*, 21 Ch. D. 369 (an illustrated catalogue; overruling *Cobbett v. Wood-*

ward, L. R. 14 Eq. 407); *Hotten v. Arthur*, 1 Hem. & M. 603; *Grace v. Newnman*, L. R. 19 Eq. 623; *Ager v. Peninsular Nav. Co.*, 26 Ch. D. 637.

(*b*) See *Story v. Holcombe*, 4 McLean, 307, relating to the present work; *Scott v. Stanford*, L. R. 3 Eq. 718.

940. A difficulty of a similar character often arises in the ascertainment of the fact whether a work is original or not. Of some intellectual productions the originality admits of as little doubt as the originality of some inventions or discoveries. But in a great variety of cases the differences between the known and the unknown, between the new and the old, between the original and the copy, depend upon shades of distinction extremely minute and almost inappreciable. (a) It is obvious that there can be no monopoly of thoughts, or of the expression of them. Language is common to all; and in the present advanced state of literature and learning and science, most species of literary works must contain much which is old and well known mixed up with something which perhaps is new, peculiar, and original. The character of some works of this sort may beyond question be in the highest sense original; such for example as the works of Shakespeare and Milton and Pope and Sir Walter Scott, although all of them have freely used the thoughts of others. Of others again the original ingredients may be so small and scattered that the substance of the volumes may be said to embrace little more than the labor of sedulous transcription and colorable curtailment of other works. There are others of an intermediate class, where the intermixture of original and borrowed materials may be seen in proportions more nearly approaching to an equality with each other. And there are others again, as in cases of maps, charts, translations, and road books, where, the materials being equally open to all, there must be a close identity or similitude in the very form and use of the common materials. The difficulty here is to distinguish what belongs to the exclusive labors of a single mind from what are the common sources of the materials of the knowledge used by all.¹ Suppose for instance the case of maps; one man may publish the map of a country, another man with the same design, if he has equal skill and opportunity, may by his own labor produce almost a fac-simile. He has certainly a right so to do. But then from his right through that medium it does not follow that he would be at liberty to copy the other map and claim it as his own. He may work on the same original materials, but he cannot exclusively and evasively use those

¹ Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 322, 323.

(a) See *Jollie v. Jaques*, 1 Blatchf. 618, musical composition.

already collected and embodied by the skill and industry and expenditures of another.¹ (a)

¹ *Ibid.*; *Wilkins v. Aikin*, 17 Ves. 424, 425; *Longman v. Winchester*, 16 Ves. 269, 271; *Matthewson v. Stockdale*, 12 Ves. 270; *Carey v. Faden*, 5 Ves. 24; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 13, pp. 282, 283. The case of *Campbell v. Scott*, 11 Simons, R. 31, was for an alleged piracy in taking large selections from the work of the poet Campbell. On that occasion the Vice-Chancellor said: 'In this case the legal right is *prima facie* quite clear with the plaintiff; because it is not denied that the extracts complained of are taken literally as they stand from the plaintiff's work. Then is the work complained of anything like an abridgment of the plaintiff's work or a critique upon it? Some of the poems are given entire, and large extracts are given from other poems; and I cannot think that it can be considered as a book of criticism when you observe the way in which it is composed. It contains 790 pages, 34 of which are taken up by a general disquisition upon the nature of the poetry of the nineteenth century; then, without any particular observation being appended to the particular poems and extracts from poems which follow, there are 758 pages of selections from the works of other authors; and therefore I cannot think that the work complained of can in any sense be said to be a book of criticism. If there were critical notes appended to each separate passage, or to several of the passages in succession, which might illustrate them and show from whence Mr. Campbell had borrowed an idea, or what idea he had communicated to others, I could understand that to be a fair criticism. But there is, first of all, a general essay, then there follows a mass of pirated matter which in fact constitutes the value of the volume. Then it is said that there is no *animus furandi*; but if A takes the property of B, the *animus furandi* is inferred from the act. Here there is a very distinct taking, and in my opinion it has been done in a manner which the law will not permit. *Roworth v. Wilkes* was a case in which 75 pages of a treatise consisting of 118 pages were taken and inserted in a very voluminous work, "The Encyclopædia Londinensis;" and although the matter taken formed but a very small proportion of the work into which it was introduced, the jury found for the plaintiff, who was the author of the treatise. I do not think that it is necessary for me to consider whether the selections in this case are the very cream and essence of all that Mr. Campbell ever wrote; but it is pretty plain that they would not have been inserted in the

(a) As to similarity see *Drury v. Ewing*, 1 Bond, 540; *Daly v. Palmer*, 6 Blatchf. 256; *Mack v. Petter*, L. R. 14 Eq. 431; *McCrea v. Holdsworth*, L. R. 6 Ch. 418; s. c. 2 H. L. 380; *Pike v. Nicholas*, L. R. 5 Ch. 251; *Jerrold v. Houlston*, 3 Kay & J. 708; *Crookes v. Petter*, 6 Jur. n. s. 1131. In *Jerrold v. Houlston* it is declared that it is a proper use of a copyrighted book, after getting one's own work into shape as well as may be, to look through the other work to see if it contain any heads now overlooked.

But it was considered that if one, instead of searching into the common sources and obtaining materials there, should avail himself of the labor of his predecessor, and adopt his arrangement with only colorable variations (*Greene v. Bishop*, 1 Cliff. 186), or his materials, it would be an infringement. Dramatizing the incidents of a novel is held no infringement of a copyright of the latter. *Reade v. Conquest*, 7 Jur. n. s. 265; *Coleman v. Wathen*, 5 T. R. 245.

941. In some cases of this nature a Court of Equity will take upon itself the task of inspection and comparison of books alleged

defendants' work unless the party who selected them thought that they were very attractive in themselves. However it so happens that in turning over the pages of the defendants' publication I find an extract from "The Pleasures of Hope," which is the only part of that poem of which I have a distinct recollection; and I have reason to suppose that is a very striking passage, because it has remained impressed upon my memory for so many years. Then it is said that with respect to three of the selected poems the court ought not to interfere in the present case. I admit that they are not contained in Moxon's edition of the plaintiff's works, published in 1840; but nevertheless there is a general statement in the bill that the plaintiff composed them all. And I observe that Mr. Campbell is the sole plaintiff; the bill is not filed by him and Mr. Moxon, or by Mr. Moxon alone, but by Mr. Campbell solely; and I consider that his copyright in those three poems is entitled to protection equally with his copyright in the rest of the matters, which unquestionably have been pirated from Moxon's edition and copied into the work complained of. Then the only question is whether there has been such a *damnum* as will justify the party in applying to the court; because *injuria* there clearly has been. What has been done is against the right of the plaintiff. Now in my opinion he is the person best able to judge of that himself; and if the court does clearly see that there has been anything done which tends to an injury, I cannot but think that the safest rule is to follow the legal right and grant the injunction.' In *Bramwell v. Halcomb*, Lord Cottenham said: 'When it comes to a question of quantity it must be very vague. One writer might take all the vital part of another's book, though it might be but a small proportion of the book in quantity. It is not only quantity but value that is always looked to. It is useless to refer to any particular cases as to quantity. In my view of the law, Lord Eldon, in *Wilkins v. Aikin*, 17 Ves. 422. put the question on a most proper footing. He says: "The question upon the whole is whether this is a legitimate use of the plaintiff's publication in the fair exercise of a mental operation deserving the character of an original work.'" See also *Gray v. Russell*, 1 Story, Rep. 11.

This subject was largely discussed in *Gray v. Russell*, 1 Story, R. 11. It was the case of a supposed piracy of Gould's edition of Adam's Latin Grammar, with notes. On this occasion the court said: 'Now certainly the preparation and collection of these notes from these various sources must have been a work of no small labor and intellectual exertion. The plan, the arrangement, and the combination of these notes in the form in which they are collectively exhibited in Gould's Grammar belong exclusively to this gentleman. He is then justly to be deemed the author of them in their actual form and combination, and entitled to a copyright accordingly. If no work could be considered by our law as entitled to the privilege of copyright which is composed of materials drawn from many different sources, but for the first time brought together in the same plan and arrangement and combination, simply because those materials might be found scattered up and down in a great variety of volumes, perhaps in hundreds or even thousands of volumes, and might therefore have been brought together in the same way and by the same researches of another mind equally skilful and equally diligent, — then indeed it would be difficult to say that there could be any copyright in most of the

to be a piracy.¹ But the usual practice is to refer the subject to a master, who then reports whether the books differ, and in what

scientific and professional treatises of the present day. What would become of the elaborate commentaries of modern scholars upon the classics, which for the most part consist of selections from the works and criticisms of various former authors, arranged in a new form, and combined together by new illustrations intermixed with them? What would become of the modern treatises upon astronomy, mathematics, natural philosophy, and chemistry? What would become of the treatises in our own profession, the materials of which, if the works be of any real value, must essentially depend upon faithful abstracts from the reports, and from juridical treatises, with illustrations of their bearing. Blackstone's Commentaries is but a compilation of the laws of England, drawn from authentic sources, open to the whole profession; and yet it was never dreamed that it was not a work which in the highest sense might be deemed an original work, since never before were the same materials so admirably combined and exquisitely wrought out, with a judgment, skill, and taste absolutely unrivalled. Take the case of the work on Insurance, written by one of the learned counsel in this cause, and to which the whole profession are so much indebted; it is but a compilation with occasional comments upon all the leading doctrines of that branch of the law, drawn from reported cases or from former authors, but combined together in a new form and in a new plan and arrangement; yet I presume none of us ever doubted that he was fully entitled to a copyright in the work as being truly in a just sense his own. There is no foundation in law for the argument, that because the same sources of information are open to all persons, and by the exercise of their own industry and talents and skill they could from all these sources have produced a similar work, one party may at second hand, without any exercise of industry, talents, or skill, borrow from another all the materials which have been accumulated and combined together by him. Take the case of a map of a county, or of a state or an empire; (a) it is plain that in proportion to the accuracy of every such map must be its similarity to or even its identity with every other. Now suppose a person has bestowed his time and skill and attention, and made a large series of topographical surveys in order to perfect such a map, and has thereby produced one far excelling every existing map of the same sort. It is clear that notwithstanding this production he cannot supersede the right of any other person to use the same means, by similar surveys and labors, to accomplish the same end. But it is just as clear that he has no right, without any such surveys and labors, to sit down and copy the whole of the map already produced by the skill and labors of the first party, and thus to rob him of all the fruit of his industry, skill, and expenditures. See *Wilkins v. Aikin*, 17 Ves. 424, 425; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 13, pp. 282, 283; 2 *Story on Equity Jurisp.* §§ 939 to 942. It would be a downright piracy. Neither is it of any consequence in what form the works of another author are used; whether it be by a simple reprint, or by incorporating the whole or a large portion thereof in some larger work. Thus for example if in one of the large encyclopædias of the present day the whole or a large portion of a scientific treatise of another

¹ *Lewis v. Fullerton*, 2 *Beav. R.* 6.

(a) *Farmer v. Calvert Lith. Co.*, 5 *Chic. Leg. N.* 1; s. c. 7 *Am. Law Rev.* 365.

respects; and upon such a report the court usually acts in making its interlocutory as well as its final decree.¹

author, — as for example one of Dr. Lardner's, or Sir John Herschell's, or Mrs. Somerville's treatises, should be incorporated, — it would be just as much a piracy upon the copyright as if it were published in a single volume. In some cases indeed it may be a very nice question what amounts to a piracy of a work or not. Thus if large extracts are made therefrom in a review it might be a question whether those extracts were designed bona fide for the mere purpose of criticism, or were designed to supersede the original work under the pretence of a review by giving its substance in a fugitive form. The same difficulty may arise in relation to an abridgment of an original work. The question in such a case must be compounded of various considerations: whether it be a bona fide abridgment, or only an evasion by the omission of some unimportant parts; whether it will in its present form prejudice or supersede the original work; whether it will be adapted to the same class of readers; and many other considerations of the same sort which may enter as elements in ascertaining whether there has been a piracy or not. Although the doctrine is often laid down in the books that an abridgment is not a piracy of the original copyright, yet this proposition must be received with many qualifications. See 2 Story on Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 939 to 942; *Sweet v. Shaw* before the Vice-Chancellor in 1839; *The [English] Jurist* for 1839, p. 212. In many cases the question may naturally turn upon the point not so much of the quantity as of the value of the selected materials. As was significantly said on another occasion, — “Non numerantur, ponderantur.” The quintessence of a work may be piratically extracted so as to leave a mere caput mortuum, by the selection of all the important passages in a comparatively moderate space. In the recent case of *Bramwell v. Halcomb* (3 Mylne & Craig, 737), it was held that the question whether one author has made a piratical use of another's work does not necessarily depend upon the quantity of that work which he has quoted or introduced into his own book. On that occasion Lord Cottenham said: “When it comes to a question of quantity it must be very vague. One writer might take all the vital part of another's book, though it might be but a small proportion of the book in quantity. It is not only quantity but value which is looked to. It is useless to look to any particular cases about quantity.” See the Lord Chancellor's opinion in *Bell v. Whitehead*, *The [English] Jurist*, 1839, p. 14; *Sweet v. Shaw*, before the Vice-Chancellor, 1839; *The [English] Jurist* for 1839, p. 212. The same subject was a good deal considered by the same learned judge in *Saunders v. Smith* (3 Mylne & Craig, R. 711, 723, 729), with reference to copyright in reports; and how far another person was at liberty to extract the substance of such reports or to publish select cases therefrom even with notes appended. In the case of *Wheaton v. Peters* (8 Peters, R. 591) the same subject was considered very much at large. It was not doubted by the court that Mr. Peters's Condensed Reports would have been an infringement of Mr. Wheaton's copyright (supposing that copyright properly secured under the act), if the opinions of the court had been

¹ *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 13, p. 289; *Carnan v. Bowles*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 80; — *v. Leadbetter*, 4 Ves. 681; *Carey v. Faden*, 5 Ves. 24, 25; *Jeffrey v. Bowles*, 1 Dick. 429.

942. In cases of the invasion of a copyright by using the same materials in another work of which a large proportion is original, it constitutes no objection that an injunction will in effect stop the sale and circulation of the work which so infringes upon the copyright. If the parts which are original (*a*) cannot be separated from those which are not original, without destroying the use and value of the original matter, he who has made the improper use of that which did not belong to him must suffer the consequences of so doing. If a man mixes what belongs to him with what belongs to another, and the mixture is forbidden by the law, he must again separate them and bear all the mischief and loss which the separation may occasion. The same rule applies to the use of literary matter.¹ (*b*) It proceeds upon the same general principle of justice which applies to the ordinary case of a confusion of property by premeditation or wanton impropriety.²

943. We may now proceed to the consideration of other cases, where upon similar grounds of irreparable mischief, or the inadequacy of the remedy at law, or the prevention of multiplicity of suits, Courts of Equity interfere by way of injunction.³ And

or could be the proper subject of the private copyright by Mr. Wheaton. But it was held that the opinions of the court, being published under the authority of Congress, were not the proper subject of private copyright. But it was as little doubted by the court that Mr. Wheaton had a copyright in his own marginal notes and in the arguments of counsel as prepared and arranged in his work. The cause went back to the Circuit Court for the purpose of further inquiries as to the fact whether the requisites of the act of Congress had been complied with or not by Mr. Wheaton. This would have been wholly useless and nugatory, unless Mr. Wheaton's marginal notes and abstracts of arguments could have been the subject of a copyright (for that was all the work which could be the subject of copyright); so that if Mr. Peters had violated that right, Mr. Wheaton was entitled to redress.' See also *Emerson v. Davies*, 3 Story, R. 768.

¹ *Mawman v. Tegg*, 2 Russ. R. 390, 391. But see *Baily v. Taylor*, 1 Tamlyn, R. 295; *Emerson v. Davies*, 2 Story, 768.

² Story, Comm. on Bailments, § 40. Ante, §§ 468, 623.

³ Ante, §§ 851 to 855, 857.

(*a*) As to the copyright of part of a book see *Low v. Ward*, L. R. 6 Eq. 415. Query as to copyrighting the title of a book. See *Dicks v. Yates*, 18 Ch. D. 76; *Waldon v. Dicks*, 10 Ch. D. 247. But one may be protected against a fraudulent use of his titlepage. See editor's note at end of § 951.

(*b*) See *Jarrold v. Houlston*, 3 Kay & J. 708.

here we may take notice in the first place of a class of cases bearing a close analogy to that of copyrights; that is to say, cases where Courts of Equity interfere to restrain the publication of unpublished manuscripts. In cases of literary, scientific, and professional treatises in manuscript it is obvious that the author must be deemed to possess the original ownership, and be entitled to appropriate them to such uses as he shall please. Nor can he justly be deemed to intend to part with that ownership by depositing them in the possession of a third person, or by allowing a third person to take and hold a copy of them. Such acts must be deemed strictly limited in point of right, use, and effect to the very occasions expressed or implied, and ought not to be construed as a general gift or authority for any purposes of profit or publication to which the receiver may choose to devote them. The property then in such manuscripts, not having been parted with in cases of this sort, if any attempt is made to publish them without the consent of the author or proprietor, it is obvious that he ought to be entitled to protection in equity. And accordingly this course of granting injunctions against such unauthorized publications has been constantly acted upon in Courts of Equity,¹ and has been applied to all sorts of literary compositions.²

944. Upon the same principle the publication of private letters forming literary compositions has been restrained, where the publication has been attempted without the consent of the author.³ (a) Upon one occasion of this sort the question arose

¹ Eden on Injunct. ch. 13, pp. 275, 276; *Duke of Queensbury v. Shebbeare*, 2 Eden, R. 329; *Southey v. Sherwood*, 2 Meriv. R. 434, 436; *Macklin v. Richardson*, Ambl. R. 694; *Pope v. Curl*, 2 Atk. 342.

² An author of letters or papers of whatever kind, whether they be letters of business or private letters or literary compositions, has a property and an exclusive copyright therein, unless he unequivocally dedicate them to the public or to some private person; and no person has any right to publish them without his consent unless such publication be required to establish a personal right or claim or to vindicate character. *Folsom v. Marsh*, 2 Story, R. 100. (b) See the qualification as to the right of the government to publish official letters, post, § 947, note.

³ *Pope v. Curl*, 2 Atk. 342; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 56, p. 415.

(a) Unless the publishing is necessary for the vindication of the receiver's character. *Lytton v. Devey*, 54 L. J. Ch. 293. But the letters belong to the receiver. *Ib.*

(b) See *Grigsby v. Breckenridge*, 2 Bush, 480; *Lytton v. Devey*, 54 L. J. Ch. 293.

whether letters having the character of literary compositions remained in any respect the property of the writer after they were transmitted to the person to whom they were addressed. It was held that they did; (a) that by sending letters the writer does not part wholly with his property in the literary compositions, nor give the receiver the power of publishing them; and that at most the receiver has only a special property in them, and possibly may have the property of the paper. But this does not give a license to any person whatsoever to publish them to the world, and at most the receiver has only a joint property with the writer. Whether he is to be considered as having such joint property or not, letters having the character of literary composition must be treated as within the laws protecting the rights of literary property; and a violation of those rights in that instance is attended with the same legal consequences as in the case of an unpublished manuscript of an original composition of any other description.¹

945. In a comparatively recent case Lord Eldon has explained the doctrine of Courts of Equity on this subject to be founded, not on any notion that the publication of letters would be painful to the feelings of the writer, but upon a civil right of property, which the court is bound to respect. That the property is qualified in some respects, that by sending a letter the writer has given for the purpose of reading it, and in some cases of keeping it, a property to the person to whom the letter is addressed, yet that the gift is so restrained, that beyond the purposes for which the letter is sent, the property is in the sender. Under such circumstances it is immaterial whether the intended publication is for the purpose of profit or not. If for profit, the party is then selling; if not for profit, he is then giving that a portion of which belongs to the writer.²

946. A question has been made, and a doubt has been suggested, how far the like protection ought to be given to restrain the publication of mere private letters on business, or on family

¹ *Pope v. Curl*, 2 Atk. 342; *Lord Perceval v. Phipps*, 2 Ves. & Beam. 19, 24; *Thompson v. Stanhope*, Ambler, R. 739, 740; *Gee v. Pritchard*, 2 Swanst. R. 403, 414, 415, 422, 425.

² *Gee v. Pritchard*, 2 Swanst. R. 413 to 416.

(a) But see *Lytton v. Devey*, 54 L. J. Ch. 293.

concerns, or on matters of personal friendship, and not strictly falling within the line of literary compositions.¹ In a moral view the publication of such letters, unless in cases where it is necessary to the proper vindication of the rights or conduct of the party against unjust claims or injurious imputations, (a) is perhaps one of the most odious breaches of private confidence, of social duty, and of honorable feelings, which can well be imagined. It strikes at the root of all that free and mutual interchange of advice, opinions, and sentiments between relatives and friends and correspondents which is so essential to the well-being of society and to the spirit of a liberal courtesy and refinement. It may involve whole families in great distress, from the public display of facts and circumstances which were reposed in the bosoms of others under the deepest and most affecting confidence that they should forever remain inviolable secrets. It may do more, and compel every one in self-defence to write even to his dearest friends with the cold and formal severity with which he would write to his wariest opponents or his most implacable enemies. Cicero has with great beauty and force spoken of the grossness of such offences against common decency: ‘*Quis enim unquam qui paulum modo bonorum consuetudinem nosset, literas ad se ab amico missas, offensione aliqua interposita, in medium protulit, palamque recitavit? Quid est aliud, tollere e vita vitæ societatem, quam tollere amicorum colloquia absentium? Quam multa joca solent esse in epistolis, quæ, prolati si sint, inepta videantur! Quam multa seria, neque tamen ullo modo divulganda!*’²

947. It would be a sad reproach to English and American jurisprudence if Courts of Equity could not interpose in such cases, and if the rights of property of the writers should be deemed to exist only when the letters were literary compositions. If the mere sending of letters to third persons is not to be deemed in cases of literary composition a total abandonment of the right of property therein by the sender, a fortiori the act of sending them cannot be presumed to be an abandonment thereof in cases where the very nature of the letters imports as matter of busi-

¹ *Perceval v. Phipps*, 2 Ves. & Beam. 24 to 28.

² *Cic. Orat. Phillip.* 2, ch. 4, Oliv. & Ernest. edit.; *Id.* cited by Sir Samuel Romilly, 2 Swanst. 419.

(a) See *Lytton v. Devey*, 54 L. J. Ch. 293.

ness, or friendship, or advice, or family or personal confidence, the implied or necessary intention and duty of privacy and secrecy. (a)

948. Fortunately for public as well as for private peace and morals, the learned doubts on this subject have been overruled; and it is now held that there is no distinction between private letters of one nature and private letters of another. (b) For the purposes of public justice publicly administered, according to the established institutions of the country in the ordinary modes of proceeding, private letters may be required to be produced and published.¹ But it by no means follows that private persons have a right to make such publications on other occasions, upon their own notion of taking the administration of justice into their own hands, or for the purpose of vindicating their own conduct or of gratifying their own enmity, or of indulging a gross and diseased public curiosity by the circulation of private anecdotes or family secrets or personal concerns.²

¹ *Gee v. Pritchard*, 2 Swanst. R. 418, 426, 427; *Brandreth v. Lance*, 8 Paige, R. 24.

² *Ibid.*

(a) In *Folsom v. Marsh*, 2 Story, 100, 113, Mr. Justice Story said: 'In respect to official letters addressed to the government or any of its departments by public officers, so far as the right of the government extends, from principles of public policy, to withhold them from publication or to give them publicity, there may be a just ground of distinction. It may be doubtful whether any public officer is at liberty to publish them, at least in the same age, when secrecy may be required by the public exigencies, without the sanction of the government. On the other hand from the nature of the public service or the character of the documents, embracing historical, military, or diplomatic information, it may be the right and even the duty of the government to give them publicity even against the will of the writers. But this is an exception in favor of the government, and stands upon principles allied to, or nearly similar to, the rights of private individuals to whom letters are addressed by their

agents, to use them and publish them upon fit and justifiable occasions. But assuming the right of the government to publish such official letters and papers under its own sanction and for public purposes, I am not prepared to admit that any private persons have a right to publish the same letters and papers without the sanction of the government for their own private profit and advantage. Recently the Duke of Wellington's despatches have (I believe) been published by an able editor with the consent of the noble Duke under the sanction of the government. It would be a strange thing to say that a compilation, involving so much expense and so much labor to the editor in collecting and arranging the materials, might be pirated and republished by another bookseller, perhaps to the ruin of the original publisher and editor.' See *Nicols v. Pitman*, 26 Ch. D. 374.

(b) See 1 Am. Law Reg., 449, June, 1853, a valuable article.

948 *a*. But the utmost extent to which Courts of Equity have gone in restraining any publication by injunction has been upon the principle of protecting the rights of property in the book or letters sought to be published. They have never assumed, at least since the destruction of the Court of Star Chamber, to restrain any publication which purports to be a literary work, upon the mere ground that it is of a libellous character, and tends to the degradation or injury of the reputation or business of the plaintiff, who seeks relief against such publication. (*a*) For matters of this sort do not properly fall within the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to redress, but are cognizable in a civil or criminal suit at law. To justify therefore the interposition of a Court of Equity by way of injunction, in cases of literary publication, there must be an invasion by the defendant of the rights of property of the plaintiff, or some direct breach of confidence connected therewith.

949. Principles of a similar nature have been applied for the assistance of persons to whom letters are written, and by whom they are received, in order to protect such letters from publication in any manner injurious to the rights of property of the lawful owners thereof.¹ So they have been applied in all cases where the publication would be a violation of a trust or confidence founded in contract,² or implied from circumstances. Thus for example where a person delivers scientific or literary oral lectures, it is not competent for any person who is privileged to hear them, to publish the substance of them from his own notes; for the admission to hear such lectures is upon the implied confidence and contract that the hearer will not use any means to injure or to take away the exclusive right of the lecturer in his own lectures. (*b*)

950. So where a dramatic performance has been allowed by

¹ Earl of Granard *v.* Dunkin, 1 B. & Beatt. 207; Thompson *v.* Stanhope, Ambler, R. 737.

² See Lord Perceval *v.* Phipps, 2 Ves. & Beam. 19, 27; Eden on Injunct. ch. 13, p. 279.

(*a*) See however ante, note (*a*), Ch. D. 374; Bartlette *v.* Crittenden, 4 McLean, 300. The publication of

(*b*) See Williams *v.* Prince of Wales Assur. Co., 23 Beav. 338; Abernethy *v.* Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209, Lord Eldon; Nicols *v.* Pitman, 26 23 Beav. 338.

the author to be acted at a theatre, no person has a right to pirate such performance and to publish copies of it surreptitiously, or to act it at another theatre without the consent of the author or proprietor; for his permission to act it at a public theatre does not amount to an abandonment of his title to it, or to a dedication of it to the public at large.¹ (a)

951. So an injunction will be granted against publishing a magazine in a party's name who has ceased to authorize it;² (b) or from assuming the name of a newspaper published by the plaintiff, for the fraudulent purpose of deceiving the public, and supplanting the plaintiff in the good-will of his own newspaper.³ So an injunction will be granted against vending an article of trade under the name of a party with false labels, to the injury of the same party who has already acquired a reputation in trade by it.⁴ (c) So an injunction will be granted to restrain the owner from running omnibuses having on them such names and words and devices as to form a colorable imitation of the words, names, and devices on the omnibuses of the plaintiff; for this has a natural tendency to deprive the plaintiff of the fair profits of his business by attracting custom under the false representation that the omnibuses of the defendant belong to and are under

¹ See *Morris v. Kelley*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 461.

² *Hogg v. Kirby*, 8 Ves. 215; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 14, pp. 313, 314; *Bell v. Locke*, 8 Paige, R. 75.

³ *Bell v. Locke*, 8 Paige, R. 75.

⁴ *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 14, pp. 314, 315; *Motley v. Dowman*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 1, 14, 15; *Millington v. Fox*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 338; *Perry v. Truefit*, 6 Beav. R. 66.

(a) *Boucicault v. Fox*, 5 Blatchf. 87; *Palmer v. De Witt*, 47 N. Y. 532; *Chappell v. Boosey*, 21 Ch. D. 232. But a spectator may, it seems, publish what he can remember, though he cannot publish notes or a phonographic copy. *Palmer v. De Witt*; *Keene v. Clark*, 5 Rob. (N. Y.) 38. See *Keene v. Kimball*, 16 Gray, 545; *Keene v. Wheatley*, 9 Am. Law Reg. 33. The publication in England of a dramatic piece or musical composition as a book, before it has been publicly represented or performed, does not deprive the author or his assignee of the exclusive

right of representing or performing it. *Chappell v. Boosey*, 21 Ch. D. 232.

(b) Or a prospectus stating without authority that A is trustee of a company. *Routh v. Webster*, 10 Beav. 561.

(c) But not, it is said, against one for selling a quack medicine under a false and colorable representation that it was the medicine of the plaintiff, an eminent physician, who had no such medicine of his own with which the quack medicine could come into competition. *Clark v. Freeman*, 10 Beav. 112.

the management of the plaintiff.¹ (a) So an injunction will be granted to prevent the use of names, marks, letters, or other indicia of a tradesman, by which to pass off goods to purchasers as the manufacture of that tradesman, when they are not so.² (b)

¹ Knott v. Morgan, 2 Keen, R. 213, 219; Perry v. Truefit, 6 Beav. R. 66.

² Perry v. Truefit, 6 Beav. R. 66; Gout v. Aleploglu, 6 Beav. R. 69, note. In Perry v. Truefit, Lord Langdale said, 'I think that the principle on which both the Courts of Law and Equity proceed in granting relief and protection in cases of this sort is very well understood. A man is not to sell his own goods under the pretence that they are the goods of another man; he cannot be permitted to practise such a deception nor to use the means which contribute to that end. He cannot therefore be allowed to use names, marks, letters, or indicia, by which he may induce purchasers to believe that the goods which he is selling are the manufacture of another person. I own it does not seem to me that a man can acquire a property merely in a name or mark; but whether he has or not a property in the name or the mark, I have no doubt that another person has not a right to use that name or mark for the purposes of deception, and in order to attract to himself that course of trade or that custom which, without that improper act, would have flowed to the person who first used, or was alone in the habit of using, the particular name or mark. The case of Millington v. Fox (3 M. & Cr. 338) seems to have gone this length, that the deception need not be intentional, and that a man, though not intending any injury to another, shall not be allowed to adopt the marks by which the goods of another are designated, if the effect of adopting them would be to prejudice the trade of such other person. I am not aware that any previous case carried the principle to that extent.'^(c)

(a) See Marsh v. Billings, 7 Cush. 322.

(b) See Howard v. Henriques, 3 Sandf. 725; Sykes v. Sykes, 3 Barn. & C. 541; Cartier v. Carlile, 31 Beav. 292; Edelsten v. Edlesten, 1 DeG. J. & S. 185; Coats v. Holbrook, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586; Lee v. Haley, L. R. 5 Ch. 155; Marsh v. Billings, 7 Cush. 322; Wotherspoon v. Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; Seixo v. Provizende, L. R. 1 Ch. 192; Hirst v. Denham, L. R. 14 Eq. 542; Bradley v. Norton, 33 Conn. 157.

Trade Marks and the Like. — For the purpose of redress it is only necessary that the mark or device used by the defendant should so far resemble that of the plaintiff as to be apt to mislead the general public, where used; it is not necessary that there should be

such a resemblance that it would be difficult to distinguish the two when placed together. The defendant's mark, word, or device need not be a counterfeit in any sense, or anything near a counterfeit; enough that, as it is used, it is likely to deceive, not an expert, but an average person. Seixo v. Provizende, supra; Lawrence Mannf. Co. v. Lowell Mills, 129 Mass. 325; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511; Metzler v. Wood, 8 Ch. D. 606. And further as to resemblance see Wotherspoon v. Currie, supra; Crawshay v. Thompson, 4 Man. & G. 357; Orr v. Johnston, 13 Ch. D. 434; Gillott v. Esterbrook, 48 N. Y. 374; Partridge v. Menck, 2 Sandf. Ch. 622; McCartney v. Garnhart, 45 Mo. 593. But if the truth is clearly told

(c) As to this point see the editor's note, p. 256.

952. Upon similar grounds of irreparable mischief Courts of Equity will restrain a party from making a disclosure of secrets

with the mark, the resemblance will not be ground for relief. *Magee Furnace Co. v. Le Barron*, 127 Mass. 115; *Singer Manuf. Co. v. Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434.

If there is however such resemblance as that here indicated, and there appears an intention on the part of the defendant to palm off his goods, in the case of a trade mark, as the goods of the plaintiff, or to represent the plaintiff or his business, in any case,—then an injunction will be readily granted. *Lee v. Haley*, L. R. 5 Ch. 155; *Day v. Brownrigg*, 10 Ch. D. 294; *Seixo v. Provizende*, supra; *Wotherspoon v. Currie*, supra; *Congress Spring Co. v. High Rock Spring Co.*, 45 N. Y. 291; and many other cases.

Indeed if the mark or word be capable of exclusive appropriation, it is not necessary for the purpose of a mere injunction that there should be any intention, in the use of the imitative mark or word, on the part of the defendant to personate the plaintiff in his business or property. Priority of use, with the resemblance, will then be enough. *Singer Manuf. Co. v. Loog*, 18 Ch. D. 395, 417, *Cotton, L. J.*; *Cartier v. Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292; *Edelsten v. Edelsten*, 1 DeG. J. & S. 185; *Dale v. Smithson*, 12 Abb. Pr. 237; *Coffeen v. Brunton*, 4 McLean, 516; *Kendall v. Davis*, 2 R. I. 566. But to recover *damages* the plaintiff must show more than prior use of a word or device capable of exclusive appropriation,—he must show intention on the part of the defendant to appear as the plaintiff. *Marsh v. Billings*, 7 Cush. 322; *Sykes v. Sykes*, 3 Barn. & C. 541; *Rodgers v. Nowill*, 5 C. B. 109; *Morison v. Salmon*, 2 Man. & G. 385; *Coats v. Holbrook*, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586, 597; *Crawshay v. Thompson*, 4 Man. & G. 357.

The injunction can be had in any

case, as has already been observed, where there appears to be an intention to personate the plaintiff; and this whether the mark used is capable or not of exclusive appropriation. But where the mark, device, or words used are not in law capable of such appropriation, the right to an injunction, unlike the converse case, depends upon fraud on the part of the defendant; that being shown however, the injunction will be granted. *Lee v. Haley*, L. R. 5 Ch. 155; *Radde v. Norman*, L. R. 14 Eq. 348; *Rodgers v. Nowill*, 6 Hare, 325. See *Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Spear*, 2 Sandf. 599 (as to this case see *infra*, near end of this note); *Congress Spring Co. v. High Rock Spring Co.*, 45 N. Y. 291; *Newman v. Alvord*, 51 N. Y. 189; *Seixo v. Provizende*, L. R. 1 Ch. 192; *Wotherspoon v. Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; *Singer Manuf. Co. v. Loog*, 18 Ch. D. 395, 412, *James, L. J.* Continuing to use a mark after complaint to the party by the plaintiff is strong evidence of fraud. *Orr v. Johnston*, 13 Ch. D. 434 (C. A.). See *Crawshay v. Thompson*, 4 Man. & G. 357, 379, 383.

The courts have found it difficult however to lay down any clear rule by which to determine what may be exclusively appropriated as a mark. The chief difficulty has arisen with respect to names used as business trade marks, that do not define kind or quality, composition or texture, or something of the sort. Much of the difficulty has been removed in England by recent decisions. It has lately been declared in that country that no one can appropriate to his exclusive use any name which he may choose to fix to landed property of his, whether consisting of a house or only of land. *Day v. Brownrigg*, 10 Ch. D. 294 (C. A.), name of a lodge. *Contra Howard v. Henriques*, 3 Sandf. 725,

communicated to him in the course of a confidential employment. And it matters not in such cases whether the secrets be secrets

name of a hotel. However it would probably be agreed that if the proprietor e. g. of a hotel should license another to place the name of the hotel, for a certain time, upon coaches run by him, a different case would arise. *Deiz v. Lamb*, 6 Rob. (N. Y.) 537. A special right for the time would then be conferred upon the coach-owner at least towards the hotel-owner; which right would terminate, if not extended, at the end of the time agreed. And if the coach-owner should afterwards persist in using the name of the hotel as of *such right*, he could, it seems, be enjoined. *Ib.* Compare *Marsh v. Billings*, 7 Cush. 322.

With regard to the clearer case of the use of a family name it was said by Bruce, L. J., in *Burgess v. Burgess*, 3 DeG. M. & G. 896, 903, that all 'the Queen's subjects have a right, if they will, to manufacture and sell pickles and sauces, and not the less so that their fathers have done so before them. All the Queen's subjects have a right to sell them in their own name, and not the less so that they bear the same name as their fathers.' See also *Holloway v. Holloway*, 13 Beav. 209; *Rodgers v. Nowill*, 6 Hare, 325; *Edleston v. Vick*, 23 Eng. L. & E. 51, 57; s. c. 18 Jur. 7; *Singer Manuf. Co. v. Loog*, 18 Ch. D. 395, 412. But even in such a case fraud will give a right to relief. *Sykes v. Sykes*, 3 Barn. & C. 541.

Perhaps the general test in doubtful cases of names, of the right of exclusive appropriation at the outset, may lie in the question whether the use of the words by another would have the obvious or perhaps the natural effect to injure the plaintiff materially. See *Day v. Brownrigg*, 10 Ch. D. 294, 303, *Jessel, M. R.* That would clearly be a proper test

on a question of resemblance. *Singer Manuf. Co. v. Loog*, 18 Ch. D. 395, 417.

But it seems that names not in the first instance capable in law of exclusive appropriation may become individual property under certain circumstances, as where they have been used by the plaintiff alone for a long time and have come to be understood generally as designating a certain particular kind or quality of goods or property. *Newman v. Alvord*, 51 N. Y. 189; *Congress Spring Co. v. High Rock Spring Co.*, 45 N. Y. 291; *Magee Furnace Co. v. Le Barron*, 127 Mass. 115; *Wotherspoon v. Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; *Radde v. Norman*, L. R. 14 Eq. 348. In the last-named case, at p. 355, *Wickens, V. C.*, says, 'I must treat the case therefore as one in which the plaintiffs have established prima facie what I admit to be a very difficult title to establish, — a title to the exclusive use of a particular word as a trade-mark.' But he was not willing to admit that such a title would have been considered established, for the purpose of an injunction, against one who had used the name in ignorance of the plaintiffs' claim. The case is therefore clear authority, as already cited, for the rule that if the words are not naturally capable of exclusive use, fraud must be shown even for an injunction. *Rodgers v. Nowill*, 6 Hare, 325.

A few special cases may now be enumerated in which the use of particular words, marks, or the like has been enjoined or considered: 'The original.' *Cocks v. Chandler*, L. R. 11 Eq. 446. 'Only genuine.' *James v. James*, L. R. 13 Eq. 421. 'Charter Oak' stoves. *Filley v. Fassett*, 44 Mo. 168. 'Magee Advance.' *Magee Furnace Co. v. Le Barron*, 127 Mass.

of trade, or secrets of title, or any other secrets of the party important to his interests.¹ (a)

953. Before closing this subject we shall now proceed to state a few other cases of special injunctions, in order more fully to illustrate the nature and limits of the jurisdiction, and the importance of it to prevent a total failure of remedial justice. There are for instance many cases in which Courts of Equity will interfere by injunction to prevent the sales of real estates; as to restrain the vendor from selling to the prejudice of the vendee, pending a bill for the specific performance of a contract respecting an estate; for it might put the latter to the expense of

¹ *Cholmondeley v. Clinton*, 19 Ves. 261, 267; *Evitt v. Price*, 1 Sim. R. 483; *Yovatt v. Winyard*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 394.

115. 'Ainsworth's thread.' *Ainsworth v. Walmsley* L. R. 1 Eq. 518. 'Coats' best six cord.' *Coats v. Holbrook*, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586. Name of a newspaper. *Kelly v. Hutton*, L. R. 3 Ch. 703. A system of numerals or letters. *Gillott v. Esterbrook*, 48 N. Y. 374; *Crawshay v. Thompson*, 4 Man. & G. 357; *Gillott v. Kettle*, 3 Duer, 624; *Glen Manuf. Co. v. Hall*, 61 N. Y. 226; *Coats v. Holbrook*, supra; *Lawrence Manuf. Co. v. Lowell Mills*, 129 Mass. 325; *Boardman v. Meriden Co.*, 35 Conn. 402; *Magee Furnace Co. v. Le Barron*, supra. But see *Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Spear*, 2 Sandf. 599 (letters of the alphabet). Imitation of sheet music of a song sung by a particular singer at a popular theatre. *Chappell v. Sheard*, 2 Kay & J. 117; *Chappell v. Davidson*, Ib. 123 (the fact of shopmen being cationed to explain was disregarded). Imitation of the titlepage of a book. *Metzler v. Wood*, 8 Ch. D. 606. An advertisement calculated to make the public believe that the party is the same as or successor to another person or firm. *Colton v. Thomas*, 2 Brewst. 308. See *Reeves v. Dénicé*, 12 Abb. Pr. n. s. 92.

An injunction may be granted against the use of a mark though it

is used only in a foreign market. *Orr v. Johnston*, 13 Ch. D. 434 (C. A.).

It is laid down that where particular labels are made and sold for legitimate purposes, the court will not restrain the printing and sale of them until the party who claims to be aggrieved has established his right at law. *Farina v. Silverlock*, 6 DeG. M. & G. 214; s. c. in a later stage somewhat qualifying the first decision, 4 Kay & J. 650.

If the plaintiff's own mark or device is a deceptive misrepresentation, no injunction will be granted. *Manhattan Co. v. Wood*, 108 U. S. 218; *Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co.*, 4 DeG. J. & S. 137; s. c. 11 H. L. Cas. 523; *Connell v. Reed*, 128 Mass. 477; *Palmer v. Harris*, 60 Penn. St. 156; *Marshall v. Ross*, L. R. 8 Eq. 651; *Pidding v. How*, 8 Sim. 477; *Perry v. Truefitt*, 6 Beav. 66; *Smith v. Woodruff*, 48 Barb. 438. The mere unauthorized use of the word 'patent' however will not necessarily be fatal. *Sykes v. Sykes*, 3 Barn. & C. 541; *Ford v. Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611; *Marshall v. Ross*, supra.

(a) *Morrison v. Moat*, 15 Jur. 787; *Williams v. Williams*, 3 Mer. 159; *Green v. Folghamb*, 1 Sim. & S. 398.

making the purchaser a party, in order to give perfect security to his title.¹

954. In like manner sales may be restrained in all cases where they are inequitable, or may operate as a fraud upon the rights or interests of third persons; as in cases of trusts and special authorities, where the party is abusing his trust or authority.² And where sales have been made to satisfy certain trusts and purposes, and there is danger of a misapplication of the proceeds, Courts of Equity will also restrain the purchaser from paying over the purchase-money.³ (a)

955. Cases of injunctions against a transfer of stocks, of annuities, of ships, and of negotiable instruments furnish an appropriate illustration of the same principle;⁴ as also do injunctions to restrain husbands from transferring property in fraud of the legal or equitable rights of their wives.⁵

955 a. The question has been made, how far a Court of Equity has jurisdiction to interfere in cases of public functionaries who are exercising special public trusts or functions. As to this the established doctrine now is that so long as those functionaries strictly confine themselves within the exercise of those duties which are confided to them by the law, this court will not interfere. The court will not interfere to see whether any alteration or regulation which they may direct is good or bad; but if they are departing from that power which the law has vested in them, if they are assuming to themselves a power over property which the law does not give them, this court no longer considers them

¹ *Echliff v. Baldwin*, 16 Ves. 267; *Curtis v. Marquis of Buckingham*, 3 Ves. & B. 168; *Daly v. Kelly*, 4 Dow, R. 440; ante, §§ 406, 908.

² *Anon.* 6 Madd. R. 10.

³ *Green v. Lowes*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 217; *Mathews v. Jones*, 2 Anst. R. 506; *Hawkshaw v. Parkins*, 2 Swanst. 549; *Hine v. Handy*, 1 John. Ch. R. 6.

⁴ *Terry v. Harrison*, Bunb. R. 289; *Chedworth v. Edwards*, 8 Ves. 46; *Stead v. Clay*, 1 Sim. 294; *Hood v. Aston*, 1 Russ. R. 412; *Thompson v. Smith*, 1 Madd. R. 395; *Rogers v. Rogers*, 1 Anst. R. 174; ante, § 907.

⁵ *Anon.* 9 Mod. 43; *Eden on Injunctions*, ch. 14, pp. 295, 296; *Roberts v. Roberts*, 2 Cox, 422; *Flight v. Cook*, 2 Ves. 619; 1 Eq. Abridg. 360, pl. 5; ante, § 847, and note 4; *Cadogan v. Kennet*, Cowp. R. 436.

(a) So equity will interfere, when necessary, to prevent a defendant from affecting property in litigation by contracts, conveyances, or other acts. *Shrewsbury Ry. Co. v. Shrewsbury & B. Ry. Co.*, 4 Eng. L. & E. 171; s. c. 15 Jur. 548; *Great Western Ry. Co. v. Birmingham Ry. Co.*, 2 Phill. 597.

as acting under the authority of their commission, but treats them, whether they be a corporation or individuals, merely as persons dealing with property without legal authority.¹ (a)

956. We have already had occasion to take notice of the granting of injunctions in the case of persons having future interests in chattels, as in remainder after an immediate estate for life.² The same principle is applied to cases of personal property bequeathed as heirlooms, or settled in trust to go with particular estates. Thus for example household furniture, plate, pictures, statues, books, and libraries are often bequeathed or settled in trust to go with the title of certain family mansions and estates. In such cases Courts of Equity will enforce a due observance of the trust, and restrain the parties having a present possession from wasting the property or doing any acts inconsistent with the trust.³

957. Injunctions will also be granted to restrain the sailing of a ship upon the application of a part-owner whose share is unascertained, in order to ascertain that share, and to obtain the usual security given in the Admiralty for the due return of the ship.⁴ So they will be granted against the removal of timber which has been wrongfully cut down.⁵

958. Injunctions will also be granted to compel the due observance of personal covenants where there is no effectual remedy at law.⁶ Thus in the old case of the parish bell where certain persons owning a house in the neighborhood of a church entered into an agreement to erect a cupola and clock in consideration that the bell should not be rung at five o'clock in the morning to their

¹ *Frewin v. Lewis*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 254.

² Ante, §§ 843, 844.

³ Ante, §§ 843, 844, and note, § 845; *Cadogan v. Kennet*, Cowp. 435, 436; Co. Litt. 20 a; Hargrave's note (5).

⁴ *Haly v. Goodson*, 2 Meriv. R. 77; *Christie v. Craig*, 2 Meriv. R. 137; *Abbott on Shipp.* Pt. 1, ch. 3, §§ 4, 5.

⁵ *Anon.* 1 Ves. jr. 93.

⁶ Ante, §§ 710, 718, 721, 722, 850.

(a) As to injunctions against the Executive, and against public officers generally see *Mississippi v. Johnson*, 4 Wall. 475; *Gaines v. Thompson*, 7 Wall. 347; *Graham v. Horton*, 6 Kans. 343; *Galloway v. Jenkins*, 63 N. Car. 147; *Missouri R. Co. v. Commissioners*, 12 Kans. 230; *Murray v. Claren-*

don, L. R. 9 Eq. 11; *Attorney-Gen. v. Kirk*, L. R. 14 Eq. 558; *People v. Canal Board*, 55 N. Y. 390; *Lane v. Morrill*, 51 N. H. 422; *Beebe v. Robinson*, 52 Ala. 66, 75; *Vavasseur v. Krupp*, 9 Ch. D. 351 (foreign sovereign).

disturbance. The agreement being violated, an injunction was afterwards granted to prevent the bell being rung at that hour.¹ (a) Upon the same ground a celebrated play-writer who had covenanted not to write any dramatic performances for another theatre, was by injunction restrained from violating the covenant.² (b) So an author who had sold his copyright in a work and covenanted not to publish any other to its prejudice was restrained by injunction from so doing.³ (c)

959. Courts of Equity also interfere and effectuate their own decrees in many cases by injunctions in the nature of a judicial writ or execution for possession of the property in controversy; as for example by injunctions to yield up, deliver, quiet, or continue the possession, followed up by a writ of assistance.⁴ In-

¹ *Martin v. Nutkin*, 2 P. Will. 266.

² *Morris v. Colman*, 18 Ves. 437; *Clark v. Price*, 2 Wils. Ch. R. 157. But a Court of Equity will not decree a specific performance of a contract by an actor, that he would act twenty-four nights at a particular theatre during a certain period of time, and that he would not in the mean time act at any other theatre in the same town. *Kemble v. Kean*, 6 Simons, R. 333. And as it would not decree a specific performance in such a case, the Vice-Chancellor thought it ought not to restrain the defendant from acting at another theatre, that is, from breaking the negative part of his covenant. In his judgment the Vice-Chancellor commented at large upon the cases of *Morris v. Colman* and *Clark v. Price*, from which he labored to distinguish the case before him. His reasoning, it must be confessed, has not relieved the subject from all doubt. *Ibid.* See also *Kimberley v. Jennings*, 6 Sim. R. 340.

³ *Barfield v. Nicholson*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 1; *Kimberley v. Jennings*, 6 Sim. 340.

⁴ *Stribley v. Hawkie*, 3 Atk. 275; *Penn v. Lord Baltimore*, 1 Ves. 454; *Dove v. Dove*, 1 Cox, R. 101; s. c. 1 Bro. Ch. R. 373; 2 Dick. 617; *Huguenin*

(a) See *Soltau v. De Held*, 2 Sim. n. s. 133.

(b) Compare *Lumley v. Wagner*, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604; ante, p. 35, note.

(c) In *Stevens v. Benning*, 6 DeG. M. & G. 223, publishers had agreed with an author to print, reprint, and publish a work at their own risk, the author to make all necessary alterations and additions in future editions, which were to be published on the same terms. After several changes in the partners of the publishing house, and the bankruptcy of the last survivor, the assignees, with the solvent members of the new firm, to whom the work had been assigned by their

predecessors, assigned to other publishers all the interest of the firm in the work and all the unsold copies. Upon these facts it was held that the purchasers were not entitled to an injunction to restrain the publication of a new edition by another publisher with the author's concurrence. See also *Jarrold v. Heywood*, 18 Week. R. 279; *Pike v. Nicholas*, *Ib.* 321; s. c. L. R. 5 Ch. 251; *Morris v. Morris*, 18 Week. R. 327; *Reade v. Bentley*, 3 Kay & J. 278; s. c. 4 Kay & J. 656; *Taylor v. Pillow*, L. R. 7 Eq. 418; *Paige v. Banks*, 7 Blatchf. 152; s. c. 13 Wall. 608.

junctions of this sort are older than the time of Lord Bacon, since in his Ordinances they are treated as a well-known process. Indeed they have been distinctly traced back to the reign of Elizabeth and Edward the Sixth, and even of Henry the Eighth.¹ In some respects they bear an analogy to sequestrations; but the latter process, at least since the reign of James the First, has been applied not merely to the lands in controversy in the cause but also to other lands of the party.²

959 *a*. It has been already suggested that the granting or refusing of injunctions is a matter resting in the sound discretion of a Court of Equity;³ and consequently no injunction will be granted whenever it will operate oppressively, or inequitably, or contrary to the real justice of the case; or where it is not the fit and appropriate mode of redress under all the circumstances of the case; or where it will or may work an immediate mischief or fatal injury. Thus for example no injunction will be granted to restrain a nuisance by the erection of a building, where the erection has been acquiesced in or encouraged by the party seeking the relief.⁴ (*a*) So it will not be granted in cases of gross laches or delay by the party seeking the relief in enforcing his rights; as for example where in case of a patent or a copyright the patentee has lain by and allowed the violation to go on for a *v. Baseley*, 15 Ves. 180; *Roberdeau v. Rous*, 1 Atk. 549; *Kershaw v. Thompson*, 4 John. Ch. R. 612 to 618.

¹ *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 17, pp. 363, 364; *Id.* App. 380; *Beam. Ord. Ch.* 15, 16; *Kershaw v. Thompson*, 4 John. Ch. R. 612 to 618. It has been remarked by Mr. Chancellor Kent in his *Commentaries* (4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 191, 192, 3d edit.) that, 'Upon a decree for a sale [of mortgaged property] it is usual to insert a direction that the mortgagor deliver up possession to the purchaser. But whether it be or be not a part of the decree, a Court of Equity has competent power to require by injunction, and enforce by process of execution, delivery of possession; and the power is founded upon the simple elementary principle that the power of the court to apply the remedy is co-extensive with its jurisdiction over the subject-matter.' He cites among other cases *Dove v. Dove*, 2 Dick. 617; s. c. 1 Bro. Ch. R. 373, and *Belt's* note; s. c. 1 Cox, R. 101; *Kershaw v. Thompson*, 4 John. Ch. R. 609. In this last case the whole of the leading authorities were historically and critically examined.

² *Ibid.* and note (*c*), p. 363; *Beames, Ord. Chan.* 16, and note 55; *Barton, Suit in Eq.* 87; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 163; *Hide v. Petit*, 1 Ch. Cas. 91.

³ *Ante*, §§ 862, 863; *Bacon v. Jones*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 433; *Bramwell v. Halcomb*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 737.

⁴ *Williams v. Earl of Jersey*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 91.

(*a*) Secus of merely locating near a low's L. C. Torts, 467; *ante*, p. 233, nuisance. *St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping*, 11 H. L. Cas. 642; *Bige-*

note (*b*).

long time without objection or seeking redress.¹ On the other hand a covenant may be of such a nature as ought not in equity to be specifically enforced by an injunction in consideration of the unreasonable and inconvenient consequences which may ensue therefrom. Thus where it was covenanted by the lessee of an inn that he would keep it open and not discontinue it, the court refused to grant an injunction to enforce the specific performance of the covenant.² It is obvious that the granting of the injunction in such a case might be utterly useless, and moreover be attended with ruinous consequences to the lessee. Upon similar principles a Court of Equity will not by injunction compel a person to fulfil a contract to write dramatic performances for a particular theatre;³ or to act a certain number of nights at a particular theatre;⁴ (a) or to furnish maps which the plaintiff is to have the sole privilege of engraving and publishing.⁵

959 *b*. It may be remarked in conclusion, upon the subject of special injunctions, that Courts of Equity constantly decline to lay down any rule which shall limit their power and discretion as

¹ *Saunders v. Smith*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 711; *Lewis v. Chapman*, 3 Beav. 133.

² *Hooper v. Brodrick*, 11 Simons, R. 47. On this occasion the Vice-Chancellor said: 'The court ought not to have restrained the defendant from discontinuing to use and keep open the demised premises as an inn, which is the same in effect as ordering him to carry on the business of an innkeeper; but it might have restrained him from doing, or causing or permitting to be done, any act which would have put it out of his power, or the power of any other person, to carry on that business on the premises. It is not however shown that the defendant has threatened, or intends to do, or to cause or permit to be done, any act whereby the licenses may become forfeited or be refused; and therefore the injunction must be dissolved.' (*b*)

³ *Morris v. Colman*, 18 Ves. 437; *Clark v. Price*, 2 Wils. Ch. R. 157.

⁴ *Kemble v. Kean*, 6 Simons, R. 333.

⁵ *Baldwin v. Society for Diffusing Useful Knowledge*, 9 Simons, R. 393.

(a) See however *Lumley v. Wagner*, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604; ante, p. 35, note.

(b) Equity will, it seems, enjoin the expulsion of a member of a company owning property, though the proposed expulsion is for misconduct, unless the accused is given a proper opportunity to defend himself. *Russell v. Russell*, 14 Ch. D. 471, 478; *Wood v. Woad*, L. R. 9 Ex. 190. See *Blisset v. Daniel*, 10 Hare, 493; *O'Hara v. Stack*, 90 Penn. St. 477 (removal of a priest by his bishop). Secus of an association having no property, and

formed for purposes of pleasure, or for prosecuting scientific or philanthropic pursuits. *Rigby v. Connol*, 14 Ch. D. 482, 487.

A pastor lawfully dismissed from his church may be enjoined from attempting to continue his ministrations. *Cooper v. Gordon*, L. R. 8 Eq. 249. See *First Church v. Stewart*, 43 Ill. 81; *Reformed Soc. v. Draper*, 97 Mass. 349; *Gilbert v. Arnold*, 30 Md. 29; *Sarver's Appeal*, 81 * Penn. St. 183; *Lutheran Church v. Maschop*, 2 Stockt. 57.

to the particular cases in which such injunctions shall be granted or withheld. And there is wisdom in this course; for it is impossible to foresee all the exigencies of society which may require their aid and assistance to protect rights or redress wrongs. The jurisdiction of these courts thus operating by way of special injunction is manifestly indispensable for the purposes of social justice in a great variety of cases, and therefore should be fostered and upheld by a steady confidence. At the same time it must be admitted that the exercise of it is attended with no small danger both from its summary nature and its liability to abuse. It ought therefore to be guarded with extreme caution and applied only in very clear cases; otherwise instead of becoming an instrument to promote the public as well as private welfare, it may become a means of extensive and perhaps of irreparable injustice.¹

¹ See the pointed remarks of Lord Cottenham on this subject, in *Brown v. Newall*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 570, 571. See also Lord Brougham's remarks in the case of the Earl of Ripon *v. Hobart*, 1 Cooper, Sel. Cases, 333; s. c. 3 Mylne & Keen, 169. Mr. Justice Baldwin, in *Bouaparte v. Camden & Amboy Railroad Company*, 1 Baldwin's Cir. R. 218, made the following remarks on the same subject: 'There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where Courts of Law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction. But that will not be awarded in doubtful cases, or new ones not coming within well-established principles; for if it issues erroneously, an irreparable injury is inflicted for which there can be no redress, it being the act of a court, not of the party who prays for it. It will be refused till the court are satisfied that the case before them is of a right about to be destroyed, irreparably injured, or great and lasting injury about to be done by an illegal act. In such a case the court owes it to its snitors and its own principles to administer the only remedy which the law allows to prevent the commission of such act. We know of no rule which excludes from this process any person over whom the court has jurisdiction on account of the character or capacity in which he acts, although it is conferred upon him by a law of a State or of Congress.' Railways have recently given rise to many questions as to the duty of Courts of Equity to interfere and prevent mischiefs to private property by an excess or abuse or misapplication of the corporate powers of the companies. See Nicoll & Hare's Reports of Cases relating to Railways, where the recent decisions are collected. See also *Barnard v. Wallis*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 85; *Durham and Sunderland Railway Co. v. Wawn*, 3 Beav. R. 119. (a)

(a) 'An interlocutory application running their trains is monstrous.' to restrain a railway company from *Latimer v. Aylesbury Ry. Co.*, 9 Ch.

D. 385, James, L. J. See *Pell v. Northampton Ry. Co.*, L. R. 2 Ch. 100. The application of injunctions to railroad companies may be seen in the following cases: *Delaware R. Co. v. Raritan R. Co.*, 1 C. E. Green, 321 (against illegal connections); *Delaware R. Co. v. Erie R. Co.*, 6 C. E. Green, 298; *Attorney-Gen. v. Ely*, L. R. 6 Eq. 106 (injunction against changing road for convenience of public refused); *In re Palmer*, L. R. 1 C. P. 588; 6 C. P. 194; *In re Parkinson*, L. R. 6 C. P. 554; *Great Western Ry. Co. v. Sutton*, L. R. 4 H. L. 226 (these English cases being injunctions against granting privileges, contrary to statute); *Cumberland R. Co.'s Appeal*, 62 Penn. St. 218; *Rogers Locom. Works v. Erie Ry. Co.*, 5 C. E. Green, 379; *Stewart v. E. Transp. Co.*, 17 Minn. 372.

CHAPTER XXIV.

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. — EXPRESS TRUSTS.

960. HAVING taken this general survey of Equity Jurisprudence in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, we shall in the next place proceed to the consideration of another head proposed in these Commentaries, that of EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. And this again, like the former head, is divisible into two branches, the one dependent upon the subject-matter, the other upon the nature of the remedy to be administered. The former comprehends TRUSTS in the largest and most general sense of the word, whether they are express or implied, direct or constructive, created by the parties or resulting by operation of law. The latter comprehends all those processes or remedies which are peculiar and exclusive in Courts of Equity, and through the instrumentality of which they endeavor to reach the purposes of justice in a manner unknown or unattainable at law.

961. And in the first place let us examine the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in matters of trust in the general sense above alluded to, which will be found directly or remotely to embrace most of the subjects of their exclusive jurisdiction. It has been well observed that the principles of law which guide the decisions of the Courts of Common Law were principally formed in times when the necessities of men were few and their ingenuity was little exercised to supply their wants. Hence it has happened that there are many rights according to the principles of natural and universal justice for injuries to which the law as administered by those courts has provided no remedy. This is particularly the case in matters of trust and confidence of which the ordinary Courts of Law in a vast variety of instances take no cognizance. The positive law being

silent on the subject, Courts of Equity, considering the conscience of the party intrusted as bound to perform the trust, have, to prevent a total failure of justice, interfered to compel the performance of it.¹ And as they will compel the performance of the trust, so on the other hand they will assist the trustees and protect them in the due performance of the trust whenever they seek the aid and direction of the court as to the establishment, the management, or the execution of it.²

962. For the most part indeed matters of trust and confidence are exclusively cognizable in Courts of Equity; there being few cases except bailments, and rights founded in contract and remedial by an action of assumpsit and especially by an action for money had and received, in which a remedy can be administered in the Courts of Law.³ Thus for example a debt or chose in action is not generally assignable at law except in case of negotiable instruments.⁴ And hence the assignee is ordinarily compellable to seek redress against the assignor and the debtor solely in Courts of Equity.⁵ (a)

963. It is not within the design of these Commentaries to enter upon a minute examination of the nature and peculiarities of trusts as known to English Jurisprudence, or to attempt by any development of the history of their rise and progress to ascertain the exact boundaries of the jurisdiction at present exercised over them. In general it may be said that trusts constitute a very important and comprehensive branch of Equity Jurisprudence; and that where the remedy in regard to them ends at law, there the exclusive jurisdiction in equity for the most part begins.

964. A trust in the most enlarged sense in which that term is used in English Jurisprudence may be defined to be an equitable right, title, or interest in property real or personal, distinct from the legal ownership thereof.⁶ In other words the legal owner

¹ Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 4; Id. 133.

² Id. 134.

³ Cooper on Eq. Pl. Introd. p. 27; 3 Black. Comm. 432; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (a); *Sturt v. Mellish*, 2 Atk. 610; Co. Litt. 290 b; Butler's note, 246, § xv.

⁴ Post, § 1039.

⁵ Com. Dig. Assignment, C. 1; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2, H.; Post, § 1057.

⁶ Lord Hardwicke, in *Sturt v. Mellish* (2 Atk. 612), said: 'A trust is where there is such a confidence between parties that no action at law will lie, but is merely a case for the consideration of this court.'

(a) This statement would now be too broad.

holds the direct and absolute dominion over the property in the view of the law ; but the income, profits, or benefits thereof in his hands belong wholly or in part to others. The legal estate in the property is thus made subservient to certain uses, benefits, or charges in favor of others ; and these uses, benefits, or charges constitute the trusts which Courts of Equity will compel the legal owner as trustee to perform in favor of the cestui que trust or beneficiary. Three things are said to be indispensable to constitute a valid trust : first, sufficient words to raise it ; secondly, a definite subject ; and thirdly, a certain or ascertained object.¹

965. It is in the highest degree probable that those trusts which are exclusively cognizable in Courts of Equity were in their origin derived from the Roman law, being very similar in their nature to the Fidei Commissa of that law. (*a*) As the jurisdiction of a peculiar prætor (*b*) was created for the express purpose of protecting property fidei commissum, so the jurisdiction of our Courts of Equity, if not created, was soon extended for the purpose of protecting and enforcing the execution of trusts.² Indeed it is impossible to suppose that in any country professing to have an enlightened jurisprudence, obligations and trusts in regard to property binding in conscience and duty, and which ex æquo et bono the party ought to perform, should be left without any positive means of securing their due fulfilment ; or that they might be violated without rebuke or evaded with impunity.

966. In the Institutes of Justinian a summary account is given of the origin and nature of the Roman Fidei Commissa. It is there observed that anciently all trusts were infirm (precarious) ; for no man could without his own consent be compelled to perform what he was requested to do. But when testators were unable directly to bequeath an inheritance or legacy to certain persons, if they did bequeath it to them they gave it in trust to other persons who were capable of taking it by will. And therefore such bequests were called trusts (Fidei commissa) because they could not be enforced by law, but depended solely on

¹ *Cruwys v. Colman*, 9 Ves. 323.

² 2 Foulbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 1, note (*a*) ; 2 Black. Comm. 327, 328.

(*a*) The origin of trusts in the early Germanic sources. 1 Law Quarterly Rev. 162.

Justice Holmes to be traceable to (*b*) 'Prætor proprius.' Inst. lib. 2, tit. 23, § 1.

the honor of those to whom they were entrusted. Afterwards the Emperor Augustus having been frequently solicited in favor of particular persons either on account of the solemn adjurations of the party, or on account of the gross perfidy of other persons, commanded the consuls to interpose their authority. This, being a just and popular order, was by degrees converted into a permanent jurisdiction. So great indeed was the favor in which trusts were held, that at length a special prætor was created to pronounce judgment in cases of trusts; and hence he was called the commissary of trusts (*Fidei Commissarius*¹).

967. This brief sketch of the origin and nature of trusts in the civil law does in a very striking manner illustrate the origin and nature of trusts in the common law of England in regard to real property. It has been well remarked by Mr. Justice Blackstone that uses and trusts in English Jurisprudence are in their original of a nature very similar or rather exactly the same, answering more to the *Fidei commissum* than to the *Usus fructus* of the civil law; (*a*) the latter being the temporary right of using a thing, without having the ultimate property or full dominion of the substance.²

968. Lord Coke, in describing the nature of a use or trust in land according to the common law, uses the following language: 'A use is a trust or confidence reposed in some other which is not issuing out of the land, but as a thing collateral annexed in privacy to the estate of the land and to the person touching the land; scilicet, that *cestui que use* (the beneficiary) shall take the profit, and that the *terre-tenant* shall make an estate according to his direction. So as *cestui qui use* had neither *jus in re* nor *jus ad rem*, but only a confidence and trust for which he had no remedy by the common law, but for breach of trust his remedy was by *subpœna in chancery*.'³ Thus we see that the original fiduciary estate from its nature imported a right to the enjoyment of the profits of the land as distinct from the *seisin* of the land and the rights issuing thereout.

¹ Inst. B. 2, tit. 23, § 1, Vinn. ad Inst. h. t. Comm.; 2 Black. Comm. 327, 328; Bac. on Uses, 19.

² Black. Comm. 327; Bac. on Uses, 19.

³ Co. Litt. 272 *b.*; Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 121 *a. b.*; Bac. Abridg. Uses and Trusts, A. B.; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 1, § 2; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W.; Fisher v. Fields, 10 John. Rep. 505, 506.

(*a*) But see Markby, Elements of Law, §§ 336, 814 (3d edit.).

969. The introduction of uses and trusts into England has been generally attributed to the ingenuity of the clergy in order to escape from the prohibitions of the Mortmain Acts. But whether this be the true origin of them or not, it is very certain that the general convenience of them in subserving the common interests of society, as well as in enabling parties to escape from forfeitures in times of civil commotion, soon gave them an extensive public approbation and secured their permanent adoption into the system of English Jurisprudence.¹ And they have since been applied to a great variety of cases which never could have been in the contemplation of those who originally introduced them ; but which nevertheless are the natural attendants upon a refined and cultivated state of society where wealth is widely diffused and the necessities and conveniences of families, of commerce, and even of the ordinary business of human life require that trusts should be established, temporary or permanent, limited or general, to meet the changes of past times as well as to provide for the exigencies of times to come.

970. According to the spirit of over-nice and curious learning belonging to the age, uses in lands upon their introduction into English Jurisprudence were refined upon with many elaborate distinctions,² to cure the mischiefs arising from which the Statute of Uses of 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10 was enacted, the general intent of which was to transfer the use into possession and to make the cestui que use complete owner of the lands as well at law as in equity.³ But as the statute did not in its terms apply to all sorts of uses, and was construed not to apply to uses engrafted on uses (which constitute one great class of modern trusts in lands), it failed in a great measure to accomplish the ends for which it was designed.⁴ Thus for example it was held not to apply to trusts or uses created upon terms of years, or to trusts of a nature requiring the trustee still to hold out the estate in order to perform the trusts, and generally not to trusts created in relation to mere personal property.⁵

¹ 2 Black. Comm. 328, 329; Bac. Abridg. Uses and Trusts, A. B.; Gilb. Lex Prætor. 259, 260. See also *Lloyd v. Spillet*, 2 Atk. 149, 150; *Hopkins v. Hopkins*, 1 Atk. 591; ante, § 48.

² 2 Black. Comm. 330.

³ 2 Black. Comm. 332, 333; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, §§ 2, 3; Butler's note 231 to Co. Litt. 271 b.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ 2 Black. Comm. 335 to 337; *Sympson v. Turner*, 1 Eq. Abridg. 383; But-

971. In regard to uses it seems formerly to have been a matter of considerable doubt whether at the common law they could be raised by parol, or even by writing without a seal. Lord Chief Baron Gilbert has extracted a distinction from the different cases which will in some measure reconcile their apparent contrariety. It is in effect that a use might be raised at the common law by parol upon any conveyance which operated by way of transmutation of possession, or passed the possession by some solemn act, such as a feoffment, since the estate itself might by the common law pass by a parol feoffment, and therefore by the same reason a use of the estate might be declared by parol. But where a deed was requisite to the passing of the estate itself, there a deed was also necessary for the declaration of the uses. Thus for example a man could not covenant to stand seised to a use without a deed.¹

972. However this may have been, the Statute of Frauds of 29 Charles II. ch. 3, § 7 (which has been generally adopted in America) requires all declarations or creations of trusts or confidences of any lands, tenements, and hereditaments to be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party entitled to declare such trusts, or by his last will in writing. (a) The statute excepts trusts arising, transferred, or extinguished by operation of law; and from its terms it is apparent that it does not extend to declarations of trusts of personalty.² (b) Neither

ler's note (1) to Co. Litt. 290 *b*, and to Co. Litt. 271 *b*, note (1) iii. § 5; Bac. Abridg. Uses and Trusts, B., C., D., G., 2 H.; Id. Trusts, A.; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 1, § 4; 2 Wooddes. Lect. 29, pp. 295 to 297. It is said that a tenant by the curtesy cannot stand seised to a use, for he is in by the act of law in consideration of marriage, and not in privity of estate; and for a like reason also tenant in dower by the better opinion cannot stand seised to a use. Sanders on Uses, ch. 1, § 11, pp. 62, 63; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 6, § 1, note (a). But in equity such a tenant would nevertheless be affected by the use or trust.

¹ Gilb. Uses, 270, 271; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 1, note (b); Id. § 3.

² Ante, § 793 *a*; post, §§ 987, 1040; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 2, § 4, and note

(a) A verbal agreement by a grantee to hold premises, voluntarily conveyed to him, to the benefit of the grantor raises no trust. *Titcomb v. Morrill*, 10 Allen, 15; *Eaton v. Eaton*, 35 N. J. 290. See also *Bedilian v. Seaton*, 3 Wall. jr. 279; *Harper v. Harper*, 5 Bush, 176; *Minot v. Mitchell*, 30 Ind. 228; *Smith v. Hollenback*,

51 Ill. 223; *Lantry v. Lantry*, Ib. 458. If however it would work a fraud to deny the trust, the statute cannot be relied upon. *Haigh v. Kaye*, L. R. 7 Ch. 469; *Foote v. Foote*, 58 Barb. 258. See *Bedilian v. Seaton*, supra.

(b) *Danser v. Warwick*, 33 N. J. Eq. 133; *Barkley v. Lane*, 6 Bush, 587. Such a trust must be clearly

does it prescribe any particular form or solemnity in writing, nor that the writing should be under seal. Hence any writing sufficiently evincive of a trust, as a letter or other writing of a trustee stating the trust, or any language in writing clearly expressive of a trust intended by the party, although in the form of a desire, or a request, or a recommendation, will create a trust by implication.¹ (a) And where a trust is created for the benefit of a third person, although without his knowledge, he may afterwards affirm it and enforce the execution of it in his own favor,² (b) at least if it has not in the intermediate time been revoked by the person who has created the trust.³ (c)

(x); *Nab v. Nab*, 10 Mod. 404; *Fordyce v. Willis*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 586; 2 Black. Comm. 337; *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 506.

¹ 2 Foulb. Eq. B. 2, ch. 2, § 4, and note (x), and cases there cited; *Crook v. Brooking*, 3 Vern. 106, 107; *Inchiquin v. French*, 1 Cox, 1; *Smith v. Atter-soll*, 1 Russ. R. 266.

² *Cumberland (Duke of) v. Codrington*, 3 John. Ch. R. 261; *Shepherd v. McEvers*, 4 John. Ch. R. 136; *Neilson v. Blight*, 1 John. Cas. 205; *Weston v. Barker*, 12 John. R. 276; *Moses v. Murgatroyd*, 1 John. Ch. R. 119, 473; *Nicoll v. Mumford*, 4 John. Ch. R. 529; ante, § 793 a; post, §§ 1073, note, 1040, 1042, 1196.

³ *Acton v. Woodgate*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 492. It is now clearly settled that if a debtor conveys property in trust for the benefit of his creditors, to whom the conveyance is not communicated, and the creditors are not in any manner parties or privy to the conveyance, the deed merely operates as a power to the trustees, which is revocable by the debtor, and has the same effect as if the debtor had delivered money to an agent to pay his creditors, and before any payment or communication with the creditors had recalled it. *Ibid.*; *Wallwyn v. Coutts*, 3 Meriv. R. 707; s. c. 3 Sim. R. 14; *Gerrard v. Lord Lander-*

shown. *Monroe v. Graves*, 23 Iowa, 597; *Crossman v. Crossman*, 23 Mich. 217. See *Turner v. Nye*, 7 Allen, 176; *Moore v. Pickett*, 62 Ill. 158. A valid trust in a mortgage debt may be created by parol, for though a trust thus created will not pass any interest in land held in pledge, it is good in respect of the debt, and will entitle the cestui que trust to the payment of the debt out of the proceeds of the sale of the land. *Danser v. Warwick*, 33 N. J. Eq. 133. See *Childs v. Jordan*, 106 Mass. 321.

(a) See *Barrell v. Joy*, 16 Mass. 221; *Baylies v. Payson*, 5 Allen, 473; *Urann v. Coates*, 109 Mass. 581;

Maffit v. Rynd, 69 Penn. St. 380; *De Laurencel v. De Boom*, 48 Cal. 581; *Bryan v. Howland*, 98 Ill. 625 (expression of a motive of a gift not enough); *Cook v. Barr*, 44 N. Y. 156; *Ivory v. Burns*, 56 Penn. St. 300; *Bancroft v. Consen*, 13 Allen, 50. A mere memorandum upon a ledger is not enough. *Homer v. Homer*, 107 Mass. 82. As to declarations of trust in Pennsylvania by married women see *Graham v. Long*, 65 Penn. St. 383.

(b) See *Walker v. Johnson*, 37 Texas, 127.

(c) As to the revocation of a trust see *Paul v. Paul*, 19 Ch. D. 47, doubting s. c. 15 Ch. D. 580.

973. Uses or trusts, to be raised by any covenant or agreement of a party in equity, must be founded upon some meritorious or some valuable consideration; for Courts of Equity will not enforce a mere gratuitous gift (*donum gratuitum*), or a mere moral obligation.¹ (*a*) Hence it is that if there be a mere voluntary executory trust created, Courts of Equity will not enforce it.² (*b*) And upon the same ground if two persons for a valuable consideration, as between themselves, covenant to do some act for the benefit of a third person who is a mere stranger to the consideration, he cannot enforce the covenant against the two, although each one might enforce it against the other.³ But it is otherwise in cases where the use or trust is already created and vested, or otherwise fixed in the *cestui que trust*, or where it is raised by a last will and testament.⁴ Thus for example if A should direct his debtor to hold the debt in trust for B, and the debtor should accept the trust, and communicate the fact to both A and B, the trust, although voluntary, would be enforced in favor of B and binding on A, for nothing remains to be done to fix the trust. (*c*) So if

dale, 3 Sim. R. 1; post, §§ 1036 *a*, 1044, 1045, 1046, 1196; *Maber v. Hobbs*, 2 Younge & Coll. 317, 327; *Wallwynn v. Coutts*, 3 Meriv. 708; *Lane v. Husband*, 14 Simons, R. 656.

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 2, and notes (*f*), (*g*), (*i*); 2 Bl. Comm. 330; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 8; *Colman v. Sarrel*, 1 Ves. jr. 53, 54; ante, §§ 433, 706 *a*, 787, 793 *a*; post, §§ 986, 987; *Colyear v. Countess of Mulgrave*, 2 Keen, 81, 97, 98; *Ellis v. Nimmo*, Lloyd & Goold Rep. 333; *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Sim. R. 324; *Gaskell v. Gaskell*, 2 Younge & Jerv. 502. But see ante, §§ 433, 706, 706 *a*; post, §§ 793, 973, 987, 1040 *b*.

² *Colyear v. Countess of Mulgrave*, 2 Keen, 81, 97, 98; *Collinson v. Patrick*, 2 Keen, R. 123, 134; *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Sim. R. 329; *Callagan v. Callagan*, 8 Clark & Fin. 374, 401.

³ *Ibid.*; *Sutton v. Chetwynd*, 3 Meriv. R. 249; 1 Turn. & Russ. 296.

⁴ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 6; *Id.* § 8, and note (*r*); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 2, notes (*f*), (*g*); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 9, note (*r*); *Lechmere v. Earl of Carlisle*, 3 P. Will. 222; *Austen v. Taylor*, Ambl. R. 376; *s. c.* 1 Eden, R. 361; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. R. 329; *Petre v. Espinasse*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 496; *Collinson v. Patrick*, 2 Keen, 123, 134; *Lewin on Trusts*, ch. 9, pp. 110 to 137.

(*a*) See *Carson v. Phelps*, 40 Md. 73. Though under seal. *Lamprey v. Lamprey*, 29 Minn. 151.

(*b*) See *Lloyd v. Brooks*, 34 Md. 27; *Swan v. Frick*, *Ib.* 139; *Jones v. Lock*, L. R. 1 Ch. 25; *Scales v. Maude*, 6 DeG. M. & G. 43.

(*c*) See *Adams v. Adams*, 21 Wall. 185 (that the trust will arise though the trustee did not know of the transaction at the time, and on hearing of it declined to act); *Craven v. Winter*, 38 Iowa, 472; *Pierce v. Brooks*, 52 Ga. 425.

A had declared himself trustee for B of the same debt, the same doctrine would apply.¹

974. Trusts in real property which are exclusively cognizable in equity are now in many respects governed by the same rules as the like estates at law, and afford a striking illustration of the maxim 'æquitas sequitur legem.' Thus for example they are descendible, devisable, and alienable; and heirs, devisees, and alienees may, and generally do, take therein the same interests in point of construction and duration, and they are affected by the same incidents, properties, and consequences, as would under like circumstances apply to similar estates at law.² We say gener-

¹ *McFadden v. Jenkins*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 152. See also *Stapleton v. Stapleton*, 14 Simons, R. 186.

² 2 Bl. Comm. 337; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 360; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 59, pp. 479, 480; 1 Wooddes. Lect. 7, p. 209; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, §§ 6, 7, and note (*n*); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 360, 361; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 3, §§ 5, 6, ch. 4, §§ 1, 2; *Fisher v. Fields*, 10 John. R. 494. The most remarkable deviation in executed trusts from the rules in relation to legal estates is, that a man may be tenant by the curtesy of a trust estate of his wife, but a woman is not entitled to dower in a trust estate of her husband. 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 4, § 1, and notes (*c*) and (*d*). Lord Redesdale, in *D'Arcy v. Blake* (2 Sch. & Lefr. 387), has given the best account of the origin of this anomaly. He there observed: 'The difficulty in which the Courts of Equity have been involved with respect to dower, I apprehend originally arose thus. They had assumed as a principle, in acting upon trusts, to follow the law. And according to this principle they ought in all cases where rights attached on legal estates to have attached the same rights upon trusts, and consequently to have given dower of an equitable estate. It was found however that in cases of dower this principle, if pursued to the utmost, would affect the titles to a large proportion of the estates in the country; for that parties had been acting on the footing of dower upon a contrary principle, and had supposed that by the creation of a trust the right of dower would be prevented from attaching. Many persons had purchased under this idea; and the country would have been thrown into the utmost confusion if Courts of Equity had followed their general rule with respect to trusts in the cases of dower. But the same objection did not apply to tenancy by the curtesy; for no person would purchase an estate subject to tenancy by the curtesy without the concurrence of the person in whom that right was vested. This I take to be the true reason of the distinction between dower and tenancy by the curtesy. It was necessary for the security of purchasers of mortgagees, and of other persons taking the legal estates, to depart from the general principle in case of dower, but it was not necessary in the case of tenancy by the curtesy. Pending the coverture, a woman could not aliene without her husband, and therefore nothing she could do could be understood by a purchaser to affect his interest. But where the husband was seised or entitled in his own right, he had full power of disposing except so far as dower might attach. And the general opinion having long been that dower was a mere legal right, and that as the existence of a trust estate previously

ally, because there are exceptions to the doctrine above stated. Thus for example the construction put upon executory trusts arising under agreements and wills sometimes differs in equity from that in regard to executed trusts.¹ And trusts in terms for years and personalty will be often recognized and enforced in equity, which would be wholly disregarded at law.²

974 *a*. Where a trust is created for the benefit of a party, it is not only alienable by him by his own proper act and conveyance, (*a*) but it is also liable to be disposed of by operation of law in invitum, like any other property; as for example by a general assignment under bankruptcy or insolvency, although

created prevented the right of dower [from] attaching at law, it would also prevent the property from all claim of dower in equity; and many titles depending on this opinion, it was found that it would be mischievous in this instance to the general principle that equity should follow the law. And it has been so long and so clearly settled that a woman should not have dower in equity who is not entitled at law, that it would be shaking everything to attempt to disturb the rule.³

¹ 3 Wooddes. Lect. 59, pp. 480, 481; Co. Litt. 290 *b*, Butler's note, 246, xiv.; ante, § 56; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 8, note (*s*); Fisher *v.* Fields, 10 John. R. 506. It has been well remarked that Courts of Equity take cognizance of trusts only when they are executory, or are not so executed as to be enforced at law. If therefore the trust is executed so that it is cognizable at law, and nothing more remains to be done by the trustee, Courts of Equity will leave the parties to their remedies at law. Baker *v.* Biddle, 1 Baldwin, Cir. R. 422.

² 2 Foul. Eq. B. 2, ch. 4, § 2, note (*d*); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 20; Id. ch. 3, § 1, note (*b*); Id. ch. 4, § 1, note (*f*); Id. ch. 6, § 8, note (*s*), § 9, note (*r*); Austen *v.* Taylor, Amb. 376; s. c. 1 Eden, R. 361; Messenburgh *v.* Ash, 1 Vern. 234, 304; Bac. Abridg. Uses and Trusts, G. § 2, p. 109, Guilim's edit.; Wood *v.* Burnham, 6 Paige, 513. Hence in executory trusts created by a will, the rule in Shelly's Case (as it is called) will not be strictly followed in equity, but the same construction will be had as governs in regard to marriage articles, if the same intent is apparent on the face of the will. There is however a distinction between marriage articles and executory trusts arising under wills, as to the inference of the intention of the parties. It is stated post, § 984. See Stonor *v.* Curwen, 5 Sim. R. 264; Roberts *v.* Dixwell, 1 West. R. 542; Countess of Lincoln *v.* Duke of Newcastle, 12 Ves. 227; Wood *v.* Burnham, 6 Paige, R. 513, 519; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 59, p. 218; post, §§ 983, 985. See also 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 6; Co. Litt. 290 *b*, Butler's note, 246. X.; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 360; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 5, 4 W. 19; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 31, 32; Id. pp. 53, 56, 62, 63; ante, § 56. Mr. Butler's note to Co. Litt. 290 *b* contains so valuable a summary of the general doctrine on this subject that it deserves to be here

(*a*) See Parker *v.* Converse, 5 Gray, 349; Palmer *v.* Stevens, 15 Gray, 343; 336; Sayre *v.* Sayre, 2 C. E. Green, Ames *v.* Clark, 106 Mass. 573.

indirectly the very purposes of the trust may thereby be defeated. Thus where by will certain estates were bequeathed to trustees

stated at large. 'It is to be observed that in most cases, particularly those which relate to real property, Courts of Equity have generally endeavored that their decisions should bear the strictest possible analogy to the decisions of Courts of Law in cases of a similar or corresponding impression. All the canons of law respecting the descent or inheritance of legal estates in lands have been applied to trust or equitable estates. Some of these, as the exclusion of the half-blood of the ascending line of the paternal line from the maternal inheritance, and the maternal line from the paternal inheritance, are evidently of feudal extraction, and are generally supposed to be contrary to reason and equity. Yet they have been admitted without any limitation into the equitable code of England. There is the same division in equity as there is at law, of estates of freehold and inheritance, of estates of freehold only, and of estates less than freehold; of estates in possession, remainder, or reversion; and of estates several and estates undivided. It has been observed before that every species of property is in substance equally capable of being settled in the way of entail, and that the utmost term allowed for the suspense either of real or personal property from vesting absolutely is that of a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years after, and perhaps in the case of a posthumous child, a few months more. The analogy between law and equity is in this instance complete. It may be laid down without any qualification that no nearer approach to a perpetuity can be made through the medium of a trust, or will be supported by a Court of Equity, than can be made by legal conveyances of legal estates or interests, or will be admitted in a Court of Law. (a) In these leading rules we find the analogy holds. In some instances it fails. Curtesy has been admitted; dower, though a more favored claim, has been refused in equitable estates. An equitable estate is by its nature incapable of livery of seisin, and of every form of conveyance which operates by the Statute of Uses. In the transfer therefore of equitable estates these forms of conveyance have been dispensed with, and a mere declaration of trust in favor of another has been held sufficient to transfer to him the equitable fee. On the other hand trust estates are by their nature equally incapable of the process of fines or recoveries. Yet fines are levied and recoveries are suffered of them; and fines and recoveries are as necessary to bar entails of equitable estates as they are to bar entails of legal estates. In the case of a feme inheritor, law and equity agree in vesting the fee in the husband in her right during their joint lives, and, subject to that, in preserving it to the wife. Where the feme is possessed of personal property, the law, speaking generally, vests it absolutely in the husband, or at least gives him the power of acquiring the absolute property of it. Courts of Equity have in many cases abridged the right of the husband to the personal property of the wife, and qualified his power over it. In fixing the term for the redemption of mortgages, and in many other cases, an analogy to the term for bringing ejectments has frequently influenced the decisions of the courts. In other cases an analogy to

(a) See *Sears v. Russell*, 8 Gray, 86; *Thorndike v. Loring*, 15 Gray, 341; *Fosdick v. Fosdick*, 6 Allen, 41; *Otis v. McClellan*, 13 Allen, 339; *Loving v. Worthington*, 106 Mass. 86; *Floyer v. Bankes*, L. R. 8 Eq. 115; *Morgan v. Gronow*, L. R. 16 Eq. 1; *Sykes v. Sykes*, L. R. 13 Eq. 59.

in order, among other things, to pay an annuity to the testator's son of £500 for his natural life, the annuity being declared to be for his personal maintenance and support during his life, and not on any account to be subject or liable to the debts, engagements, charges, and incumbrances of the son, but as the same became due it was to be paid into the son's hands, and not to any other person whatsoever, and the son became a bankrupt, it was held that the annuity passed by the assignment under the bankruptcy to the assignees. (a) For it was said that the policy of the law does not permit property to be so limited that it shall continue in the enjoyment of the bankrupt notwithstanding the bankruptcy. The testator might, if he had thought fit, have made the annuity determinable on the bankruptcy,¹ (b) or have made it to go over to another person in the event of the bankruptcy. But while it was the property of the bankrupt it must be subject to the ordinary incidents of property, and therefore subject to his debts.² (c) So if a trust is created for a married woman for her separate use, and the trustees are to pay the money into her proper hands and for her use, her own receipt only being required, she may still assign it, and her assignee will take the full title to it.³ (d) The

term for ejectments, or the terms for bringing other writs, has not been attended to. And in some instances the courts have not considered themselves bound even by the Statutes of Limitations. *Smith v. Clay*, 3 Bro. Ch. Rep. 639. But the cases where the analogy fails are not numerous; and there scarcely is a rule of law or equity of a more ancient origin, or which admits of fewer exceptions, than the rule that equity followeth the law.'

¹ *Graves v. Dolphin*, 1 Sim. R. 66; *Piercy v. Roberts*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 4.

² *Brandon v. Robinson*, 18 Ves. 429, 433, 434; *Hallet v. Thompson*, 5 Paige, R. 583.

³ *Brandon v. Robinson*, 18 Ves. 434; post, § 1394.

(a) See *Sparhawk v. Cloon*, 125 Mass. 263. But see *Nichols v. Eaton*, 91 U. S. 716. In these two cases the principal authorities upon this subject of the power of the founder of a trust to secure to the beneficiary a bounty against the demands of creditors, are considered or cited.

(b) See *In re Muggeridge*, Johns. (Eng. Ch.) 625.

(c) See *Rochford v. Hackman*, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 64, 67; s. c. 16 Jur.

212, where *Brandon v. Robinson*, supra, is commented upon. And see *Hutchins v. Heywood*, 50 N. H. 491; *Rife v. Geyer*, 59 Penn. St. 393; *East-erly v. Keney*, 36 Conn. 18; *McIlvaine v. Smith*, 42 Mo. 45.

(d) But an express prohibition of alienation or anticipation will, in the case of a married woman, be binding. *Perkins v. Hays*, 3 Gray, 405; *Arnold v. Woodhams*, L. R. 16 Eq. 29.

same rule will apply to the case of a trust fund in rents and profits created by a will for the benefit of a particular person during his life, although there be a proviso that he shall not have any power to sell, or to mortgage, or to anticipate in any way the rents and profits.¹

975. In regard to trusts the analogy to estates at the common law is not only followed as to the rights and interests of the cestui que trust, but also as to the remedies to enforce, preserve, and extinguish those rights and interests. Thus for instance there cannot, strictly speaking, be a disseisin, abatement, or intrusion as to a trust estate. But nevertheless there may be such an adverse claim of a trust estate by an adverse claimant, taking the rents and profits, as may amount to an equitable ouster of the rightful claimant; and such as, if continued twenty years, would by analogy to legal remedies bar any assertion of his right in equity.² (a) We have already had occasion to consider this subject in reference to Statutes of Limitations generally.³ And it may be here added that bars to relief in equity from lapse of time are also entertained in Courts of Equity independently of the express provisions of any Statute of Limitations.⁴

975 a. In general a trustee is only suable in equity in regard to any matters touching the trust. (b) But if he chooses to bind himself by a personal covenant in any such matters, he will be liable at law for a breach thereof, although he may in the instrument containing the covenant describe himself as covenanting as trustee; for the covenant is still operative as a personal covenant, and the superadded words are but a descriptio personæ.⁵ Still

¹ *Green v. Spicer*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 395.

² *Cholmondeley v. Clinton*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 1; *Id.* 191, note; *Bond v. Hopkins*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 428, 429; *Hovenden v. Annesley*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 630, 636; *Elmendorf v. Taylor*, 10 Wheat. R. 168 to 176; *Kane v. Bloodgood*, 7 John. Ch. R. 90, 113 to 128; *Prevost v. Gratz*, 6 Wheat. R. 481; *Boone v. Chiles*, 10 Peters, 177; *Shaver v. Radley*, 4 John. Ch. R. 310, 316.

³ *Ante*, §§ 55, 529, 771; *post*, §§ 1520, 1521; *Prevost v. Gratz*, 6 Wheat. R. 481.

⁴ *Piatt v. Vattier*, 9 Peters, R. 405, and cases there cited; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 27, note (q); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 365; *post*, §§ 1520, 1521.

⁵ *Duvall v. Craig*, 2 Wheat. R. 45.

(a) See *Merriam v. Hassam*, 14 Allen, 516; *Watkins v. Specht*, 7 Cold. C. C. 537.
585.

(b) See *Curtis v. Smith*, 6 Blatchf.

however, where the matter is otherwise cognizable in equity, the mere existence of such a covenant will not deprive the Courts of Equity of their jurisdiction over the trust.

976. It is a general rule in Courts of Equity that wherever a trust exists, either by the declaration of the party or by intendment or implication of law, and the party creating the trust has not appointed any trustee to execute it, equity will follow the legal estate and decree the person in whom it is vested (not being a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, or otherwise entitled to protection) to execute the trust. For it is a rule in equity which admits of no exception, that a Court of Equity never wants a trustee.¹ (a) This is often applied to the cases of powers of sale of lands given by will for the payment of debts and other purposes, which are in the nature of a trust. In such cases if the power becomes extinct at law, either from no person being appointed in the will to execute it, or from the party designated dying before the execution of it, Courts of Equity will decree the execution of such trust, and compel the party in possession as heir or devisee of the legal estate in the lands to perform it.² And generally it may be stated that where property has been bequeathed in trust without the appointment of a trustee, if it is personal estate the personal representative is deemed the trustee, and if real estate the heir or devisee is deemed the trustee, and is bound to its due execution.³

977. The power of a trustee over the legal estate or property vested in him properly speaking exists only for the benefit of the cestui que trust. It is true that he may as legal owner do acts to the prejudice of the rights of the cestui que trust, and he may even dispose of the estate or property so as to bar the interests of the latter therein, as by a sale to a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice of the trust. (b) But when the alienation is purely voluntary, or where the estate

¹ Co. Litt. 290 *b*, Butler's note (1); Co. Litt. 113 *a*, Butler's note (1); ante, § 98; *McCartee v. Orph. Asylum Soc.*, 9 Cowen, R. 437.

² Co. Litt. 113 *a*, Butler's note (1); *Id.* 290, Butler's note (1).

³ *Piatt v. Vattier*, 9 Peters, R. 405, and cases there cited; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 27, note (*q*); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 365.

(a) *Dodkin v. Brunt*, L. R. 6 Eq. 580; *Bowditch v. Bannelos*, 1 Gray, 478, 482.
220.

(b) *Williams v. Jackson*, 107 U. S.

devolves upon heirs, devisees, or other representatives of the trustee, or where the alienee has notice of the trust, the trust attaches to the estate in the same manner as it did in the hands of the trustee himself, and it will be enforced accordingly in equity.¹ (a) And although the trustee may by a mortgage or other specific lien without notice of the trust bind the estate or the property, yet it is not bound by any judgments or any other claims of creditors against him.² (b) How far acts of forfeiture by the trustee ought to be allowed to bind the estate of the cestui que trust has been a matter of considerable diversity of judgment.³

978. What powers may be properly exercised over trust property by a trustee depends upon the nature of the trust, and sometimes upon the character and situation of the cestui que trust. Where the cestui que trust is of age, or sui juris, the trustee has no right (unless express power is given) to change the nature of the estate, as by converting land into money, or money into land, so as to bind the cestui que trust. (c) But where the cestui que

¹ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 363, 364; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 1, and note (a); *Pye v. Gorge*, 1 P. Will. 129; *Saunders v. Dehew*, 2 Vern. 271.

² *Ibid.*

³ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 363, 364; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 1, note (a).

(a) *Smith v. Walser*, 49 Mo. 250; *Ryan v. Doyle*, 31 Iowa, 53. Where the trustee holds the legal title with power to convert the trust property into money and apply the money to the purposes of the trust, a bona fide purchaser will hold the property free from the trust. To enable the cestui que trust to follow the money into the hands of a purchaser from the trustee in such a case, it must appear either that no consideration was paid or that the purchaser knew that the trustee was misapplying the trust estate, and took the estate in aid of such wrong. It is not enough that one who advances money on a pledge of the trust estate knew the character of the estate, if he had no reason to doubt the right of the trustee. *Ashton v. Atlantic Bank*, 3 Allen, 217. See also *Shaw v. Spencer*, 100 Mass. 382; *Jandon v.*

National Bank, 8 Blatchf. C. C. 430; *Newton v. Newton*, L. R. 6 Eq. 135; *Boursot v. Savage*, L. R. 2 Eq. 134.

(b) *Hart v. Farmers' Bank*, 33 Vt. 252. See also *Abell v. Howe*, 43 Vt. 403; *Siemon v. Shurck*, 29 N. Y. 598.

(c) If trustees have possession and control of premises they may make necessary repairs, but without either general or special authority they cannot enter upon making large improvements. *Dickinson v. Corniff*, 65 Ala. 581; *Green v. Winter*, 1 Johns. Ch. 27; *Wykoff v. Wykoff*, 3 Watts & S. 481; *Hassard v. Rowe*, 2 Barb. Ch. 22. But see *Cogswell v. Cogswell*, 2 Edw. Ch. 231.

Persons dealing with a trustee must look to him for payment and ordinarily the creditor cannot resort to the trust estate for advances or services to that estate. But where ex-

trust is not of age, or *sui juris*, it is frequently necessary to his interests that the trustee should possess the power; and in case his interests require the conversion, the acts of the trustee *bona fide* done for such a purpose seem to be justifiable.¹ (a)

979. It has also been laid down as a general rule that the *cestui que trust* may call upon the trustee for a conveyance to execute the trust;² (b) and that what the trustee may be compelled to do by a suit he may voluntarily do without a suit. But this rule admits, if it does not require, many qualifications in its practical application; for otherwise a trustee may incur many perils, the true nature and extent of which may not be ascertainable until there has been a positive decision upon his acts by a Court of Equity, or a positive declaration by such a court of the acts which he is at liberty to do.³

979 a. In regard to trusts it may be proper to state that Courts of Equity carry them into effect only when they are of a certain and definite character. If therefore a trust be clearly created in a party, but the terms by which it is created are so vague and indefinite that Courts of Equity cannot clearly ascertain either its objects or the persons who are to take, then the trust will be held entirely to fail, and the property will fall into the general funds of the author of the trust. Thus for example

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 1, note (a).

² See *Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 559, 571.

³ See Mr. Fonblanque's note (c), 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 2; *Moody v. Walters*, 16 Ves. 302, 303; 307 to 314.

penses have been made for the trust estate, and they have not been paid for, and the estate is either indebted to the trustee or would be if he should pay the demand, and the trustee is insolvent or non-resident so that the creditor cannot recover of him, and must follow him into a foreign jurisdiction, the trust estate may be resorted to directly in equity. *Hewitt v. Phelps*, 105 U. S. 393, 400, *Matthews, J.*, quoting from *Norton v. Phelps*, 54 Miss. 467, 471. See *Clopton v. Gholson*, 53 Miss. 466.

The ground of the rule is that the trustee has an equity of his own for reimbursement enforceable through the legal title in him, and that the

creditor in the cases supposed may resort to this equity upon a principle of equitable substitution or attachment. *Hewitt v. Phelps*, *supra*.

(a) If the trustee has a discretionary right, equity will not interfere with his exercise thereof unless to prevent or to redress fraud. *Camden v. Murray*, 16 Ch. D. 161; *Tabor v. Brooks*, 10 Ch. D. 273; *Tempest v. Camoys*, 21 Ch. D. 571; *Proctor v. Heyer*, 122 Mass. 525; *Marshall v. Caldwell*, 125 Mass. 435; *Nichols v. Eaton*, 91 U. S. 716. See *In re Norrington*, 13 Ch. D. 654.

(b) See *Inches v. Hill*, 106 Mass. 575.

where a lady in her lifetime indorsed a promissory note of £2,000, and sent it to another lady in a letter, whereby she gave it to the latter for her sole use and benefit, for the express purpose of enabling her to present to either branch of the testatrix's family any portion of the principal or interest thereon as she might deem the most prudent, and, in the event of her death, empowering her to dispose of the same by will or deed to those, or either branch of her family she might consider most deserving thereof, and stating that the indorsement was made to enable her to have the sole use and power thereof, it was held that the letter created a trust the objects of which were too indefinite to enable the court to execute it; and that therefore the £2,000 formed a part of the donor's personal estate.¹ (a) It was clear in this case that the donee could not take to her own sole use, for there was a superadded trust, showing that not to be the intention of the donor; and therefore the property reverted to the donor, as it would upon the failure of any ordinary trust.² (b)

979 b. So where a testatrix bequeathed the residue of her estate to her executor 'upon trust to dispose of the same at such times and in such manner, and for such use and purposes, as they shall think fit, it being my will that the distribution thereof shall be left to their discretion,' it was held to be a trust in the executors of such a vague and uncertain nature that it could not be executed by a Court of Equity, and it was therefore void; and the residuary estate so bequeathed was decreed to belong to the next of kin of the testatrix.³ (c)

980. Passing from these more general considerations in regard to trusts, and the jurisdiction exercised in equity over them, we may next proceed to examine them under the heads into which they are usually divided, of express trusts and implied trusts; the latter comprehending all those trusts which are called con-

¹ *Stubbs v. Sargon*, 2 Keen, R. 225; *Omanney v. Butcher*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 260, 270, 271.

² Post, §§ 1071 to 1073, 1156, 1183, 1197 a. See *Wood v. Cox*, 2 M. & Craig, 684; s. c. 1 Keen, R. 317.

³ *Fowler v. Garlike*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 232.

(a) See also *Wheeler v. Smith*, 9 How. 55, 79; *Monroe v. Graves*, 23 Iowa, 597; *Crossman v. Crossman*, 23 Mich. 217.

(b) *Aston v. Wood*, L. R. 6 Eq. 419.

(c) *Wheeler v. Smith*, 9 How. 55, 79.

structive and resulting trusts. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties by some writing, or deed, or will. (a) Not that in those cases the language of the instrument need point out the very nature, character, and limitations of the trust in direct terms, *ipsisimis verbis*; for it is sufficient that the intention to create it can be fairly collected upon the face of the instrument from the terms used, and the trust can be drawn, as it were, *ex visceribus verborum*.¹ Implied trusts are those which are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matter of clear intention, although not found in the words of the parties; or which are superinduced upon the transaction by operation of law as matter of equity, independent of the particular intention of the parties.

981. The most usual cases of express trusts are found in preliminary sealed agreements, such as marriage articles, or articles for the purchase of lands; or in formal conveyances, such as marriage settlements, terms for years, mortgages, and other conveyances and assignments for the payment of debts, or for raising portions, or for other special purposes; or in last wills and testaments in a variety of bequests and devises, involving fiduciary interests for private benefit or for public charity. Indeed many of these instruments (as we shall abundantly see) will also be found to contain implied, constructive, and resulting trusts; and the separate consideration of them throughout would therefore be scarcely attainable without frequent repetitions of the same matters as well as of the same illustrations.

982. In regard to each of these subjects there are a great many nice and refined doctrines and distinctions which have been grafted into Equity Jurisprudence, the full examination of which belongs rather to single treatises upon each particular topic than to a general survey of the system such as is embraced in the design of the present Commentaries. It may be added that many of these doctrines and distinctions are the creations of Courts of Equity, acting upon the enlarged principles of social justice, *ex æquo et bono*, rather than express trusts created by

¹ *Fisher v. Fields*, 10 John. R. 494.

(a) See as to what constitutes an express trust *Banner v. Berridge*, 18 Ch. D. 254; *Burdick v. Garrick*, L. R. 5 Ch. 233, 239; *Foley v. Hill*, 2 H. L. Cas. 28, 35; *Paul v. Paul*, 19 Ch. D. 47.

the acts of the parties, or an exposition and execution of their declared intentions. So that they may properly be said to fall within the scope of implied or constructive trusts. In our subsequent remarks upon all of these topics (which will necessarily be brief) no attempt will be made nicely to distinguish between those trusts which are express and those which are implied. Both will occasionally be blended, unless where the particular nature of the trusts calls for some discrimination between them.

CHAPTER XXV.

EXPRESS TRUSTS. — MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS.

983. AND in the first place in regard to MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS. Where an instrument designed as a marriage settlement is final in its character, and the nature and extent of the trust estates created thereby are clearly ascertained and accurately defined, so that nothing further remains to be done according to the intention of the parties, there the trusts will be treated as executed trusts, and Courts of Equity will construe them in the same way as legal estates of the like nature would be construed at law upon the same language.¹ Thus if the language of the instrument would give a fee tail to the parents in a legal estate, they will be held entitled to a fee tail in the trust estate. But where no marriage settlement has actually been executed, but mere marriage articles only for a settlement, there Courts of Equity when called upon to execute them will indulge in a wider latitude of interpretation, and will construe the words, according to the presumed intention of the parties, most beneficially for the issue of the marriage. (a) In executing such articles they will put it out of the power of the parents to defeat the issue, by requiring that the limitations in the marriage settlement should be what are called limitations in strict settlement; that is to say, instead of giving the parents a fee tail, the limita-

¹ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 7, and note (n); Id. § 8, note (s); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 1, § 5, note (k); Fearn on Conting. Rem. by Butler, pp. 145 to 148 (7th edit.); Id. pp. 133 to 136; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 360; Synges v. Hales, 2 B. & Beatt. 507; Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland, 1 Jac. & Walk. 559, 571; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 61, p. 302 (2d edit.).

(a) See Dawes v. Tredwell, 18 Ch. Stonor, 24 Ch. D. 195; In re Bellasis, D. 354, Smith v. Lucas, Ib. 531; In L. R. 12 Eq. 218; In re Brookman, re Allnutt, 22 Ch. D. 275; In re L. R. 5 Ch. 182.

tions will be made to them for life, with remainders to the first and other sons, &c. in the fee tail; and if the articles are applicable to daughters, the like limitations will be made to them also.¹ (a) And in cases of executory trusts arising under wills a similar favorable construction will be made in favor of the issue in carrying them into effect, if the court can clearly see from the terms of the will that the intention of the testator is to protect the interests of the issue in the same way.² (b)

984. There is however a distinction recognized in equity between executory trusts created under marriage articles and those created under wills, in relation to the interpretation of them and the mode of carrying them into execution. In cases

¹ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 7, and note (n); Id. § 8, note (s); Fearne on Conting. Rem. pp. 90 to 114, by Butler (7th edit.); Earl of Stamford v. Hobart, 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 288; Glenorchy v. Bosville, Cas. temp. Talb. 3; Countess of Lincoln v. Duke of Newcastle, 12 Ves. 218, 227; Taggart v. Taggart, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 87. There is a most elaborate note of Mr. Fonblanque (1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 8, note s), on this subject, in which the distinction between trusts executed and trusts executory is fully discussed, and the distinction stated in the text is firmly maintained. I regret that it is too long for an insertion in this place. See also Atherley on Marriage Settlement, ch. 7, pp. 93 to 105. Lord Eldon, in Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland (1 Jac. & Walk. 559, 571), has taken notice of the confused and inaccurate senses in which the words executory trusts and executed trusts are often used. In one sense all trusts are executory, since the cestui que trust may call for a conveyance and execution of the trust. But executory trusts are properly those where something remains to be done to complete the intention of the parties, and their act is not final. See Mott v. Buxton, 7 Ves. 201; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 591. (c)

² Leonard v. Earl of Sussex, 2 Vern. 526; Papillon v. Voice, 2 P. Will. 478; Glenorchy v. Bosville, Cas. temp. Talb. 3; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 8, and note (s); Countess of Lincoln v. Duke of Newcastle, 12 Ves. 227, 230, 231, 234; Fearne on Cont. Rem. by Butler, pp. 113 to 148 (7th edit.); Id. p. 184; Green v. Stephens, 17 Ves. 75, 76; Carter v. White, Ambler, R. 670; Sydney v. Shelley, 19 Ves. 366; Stonor v. Curwen, 5 Sim. R. 264.

(a) As to the proper limitations where a will directs a strict settlement see Loch v. Bagley, L. R. 4 Eq. 122; Stanley v. Coulthurst, L. R. 10 Eq. 259; Grier v. Grier, L. R. 5 H. L. 688; Mayn v. Mayn, L. R. 5 Eq. 150 (that the estates to be vested in children should be in common rather than in joint tenancy).

(b) See Thompson v. Fisher, L. R.

10 Eq. 207; Magrath v. Morehead, L. R. 12 Eq. 491. As to after-acquired property see In re Edwards, L. R. 9 Ch. 97; In re Mainwaring, L. R. 2 Eq. 487; Carter v. Carter, L. R. 8 Eq. 551; Young v. Smith, L. R. 1 Eq. 180.

(c) As to this case see Habbergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves. jr. 238; Lloyd v. Brooks, 34 Md. 27.

of marriage articles Courts of Equity will, from the nature of the instrument, presume it to be intended for the protection and support of the interests of the issue of the marriage, and will therefore direct the articles to be executed in strict settlement, unless the contrary purpose clearly appear.¹ For otherwise it would be in the power of the father to defeat the purpose of protecting and supporting such interests, and to appropriate the estate to himself. But in executory trusts under wills all the parties take from the mere bounty of the testator, and there is no presumption that the testator means one quantity of interest rather than another, an estate for life in the parent rather than an estate tail; for he has a right arbitrarily to give what estate he thinks fit to the parent or to the issue.² If therefore the words of marriage articles limit an estate for life to the father, with remainder to the heirs of his body, Courts of Equity will decree a strict settlement in conformity to the presumed intention of the parties. But if the like words occur in executory trusts created by a will, there is no ground for Courts of Equity to decree the execution of them in strict settlement, unless other words occur explanatory of the intent. The subject being a mere bounty, the intended extent of the bounty can be known only from the words in which it is conferred. If it is clearly ascertained from anything in the will that the testator did not mean to use the expressions which he has employed in a technical sense, Courts of Equity in decreeing such a settlement as he has directed will depart from his words in order to execute his intention. But they will follow his words unless he has himself shown that he did not mean to use them in their proper sense; and they have never said that merely because the direction was for an entail they could execute that by decreeing a strict settlement.³

¹ Atherley on Marr. Settle. ch. 7, pp. 93 to 101; ante, § 974.

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 8; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, p. 32; Id. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 2, p. 379; *Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 550, 551, 554.

³ *Blackburn v. Stables*, 2 Ves. & B. 370; *Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 559, 571, 574; *Lord Deerhurst v. Duke of St. Albans*, 5 Madd. R. 260; *Syngé v. Hales*, 2 B. & Beatt. 508. There is some language of Lord Eldon in *The Countess of Lincoln v. Duke of Newcastle*, 12 Ves. 227 to 230, which might lead to the conclusion that he held that there was no distinction between executory trusts under marriage articles and those created by a will. In that case he said: 'There is no difference in the execution of

985. In furtherance of the same beneficial purpose in favor of issue Courts of Equity will construe an instrument which might under one aspect be treated as susceptible of a complete operation at law, to contain merely executory marriage articles, if such an intent is apparent on the face of it; for this construction may be most important to the rights and interests of the issue.¹ So an instrument, as to one part of the property comprised in it, may be construed to be a final legal marriage settlement, and as to other property merely to be executory marriage articles.²

986. There is also a distinction in Courts of Equity as to the parties in whose favor the provisions of marriage articles will be specifically executed or not. (a) The parties seeking a specific execution of such articles may be those who are strictly within the reach and influence of the consideration of the marriage, or claiming through them, such as the wife and issue, and those claiming under them; or they may be mere volunteers for whom the settler is under no natural or moral obligation to provide, and yet who are included within the scope of the provisions in the marriage articles, such as his distant heirs or relatives, or mere strangers. Now the distinction is that marriage articles will be specifically executed upon the application of any persons within the scope of the consideration of the marriage, or claiming under such person; (b) but not generally upon the application

an executory trust created by a will and of a covenant in marriage articles; such a distinction would shake to their foundation the rules of equity.' But in *Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland* (1 Jac. & Walk. 573) he corrected the misapprehension of his opinion, and said: 'If it is supposed that I said there was no difference between marriage articles and executory trusts, and that they stood precisely on the same ground, I never meant to say so. In marriage articles, the object of such settlement, the issue to be provided for, the intention to provide for such issue, and in short all the considerations that belong peculiarly to them, afford prima facie evidence of intent which does not belong to executory trusts under wills.' (c)

¹ *Atherley on Marr. Sett.* ch. 7, pp. 121 to 133; *Trevor v. Trevor*, 1 P. Will. 622; *White v. Thornborough*, 2 Vern. 702.

² *Countess of Lincoln v. Duke of Newcastle*, 12 Ves. 218; *Vaughan v. Burslem*, 3 Bro. Ch. 101, 106.

(a) See *Neves v. Scott*, 9 How. 197; *Deunison v. Gothring*, 7 Barr, 175; *King v. Whitely*, 10 Paige, 465.

(b) In *Jeston v. Key*, L. R. 6 Ch. 610, articles were enforced in favor of a husband, though he had broken the contract, there being part performance by the marriage, and the covenants being independent. Compare *Butman v. Porter*, 100 Mass. 337.

(c) See *Sackville-West v. Holmesdale*, L. R. 4 H. L. 543.

of mere volunteers.¹ But where the bill is brought by persons who are within the scope of the marriage consideration, or claiming under them, there Courts of Equity will decree a specific execution throughout, as well in favor of the mere volunteers as of the plaintiffs in the suit. So that indirectly mere volunteers may obtain the full benefit of the articles in the cases where they could not directly insist upon such rights. The ground of this peculiarity is, that when Courts of Equity execute such articles at all, they execute them in toto, and not partially.²

987. It has been already stated that generally marriage articles will not be decreed in favor of mere volunteers.³ But an exception seems formerly to have been entertained in favor of a wife and children claiming as volunteers (such as a wife and children under a subsequent marriage, (a) or under a voluntary

¹ See *Atherley on Marr. Sett.* ch. 5, pp. 131 to 145; ante, §§ 433, 706 a, 793 a, 973; post, § 1040.

² *Atherley on Marr. Sett.* ch. 5, pp. 125 to 130; *Id.* 131 to 135; *Osgood v. Strode*, 2 P. Will. 255, 256; *Trevor v. Trevor*, 1 P. Will. 622; *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 186, 190.

³ Ante, §§ 95, 169, 433, 706 a, 793, 793 a; *West v. Erissey*, 2 P. Will. 349; *Kettleby v. Atwood*, 1 Vern. 298, 471; *Stephens v. Trueman*, 1 Ves. 73; *Williamson v. Codrington*, 1 Ves. 512, 516; *Colman v. Sarrel*, 1 Ves. jr. 50; s. c. 3 Bro. Ch. R. 13; *Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft*, 18 Ves. 99; *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 662; *Graham v. Graham*, 1 Ves. jr. 275; *Wycherley v. Wycherley*, 2 Eden, R. 177, and note; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. R. 336, 337. This seems to be the general rule. But there are cases not easily reconcilable with it. See *Vernon v. Vernon*, 2 P. Will. 594; *Williamson v. Codrington*, 1 Ves. 512, 514; *Stephens v. Trueman*, 1 Ves. 73; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 326, 328; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 7, notes (v), (x); *Id.* ch. 5, § 2, note (h); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 2, and note (i). Lord Eldon, in *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 662, has stated the general doctrine in equity to be that voluntary trusts executed by a conveyance will be held valid and enforced in equity; but if the trust is executory, and rests merely in covenant, it will not be executed. The exception in favor of meritorious claimants, such as a wife or children, is admitted by the same learned judge in *Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft*, 18 Ves. 99. Mr. Chancellor Kent, in *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. R. 336, 337, has examined many of the cases and adopted Lord Eldon's conclusion. With respect to chattel interests he maintains that an agreement under seal imports a consideration at law, and that therefore a bond though voluntary and without consideration will support a decree for executing the trust; relying on *Lechmere v. Earl of Carlisle*, 3 P. Will. 222, and *Beard v. Nuthall*, 1 Vern. 427; ante,

(a) See *Gale v. Gale*, 6 Ch. D. 144. *Price v. Jenkins*, 4 Ch. D. 483; s. c. 5 Ch. D. 219; *Clarke v. Wright*, 6 Hurl. & N. 849; *Ithill v. Beane*, 1 Ves. Ib.; *Newstead v. Searle*, 1 Atk. 265; *Sr.* 215.

contract made before or after marriage, and not in consideration thereof) upon the ground that the settler is under a natural and moral obligation to provide for them,¹ upon the same principle which has been applied in favor of a wife and children in cases of a defective execution of powers.² But against what persons Courts of Equity ought in favor of a wife or children to interfere was a point which was thought to admit of more question. It was said that they ought to interfere to enforce the specific execution of such voluntary contracts or voluntary articles, against the heir at law of the voluntary settler, unless perhaps where he was a son wholly unprovided for. But whether they ought to interfere against the settler himself in such a case was a matter upon which there was more diversity of opinion and judgment. However the whole doctrine seems now overthrown; and the general principle is established that in no case whatsoever will Courts of Equity interfere in favor of mere volunteers, whether it be upon a voluntary contract, or a covenant, or a settlement, however meritorious may be the consideration, and although they stand in the relation of a wife or child.³ (a)

§§ 973, 979 a; *Wallwyn v. Contts*, 3 Meriv. R. 708. See also *Minturn v. Seymour*, 4 John. Ch. R. 500; *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 44 to 46, and *Colman v. Sarrel*, 1 Ves. jr. 54, seem contra.

¹ *Atherley on Marriage Sett.* ch. 5, pp. 131 to 139; *Osgood v. Strode*, 2 P. Will. 245; *Ithill v. Beane*, 1 Ves. 216; *Roe v. Mitton*, 2 Wils. R. 356; *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 186; *Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft*, 18 Ves. 99; *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 662; ante, §§ 433, 706 a, 787, 793 a, 973; *Ellis v. Nimmo*, 1 Lloyd & Gould, R. 333. But see *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Sim. R. 324, 325; *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 138, 141.

² Ante, §§ 95, 169, 170, and note.

³ *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Simons, R. 325; *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 138, 141; ante, §§ 433, 706, 706 a, 787, 793, 793 b, 973; post, § 1040 a.

(a) But see *Gale v. Gale*, 6 Ch. D. 144, 148; *Price v. Jenkins*, 4 Ch. D. 483; s. c. 5 Ch. D. 219. It is clear that if any inducement were held out by another on behalf of the woman, on the faith of which the marriage and the settlement were entered into, the inducement must be made good. *Hammersley v. De Biel*, 12 Clark & F. 45; *Coverdale v. Eastwood*, L. R. 15 Eq. 121. See *Young v. Young*, 80 N. Y. 422. Whether a settlement of the wife's property, after marriage, in

express pursuance of an antenuptial parol agreement is valid against creditors, query. The affirmative was held in *Dundas v. Dutens*, 2 Cox, 235. But see contra *Warden v. Jones*, 2 DeG. & J. 76, a case that has been criticised. *Jurist*, Feb. 12, 1859 (5 Jur. n. s. part 2), p. 46. See also *Barkworth v. Young*, 3 Jur. n. s. 34; *Hall v. Light*, 2 Duv. 358; and compare *Turner v. Nye*, 7 Allen, 176; *Merrill v. Merrill*, 32 Vt. 27; *Caldwell v. Renfrew*, 33 Vt. 213.

988. In regard to terms for years and personal chattels it may be observed that they are capable of being limited in equity in strict settlement, in the same way and to the same extent as real estates of inheritance may be, so as to be transmissible like heirlooms.¹ (a) The statute de Donis does not extend to entails of anything except real estates of inheritance. But nevertheless estates pur autre vie, and terms of years, and personal chattels are now held to be susceptible of being settled in tail, and rendered unalienable almost for as long a time as if they were strictly entailable.

989. In regard to estates pur autre vie, they may at law be devised or limited in strict settlement by way of remainder, like estates of inheritance, and the remainder-man will take as special occupant.² But those who have an interest therein in the nature of estates tail may bar their issue and all remainders over by the alienation of the estate pur autre vie; as those who are, strictly speaking, tenants in tail of legal estates may do by fine and recovery.³

¹ Atherley on Marr. Sett. ch. 5, 121 to 139; *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 185; s. c. cited 1 Ves. 513; ante, § 433. I content myself with referring to Mr. Atherley's examination of this subject in his work on Marriage Settlements (ch. 5, pp. 131 to 145), and Lewin on Trusts (ch. 9, pp. 110 to 137), where indeed the authorities cited may be thought to afford some grounds for doubt and further consideration. Co. Litt. 18 b, note (7), by Hargrave; Co. Litt. 20 a, note (5), by Hargrave; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 367; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 4, § 2, note (d); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 2, note (f). In the case of *Ellis v. Nimmo* (1 Lloyd & Goold, R. 333) the subject was discussed at large by Lord Chancellor Sugden, who affirmed the doctrine that a postnuptial agreement making provision for a child ought to be enforced in equity against the settler as being grounded on a meritorious consideration. But in *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Sim. R. 325, the Vice-Chancellor (Sir L. Shadwell) expressed some doubt upon the case of *Ellis v. Nimmo*, and the case has since been shaken, and seems overthrown by the case of *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 138, 141.

² *Low v. Barron*, 3 P. Will. 262, and Mr. Cox's notes; *Fearne on Conting. Rem.* by Butler, pp. 493 to 499 (7th edit.); *Doe d. Blake v. Luxton*, 6 Term Rep. 291, 292; *Finch v. Tucker*, 2 Vern. 184; *Baker v. Bayley*, 2 Vern. 225.

³ Co. Litt. 20 a, note (5); *Fearne on Conting. Rem.* by Butler, pp. 493 to 499 (7th edit.); 2 Black. Comm. 113, 259, 260; *Wastneys v. Chappell*, 1 Bro. Parl. R. 475; *Norton v. Frecker*, 1 Atk. 525; *Low v. Barron*, 3 P. Will. 262, and Mr. Cox's notes; *Gray v. Mannock*, 2 Eden, R. 339; *Blake v. Luxton*, Cooper, R. 178, 184 to 186; *Forster v. Forster*, 2 Atk. 260.

(a) See *Shelley v. Shelley*, L. R. Howe, L. R. 9 Eq. 358; *Harrington* 6 Eq. 540; *West v. Holmesdale*, L. R. v. *Harrington*, L. R. 5 H. L. 87. 4 H. L. 543; *Cardigan v. Curzon*-

990. In regard to estates in terms of years and personal chattels the manner of settling them is different; for in them no remainder can at law be limited. But they may be entailed at law by an executory devise, or by a deed of trust in equity, as effectually as estates of inheritance, and with the same limitations as to perpetuity.¹ However the vesting of an interest in a term for years or in chattels in any person equivalent to a tenancy in tail confers upon such person the absolute property in such term or chattels, and bars the issue and all subsequent limitations as effectually as a fine and recovery would do in cases of pure entails, or as an alienation would do in the case of conditional fees and estates *pur autre vie*.² If in the case of a term of years or of chattels the limitations over are too remote, the whole property vests in the first taker.³

991. In marriage settlements it is that we principally find limitations made to trustees to preserve contingent remainders. Trusts of this sort arose out of the doctrine in *Chudleigh's Case*⁴ and *Archer's Case*,⁵ although it is said that they were not put in practice until the time of the Usurpation.⁶ The object of these limitations is to prevent the destruction of contingent remainders by the tenant for life or other party before the remainder comes in esse, and is vested in the remainder-man. The great dispute in *Chudleigh's Case* was concerning the power of feoffees to uses, created since the Statute of Uses of 27 Henry VIII. ch. 10, to destroy contingent uses by fine or feoffment before the contingent uses came into being. It was determined that the feoffees possessed such a power, and also that they had in them a possibility of seisin to serve such contingent uses when they came into being, and a *scintilla juris*, or power of entry, in case their estate was divested, to restore that possibility. At this time it

¹ Ante, § 844, and note, § 845; 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 1 ch. 4, § 2, and note (*f*); 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 2, ch. 4, § 2, note (*d*); *Wright v. Cartwright*, 1 *Burr.* 282, 284.

² *Co. Litt.* 18 *b*, *Hargrave's note* (7); *Co. Litt.* 20 *a*, *Hargrave's note* (5); *Mathew Manning's case*, 8 *Co. R.* 94, 95; *Lampet's case*, 10 *Co. R.* 47; *Fearne on Conting. Rem. by Butler*, 402, 403 (7th edit.); 1 *Madd. Ch. Pr.* 367; *Goodright v. Parker*, 1 *M. & Selw.* 692; 2 *Kent, Comm. Lect.* 35, p. 352 (3d edit.); 2 *Fonbl. B.* 2, ch. 4, § 2, note (*d*).

³ *Co. Litt.* 20 *a*, *Harg. note* (5); 1 *Madd. Ch. Pr.* 367.

⁴ 1 *Co. R.* 120.

⁵ 1 *Co. R.* 66.

⁶ Per Lord Hardwicke, in *Garth v. Cotton*, 1 *Dick. R.* 191; s. c. 1 *Ves.* 555; 3 *Atk.* 751; *Fearne on Conting. Rem. by Butler*, 325, 326 (7th edit.).

had not been decided that the destruction of the particular estate for life, by the feoffment or other conveyance of the cestui que use for life, before the contingent remainder became vested, was a destruction of the contingent remainder. But that point was settled in the affirmative a few years afterwards in Archer's Case.¹

992. There being then at law under these determinations a power in the general feoffees to uses either to preserve or to destroy these contingent uses ad libitum, and also a power in the cestui que use for life to destroy them, there arose a necessity to remedy these defects. And it was done by vesting a limitation in certain trustees, eo nomine, upon an express trust to preserve such contingent remainders. So that thereby the whole inheritance might come entire to the cestui que use in contingency, in like manner as trustees to uses ought to have preserved them before the Statute of Uses, when they were but trusts to be executed by Courts of Equity.²

993. It was at first a question whether upon such a limitation to trustees after a prior limitation for life they took any estate in the land, or only a right of entry on the forfeiture or surrender of the first tenant for life, by reason that the limitation being only during his life could not commence or take effect after his death. But it was settled that the trustees had the immediate freehold in them as an estate pur autre vie; and that at law they could maintain and defend any action respecting the freehold.³ Upon this ground it is that such trustees are entitled to an injunction in equity to prevent waste in the lands, and in mines, and timber thereon, as these constitute a valuable and sometimes the most valuable portion of the inheritance, which the trustees are bound to preserve. In short as has been observed by Lord Hardwicke, the duty of such trustees being to preserve the inheritance, every assistance will be granted by Courts of Equity in support of their trust, and to aid them in its due accomplishment.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*; Fearne on Conting. Rem. by Butler, 290, and note (*h*); *Id.* 291 to 300; Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. R. 120; Archer's Case, 1 Co. R. 66.

² *Garth v. Cotton*, 1 Dick. R. 194.

³ *Ibid.*; *Duncomb v. Duncomb*, 3 Lev. 437; Fearne on Cont Rem. by Butler, 326 (7th edit.).

⁴ *Garth v. Cotton*, 1 Dick. 195 to 197, 205, 208, 219; Eden on Injunc. ch. 9,

994. On the other hand Courts of Equity will treat as a distinct breach of trust every act of such trustees inconsistent with their proper duty, and will give relief to the parties injured by such misconduct.¹ If therefore they should in violation of their trust join in any conveyance to destroy the contingent uses or remainders, they will be held responsible therefor. If the persons taking under such conveyance are volunteers, or have notice of the trust, they will be held liable to the same trusts, and decreed to restore the estate. If they are purchasers without notice, then the lands are indeed discharged of the trust; but the trustees themselves will be held liable for the breach in equity, and will be decreed to purchase lands with their own money equal in value to the lands sold, and to hold them upon the same trusts and limitations as they held those sold by them.²

995. But it is not in every case in which trustees have joined in a conveyance to destroy contingent remainders that they will be deemed guilty of a breach of trust.³ In some cases Courts of Equity will even compel them to join in conveyances which may affect or destroy such remainders. And in such cases it has been supposed that what they may be compelled to do by suit, if voluntarily done, will not be deemed a breach of trust.⁴ But the cases in which Courts of Equity will compel trustees to join in such conveyances are (as has been correctly said) rare. They have happened under peculiar circumstances; either of pressure to discharge incumbrances prior to the settlement, or in favor of creditors where the settlement was voluntary, or for the advantage of persons who were the first objects of the settlement, as for example to enable the first son to make a settlement upon an advantageous marriage.⁵

pp. 167, 168; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 395 to 397; *Stansfield v. Habergham*, 10 Ves. 278.

¹ *Garth v. Cotton*, 1 Dick. 199.

² *Garth v. Cotton*, 1 Dick. R. 199, 200 to 202, 205, 208, 219; *Pye v. Gorges*, Prec. Ch. 308; s. c. 1 P. Will. 128; *Mansel v. Mansel*, 2 P. Will. 680 to 685; *Fearne on Conting. Rem. by Butler*, 326, 327 (7th edit.); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 393, 394.

³ *Moody v. Walters*, 16 Ves. 302, 303, 307 to 314.

⁴ *Id.* 310.

⁵ *Fearne on Conting. Rem. by Butler*, 331 to 337, and the cases there cited; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 394, 395; *Moody v. Walters*, 16 Ves. 301 to 314, and cases there cited.

996. There is no question however that the trustees may join with the cestui que trust in tail in any conveyance to bar the entail; for that is no breach of trust, but precisely what they may be compelled to do; although the cestui que trust himself might have barred such entail without their joining in it.¹ But there is a great distinction between cases where Courts of Equity will compel trustees to join in a conveyance to destroy contingent remainders and cases where they will decree them to be guilty of a breach of trust for such an act when it is voluntarily done by them. Thus for example Courts of Equity will not punish trustees as guilty of a breach of trust for joining in a conveyance of the cestui que trust in tail to bar the entail. And yet it is equally clear that they will not compel them to join in such conveyance.² The ground of this distinction is that trustees to support contingent remainders are considered as honorary trustees for the benefit of the family, and the interests of mankind require them to be treated as such by all courts of justice; and unless a violation of their trust appears, Courts of Equity ought not to take away all their discretion, or to direct them not to join in any conveyance without the order of such a court, although the trustees may be of opinion that the interests of the family require it. The effect of such a doctrine would be to make the Courts of Equity the trustees of all the estates in the country.³

997. It is not a little difficult to ascertain from the authorities the true nature and extent of the duties and liabilities of trustees to preserve contingent remainders, and in what cases they may or ought to join in conveyances to destroy them or not. Lord Eldon has expressed himself unable to deduce the true

¹ *Fearne on Conting. Rem.* by Butler, 133; 1 *Eq. Abridg.* 384, E. 1, note; *Robinson v. Comyns*, *Cas. temp. Talb.* 166; *Boteler v. Allington*, 1 *Bro. Ch. R.* 72; and *Belt's* note (5); *Marwood v. Turner*, 3 *P. Will.* 165, 171; *Biscoe v. Perkins*, 1 *Ves. & B.* 485.

² *Moody v. Walters*, 16 *Ves.* 301 to 314; *Biscoe v. Perkins*, 1 *V. & Beam.* 491; *Woodhouse v. Hoskins*, 3 *Atk.* 22; s. c. cited 16 *Ves.* 308; *Barnard v. Large*, 1 *Bro. Ch. R.* 354; *Osbrey v. Bury*, 1 *B. & Beatt.* 58.

³ *Moody v. Walters*, 16 *Ves.* 310, 311; *Biscoe v. Perkins*, 1 *Ves. & Beam.* 491. Lord Hardwicke, in *Potter v. Chapman* (*Ambler*, R. 99), said that if a trust is personal and has not been corruptly exercised, Courts of Equity will not interpose. This remark is applicable, not to cases like those of trustees to preserve contingent remainders, but to trusts purely personal, and in the discretion of the trustee as to their exercise.

principle from them. His language is: 'The cases are uniform to this extent; that if trustees before the first tenant in tail is of age join in destroying the remainders, they are liable for a breach of trust, and so is every purchaser under them with notice. But when we come to the situation of trustees to preserve remainders who have joined in a recovery after the first tenant in tail is of age, it is difficult to say more than that no judge in equity has gone the length of holding that he would punish them as for a breach of trust, even in a case where they would not have been directed to join. The result is that they seem to have laid down as the safest rule for trustees, but certainly most inconvenient for the general interests of mankind, that it is better for the trustees never to destroy the remainders, even if the tenant in tail concurs, without the direction of the court. The next consideration is in what cases the court will direct them to join. And if I am governed by what my predecessors have done and refused to do, I cannot collect in what cases trustees would or would not be directed to join, as it requires more abilities than I possess to reconcile the different cases with reference to that question. They all however agree that these trustees are honorary trustees; that they cannot be compelled to join; and all the judges protect themselves from saying that if they had joined they should be punished; always assuming that the tenant in tail must be twenty-one.'¹

¹ *Biscoe v. Perkins*, 1 V. & Beam. 491, 492.

CHAPTER XXVI.

EXPRESS TRUSTS. — TERMS FOR YEARS.

998. IN the next place in regard to TERMS FOR YEARS, whereby trusts are created to subserve the special objects of the parties. The creation of long terms for years for the purpose of securing money lent on mortgage of the land took its rise from the inconveniences of the ancient way of making mortgages in fee by way of feoffment and other solemn conveyances with a condition of defeasance. For by such mode if the condition was not punctually performed the estate of the mortgagee at law became absolute and was subject to incumbrances made by him, and even (as some thought) to the dower of his wife. Hence it became usual to create long terms of years upon the like condition, because among other reasons such terms on the death of the mortgagee became vested in his personal representatives who were also entitled to the debt and could properly discharge it.¹ But as this subject will be more fully considered hereafter,² it is only necessary to say in this place that by analogy to the case of mortgages, terms for years were often created for securing the payment of jointures and portions for children, and for other special trusts. Such terms do not determine upon the mere performance of the trusts for which they are created unless there be a special proviso to that effect in the deed. The legal interest thus continues in the trustee after the trusts are performed, although the owner of the fee is entitled to the equitable and beneficial interest therein. At law the possession of the lessee for years is deemed to be the possession of the owner of the free-

¹ Black. Comm. 158; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 4, § 3, (i); Id. B. 3, ch. 1, § 2, and note (b); Co. Litt. 290 b, Butler's note (1), § 13; Id. 208 a, note (1); Bac. Abridg. Mortgage, A.

² See post, chapter on Mortgages, §§ 1004 to 1035.

hold. And by analogy Courts of Equity hold that where the tenant for the term of years is but a trustee for the owner of the inheritance he shall not oust his cestui que trust, or obstruct him in any act of ownership or in making any assurances of his estate. In these respects therefore the term is consolidated with the inheritance. It follows the descent to the heir, and all the alienations made of the inheritance or of any particular estate or interest carved out of it by deed or by will or by act of law.¹ In short a term attendant upon the inheritance by express

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 4, § 3, note (i), § 4, note (o); Co. Litt. 290 b, Butler's note (1), § 13; *Whitchurch, v. Whitchurch*, 2 P. Will. 236; *Charlton v. Low*, 3 P. Will. 330; *Villers v. Villers*, 2 Atk. 72; *Willoughby v. Willoughby*, Term Rep. 765. This whole subject was fully considered by Lord Hardwicke in his masterly judgment in *Willoughby v. Willoughby* (1 Term Rep. 763). The following extract from that opinion contains a clear exposition of the points in the text. 'What is the nature of a term attendant upon the inheritance? The attendance of terms for years upon the inheritance is the creature of a Court of Equity, invented partly to protect real property, and partly to keep it in the right channel. In order to it this court framed the distinction between such attendant terms and terms in gross, notwithstanding that in the consideration of the common law they are both the same, and equally keep out the owner of the fee so long as they subsist. But as equity always considers who has the right in conscience to the land, and on that ground makes one man a trustee for another, and as the common law allows the possession of the tenant for years to be the possession of the owner of the freehold, this court said where the tenant for years is but a trustee for the owner of the inheritance, he shall not keep out his cestui que trust nor, *pari ratione*, obstruct him in doing any acts of ownership or in making any assurances of his estate. And therefore in equity such a term for years shall yield, ply, and be moulded according to the uses, estates, or charges which the owner of the inheritance declares, or carves out of the fee. Thus the dominion of real property was kept entire. Of this we meet with nothing in our books before Queen Elizabeth's reign, when mortgages by long terms of years began to come into use. Before that time the law looked upon very long terms with a jealous eye and laid them under violent presumptions of fraud, because they tended to prevent the Crown of its forfeitures, and the lord of the fruits of his tenures. Neither could there much before that time be any use of a term attendant upon the inheritance to preserve the limitations of a settlement in many cases, because the tenant for years was in the power of the owner of the freehold till the statute 21 Hen. VIII. c. 15, which enabled him to falsify a recovery against the tenant of the freehold. Till then, by such a recovery the term was gone, and consequently could attend upon nothing. But since the law was altered by that statute and the term was preserved, this court could lay hold of it. Proceeding upon these principles, wherever a term for years has been vested in a stranger in trust for the owner of the inheritance, whether by trust expressly declared or by construction or judgment of this court, which is called a trust by operation of law, this court has said that the trust or beneficial interest of such a term shall follow or be affected by all such

declaration or by implication of law may be said to be governed in equity by the same rules generally to which the inheritance is subject.¹

999. Still although the trust or benefit of the term is annexed to the inheritance, the legal interest of the term remains distinct and separate from it at law, and the whole benefit and advantage to be made of the term arises from this separation. For if two or more persons have claims upon the inheritance under different titles, a term of years attendant upon it is still so distinct from it that if any one of them obtains an assignment of it then (unless he is affected by some of the circumstances which equity considers as fraudulent or as otherwise controlling his rights) he

conveyances, assurances, or charges as the owner creates of the inheritance. Although the law says that the term and the fee being in different persons, they are separate, distinct estates, and the one not merged in the other, yet the beneficial and profitable interest of both being in the same person, equity will unite them for the sake of keeping the property entire. Therefore if the owner of the inheritance levy a fine sur conusance de droit, or suffer a common recovery to uses, the trust of the term shall follow and be governed by those uses, although a term for years is not the subject of a fine sur conusance de droit, much less of a common recovery; nor would equity allow the trust of a term in gross to be settled with such limitations. This doctrine is always allowed to have its full effect as between the representatives, that is, the heir either in fee-simple or fee-tail of the owner of the inheritance, and the executor, and all persons claiming as volunteers under him, though certain distinctions have been admitted as to creditors which are not material to the present case. And in general the rule has been the same, whether the trust of the term be created by express declaration, or arise by construction and judgment of this court. On this ground are the cases of *Tiffin v. Tiffin*, 2 Ch. Cas. 49 and 55, and *Vern. 1*; *Best v. Stamford*, 2 *Vern.* 420, and *Preced. in Chan.* 252; *Haytor v. Rod*, 1 *P. Will.* 360; *Whitchurch v. Whitchurch*, before the Lord's Commissioners, 1725, 2 *P. Will.* 236, and *Lady Dudley v. Lord Dudley*, *Precedents in Chancery*, 241, 2 *Chan. Cas.* 160, which was a case on the custom of London. All these cases were cited at the bar, and I choose to put them together without stating them particularly, because they all tend only to prove this general proposition. But although in all these cases this court considers the trust of the term as annexed to the inheritance, yet the legal estate of the term is always separate from it, and must be so, otherwise it would be merged. And this gives the court an opportunity to make use of such terms as a guard and protection to an equitable owner of the inheritance against mesne conveyances, which would carry the fee at common law, or to a person who is both legal and equitable owner of the inheritance against such mesne incumbrances as he ought not to be affected with in conscience. And here the court often disannexes the trust of the term from the strict legal fee, but still in support of right.'

¹ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 9, § 2, n. 7, p. 450.

will be entitled both at law and in equity to the estate for the whole continuance of the term to the utter exclusion of all the other claimants. This, if the term is of long duration, absolutely deprives all the other claimants of every kind of benefit in the land.¹

1000. Supposing therefore that A purchases an estate which previous to his purchase had been sold, mortgaged, leased, and charged with every kind of incumbrance to which real property is subject; in this case A and the other purchasers and all the incumbrancers have equal claim upon the estate. This is the meaning of the expression that their equity is equal. But if there is a term of years subsisting in the estate which was created prior to the purchases, mortgages, or other incumbrances, and A procures an assignment of it in trust for himself, this gives him the legal interest in the lands during the continuance of the term absolutely discharged from and unaffected by any of the purchases, mortgages, and other incumbrances subsequent to the creation of the term but prior to his own purchase. This is the meaning of the expression in assignments of terms that they are to protect the purchaser from all mesne incumbrances. But it is to be observed that A to be entitled in equity to the benefit of the term must have all the following requisites: he must be a purchaser for a valuable consideration; his purchase must in all respects be a fair purchase and free from every kind of fraud; and at the time of his purchase he must have no notice of the prior conveyance, mortgage charge, or other incumbrance. It is to be observed that mortgagees, lessees, and other incumbrancers are purchasers in this sense to the amount of their several charges, interests, or rights. If any person of this description unaffected by notice or fraud takes a defective conveyance or assignment of the fee or of any estate carved out of it defective either by reason of some prior conveyance or some prior charge or incumbrance, and if he also takes an assignment of a term to a trustee for himself or to himself where he takes the conveyance of the inheritance to his trustee, — in each of these cases he is entitled to the full benefit of the term; that is, he may use the legal estate of the term to defend his possession during the continuance of the term, or if he has lost the possession, to recover it

¹ Co. Litt. 290 *b*, Butler's note (1), § 13.

at common law in preference to all claimants prior to his purchase but subsequent to his term.¹

1001. At the common law all terms for years are (as has been intimated) deemed to be terms in gross.² And Courts of Equity when they hold terms for years to be attendant upon the inheritance always do so by affecting the person holding the term with a trust for that purpose either upon the express declaration of the parties or by implication of law. If the term is made attendant upon the inheritance by express declaration, it is immaterial whether the term if it were in the same hands with the inheritance would or would not have merged, or whether it be subject to some ulterior limitation to which the inheritance is not subject; for the express declaration will be sufficient to make it attendant upon the inheritance. But if the term is to be made attendant upon the inheritance by implication of law, then it is necessary that it should not be subject to any other limitation, and that the owner of the inheritance should be entitled to the whole trust in the term.³ The general rule is that where the same person has the inheritance and the term in himself although he has in one the equitable interest and in the other the legal interest, there the inheritance by implication draws to itself the term and makes that attendant upon it. For as at law if the legal estate in the term and in the inheritance come into the

¹ *Ibid.* The whole of these last two sections have been copied almost verbatim from Mr. Butler's learned note to Co. Litt. 290 *b*, § 13, which gives a thorough and at the same time a condensed view of the doctrines of equity on this subject. The notes of Mr. Fonblanque on the same subject are highly valuable. 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 4, § 3, notes (*i*), (*l*), § 4, note (*o*). The basis of the general statements by each of these distinguished authors will be found in the opinion of Lord Hardwicke in the case of *Willoughby v. Willoughby*, 1 Term Rep. 765. See also Sugden on Vendors, ch. 9, § 2, pp. 387 to 462 (7th edit.); *Id.* pp. 510 to 529 (9th edit.); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 406 to 413; Powell on Mortg. ch. 8, pp. 189, 390; *Id.* 464 to 513, and the notes of Coventry and Hughes. (*a*)

² *Willoughby v. Willoughby*, 1 T. Rep. 765; *Scott v. Fenhoulet*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 69, 70.

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 4, § 3, note (*l*); *Scott v. Fenhoulet*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 70, and Mr. Belt's notes. If there be a substantial intervening interest in a third person, there the term will not by implication or without an express declaration be attendant upon the inheritance. *Scott v. Fenhoulet*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 69, 70, and Mr. Belt's notes; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 9, § 2, art. 6, pp. 455 to 459 (7th edit.); *Id.* pp. 521 to 525 (9th edit.).

(*a*) See *In re Russell Road Moneys*, L. R. 12 Eq. 78.

same hand the term is merged and the estate goes to the heir, so in equity where the one estate is equitable and the other legal it is in the nature of a merger; and the trust of the term will follow the inheritance.¹

1002. But although a term may be so attendant upon the inheritance, yet as the legal estate in it remains distinct and separate from the inheritance at law it may at any time be disannexed therefrom by the proper acts of the parties in interest and be turned into a term in gross at law. And a term so attendant becomes a term in gross when it fails of a freehold to support it or it is divided from the inheritance by different limitations from those of the latter.² In many cases the distinction between terms in gross and terms attendant upon the inheritance is highly important; the former being generally treated as mere personalty, the latter as partaking of the realty and following the fate of the inheritance. Thus for example a term attendant upon the inheritance will not pass by a will not executed so as to pass real estate under the Statute of Frauds. So such a term is real assets in the hands of the heir; for the Statute of Frauds having made a trust in fee assets in the hands of the heir, the term which follows the inheritance and is subject to all the charges which would affect the inheritance must also be real assets.³ On the contrary a term in gross is personal assets only.⁴

1003. It would lead us too far from the immediate object of these Commentaries to go at large into all the doctrines of Courts of Equity in regard to terms for years created upon special trusts. It may be remarked however that where such terms are created to raise portions for children upon marriage settlements, and the settler also personally covenants to pay such portions, the real estate is considered as the primary fund, and the personal estate of the covenantor as auxiliary only.⁵ If there be no

¹ *Capel v. Girdler*, 9 Ves. 510; *Best v. Stamford*, 2 Frém. R. 288; s. c. *Prec. Ch.* 252; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 9, § 2, art. 6, pp. 455 to 459 (7th edit.); *Id.* pp. 521 to 525 (9th edit.). *Whitchurch v. Whitchurch*, 2 P. Will. 236; *Sidney v. Shelly*, 19 Ves. 352; *Kelly v. Power*, 2 Ball & Beatt. 253.

² *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 2, ch. 4, § 3, and notes (*i*), (*l*); *Willoughby v. Willoughby*, 1 Term R. 765, 770.

³ 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 2, ch. 4, § 6, and notes (*r*), (*s*); *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 9, § 2, art. 7, pp. 459 to 461; *Id.* pp. 525 to 528 (9th edit.).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ 1 *Madd. Ch. Pr.* 327, 398; *Lechmere v. Charlton*, 15 Ves. 197, 198; ante, §§ 574, 575; post, §§ 1248, 1249.

such personal covenant for the payment of the portions, but only a covenant to settle lands and to raise a term of years out of the lands for securing the portions, in such a case, even although there be a bond to perform the covenant, the portions are not in any event payable out of his personal estate.¹

¹ *Ibid.*; *Edwards v. Freeman*, 2 P. Will. 437, 438. Very intricate questions have arisen as to the time when portions are to be raised by trustees for the benefit of children, especially upon reversionary interests. Upon this subject I cannot do better than to quote a passage from the learned commentaries of Mr. Chancellor Kent (4 Kent Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 148 to 150, 3d edit.). 'A very vexatious question has been agitated, and has distressed the English courts, from the early case of *Graves v. Mattison* down to the recent decision in *Wynter v. Bold*, as to the time at which money provided for children's portions may be raised by sale or mortgage of a reversionary term. The history of the question is worthy of a moment's attention as a legal curiosity and a sample of the perplexity and uncertainty with which complicated settlements "rolled in tangles," and subtle disputation, and eternal doubts, will insensibly encumber and oppress a free and civilized system of jurisprudence. If nothing appears to gainsay it, the period at which they are to be raised is presumed to have been intended to be that which would be most beneficial to those for whom the portions were provided. If the term for providing portions ceases to be contingent and becomes a vested remainder in trustees, to raise portions out of the rents and profits after the death of the parents and payable to the daughters coming of age or marriage, a Court of Equity has allowed a portion to be raised by sale or mortgage in the lifetime of the parents, subject nevertheless to the life estate. The parents' death is anticipated in order to make provision for the children. The result of the very protracted series of these discussions for one hundred and fifty years is, that if an estate be settled to the use of the father for life, remainder to the mother for life, remainder to the sons of the marriage in strict settlement, and in default of such issue with remainder to trustees to raise portions, and the mother dies without male issue, and leaves issue female, the term is vested in remainder in the trustees; and they may sell or mortgage such a reversionary term in the lifetime of the surviving parent for the purpose of raising the portions; unless the contingencies on which the portions were to become vested had not happened, or there was a manifest intent that the term should not be sold or mortgaged in the lifetime of the parents, nor until it had become vested in the trustees in possession. The inclination of the Court of Chancery has been against raising portions out of reversionary terms by sale or mortgage in the lifetime of the parent, as leading to a sacrifice of the interests of the person in reversion or remainder. And modern settlements usually contain a prohibitory clause against it.' *Post*, §§ 1248, 1249.

CHAPTER XXVII.

EXPRESS TRUSTS. — MORTGAGES.

1004. IN the next place as to MORTGAGES. It is wholly unnecessary to enter into a minute examination of the origin and history of this well-known and universally received security in the countries governed by the common law. During the existence of the system of feudal tenures in its full rigor, mortgages could have had no existence in English Jurisprudence, as they were incompatible with the leading objects of that system.¹ The maxim of the feudal law was, ‘*Feudalia, invito domino, aut agnatis, non recte subjiciuntur hypothecæ, quamvis fructus posse esse, receptum est.*’² But as soon as the general right of alienation of real property was admitted, the necessities of the people almost immediately led to the introduction of mortgages.³ Littleton has enumerated two sorts, which were distinguished by the names of *vadium vivum* and *vadium mortuum*.⁴ The latter was in the common law called a mortgage, from two French words, *mort* (*mortuum* or dead) and *gage* (*vadium*, *pignus* or pledge), because if not redeemed at the stipulated time it was dead to the debtor.⁵ The former was called simply a living pledge, in contradistinction to the latter, for the reason given by Lord Coke. ‘*Vivum autem dicitur vadium, quia nunquam moritur ex aliqua parte, quod ex suis proventus acquiratur.*’⁶

¹ Glanville, Lib. 10, cap. 6.

² Bac. Abridg. Mortgage, A; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 1, note (a).

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 1, and note (a); Bac. Abridg. Mortgage, A.

⁴ Litt. §§ 327, 332; Co. Litt. 202 *b*, 205 *a*.

⁵ Glanville seems to give a somewhat different explanation. ‘*Mortuum vadium dicitur illud, cujus fructus vel redditus interim percepti in nullo se acquiescant.*’ Glanv. Lib. 10, cap. 6; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 136, 137 (3d edit.), and note (b).

⁶ Co. Litt. 205 *a*.

Thus if a man borrowed £100 of another and made over an estate of lands to him until he received the same sum out of the issues and profits of the land, it was called a *vivum vadium*; for neither the money nor the land dieth or is lost. But if a feoffment was made of land, upon condition that if the feoffor paid to the feoffee the sum of £100 on a certain day he might re-enter on the land; there, if he did not pay the sum at the day, he could not at the common law afterwards re-enter; but (as Littleton said) the land was taken away from him forever, and so dead to him. And if he did pay at the day, then the pledge was dead as to the feoffee; and therefore the feoffee was called tenant in mortgage, the estate being *mortuum vadium*.¹

1005. It has been generally supposed that the notion of mortgages and of the redemption thereof in the English law was borrowed from the Roman law, although Mr. Butler contends that they were strictly founded on the common-law doctrine of conditions.² Whatever truth there may be in this latter observation as to the origin of mortgages of lands in the English law, there is no doubt that the notion of the equity of redemption was derived from the Roman law, and that it is purely the creature of Courts of Equity.³ In the Roman law there were two sorts of transfers of property as security for debts; namely, the *pignus* and the *hypotheca*. The *pignus*, or pledge, was when anything was pledged as a security for money lent, and the possession thereof was passed to the creditor upon the condition of returning it to the owner when the debt was paid. The *hypotheca* was when the thing pledged was not delivered to the creditor, but remained in the possession of the debtor.⁴ In respect to what was called an hypothecary action there was no difference between them. ‘*Inter pignus,*’ says the Institutes, ‘*autem et*

¹ Littleton, § 333; Co. Litt. 205 *a*; 2 Black. Comm. 157.

² In respect to mortgages of lands this opinion of Mr. Butler is certainly entitled to great consideration, for Littleton expressly puts mortgages as estates on condition. In respect to mortgages and pledges of personal property there may have been originally a distinction borrowed from the civil law. Glanville, Lib. 10, cap. 6. Courts of equity, in a great variety of cases of both sorts, act upon the principles of the civil law.

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 1, note (a).

⁴ Halifax, Roman Law, ch. 15, p. 63; Bac. Abr. Mortgage, A.; The Brig Nestor, 1 Sumner, R. 81, 82; Vinn. ad Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 15, Comm. 1, 2; Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 166, 167; Story on Bailments, § 286.

hypothecam (quantum ad actionem hypothecariam attinet) nihil interest; nam de qua re inter creditorem et debitorem conuenit, ut sit pro debito obligata, utraque hac appellatione continetur. Sed in aliis differentia est. Nam pignoris appellatione eam proprie rem contineri dicimus, quæ simul etiam traditur creditori; maxime si mobilis sit. At eam quæ sine traditione nuda conventionione tenetur, proprie hypothecæ appellatione contineri dicimus.¹ The Digest states the distinction with still more pregnant brevity. 'Proprie pignus dicimus, quod ad creditorem transit; hypothecam, cum non transit, nec possessio ad creditorem.'²

1006. In the Roman law it seems that the word 'pignus' was often used indiscriminately to describe both species of securities, whether applied to movables or immovables. Thus it is said in the Digest, 'Pignus contrahitur non sola traditione, sed etiam nuda conventionione, etsi non traditum est.'³ But in an exact sense pignus was properly applied to movables and hypotheca to immovables. 'Pignus appellatum,' says the Digest, 'a pugno, quia res, quæ pignori dantur, manu traduntur. Unde etiam videri potest verum esse quod quidam putant, pignus proprie rei mobilis constituti.'⁴ So that it answered very nearly to the corresponding term *pledge* in the common law, which although sometimes used in a general sense to include mortgages of land, is in the stricter sense confined to the pawn and deposit of personal property. (a) In the Roman law however there was generally no substantial difference, in the nature and extent of the rights and remedies of the parties, between movables and immovables, whether pledged or hypothecated. But in the common law, as we shall presently see, the difference as to rights and remedies between a pledge of personal property and a mortgage of real estate, or even of personal property, is very marked and important.⁵

¹ Justin. Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 6, § 7; Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 1, l. 5, § 1; Vinn. ad Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 15.

² Dig. Lib. 13, tit. 7, l. 9, § 2.

³ Dig. Lib. 13, tit. 7, l. 1.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 16, l. 238, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 20, tit. 1, n. 1; 1 Domat. B. 3, tit. 1, § 1, art. 1; Vinn. ad Inst. 4, tit. 6, § 8; Comm. 112; Id. Lib. 3, tit. 15, § 4, and Comm. 1; Story on Bailments, § 286; Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Ves. 358; s. c. 1 Atk. 166, 167.

⁵ See 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 138, 139 (2d edit.); Story on Bail-

(a) See Markby, Elements of Law, §§ 439-453 (3d edit.).

1007. In the Roman law there were two sorts of actions applicable to pledges and hypothecations; the action called *actio pignoratitia* and that called *actio hypothecaria*. The former was properly an action in personam and divisible into two sorts: (1) *Actio directa*, which lay in favor of the debtor against the creditor, to compel him to restore the pledge when the debt had been paid;¹ (2) *Actio contraria*, which lay in favor of the creditor against the debtor, to recover the proper value or compensation when the latter had retained possession of the pledge, or when the title to it had failed by fraud or otherwise, or when the creditor sought compensation for expenses upon it.² The *actio hypothecaria* on the other hand was strictly in rem, and was given to the creditor to obtain possession of the pledge in whosever hands it might be.³

1008. Without dwelling more upon topics of this sort, which are purely technical, it may be useful to state, as illustrative of some of the doctrines admitted into Equity Jurisprudence, that under the civil law, although the debt for which the mortgage or pledge was given was not paid at the stipulated time, it did not amount to a forfeiture of the right of property of the debtor therein. It simply clothed the creditor with the authority to sell the pledge and reimburse himself for his debt, interest, and expenses; and the residue of the proceeds of the sale then belonged to the debtor.⁴ It has been supposed by some writers that to justify such a sale it was indispensable that it should be made under a decretal order of some court upon the application of the creditor. But although the creditor was at liberty to make such an application, it does not appear that he might not act in ordinary cases without any such judicial sanction, after giving the proper notice of the intended sale as prescribed by law to the debtor. When the debtor could not be found and notice could not be given to him, such a decretal order seems to

ments, §§ 286, 287; 1 Powell on Mortg. 3, by Coventry and Hughes and Rand.

¹ Just. Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 15, § 4; Vinn. ad Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 15, Comm. 2, 3.

² Dig. Lib. 13, tit. 7, l. 3, 8, 9; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 13, tit. 7, n. 24 to 29; Vinn. ad Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 15, § 4, Comm. 2, 3; Id. Lib. 4, tit. 6, § 8, Comm. 6. The statement of Mr. Powell respecting the *Actio Pignoratitia* and *Hypothecaria* is not accurate. See 1 Brown, Civil Law, 204, note (8).

³ Vinn. ad Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 15, § 4, Comm. 3; Id. Lib. 4, tit. 6, § 8, Comm. 1, 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 20, tit. 1, §§ 29 to 36.

⁴ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 20, tit. 5; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 3, art. 1.

have been necessary.¹ And where a sale could not be effected, a decree in the nature of a foreclosure could be obtained under certain circumstances, by which the absolute property would be vested in the creditor.²

1009. This authority to make a sale might be exercised not only when it was expressly so agreed between the parties, but when the agreement between them was silent on the subject. Even an agreement between them that there should be no sale was so far invalid that a decretal order of sale might be obtained upon the application of the creditor.³ On the other hand if by the agreement it was expressly stipulated that if the debt was not paid at the day the property should belong to the creditor in lieu of the debt, such a stipulation was held void as being inhuman and unjust.⁴ (a)

1010. In some cases also by the civil law a sort of tacking of debts could be insisted on by the mortgagee against the mortgagor, but not against intermediate incumbrancers;⁵ (b) and

¹ 1 Bro. Civ. Law, 204, note (8); Cod. Lib. 8, tit. 34, l. 3, §§ 1 to 3; Heinecc. Elem. Pand. Ps. 4, tit. 5, §§ 37 to 44; Story on Bailments, § 309; Cortelyou v. Lansing, 2 Cain, Cas. Er. 213.

² Cod. Lib. 8, tit. 34, l. 3, §§ 2, 3; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 20, tit. 5, n. 34; Vinn. ad. Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 8, Comm. 2, 3; Story on Bailments, § 309. But see 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 138, 139 (3d edit.).

³ 1 Bro. Civ. Law, 203, 204; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 3, art. 9, 10; Dig. Lib. 13, tit. 7, l. 4; Cod. Lib. 8, tit. 28, l. 14; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 20, tit. 5, n. 1 to 5.

⁴ Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 3, art. 11; Cod. Lib. 8, tit. 35, l. 3; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 136, note (a) (3d edit.).

⁵ Cod. Lib. 8, tit. 27, l. 1; Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 4, l. 20; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 3, art. 3, 4. In a note to the former volume (§ 415, note 2, p. 419, § 420, and notes) it was stated that the doctrine of tacking mortgages was not known in the civil law. Of course the remarks there made were applicable to the case of tacking a first and third mortgage to the exclusion of an intermediate mortgagee; and not what may be called a tacking of debts by the mortgagee in the case of a mortgagor seeking redemption. It is clear that the civil law in the case of the mortgagor seeking to redeem did not permit it, unless the mortgagor paid not only the debt for which the mortgage was given, but all other debts due to the mortgagee. 'Si in possessione fueris constitutus,' says the Code, 'nisi ea quoque pecunia tibi a debitore reddatur, vel offeratur, quæ sine pignore debetur, eam restituere propter exceptionem doli mali non cogeris. Jure enim contendis, debitores eam solam pecuniam, cujus nomine ea pignora obligaverunt, offerentes audiri non oportere, nisi pro illa satisfecerint quam mutuam simpliciter acceperunt.' But then it is immediately added that this

(a) See Markby, Elements, §§ 448, 456 (3d edit.).

(b) Markby, § 455. See editor's note to § 1023, infra.

where movables and immovables were included in the same mortgage, and movables were first to be sold and applied in the course of payment.¹

1011. These instances are sufficient to show some strong analogies between the Roman law and the Equity Jurisprudence of England on the subject of mortgages, and to evince the probability if not the certainty that the latter has silently borrowed some of its doctrines from the former source.² But to develop them at large would occupy too much space; and we may now therefore return to the more immediate subject of mortgages at the common law.

does not apply to the case of a second creditor. ‘*Quod in secundo creditore locum non habet; nec enim necessitas ei imponitur chirographarium etiam debitum priori creditore offerre.*’ Cod. Lib. 8, tit. 27, l. 1. For it was expressly held in the civil law that where there was a first mortgage and then a second mortgage, and then the first mortgagee lent another sum to the debtor, he could not tack it against the second mortgagee. Pothier, Pand. Lib. 20, tit. 4, n. 10; Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 4, l. 20. Mr. Chancellor Kent (4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 136, note (a); Idem, pp. 175, 176, 3d edit.) has said that in the civil law the mortgagee was even allowed to tack another incumbrance to his own, and thereby to gain a preference over an intermediate incumbrance; for which he cites Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 4, l. 3. If, as I presume, his meaning is that the tacking gave a preference over the intermediate incumbrancer, with great deference I do not find that the passage cited supports the doctrine; and it seems contrary to the passages already cited from Cod. Lib. 8, tit. 27, l. 1, and Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 4, l. 20. There are other passages in the Code on the subject of a subsequent mortgagee acquiring the rights of a first mortgagee by paying his mortgage, and thereby confirming his own title by substitution. But it appears to me that they do no more than subrogate the subsequent mortgagee to all the rights of the first mortgagee, and that they do not enlarge those rights. See Code, Lib. 8, tit. 18, l. 1, 5; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 3, art. 7, 8; Id. B. 3, tit. 1, § 6, art. 6, 7; Heinecc. Elem. Pand. Ps. 4, tit. 4, § 35. Doctor Brown too (1 Brown, Civ. Law, 208; Id. 202) insists that a mortgagee might tack another incumbrance to his mortgage; and if he lent more money by way of further charge on the estate he was, in the civil law, preferred as to this charge also before a mortgage created in the intermediate time. He cites the Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 4, l. 3, which does not (as has been already stated) seem to support the conclusion. In the Equity Jurisprudence of England (as we have seen) the heir of a mortgagor cannot (although the mortgagor himself may) redeem without paying the bond debt of the mortgagor as well as the mortgage debt. Ante, § 418. And tacking is also permitted against mesne incumbrancers in certain cases. See ante, §§ 412 to 419; 2 Wooddes. Lect. 24, pp. 158, 159; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 175, 176 (3d edit.); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 9, note (u); Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 188 to 191; ante, § 415, note 2.

¹ 1 Bro. Civ. Law, 206, 207; Dig. Lib. 42, tit. 1, l. 15, § 2.

² 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 136, note (a), (3d edit.).

1012. We have already had occasion to take notice of the inconveniences attendant upon the creation of mortgages in fee, and of the substitution in their stead of terms for years.¹ But in truth whether the one course or the other was adopted, so far as the common law was concerned the mortgagor was subjected to great hardships and inconveniences if he did not strictly fulfil the conditions of the mortgage at the very time specified; as he thereby forfeited the inheritance or the term, as the case might be, however great might be its intrinsic value compared with the debt for which it was mortgaged.²

1013. Courts of Equity therefore acting upon their general principles could not fail to perceive the necessity of interposing to prevent such manifest mischief and injustice, which were wholly irremediable at law. They soon arrived at the just conclusion that mortgages ought to be treated as the Roman law had treated them, as a mere security for the debt due to the mortgagee; that the mortgagee held the estate, although forfeited at law, as a trust;³ and that the mortgagor had what was signi-

¹ Ante, § 998.

² See 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 140 (3d edit.).

³ *Seton v. Slade*, 7 Ves. 273; *Cholmondeley v. Clinton*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 182 to 185. When a mortgage is denominated a trust and the mortgagee a trustee of the mortgagor, the expression is not to be understood in an unlimited sense. It is a trust sui generis and of a peculiar nature. This subject is expounded with great ability by Sir Thomas Plumer in his masterly judgment in *Cholmondeley v. Clinton*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 1 to 189, &c. The following extract from it is so valuable and important that I have not been able to persuade myself to omit it although it is long (p. 182). 'As to the position,' said he, 'of the mortgagee being a trustee for the mortgagor, upon which so much of the argument is built that the consequences contended for would not follow even if the character of trustee did properly belong to the mortgagee, not being in actual possession, I have already endeavored to show. It may be proper however to consider how far and in what respect he is to be considered as possessing that character. The position is to be received with considerable qualifications, as will appear by examining, what is the true character of a mortgagee, and how he is considered in a Court of Equity. Lord Mansfield, adverting to the comparisons made in respect to mortgages, has, I think, said there is nothing so unlike as a simile, and nothing more apt to mislead. A mortgagor has had ascribed to him a variety of different characters, in which there existed some points of resemblance when it was not very material to ascertain what his powers or interests were, or to settle with any great precision in what respects the resemblance did and in what it did not exist. But it would be productive of much error if it were to be concluded that the resemblance was complete in every point to any one of the ascribed characters. The relations of vendor and purchaser, of principal and bailiff, of landlord and tenant, of debtor and creditor, of trustee and cestui que trust, have been applied to the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee according to their different

ficantly called an equity of redemption, which he might enforce against the mortgagee, as he could any other trust, if he applied

rights and interests before or after the condition forfeited, before or after foreclosure, and according as the possession was in the mortgagor or mortgagee. "Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo?" The truth is, it is a relation perfectly anomalous and *sui generis*. The names of mortgagor and mortgagee most properly characterize the relation. They are (as Mr. Justice Buller observes in *Birch v. Wright*) characters as well known, and their rights, powers, and interests as well settled, as any in the law. It is only in a secondary point of view, and under certain circumstances, and for a particular purpose, that the character of trustee constructively belongs to a mortgagee. No trust is expressed in the contract. It is only raised by implication in subordination to the main purposes of it and after that is fully satisfied. Its primary character is not fiduciary. It is a contract of a peculiar nature by which under certain conditions the mortgagee becomes the purchaser of a security and pledge to hold for his own use and benefit. He acquires a distinct and independent beneficial interest in the estate; he has always a qualified and limited right, and may eventually acquire an absolute and permanent one, to take possession; and he is entitled to enforce his right by an adverse suit *in invitum* against the mortgagor, — all which can never take place between trustee and *cestui que trust*. They have always an identity and unity of interest, and are never opposed in contest to each other. The late Master of the Rolls observes that in general a trustee is not allowed to deprive his *cestui que trust* of the possession. But a Court of Equity never interferes to prevent the mortgagee from assuming the possession. In this the contrast between the two characters is strongly marked. By not interfering in this latter case a Court of Equity does not, as it is supposed, in opposition to its usual principle, refuse to afford a protection to a *cestui que trust* against his trustee. But the interference is refused because the mortgagor and mortgagee do not in this instance stand in the relation of trustee and *cestui que trust*. The mortgagee, when he takes the possession, is not acting as a trustee for the mortgagor, but independently and adversely for his own use and benefit. A trustee is stopped in equity from dispossessing his *cestui que trust*, because such dispossession would be a breach of trust. A mortgagee cannot be stopped, because in him it is no breach of trust, but in strict conformity to his contract, which would be directly violated by any impediment thrown in the way of the exercise of this right. Upon the same principle the mortgagee is not prevented but assisted in equity, when he has recourse to a proceeding which is not only to obtain the possession but the absolute title to the estate by foreclosure. This presents no resemblance to the character of a trustee, but to a character directly opposite. It is in this opposite character that he accounts for the rents when in possession, and when he is not, receives the interest of his mortgage debt. The payment of that interest by the person claiming to be the mortgagor is a recognition of that relation subsisting between them; but is no recognition of the mortgagee's possessing the character of trustee, much less of his being a trustee for any other person claiming the same character of mortgagor. The ground on which a mortgagee is in any case and for any purpose considered to have a character resembling that of a trustee, is the partial and limited right which in equity he is allowed to have in the whole estate legal and equitable. He does not at any time possess like a trustee a

within a reasonable time to redeem, and offered a full payment of the debt and of all equitable charges.¹

1014. These doctrines of Courts of Equity were at first strenuously resisted, and found little public favor owing to the rigid character of the common law and the sturdy prejudices of its advocates. We are told by Lord Hale that in the 14th year of Richard II. Parliament would not admit of an equity of redemption;² although it seems not long after to have struggled into existence.³ Even as late as the latter part of the reign of Charles II. the same great judge was so little satisfied with encouraging an equity of redemption, that in a case before him for a redemption he declared that by the growth of equity on equity the heart of the common law is eaten out and legal settlements are destroyed.⁴ And perhaps the triumph of common

title to the legal estate distinct and separate from the beneficial and equitable. Whenever he is entitled at all to either he is fully entitled to both and to the legal and equitable remedies incident to both. But in equity his title is confined to a particular purpose. He has no right to either, nor can he make use of any remedy belonging to either further than, and as may be necessary, to secure the repayment of the money due to him. When that is paid his duty is to reconvey the estate to the person entitled to it. It never remains in his hands clothed with any fiduciary duty. He is never intrusted with the care of it, nor under any obligation to hold it for any one but himself; nor is he allowed to use it for any other purpose. The estate is not committed to his care, nor has he the means of preventing or being acquainted with the changes which the title to the equity of redemption may undergo, either by the act of the mortgagor without his privity, or by operation of law by descent, forfeiture, or otherwise; and consequently, as I have already endeavored to show, by the operation of the analogy to the Statute of Limitations.' See also *Casburne v. Inglis*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 194, 196, in note.

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 13, and note (e); *Seton v. Slade*, 7 Ves. 273.

² *Roscarrick v. Barton*, 1 Ch. Cas. 219; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 2, note (c).

³ Butler's note (1) to Co. Litt. 204 b.

⁴ *Roscarrick v. Barton*, 1 Ch. Cas. 219. But see *Pawlett v. Attorney-Gen. Hardes*, R. 469. Lord Redesdale, in his treatise on Equity Pleadings, seems to attribute the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in cases of non-redemption of mortgages at the prescribed time to the head of accident. 'In many cases,' says he, 'as lapse of time, the Courts of Equity will relieve against the consequence of the accident in a Court of Law. Upon this ground they proceed in the common case of a mortgagee, where the title of the mortgage has become absolute at law upon default of payment of the mortgage money at the time stipulated for payment.' Mitford, Eq. Pl. 130, by Jeremy. But this is quite too narrow a ground upon which to rest the general jurisdiction. A trust arising from the nature of the contract as a security is a broader and in many cases a better foundation. See ante, § 89, and note, where this passage

sense over professional prejudices has never been more strikingly illustrated than in the gradual manner in which Courts of Equity have been enabled to withdraw mortgages from the stern and unrelenting character of conditions at the common law.¹ Even after the equity of redemption was admitted it was long maintained that if the money was not paid at the time appointed, the estate became liable in the hands of the mortgagee to his legal charges, to the dower of his wife, and to escheat.² And it was a common opinion that there was no redemption against those who came in by the post. This introduced mortgages for long terms of years,³ the nature of which we have already somewhat considered.⁴

1015. Courts of Equity having thus succeeded in establishing the doctrine, in conformity to common sense and common justice, that the mortgage is but a pledge or security for the payment of the debt or the discharge to the other engagements for which it was originally given,⁵ (*a*) it yet remained to be determined what was the true nature and character of the equity of redemption and of the relations between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It has been well observed that these were not actually settled until a comparatively recent period.⁶ It was formerly contended that the mortgagor after forfeiture of the condition had but a mere right to reduce the estate back into his own pos-

is also cited. See *Lennon v. Napper*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 684, 688; *Seton v. Slade*, 7 Ves. 273, 274.

¹ Mr. Chancellor Kent has said, with great force and felicity of expression: 'The case of mortgages is one of the most splendid instances in the history of our jurisprudence of the triumph of equitable principles over technical rules, and of the homage which those principles have received by their adoption in the Courts of Law. Without any prophetic anticipation, we may well say that "returning Justice lifts aloft her scale."' 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 158 (4th edit.).

² Butler's note (1) to Co. Litt. 204 *b*; Bac. Abr. Mortgage, A.

³ *Ibid.*; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 2, note (*b*); Bac. Abr. Mortgage, A.; 2 Black. Comm. 158.

⁴ Ante, § 998, and note. Mr. Butler has stated the advantages and disadvantages of mortgages by way of long terms of years in a very accurate manner in his note (1) to Co. Litt. 204 *b*.

⁵ Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 A. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 3, note (*d*).

(*a*) A trust for sale, given as security, is a mortgage. *Locking v. Parker*, L. R. 8 Ch. 30.

session by payment of the debt or other discharge of the condition. But it is now firmly established that the mortgagor has an estate in the land in equity, in the nature of a trust estate, which may be granted, devised, and entailed; ¹ that this equity of redemption if entailed may be barred by a fine or recovery; that it is capable of a *possessio fratris*; (*a*) and that it is liable to tenancy by the curtesy, ² but not liable to dower. ³

1016. In regard to the estate of the mortgagee, it being treated in equity as a mere security for the debt, it follows the nature of the debt. And although where the mortgage is in fee the legal estate descends to the heir, yet in equity it is deemed a chattel interest and personal estate, and belongs to the personal representatives as assets. ⁴ It is upon the same ground that an assignment of the debt by the mortgagee carries with it in equity as an incident the interest of the mortgagee in the mortgaged property; (*b*) unless indeed the instrument of assignment

¹ Lord Hale, in *Pawlett v. Attorney-Gen. Hardres*, R. 469, distinguished between a trust and an equity of redemption, as follows. 'There is a diversity,' says he, 'betwixt a trust and a power of redemption; for a trust is created by the contract of the party and he may direct it as he pleaseth, and he may provide for the execution of it; and therefore one that comes in the post shall not be liable to it without express mention made by the party. And the rules for executing a trust have often varied, and therefore they only are bound by it who come in in privity of estate. A tenant in dower is bound by it because she is in in the per; but not a tenant by the curtesy, who is in in the post. So all who come in in privity of estate, or with notice, or without a consideration. But a power of redemption is an equitable right inherent in the land, and binds all persons in the post or otherwise; because it is an ancient right which the party is entitled to in equity. And although by the escheat the tenure is extinguished, that will be nothing to the purpose; because the party may be recompensed for that by the court by a decree for rent, or part of the land itself, or some other satisfaction. And it is of such consideration in the eye of the law that the law takes notice of it and makes it assignable and devisable.' S. P. cited 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 3.*

² *Ibid.*; *Casborne v. Scarfe*, 1 *Atk.* 605, 606.

³ *Dixon v. Saville*, 1 *Bro. Ch. R.* 327, 328.

⁴ 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 3, note (d)*; *Id.* § 13, note (*e*); *Co. Litt.* 208 *b*, *Butler's note* (1); 1 *Madd. Ch. Pr.* 412; *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 4 A. 9;

(*a*) *Coke, Litt.* 14 *b*.

(*b*) *Whittemore v. Gibbs*, 24 *N. H.* 484; *Graham v. Newman*, 21 *Ala.* 497; *Potter v. Stevens*, 40 *Mo.* 229; *Holmes v. McGinty*, 44 *Miss.* 94; *Hyman v. Devereux*, 63 *N. Car.* 624; *Kurtz v. Sponable*, 6 *Kans.* 395;

Mapps v. Sharpe, 32 *Ill.* 13; *Lindsay v. Bates*, 42 *Miss.* 397; post, § 1047 *a*. On the other hand it is held that a transfer of the mortgage, or the mortgaged premises, without transferring the note or debt to secure which it was given, conveys no estate.

contains a plain exception of the latter.¹ The mortgagee is however entitled (unless there be some agreement to the contrary)

Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. 605; *Demarest v. Wynkoop*, 3 John. Ch. R. 145; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 159, 160, 164 to 166 (4th edit.). The remarks of Mr. Chancellor Kent in the passage cited contain a very exact and luminous view of the equitable doctrine on this subject. It is also very fully discussed in Mr. Butler's note (1) to Co. Litt. 208 *b*. In adopting the rule of considering mortgages to be personal assets, Courts of Equity (as Mr. Butler has well remarked) appear to have been guided by the same reasoning which in former times made Courts of Law consider the estates of tenants by statute merchant, and tenant by statute staple and by elegit, merely as chattels interest. These from their uncertain nature ought to have been considered as freehold; but, as Mr. Justice Blackstone observes, being a security and remedy provided for personal debts to which the executor is entitled, the law has therefore directed their succession, as judging it reasonable from a principle of natural equity that the security and remedy should be vested in them to whom the debt if recovered would belong. Butler's note, *Ibid.*; 2 Black.

¹ *Wheeler v. Wheeler*, 9 Cowen, R. 34.

Johnson v. Cornett, 29 Ind. 59; *Merritt v. Bartholick*, 36 N. Y. 44; *Dearborn v. Taylor*, 18 N. H. 153. The explanation given is that the note or debt being the principal obligation, and the mortgage only an incident thereof, the incident cannot be alone transferred. *Ib.* But this is technical reasoning, and if taken as a broad rule of law concerning securities generally would lead to erroneous results. As regards the interest of the *debtor* the true ground of the rule stated appears to be that the debtor who has mortgaged his property to secure payment of his undertaking still owes but one debt, and that this cannot be doubled or increased by separating the security from that which it secures, towards any assignee or any transferee fixed with notice. This appears clearly from *Ruggles v. Barton*, 13 Gray, 506, where a mortgagee conveyed the mortgaged premises by warranty deed, without transferring at the time the mortgage notes; but the grantee on bringing suit to foreclose the mortgage produced the notes in court as his own, and this was held sufficient. The notes had 'never been

given up or in any way discharged or transferred to any third person.' *Dewey, J.* It is obvious that the rule itself applies only to securities given by the debtor on his own property.

But to determine which of two claimants' to rights under the mortgage should prevail, — as e. g. whether the original mortgagee, who has transferred to another the mortgage but has retained the mortgage note should prevail, or such transferee, — it becomes more important to consider what is the principal obligation and what the incident; and here it may well be said that he who holds the principal obligation shall prevail, unless there is some very special equity in favor of the other party. See *Merritt v. Bartholick*, 36 N. Y. 44; *Strong v. Jackson*, 123 Mass. 60; *Morris v. Bacon*, *lq.* 58; *Blunt v. Norris*, *Ib.* 55; *Commonwealth v. Reading Bank*, 137 Mass. 431, 443.

An assignment of a mortgage to one who, for the benefit of others, is bound to extinguish it is a discharge of it. *Morse v. Bassett*, 132 Mass. 502; *Wadsworth v. Williams*, 100 Mass. 126.

to enter into possession of the lands and to take the rents and profits if he chooses so to do. (a) But in such cases he must account therefor towards the discharge of the debt after deducting all reasonable charges and allowances.¹ (b) So he may grant

Comm. pp. 161, 162; Co. Litt. 42, 43. The mortgage is not only considered as personal estate of the mortgagee, but the debt is also treated as the personal debt of the mortgagor; and therefore it is primarily a charge on his personal assets in favor of his heir, his devisee, and other parties standing in a similar predicament. There are exceptions to the doctrine where the land is treated as the primary fund, but they stand on special reasons. See ante, §§ 562 to 578; Co. Litt. 208 *b*, Butler's note (106); Howell *v.* Price, 1 P. Will. 294, Mr. Cox's note. If a mortgage should happen to be in the disjunctive, payable to the heirs or the executors of the mortgagee, there a payment to either the heir or the executor will discharge it, and the mortgagor has his election. But if there has been a default of payment at the day, there the mortgage is absolute at law, and the election is gone and the money is payable exclusively to the executor. This doctrine was very ably expounded and the reasons stated in *Thornborough v. Baker*, 1 Ch. Cas. 283. See 2 Foul. Eq. B. 2, ch. 1, § 13, and note (e); Co. Litt. 209 *b*, 210; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 184, 185; 2 Powell on Mort. ch. 15, pp. 662, 667, and the notes of Coventry & Rand, *ibid.*

¹ 4 Kent. Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 166, 167 (4th edit.). See in what cases in respect to rents received by the mortgagee annual rests will be made in equity in favor of the mortgagee, *Wilson v. Cluer*, 3 Beav. R. 136, 140.

(a) *Scott v. Ware*, 65 Ala. 174, 184. In the case of mortgages conditioned to support the mortgagee or others during life it seems to be impliedly taken that the mortgagor shall remain in possession until breach of condition. *Wales v. Mellen*, 1 Gray, 512; *Norton v. Webb*, 35 Maine, 218; *Brown v. Leach*, *ib.* 39.

Though there be a provision for the mortgagee's taking possession, it seems that equity will not give possession by interlocutory decree on a bill to foreclose. *Cheever v. Rutland R. Co.*, 39 Vt. 653. See *Whitehead v. Wooten*, 43 Miss. 523.

(b) *Scruggs v. Memphis R. Co.*, 108 U. S. 368; *Saunders v. Frost*, 5 Pick. 260; *Mahone v. Williams*, 39 Ala. 202; *Shaiffer v. Chambers*, 2 Halst. Ch. 548; *Brocklehurst v. Jessop*, 7 Sim. 438; *Shepard v. Jones*, 21 Ch. D. 469, 475. See *Mayer v. Murray*, 8 Ch. D. 424. This, it is held, assumes that the mortgagee occupies, either

personally or by his own tenant or servants.' *Shepard v. Jones*, *supra*. But it is laid down by Jessel, M. R. in *Cockburn v. Edwards*, 18 Ch. D. 449, 456, that a mortgagee in possession receiving rents receives only what is his own, subject to the right of redemption, and that there is no appropriation in law on the principal or interest by the payment of rent to the mortgagee or his tenants until the accounting is reached, unless indeed the rents were paid and received on behalf of the mortgagor. But of course at the accounting the rents and profits must be allowed the mortgagor; and the mortgagee must then account for what he received or could have received 'by reasonable diligence.' *Scruggs v. Memphis R. Co.*, *supra*. But see *Mayer v. Murray*, *supra*, where it is said that the mortgagee must account for what he has received or might have received 'without wilful default' from the time of taking pos-

leases of the premises and avoid any leases which have been made by the mortgagor subsequent to his mortgage.¹ Still he is treated so entirely as a trustee that he cannot exercise any right over the mortgaged property (such for example as the renewal of a lease) for his own benefit; but all acts of this sort done and all profits made are deemed to be for the benefit of the party who is entitled to the estate.² A mortgagor has no right to cut timber upon the mortgaged estate; and if he assumes to do so he will be restrained by an injunction if it would be injurious to the security of the mortgagee.³

1016 *a*. Where the mortgagee enters into possession of the mortgaged property he is of course accountable for the rents and profits. But Courts of Equity will not under such circumstances ordinarily require annual rests to be made in settling the accounts; as for example they will not require annual rests to be made where the interest of the mortgage is in arrears at the time when the mortgagee takes possession, even although the rents and profits may exceed the annual interest, nor until the principal mortgage debt is entirely paid off.⁴ But where special cir-

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 3, note (*d*); 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 157, 164 to 167 (4th edit.).

² 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, 167 (4th edit.); *Holdridge v. Gillespie*, 2 John. Ch. R. 33, and cases there cited; *Rakestraw v. Brewer*, 2 P. Will. 511.

³ *King v. Smith*, 2 Hare, R. 239, 242.

⁴ *Finch v. Brown*, 3 Beav. R. 70; *Wilson v. Cluer*, 3 Beav. R. 136. In this latter case Lord Langdale said: 'Under these circumstances the question is, whether the surplus of the rents after satisfying the interest ought or ought not to be annually applied in reduction of the principal money due on the mortgage; or in other words whether the account ought to be taken against the mortgagee with annual rests. With some qualification perhaps it may be said to be a general rule not to direct annual rests to be made in the accounts of a mortgagee in possession when the interest is in arrear at the time when he takes possession; and in the absence of any special reason, I conceive that if a mortgagee is not liable to account with annual rests when he enters into possession, he does not become so liable when the arrear of interest is paid off, or till after the whole of the mortgage debt has been paid off by receipt of the rents, although from the time when the debt is ascertained to be paid off annual rests will be decreed, though none were ordered previously. I am not aware of any case in which, although the mortgagee

session. *Shepard v. Jones*, supra, H. L. 1; *Strong v. Blanchard*, 4 Allen, 538; *Richardson v. Wallis*, 5 Allen, 78; *Hubbard v. Shaw*, 12 Allen, 120; 511, 519; *Barron v. Paulling*, 38 Ala. 292; *Parkinson v. Hanbury*, L. R. 2

Moshier v. Norton, 100 Ill. 63.

cumstances exist, as for example where no arrears of interest are due at the time when the mortgagee enters into possession, or any agreement exists between the parties by which the interest in arrears is converted into principal, there and in such cases annual rests will be made.¹ (a)

1016 b. In respect to the rights of a mortgagee in possession it may be stated that he will in equity be allowed for all repairs necessary for the support of the property, (b) but not for general improvements made without the acquiescence or consent of the mortgagor which enhance the value of the estate, especially if they are of such a nature as may cripple the right or power of redemption.² (c) And in no case will a Court of Equity permit

may have taken possession under circumstances which did not render him liable to account with annual rests, there was afterwards a settled account by which it appeared either that no interest was due or that any interest which was due was satisfied as interest by being converted into principal, and the mortgagee continued in the receipt of rents of amount more than sufficient to satisfy the interest of such principal. But it appears to me that such settlement of account ought to be considered as a rest made by the parties themselves; and that the mortgagee continuing in possession after the statement of such an account, and with no interest due to him, must from that time be dealt with as a mortgagee who takes possession without any interest being in arrear.³

¹ Ibid. Satisfaction of the debt due upon a mortgage will extinguish all the interest of the mortgagee in the mortgage, and an assignee of the mortgagee will not be in any better condition after such extinguishment of the debt than the mortgagee. See *Wilkinson v. Simson*, 2 Moore, Priv. Coun. R. 275, which was a case arising under the Dutch law. As to when payment by tenant for life is an extinguishment of mortgages or other incumbrances, see 3 Hare, R. 217.

² *Sandon v. Hooper*, 6 Beavan, R. 246. On this occasion Lord Langdale said: 'The next question is, whether the plaintiff is entitled to anything for the improvements which he alleges to have been made. With respect to what a mortgagee in possession may do with the mortgaged property, several cases have occurred at different times showing what he ought, and to some extent

(a) See as to rests *Thompson v. Hudson*, L. R. 10 Eq. 497; *Van Vronker v. Eastman*, 7 Met. 157; *Mahone v. Williams*, 39 Ala. 202.

(b) He is bound to make reasonable repairs. *Dozier v. Mitchell*, 65 Ala. 511.

(c) It has recently been laid down that a mortgagee in possession or selling under power of sale who has reasonably expended money in permanent

works on the property is entitled to an inquiry whether the outlay has increased the value of the property. If it has, he must be repaid the outlay to the extent of the increase of value. In such a case it matters not whether the mortgagor had notice of the intended outlay; notice is material only when the outlay is unreasonable, — then for the purpose of showing consent. *Shepard v. Jones*, 21 Ch. D. 469 (C. A.),

a mortgagee to commit waste or do damage to the estate, as for example by pulling down cottages.¹ (a)

1017. In regard to the mortgagor he is not, unless there be some special agreement to that effect, entitled of right to the possession of the land mortgaged. But he holds it solely at the will and by the permission of the mortgagee, who may at any time by an ejectment, without giving any prior notice, recover the same against him or his tenants. In this respect the estate of the mortgagor at law is inferior to that of a tenant at will.² But so long as he continues in possession, by the permission of the mortgagee, he is entitled to take the rents and profits in his own right without any account whatsoever therefor to the mortgagee.³ (b)

what he ought not to do. Such repairs as are necessary for the support of the property he will be allowed for. He will not only be allowed for repairs, but he will be also allowed for doing that which is essential for the protection of the title of the mortgagor. Further, if he has got the consent of the mortgagor, or has given him notice in which he acquiesces, then he may be allowed for sums of money which are laid out in increasing the value of the property; but he has no right to lay out money in what he calls increasing the value of the property, which may be done in such a way as to make it utterly impossible for the mortgagor with his means ever to redeem; this is what has been termed improving a mortgagor out of his estate, — an expression which has been used both in this argument and on former occasions. The mortgagee has not a right to make it more expensive for the mortgagor to redeem than may be required for the purpose of keeping the property in a proper state of repair and for protecting the title to the property.⁷

¹ Ibid.

² Butler's note (1) to Co. Litt. 204 b; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 3, note (d); Keech v. Hall, Doug. R. 21; Moss v. Gallimore, Doug. R. 279; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 155 (4th edit.).

³ Moss v. Gallimore, Doug. R. 279, 282; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 1, § 13, note (d); Colman v. Duke of St. Albans, 3 Ves. 25, 32; Mead v. Lord Orrery, 3 Atk. 244; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 156, 157, 164 to 166 (4th edit.); Ex parte Wilson, 2 Ves. & B. 252.

explaining *Sandon v. Hooper*, 6 Beav. 246. See also *Tipton Green Colliery Co. v. Tipton Moat Colliery Co.*, 7 Ch. D. 192.

Under a proviso in a mortgage for reduction of interest on punctual payment, a mortgagee who has taken possession in default of the mortgagor is entitled on the accounts being taken to charge the mortgagor with the higher rate, and also in a proper case with the commission paid to a receiver

for collecting the rents. *Union Bank v. Ingram*, 16 Ch. D. 53, pointing out that *Stains v. Banks*, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1049, contra, had been reversed on appeal.

(a) *Dozier v. Mitchell*, 65 Ala. 511.

(b) After maturity of the mortgage the mortgagor, allowed to remain in possession, will be entitled to the rents and profits to his own use, though he is in default in payment of the debt, unless they have been pledged. *Scott*

Indeed for most purposes, except where the interest of the mortgagee is concerned, the mortgagor is treated as the substantial owner of the estate.¹ He will not however be permitted to do any acts injurious to or diminishing the security of the mortgagee; and if he should commit or attempt to commit acts of waste, he will be restrained therefrom by the process of injunction.² (a)

1018. As to what constitutes a mortgage there is no difficulty whatever in Courts of Equity, although there may be technical embarrassments in Courts of Law. The particular form or words of the conveyance are unimportant; (b) and it may be laid down as a general rule subject to few exceptions that wherever a conveyance, assignment, or other instrument, transferring an estate, is originally intended between the parties as a security for money or for any other incumbrance, whether this intention appear from the same instrument or from any other, it is always considered in equity as a mortgage and consequently is redeemable upon the performance of the conditions or stipulations thereof.³ (c) Even parol evidence is admissible in some cases, as

¹ 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 154 to 157, 160 to 162 (4th edit.).

² Ibid.; *Robinson v. Litton*, 3 Atk. 210; *Ushborne v. Ushborne*, 1 Dick. R. 75; *Brady v. Waldron*, 2 John. Ch. R. 148.

³ Butler's note (1) to Co. Litt. 204 b; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 142 (4th edit.); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 4, and note (e); Id. § 5, note (h).

v. Ware, 65 Ala. 174. And merely filing a bill for foreclosure will not cut off this right. *Ib.* A receiver must be granted. *Ib.* But this right of the mortgagor to take the rents and profits to his own use may be displaced by notice to the tenants to pay to the mortgagee. But payments made before such notice will be good. *Ib.*

(a) *Malone v. Marriott*, 64 Ala. 486; *Barlow v. Gaines*, 8 Beav. 329; *Goodman v. Kine*, *Ib.* 379. See *In re Tallahassee Manuf. Co.*, 64 Ala. 568.

(b) Whether a conveyance of land and the contemporaneous execution of a bond to reconvey the land upon the payment of the consideration for the conveyance amount to a mortgage or a contract for repurchase is a question of fact; and this, if really doubtful, is, it seems, to be decided upon the view

that it is a mortgage. *Rich v. Doane*, 35 Vt. 125; *Lodge v. Furman*, 24 Cal. 385; *Crassen v. Swoveland*, 22 Ind. 427; *Leech's Appeal*, 44 Penn. St. 519; *Harper's Appeal*, 64 Penn. St. 315; *Turner v. Kerr*, 44 Mo. 429; *Robinson v. Willoughby*, 65 N. Car. 520; *Holton v. Meighen*, 15 Minn. 69. The agreement for repurchase will of course be sustained if it is not a mere cover for securing a debt. See *Pitts v. Cable*, 44 Ill. 103; *Carr v. Rising*, 62 Ill. 14; *Turner v. Kerr*, *supra*; *Cornell v. Hall*, 22 Mich. 377; *Carter v. Williams*, 23 La. An. 281.

The transaction may amount to a mortgage though the bond for recoupyance bears a different date from that of the deed. *McIntier v. Shaw*, 6 Allen, 83. The existence and securing of a debt make the test.

(c) Every conveyance of land which

in cases of fraud, (a) accident, and mistake to show that a conveyance absolute on its face was intended between the parties to be a mere mortgage or security for money.¹ (b)

1019. So inseparable indeed is the equity of redemption from a mortgage that it cannot be disannexed even by an express agreement of the parties. If therefore it should be expressly stipulated that unless the money should be paid at a particular day or by or to a particular person the estate should be irredeemable, the stipulation would be utterly void.² (c) In this respect

¹ Ante, §§ 153, 156, 330, 768, 770 a; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 3, § 5, note (h); 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 142 (4th edit.); *Monis v. Nixon*, 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 118; *Maxwell v. Montacute*, Prec. Ch. 556; s. c. 1 P. Will. 618; *Walker v. Walker*, 2 Atk. 98; *Vernon v. Bethell*, 2 Eden, R. 110; *Marks v. Pell*, 1 John. Ch. R. 594.

² Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 3, § 4, and note (e), § 5; Butler's note (1) to Co. Litt. 204 b; *Newcomb v. Bonham*, 1 Vern. R. 232; *Seton v. Slade*, 7 Ves. 273; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 142, 143 (4th edit.); *Id.* 159; *Holridge v. Gillespie*, 2 John. Ch. R. 33, 34; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 A. 1, 2. The cases on

is in fact, whatever it may be in form, a security for a debt contemporaneous or antecedent is in equity a mortgage. *Mobile Building Assoc. v. Robertson*, 65 Ala. 382, 388; *Bryant v. Cowart*, 21 Ala. 92; *Brookings v. White*, 49 Maine, 479; *Shillaber v. Robinson*, 97 U. S. 68; *Hughes v. Edwards*, 9 Wheat. 489; *Brick v. Brick*, 98 U. S. 514; *Peugh v. Davis*, 96 U. S. 336; *Curtiss v. Sheldon*, 47 Mich. 262. It matters not that no bond, bill, or note may be given with it; though the absence of anything of the kind would be a circumstance in aid of the position that the deed was really an absolute conveyance if purporting to be such. *Mobile Building Assoc. v. Robertson*, supra; *Conway v. Alexander*, 7 Cranch, 218; *Russell v. Southard*, 12 How. 139; *Brown v. Dewey*, 1 Sandf. Ch. 56. And parol evidence is admissible to show the facts. *Brick v. Brick*, supra; *Peugh v. Davis*, supra.

Absence of remedy against the person is not conclusive that the instrument is not a mortgage. *Mobile Building Assoc. v. Robertson*; *Brown v. Dewey*, supra.

VOL. II. — 21

(a) *Anding v. Davis*, 38 Miss. 574. See *Green v. Butler*, 26 Cal. 595.

(b) *Haines v. Thompson*, 70 Penn. St. 434; *How v. Russell*, 36 Maine, 115; *Hodges v. Tennessee Ins. Co.*, 4 Seld. 416; *Bigelow v. Toppliff*, 25 Vt. 273; *Bank of Westminster v. Whyte*, 3 Md. Ch. 508; *Bryan v. Cowart*, 21 Ala. 92; *Johnson v. Huston*, 17 Miss. 58; *Wyman v. Babcock*, 2 Curt. C. C. 36; s. c. 19 How. 289; *Hills v. Loomis*, 42 Vt. 562; *Campbell v. Dearborn*, 109 Mass. 130; *Horn v. Ketaltas*, 46 N. Y. 605; *French v. Burns*, 35 Conn. 359; *Villa v. Rodriguez*, 12 Wall. 323.

A bona fide purchaser for value without notice, under a warranty deed from the grantee of the supposed absolute deed, would of course take free from the equity against such grantee; but it seems that one who has taken title by quit-claim only will not be protected beyond improvements honestly made. *Villa v. Rodriguez*, supra.

(c) *Hazeltine v. Granger*, 44 Mich. 503. A mortgagor's right to redeem was deemed lost in *Tufts v. Tapley*, 129 Mass. 380, by reason of concealment of title while outlays and improvements were being made.

Courts of Equity act upon the same principle which (we have seen) is avowed in the civil law,¹ and most probably it has been borrowed from that source. A distinction also is taken like that in the civil law between a conditional purchase or an agreement for a repurchase and a mortgage properly so called.² The former, if clearly and satisfactorily proved to be a real sale and not a mere transaction to disguise a loan, will be held valid, although every transaction of this sort is watched with jealousy.³ (a)

1020. Mortgages may not only be created by the express deeds and contracts of the parties, but they may also be implied in equity from the nature of the transactions between the parties, and then they are termed equitable mortgages. (b) Thus for instance it is now settled in England that if the debtor deposits his title-deeds to an estate with a creditor as security for an antecedent debt, or upon a fresh loan of money, it is a valid agreement for a mortgage between the parties, and is not within the operation of the Statute of Frauds.⁴ (c) This doctrine has some-

this point are fully collected in Butler's note to Co. Litt. 204 *b*, and in 4 Kent, Comm. 142 to 144 (4th edit.). See also *Cortelyou v. Lansing*, 2 Caines, Cas. Err. 209, 210.

¹ Ante, § 1009; Story on Bailm. § 345; *Cortelyou v. Lansing*, 2 Caines, Cas. Err. 209, 210.

² 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 3, art. 11; Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 1, l. 16, § 9. 'Potest ita fieri pignoris datio, hypothecæve,' says the Digest, 'ut si intra certum tempus non sit soluta pecunia, jure emptoris possideat rem, justo pretio tunc æstimandam; hoc enim casu videtur quodammodo conditionalis esse venditio.' Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 1, l. 16, § 9. This approaches nearer to a right of pre-emption than to a conditional sale. See *Orby v. Trigg*, 2 Eq. Cas. Abridg. 599, pl. 25; s. c. 9 Mod. R. 2.

³ Butler's note (1) to Co. Litt. 204 *b*; *Barrell v. Sabine*, 1 Vern. 268; *Longuet v. Scawen*, 1 Ves. 402, 406; 1 Powell, Mort. 138, note (Coventry and Rand's edit.); 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 143, 144, 159 (4th edit.); Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 A. 2; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 5, note (*h*); *Vernon v. Bethell*, 2 Eden, R. 113; *Goodman v. Grierson*, 2 Ball & Beatt. 278.

⁴ *Russell v. Russell*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 269, and Mr. Belt's note (1); *Ex parte*

(a) See supra, p. 320, note (*h*).

(b) An equitable mortgage may be created by an unsuccessful attempt to make a valid mortgage. *Gale v. Morris*, 29 N. J. Eq. 222; *Love v. Sierra Nev. Mining Co.*, 32 Cal. 639, 652. So an assignment of a mortgage, the assignment being defective at law, may be good in equity, giving the assignee a right to foreclose. *Carlisle v. Wilkins*, 51 Ala. 371.

(c) So in some of our States. *Rockwell v. Hobby*, 2 Sandf. Ch. 9; *Welsh v. Usher*, 2 Hill, Ch. 166; *Williams v. Stratton*, 10 Smedes & M. 418. See *Griffin v. Griffin*, 3 C. E. Green, 104. Contra in other States. *Shitz v. Diefenbach*, 3 Barr, 233; *Van Meter v. McFaddin*, 8 B. Mon. 435; *Probosco v. Johnson*, 2 Disn. 96.

times been thought difficult to be maintained either upon the ground of principle or of public policy. And although it is firmly established, it has of late years been received with no small hesitation and disapprobation, and a disposition has been strongly evinced not to enlarge its operation.¹ (a) It is not therefore ordinarily applied to enforce parol agreements to make a mortgage or to make a deposit of title-deeds for such a pur-

Coming, 9 Ves. 116, 117; *Birch v. Ellames*, 2 Anst. R. 427, 438; *Ex parte Mountfort*, 14 Ves. 606; *Ex parte Langston*, 17 Ves. 228, 229; *Pain v. Smith*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 417; *Keys v. Williams*, 3 Y. & Coll. 55; *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. R. 277, 284; post, § 1230.

¹ *Ex parte Haigh*, 11 Ves. 403; *Norris v. Wilkinson*, 12 Ves. 197, 198; *Ex parte Kensington*, 2 V. & B. 83; *Ex parte Coomb*, 17 Ves. 369; *Ex parte Hooper*, 1 Meriv. R. 9; *Ex parte Whitbread*, 19 Ves. 209. In *Keys v. Williams*, 3 Younge & Coll. 55, 61, Lord Abinger said: 'The doctrine of equitable mortgages has been said to be an invasion of the Statute of Frauds, and no doubt there was great difficulty in knowing how to deal with deposits of deeds by way of security after the passing of that statute. But in my opinion that statute was never meant to affect the transaction of a man borrowing money and depositing his title-deeds as a pledge of payment. A Court of Law could not assist such a party to recover back his title-deeds by an action of trover, the answer to such an action being that the title-deeds were pledged for a sum of money, and that till the money is repaid the party has no right to them. So if the party came into equity for relief, he would be told that before he sought equity he must do equity by repaying the money in consideration for which the deeds had been lodged in the other party's hands. The doctrine of equitable mortgages therefore appears to have arisen from the necessity of the case. It may however in many cases operate to useful purposes, and is certainly not injurious to commerce. In commercial transactions it may be frequently necessary to raise money on a sudden, before an opportunity can be afforded of investigating the title-deeds and preparing the mortgage. Expediency therefore as well as necessity has contributed to establish the general doctrine, although it may not altogether be in consistency with the statute. The question here is, whether the circumstances under which these deeds were deposited lead to any distinction between this case and others which have been decided on the general doctrine. It has been very ably argued for the defendant, that the circumstance of the deeds having been deposited, not as a present security but with a view to a future security, gives rise to such a distinction. Certainly if before the money was advanced the deeds had been deposited with a view to prepare a future mortgage, such transaction could not be considered as an equitable mortgage by deposit. But it is otherwise where there is a present advance and the deeds are deposited under a promise to forbear suing, although they may be deposited only for the purpose of preparing a future mortgage. In such case the deeds are given in [as] part of the security and become pledged from the very nature of the transaction.'

(a) The doctrine that an equitable mortgagee by deposit of title-deeds is entitled to foreclosure does not extend to a pledgee of personal chattels. *Carter v. Wake*, 4 Ch. D. 605.

pose; but it is strictly confined to an actual, immediate, and bona fide deposit of the title-deeds with the creditor as a security in order to create the lien.¹ Such an equitable mortgage will not however avail against a subsequent mortgagee whose mortgage has been duly registered without notice of the deposit of the title-deeds. But in cases not affected by the registry acts the mere fact that a first mortgagee has left the title-deeds in the possession of the mortgagor, without any attendant circumstances of fraud, will not be sufficient to postpone such first mortgagee to a second, who has taken the title-deeds with his mortgage without any notice of the prior mortgage.² (a)

¹ *Norris v. Wilkinson*, 12 Ves. 197 to 199.

² *Birch v. Ellames*, 2 Anst. 427, 431; *Plumb v. Fluit*, 2 Anst. 432, 439, 440; *Tourle v. Rand*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 649, and Mr. Belt's note; *Evans v. Bicknell*, 6 Ves. 182 to 184; *Berry v. Mutual Insur. Co.*, 2 John. Ch. R. 609, 610; *Evans v. Bicknell*, 6 Ves. 173, 183, 184. Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram, in *West v. Reid*, 2 Hare, R. 249, 259, said: 'I do not deny that difficulty may sometimes arise in drawing the line between the degree of negligence which shall be sufficient to charge a purchaser, and that mere want of extreme caution which in the absence of fraud will excuse him. But the distinction is founded in principle, and the difficulty is one with which (upon the very question of gross negligence) courts of justice are in the daily habit of grappling; and the difficulty in principle is not distinguishable from that which occurs in every other case in which antagonistic principles come into immediate conflict with each other. The distinction which is taken in terms by Sir Edward Sugden (1 Vend. & Pur. vol. 3, p. 472, ed. 10) is fully borne out by the cases which decide that a person purchasing without obtaining the title-deeds is not affected by notice of an equitable mortgage. *Plumb v. Flint*, *Bicknell v. Evans*; by Lord Thurlow's judgment in *Cothoy v. Sydenham*; by a judgment of Lord Hardwicke; and other cases referred to in the judgment in *Jones v. Smith*. If that distinction be not admitted in a case like *Jones v. Smith*, the unavoidable consequence must be that a man who mortgages a fraction of his estate will thereby throw a cloud upon the title to the rest of his estate, and a devise

(a) But see *Layard v. Maud*, L. R. 4 Eq. 397, 406; *Spencer v. Clarke*, 9 Ch. D. 137, 142; *Clarke v. Palmer*, 21 Ch. D. 124, and cases cited. Further as to deposit of title-deeds see *West v. Reid*, 2 Hare, 249; *Ratcliffe v. Barnard*, L. R. 6 Ch. 652; *Dixon v. Muckleston*, L. R. 8 Ch. 155; *Ex parte National Bank*, L. R. 14 Eq. 507; *Ex parte Valpy*, L. R. 7 Ch. 289; *Wilson's Case*, L. R. 12 Eq. 516; *Newton v. Newton*, L. R. 6 Eq. 135; s. c. 4 Ch. 143; *Layard v. Maud*, L. R. 4 Eq. 397; *Thorpe v. Holdsworth*, L. R. 7 Eq. 139; *Darke v. Williamson*, 25 Beav. 622; *Briggs v. Jones*, L. R. 10 Eq. 92; *Roberts v. Croft*, 24 Beav. 223; *Espin v. Pemberton*, 3 DeG. & J. 547.

One who lends money on an insurance policy which the borrower says is deposited with his banker for safe keeping does so at his peril; and if it be found that the policy had already been pledged to the banker in whose possession it was, the banker will have priority over the later creditor. *Spencer v. Clark*, 9 Ch. D. 137.

1021. As to the kinds of property which may be mortgaged it may be stated that in equity whatever property personal or real is capable of an absolute sale may be the subject of a mortgage. This is in conformity to the doctrine of the civil law: 'Quod emptionem venditionemque recipit, etiam pignorationem recipere potest.'¹ Therefore rights in remainder and reversion, possibilities coupled with an interest, rents, franchises, and choses in action are capable of being mortgaged. But a mere naked possibility or expectancy, such as that of an heir, is not.² In this respect the civil law seems to differ from ours; for a party might by that law mortgage property to which he had no present title by contract or otherwise.³ (a)

of a single acre of land by a will which does nothing more will throw a cloud upon the title of an heir-at-law to his descended estates; for it is clear that neither the mortgagor in the one case nor the heir in the other can command the production of the mortgage-deed or will; and it is equally clear that nothing but the production of the original itself would be sufficient if a representation such as Smith relied upon be not sufficient. Similar observations would apply to a codicil partially revoking a will, and to every deed executed after the date of a will. In short let the doctrine of constructive notice be extended to all cases in which the purchaser has notice that the property is affected, or has notice of facts raising a presumption that it is so, and the doctrine is reasonable, though it may sometimes operate with severity. But once transgress the limits which that statement of the rule imposes, — once admit that a purchaser is to be affected with constructive notice of the contents of instruments not necessary to nor presumptively connected with the title, only because by possibility they may affect it (for that may be predicated of almost any instrument), and it is impossible in sound reasoning to stop short of the conclusion that every purchaser is affected with constructive notice of the contents of every instrument of the mere existence of which he has notice. A purchaser must be presumed to investigate the title of the property he purchases, and may therefore be presumed to have examined every instrument forming a link directly or by inference in that title; and that presumption I take to be the foundation of the whole doctrine. But it is impossible to presume that a purchaser examines instruments not directly nor presumptively connected with the title, only because they may by possibility affect it.' This whole subject is very ably summed up in 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 150, 151 (4th edit.).

¹ 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 1, art. 19; Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 1, l. 9, § 1.

² 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 144 (4th edit.); *Carlton v. Leighton*, 3 Meriv. 667; 1 Powell on Mort. 17, 18, 23, and note (Coventry & Rand's edit.). Lord Eldon, in *Carlton v. Leighton*, 3 Meriv. R. 967, 670, expressly held that an expectancy of an heir presumptive or apparent, the fee-simple being in the ancestor, was not an interest or a possibility, nor was capable of being made the subject of an assignment or contract. But may it not operate, although not as a mortgage, yet as a contract for a mortgage? Post, § 1040.

³ 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 3, art. 5, 20.

(a) An attempted mortgage of gagor, made with full warranty, will property not belonging to the mort- be good upon a subsequent acquisition

1022. As to the persons who are capable of mortgaging an estate nothing need be said in this place except so far as regards persons who have qualified interests therein, or are trustees in autre droit, or are clothed with particular powers for limited purposes. And here very difficult questions may arise as to the construction of such powers and the competency of such persons to make mortgages. Thus for example if a power is given to trustees to sell for the purpose of raising money, a question may arise whether they may raise the money by way of mortgage. But the solution of such questions properly belongs to a treatise on powers.¹

1023. As to the right of redemption. From what has been already stated it is clear that the equity of redemption is not only a subsisting estate and interest in the land in the hands of the heirs, devisees, assignees, and representatives (strictly so called) of the mortgagor, but it is also in the hands of any other persons who have acquired any interest in the lands mortgaged by operation of law, or otherwise in privity of title.² Such persons have a clear right to disengage the property from all incumbrances in order to make their own claims beneficial or available. Hence a tenant for life, a tenant by the curtesy, a jointress, a tenant in dower in some cases,³ (a) a reversioner, a remainder-man, a judgment creditor, (b) a tenant by elegit, the lord of a manor holding by escheat,⁴ and indeed every other person being an incumbrancer or having legal or equitable title or lien therein, may insist upon a redemption of the mortgage in order to the due enforcement of their claims and interests respec-

¹ See on this subject 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 147, 148 (4th edit.); Sugden on Powers, ch. 9, § 2, p. 437; Id. art. 3, pp. 472, 478 (2d edit.); 1 Powell on Mort. 62, by Coventry & Rand; 3 Powell on Mort. 1633, note (o), same edit.; Mills v. Banks, 3 P. Will. 1, 6; Wilson v. Troup, 7 John. Ch. R. 25.

² 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 8, note (p); Co. Litt. 208, Butler's note (1); 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 162, 163 (4th edit.).

³ Ibid. and Co. Litt. 208 a, Butler's note (1); Swannoch v. Lifford, cited ibid.; s. c. Ambler, R. 6; Kinnoul v. Money, 3 Swanst. R. 208; Jeremy on Eq. Juris. B. 1, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 182, 183.

⁴ Downe v. Morris, 3 Hare, R. 394.

of title by the mortgagor, through the application of the law of estoppel. See Bigelow, Estoppel, 332 et seq. (3d ed.). So too a mortgage in terms of property thereafter to be acquired will be good in equity as an agreement

for a mortgage whenever the property is acquired.

(a) See Dawson v. Whitehaven, 4 Ch. D. 639; s. c. 6 Ch. D. 218.

(b) Mildred v. Austin, L. R. 8 Eq. 220.

tively in the land.¹ (a) When any such person does so redeem, he or she becomes substituted to the rights and interests of the original mortgagee in the land exactly as in the civil law. And in some cases (as we have already seen) a further right of priority by tacking may sometimes be acquired beyond what the civil law allowed.² (b) But no person except a mortgagee, his heirs

¹ *Ibid*; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 A. 4. Even a person claiming under a prior or subsequent voluntary conveyance may, as against the mortgagee, redeem. 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 8, and note (p). An assignment of the debt generally draws after it the land mortgaged as a consequence and an appurtenance of the debt, upon the rule, 'Omne principale trahit ad se accessorium.' But an assignment of the mortgage without an assignment of the debt is treated at most as a transfer of a naked trust. See 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 194 (4th edit.).

² Ante, §§ 410 to 421, and notes; ante, § 1010, and note 5; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 A. 10, 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3 ch. 1, § 9, and note (u); § 11 note (a).

(a) A junior mortgagee may file a bill against the mortgagor and senior mortgagee asking an account of the mortgage debts and a sale of the property for the payment of the sums due; and he may offer in his bill to redeem the senior mortgage, and have the property sold for the satisfaction of that mortgage, or sold to satisfy both mortgages, the proceeds to be applied first to the elder mortgagee. *Davis v. Cook*, 65 Ala. 617.

When however subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers file a bill in equity against the first mortgagee asking an account and redemption, and not denying that there is a balance due on the mortgage debt, it follows that they ought to make tender in the bill or offer to pay whatever may be found due. *Smith v. Conner*, 65 Ala. 571; *Rogers v. Torbert*, 58 Ala. 523; *Eslava v. Crampton*, 61 Ala. 507; *Cain v. Gimon*, 36 Ala. 168.

The mortgagee himself may pay off an existing incumbrance of any kind, and doing so will be entitled to reimbursement when redemption is sought by the mortgagor or by any one claiming under him. *McCormick v. Knox*, 105 U. S. 122; *Sharp v. Thompson*, 100 Ill. 447; *Humphreys v. Allen*, *Ib.*

511. See *Dale v. McEvers*, 2 Cowen, 118.

In redeeming from a purchaser from the mortgagee with notice, the mortgagor is not concerned with any enhanced price paid. *Dozier v. Mitchell*, 65 Ala. 511.

(b) The author here and elsewhere (see note 2, supra) alludes to the case of consolidation of mortgages on different estates. 'What is consolidation? It is when a mortgagor comes into a Court of Equity to redeem his property, and the court says: "You shall not do this if the mortgagee has another debt due from you which is secured upon an insufficient security. You must pay both debts; if not, you cannot redeem either property."' Cotton, L. J. in *In re Raggett*, 16 Ch. D. 117.

But this consolidation of two mortgages of different estates cannot be insisted upon by the common mortgagee as a condition to the right of redemption when one of the mortgage debts has ceased to exist, as by bankruptcy. *Ib.* Nor where one of the mortgage debts is created after the mortgagor has assigned the equity of redemption of the first mortgage to the person seeking to redeem. *Mills v.*

or privies in estate, has a right to redeem or to call for an account unless indeed it can be shown that there is collusion between them and the mortgagee. (a) Hence it is that a mere annuitant of the mortgagor (who has no interest in the land) has no title to redeem.¹ (b)

Where a mortgagee has two mortgages upon different estates separately mortgaged to him by the mortgagor, and one of them is a deficient security for the debt, and the other is more than sufficient, the mortgagor and his heirs will not be permitted to redeem one without redeeming the other. 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 425; *Shuttleworth v. Laycock*, 1 Vern. R. 245; *Margrave v. Le Hooke*, 2 Vern. R. 207; *Pope v. Onslow*, 2 Vern. R. 286; *Jones v. Smith*, 2 Ves. jr. 376. But see *Ex parte King*, 1 Atk. 300. And if the equity of redemption of one of the estates be sold, the purchaser will not be permitted to redeem that estate (if the mortgage has become absolute at law) without redeeming both mortgages. *Purefoy v. Purefoy*, 1 Vern. 29, and *Mr. Raithby's note*; *Ex parte Carter, Ambler*, R. 733; *Jones v. Smith*, 2 Ves. jr. 376; *Ireson v. Denn*, 2 Cox, R. 425; *Willie v. Lugg*, 2 Eden, R. 80. The ground of this doctrine is that he who seeks equity must do equity; and a Court of Equity will not assist any person in depriving a mortgagee of any security which he would have against the mortgagor. See also 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 3, § 9, and note (x).

¹ *White v. Parnter*, 1 Knapp, R. 229; *Troughton v. Binkes*, 6 Ves. 572. Lord Wynford, in delivering the opinion of the court, in *White v. Parnter*, 1 Knapp, R. 229, said: 'But it has been said that as the mortgagee has within twenty years acknowledged the existence of the mortgage, the mortgagor has,

Jennings, 13 Ch. D. 638 (C. A.), overruling *Tassell v. Smith*, 1 DeG. & J. 718. And see *Baker v. Gray*, 1 Ch. D. 491. The court in *Mills v. Jennings* said that *Beevor v. Luck*, L. R. 4 Eq. 517, was not opposed to this rule. Indeed in *Harter v. Colman*, 19 Ch. D. 630, the case of *Beevor v. Luck* was denied, and it was held by Mr. Justice Fry that the owner of the two mortgages, who had acquired both after an assignment by the mortgagor of the equity of redemption of one, could not consolidate them against the assignee of the equity of the one, though both mortgages were created before the assignment. See *White v. Hillacre*, 3 Younge & C. Ex. 597. It was declared that in such a case the assignee of the equity was subject to the equities which would exist against the assignor only at the time of the assignment, not to those which might prevail against him at the time of the

claim to redemption. *Harter v. Colman*, supra; *Cummings v. Fletcher*, 14 Ch. D. 712; *Jennings v. Jordan*, 6 App. Cas. 701. But the case was admitted to be otherwise where both equities of redemption existed in the same person. See *Vint v. Padget*, 2 DeG. & J. 611.

(a) See *Briggs v. Davis*, 108 Mass. 322, that a divorced wife entitled to dower may redeem in case of collusion between the husband and the mortgagee.

(b) So of one who has only a bond from the mortgagor to convey the equity of redemption. *McDougald v. Capron*, 7 Gray, 278; *Grant v. Duane*, 9 Johns. 612. See *Porter v. Read*, 19 Maine, 363. So also of one who has an assignment of the debt, with right to retain a portion of it, the remainder to belong to the assignor, but without an assignment of the mortgage. *Morley v. Morley*, 25 Beav. 253.

1024. As to the correspondent right of foreclosure and other remedies for the mortgagee, to secure the due discharge of the mortgage, they naturally flow from the principles already stated. We have already seen¹ that in the civil law there were two remedies allowed to the mortgagee, a remedy in rem and also a remedy in personam against the mortgagor for the debt. The general remedy in rem was by a sale by the mortgagee of the mortgaged estate, either under a judicial decree or without such a decree by his own voluntary act of sale after a certain fixed notice to the debtor. In either case the sale if bona fide and regularly made was valid to pass the absolute title to the estate against the mortgagor and his heirs, and the proceeds were first to be applied to the discharge of the debt, and the surplus if any was to be paid over to the mortgagor or his representatives. This seems to have been the ordinary course in the civil law in order to obtain satisfaction of the debt out of the mortgaged estate. But in some cases, and especially where a sale could not be made effectual, a decree might be obtained in the nature of a foreclosure, by which after certain judicial proceedings the absolute dominion of the property would be passed to the mortgagee.² (a) This was probably the origin of the present mode of extinguishing the rights of the mortgagor by a decree of foreclosure in a Court of Equity.

on account of such acknowledgment, a right to sue for the redemption of the estate; and that this annuitant whose claim is against the equity of redemption has a right, as the mortgagor does not object to it, to claim through his side against the mortgagee. If so, every legatee of the mortgagor must have the same right of insisting that the mortgage debt is satisfied, and of calling on the mortgagee to give him an account of the proceeds of the estate from the time of the death of the mortgagor, a period of above fifty years. If creditors or legatees of the mortgagor had the right of calling mortgagees to separate accounts, every mortgagee would be liable to be ruined by the different suits that might be instituted against him. But from the principle laid down in the case of *Troughton v. Binkes* (6 Vesey, 572), and the cases referred to by the Master of the Rolls in his judgment in that case, I think that the mortgagor or his heirs only can sue the mortgagee for an account and redemption, unless it can be shown that they and the mortgagee are in collusion to prevent creditors or legatees from recovering what is due to them from the mortgagor's property.'

¹ Ante, § 1007.

² Ante, §§ 1008, 1009.

(a) Equity will sometimes relieve injustice upon a third person having against one who has so enforced his rights in the property. See *Gilbert v. Haire*, 43 Mich. 283.

1025. The natural course and certainly the most convenient and beneficial course for the mortgagor would seem to be for the court to follow out the civil-law rules on this subject; ¹ that is to say, primarily and ordinarily to direct a sale of the mortgaged property giving the debtor any surplus after discharging the mortgaged debt; and secondarily to apply the remedy of foreclosure only to special cases where the former remedy would not apply or might be inadequate or injurious to the interests of the parties. This course has accordingly been adopted in many of the American Courts of Equity, and it is also the prevailing practice in Ireland. It is done without any distinction whether there is a power to sell contained in the mortgage or not.²

1026. In England a practice widely different has prevailed. A bill for a foreclosure is deemed in common cases the exclusive and appropriate remedy; and the Courts of Equity in that country refuse except in special cases to decree a compulsory sale against the will of the mortgagor. These courts however have departed from this general rule in certain cases: (1) where the estate is deficient to pay the incumbrance; ³ (2) where the mortgagor is dead and there is a deficiency of personal assets; ⁴ (3) where the mortgage is of a dry reversion; ⁵ (4) where the mortgagor dies and the estate descends to an infant; ⁶ (5) where the

¹ In most if not all cases it would be equally beneficial to the mortgagee, as it would prevent the delays incident to the common decree of foreclosure, which is liable to be reopened, and would also prevent any difficulty in obtaining the residue of the debt when the mortgaged property is not sufficient to discharge it. See 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 146, 147, 181, 182 (4th edit.). See also Perry v. Barker, 13 Ves. 198, 202; Tooke v. Hartely, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 125, and Mr. Belt's note (1); s. c. 2 Dick. R. 785; 3 Powell on Mort. 1046, note T, by Coventry (Coventry & Rand's edit.).

² 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 181, 182 (4th edit.); Brinckerhoff v. Thalhimer, 2 John. Ch. R. 486; Mills v. Dennis, 3 John. Ch. R. 369, 370; Perry v. Baker, 13 Ves. 205; 3 Powell on Mort. 963, Coventry's note B. (Cov. & Rand's edit.); 1 Dow, Parl. R. 20; McDonough v. Shewbridge, 2 Ball & Beatt. 555. But although the mortgagee may pray a sale, yet it seems that in Ireland a mortgagor cannot insist on a sale, but is only entitled to redeem. McDonough v. Shewbridge, 2 Ball & Beatt. 555. Can a pledgor compel a sale by the pledgee? See Story on Bailments, § 320.

³ Dashwood v. Bithazey, Mosel. R. 196.

⁴ Daniel v. Skipwith, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 155.

⁵ How v. Vigneres, 1 Ch. Rep. 32.

⁶ Booth v. Rich, 1 Vern. 295; Mondey v. Mondey, 1 Ves. & B. 223. But see Goodier v. Ashton, 18 Ves. 83; Mills v. Dennis, 3 John. Ch. R. 369, 370; 3 Powell on Mort. 982, 983 a, 984 b, by Coventry & Rand, and notes, *ibid.*,

mortgage is of an advowson; ¹ (6) where the mortgagor becomes bankrupt and the mortgagee prays a sale; (7) or where the mortgagor is dead and the mortgagee by his bill, brought against the executor or administrator and the heir, prays for a sale of the mortgaged estate, alleging it to be scanty security, and for the payment of any deficiency out of the general estate of the deceased mortgagor; ² (8) where the mortgage or charge is purely equitable, as for example by a deposit of title-deeds; ³ (a) (9) where the mortgage is of land and by the local law is subject to a sale; ⁴ such as for example in Ireland and America.

1027. It is difficult to perceive any solid or distinct ground upon which these exceptions stand, which would not justify the Courts of Equity in England in decreeing a sale at all times when it is prayed for by the mortgagee, or when it would be beneficial to the mortgagor. The inconveniences of the existing practice of foreclosure in that country are so great that it has become a common practice to insert in mortgages a power of sale upon default of payment. And although Lord Eldon at first intimated an opinion unfavorable to such a power as dangerous, it is now firmly established. ⁵ (b)

and especially note (z); *Gore v. Stackpole*, 1 Dow, R. 18; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 3, §§ 8, 12, note (b); *Davis v. Dowding*, 2 Keen, R. 245.

¹ *Mackensie v. Robinson*, 3 Atk. 559; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 3, § 3, note (d).

² *King v. Smith*, 2 Hare, R. 239.

³ *Pain v. Smith*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 417; *Parker v. Housefield*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 419; *Meller v. Woods*, 1 Keen, R. 16, 23; *Russell v. Russell*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 269; *Brocklehurst v. Jessop*, 7 Sim. R. 438; *Thorpe v. Gartside*, 2 Younge & Coll. 730; *Greenwood v. Firth*, 2 Hare, R. 241, note. But six months are allowed to redeem before the sale is made. *Ibid.*; post, § 1230.

⁴ 4 Powell on Mort. 1016, *Coventry & Rand's note*; *Stileman v. Ashdown*, 2 Atk. 477, 608; s. c. *Ambler*, R. 13 and Mr. Blunt's note, p. 16, note (b); post, § 1216 a; *Branson v. Kinsie*, 1 Howard's Sup. Ct. R. 321; s. c. 17 Peters, R.

⁵ 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 146, 147 (4th edit.), and note; *Croft v. Powell*, Comyn. R. 603; *Anon.* 6 Madd. R. 15; *Clay v. Sharpe*, Sugden on Vendors, p. 326, and App. No. 14 (7th edit.); *Corder v. Morgan*, 18 Ves. 344; 1 Powell on Mort. 9, 13, *Coventry's note K*, and *Rand's note (1)*; *Doolittle v. Lewis*, 7 John. Ch. R. 35.

(a) The remedy in England of an equitable mortgagee is foreclosure, not sale. *James v. James*, L. R. 16 Eq. 153. 8 Eq. 569; *Cruikshank v. Duffin*, L. R. 13 Eq. 555; *Boyd v. Petrie*, L. R. 7 Ch. 385; *Thurlow v. Mackeson*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 97; *McLean v. Presley*, 56

(b) See *In re Richardson*, L. R. 12 Eq. 398; *In re Chawner*, L. R. Ala. 211; *Shillaber v. Robinson*, 97 U. S. 68. Thus the mortgagee can-

1028. In bills for redeeming mortgages where there are various persons claiming adverse rights and limited interests in the mortgaged estate, it often becomes necessary to direct how assets and securities are to be marshalled in order to do justice between the different claimants and to prevent irreparable mischiefs, as well as to ascertain the amounts and proportions in which they should contribute towards the discharge of the incumbrances common to them all. This subject in many of its most important bearings has already been examined in other places.¹ Similar

¹ Ante, §§ 499, 558 to 560, 564, 565, 567, 574, 576, 633 to 636; post, § 1233 a.

not be enjoined from selling under the power in the absence of fraud or of some other particular equity, such as an attempt to pervert the power to purposes of unlawful oppression. *Struve v. Childs*, 63 Ala. 473; *Robertson v. Norris*, 4 Jur. N. S. 155; s. c. 1 Giff. 421.

But the power must be strictly complied with or the sale will be invalid. *Shillaber v. Robinson*, supra. This rule must not however be taken too widely. Much may be done which the power does not expressly authorize. Thus upon the non-payment of an instalment due upon a mortgage with power of sale, the mortgage becomes payable; and in the absence of controlling language to the contrary, the property may be sold and enough held by the mortgagee to cover future instalments as well as those in default. *McLean v. Presley*, 56 Ala. 211; *Cox v. Wheeler*, 7 Paige, 248; *Holden v. Gilbert*, Ib. 208; *Jencks v. Alexander*, 11 Paige, 619; *Barber v. Cary*, 11 Barb. 549; *Bunce v. Reed*, 16 Barb. 347.

A mortgagee acting under a power of sale is not trustee of the power. The power is given him for his own benefit, to enable him the better to realize his debt. If he exercise it bona fide for that purpose, without corruption or collusion with the purchaser, equity will not interfere, even though the sale be very disadvantageous, unless the price is so low as to show fraud. *Warner v. Jacob*,

20 Ch. D. 220, *Kay, J.* See *Jones v. Matthie*, 11 Jur. 504 (reversing *Matthie v. Edwards*, 2 Coll. 465); *Davey v. Durrant*, 1 DeG. & J. 535, 557; *Adams v. Scott*, 7 W. R. 213; *Kirkwood v. Thompson*, 2 H. & M. 392; *Locking v. Parker*, L. R. 8 Ch. 30; In re *Alison*, 11 Ch. D. 284. Doubt is cast on *Robertson v. Norris*, 1 Giff. 421, 424, in which the language of Lord Eldon in *Downes v. Glazebrook*, 3 Mer. 600, is referred to. But see *Hood v. Adams*, 124 Mass. 481, 484. The mortgagee of course is trustee for the mortgagor as to any surplus remaining after the debt is paid from the proceeds of sale. *Warner v. Jacob*, supra. And see *Hood v. Adams*, supra.

Even where the words of a mortgage express a trust most clearly, equity will not hold the mortgagee a trustee for all purposes. Thus where under an ordinary power of sale in a mortgage there is an express trust of the moneys to be received by the mortgagee, that is not a trust which the mortgagor can enforce except as to the surplus. *Banner v. Berridge*, 18 Ch. D. 254, 269, *Kay, J.*

A sale under the power will be restrained if the mortgagor bring into court the amount due. *Hickson v. Darlow*, 23 Ch. D. 690. On the other hand a mortgagee may file a bill to foreclose though the mortgage contain a power of sale. *Vaughan v. Marable*, 64 Ala. 60.

principles prevailed (as we have seen) to a great extent in the civil law, in which the right of substitution was admitted as well as what was technically called the benefit of discussion, answering in some measure to our doctrine of marshalling assets and securities.¹

1028 *a*. In respect to the time within which a mortgage is redeemable it may be remarked that the ordinary limitation is twenty years from the time when the mortgagee has entered into possession after breach of the condition under his title, by analogy to the ordinary limitation of rights of entry and actions of ejectment.² (*a*) If therefore the mortgagee enters into possession in his character of mortgagee and by virtue of his mortgage alone, he is for twenty years liable to account; and if payment be tendered to him, he is liable to become a trustee of the mortgagor and to be treated as such. But if the mortgagor permits the mortgagee to hold the possession for twenty years without accounting or without admitting that he possesses a mortgage title only, the mortgagor loses his right of redemption, and the title of the mortgagee becomes as absolute in equity as it previously was in law. In such a case the time begins to run against the mortgagor from the moment the mortgagee takes possession in his character as such; and if it has once begun to run and no subsequent admission is made by the mortgagee, it continues to run against all persons claiming under the mortgagor, whatever may be the disabilities to which they may be subjected.³ (*b*) But if the mortgagee enters not in his character of mortgagee only, but as purchaser of the equity of redemption, he must look to the title of his vendor and the validity of the conveyance which he takes. So that if the conveyance be such as gives him the estate of a tenant for life only in the equity of

¹ Ante, §§ 494, 635, 636, and note (1).

² *Raffety v. King*, 1 Keen, R. 602, 609, 610, 616, 617; *Cholmondeley v. Clinton*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 1, 191; s. c. 4 Bligh, n. s. 1; *Corbett v. Barker*, 1 Anst. R. 138; s. c. 3 Anst. R. 755; *White v. Parnter*, 1 Knapp, R. 228, 229.

³ *Ibid.*

(*a*) *Stevens v. Dedham Inst.* for 10 Cush. 72; *Crook v. Glen*, 30 Md. Sav., 129 Mass. 547; *Ayres v. Waite*, 10 Cush. 72. 55. An acknowledgment by one of several joint mortgagees is inoperative.

(*b*) See post, § 1520; *Robinson v. Richardson v. Younge*, L. R. 6 Ch. Fife, 3 Ohio St. 551; *Ayres v. Waite*, 478.

redemption, there, as he unites in himself the characters of mortgagor and mortgagee, he is bound to keep down the interest of the mortgage, like any other tenant for life, for the benefit of the persons entitled to the remainder; and time will not run against the remainder-man during the continuance of the life estate.¹

1028 *b*. Similar considerations will in many respects apply to the right of foreclosure of a mortgage. If he has suffered the mortgagor to remain in possession for twenty years after the breach of the condition without any payment of interest or any admission of the debt or other duty, the right to file a bill for a foreclosure will generally be deemed to be barred and extinguished.² However in cases of this sort, as the bar is not positive but is founded upon a presumption of payment, it is open to be rebutted by circumstances.³ (*a*)

1029. These may suffice as illustrations of some of the more important doctrines of Courts of Equity in regard to mortgages of lands, many of which are founded upon principles of justice so universal as equally to commend themselves to the approbation of a Roman prætor and of a modern judge administering the law of continental Europe *ex equo et bono*.⁴

1030. Let us now pass to a brief consideration of the doctrines of equity applicable to mortgages and pledges of personal property. A mortgage of personal property differs from a pledge. The former is a conditional transfer or conveyance of the property itself; and if the condition is not duly performed, the whole title vests absolutely at law in the mortgagee, exactly as it does in the case of a mortgage of lands. The latter only passes the possession, or at most a special property only to the pledgee with a right of retainer until the debt is paid or the other engagement

¹ *Raffety v. King*, 1 Keen, R. 601, 609, 610, 616 to 618; *Corbett v. Barker*, 1 Anst. R. 138; s. c. 3 Anst. 755; *Reeve v. Hicks*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 403; *Ravald v. Russell*, 1 Younge, R. 19.

² *Stewart v. Nicholls*, 1 Tamlyn, R. 307; *Christophers v. Sparke*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 223; *Trash v. White*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 289; *Toplis v. Baker*, 2 Cox, R. 119. See also *White v. Parnter*, 1 Knapp, R. 228, 229.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ See 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 3, art. 6, and note, *ibid.*; Cod. Lib. 8, tit. 14, l. 2; Code Civ. of Louisiana, art. 3366, 3367.

(*a*) *Richmond v. Aiken*, 25 Vt. 324; *Cheever v. Perley*, 11 Allen, 584. See post, § 1520.

is fulfilled.¹ (a) The difference between them was well stated by a learned judge in a comparatively recent case. 'A mortgage is a pledge, and more; for it is an absolute pledge, to become an absolute interest if not redeemed at a certain time. A pledge is a deposit of personal effects not to be taken back but on payment of a certain sum, by express stipulation or the course of trade to be a lien upon them.'²

1031. In mortgages of personal property, although the prescribed condition has not been fulfilled, there exists as in mortgages of land an equity of redemption which may be asserted by the mortgagor if he brings his bill to redeem within a reasonable time.³ (b) There is however a difference between mortgages of land and mortgages of personal property in regard to the rights of the mortgagee after a breach of the condition. In the latter case there is no necessity to bring a bill of foreclosure; but the mortgagee upon due notice may sell the personal property mortgaged, as he could under the civil law; and the title, if the sale be bona fide made, will vest absolutely in the vendee.⁴ (c) And

¹ 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 138 (4th edit.); Story on Bailments, § 287; Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 166, 167; Ratcliff v. Davies, Cro. Jac. 244; Barrow v. Paxton, 5 John. R. 258; Story v. Tompkins, 8 John. R. 97, 98; McLean v. Walker, 10 John. R. 472; Cortelyou v. Lansing, 1 Cain. Cas. Err. 200, 202; Com. Dig. Mortgage, A.

² Jones v. Smith, 2 Ves. jr. 378.

³ See Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. 278; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 John. Ch. R. 100, 101; Harrison v. Hart, Comyns, R. 392, 411.

⁴ Tucker v. Wilson, 1 P. Will. 261; Lockwood v. Ewer, 9 Mod. R. 275; s. c. 2 Atk. 308; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 John. Ch. R. 100, 101; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 3, § 4, and note (f); 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 3, art. 9; Story on Bailments, § 309; Cortelyou v. Lansing, 1 Cain. Cas. Err. 210, 213.

(a) See Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray, 382, 384; Winchester v. Ball, 54 Maine, 558; Donald v. Suckling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 585; Halliday v. Holgate, L. R. 3 Ex. 299; Johnson v. Stear, 15 C. B. n. s. 330; Baltimore Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 269; Bulkeley v. Walch, 31 Conn. 339. Delivery is necessary to create the lien of a pledge. Walcott v. Keith, 22 N. H. 196; Whittle v. Skinner, 23 Vt. 531. See Donald v. Suckling, supra. Further as to the distinction between these securities

see Heyland v. Badger, 35 Cal. 404; Wright v. Ross, 36 Cal. 414; Parshall v. Eggart, 52 Barb. 367; Haskins v. Kelly, 1 Robt. (N. Y.) 160; Bunacleugh v. Poolman, 3 Daly, 236.

(b) See Flanders v. Chamberlain, 24 Mich. 305; Stoddard v. Dennison, 7 Abb. Pr. n. s. 309.

(c) See Dane v. Mallory, 16 Barb. 46; Freeman v. Freeman, 2 C. E. Green, 44; Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray, 382, 384; Bryant v. Carson, 3 Nev. 313.

it makes no difference whether the personal property mortgaged consists of goods, or of stock, or of personal annuities.¹

1032. In cases of pledges, if a time for the redemption be fixed by the contract, still the pledgor may redeem afterwards if he applies within a reasonable time. But if no time is fixed for the payment, the pledgor has his whole life to redeem unless he is called upon to redeem by the pledgee; and in case of the death of the pledgor without such a demand his personal representatives may redeem.² Generally speaking a bill in equity to redeem will not lie on the behalf of the pledgor or his representatives, as his remedy upon a tender is at law. (a) But if any special ground is shown, as if an account or a discovery is wanted, or there has been an assignment of the pledge, a bill will lie.³ (b)

1033. On the other hand the pledgee might, according to Glanville, at any time bring a suit at the common law to compel the pledgor to redeem by a given day; and if he did not then redeem he was forever foreclosed of his right.⁴ But the course now adopted is to bring a bill in equity to foreclose and sell the pledge, in which case an absolute title passes to the vendee.⁵ It has been also said that the pledgee may, after the time for redemption has passed, upon due notice given to the pledgor, sell the pledge without a judicial decree of sale.⁶ (c)

¹ Ibid.

² 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 138 (4th edit.); Story on Bailments, §§ 308, 345, 346, 348; Glanville, Lib. 10, cap. 6, 8; Cortelyou v. Lansing, 1 Cain. Cas. Err. 200, 203; Demandry v. Metcalf, Prec. Ch. 420; s. c. 2 Vern. 691, 698; Gilb. Eq. R. 104; Vanderzee v. Willis, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 21; Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. 278.

³ Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. 278; Demandry v. Metcalf, Prec. Ch. 419, 420; Jones v. Smith, 2 Ves. jr. 372.

⁴ Glanville, Lib. 10, cap. 8; 1 Cain. Cas. Err. 204, 205; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 138 (4th edit.).

⁵ 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 139 (4th edit.); Story on Bailments, §§ 308, 310, 317; Ex parte Mountfort, 14 Ves. 606.

⁶ Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. 278; Lockwood v. Ewer, 9 Mod. 278; Cortelyou v. Lansing, 1 Cain. Cas. Err. 202, 203, 210; Garlick v. James, 12 John.

(a) Surber v. McClintic, 10 W. 384; Washburn v. Pond, 2 Allen, 474; Va. 236; Freeman v. Freeman, 2 C. E. Green,

(b) See Hasbrouck v. Vandervoort, 44; Donald v. Suckling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 4 Sandf. 74; Bartlett v. Johnson, 9 585; Halliday v. Holgate, L. R. 3 Ex. Allen, 530. 299.

(c) Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray, 382,

1034. There is another consideration applicable to cases of mortgages and pledges of personal property which does not apply, or at least is not as cogent, in cases of mortgages of land. The latter pass by formal conveyances; the former may be transferred by the mere change of possession. A subsequent advance made by a mortgagee or a pledgee of chattels would attach by tacking to the property in favor of such mortgagee, when a like tacking might not be allowed in cases of real estate. Thus for instance in the case of a mortgage of real estate the mortgagee cannot, as we have seen, compel the mortgagor upon an application to redeem to pay any debts subsequently contracted by him with, or advances made up to him by, the mortgagee, unless such new debts or advances are distinctly agreed to be made upon the security of the mortgaged property.¹ But in the case of a mortgage or pledge of chattels the general rule, or at least the general presumption, seems the other way. For it has been held that in such a case, without any distinct proof of any contract for

R. 146; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 40, pp. 581, 582 (4th edit.); 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 139 (4th edit.); Story on Bailments, § 310; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 2, § 2, p. 196. The doctrine that the pledgee has a right to sell the pledge absolutely, after the due notice to the pledgor, is so frequently stated that it is laid down in the text as clear law. The cases however in which it has been asserted are generally cases of mortgages of personal property, and not of mere pledges strictly so called. Whether there is any substantial distinction between the cases is left for the consideration of the learned reader; none has as yet been taken in Courts of Equity as to this point. In *Pothnier v. Dawson*, Holt's N. P. Rep. 385 (which was the case of a pledge sold), Lord Chief Justice Gibbs said: 'Undoubtedly as a general proposition a right of lien gives no right to sell the goods. But when goods are deposited by way of security to indemnify a party against a loan of money it is more than a pledge. The lender's rights are more extensive than such as accrue under an ordinary lien in the way of trade. These goods were deposited to secure a loan. It may be inferred therefore that the contract was this: If I the borrower repay the money, you must redeliver the goods; but if I fail to repay it, you must use the security I have left to repay yourself. I think therefore the defendant had a right to sell.' There is certainly much sound sense to commend itself in this interpretation of the contract of pledge in such a case. (a)

¹ Ante, § 417, and note, § 418; *Mathews v. Cartwright*, 2 Atk. 347; *Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough*, 2 P. Will. 491, 492, 494; *Shepherd v. Titley*, 2 Atk. 352, 354; *Anon.* 2 Ves. 662; *Lowthian v. Hasel*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 162; *Jones v. Smith*, 2 Ves. jr. 376, 378; *Ex parte Knott*, 11 Ves. 617; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 1, § 9, and note (u); *Id.* § 12; *St. John v. Holford*, 1 Ch. Cas. 97; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 185 (4th edit.).

(a) See post, note by the editor at end of § 1047 a.

that purpose, the pledge may be held until the subsequent debt or advance is paid as well as the original debt. The ground of this distinction is, that he who seeks equity must do equity; and the plaintiff seeking the assistance of the court ought to pay all the moneys due to the creditor, as it is natural to presume that the pledgee would not have lent the new sum but upon the credit of the pledge which he had in his hands before.¹ The presumption may indeed be rebutted by circumstances; but unless it is rebutted it will generally in favor of the lien stand for verity against the pledgor himself, although not against his creditors or against subsequent purchasers.²

1035. It is not improbable that this doctrine respecting mortgages and pledges of chattels being held as security for subsequent debts and advances was borrowed from the civil law, although it is applied with some modifications in the Equity Jurisprudence of England. In the civil law (as we have already seen) the mortgagor or pledgor could not redeem without discharging all the other debts which he then owed to the pledgee; with a saving however in favor of the rights of other creditors and purchasers.³

1035 *a*. We have already had occasion to consider the doctrine of tacking mortgages when one of several incumbrancers has acquired the legal estate.⁴ But in cases of mortgages other questions as to relative priorities and titles to payment often arise between different merely equitable incumbrancers. In such cases if a second equitable incumbrancer without notice of a prior incumbrance has by his diligence acquired a better

¹ *Demandray v. Metcalf*, Prec. Ch. 419, 420; s. c. 2 Vern. 691, 698; 1 Eq. Abr. 324, pl. 4; *Gilb. Eq. R.* 104, *Jones v. Smith*, 2 Ves. jr. 378, 379; *Vanderzee v. Willis*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 21; *Adams v. Claxton*, 6 Ves. 229; *Anon.* 2 Vern. R. 177; 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 3, ch. 1, § 10; 2 *Kent, Comm. Lect.* 40, p. 584 (3d edit.); *Jarvis v. Rogers*, 15 *Mass. R.* 389.

² *Ibid.*; 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 3, ch. 1, § 11; 4 *Kent, Comm. Lect.* 58, pp. 175, 176 (4th edit.). As to the general doctrine of tacking in cases of mortgages of real estate see ante, §§ 412 to 421.

³ Ante, § 415, note (1); § 1010, and note (2); 4 *Kent, Comm. Lect.* 58, pp. 175, 176 (4th edit.); *Cod. Lib.* 8, tit. 27, l. 1; *Heinecc. Elem. P. and P.* 4, § 46. In regard to the liens and charges and the modes of enforcing them in equity see post, §§ 1215, 1216, 1216 *a*, 1217, &c., 1230, 1244 to 1253. In regard to the time within which a bill to foreclose a mortgage or to redeem a mortgage must be brought see ante, §§ 55 *a*, 1028 *a*, 1028 *b*; post, §§ 1520, 1521; *Story on Equity Plead.* §§ 503, 751 to 760; *White v. Parnter*, 1 *Knapp, R.* 228, 229.

⁴ Ante, §§ 412 to 420.

equity, he will be entitled to be first paid. A better equity is thus acquired when the legal estate being outstanding in a trustee, a second incumbrancer without notice of a prior incumbrance takes a protection against a subsequent incumbrancer which the prior incumbrancer has neglected to take.¹ Thus for example (as we have seen) a declaration of trust of an outstanding term accompanied by a delivery of the deeds which create and continue the term will give a better equity than a mere declaration of trust to a prior incumbrancer.² So where a second equitable incumbrancer has given notice to the trustees in whom the legal estate is vested, he will thereby acquire a priority over a prior incumbrancer who has omitted to give such notice.³ So where the same equitable interest has been assigned by the assignor to different independent assignees, he who first gives notice of his title to the legal holder of the interest will thereby acquire a priority of right over the others, although his assignment be subsequent in date, provided that at the time of taking it he had no notice of the prior assignments.⁴ (a) And it has

¹ Ante, § 421 a. But see *Muir v. Schenectady*, 3 Hill, N. Y. R. 228; *Davies v. Austin*, 1 Ves. jr. R. 228; *Story on Confl. of Laws*, § 395; *James v. Marey*, 2 Cowen, R. 246.

² *Foster v. Blackstone*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 297; ante, § 421 a; *Id.* § 399, note (1); *Stanhope v. Earl Verney*, 2 Eden, R. 81. ³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Timson v. Ramsbottom*, 2 Keen, R. 35; *Dearle v. Hall*, 3 Russ. R. 1; *Loveridge v. Cooper*, 3 Russ. R. 30; *Meux v. Bell*, 1 Hare, Ch. R. 73; *Foster v. Cockerell*, 9 Bligh, R. 332, 375, 376. Lord Lyndhurst, in delivering his opinion in the House of Lords on this occasion, said: 'This was a question of priority between two equitable incumbrancers, — a question whether the subsequent incumbrancer of the equity having given notice to the trustees of the fund was entitled to priority over the former incumbrancer. Now that question has been settled, after much deliberate discussion, in the cases of *Dearle v. Hall* and *Loveridge v. Cooper*. Those two cases were argued before Sir Thomas Plumer, as Master of the Rolls, with great learning and attention to the subject. The Master of the Rolls, after considering the question, pronounced a very elaborate judgment, deciding that in cases of this description the party who gave notice to the trustees was entitled to the priority. And without adverting to the particular facts of those cases the principle upon

(a) See *Société Générale v. Tramways Co.*, 14 Q. B. D. 424; *Lee v. Howlett*, 2 Kay & J. 531. This last case and *Wiltshire v. Rabbits*, 14 Sim. 76, declare that this does not apply to real estate or to equitable interests in chattels real. But in *Consolidated Ins. Co. v. Riley*, 5 Jur. n. s. full

effect was given to the prior notice of a subsequent assignment of an equitable interest in real and personal estate of the nature of a chose in action. See also *Foster v. Cockerell*, 9 Bligh, 332; *Foster v. Blackstone*, 1 Mylne & K. 297; *Kekewich v. Manning*, 1 DeG. M. & G. 176.

been held that it makes no difference, in cases of different assignments as to this priority of title acquired by notice under such assignments, whether the interest of the assignor be vested or contingent, present or reversionary.¹

1035 *b*. Questions often arise as to the point when and under what circumstances a mortgage is deemed to be extinguished. Undoubtedly by our law the satisfaction of the principal debt by payment or otherwise will be deemed in equity an extinguishment of the mortgage, unless there is an express or implied contract for keeping alive the original security.² (*a*) By the Dutch

which the decisions were founded was this, that if a contrary doctrine were to prevail it would enable a cestui que trust to commit a fraud; he might assign his interest first to one and then to a second incumbrancer, and that second incumbrancer would have no opportunity by any communication with the trustees of ascertaining whether or not there had been a prior assignment of the interest. There was also another principle upon which he decided that case, which was this, that a party till he gives notice to the trustee has not done everything necessary to complete his title. In such cases it is necessary for the parties to do everything in their power. Further than that he assigns as an additional reason, that until notice was given to the trustees they did not in fact become trustees for the assignee. It was upon these distinct grounds that he laid down as a general rule, that in cases of an equitable assignment the party giving notice to the trustees, although he was the second incumbrancer, was entitled to priority if the former incumbrancer had given no such notice. These cases afterwards came before me when I had the honor of presiding in the Court of Chancery, and they were again argued before me with great ability and learning. I took time to consider the judgment on those occasions, and I was satisfied, after deliberate consideration, that the judgment pronounced in each of those cases was correct, and that it was my duty to affirm those judgments. Now the principle of those authorities applies directly to the present case. There are two incumbrancers of an equitable interest; the latter gave notice to the trustees, the former neglected to do so. The Master of the Rolls, Sir John Leach, when this case came before him, was of opinion, in conformity with the decisions already pronounced, that the notice gave to the second incumbrancer a prior right; and under these circumstances I think the decision so pronounced upon these principles by the Master of the Rolls was a correct decision, and that your lordships will be disposed to affirm the judgment; and as the case has already been decided after deliberate argument, this judgment ought to be affirmed with costs.' Ante, §§ 391, 421 *a*; post, §§ 1047, 1057. See *Langton v. Horton*, 2 Hare, R. 549, 560, 562.

¹ *Dearle v. Hall*, 3 Russ. R. 1; *Foster v. Cockerell*, 9 Bligh, R. n. s. 378; *Foster v. Blackstone*, 1 Mylne & K. 297, 306, 307; *Ety v. Bridges*, 3 Younge & Coll. New R. 486, 492; ante, § 421 *a*.

² *Chester v. Willis, Ambler*, R. 246; *Compton v. Oxendon*, 2 Ves. jr. 264; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 6, § 8.

(*a*) Whether payment of the amount charge the debt or as a purchase and due on a mortgage will operate to dis- an assignment of the mortgage will

law it seems that the mortgage is extinguished unless there is an express contract for keeping it alive.¹ An extinguishment of the debt will also ordinarily take place where the mortgagee becomes also absolute owner of the equity of redemption, for then the equitable estate becomes merged in the legal.² (a)

¹ *Wilkinson v. Simson*, 2 Moore, Priv. Coun. R. 275.

² *James v. Marcy*, 2 Cowen, R. 246; *Jackson v. De Witt*, 6 Cowen, R. 310;

depend not so much on the form of language as upon the relation between the party advancing the money and the party executing the release or transfer, and their relative duties. *Ryer v. Gass*, 130 Mass. 227; *Brown v. Lapham*, 3 Cush. 551; *Gibson v. Crehore*, 3 Pick. 475. As where the payment is made by one not bound to make it, and is made for the protection of his own interest, there the mortgage is treated as purchased. *Ib.* So the mortgage is treated as assigned to him who pays the debt if it is manifestly for his interest and consistent with justice, and no contrary interest is expressed or implied. *Ib.*; *Hinds v. Ballou*, 44 N. H. 619; *Leavitt v. Pratt*, 53 Maine, 147.

It is further laid down that payment made on a mortgage by one who has assumed the same must be taken in discharge thereof, without regard to the form of any instrument by which the mortgagee may have attempted to transfer to him his interest. *Thompson v. Heywood*, 129 Mass. 401; *McCabe v. Swap*, 14 Allen, 188; *Putnam v. Collamore*, 120 Mass. 454; *Birke v. Abbott*, 1 Northeastern Rep. 485, Sup. Court of Indiana, 1885. And in the last of these cases it was held to result from this rule that a purchaser of land, by having assumed the payment of incumbrances, could not on payment of one of them become subrogated to the rights of the incumbrancer, so as to cut off the rights of a later mortgagee (of whose mortgage such purchaser had no actual notice when he purchased). It was declared, upon a review of authorities, overrul-

ing *Peet v. Beers*, 4 Ind. 46, and *Ayers v. Adams*, 82 Ind. 109, that the assumption of incumbrances for a valuable consideration made them the primary debt of the purchaser, and did not put him in the situation of a surety to the parties bound before; the purchaser, it was affirmed, is now the principal debtor and they are his sureties. *Fairchild v. Lynch*, 1 Eastern Rep. 190, N. Y. Court of App. 1885; *Bowen v. Beck*, 94 N. Y. 86; *Winans v. Wilkie*, 41 Mich. 264; *Heine v. Vogel*, 69 Mo. 529; *Snyder v. Robinson*, 35 Ind. 311; *Ritter v. Cost*, 99 Ind. 80. Hence payment by him destroyed the incumbrances. See *Carlton v. Jackson*, 121 Mass. 592, 596; *Willson v. Barton*, 52 Vt. 394; *Abbott v. Keeson*, 72 Penn. St. 183.

It was further decided in *Birke v. Abbott*, contrary to certain cases of the New York courts, that the rule was not affected by the fact that the immediate grantor (himself a grantee after the incumbrances assumed) of the purchaser had not become personally liable to pay off the incumbrances. *King v. Whitely*, 10 Paige, 465; *Trotter v. Hughes*, 12 N. Y. 76. But see *Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co.*, 48 N. Y. 253; *Vrooman v. Turner*, 69 N. Y. 280; *Pardee v. Treat*, 82 N. Y. 387. The earlier of the New York cases make the situation of the last purchaser, on his assumption of the incumbrances, depend upon the liability of his grantor, instead of making it dependent upon his own contract; which appears anomalous.

(a) Equity will not, in the absence of intention in fact, permit a merger

The rule however is not inflexible, and may be controlled by the express or implied intention of the parties; and where it is manifestly for the interest of the person in whom both the legal and equitable titles unite to keep the incumbrance alive, there Courts of Equity will imply an intention to keep it alive unless the other circumstances of the case repel such a presumption.¹ (a) The same doctrine with the like qualifications will apply to the case where an assignee of a mortgage purchases the equity of redemption, or the assignee of an equity of redemption purchases and takes a conveyance of the mortgage.²

1035 c. Questions have also arisen as to what shall or ought to be deemed a waiver or extinguishment of a mortgage upon personal property by taking other security therefor. It has been held that a creditor having a mortgage for part of his debt upon the funds of his debtor does not necessarily surrender that mortgage or lower its priority by taking a subsequent mortgage upon the same property for his whole debt, or by taking security on the same fund for another debt due to him either solely or jointly with another creditor.³ (b)

Pelletrave v. Jackson, 11 Wend. R. 110; *Wade v. Howard*, 6 Pick. R. 492; *St. Paul's v. Viscount Dudley and Ward*, 15 Ves. 173; *Forbes v. Moffatt*, 18 Ves. 390; *Gardner v. Gardner*, 3. Johns. Ch. R. 53.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Milne v. Walton*, 2 Younge & Coll. New R. 354.

when that would work injustice. See *Wilkes v. Collin*, L. R. 8 Eq. 338; *Mulford v. Peterson*, 35 N. J. 127; *Stantons v. Thompson*, 49 N. H. 272; *Crosby v. Taylor*, 15 Gray, 64; *Aldrich v. Blake*, 134 Mass. 582; *Adams v. Angell*, 5 Ch. D. 634; *Toulmin v. Steere*, 3 Mer. 210; *Stevens v. Mid-Hants Ry. Co.*, L. R. 8 Ch. 1064; *Knowles v. Carpenter*, 8 R. I. 548; *Lyon v. McIlvaine*, 24 Iowa, 9.

(a) See *Wilkes v. Collin*, L. R. 8 Eq. 338; *Mulford v. Peterson*, 35 N. J. 127; *Stantons v. Thompson*, 49 N. H. 272; *Crosby v. Taylor*, 15 Gray, 64; *Kellogg v. Ames*, 41 N. Y. 259; *McCabe v. Swap*, 14 Allen, 188, 191; *Kilborn v. Robbins*, 8 Allen, 466.

(b) *Burdett v. Clay*, 8 B. Mon. 287; *Hill v. Beebe*, 3 Kern. 556.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

EXPRESS TRUSTS.—ASSIGNMENTS.

1036. IN the next place let us pass to the consideration of ASSIGNMENTS of real and personal property upon special trusts. The most important and extensive of this class of trusts is that which embraces general assignments by insolvents and other debtors for the discharge of their debts, sometimes with priorities and preferences of particular creditors, and sometimes with an equality of rights among all the creditors. (a) The question of the validity of such conveyances and under what circumstances they are deemed fraudulent or bona fide has been already in some measure considered under the head of constructive fraud.¹ In general it may be stated that such priorities and preferences are not deemed fraudulent or inequitable; and even a stipulation on the part of the debtor in such an assignment that the creditors taking under it shall release and discharge him from all their further claims beyond the property assigned will (it seems) be valid and binding on such creditors.²

¹ Ante, §§ 349, 369, 370, 378, 379; *Estwick v. Caillaud*, 6 Term Rep. 420; *Holbird v. Anderson*, 5 T. Rep. 235; *Meux v. Howell*, 4 East, R. 1; *The King v. Watson*, 3 Price, R. 6; *Small v. Marwood*, 9 B. & Cresw. 300; *Pickstock v. Lyster*, 3 M. & Selw. 371; *Marbury v. Brooks*, 7 Wheat. R. 556; 11 Wheat. R. 73; *Wilkes v. Ferris*, 5 John. Rep. 335; *Hyslop v. Clarke*, 14 John. R. 459; *Lippencott v. Barker*, 2 Binn. R. 174; *Halsey v. Whitney*, 4 Mason, R. 206, 227 to 230.

² Ante, § 371; *Halsey v. Whitney*, 4 Mason, Cir. R. 206; *Spring v. So. Car. Ins. Co.*, 8 Wheat. R. 268; *Pearpont v. Graham*, 4 Wash. Cir. R. 232; *Brashear v. West*, 7 Peters, R. 608; *Wheeler v. Sumner*, 4 Mason, Cir. R. 183. The decisions in New York are against the validity of an assignment with

(a) Equity has jurisdiction to set aside, in favor of an assignee in bankruptcy, conveyances in fraud of creditors by the bankrupt. *Barnard v. Davis*, 54 Ala. 565; *Ward v. Jenkins*, 10 Met. 583; *Boone v. Hall*, 7 Bush, 66.

1036 *a*. In order to entitle the creditors named in a general assignment for the benefit of creditors to take under it, it is not necessary that they should be technical parties thereto.¹ It will be sufficient if they have notice of the trust in their favor and they assent to it; and if there be no stipulation for a release, or any other condition in it which may not be for their benefit, their assent will be presumed until the contrary appears.² Such a general assignment bona fide made by the debtor and assented to by the assignee will be deemed a valid conveyance founded upon a valuable consideration and good against creditors proceeding adversely to it by attachment or seizure in execution of the property conveyed thereby; at least unless all the creditors for whose benefit the assignment is made repudiate it.³ Where the creditors are named in the assignment as parties and they are required to execute it before they can take under its provisions, there they must signify their assent in that mode; otherwise they cannot take under the instrument.⁴ But where they are not required to be parties to the instrument, there they may take the benefit of the trust by notice to the trustee within the time

such a clause of release. See *Hyslop v. Clarke*, 14 John. R. 459; *Austin v. Bell*, 20 John. R. 442; *Seaving v. Brinkerhoff*, 5 John. Ch. R. 329; *Wakeman v. Groner*, 4 Paige, R. 23; s. c. 11 Wend. R. 187. See also *Ingraham v. Wheeler*, 6 Conn. 277.

¹ *New England Bank v. Lewis*, 8 Pick. 113; *Halsey v. Whitney*, 4 Mason, R. 206; *Smith v. Wheeler*, 1 Vent. R. 128; 2 Keble, R. 564; *Brashear v. West*, 7 Peters, R. 608; *Garrard v. Lord Lauderdale*, 3 Sim. 1; (*a*) *Acton v. Woodgate*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 492; *Lane v. Husband*, 14 Simons, R. 656.

² *New England Bank v. Lewis*, 8 Pick. 113; *Halsey v. Whitney*, 4 Mason, R. 106; *Egberts v. Wood*, 3 Paige, R. 517; *Nicoll v. Mumford*, 4 John. Ch. R. 522; ante, § 972; post, § 1045; *Small v. Marwood*, 9 Barn. & Cresw. 300. But contra, *Russell v. Woodward*, 10 Pick. R. 408.

³ *Small v. Marwood*, 9 Barn. & Cresw. 300; *Halsey v. Whitney*, 4 Mason, R. 206; *Wilt v. Franklin*, 1 Binn. R. 502, 517; *Marbury v. Brooks*, 7 Wheat. 556; 11 Wheat. R. 78; *Pickstock v. Lyster*, 3 Manle & Selwyn, 371; *Dey v. Dunham*, 2 John. Ch. R. 182; *Nicoll v. Mumford*, 4 John. Ch. R. 522. Where a debtor conveyed all his property to trustees for his creditors in consideration of a license and release granted to him by the deed, it was held that a creditor could not have the benefit of it, who having notice of the deed shortly after its execution, seven years after the death of the debtor filed a bill to be allowed to execute it, for the debtor could not have the benefit of the consideration. *Lane v. Husband*, 14 Simons, R. 656.

⁴ *Garrard v. Lord Lauderdale*, 3 Sim. R. 1. (*a*)

(*a*) As to this case see *Simmonds v. Pales*, 2 Jones & L. 489.

prescribed therefor if any, and if none is prescribed, then within a reasonable time and before a distribution is made of the property.¹ Where a specific time is prescribed for the creditors to come in and assent to the assignment as parties thereto or otherwise, there they must comply strictly with the condition or they will be excluded from the benefit of the trust; unless indeed by reason of absence from the country or some other cause any creditor has not within the time prescribed had any knowledge of the existence of the assignment.²

1036 *b*. It is proper to add that in all such cases of general assignments voluntarily made by the debtor for the benefit of creditors, whether they are specially named in the instrument or only by a general description, if such creditors are not parties thereto and have not executed the same, the assignment is deemed in equity as well as at law to be revocable by the debtor, except as to creditors who have assented to the trust and given notice thereof to the assignee. For until such assent and notice the assignment is treated as between the debtor and the assignee as merely directing the mode in which the assignee shall and may apply the debtor's property for his own benefit.³ (*a*)

1037. The trusts arising under general assignments for the benefit of creditors are in a peculiar sense the objects of equity jurisdiction. For although at law there may under some circumstances be a remedy for the creditors to enforce the trusts, that remedy must be very inadequate as a measure of full relief. On the other hand Courts of Equity by their power of enforcing a discovery and account from the trustees, and of making all the creditors as well as the debtor parties to the suit, can administer entire justice and distribute the whole funds in their proper order among all the claimants upon the application of any of them,⁴

¹ See *Halsey v. Whitney*, 4 Mason, R. 206; *Acton v. Woodgate*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 492; post, §§ 1036 *b*, 1045.

² *Phenix Bank v. Sullivan*, 9 Pick. 410; *De Caters v. Le Ray de Chaumont*, 2 Paige, R. 490.

³ *Garrard v. Lord Lauderdale*, 3 Sim. 1; *Wallwyn v. Coutts*, 3 Meriv. R. 767; s. c. 3 Sim. R. 14; *Page v. Broom*, 4 Russ. R. 6; *Acton v. Woodgate*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 492; ante, § 972 and note; post, §§ 1045, 1046, 1196.

⁴ *Hamilton v. Houghton*, 2 Bligh, R. 171, 189; *Brashear v. West*, 7 Peters, R. 608. A question has arisen under such assignments, whether they take effect from the moment of their execution and before the creditors have

(*a*) See *Simmonds v. Palles*, 2 Jones & L. 489; *Glegg v. Rees*, L. R. 7 Ch. 71.

either on his own behalf or on behalf of himself and all the other creditors. This remedy is ordinarily resorted to by the government in order to enforce its own right of priority and preference in payment of the debts due to it against the assignees.¹ Sureties on custom-house bonds paid by them are also entitled to the like remedy by way of substitution to the government by the express provisions of law.²

1038. It may also be necessary in many cases for the purposes of a due distribution to order a sale of the property ; to take an account of and to adjust the conflicting claims of different creditors ; to direct the order of preferences and payment of the various debts according to their respective priorities ; and to marshal the various funds on which particular creditors may have a lien, so as to secure the due proportion of the assets to each creditor according to his particular rights.³ For all these purposes (and others might be mentioned) Courts of Equity are the only tribunals competent to afford suitable means of relief. And where trusts are created by general assignments in favor of creditors, with or without any limitation as to the time of their assent thereto, Courts of Equity will upon a suitable application require the creditors within a reasonable time to come in and signify their assent, or otherwise they will be excluded from all the benefit of the trusts.⁴ Assignees under general assignments,

assented thereto, or only from the time of such assent. It has been decided that they take effect from the time of their execution upon the ground that being for the benefit of creditors their assent is presumed until the contrary is shown. See *Marbury v. Brooks*, 7 Wheat. R. 556; 11 Wheat. R. 78; *Smith v. Wheeler*, 1 Vent. 128; *Small v. Marwood*, 9 B. & Cres. 300; *Nicoll v. Mumford*, 4 John. Ch. R. 529; ante, § 972. A question has also been made whether such an assignment is operative unless all the trustees should assent thereto. But it has been decided that unless the contrary is provided for in the assignment, the assignment is good and vests the property in the assenting trustees, although the other trustees do not assent. *Ibid.*; *Neilson v. Blight*, 1 John. Cas. 205; *Moses v. Murgatroyd*, 1 John. Ch. R. 119, 129; *Shepherd v. McIvers*, 4 John. Ch. R. 136; *Duke of Cumberland v. Coddington*, 3 John. Ch. R. 261; *Weston v. Barker*, 12 John. R. 276.

¹ *United States v. Howland*, 4 Wheat. R. 108; *United States v. Hunter*, 5 Mason, R. 62; s. c. 5 Peters, R. 173.

² Act of 1799, ch. 128, § 65.

³ See *United States v. Howland*, 4 Wheat. R. 108, 115; ante, ch. 12, §§ 633 to 645.

⁴ *Dunch v. Kent*, 1 Vern. 260, 319; 1 Eq. Abridg. 147, pl. 12; ante, § 1036 a.

such as assignees in cases of bankruptcy and insolvency, take only such rights as the assignor or debtor had at the time of the general assignment; and consequently a prior special assignee will hold against them without giving notice thereof.¹ (a)

1039. In regard to particular assignments upon special trusts there is little to be said which is not equally applicable to all cases of jurisdiction exercised over general trusts. But Courts of Equity take notice of assignments of property and enforce the rights growing out of the same in many cases where such assignments are not recognized at law as valid or effectual to pass titles. It is a well-known rule of the common law that no possibility, right, title, or thing in action can be granted to third persons.² For it was thought that a different rule would be the occasion of multiplying contentions and suits, as it would in effect be transferring a lawsuit to a mere stranger.³ Hence a debt or other chose in action could not be transferred by assignment except in case of the king, to whom and by whom at the common law an assignment of a chose in action could always be made; for the policy of the rule was not supposed to apply to the king.⁴ So strictly was this doctrine construed that it was even doubted whether an annuity was assignable although assigns were mentioned in the deed creating it.⁵ And at law, with

¹ *Muir v. Schenk*, 3 Hill, R. 228. See also *Murray v. Lylburn*, 2 John. Ch. R. 441, 443; *Brown v. Heathcote*, 1 Atk. 160, 162; *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 Ves. 87, 100; *Jewson v. Moulson*, 2 Atk. R. 417, 420; *Morrall v. Marlow*, 1 P. Williams, R. 459; post, §§ 1228, 1229, 1411; 1 Deacon on Bank. ch. 13, § 3, pp. 320, 321, Edit. 1827; *Scott v. Surman*, Willes, R. 402, and the Reporter's note; *Gladstone v. Hadwen*, 1 M. & Selw. R. 517, 526; Com. Dig. Bankrupt, D. 19; *Carvalho v. Burn*, 4 B. & Adolph. 382, 398; *Leslie v. Guthrie*, 1 Bing. N. C. 697.

² *Lampet's Case*, 10 Co. R. 48 a; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 2, note (g); Com. Dig. Chancery, 2 H.; *Thalhimer v. Brinckerhoff*, 3 Cowen, R. 623.

³ *Ibid.*; Co. Litt. 232 b., Butler's note (1); *Prosser v. Edmonds*, 1 Younge & Coll. 489; *Stafford v. Buckley*, 2 Ves. 101.

⁴ Co. Litt. 232 b., Butler's note, *Stafford v. Buckley*, 2 Ves. 177, 181; Com. Dig. Assignment, D.; *Stafford v. Buckley*, 2 Ves. 170, 181; *Miles v. Williams*, 1 P. Will. 252; W. S. Buford, 3 Peters, R. 12, 30.

⁵ Co. Litt. 144 b., and Hargrave's note (1); Co. Litt. 232 b., Butler's note (1). But though a possibility or a contingent interest is not assignable at law, yet it is transmissible and devisable. 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 5,

(a) It seems that notice is necessary to perfect title of a special assignee against the assignee in bankruptcy. *Wragge's Case*, L. R. 5 Eq. 284; *Ex parte Caldwell*, L. R. 13 Eq. 188.

the exception of negotiable instruments and some few other securities, this still continues to be the general rule unless the debtor assents to the transfer; but if he does assent, then the right of the assignee is complete at law, so that he may maintain a direct action against the debtor upon the implied promise to pay him the same, which results from such assent.¹

1040. But Courts of Equity have long since totally disregarded this nicety. (a) They accordingly give effect to assignments of trusts and possibilities of trusts and contingent interests and expectancies, whether they are in real or in personal estate, as well as to assignments of choses in action.² (b) Every such assignment is considered in equity as in its nature amounting to a

and notes (g) and (p). There are, as we have seen and shall presently more fully see, certain interests which are not assignable; such as pensions and half-pay to support a party in future duties, because it would defeat a great public policy. Ante, § 294; post, § 1040 c; *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 1 Swanst. 79; *McCarthy v. Goold*, 1 B. & Beatt. 389; *Stone v. Lidderdale*, 2 Anst. R. 533. Upon similar grounds the assignment of the share in a prize, pendente lite, is void. *Stevens v. Bagwell*, 15 Ves. 139; ante, § 297. See also as to assignments, pendente lite, *Foster v. Deacon*, 6 Madd. 59; *Harrington v. Long*, 2 Mylne & Keen, R. 592; ante, §§ 406, 907, 908, 1048 to 1055.

¹ *Ibid.*; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 434 to 437; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 2, note (g); *Tiernan v. Jackson*, 5 Peters, R. 597, 598; *Israel v. Douglas*, 1 H. Black. 239; *Williams v. Everett*, 14 East, 582; *Crowfoot v. Gurney*, 9 Bing. R. 372; *Hodgson v. Anderson*, 3 B. & Cresw. 842; *Baron v. Husband*, 4 B. & Adolph. 611. As between different assignees, quære, whether the second assignee without notice may not, by giving notice to the debtor first, acquire a priority. See ante, § 421 a. *Muir v. Schenck*, 3 Hill, R. 228.

² *Fearne on Conting. Rem.* by Butler, 548, 550 (7th edit.); *Warmstrey v. Tanfield*, 1 Ch. Rep. 29; *Goring v. Bickerstaff*, 1 Ch. Cas. 8; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 437; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 2, and note (g); *Wind v. Jekyll*, 1 P. Will. 573, 574; *Kimpland v. Courtney*, 2 Freem. R. 251; *Thomas v. Freeman*,

(a) The burden of a covenant entered into by a grantee in fee for himself, his heirs and assigns, though not running with the land at law so as to give a legal remedy against the owner thereof for the time being, is binding in equity upon the owner for the time being, if he has notice thereof. *Renals v. Colishaw*, 9 Ch. D. 125, 129; s. c. 11 Ch. D. 866; *Luker v. Dennis*, 7 Ch. D. 227 (declaring that *Keppell v. Bailey*, 2 Mylne & K. 517, has been overruled). See *De Mattos v. Gibson*, 1 DeG. & J. 282;

Catt v. Tourle, L. R. 4 Ch. 654; *Wilson v. Hart*, L. R. 1 Ch. 463; *Tobey v. Moore*, 130 Mass. 448; *Parker v. Nightingale*, 6 Allen, 341; *Linzee v. Mixer*, 101 Mass. 512; *Sharp v. Ropes*, 110 Mass. 381; *Jeffries v. Jeffries*, 117 Mass. 184; *Peck v. Conway*, 119 Mass. 546.

(b) *Bacon v. Bonham*, 33 N. J. Eq. 614; *East Lewisburg Manuf. Co. v. Marsh*, 91 Penn. St. 96; *Trull v. Eastman*, 3 Met. 121. But see *In re Duggan*, L. R. 8 Eq. 697.

declaration of trust, and to an agreement to permit the assignee to make use of the name of the assignor in order to recover the debt or to reduce the property into possession.¹ Contingent rights and interests are not ordinarily assignable at law; (a) and yet they may sometimes be assigned at law if coupled with some present interest.² (b) So at law such rights and interests may pass by way of estoppel by lease and release or by fine.³ But the reach of this doctrine at law falls far short of that now entertained in equity.⁴ To make an assignment valid at law the thing which is the subject of it must have actual or potential existence at the time of the grant or assignment. (c) But Courts of Equity will support assignments not only of choses in action and of contingent interests and expectancies, but also of things which have no present actual or potential existence, but rest in mere possibility; not indeed as a present positive transfer operative in presenti, for that can only be of a thing in esse, but as a present contract — to take effect and attach as soon as the thing comes in esse.⁵ (d) Thus for example the assignment of the

2 Vern. R. 563, and Raithby's note (2); *Wright v. Wright*, 1 Ves. R. 411, 412; *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. R. 277, 283; post, § 1055; *Jones v. Roe*, 3 T. R. 93, 94. Per Lord Kenyon; *Stokes v. Holden*, 1 Keen, R. 145; *Prosser v. Edmonds*, 1 Younge & Coll. 481, 496; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2 H. Assignment; ante, §§ 783, 1021; *Langton v. Horton*, 1 Hare, R. 554, cited; post, § 1055. See Trull v. Eastman, 3 Metc. R. 121.

¹ *Ibid.*; Co. Litt. 232 b., Butler's note; *Lord Carteret v. Paschal*, 3 P. Will. 199; *Duke of Chandos v. Talbot*, 2 P. Will. 603; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 434 to 437; *Wright v. Wright*, 1 Ves. R. 411, 412; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 1.

² *Shep. Touch.* 238, 239, 322; *Arthur v. Bokenham*, 11 Mod. R. 152; Com. Digest, Assignment A, c. 3.

³ *Doe d. Christmas v. Oliver*, 10 B. & Cressw. 181; *Weate v. Lower*, Pollexf. R. 54; *Fearne on Conting. Rem.* ch. 6, § 5, p. 363, edit. 1831; *Bensely v. Burden*, 2 Sim. & Stew. 519.

⁴ Post, § 1040 b.

⁵ *Mitchell v. Winslow*, 2 Story, R. 630.

(a) *Mulhall v. Quinn*, 1 Gray, 105.

(b) *Emery v. Lawrence*, 8 Cush. 151; *Hartley v. Tapley*, 2 Gray, 565.

(c) See *Lunn v. Thornton*, 1 C. B. 379; *Hope v. Hayley*, 5 El. & B. 830, 845; *Petch v. Tutin*, 15 Mees. & W. 110; *Moody v. Wright*, 13 Met. 17; *Skipper v. Stokes*, 42 Ala. 255. The proceeds of a call upon stockholders, made but not collected, may be assigned. *Pickering v. Ilfracombe Ry.*

Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 235. And so it seems in equity if determined upon, though not yet made. In re *Sankey Coal Co.*, L. R. 9 Eq. 721.

(d) See *Hope v. Hayley*, 5 El. & B. 830, 845; *Holroyd v. Marshall*, 6 Jur. n. s. 931; *Hassie v. G. I. Congregation*, 35 Cal. 378; *Taylor v. Palmer*, 31 Cal. 240; *Lansden v. McCarthy*, 45 Mo. 106; *St. Louis v. Clemens*, 42 Mo. 69; *Tyler v. Barrows*, 6 Robt. (N. Y.)

head-matter and whale-oil to be caught in a whaling voyage now in progress will be valid in equity, and will attach to the head-matter and oil when obtained.¹

1040 *a*. In the civil law and in the jurisprudence of the modern commercial nations of Continental Europe there does not seem to have been any foundation for such an objection to the assignment of debts; for all debts were from an early period allowed to be assigned, if not formally, at least in legal effect, and for the most part, if not in all cases, they may now be sued for in the name of the assignee.² The Code of Justinian says:

¹ *Ibid.*; *Langton v. Horton*, 1 Hare, R. 549, 556, 557; post, § 1055.

² Pothier has stated the old French law upon this subject (which does not in substance probably differ from that of the other modern states of Continental Europe) in very explicit terms in his *Treatise on the Contract of Sale*, of which an excellent translation has been made by L. S. Cushing, Esq. The doctrines therein stated are in many respects so nearly coincident with those maintained by our Courts of Equity that I have ventured to transcribe the following passages from Mr. Cushing's work: 'A credit being a personal right of the creditor, a right inherent in his person, it cannot, considered only according to the subtlety of the law, be transferred to another person, nor consequently be sold. It may well pass to the heir of the creditor, because the heir is the successor of the person and of all the personal rights of the deceased. But in strictness of law it cannot pass to a third person; for the debtor being obliged towards a certain person cannot by a transfer of the credit, which is not an act of his, become obliged towards another. The juriconsults have nevertheless invented a mode of transferring credits without either the consent or the intervention of the debtor; as the creditor may exercise against his debtor by a mandatary as well as by himself the action which results from his credit. When he wishes to transfer his credit to a third person he makes such person his mandatary, to exercise his right of action against the debtor; and it is agreed between them that the action shall be exercised by the mandatary, in the name indeed of the mandator, but at the risk and on the account of the mandatary, who shall retain for himself all that may be exacted of the debtor in consequence of the mandate, without rendering any account thereof to the mandator. Such a mandatary is called by the juriconsults *Procurator in rem suam*, because he exercises the mandate not on account of the mandator, but on his own. A mandate made in this manner is as to its effect a real transfer which the creditor makes of his credit; and if he receives nothing from the mandatary for his consent that the latter shall retain to his own use what he may exact of the debtor, it is donation; if for this authority he receives a sum of money of the mandatary, it is a sale of the credit. From which it is established in practice that credits may be transferred, and may be given, sold, or disposed of by any other title; and it is not even necessary that the act which contains the transfer should express the mandate, in

104; *Groot v. Story*, 41 Vt. 533; *Penn. St.* 96; *Bigelow, Estoppel*, 371 *Wright v. Bircher*, 72 Mo. 179; *East* (3d ed.).
Lewisburg Manuf. Co. v. Marsh, 91

‘*Nominis autem venditio*’ (distinguishing between the sale of a debt and the delegation or substitution of one debtor for

which, as has been explained, the transfer consists. The transfer of an annuity or other credit before notice of it is given to the debtor is what the sale of a corporeal thing is before the delivery; in the same manner that the seller of a corporeal thing until a delivery remains the possessor and proprietor of it, as has been established in another place. So until the assignee notifies the debtor of the assignment made to him the assignor is not divested of the credit which he assigns. This is the provision of art. 108 of the Custom of Paris: “A simple transfer does not divest, and it is necessary to notify the party of the transfer and to furnish him with a copy of it.” From which it follows, first, that before notice the debtor may legally pay to the assignor his creditor; and the assignee has no action, in such case except against the assignor, namely, the action *ex empto*, *ut præstet ipsi habere licere*; and consequently that he should remit to him the sum which he is no longer able to exact of the debtor who has legally paid the debt to the assignor. Second, that before notice the creditors of the assignor may seize and arrest that which is due from the debtor whose debt is assigned; and they are preferred to the assignee who has not before such seizure and arrest given notice of the assignment to him; the assignee in this case is only entitled to his action against the assignor, namely, the action *ex empto*, in order that the latter *præstet ipsi habere licere*; and consequently that he should report to him a removal of the seizure and arrests, or pay him the sum which by reason thereof he is prevented from obtaining of the debtor. Third, that if the assignor, after having transferred a credit to a first assignee, has the bad faith to make a transfer of it to a second, who is more diligent than the first to give notice of his assignment to the debtor, the second assignee will be preferred to the first, saving to the first his recourse against the assignor. Though the assignee notifies to the debtor the assignment to him, the assignor in strictness of law remains the creditor, notwithstanding the transfer and notice, and the credit continues to be in him. This results from the principles established in the preceding article; but *quoad juris effectus*, the assignor is considered by the notice of the transfer given to the debtor to be divested of the credit which he assigns, and is no longer regarded as the owner of it; the assignee is considered to be so, and therefore the debtor cannot afterwards legally pay the assignor; and the creditors of the assignor cannot from that time seize and arrest the credit, because it is no longer considered to belong to their debtor. Nevertheless as the assignee even after notice of the transfer is only the mandatary, though in *rem suam* of the assignor in whose person the credit in truth resides, the debtor may oppose to the assignee a compensation of what the assignor was indebted to him before the notice of the assignment, which however does not prevent him from opposing also a compensation of what the assignee himself owes him; the assignee being himself “*non quidem ex juris subtilitate, sed juris effectu, creditor.*” Pothier on Sales, by Cushing, n. 550, 555 to 559. The modern French law has gotten rid of the subtlety as to the suit being brought in the name of the assignor upon contracts generally; for it may now (whatever might have been the case formerly) be brought in the name of the assignee directly against the debtor. See Troplong des Privil. et Hypoth. Tom. 1, n. 340 to 343; Code Civ. of France, art. 2112; Id. 1689 to 1692; Troplong de la Vente, n. 879 to 882, n. 906, 913.

another for the same debt) ‘et ignorante, vel invito eo, adversus quem actiones mandantur, contrahi solet.’¹ And Heineccius, after remarking that bills of exchange are for the most part drawn payable to a person or his order, says that although this form be omitted, yet an indorsement thereof may have full effect if the laws of the particular country respecting exchange do not specially prohibit it; because an assignment thereof may be made without the knowledge and against the will of the debtor, and he refers to the passage in the Code in proof of it.² But he adds (which is certainly not our law) that if the bill be drawn payable to the order of Titius, it is not to be paid to Titius but to his indorsee. ‘Tunc enim Titio solvi non potest sed ejus indossatario.’³ The same general doctrine as to the assignability of bills of exchange payable to a party but not to his order is affirmed in the Ordinance of France of 1673 (art. 12), as soon as the transfer is made known to the drawee or debtor.⁴ Indeed the like doctrine prevails now in France, not only in cases of bills of exchange but of contracts generally; so that the assignee may now sue therefor in his own name after the assignment, subject however to all the equities subsisting between the parties before and at the time when the debtor has notice of the assignment.⁵

1040 *b.* Contingent interests and expectancies may not only be assigned in equity, but they may also be the subject of a contract, such as a contract of sale when made for a valuable consideration,

¹ Cod. Lib. 8, tit. 42, l. 1; 1 Domat, B. 4, tit. 4, §§ 3, 4.

² Heinecc. de Camb. cap. 3, § 8; Id. cap. 3, §§ 21 to 25. Heineccius, in a note, says that in Franconia and Leipsic no assignment is of any validity if the formulary of its being payable to order is omitted. The present law of France is the same so far as the general negotiability of bills is concerned, and to give them circulation unaffected by any equities between the payee and the debtor. Pardessus, Droit Comm. Tom. 2, art. 339, p. 360; Delvincourt, Instit. Droit Comm. Tom. 1, Liv. 1, tit. 7, Pt. 2, pp. 114, 115. Delvincourt says that the right of a simple bill (not payable to order) is transferable only by an act of transfer made known to the debtor. See also Merlin, Repert. Lettre et Billet de Change, §§ 4, 8, pp. 196, 252 (edit. 1827).

³ Heinecc. de Camb. cap. 2, § 8.

⁴ Jousse, sur l’Ordon. 1673, art. 30, p. 123. See also Story on Bills of Exchange, § 19; Greenleaf on Evid. §§ 172, 190.

⁵ Pardessus, Droit Comm. Tom. 2, art. 313; Troplong de Priv. et Hypoth. Tom. 1; Troplong de la Vente, n. 879 to 913; Code Civil of France, art. 1689 to 1693; Id. art. 2112; Id. art. 1295; Locre, Esprit du Code de Comm. Tom. 1, Liv. 1, tit. 8, p. 342.

which Courts of Equity after the event has happened will enforce.¹ (a) But until the event has happened the party contracting to buy has nothing but the contingency, which is a very different thing from the right immediately to recover and enjoy the property. He has not strictly speaking a *ius ad rem* any more than a *ius in re*. It is not an interest in the property, but a mere right under the contract.² Indeed the same effect takes place in such cases if there be an actual assignment; for in contemplation of equity it amounts not to an assignment of a present interest, but only to a contract to assign when the interest becomes vested.³ Therefore a contingent legacy which is to vest upon some future event, such as the legatee's coming of age, may become the subject of an assignment or a contract of sale. So even the naked possibility or expectancy of an heir to his ancestor's estate may become the subject of a contract of sale or settlement; and in such a case, if made *bona fide* for a valuable consideration, it will be enforced in equity after the death of the ancestor, not indeed as a trust attaching to the estate, but as a right of contract.⁴ (b)

¹ Post, § 1055; *Stokes v. Holden*, 1 Keen, R. 145, 152, 153; *Stone v. Lidderdale*, 2 Anst. 533; *Tunstall v. Boothby*, 10 Simons, R. 542, 549; *Wells v. Foster*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 149; *Langton v. Horton*, 1 Hare, R. 549, 556, 557; *Trull v. Eastman*, 3 Metc. R. 121.

² *Stokes v. Holden*, 1 Keen, R. 152, 153; *Carleton v. Leighton*, 3 Meriv. R. 667, 672, and the Reporter's note (c).

³ See *Purdew v. Jackson*, 1 Russ. R. 1, 26, 44, 45, 47, 50.

⁴ *Hobson v. Trevor*, 2 P. Will. 191; *Beckley v. Newland*, 2 P. Will. 182; *Wethered v. Wethered*, 2 Sim. R. 183; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 2, notes (e), (g), (h); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 437. See *Trull v. Eastman*, 3 Metc. R. 121. Mr. Fonblanque has remarked: 'A distinction appears to have been taken in *Wright v. Wright*, 1 Ves. 409, between assignments of a possibility of an inheritance and assignments of a possibility of a chattel real. The distinction was however overruled; and the cases of *Beckley v. Newland* and *Hobson v. Trevor* were referred to by Lord Hardwicke as conclusive upon the point. It is observable that Lord Kenyon, C. J., in the case of *Jones v. Roe*, 3 Term R. 88, put the case of an heir dealing in respect of his hope of succession as a void contract, it being a bare possibility, and not the subject of a disposition during the life of the ancestor; from which it may be inferred that damages could not be recovered at law for non-performance of such a contract; and

(a) *Hannon v. Christopher*, 34 N. J. 84; *Powers's Appeal*, 63 Penn. St. Eq. 459; *Jenkins v. Stetson*, 9 Allen, 443; *Hannon v. Christopher*, 34 N. J. 128. Eq. 459; *Wright v. Bircher*, 72 Mo.

(b) See *Jenkins v. Stetson*, 9 Allen, 179; *Bigelow, Estoppel*, 371, 372, 375 128; *Stover v. Eycleshimer*, 46 Barb. (3d ed.).

1040 *c*. But although such assignments are valid in equity, yet they will not generally be carried into effect in favor of mere volunteers; nay, not in favor of persons claiming under the consideration of love and affection (such for instance as a wife or children) against the heirs and personal representatives of the assignor, but only in favor of persons claiming for a valuable consideration.¹ And if the assignee of a chose in action is a mere nominal holder and has no interest in the assigned chose in action, it has been held that he is not entitled to sue in his own name in equity, but the suit should be brought in the name of the real party in interest.²

yet it appears from the above cases of *Beckley v. Newland* and *Hobson v. Trevor* that such a contract would be decreed in equity if for a valuable consideration. This therefore may be considered as an instance in which a Court of Equity will decree the specific performance of a contract, though damages could not be recovered at law for the non-performance of it.' 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 2, note (*h*); ante, § 1021. Of the doctrine stated in the text some doubt may perhaps even now be entertained; for it has been held by very able judges that the expectancy of an heir, presumptive or apparent, is not an interest or a possibility capable of being made the subject of an assignment or contract. *Carleton v. Leighton*, 3 Meriv. R. 671, 672; *Jones v. Roe*, 3 T. Rep. 93; *Harwood v. Tooke*, cited 1 Madd. Ch. Prac. 437; *Ibid.* 548 (2d edit.); s. c. 2 Sim. R. 192. The language however of both of these cases seems susceptible of an interpretation consistent with the text, if we suppose the learned judges were referring to a contract or assignment operating to convey an interest in presenti. Indeed the language of Lord Eldon in *Carleton v. Leighton*, 3 Meriv. R. 667, 672, seems to admit that a covenant to convey the expectancy of an heir might be good by way of contract to be enforced when the estate descended to the heir; for in reference to *Beckley v. Newland*, 2 P. Will. 182, and *Hobson v. Trevor*, 2 P. Will. 191, he said that the cases cited were cases of covenant to settle or assign property which should fall to the covenantor, where the interest which passed by the covenant was not an interest in the land but a right under the contract. The same doctrine as to the obligatory force of such a contract was fully recognized in *Wethered v. Wethered*, 2 Sim. R. 183; ante, § 1021; post, § 1054; *Langton v. Horton*, 1 Hare, R. 549, 556, 557. In *re Ship Warre*, 8 Price, R. 269; *Douglass v. Russell*, 4 Sim. R. 529; s. c. 1 M. & Keen, 488.

¹ *Wright v. Wright*, 1 Ves. 412; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 2, notes (*g*), (*h*); *Whitfield v. Faussett*, 1 Ves. 391; ante, §§ 706, 737, 788, 793 *a*, 973. See also *Collyear v. Countess of Mulgrave*, 2 Keen, R. 81, 98; *Collinson v. Patrick*, 2 Keen, R. 123, 134; *Stokes v. Holden*, 1 Keen, R. 145, 152, 153; *Doungsworth v. Blair*, 1 Keen, R. 795, 801, 802; *Ellis v. Nimmo*, 1 Lloyd & Goad's Reports, 333; *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Sim. R. 324; *Jones v. Roe*, 3 T. R. 63, 94; *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 138, 181; ante, § 433, and note 4, p. 433, §§ 706, 706 *a*, 787, 793 *b*, 973, 987; *Callaghan v. Callaghan*, 8 Clark & Finel. 374.

² Ante, § 607 *a* to 607 *c*, 793 *a*, 973; *Field v. Maghee*, 5 Paige, R. 539;

1040 *d.* There are however certain cases in which assignments will not be upheld, either in equity or at law, as being against the principles of public policy. Thus for example an officer in the army will not be allowed to pledge or assign his commission by way of mortgage,¹ (*a*) for his commission is an honorary personal trust. So the full pay or half pay of an officer in the army or navy is not upon principles of public policy assignable either by the party or by operation of law.² For officers, as well upon half pay as full pay, are liable at any time to be called into service; and it has been well remarked that emoluments of this sort are granted for the dignity of the State and for the decent support of those persons who are engaged in the service of it. It would therefore be highly impolitic to permit them to be assigned; for persons who are liable to be called out in the service of their country ought not to be taken from a state of poverty. And it has been added that it might as well be contended that the salaries of the judges, which are granted to support the dignity of the State and the administration of justice, may be assigned.³ The fact that half pay is intended in part as a reward for past services does not in any respect change the application of the principle; for it is also designed to enable the party to be always in readiness to return to the public service if he shall at any time be required so to do.⁴ The same doctrine

Rogers v. The Traders' Insur. Co., 6 Paige, R. 584, 597, 598. In this latter case Mr. Chancellor Walworth seems to have entertained some doubt whether an agent, effecting a policy in his own name for the benefit of other persons, could sue in equity on the policy; or at least his language may be thought to lead to such a doubt. The point was not before him; for the real question was whether the persons in interest could sue in equity on such a policy in their own names; and it was very properly held that they could.

¹ *Collyer v. Fallon*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 459.

² Ante, §§ 294, 1040, note (1); *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 1 Swanst. R. 79; *McCarthy v. Goold*, 1 Ball & Beatt. 387; *Stone v. Lidderdale*, 2 Anst. R. 533.

³ Per Lord Kenyon, in *Flarty v. Odlum*, 3 Term R. 681; *Stone v. Lidderdale*, 2 Anst. R. 533; *Tunstall v. Boothby*, 10 Sim. R. 540; *Grenfell v. Dean of Windsor*, 2 Beav. R. 544, 549. *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 1 Swanst. R. 79.

⁴ *Stone v. Lidderdale*, 2 Anst. R. 533; *Lidderdale v. Duke of Montrose*, 4 Term R. 248; *Priddy v. Rose*, 3 Meriv. 102.

(*a*) See *Calisher v. Forbes*, L. R. L'Estrange, 1 Eng. L. & E. 153; s. c. 7 Ch. 109; *Addison v. Cox*, L. R. 20 L. J. Ch. 39. 8 Ch. 76. But see *L'Estrange v.*

has been applied to the compensation granted to a public officer for the reduction of his emoluments or the abolition of his office, who by the terms of the grant might be required to return to the public service. For in such a case the object of the government is to command a right to his future services and to enable the party to perform the duties with suitable means to support him.¹ (a) In like manner the profits of a public office would seem upon a similar ground of public policy not to be assignable.² (b)

1040 e. But it has been thought that a different principle is properly applicable to pensions, either for life or during pleasure, which are granted purely for past services or as mere honorary gratuities without any obligation to perform future services; for it has been said that as in such a case no future benefit is expected by the State, no public policy or interest is thwarted by allowing an assignment thereof.³ (c) And this distinction has been strongly insisted upon on various occasions. But it may be fairly questioned whether the public policy in cases of pensions is not thereby materially thwarted and overturned. The object of every such pension is to secure to the party for his past services or honorable conduct a decent support and maintenance during his life or during the pleasure of the government. It is essentially designed to be for the personal comfort and dignity of the party and for the honor of the State, and to promote and encourage extraordinary exertions for the public service on the part of all the citizens or subjects. To enable the party therefore to assign his pension is to defeat the very purposes of the government by enabling the assignee to have all the benefit of the bounty of the government, and to encourage on the part of the pensioner at once indifference and profusion, as well as to expose him to all the evils of poverty. However this may be, the authorities seem strongly to support the right of assignment of pensions.

¹ *Wells v. Foster*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 149.

² *Hill v. Paul*, 8 Clark & Finel. 295, 307; *Palmer v. Bate*, 2 Brod. & Bing. 673; *Davis v. Duke of Marlborough*, 1 Swanst. R. 79.

³ *Stone v. Lidderdale*, 2 Anst. R. 533; *Wells v. Foster*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 149; *Tunstall v. Boothby*, 10 Sim. 549; *Ex parte Battine*, 4 Barn. & Adolph. R. 690.

(a) See *Spooner v. Payne*, 16 Jur. 367; s. c. 10 Eng. L. & E. 202.

(c) See *Feistel v. King's College*, 10 Beav. 491, assignment of emolu-

(b) See *Nichols v. Davis*, L. R. 4 C. P. 80. ments of a fellow of a college.

1040*f.* There seems still to be some doubt as to another point connected with this subject, and that is whether a compensation or pension granted during pleasure and not for any certain time, and revocable in its own nature, is properly the subject of an assignment, as being of too uncertain and fleeting a character to pass by assignment; for although mere expectancies may properly pass by assignment, yet they must be of a substantial character, and not ordinarily of such a nature as to rest in the pure discretion of the party granting or withholding them from time to time at his pleasure.¹ Upon this ground the salary of an assistant parliamentary counsel for the Treasury has been held to be not assignable.² A distinction has also been taken between

¹ Lord Kenyon, in *Flarty v. Odum*, 3 Term R. 681, seemed to think the assignment of half pay would be void, on account of its being dependent upon the mere pleasure of the Crown, and too uncertain to pass any interest therein by assignment. See also *The King v. The Lords Commiss. of the Treasury*, 4 Adolph. & Ell. R. 976; *Id.* 984; *Ex parte Ricketts*, 4 Adolph. & Ell. 999. The weight of authority seems however in favor of the assignability of half pay. *Tunstall v. Boothby*, 10 Sim. 542, 549; *Wells v. Foster*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. R. 149. In this last case Mr. Baron Parke said: 'I concur in the opinion that this action is not maintainable upon the ground that on principles of public policy the allowance granted to the defendant was not assignable by him. It is not necessary in this case to determine whether this is an allowance to which the defendant is entitled as a matter of indefeasible right, or whether it is payable only during pleasure; although I have a strong impression that it subsists only during the joint pleasure of the Treasury and of Parliament, by which the fund for its payment is provided. On the other hand even if it be payable only during pleasure it appears to me that it is not therefore in point of law the less assignable, however little its value would be in consequence of its being liable to be withdrawn at any moment. But viewing the matter on the ground of public policy, we are to look, not so much at the tenure of this pension, whether it is held for life or during pleasure, as whether it is in either case such a one as the law ought to allow to be assigned. The correct distinction made in the cases on this subject is that a man may always assign a pension given to him entirely as a compensation for past services, whether granted to him for life or merely during the pleasure of others. In such a case the assignee acquires a title to it both in equity and at law, and may recover back any sums received in respect of it by the assignor after the date of the assignment. But where the pension is granted not exclusively for past services, but as a consideration for some continuing duty or service, although the amount of it may be influenced by the length of the service which the party has already performed, it is against the policy of the law that it should be assignable.'

² *Cooper v. Reilly*, 2 Sim. R. 560. But military prize-money, although resting in the mere bounty of the Crown, is held to be different in its nature and objects from military pay, and treated as a right of property rather than as a personal pension or reward. *Alexander v. Duke of Wellington*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 35; *Stevens v. Bagwell*, 15 Ves. 139, 152. In this last case the Master

the case of an assignment of the arrearages of full pay or half pay or other compensation connected with the right to future services, and the case of an assignment of the future accruing pay or half pay or other compensation; as the right to the arrearages has become absolute and the assignment thereof may not interfere with any public policy.¹ It seems also that the profits of a public office are not assignable even for the benefit of creditors.² (a)

of the Rolls (Sir William Grant) said: 'The capture of the fort at Chinsurah, in July, 1781, was made by "The Nymph," sloop of war, commanded by Lieutenant Stevens, under the orders of Sir Edward Hughes, and by a detachment of the East India Company's forces. If the captured effects had, after the death of Lieutenant Stevens, been condemned as prize to the captors, there can be no doubt that his share would have passed by his will; as though the property was not completely vested in the captors until condemnation, yet after condemnation it is by relation considered as theirs from the time of the capture. The captured effects being condemned to the Crown, no right to any part of the produce can accrue to any one except by the gift of the Crown, and as Lieutenant Stevens died before any gift was made, his will could have no direct operation upon the subject of that gift. But the intention of the Crown in all cases of this kind is to put what is in strictness matter of bounty upon the footing of matter of right. The service performed is thought worthy of reward; and though the party performing it died before payment, the claim of bounty from the Crown is considered as transmissible to his representatives in the same plight and condition as the claim for wages, or any other stipulated or legal remuneration of service. In such cases the Crown never means to exercise any kind of judgment or selection with regard to the persons to be ultimately benefited by the gift. The representatives to whom the Crown gives are those who legally sustain that character. But the gift is made in augmentation of the estate, not by way of personal bounty to them. They take, subject to the same trusts upon which they would have taken wages or prize-money, to which the party from whom they claim might have been legally entitled.' Lord Brougham in the former case said: 'Reference has been made to the case of *Stevens v. Bagwell* (15 Ves. 139), where that which was a matter of bounty is put upon the footing of a right. So far to be sure as the question regards the transmission of the right from the grantee after it has once vested in him, he may sell or assign the bounty, he may transmit it to his heir or sue for it and say it has become a matter of right and is no longer bounty. But is there a shadow of pretence for asserting that, as against the Crown or against trustees standing in the place of the Crown, prize is a matter of right, and not of bounty? Such a decision will be sought for in vain.'

¹ *Tunstall v. Boothby*, 10 Sim. R. 542, 549; *Ellis v. Earl Grey*, 6 Sim. R. 214. See also *Grenfell v. Dean of Windsor*, 2 Beav. R. 544, 549.

² *Hill v. Paul*, 8 Clark & Finel. 295.

(a) The assignment of claims against the United States is prohibited by statute in certain cases. See *Wanless v. United States*, 6 Ct. of Cl. 123; *Danklessen v. Braynard*, 3 Daly, 183; *Bates's Case*, 4 Ct. of Cl. 569. *Becker v. Sweetser*, 15 Minn. 427;

1040 *g*. So an assignment of a bare right to file a bill in equity for a fraud committed upon the assignor will be held void, as contrary to public policy, and as savoring of the character of maintenance, of which we shall presently speak.¹ (*a*) So a mere right of action for a tort is not for the like reason assignable.² (*b*) Indeed it has been laid down as a general rule that where an equitable interest is assigned in order to give the assignee a *locus standi* in *judicio* in a Court of Equity, the party assigning such right must have some substantial possession and some capability of personal enjoyment, and not a mere naked right to overturn a legal instrument or to maintain a suit.³

¹ *Prosser v. Edmonds*, 1 Younge & Coll. 481; post, § 1048.

² *Gardner v. Adams*, 12 Wend. R. 297.

³ *Prosser v. Edmonds*, 1 Younge & Coll. 481, 496 to 499. In this case Lord Abinger examined the doctrine at large, and said: 'With respect to the question as to the validity of an assignment of a right to file a bill in equity, I must distinguish between this sort of case and the assignment of a chose in action or equity of redemption. It may be said that the assignment of a mortgaged estate is nothing more than an assignment of a right to file a bill in equity. But the equity of redemption arises out of an interest, though only a partial interest. Courts of Law and Equity treat the mortgage as a mere security, and there is an interest left in the mortgagor, which he may assign. But in a case where a party assigns his whole estate and afterwards makes an assignment generally of the same estate to another person, and the second assignee claims to set aside the first assignment as fraudulent and void, the assignor himself making no complaint of fraud whatever, it appears to me that the right of the second assignee to make such a claim would be a question deserving of great consideration. My present impression is that such a claim could not be sustained in equity unless the party who made the assignment joined in the prayer to set it aside. In such a case a second assignment is merely that of a right to file a bill in equity for a fraud; and I should say that some authority is necessary to show that a man can assign to another a right to file a bill for a fraud committed upon himself.' And again: 'The remaining cause of demurrer, namely, that the plaintiffs have no right to equitable relief, raises an important and curious question, which is this, Whether or not parties who either become purchasers for a valuable consideration, or who take an assignment in trust of a mere naked right to file a bill in equity, shall be entitled to become plaintiffs in equity in respect of the title so acquired. Now

(*a*) *Dayton v. Fargo*, 45 Mich. 153. See *Hill v. Boyle*, L. R. 4 Eq. 260; *Milwaukee R. Co. v. Milwaukee R. Co.*, 20 Wis. 174.

(*b*) *Dunklin v. Wilkins*, 5 Ala. 199; *Dickinson v. Seaver*, 44 Mich. 624; *McKee v. Judd*, 2 Kern. 622; *Davis v. Herndon*, 39 Miss. 484; *Linton v.*

Hurley, 104 Mass. 353. Secus, it seems, of a right of action for the value of goods converted where the tort is waived. *Hawk v. Thorn*, 54 Barb. 164. See also *Grocers' Bank v. Clark*, 48 Barb. 26; *Rindge v. Cole-raine*, 11 Gray, 157.

1041. The distinction between the operation of assignments at law and the operation of them in equity may be very familiarly

in the course of the argument it was urged that an equitable as well as a legal interest may be the subject of conveyance, and that the assignee of a chose in action may file a bill in equity to recover it, although he cannot proceed at law for that purpose. But where an equitable interest is assigned, it appears to me that in order to give the assignee a *locus standi* in a Court of Equity the party assigning that right must have some substantial possession, some capability of personal enjoyment, and not a mere naked right to overset a legal instrument. For instance that a mortgagor who conveys his estate in fee to a mortgagee has in himself an equitable right to compel a reconveyance when the mortgage-money is paid, is true. But that is a right reserved to himself by the original security; it is a right coupled with possession and receipt of rent, and he is protected so long as the interest is paid; and it does not follow that the assignee of the mortgage and the mortgagee may not adjust their rights without the intervention of a Court of Equity. In the present case it is impossible that the assignee can obtain any benefit from his security except through the medium of the court. He purchases nothing but a hostile right to bring parties into a Court of Equity as defendants to a bill filed for the purpose of obtaining the fruits of his purchase. So where a person takes an assignment of a bond he has the possession, and although a Court of Equity will permit him to file a bill on the bond, it does not follow that he is obliged to go into a Court of Equity to enforce payment of it. So other cases might be stated to show that where equity recognizes the assignment of an equitable interest, it is such an interest as is recognized also by third persons, and not merely by the party insisting on them. What is this but the purchase of a mere right to recover? It is a rule, not of our law alone, but of that of all countries (see Voet, *Comm. ad Pandect. Lib. 41, tit. 1, sect. 38*), that the mere right of purchase shall not give a man a right to legal remedies. The contrary doctrine is nowhere tolerated, and is against good policy. All our cases of maintenance and champerty are founded on the principle that no encouragement should be given to litigation by the introduction of parties to enforce those rights which others are not disposed to enforce. There are many cases where the acts charged may not amount precisely to maintenance or champerty, yet of which upon general principles and by analogy to such acts a Court of Equity will discourage the practice. Mr. Girdlestone was so obliging as to furnish me with a case, that of *Wood v. Downes* (18 Ves. 120), in which it appears to me that the principle laid down by Lord Eldon goes the full length of supporting the judgment of allowing this demurrer. That was a bill filed to set aside certain conveyances which it was alleged were obtained by the defendant in consequence of his situation of solicitor to the plaintiffs, the estate comprised in the conveyance not being in their possession at the time, but subject to litigation. Lord Eldon, in decreeing relief, adopted not only the ground that the party was the solicitor of the plaintiffs, but that the transaction was contrary to good policy. He said: 'The objection therefore is not merely that which flows out of the relation of attorney and client, but upon the fact that this was the purchase of a title in litigation, with reference to the law of maintenance and champerty;' and he accordingly decreed the conveyance to be set aside on the ground of litigated title. Here the proceeding is the converse of that in *Wood v. Downes*. It is not to set aside the convey-

shown by a few illustrations derived from cases of bailments and consignments. In the common case where money or other property is delivered by a bailor to B for the use of C or to be delivered to C, the acceptance of the bailment amounts to an express promise from the bailee to the bailor to deliver or pay over the property accordingly. In such a case it has been said that the person for whose use the money or property is so delivered may maintain an action at law therefor against the bailee without any further act or assent on the part of the bailee; for a privity is created between them by the original undertaking.¹ But of this doctrine some doubt may perhaps be entertained unless there is some act done by the bailee or some promise made by him whereby he shall directly contract an obligation to such person to deliver the money or other property over to him; otherwise it

ance in question, but to establish it. The principle is the same in both cases; for if under the present circumstances Robert Todd had filed his bill against the plaintiffs, I should have declared it to be a void deed, and should have ordered it to be set aside. Upon the same facts therefore I ought to refuse to establish the deed in their favor. But the case does not rest here. There is a short but useful statute which it is proper to refer to, that of the 32d of Hen. VIII., ch. 9, which is a legislative rule on the subject, and consistent with general policy and the principles of Courts of Law and Equity. Under the statute, if the person who parts with his title has not been in actual possession of the land within a year before the sale, he as well as the buyer is liable to the penal consequences of the act. I do not say that that is precisely the case here, because the conveyance purports to contain an ulterior trust for the party assigning, and therefore an action could not be brought against him on the statute. At the same time it is to be observed that from many cases in Anderson and Coke it appears that Courts of Common Law were favorable to actions on the statute, considering them to be highly beneficial, and not without good cause to be restrained. It has been the opinion of some learned persons that the old rule of law, that a chose in action is not assignable, was founded on the principle of the law not permitting a sale of a right to litigate. That opinion is to be met with in Sir William Blackstone and the earlier reporters. Courts of Equity, it is true, have relaxed that rule, but only in the cases which I have mentioned, where something more than a mere right to litigate has been assigned. Where a valuable consideration has passed, and the party is put in possession of that which he might acquire without litigation, these Courts of Equity will allow the assignee to stand in the right of assignor. This is not that case. Robert Todd when he assigned was in possession of nothing but a mere naked right. He could obtain nothing without filing a bill. No case can be found which decides that such a right can be the subject of assignment, either at law or in equity.' Post, § 1048, note 3.

¹ Story on Bailments, § 103; *Israel v. Douglas*, 1 H. Black. R. 242; *Bac. Abr. Bailment, D.*; *Farmer v. Russel*, 1 Bos. & Pull. 295; *Priddy v. Rofe*, 3 Meriv. R. 86, 102; *Row v. Dawson*, 1 Ves. 331.

would seem that the only contract would be between the bailor and his immediate bailee.¹ (a) But be this as it may, it is certain that a remedy would lie in equity under the like circumstances as a matter of trust; for it is laid down in a work of very high authority 'If a man gives goods or chattels to another upon trust to deliver them to a stranger, chancery will oblige him to do it.'²

1042. But if a remittance be made of a bill to a bailee to collect the amount and also to pay the proceeds or a part thereof to certain enumerated creditors, there it has been held that the mere receipt of the bill and even the collecting of the contents will not necessarily amount to such an appropriation of the

¹ See *Pigott v. Thompson*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 149; *Williams v. Everett*, 14 East, R. 582; *Yates v. Bell*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 643; *Grant v. Austen*, 3 Price, R. 58; *Tiernan v. Jackson*, 5 Peters, R. 597, 601; post, § 1042, 1045; *Story on Bailm.* § 103; *Prosser v. Edmonds*, 1 Younge & Coll. 481, 496 to 499; *Lilly v. Hayes*, 5 Adolph. & Ellis, 548. See ante, §§ 972, 1036 *b*; post, 1196; *Comyns's Digest*, Action upon the Case on Assumpsit, B. 13. There is certainly some confusion in the cases in the books on this subject. Lord Alvanley, in *Pigott v. Thompson*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 149, seems to have thought that if A lets land to B, in consideration of which B promises to pay the rent to C, the latter may maintain an action on that promise. But he said that his brothers thought differently. So in *Marchington v. Vernon*, cited in 1 Bos. & Pull. 101, note, Mr. Justice Buller is reported to have said that if one person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third, that third may maintain an action upon it. Probably it will be found upon a thorough examination of the cases that the true principle on which they have proceeded is, that where the promise is construed to be made to A for the use or benefit of B, A alone can maintain an action thereon. But if there is promise in general terms, which may be construed to be made to B through A, there B may maintain an action thereon. The cases of *Williams v. Everett*, 14 East, 582, and *Tiernan v. Jackson*, 5 Peters, R. 597, 601, contain the fullest expositions of the doctrine. See also the Reporter's learned note (a) to *Pigott v. Thompson*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 149. See also *Martyn v. Hind*, Cowp. R. 437; *S. P. Lilly v. Hayes*, 5 Adolph. & Ellis, 348. In *Ex parte South*, 3 Swanst. R. 393, Lord Eldon said: 'It has been decided in bankruptcy that if a creditor gives an order on his debtor to pay a sum in discharge of his debt, and that order is shown to the debtor, it binds him; on the other hand this doctrine has been brought into doubt by some decisions in the Courts of Law, who require that the party receiving the order should in some way enter into a contract. That has been the course of their decisions, but is certainly not the doctrine of this court.' See also *Fitzgerald v. Stewart*, 2 Sim. R. 333; s. c. 2 Russ. & M. 457; *Lett v. Morris*, 4 Sim. R. 609.

² *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 4 W. 5; *Id.* 2 A. 1; ante, § 453, note 4. See also *Scott v. Porcher*, 3 Meriv. R. 658, 659.

(a) See *Hicoek v. McKay*, 12 Gray, 265; *Mellen v. Whipple*, 1 Gray, 317; 218; *Turner v. McCarty*, 22 Mich. *Exchange Bank v. Rice*, 107 Mass. 37.

money to the use of the creditors as that they can maintain a suit at law for the same if there are circumstances in the case which repel the presumption that the bailee agreed to receive, and did receive, the money for the use of the creditors.¹ For until such assent, express or implied, no action lies at law any more than it would lie against a debtor without such assent if a debt were assigned by a creditor in favor of the assignee.²

1043. So if a draft or order is drawn on a debtor for a part or the whole of the funds of the drawer in his hands, such a draft does not entitle the holder to maintain a suit at law against the drawee unless the latter assents to accept or pay the draft.³ (a) The same principle will apply to a case where an equitable (but not a legal) interest in specific property in the hands of a bailee or factor is intended to be transferred by an assignment to creditors; or where specific property is remitted on consignment for sale with directions to apply the proceeds to the payment of certain specified creditors. In each of these cases some assent to the appropriation, express or implied, by the bailee or consignee must be established to justify a recovery at law by the creditors.⁴

1044. But in cases of this sort the transaction will have a very different operation in equity. Thus for instance if A having a debt due to him from B should order it to be paid to C, the order would amount in equity to an assignment of the debt and would be enforced in equity although the debtor had not assented thereto.⁵ (b) The same principle would apply to the case of

¹ *Williams v. Everett*, 14 East, R. 582; *Yates v. Bell*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 643; *Grant v. Austen*, 3 Price, R. 58; *Tiernan v. Jackson*, 5 Peters, R. 597 to 601.

² *De Bernales v. Fuller*, 14 East, R. 590, note; post, § 1196.

³ *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. R. 277, 286; *Tiernan v. Jackson*, 5 Peters, R. 597 to 601; *Adams v. Claxton*, 6 Ves. 231.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Williams v. Everett*, 14 East, 582; *Yates v. Bell*, 3 B. & Ald. 643; *Baron v. Husband*, 4 B. & Adolph. 611; § 1042, note.

⁵ Ante, §§ 962, 973; Ex parte *South*, 3 Swanst. R. 393; *Lett v. Morris*, 4 Sim. R. 607; Ex parte *Alderson*, 1 Madd. R. 53; *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. R. 277, 286; *Tiernan v. Jackson*, 5 Peters, R. 598. See *Collyer v. Fallon*, 1 Turn. & Russ. R. 470, 475, 476; *Adams v. Claxton*, 6 Ves. 230; *Row v. Dawson*, 1 Ves. 331; *Priddy v. Rose*, 3 Meriv. R. 86, 102; *Morton v. Naylor*, 1 Hill. N. Y. Rep. 583.

(a) But the assignment will probably be good against the drawer's creditors, even at law. *Infra*, p. 366, note (a).

(b) *Hutchinson v. Simon*, 57 Miss. 628. See *Kendall v. United States*, 7 Wall. 113, 116, in regard to the nature of the debt.

an assignment of a part of such debt.¹ In each case a trust would be created in favor of the equitable assignee on the fund, and would constitute an equitable lien upon it.

1045. In regard to the other class of cases above suggested, namely, those where the question may arise of an absolute appropriation of the proceeds of an assignment or remittance directed to be paid to particular creditors, Courts of Equity, like Courts of Law, will not deem the appropriation to the creditors absolute until the creditors have notice thereof and have assented thereto. For until that time the mandate or direction may be revoked or withdrawn, and any other appropriation made by the consignor or remitter of the proceeds.² (a) The true test whether an absolute appropriation is made out or not depends upon the point at whose risk the property is; and until the creditor has consented, the property will clearly be at the risk of the assignor or remitter.³ (b) But if upon notice the creditors should assent thereto and no intermediate revocation should have been made by the assignor or remitter, there in equity the assignee or mandatary will be held a trustee for the creditors, and they may maintain a bill to enforce a due performance of the trust. For although the assignee or mandatary has a perfect right in such a case to refuse the trust, yet he cannot act under the mandate and receive the proceeds and hold them discharged from the trust thus created and still subsisting between the mandator and the creditors.⁴ The property comes to his hands clothed with the trust by the act of parties competent to create and establish it; and his assent is in no just sense necessary to give validity to

¹ *Ibid.*; *Smith v. Everett*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 64; *Lett v. Morris*, 4 Sim. R. 607; *Morton v. Naylor*, 1 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 583; *Watson v. Duke of Wellington*, 1 Russ. & M. 602, 605.

² *Scott v. Porcher*, 3 Meriv. R. 662. See also *Acton v. Woodgate*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 492; *Wallwyn v. Coutts*, 3 Meriv. R. 707, 708; s. c. 3 Sim. R. 14; *Gerrard v. Lord Lauderdale*, 4 Russ. & Mylne, 451; *Gaskell v. Gaskell*, 2 Younge & Jerv. 502; *Maber v. Hobbs*, 2 Younge & Jerv. 327; ante, § 972 and note; §§ 1036 a, 1036 b.

³ *Williams v. Everett*, 14 East, R. 582; *Tiernan v. Jackson*, 5 Peters, R. 598.

⁴ See *Yates v. Bell*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 643; ante, §§ 1036 a, 1036 b.

(a) See *Glegg v. Rees*, L. R. 7 Ch. 71; *In re Freshfield*, 11 Ch. D. 198. same effect as direct assent. *In re Baber*, L. R. 10 Eq. 554.

(b) Acquiescence may have the

it in equity. If at the time of such assignment or remittance the very arrangement and appropriation of the proceeds had been actually made between the assignor or remitter and the creditors, it would clearly bind the proceeds in the hands of the assignee or mandatary subject to such appropriation, whether he assented to it or not.¹ And it can make no just difference that the arrangement is subsequently made by the same parties, as they still remain competent to enter into it.²

1046. It is true that in every case where a consignment or remittance is made with orders to pay over the proceeds to a third person the appropriation is not absolute; for it amounts to no more than a mandate from a principal to his agent, which can give no right or interest to a third person in the subject of the mandate. It may be revoked at any time before it is executed, or at least before any engagement is entered into by the mandatary with the third person to execute it for his benefit; and it will be revoked by any prior disposition of the property inconsistent with such execution.³ (a) But if no revocation is made and the mandate continues in full force, the trust as such continues for the benefit of such third person who, after his assent thereto notified to the mandatary, may avail himself of it in equity without any reference to the assent or dissent of the mandatary upon such notice; for his receipt of the property binds him to follow the orders of his principal.⁴ (b)

1047. In order to constitute an assignment of a debt or other chose in action in equity no particular form is necessary. A draft drawn by A on B, in favor of C, for a valuable considera-

¹ See *Fitzgerald v. Stewart*, 2 Sim. R. 333; ante, § 1044.

² See *Watson v. Duke of Wellington*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, R. 602; *Hassall v. Smithers*, 12 Ves. 119. But see *Ex parte Heywood*, 2 Rose, R. 355.

³ *Scott v. Porcher*, 3 Meriv. R. 662, 664; *Acton v. Woodgate*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 492; ante, §§ 972, 1036 a, 1036 b.

⁴ *Hassall v. Smithers*, 12 Ves. 119, 122.

(a) See *Lindsay v. Price*, 33 Texas, 280.

(b) Where the assignment, not having been made in accordance with the requirements of law, is consequently invalid as to all creditors who choose to avoid it, the property assigned remains liable to attachment in behalf

of the creditors of the assignor until a sufficient number to absorb the fund assigned have expressly notified the assignee of their assent to the provisions of the assignment, and the assignee has made a valid contract to keep the same for them. *Merrill v. Englesby*, 28 Vt. 150.

tion, amounts (as we have seen) to a valid assignment of so much of the funds of A in the hands of B.¹ (a) So indorsing and delivering a bond to an assignee for a valuable consideration amounts to an assignment of the bond.² Indeed any order, writing, or act which makes an appropriation of a fund amounts to an equitable assignment of that fund.³ (b) The reason is that the fund being matter not assignable at law nor capable of manual possession, an appropriation of it is all that the nature of the case admits of, and therefore it is held good in equity.⁴ An assignment of a debt may be by parol as well as by deed.⁵ (c) As the assignee is generally entitled to all the remedies of the assignor, so he is generally subject to all the equities between the assignor and his debtor.⁶ (d) But in order to perfect his title

¹ Ante, § 1043; *Row v. Dawson*, 1 Ves. 332; *Crowfoot v. Gurney*, 9 Bing. R. 372; *Smith v. Everett*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 64.

² *Row v. Dawson*, 1 Ves. 332; *Ryall v. Rowles*, 1 Ves. 348, 375; *Townshend v. Windham*, 2 Ves. 6; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 434; *Ex parte Alderson*, 1 Madd. R. 53; *Burn v. Carvalho*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 690, 702; *Yeates v. Groves*, 1 Ves. jr. 280, 281; *Ex parte South*, 3 Swanst. R. 393.

³ *Morton v. Naylor*, 1 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 583; *Burn v. Carvalho*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 690, 702.

⁴ *Clemson v. Davidson*, 5 Binn. R. 392, 398.

⁵ *Heath v. Hall*, 4 Taunt. R. 326 to 328; s. c. 2 Rose, R. 271; *Tibbets v. George*, 5 Adolph. & Ellis, 107, 115, 116.

⁶ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 435, 436; *Priddy v. Rose*, 3 Meriv. R. 86; *Coles v. Jones*, 2 Vern. 692; *Murray v. Lylburn*, 2 John. Ch. R. 441; post, § 1057.

(a) It should however be drawn upon a designated fund. *Attorney-Gen. v. Continental Life Ins. Co.*, 71 N. Y. 325; *Hosack v. Rogers*, 18 Wend. 319 (reversing 6 Paige, 415); *McWilliams v. Webb*, 32 Iowa, 577; *Shuttleworth v. Bruce*, 7 Robt. (N. Y.) 160; *Superintendent of Public Schools v. Heath*, 2 McCart. 22; *Harris v. Clark*, 3 Comst. 119; *Hall v. Buffalo*, 1 Keyes, 193; *Burn v. Carvalho*, 4 Mylne & C. 690; *Percival v. Dunn*, 29 Ch. D. 129. But an order so drawn is a good assignment against creditors of the drawer, without acceptance, even at law, it seems. *Kingman v. Perkins*, 105 Mass. 111. Acceptance could not add to the title made.

(b) *Shannon v. Hoboken*, 37 N. J.

Eq. 123. See *Bank of Commerce v. Bogy*, 44 Mo. 13.

(c) Delivery is sufficient. *Galway v. Fullerton*, 2 C. E. Green, 389.

(d) Not where the agreement and corresponding obligation run to 'bearer.' *Ex parte New Zealand Banking Co.*, L. R. 3 Ch. 154. Or to 'order.' *Ex parte City Bank*, L. R. 3 Ch. 758. Secus where, though the obligation runs to 'holder,' the contract calling for it did not call for an obligation of that kind. In *re Natal Investment Co.*, L. R. 3 Ch. 355. But wherever the terms of the contract show an intention that it should be assignable free from the equities of the original parties, as e. g. in the case of an open letter of credit, equity

against the debtor it is indispensable that the assignee should immediately give notice of the assignment to the debtor; for otherwise a priority of right may be obtained by a subsequent assignee, or the debt may be discharged by a payment to the assignor before such notice.¹ (a)

1047 a. In cases of assignments of a debt where the assignor has collateral securities therefor, the assignee will be entitled to the full benefit of such securities unless it is otherwise agreed between the parties.² (b) Thus for example the assignee of a debt secured by a mortgage will be held in equity entitled to the benefit of the mortgage.³ (c) So in equity, although not at law, if a debtor having goods in the hands of his agent at a foreign port sends a letter to his creditor C, promising to direct B to deliver over the goods to D as the agent of C at the port, and while the letter is on its way to B the debtor becomes bankrupt, the creditor will still be held entitled to the goods.⁴ (d)

¹ *Foster v. Blackstone*, 1 M. & Keen, 297; *Timson v. Ramsbottom*, 2 Keen, R. 35; *Meux v. Bell*, 1 Hare, Ch. R. 73; ante, §§ 421 a, 399, note 4, 1035 a; post, § 1057.

² *Foster v. Fox*, 4 Watts & Serg. 92.

³ *Pattison v. Hull*, 9 Cowen, R. 747.

⁴ *Burn v. Carvalho*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 690.

will see that such intention is respected. *Ex parte Asiatic Banking Co.*, L. R. 2 Ch. 391. And see *Dickson v. Swansea Ry. Co.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 44; *Graham v. Johnson*, L. R. 8 Eq. 36.

(a) *In re Freshfield*, 11 Ch. D. 198; *Barron v. Porter*, 44 Vt. 587; *Loomis v. Loomis*, 26 Vt. 198; *Ward v. Morrison*, 25 Vt. 593; *Green v. Ingham*, L. R. 2 C. P. 525. But see *Gayoso Sav. Inst. v. Fellows*, 6 Cold. 467; *Kennedy v. Parke*, 2 C. E. Green, 415.

(b) *Craig v. Parkis*, 40 N. Y. 181; *Perry v. Roberts*, 30 Ind. 244; *Gay v. Butler*, 6 Bush, 508; *Magruder v. Campbell*, 40 Ala. 611; *Lindsay v. Bates*, 42 Miss. 397.

(c) *Lindsay v. Bates*, 42 Miss. 397; *Cathcart's Appeal*, 1 Harris, 416; *Hurt v. Wilson*, 38 Cal. 363; ante, § 1016, p. 314, note (b).

(d) *Sale of Securities held by Lien*. — The authority which the author here

cites, *Burn v. Carvalho*, 4 Mylne & C. 690, though treated as a case of assignment, possibly goes further than might appear from the text. The case has been made the subject of some just animadversion upon the state of the English law concerning the availability of a lien to the creditor. Markby, *Elements of Law*, §§ 477-479, 3d ed. The learned author of the work cited, whose remarks have suggested this note, has shown in a striking light the backwardness of the English law of securities in contrast with the Roman law. He has shown how the Roman law passed from the stage in which a security for debt amounted merely to a right of detention, and therefore operated only as a pressure upon the debtor, to the final stage where the security passed to the creditor with a necessary right of making the same directly available towards the payment

1048. It is principally in cases of assignments that Courts of Equity have occasion to examine into the doctrine of champerty

of the debt, by sale. The idea that a security could now be a mere lien, in the sense in which that term is used in the English law, had gone out of date.

We still draw a distinction of some sort between securities such as pledges which may be sold on default and securities which the creditor cannot avail himself of directly if the debtor is obstinate or unable to pay. It might not be difficult to make a general enumeration of cases, common-law and statutory, falling within the one or the other category; but to state why a power of sale should be given in the one class (when not expressly stipulated) and not in the other would certainly not be easy.

The progressive side of judicial law is almost always found in equity; and that is the case, however feeble and halting, here. The tendency of development in our law is in the same direction in which the Roman law steadily marched, i. e. towards making securities of all kinds available to the creditor by sale. But one would look in vain to find the evidence in the action of the common-law judges. Lord Mansfield had no follower in his successor, Lord Kenyon; Lord Mansfield established indeed in the Common-law Courts the equitable principle of the action for money had and received, but Lord Kenyon, more devoted to form, did not hesitate to overrule the attempt of his great predecessor to engraft at law the equitable doctrine of mortgage upon an assignment of a chattel absolute in form but a mere security in intention. *Eaton v. Jaques*, Doug. 455, overruled in *Westerdell v. Dale*, 7 T. R. 306, 312; Coote, *Mortgages*, 241 (4th ed.), referring to other cases; Markby, *ut supra*. Lord Mansfield was a century ahead of his time.

The case alluded to at the beginning

of this note, *Burn v. Carvalho*, shows on the other hand the general feeling of Courts of Equity towards breaking away from mere form and following out the true intention of the parties. There a debtor wrote to his creditor promising to direct his agent abroad 'to hand over to V. [the creditor's agent at the place] property in his hands to cover the amount of bills that *eventually* may not be paid;' the bills referred to being paper of the debtor which the creditor had indorsed and become liable upon. The debtor thereupon wrote to his agent saying, 'I have engaged and made promise to [the creditor] that you should pass into the hands of V. all the property which might exist in your hands on my account. You will arrange with that gentleman the mode in which this order may be carried into effect.' Before the letter was received the debtor went into bankruptcy, and assignees were appointed.

This clearly did not amount to an assignment, at least at law; it did not sufficiently ascertain the fund or show the debt to be protected. A previous trial of the case had occurred at law, in an action of trover for an alleged conversion of the goods by the creditor in selling them. Both the Queen's Bench and the Exchequer Chamber held that there had been a conversion. Lord Lyndhurst speaking for the higher court said: 'Here is no immediate assignment of any certain and specified amount of property, but at most only an agreement to assign on a contingency [that *eventually* there should be bills unpaid], and goods of an uncertain quantity.' 1 Ad. & E. 883, 895. Indeed the court proceeded upon the view that the creditor had no right to hold the goods against the plaintiffs, the debtor's assignees in bankruptcy; that is, the Court of

and maintenance; and therefore it may be here proper to glance at this important topic. Champerty (*campi partitio*) is properly

Form considered that the creditor had not even acquired a lien upon the goods, and even expressed the view that no equitable title had been conveyed, giving judgment for the plaintiffs in the whole amount of the proceeds of sale. But the Court of Chancery, to which the case then went on behalf of the creditor, first by the Vice-Chancellor and then on appeal by the Lord Chancellor, sustained the creditor's claim to the same proceeds. The latter said that 'the promise and agreement' of the debtor gave the creditor a right in equity to have the property applied in payment of the debt. 4 Mylne & C. at p. 702. And that decision prevailed.

Here then was a case in which a Court of Form had declared, no doubt rightly, that the creditor had not acquired so much as a lien, even with taking possession; but a Court of Equity decided virtually that he *had* acquired a lien, and that he might make the same productive by sale. The Lord Chancellor, it is true, compared the case to, and treated it as, an equitable assignment; saying that an order given by a debtor to his creditor, upon a third person, to pay the creditor out of (particular) funds was a binding equitable assignment. 4 Mylne & C. at p. 702. But the case did not in reality come up to that. The third person was to 'hand over' or to 'pass into the hands' of the plaintiff's agent, the goods; and that too to cover bills that 'eventually' might not be paid. That might be more or less, and strictly interpreted would be ground for hesitation about turning over anything. It would seem therefore that there could not have been an assignment in the proper sense even in equity. If this be the case, the 'handing over' was merely the putting of security into the hands

of the creditor; indeed this is the impression that a reading of the whole case fairly leaves. It was not a sale or an assignment; it was not payment. It was a promise to the creditor, so stated in terms to the depository, to 'hand over' the goods, and a direction to the latter to arrange with the creditor's agent the mode of carrying out the order.

The result is that the case in substance appears to be nothing but a promise to put and a putting of security by a debtor into the hands of his creditor, not rising to what would ordinarily be understood as a pledge, and a declaration by a Court of Appeal that the creditor might in equity sell and realize his debt. Mr. Markby has taken the same view of the case. Elements of Law, ut supra. However this may be, if the case is good law, and it has never been doubted, no action of trover on account of a sale of the security by the creditor in *such* a situation could be maintained where the rules of equity prevail over those of strict law, or where equitable pleas and claims are available at law.

How far the case may have the effect to break down the distinction of the English law between mere liens and liens with power of sale, including technical equitable liens, remains to be seen. There would seem to be no ground for any substantial distinction between *Burn v. Carvalho* and cases of security in general in which there are no defined terms touching the rights of the parties; and if that case should lead the way to allowing the creditor in all cases, when not restrained by contract or by some other special and sufficient reason, to make the security available, the result will only be what in some way appears to be inevitable.

The decision of the Court of Chan-

a bargain between a plaintiff or defendant in a cause *campum partire*, to divide the land or other matter sued for between them if they prevail at law; whereupon the champertor is to carry on the party's suit at his own expense.¹ (a) Maintenance (of which champerty is a species) is properly an officious intermeddling in a suit which no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend it.² Each of these is deemed an offence against public justice, and punishable accordingly, both at the common law and by statute, as tending to keep alive strife and contention and to pervert the remedial process of the law into an engine of oppression.³

¹ 4 Black. Comm. 135; 2 Co. Inst. 564; *Williams v. Protheroe*, 3 Younge & Jerv. 129; *Thalimer v. Brinkerhoff*, 20 John. R. 386; s. c. 3 Cowen, R. 623.

² 4 Black. Comm. 135.

³ *Ibid.* Hawkins in his Pleas of the Crown, Vol. 1, B. 1, ch. 86, § 1,

cery in *Burn v. Carvalho* does not appear to have fallen under the consideration of the courts in regard to its bearing upon powers of sale, though it has been referred to as law. *Rodick v. Gandell*, 1 DeG. M. & G. 763, 773, Lord Truro. In a later case however, before Vice-Chancellor Wood, that learned judge declared, of a claim to a right of sale of a ship by ship-builders who had a lien upon the vessel, that it was settled by numerous authorities that such a lien did not entitle the creditor to sell the property; and he said that the case was not affected by the fact that the creditor was put to expense in holding the property. What these authorities were he did not indicate; and *Burn v. Carvalho* was not referred to at all, either by court or counsel, so far as the report indicates. *Thames Iron Works v. Patent Derrick Co.*, 29 L. J. Ch. 714. That a mere lien conferred only a right to hold was however the view of the same Lord Chancellor who decided *Burn v. Carvalho*, at least in the case of a solicitor's lien upon the papers of his client, though there was no attempt to sell, and could be no sale of such things. *Bozon v. Bolland*,

4 Mylne & C. 354, 358, decided just before *Burn v. Carvalho*. This makes it doubtful whether he meant to assert any different doctrine in the case under consideration; still the case itself appears to justify the useful interpretation put upon it by Mr. Markby.

It must always be an anomaly, as it is at best a state of things explainable on grounds long since obsolete, that a creditor, with a security in his hands, should not be able to avail himself of it actively after default, but must submit to the expense of keeping it with diligence, only then perhaps to see it perish in his hands; nay more, that he cannot, it seems, proceed to execution upon it at common law without abandoning, perhaps to the loss of everything, his lien. See the argument of the plaintiff in *Thames Iron Works v. Patent Derrick Co.*, supra. With the case of *Burn v. Carvalho* before a judge untrammelled by hindering precedent, it cannot require very great courage to declare that in equity this ought not to be.

(a) See *Harman v. Brewster*, 7 Bush, 355; *Cassedy v. Jackson*, 45 Miss. 397.

1048 *a*. But the doctrine of the common law as to champerty and maintenance is to be understood with proper limitations and

(Leach's edit. 1795), says: 'It seemeth to be a high offence at common law to buy or sell any doubtful title to lands known to be disputed, to the intent that the buyer may carry on the suit which the seller doth not think it worth his while to do, and on that consideration sells his pretensions at an under rate. And it seemeth not to be material whether the title so sold be a good or a bad one, or whether the seller were in possession or not, unless possession were lawful and uncontested.' This is laying down the doctrine very broadly; and more broadly than it is laid down in Blackstone's Commentaries (4 Black. Comm. 135). The Statute of 32d Hen. VIII. ch. 9, provides, 'That no person or persons whatsoever shall bargain, buy, or sell, or by any ways or means obtain, get, or have any pretended rights or titles, or take, promise, grant, or covenant to have any right or title of any person or persons to any manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, but if [unless] such person or persons their ancestors, or they by whom they claim the same, have been in possession of the same, or the reversion or remainder thereof, or taken the rents and profits thereof, by the space of one whole year next before the said bargain, covenant, grant, or promise made, upon pain,' &c. 2 Hawk. Pleas of the Crown, by Leach, B. 1, ch. 86, § 4. Mr. Russell (on Crimes, Vol. 1, B. 2, ch. 21, p. 266), says: 'Maintenance seems to signify an unlawful taking in hand or upholding of quarrels or sides, to the disturbance or hindrance of common right. This may be where a person assists another in his pretensions to lands by taking or holding the possession of them by force or subtlety, or where a person stirs up quarrels and suits in relation to matters wherein he is in no way concerned; or it may be where a person officiously intermeddles in a suit depending in a court of justice, and in no way belonging to him, by assisting either party with money or otherwise in the prosecution or defence of such suit. Where there is no contract to have a part of the thing in suit, the party so intermeddling is said to be guilty of maintenance. But if the party stipulates to have part of the thing in suit, his offence is called champerty.' It would seem that where a party purchases the whole matter in controversy and brings the suit not to support the title of another but to support his own title, the case would not fall within the predicament either of maintenance or champerty, as thus defined by Mr. Russell or by Mr. Justice Blackstone, although it may be within the scope of the offence described by Hawkins, or of the Statute of 32 Henry VIII. ch. 9, respecting the buying or selling of pretended or disputed titles. Be this as it may, it seems difficult to perceive how the language can be applied to matters of trust in lands, actual or constructive, where the trust, although disputed, falls within the jurisdiction of a Court of Equity. The case of a bill brought for a specific performance of a disputed contract respecting the purchase of lands by an assignee of the seller or buyer turns upon the ground of trust; and yet it has been uniformly held to be within the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity. Post, §§ 1049 to 1051. So the case of the assignment of a disputed debt or chose in action or covenant has been held a good assignment in equity. See Post, §§ 1053, 1054, 1057. The true distinction will perhaps be found to be that the doctrine of maintenance and champerty, and buying pretended titles, applies only to cases where there is an adverse right claimed under an independent title, not in privity with that of the assignor or seller, and not under a disputed right

qualifications, and cannot be applied to a person having an interest or believing that he has an interest in the subject in dispute and bona fide acting in the suit; for he may lawfully assist in the defence or maintenance of that suit.¹ (a)

1049. It was chiefly upon the ground of champerty and maintenance that the Courts of Common Law refused to recognize the assignment of debts and other rights of action and securities; although (as we have seen) the same doctrine does not prevail in equity. But still Courts of Equity are ever solicitous to

claimed in privity or under a trust for the assignor or seller. It is not strictly maintenance for a stranger to advance money for, or to agree to pay the costs of, a suit not yet commenced; for the offence consists in such acts done after a suit is commenced. But Courts of Equity deem such acts as savoring of maintenance; and therefore will not enforce any contracts or rights growing out of them. *Wood v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 125. In *Harrington v. Long* (2 Mylne & K. 592), the Master of the Rolls defined maintenance somewhat differently from what it is in the text. He said: 'Maintenance is where there is an agreement by which one party gives to a stranger the benefit of a suit upon condition that he prosecutes it.' See also *Prosser v. Edmonds*, 1 Younge & Coll. 496 to 499; ante, § 1040 c; *Baker v. Whiting*, 3 Sumner, R. 475; post, § 1050; *Hunter v. Daniel*, 9 Jurist, 527, 531; the comments of Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram on *Harrington v. Long*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 592, and *Wood v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 120.

¹ In *Findon v. Parker*, 11 Mees. & Welsb. R. 675, 682, Lord Abinger said: 'The law of maintenance, as I understand it upon the modern constructions, is confined to cases where a man improperly and for the purpose of stirring up litigation and strife encourages others to bring actions or to make defences which they have no right to make. I do not like to give an opinion upon an abstract case, and therefore am not desirous to consider it; but if a man were to see a poor person in the street oppressed and abused and without the means of obtaining redress, and furnished him with money or employed an attorney to obtain redress for his wrongs, it would require a very strong argument to convince me that that man could be said to be stirring up litigation and strife, and to be guilty of the crime of maintenance; I am not prepared to say that in modern times courts of justice ought to come to that conclusion. However I give no opinion upon that point. In this case I proceed upon the ground that there was reasonable evidence of a common link of interest uniting the proprietors of the lands in question at the time they made the agreement.' See also *Techell v. Watson*, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 691; *Hunter v. Daniel*, 4 Hare, R. 420; *Flight v. Leman*, 4 Adolph. & Ellis, New R. 883; *Co. Litt.* 368 b; *Hunter v. Daniel*, 9 Jurist, 526 (for 1845), where Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram comments on the authorities.

(a) See *Danforth v. Streeter*, 28 L. R. 1 Eq. 337; *Hilton v. Woods*, Vt. 490; *Fetrow v. Merriwether*, 53 L. R. 4 Eq. 432; *Rowe v. Beckett*, 30 Ill. 275; *Schaferman v. O'Brien*, 28 Ind. 154; *Edwards v. Parkhurst*, 21 Md. 565; *Elborough v. Ayres*, L. R. Vt. 472.
10 Eq. 367; *Dickinson v. Burrell*,

enforce all the principles of law respecting champerty and maintenance; and they will not in any case uphold an assignment which involves any such offensive ingredients.¹ Thus for instance Courts of Equity equally with Courts of Law will repudiate any agreement or assignment made between a creditor and a third person to maintain a suit of the former so that they may share the profits resulting from the success of the suit; for it will be a clear case of champerty.² (a) So an assignment of a part of the subject of a pending prize suit to a navy agent in consideration of his undertaking to indemnify the assignor against the costs and charges of the suit will be held void in equity; for it amounts to champerty in being the unlawful maintenance of a suit in consideration of a bargain for part of a thing or some profit out of it.³ So a bill to enforce a title acquired by a conveyance of real estate from a person out of possession in consideration of money advanced and to be advanced on suits for the recovery thereof will be dismissed, even although the parties are first cousins; for it amounts to maintenance, and is the buying of a pretended title.⁴ The only exceptions to the general rule are of certain peculiar relations recognized by the law, such as that of father and son, or of an heir apparent, of the husband of an heiress,⁵ or of master and servant,⁶ (b) and the like.

¹ *Strachan v. Brander*, 1 Eden, R. 303, and note; *Id.* 309; *Skapholme v. Hart*, Rep. temp. Finch, 477; *Burke v. Green*, 2 B. & Beatt. 517; *Wood v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 125, 126; *Wood v. Griffith*, 1 Swanst. R. 55, 56; *Wallis v. Duke of Portland*, 3 Ves. R. 493, 502; *Stone v. Yea*, Jac. Rep. 426; ante, §§ 294, 297; *Arden v. Patterson*, 5 John. Ch. R. 44, 48, 51.

² *Hartley v. Russell*, 2 Sim. & Stu. R. 244. In *Hunter v. Daniel*, 9 Jurist, pp. 526, 581, Sir James Wigram, V. C., said: 'I am by no means certain that the opinion of Sir John Leach in that case (*Harrington v. Long*, 2 M. & K. 590) is perfectly consistent with what he decided in *Hartley v. Russell*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 244.'

³ *Stevens v. Bagwell*, 15 Ves. 156.

⁴ *Burke v. Green*, 2 B. & Beatt. 521, 522; *Marquis of Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 135, 136; *Powell v. Knowler*, 2 Atk. 224; *Bayly v. Tyrell*, 2 B. & Beatt. 358; *Thalhimer v. Brinckerhoff*, 3 Cowen, R. 623.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Moore v. Usher*, 7 Sim. R. 384.

⁶ 4 Black. Comm. 135.

(a) See *Grell v. Levy*, 16 C. B. (N. Y.) 319; *Voorhees v. Dow*, 51 N. s. 73; *Martin v. Clarke*, 8 R. I. Barb. 580; *Martin v. Veeder*, 20 Wis. 389; *West v. Raymond*, 21 Ind. 305; 466.

Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa, 487. (b) See *Elborough v. Ayres*, L. R. 10 Eq. 367. But see *Fogarty v. Jordan*, 2 Robt.

1050. But consistently with these principles a party may purchase by assignment the whole interest of another in a contract or security or other property which is in litigation, provided there be nothing in the contract which savors of maintenance; that is, provided he does not undertake to pay any costs, (a) or make any advances beyond the mere support of the exclusive interest which he has so acquired.¹ Thus for example it is extremely clear that an equitable interest under a contract of purchase of real estate may be the subject of sale. A person claiming under such an original contract, in case he afterwards sells his purchase to sub-purchasers, becomes in equity a trustee for the persons to whom he so contracts to sell. Without entering into any covenant for that purpose, such sub-purchasers are obliged to indemnify him from the consequence of all acts which he must execute for their benefit. And a Court of Equity not only allows but actually compels him to permit them to use his name in all proceedings for obtaining the benefit of their contract. (b) Such indemnity and such proceedings, under such circumstances, are not deemed maintenance.² So if there be a trust estate in lands either actual or constructive, which however is controverted by the trustee, the cestui que trust (or beneficiary) may nevertheless lawfully assign it; and the assignee may in equity enforce his rights to the same if the assignment does not in the sense above stated savor of maintenance.³

¹ See *Williams v. Protheroe*, 5 Bing. R. 309; s. c. 3 Younge & Jerv. 129; *Harrington v. Long*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 592; *Thalhimer v. Brinckerhoff*, 3 Cowen, R. 623. But see *Prosser v. Edmonds*, 1 Younge & Coll. 485, 496 to 499; *Hartley v. Russell*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 244; *Hunter v. Daniel*, 9 Jurist, pp. 526, 531 (for 1845).

² *Wood v. Griffith*, 1 Swanst. R. 55, 56; s. c. Sugden on Vendors, ch. 9, § 6, p. 488 (7th edit.). The case of *Arden v. Patterson* (5 John. Ch. R. 44) may seem to support a different doctrine. That case was decided upon principles perfectly clear with reference to the relation of the parties (attorney and client) and the other circumstances. If it should be thought to lay down the more general doctrine that a purchase cannot be made absolutely of a chose in action or other matter in controversy, it would hardly be reconcilable with the other cases referred to in the text. See also *Thalhimer v. Brinckerhoff*, 3 Cowen, R. 623; *Harrington v. Long*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 590, 592, 593.

³ *Baker v. Whiting*, 3 Sumner, R. 475, 481 to 484. On this occasion the court said: 'The main objection however taken to the operation of this deed

(a) See *Grell v. Levy*, 16 C. B. n. s. 73. (b) *Deaver v. Eller*, 7 Ired. Eq. 24; *Dibble v. Scott*, 5 Jones, Eq. 164.

1051. This doctrine has been fully recognized by an eminent judge who on one occasion where a sub-contract of this sort oc-

is, that at the time of this conveyance by Stimpson to Baker the defendant was in full possession and seisin of the premises, claiming them in his own right, and of course that Stimpson was then disseised and the conveyance to Baker was void under the operation of the common law relative to maintenance and champerty, and the statute of 32d Henry VIII. ch. 9, made in aid thereof. This statute prohibits, under penalties, the buying or selling of any pretended right or title to land unless the vendor is in actual possession of the land or of the reversion or remainder. The object of the statute, as well as of the common law, was doubtless to prevent the buying up of controverted legal titles, which the owner did not think it worth his while to pursue, upon mere speculation; so that in fact it might properly be deemed the mere purchase of a lawsuit. 4 Black. Comm. 135, 136; Hawk. Pl. of the Crown, B. 1, ch. 83, §§ 1 to 20; Id. B. 1, ch. 84, §§ 1 to 20; Id. B. 1, ch. 86, §§ 1, 4 to 17. The old cases upon this subject have gone a great way further indeed than would now be sustained in Courts of Equity, which have broken in upon some of the doctrines established thereby. But be this as it may, neither the common law nor the statute applies to a trust estate actually existing either by the acts of the parties or by construction of law. Thus a cestui que trust may lawfully dispose of his trust estate notwithstanding his title is contested by the trustee; for the latter can never disseise the former of the trust estate, but so long as it continues the possession of the trustee is treated, at least in a Court of Equity, as the possession of the cestui que trust. There can be no disseisin of a trust, although the exercise of an adverse possession for a great length of time may in equity bar or extinguish the trust. The whole question in the present case turns upon this; whether the defendant Whiting at the time of his purchase of the premises at the sale for taxes in August, 1821, was the agent of the heirs of Jacob Tidd, of Stimpson, and of other proprietors of their undivided shares in the premises. If he was, then upon the acknowledged principles of Courts of Equity he as an agent could not become a purchaser at the sale for himself, but his purchase must be deemed a purchase for his principals. It matters not whether in such a case the defendant intended to purchase for himself and on his own account or not. For Courts of Equity will not tolerate any agent in acts of this sort, since they operate as a virtual fraud upon the rights and interests of his principals, which he is bound to protect. He was bound, as their agent for the premises, to give them notice of the intended sale and to save the property from any sacrifice; and until he had openly and notoriously, and after full notice to the principals, discharged himself from his agency, he could not be permitted in a Court of Equity to become a purchaser at the sale. If indeed, as there is much reason to believe, at the time of the sale he had funds of his principals in his own hands sufficient to meet the taxes, and a fortiori if he endeavored to dissuade or to prevent other persons from becoming bidders at the sale, as some of the evidence states, his conduct was, supposing him to be agent, still more reprehensible. The validity of the conveyance then from Stimpson to Baker depends upon the fact whether the defendant Whiting was or was not the agent and mere trustee of the parties; and whether if agent *eo instanti* that the conveyance under the tax sale was made to him, the law did not attach the trust to the lands in his hands. If it did, then the conveyance of Stimp-

curred in judgment used the following language : ' If G & W (the original vendees) during the pendency of the suit in the Exchequer sold the estate to A B, he would have a right in a Court of Equity to insist, as purchaser of the estate, that they should convey to him the fee simple or such title as they had. So insisting he claims no more than they would be entitled to claim if they had not sold their equitable interest. Having sold, they become trustees of that equitable interest ; their vendee acquires the same right which they had, that is, a right to call on the original vendors, indemnifying them against all costs and charges, for the use of their names to enable them to execute the sub-contract by which they have undertaken to transfer their benefits under the primary contract. If I were to suffer this doctrine to be shaken by any reference to the law of champerty or maintenance, I should violate the established habits of this court, which has always given to parties entering into a sub-contract the benefit which the vendors derived from the primary contract.' ¹

1052. Upon the like grounds, where a creditor who had instituted proceedings at law and in equity against his debtor entered into an agreement with the debtor to abandon those proceedings and give up his securities in consideration of the debtor's giving him a lien on other securities in the hands of an-

son to Baker was valid. If it did not, then it was void as falling within the reach of the doctrines respecting maintenance, champerty, and pretended titles. Those doctrines do not apply to trusts created in privity of estate, but to adverse and independent titles between strangers. It is quite a mistake to suppose that a controverted trust may not be assigned by the owner when it is clearly and unequivocally attached to property. If a contract is made for the sale of lands, the contractee may sell and assign the whole or a part, or make a binding sub-contract respecting the same, whether there be a controversy respecting the specific performance of the original contract or not. The case of *Wood v. Griffith* (1 Swanst. R. 55, 56) is fully in point upon this doctrine even when the assignment or sale is made during the pendency of a suit for a specific performance. See also 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. §§ 1048 to 1051, 1053, 1054; *Harrington v. Long*, 2 Mylne & Keen, R. 590; *Hartley v. Russell*, 2 Sim. & Stu. R. 244. In the case of *Prosser v. Edmonds*, 1 Younge & Coll. R. 497, 498, there was no trust, but a mere naked right to set aside a conveyance for fraud, which distinguishes it from the present case. I repeat it, therefore, that the whole question whether the deed from Stimpson to Baker was a valid conveyance or not, depends upon the point whether at the time the defendant was actually or constructively a trustee of the premises for Stimpson.'

¹ Per Lord Eldon, in *Wood v. Griffith*, 1 Swanst. 56.

other creditor, with authority to sue the latter, and agreeing to use his best endeavors to assist in adjusting his accounts with the holder and in recovering those securities, it was held that the agreement was lawful, and not maintenance; for there was no bargain or color of bargain that the assignee should maintain the suit instituted in the assignor's name against such creditor having the other securities in consideration of sharing in the profits to be derived from that suit. The agreement was in effect nothing more than an assignment of the equity of redemption of the assignor in the securities held by such creditor in exchange for the prior securities held by the assignee. The authority given to the assignee to sue such creditor was the common legal provision in the case of an assignment of a debt or security.¹

1053. So where by articles of agreement for the sale of an estate it was agreed between the vendor and purchaser that the purchaser, bearing all the expenses of certain suits commenced by the vendor against an occupier for bygone rents, should have the rents so to be recovered and also any money recovered for dilapidations, and that the purchaser at his own expense and indemnifying the vendor might use the name of the vendor in any action he might think fit to commence therefor, it was held that the agreement was not void for maintenance or champerty.²

1054. Indeed there is no principle in equity which prevents a creditor from assigning his interest in a debt after the institution of a suit therefor as being within the statutes against champerty and maintenance. Such an assignment gives the person to whom it is made a right to institute a new proceeding in order to obtain the benefit of the assignment. And the proper mode of doing this is by the assignee's filing a supplemental bill (if the suit is still pending) making the assignor and the debtor defendants. But if the assignment contains an agreement that the assignee is to indemnify the assignor not only against all costs incurred and to be incurred with reference to the subject-matter assigned, but also against all costs to be incurred in that suit for collateral objects and claims totally distinct from the subject-matter assigned, it will be held void for maintenance.³

¹ *Hartley v. Russell*, 2 Sim. & Stu. R. 244.

² *Williams v. Protheroe*, 5 Bing. R. 309; s. c. 3 Younge & Jerv. 129.

³ *Harrington v. Long*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 590, 592, 593, 598, 599. The

1055. So strongly are Courts of Equity inclined to uphold assignments when bona fide made, that even the assignment of freight to be earned in future is good in equity and will be enforced against the party from whom it becomes due.¹ So an assignment of a whale-ship by way of mortgage, and of all oil, head-matter, and other cargo caught or brought home on a whaling voyage, will amount to a good assignment of the future cargo of oil and head-matter obtained in the voyage.² And whenever an assignment is made of a debt or other personal property, although it is charged on land, as for example a pecuniary legacy charged on land, the assignment will be treated as an assignment of money only, and therefore it will not be affected by the policy of the registration laws by which conveyances of interests in land are required to be registered.³

1056. In Courts of Law these principles of Courts of Equity are now acted on to a limited extent. But still whenever a bond or other debt is assigned and it is necessary to sue at law for the recovery thereof, it must be done in the name of the original creditor, the person to whom it is transferred being treated rather as an attorney than as an assignee, although his rights will be recognized and protected in some measure at law against the frauds of the assignor.⁴ (a)

1057. In equity on the other hand the assignee may sue on such an assignment in his own name and enforce payment of the debt directly against the debtor, making him as well as the

report in this case is somewhat obscure, and does not exactly present the true ground of the decision. But the argument of the counsel for the defendant in pages 598, 599, shows it.

¹ *Leslie v. Guthrie*, 1 Bing. New Cas. 697; *Douglas v. Russell*, 4 Sim. R. 524; s. c. 1 Mylne & Keen, 488; *Watson v. Duke of Wellington*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 602, 605; ante, § 1040. In re *Ship Warre*, 8 Price, R. 269, note; *Curtis v. Auber*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 506; *Robinson v. McDonnell*, 5 M. & Selw. 228; ante, § 1040 b; *Langton v. Horton*, 1 Hare's R. 549, 556, 557.

² *Langton v. Horton*, 1 Hare's R. 549, 556, 557; s. c. 5 Beav. 9; *Mitchell v. Winslow*, 2 Story's R. 630.

³ *Malcolm v. Charlesworth*, 1 Keen, R. 63.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Ryall v. Rowles*, 1 Ves. 353, 362; *Welch v. Mandeville*, 1 Wheat. R. 535; *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. R. 277, 283; *Tiernan v. Jackson*, 5 Peters, R. 597 to 602. But see *Gibson v. Winter*, 2 Neville & Perry, R. 277, 283.

(a) In many of the States of the Union the assignee of a chose in action may sue in his own name. See *Long v. Heinrich*, 46 Mo. 603; *Cook v. Bell*, 18 Mich. 387; *Smith v. Chicago R. Co.*, 23 Wis. 267.

assignor (if necessary) a party to the bill. The assignment of a debt does not in equity require even the assent of the debtor in any manner thereto; ¹ although to make it effectual for all purposes it may be important to give notice of the assignment to him, since until notice he is not affected with the trust created thereby, and the rights of third persons may intervene to the prejudice of the assignee. ² (a) The ground of this doctrine is that the creditor has in equity a right to dispose of his own property as he may choose, and to require the debt to be paid to such person as he may direct, without any consultation with the debtor, who holds the debt subject to the rights of the creditor.

1057 a. It has however been recently held that the assignee of a debt not in itself negotiable is not entitled to sue the debtor for it in equity unless some circumstances intervene which show that his remedy at law is or may be obstructed by the assignor; for otherwise the assignee, although he may not sue therefor in his own name in a Court of Law, yet may sue in the name of the assignor. ³ But if the assignor refuses to allow the assignee to sue for the debt in his name at law, or has done or intends to do some act which may or will prevent the assignee from recovering in a suit at law in the name of the assignor, — that, if alleged in the bill, will be sufficient to sustain a suit in equity in the name of the assignee against the debtor. ⁴ (b) This doctrine is apparently new, at least in the broad extent in which it is laid down, and does not seem to have been generally adopted in America. On the contrary the more general principle established in this

¹ *Ex parte South*, 3 Swanst. R. 393; *Spring v. South Carolina Ins. Co.*, 8 Wheat. R. 268, 282; ante, §§ 783, 1044, 1045.

² See *Williams v. Thorp*, 2 Simons, R. 257; *Tourville v. Naish*, 3 P. Will. 307, 308; *Langley v. Earl of Oxford*, Ambler, R. 17; *Ashcomb's case*, 1 Ch. Cas. 232; *Dearle v. Hall*, 3 Russ. R. 1; *Loveridge v. Cooper*, Id. 30; *Wallwyn v. Coutts*, 3 Meriv. R. 707; s. c. 3 Sim. 14; *Collyer v. Fallon*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 469; *Foster v. Blackstone*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 297; *Garrard v. Lord Lauderdale*, 3 Sim. 1; ante, § 399 note 4, § 421 a, 783, 1035 a, 1047; *Elty v. Bridges*, 3 Younge & Coll. New R. 486, 492.

³ But see *Dhegetoft v. London Assur. Co.*, Mosely, R. 83, and *Carter v. United Insur. Co. of New York*, 1 John. Ch. R. 463, 464; post, § 1057 b.

⁴ *Ibid.* *Hammond v. Messenger*, 9 Simons, R. 327. On this occasion the Vice-Chancellor (Sir R. Shadwell) said: 'If this case were stripped of all special circumstances, it would be simply a bill filed by a plaintiff who had

(a) See *Société Générale v. Tramways Co.*, 14 Q. B. D. 424.

(b) *Walker v. Brooks*, 125 Mass. 241.

country seems to be that wherever an assignee has an equitable right or interest in a debt or other property (as the assignee of a debt certainly has), there a Court of Equity is the proper forum to enforce it; and he is not to be driven to any circuitry by instituting a suit at law in the name of the person who is possessed of the legal title.¹ (a) A cestui que trust may ordinarily sue third persons in a Court of Equity upon his equitable title without any reference to the existence of a legal title in his trustee which may be enforced at law.

1057 *b*. Cases indeed may exist where although the equitable title only has passed by the assignment, yet the remedy under ordinary circumstances may justly be held to remain at law. But these cases may constitute exceptions to the general rule rather than expositions of it; for they turn upon the consideration that under the circumstances a Court of Equity does not possess as ample and appropriate means to grant the proper relief as a Court of Law; or what in effect amounts to the same thing, that a Court of Equity cannot administer entire justice without resorting to the same means, a trial by jury, as a Court of Law. Thus for example if the assignment be of a contract involving the consideration and ascertainment of unliquidated damages, as in case of the assignment of a policy of insurance, there, unless

obtained from certain persons to whom a debt was due a right to sue in their names for the debt. It is quite new to me that in such a simple case as that, this court allows in the first instance a bill to be filed against the debtor by the person who has become the assignee of the debt. I admit that if special circumstances are stated and it is represented that, notwithstanding the right which the party has obtained to sue in the name of the creditor, the creditor will interfere and prevent the exercise of that right, this court will interpose for the purpose of preventing that species of wrong being done; and if the creditor will not allow the matter to be tried at law in his name, this court has a jurisdiction in the first instance to compel the debtor to pay the debt to the plaintiff; especially in a case where the act done by the creditor is done in collusion with the debtor. If bills of this kind were allowable, it is obvious that they would be pretty frequent; but I never remember any instance of such a bill as this being filed unaccompanied by special circumstances.' See also *S. P. Rose v. Clarke*, 1 Y. & Coll. New R. 534, 546.

¹ *Riddle v. Mandeville*, 5 Cranch, 322; post, § 1250; *Townsend v. Carpenter*, 11 Ohio (Stanton's) Rep. 21. (*b*)

(a) But see contra *Walker v. Brooks, Water Co.*, 107 U. S. 205; *Hayward v. Andrews*, 106 U. S. 672.

New York Guar. Co. v. Memphis (b) Denied in *Walker v. Brooks*, 125 Mass. 241.

some obstruction exists to the remedy at law, it would seem that a Court of Equity ought not to, or might not, interfere to grant relief; for the facts and the damages are properly matters for a jury to ascertain and decide.¹ But the same objection would not lie to an assignment of a bond or other security for a fixed sum.²

¹ *Dhegetoft v. London Assur. Co.*, Mosely, R. 83; *Carter v. United Ins. Co.*, 1 John. Ch. R. 463. These cases were on policies of insurance, and Mr. Chancellor Kent, in the latter case, said: 'The demand is properly cognizable at law, and there is no good reason for coming into this court to recover on the contract of insurance. The plaintiffs are entitled to make use of the names of Gibbs & Titus, the original assured in the suit at law; and the nominal plaintiffs would not be permitted to defeat or prejudice the right of action. It may be said here, as was said by the Chancellor in the analogous case of *Dhegetoft v. The London Assurance Company*, Mosely, 83, that at this rate all policies of insurance would be tried in this court. In that case the policy stood in the name of a nominal trustee; but that was not deemed sufficient to change the jurisdiction; and the demurrer to the bill was allowed, and the decree was afterwards affirmed in Parliament. 3 Bro. P. C. 525. The bill in this case states no special ground for equitable relief; nor is any discovery sought which requires an answer.'

² Post, § 1250.

CHAPTER XXIX.

EXPRESS TRUSTS. — WILLS AND TESTAMENTS.

1058. IN the next place let us pass to the consideration of express trusts of real and personal property created by LAST WILLS AND TESTAMENTS. These are so various in their nature and objects, and so extensive in their reach, that it would be impracticable to comprehend them within the plan of these Commentaries. They are most usually created for the security of the rights and interests of infants, of *femes covert*, of children, and of other relations; or for the payment of debts, legacies, and portions; or for the sale or purchase of real estate for the benefit of heirs or others having claims upon the testator; or for objects of general or special charity. Many trusts also arise under wills by construction and implication of law. But in whatever way or for whatever purpose or in whatever form trusts arise under wills, they are exclusively within the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity. Indeed so many arrangements, modifications, restraints and intermediate directions are indispensable to the due administration of these trusts, that without the interposition of Courts of Equity there would in many cases be a total failure of justice.¹

1059. The truth of this remark will at once be seen by the statement of a very few plain cases to illustrate it. In the first place trusts are often created by will without the designation of any trustee who is to execute them; or it may be matter of doubt upon the terms of the will who is the proper party. Now it is a settled principle in Courts of Equity (as has been already stated) that a trust shall never fail for the want of a proper trust-

¹ As to what words in a Will, will constitute a charge on real estate for the payment of debts, see post, § 1246.

tee; and if no other is designated, Courts of Equity will take upon themselves the due execution of the trust.¹ (a)

1060. Thus for example if a testator should order his real estate or any part thereof to be sold for the payment of his debts without saying who should sell, in such a case a clear trust would be created. A Court of Law will not in such a case take cognizance of the trust. Nay, so strictly is this rule adhered to, that a Court of Law will not undertake to construe a will so far as it regards mere trusts; and if a case be sent for the opinion of the judges, stating it as a trust, they will decline giving any opinion thereon.² But a Court of Equity will not hesitate in such a case to declare who is the proper party to execute the trust; or if no one is designated, it will proceed to execute the trust by its own authority and decree a sale of the land. In the case put of a trust for the payment of debts, if executors are named in the will they will be deemed by implication to be the proper parties to sell, because in equity when lands are directed to be sold they are treated as money; and as the executors are liable to pay the debts and, if the lands were money, as they would be the proper parties to receive it for that purpose, Courts of Equity will hold it to be the intent of the testator that the parties who are to receive and finally to execute the trust are the proper parties to sell for the purpose.³ (b)

¹ Ante, § 976; Co. Litt. 290 b, Butler's note (1), § 4; *Peter v. Beverly*, 10 Peters, R. 532; 1 Howard Sup. Ct. R. 134.

² 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 436.

³ See *Peter v. Beverly*, 10 Peters, R. 532, and cases there cited; *Bank of U. States v. Beverly*, 1 How. Sup. Ct. R. 134; s. c. 17 Peters, R. 127; *Wood v. White*, 4 M. & Craig, 460, 481. In this last case Lord Cottenham said: 'The circumstances of this case are so peculiar that there is no probability of any decision having taken place directly in point; but there are rules established strongly analogous, by which a power or trust to sell has been held to

(a) *Adams v. Adams*, 21 Wall. 185.

(b) In such cases the executors by accepting become bound to execute the trusts, and their bondsmen will be liable until a new trustee is appointed and bond given by him. *Holbrook v. Harrington*, 16 Gray, 102.

The implication that the executor is to act as trustee in these cases arises

only where the proceeds are to be blended with the personalty or are to be administered by him. It is a question of intention. *Rankin v. Rankin*, 36 Ill. 293; *Lippincott v. Lippincott*, 4 C. E. Green, 121. See *Bolton v. Jacks*, 6 Robt. (N. Y.) 166, 228. In some States it is a matter of statute. See *Bell's Appeal*, 66 Penn. St. 498; 2 Perry, Trusts, § 501.

1061. In the next place let us suppose the case of a will giving power to trustees to sell an estate upon some specified trust, and they should all refuse to execute the trust or should all die before executing it. Now it is a well-known rule of law that powers are never imperative; but the acts to be done under them are left to the free will of the parties to whom they are given. The same rule is applied at law to such powers even when coupled with a trust. Hence in the case supposed the trust would at law be wholly gone. The trustees if living could not at law be compelled to execute the trust; and by their death the power would be entirely extinguished.¹ But a Court of Equity would treat the whole matter in a very different way. It would compel the trustees if living to execute the power because coupled with a trust, although it would not compel them to execute a mere naked power not coupled with a trust.² If the trustees should decline or refuse to act at all, the court would appoint other trustees, if necessary, to carry the trust into effect.³ And if the trustees should die without executing the power, it would hold the trust to survive, and upon a suitable bill in equity by the parties in interest would decree its due execution by a sale of the estate for the specified trust.⁴ It is upon the same ground that if a power of appointment is given by will to a party to distribute property among certain classes of persons, as among relations of the testator, the power is treated as a trust; and if

be created by implication. If a testator directs that his lands shall be sold and the proceeds distributed by his executors, they have the power to sell, though no such power is in terms given to them. So if a testator merely charges his lands with the payment of his debts, this is so equivalent to a trust for that purpose, that a purchaser is not bound to see to the application of the purchase-money. In both cases the power and trust are implied for the purpose of carrying into effect the declared intention as to the purchase-money.¹ p. 481. *Lockton v. Lockton*, 1 Ch. Cas. 180; *Carvill v. Carville*, 2 Ch. Rep. 301; *Blatch v. Wilder*, 1 Atk. 420; *Jackson v. Ferris*, 15 John. R. 346; *Forbes v. Peacock*, 11 Sim. R. 152, 160.

¹ Sugden on Powers, ch. 6, § 3, p. 392, &c. (7th edit.); Co. Litt. 113 a, Hargrave's note (2); *Franklin v. Osgood*, 14 John. R. 527.

² Ante, §§ 169, 170; Sugden on Powers, ch. 6, § 3, p. 362, &c. (3d edit.); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 25, n. (h); *Tollett v. Tollett*, 2 P. W. 490.

³ *De Peyster v. Clendinning*, 8 Paige, R. 296.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Brown v. Higgs*, 8 Ves. 570, 574; *Richardson v. Chapman*, 5 Bro. Parl. Cas. 400. We have already seen that Courts of Equity will not execute indefinite trusts. Ante, § 979 a; post, § 1183.

the party dies without executing it, a Court of Equity will distribute the property among the next of kin.¹ (a)

1061 a. When and under what circumstances a power of appointment will be construed as a trust or not is a matter of some nicety and difficulty. In general it may be stated that where in case of a will or other instrument the donor of the power has a general intention in favor of a class, and a particular intention in favor of individuals of that class to be selected by the donee of the power, and the particular intention fails from that selection not being made by the donee of the power, the court will treat it as a trust and carry into effect the general intention in favor of the class.² (b) Thus for example where the testator bequeathed a certain leasehold estate to A upon trust subject to certain charges, to employ the remainder of the rent to such children of B as A should think most deserving and that will make the best use of it, or to the children of his nephew C if any such there are or shall be, and A died in the testator's lifetime, the bequest to the children was held to be a trust in favor of all the children of B and C.³ So where the testator directed certain stocks and real estate to remain unalienated until certain contingencies were completed, and then, after giving life estates to his two children

¹ The cases on this point are numerous. See Mr. Jarman's note to 1 Powell on Devises, 294; *Davy v. Hooper*, 2 Vern. 665; *Harding v. Glynn*, 1 Atk. 469; *Maddison v. Andrew*, 1 Ves. 57; *Witts v. Boddington*, 3 Bro. Ch. 95; *Cole v. Wade*, 16 Ves. 27; *Birch v. Wade*, 3 V. & Beam. 198; *Brown v. Higgs*, 4 Ves. 708; 5 Ves. 495; 8 Ves. 561, 569, 570; *Sugden on Powers*, ch. 6, § 3, pp. 393 to 398 (3d edit.); *Stubbs v. Sargon*, 2 Keen, R. 255.

² *Burrough v. Philcox*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 73, 92.

³ *Brown v. Higgs*, 8 Ves. 574; s. c. 4 Ves. 708, and 5 Ves. 495; 2 *Sugden on Powers*, 176.

(a) See *Butler v. Gray*, L. R. 5 Ch. 26.

(b) Where the instrument gives the fund to a class, the power being merely to determine the shares, all the class take in default of appointment. But where there is no gift, but only a power to give as the donee of the power may think fit among the members of a class, only those can take, in default of appointment, who are within the class at the time the power is to be exercised, since they alone

could have taken had the power been exercised. *Lambert v. Thwaites*, L. R. 2 Eq. 151. See *In re Jefferys*, L. R. 14 Eq. 136.

Upon the question when the property is to be considered as converted into assets by an attempted exercise of the power, and when it is to go as in case of default of appointment, see *Brickenden v. Williams*, L. R. 7 Eq. 310; *Bristow v. Skirrow*, L. R. 10 Eq. 1; *In re Davies*, L. R. 13 Eq. 163.

in such stocks and real estate, with remainder to their issue, declared that in case his two children should die without leaving lawful issue the same should be disposed of by the survivor of his children by will among his nephews and nieces or their children or either of them, or to as many of them as his surviving child should think proper, it was held to be a trust created in favor of the testator's nephews and nieces and their children, subject to a power of selection and distribution by the surviving child.¹ So where the testator devised to B in tail, and for want of issue of her body he empowered and authorized her to settle and dispose of the estate to such persons as she thought fit by her will, 'confiding' in her not to alienate or transfer the estate from his 'nearest family,' it was held to be a power coupled with an interest in favor of the heir, who was held to be the nearest family in the sense of the will.² (a)

1062. In regard to powers too some subtle distinctions have been taken at law which often require the interposition of Courts of Equity. Thus for instance it is a general rule of law that a mere naked power given to two cannot be executed by one; or given to three cannot be executed by two, although the other be dead;³ (b) for in each case it is held to be a personal trust in all the persons unless some other language is used to the contrary. Then suppose a testator by his will should give authority to A and B to sell his estate and should make them his executors; in such a case it has been said that the survivor could not sell.

¹ *Burrough v. Philcox*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 73, 92. See ante, § 1061.

² *Griffiths v. Evan*, 5 Beav. R. 241.

³ *Co. Litt.* 112 *b*, 113 *a*, and Hargrave's note (2).

(a) A trust to apply the whole or part of a fund as the trustee may think fit for the maintenance of children is obligatory, compelling the trustee to maintain the children, and if the funds should be paid over to the father, he could use it for maintaining the children though able himself to support them. But where the trust is to apply the whole or such part of the fund as the trustee may think fit for or towards the maintenance of the children, the trust is discretionary and equivalent to a power. In such a

case if the trustee does not exercise his discretion but pays the whole over to the father, the father must hold the whole to the use of his children, and cannot deduct the cost of their support, if he is able to support them. *Wilson v. Turner*, 22 Ch. D. 521, commenting on *Mundy v. Howe*, 4 Bro. C. C. 224, and disapproving *Ransome v. Burgess*, L. R. 3 Eq. 773.

(b) *Boston Franklinite Co. v. Condit*, 4 C. E. Green, 394; *Chapin v. First Univ. Soc.*, 8 Gray, 580.

But if the testator should give authority to his executors (eo nomine) to sell, and should make A and B his executors, there if one should die the survivor (it has been said) could sell.¹ The distinction is nice, but it proceeds upon the ground that in the latter case the power is given to the executors *virtute officii*, and in the former case it is merely personal to the parties named. Now although this distinction has been doubted and its soundness has been denied, yet it has much authority also in its support where the power is deemed at law to be a mere naked power.² Where the power is coupled with an interest the construction might be different even at law. But at all events if the power is coupled with a trust, Courts of Equity will insist upon its execution upon the principles already stated.³ Still however the construction upon the very words of the particular will might be very important even in equity; since if the power should survive it would not be necessary to make the heir join in the sale of the property. If it should not survive, he would not be compelled to join in the sale.⁴ (a)

¹ *Ibid.*

² See *Franklin v. Osgood*, 14 John. R. 527, 553; *Zebach v. Smith*, 3 Binn. R. 69; 1 Powell on Devises by Jarman, 239, and note (1); Co. Litt. 113 a, Hargrave's note (2).

³ Co. Litt. 113 a, Hargrave's note (2); *Jackson v. Burtis*, 14 John. R. 391; Sugden on Powers, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 105 to 111 (3d edit.). Mr. Hargrave, in his note to Co. Litt. 113 a, has discussed this subject with great acuteness and learning. Mr. Sugden has summed up the result of the decisions in the following propositions: (1) That where a power is given to two or more by their proper names, who are not made executors, it will not survive without express words. (2) That where it is given to three or more generally, as 'to my trustees,' 'my sons,' &c., and not by their proper names, the authority will survive whilst the plural number remains. (3) That where the authority is given to executors, and the will does not expressly point to the joint exercise of it, even a single surviving executor may execute it. But (4) that where it is given to them *nominatim*, although in the character of executors, it is at least doubtful whether it will survive. Sugden on Powers, ch. 3, § 2, art. 1, pp. 165, 166 (3d edit.).

⁴ *Ibid.*; Co. Litt. 290 b, Butler's note, § 7; *Jackson v. Ferris*, 15 John. R. 347; *Franklin v. Osgood*, 14 John. R. 527, 553.

(a) See *Gould v. Mather*, 104 Mass. 283; *Warden v. Richards*, 11 Gray, 277; *Zamboco v. Cassavetti*, L. R. 11 Eq. 439; *Chandler v. Rider*, 102 Mass. 268; *Anderson v. McGowan*, 45 Ala. 462; *Hazel v. Hagan*, 47 Miss. 277; *Loring v. Marsh*, 2 Cliff. 469; *Mastin v. Barnard*, 33 Ga. 520; *Colsten v. Chaudet*, 4 Bush, 666. Statutes prevail in some States. *Shields v. Smith*, 8 Bush, 601; *Dilworth v. Rice*, 48 Mo. 124.

1062 *a*. It is a general rule that in the execution of a power the donee of the power must clearly show that he means to execute it either by a reference to the power or to the subject-matter of it; for if he leaves it uncertain whether the act is done in execution of the power or not, it will not be construed to be an execution of the power.¹ (*a*)

¹ Sugden on Powers, vol. 1, ch. 6, § 2, p. 257; *Ibid.* § 7, p. 373; *Ibid.* § 8, p. 470; *Owens v. Dickenson*, 1 Craig & Phill. 53; *Blagge v. Miles*, 1 Story's R. 426, 445 to 450. In this last case the court, after referring to the doctrine that the intention governs in wills, said: 'Similar doctrines now generally prevail in regard to the execution of powers, and especially in regard to their execution by last wills and testaments. The main point is to arrive at the intention and object of the donee of the power in the instrument of execution; and that being once ascertained, effect is given to it accordingly. *Bennett v. Aburrow*, 8 Ves. 609. The authorities upon the subject may not all be easily reconcilable with each other. But the principle furnished by them, however occasionally misapplied, is never departed from, that if the donee of the power intends to execute, and the mode be in other respects unexceptionable, that intention, however manifested, whether directly or indirectly, positively or by just implication, will make the execution valid and operative. I agree that the intention to execute the power must be apparent and clear, so that the transaction is not fairly susceptible of any other interpretation. If

(*a*) The American courts, refusing to follow the early English rule, hold that where there is a general power of disposal, a general bequest or devise will be presumed to include an exercise of the power if there is nothing to show a contrary intent. *Willard v. Ware*, 10 Allen, 263; *Amory v. Meredith*, 7 Allen, 397; *Bangs v. Smith*, 98 Mass. 270; *Funk v. Eggleston*, 92 Ill. 515, 539; *Andrews v. Brunefield*, 32 Miss. 108; *White v. Hicks*, 33 N.Y. 383; *Hollister v. Shaw*, 46 Conn. 248; *Bolton v. De Peyster*, 25 Barb. 539, 564; *Collier's Will*, 40 Mo. 287, 329; *Van Wert v. Benedict*, 1 Bradf. 114. And this is now the rule by statute in England. *In re Wilkinson*, L. R. 8 Eq. 487; s. c. 4 Ch. 587; *Boyes v. Cook*, 14 Ch. D. 52.

In determining whether the will, in a case of doubt, is an execution of the power the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of its execution only can be regarded; subsequent events cannot be considered. *Boyes*

v. Cook, *supra*, overruling *In re Ruding*, L. R. 14 Eq. 266.

Under the English statute a will may operate as an execution of a power subsequently created. *Boyes v. Cook*, *supra*; *Cofield v. Pollard*, 3 Jur. n. s. 1203; *Patch v. Shore*, 2 Dru. & S. 589; *Hodsdon v. Dancer*, 16 Week. R. 1101. A testator can however execute by will only such powers as are in existence at the time of his death; hence he cannot execute a power contained in the will of a person who survives him. *Jones v. Southall*, 32 Beav. 31.

Where there are two wills, one before and one after the creation of the power which is directed to be executed by last will of the donee, and the later will purports to be the last will, but does not refer in any way to the prior one, it is a question of intention which is the last will and an execution of the power. *Pettinger v. Ambler*, L. R. 1 Eq. 510. See 1 *Jarman, Wills*, 676 (5 Am. ed. by Bigelow).

1063. Upon the construction of wills also many difficult questions arise as to the nature and extent of powers and the manner

it be doubtful under all the circumstances, then that doubt will prevent it from being deemed an execution of the power. All the authorities agree that it is not necessary that the intention to execute the power should appear by express terms or recitals in the instrument. It is sufficient that it shall appear by words, acts, or deeds, demonstrating the intention. This was directly asserted, not only in *Sir Edward Clere's Case* (6 Co. R. 17), but it was positively affirmed in *Scrope's Case* (10 Co. R. 143, 144), where the reason of the rule is stated: "Quia non refert, an quis intentionem suam declarat verbis, an rebus ipsis, vel factis." On the other hand, to use the language of Lord Chief Justice Best, in *Doe d. Nowell v. Roake* (2 Bing. R. 497, 504), "No terms, however comprehensive, although sufficient to pass every species of property, freehold or copyhold, real or personal, will execute a power, unless they demonstrate that a testator had the power in his contemplation, and intended by his will to execute it." Three classes of cases have been held to be sufficient demonstrations of an intended execution of a power: (1) Where there has been some reference in the will or other instrument to the power; (2) Or a reference to the property which is the subject on which it is to be executed; (3) Or where the provision in the will or other instrument, executed by the donee of the power, would otherwise be ineffectual or a mere nullity; in other words it would have no operation except as an execution of the power. *Langham v. Nenny*, 3 Ves. 467; *Bennett v. Aburrow*, 8 Ves. 609, 616. It seems unnecessary to refer at large to the cases which establish these propositions. They will be found collected generally in Mr. Chance's Treatise on Powers (vol. 2, ch. 13, §§ 1591 to 1714), and in Sir Edward Sugden's Treatise on Powers (vol. 1, ch. 6, § 2, p. 257, &c.; *Id.* § 7, p. 373, &c.; *Id.* § 8, p. 430, &c.), and in the opinion of the court, delivered by Lord Chief Justice Best, in *Doe d. Nowell v. Roake* (8 Bing. 497). Lord Chief Baron Alexander, in delivering the judgment of the judges in the House of Lords, in *Denn d. Nowell v. Roake* (6 Bing. R. 475), reversing the decision in the same case in 2 Bing. R. 497, and affirming that of the King's Bench (5 B. & Cressw. 720), has enumerated the same classes of cases; and he has added that in no instance has a power or authority been considered as executed, unless under such circumstances. Whether this be so or not it is not material to inquire; for there is no pretence to say that because no other cases have as yet occurred there can be no others. That would in fact be to say that the cases governed the general rule as to intention, and not the rule the cases. Lord Chief Justice Best has put these classes of cases upon the true ground. They are instances of the strong and unequivocal proof required to establish the intention to execute the power, but they are not the only cases. *Doe d. Nowell v. Roake*, 2 Bing. R. 504. On the contrary if a case of clear intention should arise, although not falling within the predicament of these classes, it must be held that the power is well executed, unless courts of justice are at liberty to overturn principles instead of interpreting acts and intentions. I entirely agree with Lord Chief Justice Best in his remark in *Roake v. Denn* (4 Bligh, n. s. 22) that "rules with respect to evidence of intention are bad rules, and I trust I shall live to see them no longer binding on the judges." The Lord Chancellor (Lord Lyndhurst) said: "It has been settled by a long series of decisions from the case which has been referred to in the time of Sir Edward

in which they are to be executed. It would occupy too great a space to enter into a general examination even of the leading

Coke, *Sir Edward Clere's Case* (6 Co. R. 17), down to the present time, that if the will, which is insisted on as an execution of the power, does not refer to the power, and if the dispositions of the will can be satisfied without their being considered to be an execution of the power, unless there be some other circumstances to show that it was the intention of the devisor to execute the appointment by the will, — under such circumstances the court have uniformly held that the will is not to be considered as an execution of the power." Certainly it is not. But then this very statement leaves it open to inquire into the intention under all the circumstances, which seems to me to be the true and sensible rule upon the subject; and when that intention is thus once ascertained it governs. So it was expressly held in *Pomeroy v. Partington* (3 Term R. 665); and in *Griffith v. Harrison* (4 Term R. 737, 748, 749) the court expressly repudiated the notion that any technical exposition was to be given to the words of a will executing a power, and held that the intention was to be collected from the words according to the ordinary and common acceptation thereof. And again in *Bailey v. Lloyd* (5 Russ. R. 330, 341) the court held that the question of the execution of a power by a will was a mere question of intention, and that intention was to be collected, not from a particular expression, but from the whole will. See 4 Kent's Comm. Lect. 62, pp. 333, 334 (4th edit.). Now *Sir Edward Clere's Case* (6 Co. R. 17) is not only unquestionable law, and has so been always held, but it affords a strong illustration of the true doctrine. In that case it was held that the power was well executed notwithstanding it was not referred to, because otherwise the devise in the will would be inoperative and void. The testator had no estate in the property devised, but only a power over it; and so *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*, it was held that he intended to execute the power. Nor is there any objection to the doctrine of Lord Chief Justice Hobart in the *Commendam Case* (Hob. R. 159, 160), that "if an act will work two ways, the one by an interest, the other by an authority or power, and the act be indifferent, the law will attribute it to the interest and not to the power." (a) This is but saying in other words that where the terms of a devise are perfectly satisfied and inoperative, without any reference to the execution of a power, by working on the interest of the testator in the land, — there it shall not be deemed that he intended to execute the power, but merely to pass his interest. This proceeds upon the plain ground that there is nothing in the will which shows any intention to execute the power; and in cases of doubt the court cannot deem it a good execution of the power. See 4 Kent's Comm. Lect. 62, pp. 333, 334 (4th edit.). *Sir Edward Sugden* (*Sugden on Powers*, vol. 1, ch. 6, § 7, pp. 402, 428) has critically examined and commented upon all the leading authorities; and it appears to me that his criticisms (and he is himself a very high authority upon this subject) are entirely well founded. The courts have indeed, as he abundantly proves, proceeded in some cases upon very narrow and technical grounds, and in others have adopted a more liberal and just interpretation; and the cases do not all well stand together. The rule of ascertaining the intention however has been recognized at all times; and as Lord Kenyon has well observed, in *Pomeroy v. Partington* (3 Term R. 674, 675), if the judges in construing

(a) See *Pease v. Pilot Knob Iron Co.*, 49 Mo. 124.

authorities upon this subject. But one or two illustrations may not be without use, rather to open the mind to some of the doubts which may arise than to satisfy inquiries.¹ Thus for example where a testator directed that if his personal estate and house and lands at W should not pay his debts, then his executors should *raise* the same out of his copyhold estate, it became a question whether the terms of the power authorized a *sale* of the copyhold estate. It was held that they did.²

1064. This is a comparatively simple question. But suppose a will should contain a direction or power to raise money out of the rents and profits of an estate to pay debts or portions, &c. ; a question might then arise whether such a power would authorize a sale or mortgage of the estate under any circumstances ; as for instance if it were otherwise impracticable without the most serious delays and inconveniences to satisfy the purposes of the trust. Now this is a point upon which great authorities have entertained opposite opinions. The old cases generally inclined to hold that the power should be restricted to the mere application of the annual rents and profits.³ The more recent cases hold to a more liberal exposition of the power so as to include in it, if necessary for the purposes of the trust, a power to sell or to mortgage the estate.⁴ Lord Eldon has significantly said with refer-

the particular words of different powers have appeared to make contradictory decisions at different times, it is not that they have denied the general rule, but because some of them have erred in the application of the general rule to the particular case before them. In a conflict of authorities I own that I should choose to follow those which appear best founded in the reason and analogies of the law. But in cases of wills, where the intention is to govern, no authorities ought to control the interpretation which the court is called upon to make, unless all the circumstances are the same in both cases, and the ground of interpretation in one is entirely satisfactory to the mind as applied to the other. If I were compelled to decide between the cases of *Wallop v. Lord Portsmouth* (*Sugden on Powers*, ch. 6, § 7, p. 394), *Hurst v. Winchelsea* (2 Ves. jr. 589), *Standen v. Standen* (2 Ves. jr. 589), *Lewis v. Llewellyn* (2 Lord Kenyon's R. 444, by Harmer), and the case of *Jones v. Curry* (1 Swanst. R. 66), if there be any dissonance between them, I should much incline to follow the former.⁷

¹ See *Sugden on Powers*, ch. 9, §§ 2 to 8, pp. 437 to 454 (3d edit.); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 283; 2 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, 644, *b*.

² *Bateman v. Bateman*, 1 Atk. 421.

³ *Ivy v. Gilbert*, 2 P. Will. 13, 19; *Trafford v. Ashton*, 1 P. Will. 418, and Mr. Cox's note; *Evelyn v. Evelyn*, 2 P. Will. 666 to 670, 672; *Mills v. Banks*, 3 P. Will. 1; *Okeden v. Okeden*, 1 Atk. 550, and Mr. Saunders's note.

⁴ *Green v. Belcher*, 1 Atk. 505; *Baines v. Dixon*, 1 Ves. 42; *Countess of*

ence to the case of a direction by a testator to pay debts and legacies out of the rents and profits of a term of five hundred years created by his will, that if he were asked out of Westminster Hall what the testator meant by rents and profits, he should say that he probably meant the annual profits only; but that it was a settled rule that where a term is created for the purpose of raising money out of the rents and profits, if the trusts of the will require that a gross sum should be raised, the expression 'rents and profits' will not confine the power to the mere annual rents, but the trustees are to raise it out of the estate itself by sale or mortgage.¹ Sir Thomas Plumer, speaking on the same subject, has also said: 'Whatever might have been the interpretation of these words had the case been new, whatever doubt might have arisen upon them as denoting annual or permanent profits, it is now too late to speculate; this court having by a technical, artificial, but liberal construction, in a series of authorities admitting it not to be the natural meaning, extended those words, when applied to the object of raising a gross sum at a fixed time, when it must be raised and paid without delay, to a power to raise by sale or mortgage unless restrained by other words.'²

1064 *a*. But the true exposition of the modern doctrine established in Courts of Equity on this subject does not in reality deserve to be deemed either technical or artificial, although it is certainly a liberal construction of the words of the testator in order to accomplish his intent. When a testator directs a gross sum to be raised out of the rents and profits of an estate at a fixed time, or for a definite purpose or object which must be accomplished within a short period of time, or which cannot be delayed beyond a reasonable time, it is but fair to presume that he intends that the gross sum shall at all events be raised so that the end may be punctually accomplished; and that he acts under the impression that it may be so obtained by a due application of the rents and profits within the intermediate period. But the

Shrewsbury v. Earl of Shrewsbury, 1 Ves. jr. 233, 234; s. c. 3 Bro. Ch. R. 120; *Trafford v. Ashton*, 1 P. Will. 415, 419; *Allan v. Backhouse*, 2 Ves. & Beam. 65, 76; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 481, 484 to 486. The cases are fully collected in Mr. Jarman's note to 1 Powell on Devises, 234, to which the learned reader is therefore referred.

¹ *Allan v. Backhouse*, 2 Ves. & Beam. 64, 74.

² *Bootle v. Blundell*, 1 Meriv. R. 193, 232, 233.

rents and profits are but the means; and the question therefore may properly be put, whether the means, if totally inadequate to accomplish the end, are to control the end or are to yield to it. Now if the gross sum cannot be raised out of the rents and profits at all, or not so soon as to meet the exigency contemplated by the testator, it would seem but a reasonable interpretation of his intention to presume that he meant to dispense with the means and at all events to require the sum to be raised. The same principle is applied by Courts of Equity in other analogous cases; as for example in cases of charities where the doctrine of *cy pres* is applied,¹ and to cases of elegits on judgments, and to other cases where the debt cannot be paid at all out of the rents and profits, or not within a reasonable time.² (a)

1064 *b*. Upon the like principles, where a testator by his will charged his real estates with the payment of his debts generally, and then devised the same estates to trustees in trust for other persons, and a question arose in what manner the charge for the payments of debts was to be satisfied, and whether the trustees had authority to sell or mortgage the estates or a part thereof for the payment of the debts, it was held by the court that the trustees had power to sell or to mortgage the real estates for the payment of the debts as they should think it best for the interest of all concerned in the real estates.³

¹ Post, §§ 1169 to 1171, 1176 to 1178.

² Post, §§ 1216 *a*, 1216 *b*.

³ *Ball v. Harris*, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 264. On this occasion Lord Cottenham said: 'In support of the appeal it was not disputed that the directions in the will constituted a charge of the debts upon the real estate. But it was contended, first, that such a charge did not give a power to sell; secondly, that if it did, the lands purchased were not subject to it; and thirdly, that the power to sell, if it existed, did not authorize the mortgage to the plaintiff. The affirmative of the first proposition was acted upon by the Master of the Rolls in *Shaw v. Borrer*, 1 Keen, 559, and the real question is, Was that decision right? I have carefully considered the judgment of the Master of the Rolls upon this point, and I entirely concur with him upon it. The point indeed has been long established. It arose directly in *Elliott v. Merryman*, Barnard. 78, and as there laid down has been recognized in the several cases referred to by the Master of the Rolls, to which may be added the opinions of

(a) A devise of real estate to trustees in fee, upon trust 'out of the rents, issues, and profits' 'and such other means, except a sale, as they may think proper, to levy and raise sufficient to pay off the charges on the estate,' does not give the trustees power to raise the charges either by sale, mortgage, or lease on fines. *Bennett v. Wyndham*, 23 Beav. 521.

1065. In the next place, independently of the consideration of powers, many very embarrassing questions arise as to the nature and extent of the limitations of trusts properly so called under last wills, as to the persons who are to take, and also as to the interests they are to take in the trust property. Many of these trusts require the positive interposition and direction of Courts of Equity before they can be properly or safely executed by the parties in interest so as to protect them against future litigation and controversy. And it not unfrequently happens that the final administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets of the testator, real and personal, must stand suspended until the aid of some Court of Equity has been invoked and a decretal order is obtained containing a declaration of the nature and extent of these trusts, of the parties who are entitled to take, and of the limitations of their respective interests; and also providing means by reference to a master whereby the cross equities and conflicting claims of various persons, such as creditors, trustees, legatees, devisees, heirs, and distributees, may be clearly ascertained and definitely established.¹ Thus for example upon a

Lord Thurlow and Lord Eldon in *Bailey v. Ekins*, 7 Ves. 319, and *Dolton v. Hewen*, 6 Madd. 9; for although the point in some of those cases was whether the purchaser was bound to see to the application of the purchase-money, the decision that he was not assumes that the sale was authorized by the charge in the will of the debts upon the estate; that is, that the charge of the debts upon the estate was equivalent to a trust to sell for the payment of them. The case indeed is free from the difficulty which has occurred in some others, for Harris is devisee in trust of the legal fee; and it being established that the will charges the estate with the payment of the debts, it follows that Harris, being trustee for that purpose, must have the power of executing his trust. Such being my opinion as to the effect of the charge of the debts upon the estate, it is unnecessary to advert to the express power to sell with the approbation of the widow and daughter, both of whom are parties to the deposit of the deeds with the plaintiff; for it cannot be doubted but that the purchased lands are subject to the same trusts as the land devised; and this disposes of the second point. The third point is equally untenable; namely, that the right of the trustee to sell did not authorize the mortgage. So long ago as the case of *Mills v. Banks*, 3 P. Will. 1, in 1724, it seems to have been assumed as settled that "a power to sell implies a power to mortgage, which is a conditional sale," and no case has been quoted throwing any doubt upon that proposition. But this is not a mere power to sell; it is a trust to raise money out of the estate to pay debts. It would indeed be most injurious to the owners of estates charged if the trustee could effect the object of his trust only by selling the estate.⁷

¹ This subject has been already somewhat considered under the heads of

will creating a trust for the payment of debts and charging them as well as legacies upon the real estate of the testator, it may often be a matter of serious difficulty to ascertain from the words of the will whether the personal estate is to be wholly exonerated from the payment of the debts and legacies, or whether it is to be the primary fund, and the real estate only to be auxiliary thereto. And in each case, if the charges on the real estate are not sufficient to exhaust the whole, in what manner the charges are to be borne and apportioned among the different devisees and heirs.¹ (a) Until these questions are settled by a Court of Equity upon a bill bringing all the proper parties before it, it will be impossible for the executors or trustees (as the case may be) to proceed to a final settlement of the various claims without manifest danger of having all their proceedings overhauled in some future suit.²

1065 *a*. Another illustration of the difficulties arising from the language of particular bequests may be gathered from a recent case where the testator bequeathed to his wife £600 per annum during her life, and after her death the said annuity to be equally divided between A, B, C, D, E, and F, or the survivors or survivor; and the question arose whether the six annuitants were to take annuities for their lives, or were to take the capital stock of such sum in the three per cents in England as would be sufficient to produce the yearly sum of £600. It was held by the Vice-Chancellor that the annuitants were entitled to such capital stock as an absolute interest vested in them, and not to mere life annuities. But this decision was reversed by the Lord Chancellor, upon the ground that upon the true interpretation

Account, Administration, Legacies, and Marshalling of Securities, ante, chs. 8, 9, 10, 13.

¹ See 2 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, ch. 35, pp. 664 to 714, and notes; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 466 to 488.

² Some of these difficulties have been already touched in considering the doctrines respecting the marshalling of assets and securities. Ante, §§ 558 to 580, 633 to 645. See also the notes of Mr. Cox to *Howell v. Price*, 1 P. Will. 294, note (1), and to *Evelyn v. Evelyn*, 2 P. Will. 664, note (1), as to the point when the personal estate is to be deemed the primary fund for the payment of debts and legacies, or not. See also 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 467 to 488; *Id.* 498 to 506.

(a) See *Forrest v. Prescott*, L. R. 10 Eq. 545; *Powell v. Riley*, L. R. 12 Eq. 175.

of the will the annuitants were such for their respective lives only.¹ (a)

¹ *Blewitt v. Roberts*, 10 Simons, R. 491; s. c. on appeal, 1 Craig & Phillips, 274. See also *Tweeddale v. Tweeddale*, 10 Simons, R. 453. In this last case the Vice-Chancellor said: 'I do not see any substantial difference between a gift of an annuity out of personal estate generally, and a gift of an annuity to be satisfied out of a particular fund; because an annuity when it is given generally is to be provided for out of all the personal estate; and if a gift of £300 a year out of the testator's funded property would give to the annuitant the absolute interest in so much of the funded property as would produce £300 a year, what is the substantial difference between that gift and a gift of £300 a year, simply to be satisfied out of so much of the personal estate as would produce the sum? I confess that I do not see any difference myself. I am very much inclined to think that the true construction is, that if it is given simply, it is given absolutely.' But the Lord Chancellor, upon the appeal in *Blewitt v. Roberts*, said: 'There is a marked distinction between the gift of the produce of a fund without limit as to time, and a simple gift of an annuity. An annuity may be perpetual, or for life, or for any period of years; but in the ordinary acceptance of the term used, if it should be said that a testator had left another an annuity of £100 per annum, no doubt would occur of the gift being an annuity for the life of the donee. It is the gift of an annual sum of £100; that is, of as many sums of £100 as the donee shall live years. In *Savery v. Dyer*, Ambl. 139, Lord Hardwicke says: "If one give by will an annuity not existing before to A, A shall have it only for life." In that case the gift was of an annuity to A during the life of B, and B having survived A, the question was whether the annuity had ceased notwithstanding the express provisions that it should be during the life of B. It is singular that no other case has been referred to in which this question distinctly arose; but in *Innes v. Mitchell*, 6 Ves. 464, before Sir W. Grant and before Lord Eldon (9 Ves. 212), upon appeal, the annuity was held to be for life only, although there were provisions leading more strongly than anything in this case to an inference that the capital was intended to be given, such as the direction as to the £5,000; without that direction the gift would be of an annuity of £200 to the use of a mother and her children, for her and their use, and the longest liver of her and her children, subject to an equal division of the interest while more than one of them should live, — a gift not very dissimilar from the present; and both those very able judges held that the annuity determined with the life of the survivor. If the gift simply of an annuity of £100 to A is a gift of that sum which shall be sufficient to produce £100 a year, there was sufficient in *Innes v. Mitchell* to give to the mother and her children such a sum as would be sufficient to produce £200 per annum, without reference to the provision as to the £5,000; and yet notwithstanding that provision it was held that there was no gift of any principal sum. It seems to have been supposed that the direction that there should be an equal division of the annuity implied that the principal producing the annuity was to be the subject-matter of the divi-

(a) See *Yates v. Madden*, 8 Eng. L. & E. 180, 263; *Stokes v. Huron*, 2 Dru. & W. 89; s. c. 12 Clark & F. 171; *Bent v. Cullen*, L. R. 6 Ch. 235; *Langley v. Thomas*, 6 DeG. M. & G. 645; *Alexander v. Alexander*, Ib. 593.

1065 *b*. Very embarrassing questions also often arise under last wills and testaments in respect to the persons who are entitled to take under words of general description; as for example under bequests to 'children,' (*a*) to 'grandchildren,' to 'younger children,' to 'issue,' (*b*) to 'heirs,' (*c*) to 'next of kin,' (*d*) to

sion; but there was a similar direction in *Innes v. Mitchell* and in *Jones v. Randall*, 1 Jac. & Walker, 100; and yet in neither of those cases was there any gift of the principal. It does not appear to me that there is any inconsistency in the cases. To hold that a simple gift of an annuity to A does not give an annuity beyond the life of A, is not inconsistent with holding that a gift of the produce of a fund without limit as to time gives the fund itself. In the former case there is no allusion to any principal sum. It is indeed the course of this court to secure an annuity by investing a capital sum; but a testator with an income much exceeding the annuity given is not very likely to contemplate any such investment. He may indeed be without the immediate means of making it, as for instance if his whole property consisted of long leaseholds. If a testator were minded to give £10,000, can it be supposed that he would set about effecting this object by giving £500 per annum to the intended legatee without making any mention of the £10,000 or of any other capital sum? To carry into effect the gift of an annuity of £500 by raising £10,000 out of the estate would probably be very foreign from the testator's intention. I feel no disposition to question the doctrine laid down by Lord Hardwicke, and followed in the cases I have referred to; and if I did, I should not feel at liberty to depart from a rule established upon such authority.'

(*a*) Various illustrations of the construction put upon this word in different situations may be found in the following cases: *Osgood v. Lovering*, 33 Maine, 464; *Thomson v. Ludington*, 104 Mass. 193; *Tillinghast v. De Wolf*, 8 R. I. 69; *Low v. Harmony*, 72 N. Y. 408; *Castner's Appeal*, 88 Penn. St. 478; *Feit v. Vanatta*, 21 N. J. Eq. 84; *Taylor v. Watson*, 35 Md. 519; *Moors v. Stone*, 19 Gratt. 130; *Turner v. Ivie*, 5 Heisk. 222; *Cromer v. Pinckney*, 3 Barb. Ch. 466, 475; *Cutter v. Doughty*, 23 Wend. 513; *Clifford v. Koe*, 5 App. Cas. 447; *Allen v. Webster*, 6 Jur. n. s. 574; *Edmunds v. Fessey*, 7 Jur. n. s. 282.

(*b*) *Robins v. Quinliven*, 79 Penn. St. 333; *Slater v. Dangerfield*, 15 Mees. & W. 263; *Guthrie's Appeal*, 37 Penn. St. 9; *Kay v. Scates*, *Ib.* 31; *Miller's Appeal*, 52 Penn. St. 113; *Kleppner v. Laverty*, 70 Penn. St. 70; *King v. Savage*, 121 Mass. 323; *O'Byrne v. Feeley*, 61 Ga. 77; *Kingsland v. Ra-*

pelye, 3 Edw. 1; *McPherson v. Snowdon*, 19 Md. 197; *Gordon v. Hope*, 3 DeG. & S. 351.

(*c*) *Parsons v. Parsons*, L. R. 8 Eq. 260; *Newton's Trusts*, L. R. 4 Eq. 171; *Gittings v. McDermott*, 2 Mylne & K. 69; *De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir*, 3 H. L. Cas. 557; *Doody v. Higgins*, 9 Hare, 32; s. c. 2 Kay & J. 729; *Jacobs v. Jacobs*, 16 Beav. 557; *Clarke v. Cordis*, 4 Allen, 466; *Lombard v. Boyden*, 5 Allen, 249; *Loring v. Thorn-dike*, *Ib.* 257.

(*d*) *Harris v. Newton*, 46 L. J. Ch. 268; *Withy v. Mangles*, 4 Beav. 358; s. c. 10 Clark & F. 215; *Elmsley v. Young*, 2 Mylne & K. 780; *Wilson v. Atkinson*, 4 DeG. J. & S. 455; *Harrison v. Ward*, 5 Jones, Eq. 236; *Jones v. Oliver*, 3 Ired. Eq. 369; *Simmons v. Gooding*, 5 Ired. Eq. 382; *Houghton v. Kendall*, 7 Allen, 72, 77; *Morris v. Potter*, 10 R. I. 58; *Gardner v. Collins*, 2 Peters, 58.

'nephews and nieces,' (*a*) to 'first and second cousins,' (*b*) to 'relations,' (*c*) to 'poor relations,' (*d*) to the 'family,' (*e*) to 'personal representatives,' (*f*) and to 'servants.' For these words have not a uniform fixed sense and meaning in all cases; but they admit of a variety of interpretations according to the context of the will, the circumstances in which the testator is placed, the state of his family, the character and reputed connection of the persons who may be presumed to be the objects of his bounty, and yet who only in a very lax and general sense can be said to fall within the descriptive words. Thus 'child' or 'children' is sometimes construed to mean 'issue;' and 'issue' to mean 'children;' 'heirs' is sometimes construed to mean 'children;' ¹ 'next of kin' is sometimes construed to mean next of blood or nearest of blood, and sometimes only those who are entitled to take under the Statute of Distributions, and sometimes to include other persons; ² 'relations' is sometimes construed

¹ *Head v. Randall*, 2 Younge & Coll. 231; *Minter v. Wraith*, 13 Simons, R. 52.

² *Withy v. Mangles*, 10 Clark & Fin. 215; *Cholmondeley v. Ashburton*, 6 Beav. 86.

(*a*) *Shull v. Johnson*, L. R. 2 Eq. 202; *Weeds v. Bristow*, Ib. 333; *Cromer v. Pinckney*, 3 Barb. Ch. 466; *Frogley v. Phillips*, 3 DeG. F. & J. 466; *Hogg v. Cook*, 32 Beav. 641; *Sherratt v. Mountford*, L. R. 8 Ch. 928; s. c. 15 Eq. 305; *Wells v. Wells*, L. R. 18 Eq. 504 (contra *Grant v. Grant*, L. R. 5 C. P. 380, denied in 2 *Jarman, Wills*, 152, note, 5th Am. edit.); *Green's Appeal*, 42 Penn. St. 25.

(*b*) *Sanderson v. Bayley*, 4 Mylne & C. 56; *Bridgenorth v. Collins*, 15 Sim. 541; *Stoddart v. Nelson*, 6 DeG. M. & G. 68; *Stephenson v. Abingdon*, 31 Beav. 305.

(*c*) *Hibbert v. Hibbert*, L. R. 15 Eq. 372; *Varrell v. Wendell*, 20 N. H. 431; *Drew v. Wakefield*, 54 Maine, 291; *McNeillledge v. Galbraith*, 8 Serg. & R. 43; *McNeillledge v. Barclay*, 11 Serg. & R. 103; *Cleaver v. Cleaver*, 39 Wis. 96; *Esty v. Clark*, 101 Mass. 36; *Kimball v. Story*, 108 Mass. 382.

(*d*) *Doyley v. Attorney-Gen.*, 4 Vin. Abr. 485, pl. 16; *Widmore v. Woodroffe*, Amb. 636; *White v. White*, 7 Ves. 423; *Attorney-Gen. v. Price*, 17 Ves. 371; *Isaac v. Defriez*, Ib. 373, note.

(*e*) *Bates v. Dewson*, 128 Mass. 334; *Bowditch v. Andrew*, 8 Allen, 339, 342; *Whelan v. Reilly*, 3 W. Va. 597; *Heck v. Kleppenger*, 5 Barr, 385; *Blackwell v. Ball*, 1 Keen, 176; *Woods v. Woods*, 1 Mylne & C. 401; *Lambe v. Eames*, L. R. 6 Ch. 597.

(*f*) *Cox v. Curwen*, 118 Mass. 198; *Brokaw v. Hudson*, 27 N. J. Eq. 135; *Thompson v. Young*, 25 Md. 450; *Gibbons v. Fairlamb*, 26 Penn. St. 217; *Stook's Appeal*, 20 Penn. St. 349; *Bridge v. Abbot*, 3 Bro. C. C. 224; *Cotton v. Cotton*, 2 Beav. 67; *Baines v. Ottey*, 1 Mylne & K. 465; *Atherton v. Crowther*, 19 Beav. 448; *Briggs v. Upton*, L. R. 7 Ch. 376; *In re Gryll*, L. R. 6 Eq. 589; *Dixon v. Dixon*, 24 Beav. 129.

to mean the 'next of kin' in the strict sense of the words, and sometimes to include persons more remote in consanguinity; 'personal representatives' is sometimes construed to mean the 'administrators or executors,' and sometimes to mean the 'next of kin';¹ 'executors' (a) sometimes includes the persons named

¹ *S. P. Daniel v. Dudley*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 1, 6. In *Holloway v. Clarkson*, 2 Hare, R. 521, 523, Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram said: 'The disputed cases have generally arisen out of bequests to "representatives," "legal representatives," "personal representatives," and similar words, and not upon the words "executors, administrators, and assigns," which occur in the present case. In *Bulmer v. Jay* (4 Sim. 48; s. c. 3 Myl. & K. 197) and in some other cases however a question has arisen upon the effect of the words "executors and administrators." If I were compelled to give an opinion upon this part of the case, I should say that the conclusion to be drawn from the more modern, not unsupported by some of the earlier cases, is this, that under a gift simply to "representatives," "legal representatives," "personal representatives," and to "executors and administrators," the hand to receive the money is that of the person constituted representative by the Ecclesiastical Courts; but that such person will, in the absence of a clear intention to the contrary, take the property as part of the estate of the person whose representative he is, and not beneficially. *Evans v. Charles*, 1 Anst. 128; (b) *Ripley v. Waterworth*, 7 Ves. 425; *Wellman v. Bowring*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 24, 2 Russ. 374, 3 Sim. 328; *Price v. Strange*, 6 Madd. 159; *Palin v. Hills*, 1 Myl. & K. 470; *Hames v. Hames*, 2 Keen, 646; *Grafftey v. Humpage*, 1 Beav. 46; *Daniel v. Dudley*, Phillips, 1, 11 Sim. 163. In the last case Lord Cottenham strongly expressed his disapprobation of *Bulmer v. Jay*. However the decision upon these cases has been by no means uniform. It has sometimes been decided that the persons intended were the representatives constituted by the Ecclesiastical Court; sometimes that next of kin were intended; sometimes that the representatives by the Ecclesiastical Court took beneficially; and sometimes that they took as representatives and consequently as trustees for the estate of the party whose representatives they were. It will be sufficient to refer to the cases generally as they are collected in *Saberton v. Skeels*, 1 Russ. & Myl. 587, and in *Grafftey v. Humpage*. In considering the cases, as they bear only upon the construction of the words (as words of description) and upon the question of the interest which the legatee takes, it will be found convenient to distinguish the cases in which a legacy has been given to an individual, and in case of his pre-deceasing the testator his representatives have been substituted for him, from the cases of direct limitations to the representatives of an individual named not by way of substitution. In the former cases the courts appear to have treated the representatives as quasi purchasers, and have thereby excluded all argument upon the words as words of limitation.' See also *Booth v. Vicars*, 1 Collyer, Ch. R. 6, where the question was who in the sense of

(a) *Palin v. Hills*, 1 Mylne & K. *Stockdale v. Nicholson*, L. R. 4 Eq. 470; *Appleton v. Rowley*, L. R. 8 Eq. 359. 139; *Webb v. Sadler*, L. R. 3 Ch. 419; (b) Overruled. See *Long v. Watkinson*, 10 Eng. L. & E. 72; s. c. 16 *Alger v. Parrott*, L. R. 3 Eq. 329; *Jur.* 235.

as executors in the will, and sometimes only such as take upon themselves that office, and 'nephews and nieces' will sometimes

the will were the 'next legal representatives.' Mr. Vice-Chancellor Bruce there said: 'The next question is whether the true construction of the bequest is that the executors of Nicholas Vicars and Mary Brown were intended to take in their character of executors or administrators, that is, not beneficially, — a meaning of which, when the context allows or does not forbid it, the words "legal representatives" are susceptible. There are several remarks however to which this clause is liable which seem to exclude that interpretation also. For in the first place I do not say in materiality, but in order, the words "executors or administrators" are used just above for another purpose in their strict legal and proper sense, and therefore if he had meant executors and administrators here, the probability is that he would have used the same phrase. In the second place he has used the word "next" in combination with the words "legal representatives," which is a word having no connection with the character of executor or administrator. And thirdly, that construction would render the latter half of the bequest mere superfluity, because, supposing that by the words in question executors or administrators are meant, the fund would go in the same way without those words as with them. These are part of the considerations which seem to me to exclude that construction also. It follows, if this view of the subject be right, that the words "next legal representatives" must in this will import in some form consanguinity; the next question is, in what form? Now the words here are not "next of kin." There is no word strictly importing kindred. If the words had been "next of kin," or "nearest," or "next in relationship," it is possible that I might have applied the rule adopted by the Lords Commissioners in *Elmsley v. Young*, and have held that the representatives of whom the statute speaks were excluded. But that is not so. The words "legal representatives" are the very words which in the Statute of Distributions are used to designate persons who, being of kindred to the deceased, come in as representatives of some one else. As to this part of the case I need do no more than refer to the language of the Master of the Rolls in *Rowland v. Gorsuch*, 2 Cox, 187, and to the expressions so recently used by Lord Langdale in *Cotton v. Cotton*, 2 Beav. 70, where he says, "when it is said that the expression 'legal representatives' means next of kin, it is not that such is the force of the words themselves, but because the words are held to indicate the persons who, upon the construction of the will, are beneficially entitled in the place of the person to whom the gift was first made, and who in that sense legally represent such person. I must therefore refer to the Statute of Distributions, which points out those who are entitled to claim as the legal representatives in that particular sense of the words." I also am of opinion upon this will that the words "next legal representatives" mean the persons who by force of law in right of consanguinity would take the personal estate of those persons beneficially. The next question is whether they are to take per stirpes or per capita. My opinion is that they take per stirpes. The word "representatives" itself almost forces that interpretation; and when you consider that if one of the two persons mentioned in the will had survived the tenant for life, only a moiety could have gone under the clause of substitution, that construction seems to be rendered absolutely necessary.'

include great-nephews and great-nieces.¹ The word 'family' admits of a still greater variety of applications. It may mean a man's household, consisting of himself, his wife, children, and servants; it may mean his wife and children, or his children excluding his wife; or in the absence of wife and children it may mean his brothers and sisters or next of kin; or it may mean the genealogical stock from which he may have sprung.²

1065 *c.* Difficulties may also arise in many cases where there is a bequest or devise to the next of kin, whether they are to take per stirpes or per capita.³ (*a*) So also it may be matter of question who are to be deemed the next of kin under bequests of personal property; whether the next of kin under the civil law, or the next of kin under the Statute of Distributions, for they may not be identical.⁴ In all these cases the true meaning in

¹ In Mr. Chitty's Digest, under the title Wills and Devises, XV *b*, a great variety of cases illustrating these statements will be found collected. See also Bridgman's Digest, Legacy and Legatee, 1 Roper on Legacies, §§ 1 to 19, pp. 24 to 167. Examples of the interpretation of these words will be found in *Hall v. Luckup*, 4 Sim. R. 5; *Dalzell v. Welch*, 2 Sim. 319; *Horridge v. Ferguson*, 1 Jacob, R. 583; *Lees v. Mosley*, 1 Young & Coll. 589; *Earl of Orford v. Churchill*, 3 Ves. & Beam. 59; *Lady Lincoln v. Pelham*, 10 Ves. 166; *Bowles v. Bowles*, 10 Ves. 177; *Gittings v. McDermott*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 69; *Mornsby v. Blamire*, 4 Russ. R. 384; *Leigh v. Norbury*, 13 Ves. 340; *Sibley v. Perry*, 7 Ves. 522; *Grant v. Lyman*, 4 Russ. R. 292; *Brandon v. Brandon*, 3 Swanst. 319; *Smith v. Campbell*, 19 Ves. 400; *Mahon v. Savage*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 111; *Pope v. Whitcombe*, 3 Meriv. R. 689; *Cruwys v. Colman*, 9 Ves. 319; *Worseley v. Johnson*, 3 Atk. 761; *Elmsley v. Young*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 82; *Palen v. Hills*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 470; *Price v. Strange*, 6 Madd. R. 159; *Piggott v. Green*, 6 Sim. 72; *Barnes v. Patch*, 8 Ves. 604; *Crossly v. Clare*, Ambl. 397; *Chambers v. Brailsford*, 18 Ves. 368; *s. c.* 19 Ves. 652; *Mayott v. Mayott*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 125; *Charge v. Goodyer*, 3 Russ. R. 140; *Silcox v. Bell*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 301; *Chilcot v. Bromley*, 12 Ves. 114; *Gill v. Shelley*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 336; *Langston v. Langston*, 8 Bligh, R. 167; *Clopton v. Butman*, 10 Simons, R. 426; *Head v. Randall*, 2 Y. & Coll. New R. 231; *Liley v. Hay*, 1 Hare, 58, 582; *Wright v. Atkyns*, Turn. & Russ. R. 156; *Wood v. Wood*, 3 Hare, R. 65.

¹ *Blackwell v. Bull*, 1 Keen, R. 176, 181; *Lewin on Trustees*, 78, 79.

³ *Mattison v. Tunfield*, 3 Beav. R. 131; *Paine v. Wagner*, 12 Simon, R. 184.

⁴ See on this point 2 Jarman on Wills, p. 37, Law Magazine for May, 1844,

(*a*) Cases in which parties took per stirpes: *Bassett v. Granger*, 100 Mass. 348; *Fisher v. Skillman*, 3 C. E. Green, 229; *Lyon v. Acker*, 33 Conn. 222; *Risk's Appeal*, 52 Penn. St. 269. Per capita: *Farmer v. Kimball*, 46 N. H. 435; *Pitney v. Brown*, 44 Ill. 363; *Wells v. Newton*, 4 Bush, 158; *Brown v. Brown*, 6 Bush, 648; *Britton v. Miller*, 63 N. C. 268; *Seabury v. Brewer*, 53 Barb. 662.

which the testator employed the words must be ascertained by considering the circumstances in which he is placed, the objects he had in view, and the context of the will.¹ Where the bequest respects personal or trust property it naturally, nay necessarily, falls within the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to establish the proper interpretation of such descriptive words in the particular will; and neither executors, nor administrators, nor trustees can safely act in such cases until a proper bill has been brought to ascertain the true nature and character of such bequests or trusts, and to obtain a declaration from the court of the persons entitled to claim under the general descriptive words. Where indeed the estate to which the descriptive words apply is of a legal nature, the interpretation thereof may well belong to Courts of Law. But even in such cases, from the inability of those courts to bring all the proper parties before them in a single suit, as well as from the mixed nature of the subject-matter of the bequest, the questions are most commonly discussed and settled in a declaratory suit before some Court of Equity.

1065 *d.* Equally embarrassing questions sometimes arise in cases of residuary legatees, whether they are to take all the personal estate which the testator has not absolutely and effectually disposed of, or it is to be treated as intestate property undisposed of. In the cases of lapsed legacies the doctrine is clearly settled that they belong to the residuary legatees, because their interest is abridged only to the extent of the particular effective legacies. And the same rule seems properly to apply to cases where the testator intended that a legatee should be benefited by a particular bequest, but the legatee cannot be ascertained or the legacy is too vague and void for uncertainty; for in such a case the mere intention that the residuary legatees should not take the whole will not defeat their right to such a legacy.²

1066. There are also some rules of construction of the words

pp. 353, 354, 355; *Elmsley v. Young*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 786; *Smith v. Campbell*, 19 Ves. 403; *Withy v. Mangles*, 4 Beav. 366; (a) s. c. 8 (English) Jurist, p. 69. In this case the subject was much discussed by Lord Langdale.

¹ *Blackwell v. Bull*, 1 Keen, R. 176, 181; *O'Dell v. Crone*, 3 Dow, Parl. R. 61.

² *The Mayor of Gloucester v. Wood*, the (English) Jurist for 28d Dec. 1843, pp. 1125, 1128.

(a) 10 Clark & F. 215 (H. L.).

of wills adopted by Courts of Equity in relation to trusts, which are different from those which are adopted by Courts of Law in construing the same words in relation to mere legal estates and interests. We have already had occasion to take notice of this distinction in remarking upon the difference between executed and executory trusts. In the former Courts of Equity follow the rules of law in the interpretation of the words; in the latter they often proceed upon an interpretation widely different.¹ (*a*)

1067. In regard also to legacies and bequests of chattels and other personal property Courts of Equity (as we have seen) treat all such cases as matters of trust, and the executor as a trustee for the benefit of the legatees, and as to the undisposed residue of such property as a trustee for the next of kin.² The rules therefore adopted by Courts of Equity in expounding the words of wills in regard to bequests of personal property are not precisely the same as those adopted by Courts of Law in interpreting the same words as to real estate. For Courts of Equity having in a great measure succeeded to the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts over these matters, and these courts in the interpretation of legacies being governed by the rules of the civil law, Courts of Equity have followed them in such interpretation rather than the rules of the common law where they differ.³

1067 *a*. Cases may easily be put to show how widely Courts of Equity sometimes differ from Courts of Law in their construction of the same words in a will as applied to real estate and as applied to personal estate, giving effect to the presumed intent of the testator to an enlarged and liberal extent not recognized at law. Thus for example if freehold and leasehold estates are devised to a person and the heirs of his body with a limitation over in case he leaves no such heirs, the words will or at least may be construed to mean a dying without leaving such heirs

¹ Ante, § 974; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 440, 441, 445 to 465; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 4, and note (*i*).

² Ante, §§ 593, 595, 596; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 2, note (*d*) 1; Id. B. 2, ch. 5, § 3, and note (*k*); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 466, 467; post, § 1067 *a*.

³ Ante, § 602; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 4, and notes (*h*), (*i*); Ib. § 5, and note (*l*); Ib. § 6, and note (*o*); Ib. § 7, and notes (*q*), (*r*), (*s*); Id. § 9, and note (*y*); Id. § 11, and note (*a*); Fearne on Cont. Rem. 471, 472, 7th ed. by Butler, and Butler's note (*s*), p. 474; Id. p. 476; Croke v. De Vandes, 9 Ves. 197.

(*a*) See *Thompson v. Fisher*, L. R. 10 Eq. 207

indefinitely as to the freehold estates, and a dying without leaving such heirs living at the time of his death as to the leasehold estates; the effect of which will be very different in the two different species of estates as to the title of the devisee and the validity of the limitation over.¹ Where the remainder over is upon an indefinite failure of such heirs, the first devisee takes an estate tail with a vested remainder over upon the determination of that estate. Now such a remainder over after an estate tail in freehold estates is valid in point of law, and awaits the regular determination of the prior estate. But in leasehold estates it is void as being too remote, and the tenant in tail takes the whole estate; whereas if the devise is construed to be a dying without issue living at the decease of the first devisee, then in each case the legal effect is the same. The devise over will be treated as a good contingent remainder to take effect, if at all, at the death of the first devisee. The reason of this difference is that in chattels, whether personal or real, there can be no good remainder limited over after an estate tail, as the tenant in tail is deemed to be the absolute owner. But in freeholds there may be a good remainder after an estate tail by the statute *de donis*; and the tenant in tail is deemed to be only the qualified owner.² (a)

¹ See *Forth v. Chapman*, 1 P. Will. 664; *Fearne on Conting. Rem.* 472 to 485, 7th edit. by Butler, and his note (s); *Crooke v. De Vandes*, 9 Ves. 197, 203, 204.

² *Forth v. Chapman*, 1 P. Will. 664; *Crooke v. De Vandes*, 9 Ves. 197, 203, 204; *Porter v. Bradley*, 3 T. R. 143; *Pells v. Brown*, Cro. Jac. 590; *Fearne on Conting. Remaind.* 472 to 485, Butler's edit. and note (s); *Id.* p. 5 note (d).

(a) See *Ex parte Wynch*, 5 DeG. M. & G. 188; *Goldney v. Crabb*, 19 Beav. 338; *Parker v. Clarke*, 6 DeG. M. & G. 104; *Hedges v. Harpur*, 3 DeG & J. 129; *Stewart v. Jones*, *ib.* 532; *Wallis v. Woodland*, 32 Md. 101. In the first of these cases it was held that a bequest to a married woman of an annuity 'for her life and the issue lawfully begotten from her body, on failure of which to revert to my heirs,' with a request that A and B would act as trustees for the annuitant, so that the annuity might be secured for her sole use and benefit, gave her a life interest only, with a gift in the nature of a remainder to her issue; and that the court, in construing a disposition of personalty by will, is not absolutely governed by the rules applicable at law in the case of realty. The rule of Lord Thurlow in *Knight v. Ellis*, 2 Bro. C. C. 570, that in such cases the heirs shall be regarded as taking by purchase and not by limitation, when that appears to be the intention of the testator, is here reaffirmed, notwithstanding the doubts of other cases. *Lyon v. Mitchell*, 1 Madd. 486, and cases cited. In

1068. In the interpretation of the language of wills also Courts of Equity have gone great lengths by creating implied or constructive trusts from mere recommendatory and precatory words of the testator. Thus if a testator should by his will desire his executor to give to a particular person a certain sum of money, it would be construed to be a legacy, although the will should leave it to the executor's own free will how and when and in what manner it should be paid.¹ So if a testator should desire his wife at or before her death to give certain personal estate among such of his relations as she should think most deserving and approve of, it would be held to be a legacy among such relations.² So a bequest to a wife of all the testator's freehold and copyhold estates, 'being well assured that she will at her decease dispose of the same amongst all or such of my children as she in her discretion shall think most proper, and as they by their future conduct towards her shall be deserving of the same,' would be held to be a trust for such of the children as she should appoint.³ So a bequest of the testator's personal estate to a wife, and if she should marry again to be secured to her separate use, and recommending the wife to give by her will what she should die possessed of to certain persons whom he named, would be held to create a trust in favor of such persons.⁴ So if a testator should give £1,000 to A, desiring, wishing, recommending, or hoping that he will at his death give the same sum or a certain part thereof to B, it would be held to be a trust in favor of B, and A would be a trustee for him.⁵ So a bequest to a daughter A,

¹ *Brest v. Offley*, 1 Ch. Rep. 246.

² *Harding v. Glyn*, 1 Atk. 469; *Malvin v. Keighley*, 2 Ves. jr. 333; *Brown v. Higgs*, 8 Ves. 570, 571; *Tibbits v. Tibbits*, Jac. Rep. 317; *Knight v. Knight*, 3 Beav. R. 148, 172, 173.

³ *Massey v. Sherman*, Ambler, R. 520, and Mr. Blunt's note; *Parsons v. Baker*, 18 Ves. 476; *Prevost v. Clarke*, 2 Madd. R. 458; *Forbes v. Ball*, 3 Meriv. R. 437. See 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 21, § 6, pp. 373 to 379, and Lewin on Trusts, ch. 5, § 2, p. 77 to 81, where most of the cases are collected.

⁴ *Horwood v. West*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 387.

⁵ *Knight v. Knight*, 3 Beav. R. 148, 172, 173.

Goldney v. Crabb, 19 Beav. 338, the same rule was adopted in the construction of a will giving leaseholds for life to A, and after her decease to the issue of her body. But where there is a gift of the absolute interest in personalty to the first donee, he will hold the same exonerated from all charge as regards any gift over depending upon some contingency. In *re Andrews*, 6 Jur. n. s. 114; ante, § 604 a.

the wife of B, of £10,000, payable six months after the testator's decease, with the following words added, 'I *recommend* to my said daughter and her said husband that they do forthwith settle and assure the said sum of £10,000, together with all such sum of money as the said B shall choose, for the benefit of my said daughter A and her children,' has been held to be a trust for the children after the decease of A, so that the legacy did not lapse by the death of A in the testator's lifetime.¹(a)

1068 a. In short it may be stated as a general result of the cases, in the language of Lord Eldon, that whether the words of the will are those of recommendation, or precatory, or expressing hope, or that the testator has 'no doubt,' if the objects with regard to whom such terms are applied are certain, and the subjects of property to be given are also certain, the words are considered imperative and create a trust.² Or as another learned judge has expressed it (in a form indeed open to some criticism), 'Wherever any person gives property and points out the object, the property, and the way in which it shall go, that does create a trust unless he shows clearly that his desire expressed is to be controlled by the party, and that he shall have an option to defeat it.'³ (b)

¹ Ford v. Fowler, 3 Beav. R. 146.

² Paul v. Compton, 8 Ves. 380; Dashwood v. Peyton, 18 Ves. 41. See also Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. jr. 333; Harland v. Trigg, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 142; Wynne v. Hank, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 179; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 2, § 4, note (x); Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves. 709; s. c. 5 Ves. 495; 8 Ves. 561; Tibbits v. Tibbits, Jac. R. 317; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 6.

³ Lord Alvanley, in Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. jr. 335. See Meredith v.

(a) A direction in a will that a certain person should be employed as agent and manager of the testator's estate, whenever his trustees should have occasion for the services of a person in that capacity, has been held not to create a trust which such person could enforce. Finden v. Stephens, 2 Phillips, 142.

(b) A trust will not be created if such a construction is inconsistent with any positive provision in the will. Shaw v. Lawless, 5 Clark & F. 129; Knott v. Cottee, 2 Phill. 192. See for further illustration of the rule of the text Briggs v. Penny, 4 Macn. &

G. 546; Williams v. Williams, 1 Sim. n. s. 358; Bernard v. Minshull, Johns. (Eng. Ch.) 276; Bonser v. Kinnear, 2 Giff. 195; Howarth v. Dewell, 6 Jur. n. s. 1360; Hambleton v. Durrington, 36 Md. 434; Irvine v. Sullivan, L. R. 8 Eq. 673; Le Merchant v. Le Merchant, L. R. 18 Eq. 414; Eaton v. Watts, L. R. 4 Eq. 151; Lambe v. Eames, L. R. 10 Eq. 267; 6 Ch. 597; Curnick v. Tucker, L. R. 17 Eq. 320; Mackett v. Mackett, L. R. 14 Eq. 49; Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass. 274; Rhett v. Mason, 18 Gratt. 541; Carpenter v. Miller, 3 W. Va. 174.

1069. The doctrine of thus construing expressions of recommendation, confidence, hope, wish, and desire into positive and peremptory commands is not a little difficult to be maintained upon sound principles of interpretation of the actual intention of a testator. It can scarcely be presumed that every testator should not clearly understand the difference between such expressions and words of positive direction and command; and that in using the one and omitting the other he should not have a determinate end in view. It will be agreed on all sides that where the intention of the testator is to leave the whole subject as a pure matter of discretion to the good-will and pleasure of the party enjoying his confidence and favor, and where his expressions of desire are intended as mere moral suggestions to excite and aid that discretion but not absolutely to control or govern it, there the language cannot and ought not to be held to create a trust. Now words of recommendation and other words precatory in their nature imply that very discretion as contradistinguished from peremptory orders; and therefore ought to be so construed unless a different sense is irresistibly forced upon them by the context.¹ Accordingly in more modern times a strong disposition has been indicated not to extend this doctrine of recommendatory trusts; but as far as the authorities will allow, to give to the words of wills their natural and ordinary sense unless it is clear that they are designed to be used in a peremptory sense.²

Heneage, 1 Sim. R. 542; Pierson v. Garnett, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 38, 45. Podmore v. Gunning, 7 Sim. R. 644; Wood v. Cox, 2 Mylne & Craig, 684. But where the objects of a trust are too indefinite to afford any certainty, there Courts of Equity will not execute it, but the property will fall into the residuum of the testator's estate, as it is clear that the legatee or devisee is not to take for his own use. Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Keen, R. 255; s. c. 3 Mylne & Craig, 507; Ommaney v. Butcher, 1 Turn. & Russ. 260; Ford v. Fowler, 3 Beav. R. 146, 147; ante, § 979 a; post, §§ 1071, 1183; 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 21, § 6, pp. 373 to 389; Lewin on Trusts, ch. 5, § 2, pp. 77 to 81; Knight v. Knight, 3 Beav. R. 148, 172 to 174; Knight v. Boughton, 11 Clark & Finel. 513, 548.

¹ See Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. R. 542.

² Sale v. Moore, 1 Sim. R. 534; Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. R. 542. In Sale v. Moore, 1 Sim. R. 534, the Vice-Chancellor said: 'The first case that construed words of recommendation into a command made a will for the testator, for every one knows the distinction between them. The current of decisions of late years has been against converting the legatee into a trustee.' See also Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. R. 542, where Lord Ch. Baron Richards expressed a similar opinion; and Lord Eldon also in Wright v. Atkyns, 1 V.

1070. Wherever therefore the objects of the supposed recommendatory trusts are not certain or definite,¹ wherever the property to which it is to attach is not certain or definite, wherever a clear discretion and choice to act or not to act is given, wherever the prior dispositions of the property import absolute and uncontrollable ownership,—in all such cases Courts of Equity will not create a trust from words of this character.² In the nature

& Beam. 315; *Lechmere v. Lavie*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 197; *Lawless v. Shaw*, 1 Lloyd & Gould, R. 154, and the Reporter's note; *Benson v. Whittam*, 5 Sim. R. 22; *Podmore v. Gunning*, 7 Sim. R. 644; *Wood v. Cox*, 1 Keen, R. 317; s. c. on appeal, 2 M. & Craig, 684. A strong case illustrative of the doctrine now maintained is *Ex parte Payne* (2 Younge & Coll. 646.). There the testator devised his estate to his daughter 'as some reward for her affectionate, unwearied, and unexampled attention to him during his illness of many years;' and then added, 'I strongly recommend to her to execute a settlement of the said estate and thereby to vest the same in trustees, &c., for the use and benefit of herself for life, with remainder to her husband and his assigns for life, with remainder to all and every the children she may happen to have, if more than one, share and share alike; and if but one, the whole to such one; or to such other uses as my said daughter shall think proper, to the intent that the said estate in the event of her marriage shall be effectually protected and secured;' and Lord Ch. Baron Abinger held that the daughter took an absolute estate. But see *Ford v. Fowler*, 3 Beav. R. 146, 147, and *Knight v. Knight*, 3 Beav. R. 148, 172, 173; ante, § 1068. See *Mayor of Gloucester v. Wood*, 3 Hare, R. 131, 143.

¹ See ante, § 979 *a*; *Stubbs v. Sargon*, 2 Keen, R. 255; s. c. 3 Mylne & Craig, 507; *Ommaney v. Butcher*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 260, 270, 271; *Mayor of Gloucester v. Wood*, 3 Hare, R. 131, 143. In this last case the court held that a bequest to an individual or corporation for a purpose which the testator says he has expressed elsewhere, but which from some unexplained cause is not and cannot be ascertained, creates such an uncertainty that a Court of Equity cannot declare what the intention of the testator is, and therefore it is to be deemed void.

² *Wynne v. Hawkins*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 179; *Harland v. Trigg*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 143; *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. R. 542; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 82, 83; *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 10 Ves. 536; *Cary v. Cary*, 2 Sch. and Lefr. 189; *Tibbits v. Tibbits*, 19 Ves. 664; *Eade v. Eade*, 5 Madd. R. 118; *Curtis v. Rippon*, 5 Madd. R. 434; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 6; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 2, § 4, note (*x*); *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 99 to 102. In *Wright v. Atkyns*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 157, Lord Eldon said, that in order to determine whether a trust of this sort is a trust which a Court of Equity will interfere with, it is matter of observation, first, that the words should be imperative; secondly, that the subject must be certain; and thirdly, that the object must be as certain as the subject. The case of *Wood v. Cox*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 684, affords a strong illustration of the first point. In *Pope v. Pope*, 10 Simons, R. 1, the testator gave whatsoever property, or effects he might die possessed of, after his debts were paid, or might become entitled to, to his wife, and appointed her sole executrix of his will, and added: 'And my reason for so doing

of things there is a wide distinction between a power and a trust. In the former the party may or may not act in his discretion.

is the constant abuse of trustees which I daily witness among men, at the same time trusting she will, from the love she bears to me and our dear children, so husband and take care of what property there may be for their good; and should she marry again, then I wish she may convey to trustees in the most secure manner possible what property she may then possess, for the benefit of the children as they may severally need or deserve, taking justice and affection for her guide;’ and at the conclusion of his will he gave the capital of his business to his wife, trusting that she would deal justly and properly to and by all their children. It was held that no trust was created for the children. This subject was much considered in the case of *Knight v. Knight*, 3 Beav. R. 148, 172 to 175, where Lord Langdale said: ‘But it is not every wish or expectation which a testator may express, nor every act which he may wish his successors to do, that can or ought to be executed or enforced as a trust in this court; and in the infinite variety of expressions which are employed, and of cases which thereupon arise, there is often the greatest difficulty in determining whether the act desired or recommended is an act which the testator intended to be executed as a trust, or which this court ought to deem fit to be, or capable of being, enforced as such. In the construction and execution of wills it is undoubtedly the duty of this court to give effect to the intention of the testator whenever it can be ascertained; but in cases of this nature, and in the examination of the authorities which are to be consulted in relation to them, it is unfortunately necessary to make some distinction between the intention of the testator and that which the court has deemed it to be its duty to perform; for of late years it has frequently been admitted by judges of great eminence that by interfering in such cases the court has sometimes rather made a will for the testator than executed the testator’s will according to his intention, and the observation shows the necessity of being extremely cautious in admitting any the least extension of the principle to be extracted from a long series of authorities in respect of which such admissions have been made. As a general rule it has been laid down that when property is given absolutely to any person, and the same person is, by the giver who has power to command, recommended, or entreated, or wished, to dispose of that property in favor of another, the recommendation, entreaty, or wish shall be held to create a trust: first, if the words are so used that upon the whole they ought to be construed as imperative; secondly, if the subject of the recommendation or wish be certain; and thirdly, if the objects or persons intended to have the benefit of the recommendation or wish be also certain. In simple cases there is no difficulty in the application of the rule thus stated. If a testator gives £1,000 to A B, desiring, wishing, recommending, or hoping that A B will at his death give the same sum or any certain part of it to C D, it is considered that C D is an object of the testator’s bounty, and A B is a trustee for him. No question arises upon the intention of the testator, upon the sum or subject intended to be given, or upon the person or object of the wish. So if a testator gives the residue of his estate, after certain purposes are answered, to A B, recommending A B after his death to give it to his own relations, or such of his own relations as he shall think most deserving, or as he shall choose, it has been considered that the residue of the property, although a subject to be ascertained, and that the rela-

In the latter the trust will be executed notwithstanding his omission to act.¹

1071. In respect to certainty in the description of objects or persons in such recommendatory trusts it may be proper to state that it is not indispensable that the persons should be described by their names. But more general descriptions will often amount to a sufficient designation of the persons to take, such for example as 'sons,' 'children,' 'family,' and 'relations,' if the context fixes the particular persons who are to take clearly and defi-

tions to be selected, although persons or objects to be ascertained, are nevertheless so clearly and certainly ascertainable — so capable of being made certain, that the rule is applicable to such cases. On the other hand if the giver accompanies his expression of wish or request by other words, from which it is to be collected that he did not intend the wish to be imperative; or if it appears from the context that the first taker was intended to have a discretionary power to withdraw any part of the subject from the object of the wish or request; or if the objects are not such as may be ascertained with sufficient certainty, it has been held that no trust is created. Thus the words "free and unfettered," accompanying the strongest expression of request, were held to prevent the words of the request being imperative. Any words by which it is expressed, or from which it may be implied, that the first taker may apply any part of the subject to his own use, are held to prevent the subject of the gift from being considered certain; and a vague description of the object, that is, a description by which the giver neither clearly defines the object himself nor names a distinct class out of which the first taker is to select, or which leaves it doubtful what interest the object or class of objects is to take, will prevent the objects from being certain within the meaning of the rule. And in such cases we are told (2 Ves. jr. 632, 633) that the question "never turns upon the grammatical import of words, — they may be imperative, but not necessarily so; the subject-matter, the situation of the parties, and the probable intent must be considered." And (10 Ves. 536) "wherever the subject to be administered as trust property, and the objects for whose benefit it is to be administered, are to be found in the will not expressly creating a trust, the indefinite nature and quantum of the subject, and the indefinite nature of the objects, are always used by the court as evidence that the mind of the testator was not to create a trust, and the difficulty that would be imposed upon the court to say what should be so applied, or to what objects, has been the foundation of the argument that no trust was intended;" or, as Lord Eldon expresses it in another case (Turn. & Russ. 159), "Where a trust is to be raised, characterized by certainty, the very difficulty of doing it is an argument which goes to a certain extent towards inducing the court to say it is not sufficiently clear what the testator intended." See also *Knight v. Boughton*, 11 Clark & Finel. R. 548.

¹ *Brown v. Higgs*, 8 Ves. 569, 570, 574; *Pushman v. Filliter*, 3 Ves. 7; *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 10 Ves. 536; *Winch v. Brutton*, *The (English) Jurist*, 1844, vol. 8, p. 1086. This last case contains a very striking illustration of the doctrine.

nately.¹ (a) Thus a devise to the family of A will often be a sufficient designation, and may be construed to mean the heir at law of A, or the children of A, or even the relations of A, according to the context.² And on the other hand the language may be so loosely and indeterminately used as not to amount to a clear designation of any persons, and thus the recommendation may fail to create a trust.

1072. We may illustrate each of these positions by cases which have actually passed into judgment. Thus where a testator devised his leasehold estates to his brother A forever, 'hoping he will continue them in the family,' it was held that this raised no trust for the family, for no particular objects were pointed out. There was a choice, and the devisee might dispose of the property either way; and if he had sold it the family could not have claimed against the vendee.³ On the other hand where a testator devised all his leasehold as well as freehold estates, &c. 'unto his mother and her heirs forever, in the fullest confidence that after her decease she would devise the property to his family,' it was held that she took an estate for life with a remainder in trust for the devisor's heir at law, as *persona designata*.⁴

1073. In the next place as to certainty in the description of property, or rather as to what property is bequeathed. This also may be illustrated by some cases which have already passed into judgment. Thus where a testator bequeathed to his wife all the residue of his personal estate, 'not doubting but that she will dispose of what shall be left at her death to our two grandchildren,' it was held that the uncertainty of the property to which the bequest should attach (what shall be left) defeated it as a

¹ *Pierson v. Garnett*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 38; *Forbes v. Ball*, 3 Meriv. R. 437; 1 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, 274 and note (7); *Id.* 290, note (3); *Jeremy on Equity Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 100, 101.

² See *Wright v. Atkyns*, 17 Ves. 255; s. c. 19 Ves. 301; *Cooper*, Eq. R. 116; *Barnes v. Patch*, 8 Ves. 604; *Cruwys v. Colman*, 9 Ves. 319; 1 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, 274, note (7); ante, § 1065 a.

³ *Harland v. Trigg*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 142, 144. See *Doe v. Joinville*, 3 East, R. 172; *Saie v. Moore*, 1 Sim. R. 534; *Nowlan v. Nellighan*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 489; *Curtis v. Rippon*, 5 Madd. R. 434.

⁴ *Wright v. Atkyns*, 17 Ves. 255; s. c. 19 Ves. 301; *Cooper*, Eq. R. 116.

(a) See *Lambe v. Eames*, L. R. 6 Ch. 597.

recommendatory trust; for the residue might be just such as the wife chose.¹ So where a testator bequeathed to his wife all the residue of his estate, 'recommending to her and not doubting, as she has no relations of her own family, but that she will consider my near relations should she survive me as I should consider them myself in case I should survive her,' it was held that the words did not create a trust, from the uncertainty both of the objects and the property to be taken by the relations.²

1074. These may suffice as specimens of the curious refinements in the interpretation of wills which Courts of Equity have adopted in creating constructive trusts; in which indeed they have often been followed by Courts of Law in regard to legal estates.³ It is highly probable that some of these refinements were borrowed from the civil law, in which the distinction between pure legacies and legacies clothed with trusts was well known. Thus it is said: 'Legatum est quod legis modo, id est imperative, testamento relinquitur. Nam ea quæ precative modo relinquuntur, fideicommissa vocantur.'⁴ And again: 'Fideicommissum est quod non civilibus verbis sed precative relinquitur; nec ex rigore juris civilis proficiscitur sed ex voluntate datur relinquentis.'⁵ And then by the way of illustration it is declared; 'Fideicommittere his verbis possumus; rogo, peto, volo, mando, deprecor, cupio, injungo, desidero, quoque et impero, verba, utile faciunt fideicommissum: relinquo, vero, et com-

¹ *Wynne v. Hawkins*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 179; *Pushman v. Filliter*, 3 Ves. 7; *Eade v. Eade*, 5 Madd. 118; *Curtis v. Rippon*, 5 Madd. R. 494. See also *Harwood v. West*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 387. In *Gilbert v. Bennett* (10 Simons, R. 371), the testator gave all his property to his wife and two other persons in trust for the undermentioned purpose, namely, to pay the income to his wife for the education and support of his children by her, and after her death the property to be divided among his children; and he gave his furniture, plate, &c. to his wife absolutely. It was held that the children were not entitled to the trust property on their father's death, but that their mother was entitled to the income for her life, she maintaining and educating the children out of it. But see *Smith v. Bell*, 6 Peters, 68; post, § 1394.

² *Sale v. Moore*, 1 Sim. R. 534; *Attorney-Gen. v. Hall*, cited 2 Cox, R. 355; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, p. 100. See also *Podmore v. Gunning*, 7 Sim. R. 644; *Wood v. Cox*, 1 Keen, R. 317; s. c. on appeal, 2 Mylne & Craig, R. 684; *Ex parte Payne*, 2 Younge & Coll. 636; ante, §§ 979 a, 1068 to 1072, 1183.

³ *Doe v. Smith*, 5 M. & Selw. 126; *Doe v. Joinville*, 3 East, R. 172.

⁴ *Pothier, Pand. Lib.* 30, tit. 1 to 3, n. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*

mendo, nullam fideicommissi pariunt actionem.’¹ Some of these shades of distinction are extremely nice and almost evanescent; especially that between the words *deprecor*, *peto*, and *desidero*, and the words *relinquo* and *commendo*. Again: ‘*Etiam hoc modo; cupio des, opto des, credo te daturum, fideicommissum est.*’² ‘*Et eo modo relictum; exigo, desidero uti des, fideicommissum valet.*’³ ‘*Verba quibus testator ita caverat: Non dubitare se, quodcumque uxor ejus cepisset liberis suis redditurum, pro fideicommisso accipienda.*’⁴ In these last citations we may clearly trace the origin or at least the application of some of our modern equity doctrines.

1074 *a*. It is in cases of wills that Courts of Equity are frequently called upon to apply the doctrine, as it is commonly called, of *cy-pres*; and it is by no means confined, as is sometimes supposed, to cases of charities. The doctrine of *cy-pres* is now sufficiently simple, and is well established, though sometimes of difficult application. If an estate is given to a person for life or indefinitely, and after failure of issue of such person it is given over, the court implies an estate tail in the first taker, sacrificing only in that simple case the life estate in order that all the issue may be embraced in the limitation. The next case which may be noticed is where a testator after giving a particular estate to the first taker has gone on to direct that it shall go to unborn persons in a way which would create a perpetuity with a limitation over on failure of issue of the first taker. The court in such a case is embarrassed with the fact that besides the gift over, which in the simple case first stated would create an estate tail, there is a direction that the estate shall devolve in a manner not allowed by law, but which in common cases previously to *Pitt v. Jackson*⁵ would, so far as respected the order of succession, only be consistent with and included in an intention to give an estate tail. The courts were thus placed in this position; the intention to give the estate to particular persons in particular order of succession was manifest, but the specified

¹ *Ibid.*; Inst. B. 2, tit. 24, § 3; Cod. Lib. 6, tit. 43, l. 2; Dig. Lib. 31, tit. 2, l. 77, passim; 2 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 1, art. 3.

² Dig. Lib. 30, tit. 1, l. 115; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 30, tit. 1 to 3, n. 26.

³ Dig. Lib. 30, tit. 1, l. 118; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 30, tit. 1 to 3, n. 26.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 31, tit. 2, l. 67, § 10; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 30, tit. 1 to 3, n. 26. See *Knight v. Knight*, 3 Beav. R. 148, 161.

⁵ 2 Bro. C. C. 51.

mode in which those persons were to take being excluded by the rule of law against perpetuities, the question was whether the primary intention to benefit particular persons in a particular order of succession should be accomplished, and the particular mode of giving effect to it be rejected, or the whole will be inoperative. This was the difficulty with which the court had to struggle. 'Whether the two expressed intentions, both of which could not be effectuated, were well or ill described by the terms "general" and "particular" intention, or whether the criticism upon those expressions is just, appears to me immaterial. It is a mode of characterizing the different and to a certain extent conflicting intentions of the testator which satisfied Lord Eldon and other judges of great eminence. The meaning of the terms is now sufficiently understood. In order to preserve and effect something which the court collects from the will to have been the paramount object of the testator, it rejects something else which is regarded as merely a subordinate purpose, namely, the mode of carrying out that paramount intention.'¹ (a)

¹ Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram in *Vanderplank v. King*, 3 Hare, R. 1, 12; *Pitt v. Jackson*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 51; post, § 1169.

(a) See *Hannam v. Sims*, 2 DeG. & J. 151.

There is probably no place in the law in which 'cases' are so lightly regarded as in the construction of written instruments. Unless the question concerns a rule of interpretation as distinguished from the application of a rule, decided cases, to be much relied upon, must be precisely in point on the facts. 'Upon the construction of wills,' says the Lord Chancellor in *Stewart v. Jones*, 5 Jur. N. s. 229; s. c. 3 DeG. & J. 532, 'we are not much assisted by a reference to cases unless the will or the words used are very similar. If this is not so, they are more likely to mislead than to assist, in coming to a correct conclusion. The object of construction is to ascertain the intention of the testator,

which is to be collected not from isolated passages but from the whole of the will and the general scope and scheme of it.' See also the suggestion of Lord Justice Lindley in an article on the Law Reports in the April number of the *Law Quarterly Review*, 1885. It is there proposed to omit the reporting of 'construction cases' 'unless there is good reason for including them;' and in the next number of the same Review, p. 289, a learned writer observes, 'Of late years [English] judges have happily set their faces against the citation of cases turning upon obscure sentences in wills, and have made it possible to consign to the waste-paper basket many decisions which the reporters of fifty years ago would have felt bound to print.'

CHAPTER XXX.

EXPRESS TRUSTS. — ELECTION AND SATISFACTION.

1075. It is in cases of wills also that the doctrine respecting ELECTION AND SATISFACTION must frequently though not exclusively¹ arise in practice and is acted upon and enforced by Courts of Equity.² Election in the sense here used is the obligation imposed upon a party to choose between two inconsistent or alternative rights or claims in cases where there is clear intention of the person from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both. Every case of election therefore presupposes a plurality of gifts or rights with an intention, express or implied, of the party who has a right to control one or both, that one should be a substitute for the other. The party who is to take has a choice; but he cannot enjoy the benefits of both.³

¹ There is no question that the doctrine of election extends to deeds in the English law. See the cases cited in Mr. Swanston's note to *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. 400, 401. Mr. Swanston seems to think that the doctrine of election in the civil law was confined to wills, and originated in the like application to wills in English Jurisprudence. Perhaps it is questionable whether in the civil law the doctrine was confined to wills. These were the most common instruments under which it would arise, and that may account for most of the cases being put as arising on wills; but the principle in its own nature seems equally applicable to other instruments.

² *Birmingham v. Kirwan*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 449; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 40 to 69; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 5*, pp. 534 to 537; 1 *Roberts on Wills*, ch. 1, § 10, pp. 96 to 106; 2 *Roper on Legacies*, by White, ch. 23, pp. 480 to 579.

³ Mr. Swanston's note to *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. R. 394, note (b); 3 *Wooddes. Lect. 69*, p. 491; *Thellusson v. Woodford*, 13 Ves. 220; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 40 to 49; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 5*, pp. 534 to 538. Mr. Swanston's note is drawn up with great ability and learning, and I have freely used it in the discussion of this topic. The whole subject of election is also most elaborately examined in *Roper on Legacies*, by White, vol. 2, ch. 23, pp. 480 to 578, to which the attention of the learned reader is invited. It is wholly inconsistent with the nature of these Commentaries to discuss all the minute distinctions belonging to it, interesting and important as they certainly are.

1076. Thus for example if a testator should by his will give to a legatee an absolute legacy of ten thousand dollars or an annuity of one thousand dollars per annum during his life at his election, it would be clear that he ought not to have both, and that he ought to be compelled to make an election whether he would take the one or the other. This would be a case of express and positive election. But suppose instead of such a bequest a testator should devise an estate belonging to his son or heir at law to a third person, and should in the same will bequeath to his son or heir at law a legacy of one hundred thousand dollars, or should make him the residuary devisee of all his estate real and personal. It would be manifest that the testator intended that the son or heir should not take both to the exclusion of the other devisee, and therefore he ought to be put to his election which he would take; that is, either to relinquish his own estate or the bequest under the will. This would be a case of implied or constructive election.¹ (a)

1077. Now the ground upon which Courts of Equity interfere in all cases of this sort (for at law there is no direct remedy to compel an election) is, that the purposes of substantial justice may be obtained by carrying into full effect the whole intentions of the testator.² And in regard to the cases of implied election it has been truly remarked that the foundation of the doctrine is still the intention of the author of the instrument; an intention which, extending to the whole disposition, is frustrated by the failure of any part. Its characteristic in its application to these cases is that by equitable arrangement full effect is given to a donation of that which is not the property of the donor. A valid gift in terms absolute is qualified by reference to a distinct clause, which though inoperative as a conveyance affords authentic evidence of intention. The intention being assumed, the conscience of the donee is affected by the condition (although it is destitute of legal validity), not express but implied, which is annexed to the benefit proposed to him. For the donee to accept the benefit while he declines the burden is to defraud the

¹ Ibid.

² *Crosbie v. Murray*, 1 Ves. jr. 557, 559.

(a) There is no rule that a person to whom a testator has made two distinct gifts, one of which is subject to a burden created by the testator, is bound to accept or reject both. It is a question of intention to be gathered from the will. *Warren v. Rudall*, 6 Jur. N. S. 395.

designs of the donor.¹ In short Courts of Equity in such cases adopt the rational exposition of the will that there is an implied condition that he who accepts a benefit under the instrument shall adopt the whole, conforming to all its provisions and renouncing every right inconsistent with it.²

1078. The doctrine of election, like many other doctrines of Equity Jurisprudence, appears to have been derived from the civil law. By that law a bequest of property which the testator knew to belong to another was not void; but it entitled the legatee to recover from his heir either the subject of the bequest, or, if the owner was unwilling to part with that at a reasonable price, the pecuniary value.³ Thus it is said in the Institutes that a testator may not only bequeath his own property or that of his heir, but also the property of other persons; so that the heir may be obliged to purchase and deliver it, or if he cannot purchase it, to give the legatee its value.⁴ But ordinarily to give

¹ 1 Swanston, R. 394, 395, note (b), where the authorities are fully collected; *Noys v. Mordaunt*, 2 Vern. 581, and Mr. Raithby's note; s. c. *Gilb. Eq. R. 2*; 2 Fonbl, Eq. B. 4, ch. 1, § 5, note (l).

² 1 Powell on Devises by Jarman, 430, 433, note (4); 1 Swanst. R. 393 to 408, note (b), *Frank v. Lady Standish*, 15 Ves. 391, note; *Streatfield v. Streatfield*, Cas. t. Talb. 183; *Boughton v. Boughton*, 2 Ves. 12, 14; *Boome v. Monck*, 10 Ves. 616, 617; *Walker v. Jackson*, 2 Atk. 627, 629; *Clarke v. Guise*, 2 Ves. 617; *Wilson v. Lord Townshend*, 2 Ves. jr. 606; *Blake v. Banbury*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 21, 24; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 514; *Thellusson v. Woodford*, 13 Ves. 220; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 40 to 49. Lord Redesdale's remarks on this subject in *Birmingham v. Kirwan* (2 Sch. & Lefr. 449, 450), illustrate the principle very clearly. 'The general rule,' says he, 'is that a person cannot accept and reject the same instrument. And this is the foundation of the law of election on which Courts of Equity particularly have grounded a variety of decisions in cases both of deeds and of wills, though principally in cases of wills; because deeds being generally matter of contract, the contract is not to be interpreted otherwise than as the consideration, which is expressed, requires; and voluntary deeds are generally prepared with greater deliberation and more knowledge of pre-existing circumstances than wills, which are often prepared with less care, and by persons uninformed of circumstances, and sometimes ignorant of the effect even of the language which they use. In wills therefore it is frequently necessary to consider the general purport of the disposition in order to extract from it what is the intention of the testator. The rule of election however I take to be applicable to every species of instrument, whether deed or will, and to be a rule of law as well as of equity.'

³ 2 Domat. B. 4, tit. 2, § 3, art. 3 to 5.

⁴ *Inst. B. 2, tit. 20, § 4, tit. 24, § 2*; *Dig. Lib. 30, tit. 1, l. 39, § 7*; *Dig. Lib. 31, tit. 2, l. 67, § 8*; 2 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 2, art. 4; 1 Swanst. 396, note; *Pothier, Pand. Lib. 30, tit. 1, n. 125*.

effect to a legacy in such a case the testator must have known that the property so bequeathed by him belonged to another, and not have been ignorant of the fact and supposed the property was his own. 'Hæredum etiam res proprias,' says the Code, 'per fideicommissum relinqui posse, non ambigitur.'¹

1079. In the civil law also, wherever the heir or devisee took an estate under a will containing burdensome legacies or any disposition of his own property in the manner above mentioned, he was at liberty to accept or to renounce the inheritance. But (it has been said) he had no other alternative. He could not accept the benefit offered by the will and retain the property of which it assumed to dispose upon the terms of compensation or indemnity to the disappointed claimant. The effect therefore of an election to take in opposition to the will was a renunciation of all the benefits offered by it. The effect of an election to take under the will was different, according to the subject-matter. If the property of which the will assumed to deprive the devisee was pecuniary, he was compelled to perform the bequest to the extent of the principal and interest which he had received; if the property was specific, then a peremptory obligation was imposed upon him to deliver that very thing, although exceeding the amount of the benefit conferred on him.²

1080. The earliest cases in which the doctrine of election was applied in English Jurisprudence seem to have been those arising out of wills; although it has since been extended to cases arising under other instruments.³ It has been said that the doctrine constitutes a rule of law as well as of equity; and that the reason why Courts of Equity are more frequently called upon to consider the subject is that in consequence of the forms of proceed-

¹ Cod. Lib. 6, tit. 42, l. 25.

² Mr. Swanston's note to *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. R. 396.

³ Mr. Swanston's note, 1 Swanst. R. 397, 400, 401; *Bigland v. Huddleston*, 3 Brown, Ch. Cas. 285, note, Belt's edition and his note (3); *Green v. Green*, 2 Meriv. R. 86; s. c. 19 Ves. 665. It appears from Mr. Swanston's note to *Dillon v. Parker* (1 Swanst. R. 397, id. 443, 444), that traces of the interposition of Courts of Equity can be found as early as the reign of Queen Elizabeth. The suggestion of Lord Hardwicke in *Boughton v. Boughton* (2 Ves. 14), that *Noys v. Mordaunt* (2 Vern. R. 581; s. c. Gilb. Eq. R. 2) was the first case, is undoubtedly incorrect; though Sir Thomas Clarke appears to have held the same opinion in *Clarke v. Guise* (2 Ves. R. 618). See Mr. Swanston's note to *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. R. 399, and *Rancliffe v. Parkins* (6 Dow, R. 149).

ing at law the party cannot be put to elect. In order to enable a Court of Law to apply the principle, the party must either be deemed concluded, being bound by the nature of the instrument, or must have acted upon it in such a manner as to be deemed concluded by what he has done; that is, to have elected. This frequently throws the jurisdiction into equity, which can compel the party to make an election, and not to leave it uncertain under what title he may take.¹ Whether any such rule of election is recognized at law has been greatly doubted; although in cases working by way of estoppel there may be a rule sometimes approaching nearly to it.²

¹ Lord Redesdale in 2 Sch. & Lefr. 450.

² Mr. Swanston, in his learned note to *Gretton v. Haward*, 1 Swanst. 425, note (a), has commented on this subject at large. It is so valuable a review of the whole subject that I have ventured to present it in this place. After citing the passage in the text from Lord Redesdale's decision he says: "Lord Rosslyn also is reported to have said, "The principle of these cases" (cases of election) "is very clear. The application is more frequent here; but it is recognized in Courts of Law every day. You cannot act, you cannot come forth to a court of justice, claiming in repugnant rights." 2 Ves. jr. 696. Lord Mansfield, in a judgment the authority of which on every point has been strongly questioned (Sugden on Powers, 498, et seq.), professed the same opinion. 4 T. R. 743 n. See *Goodtitle v. Bailey*, Cowp. 597. That no court will enforce rights which it recognizes as repugnant may be admitted probably for an universal proposition. But courts which differ in the rights which they recognize necessarily differ in the recognition of repugnancy. In no instance, it is believed (with the exception of the anomalous cases last cited), has a Court of Law adverted to a clause by which a testator assumes to dispose of the property of his devisee in favor of a third person for the purpose of declaring the right of the devisee to the benefit offered by the will, repugnant to his right to retain the property of which that clause purports to dispose. It is obvious that such a clause proceeding from one who is not the owner cannot transfer the legal interest in the property. Being distinct and unconnected, without words or necessary implication of reference, it cannot qualify the prior clause of devise as a condition. Nor can it operate by estoppel against the devisee, no party to the will, and whose title to his own estate is not derived from the testator: Failing therefore to effect, it serves only to denote the purpose of its authority, and becomes the peculiar subject of the jurisdiction of a Court of Equity, which in administering the rights of its suitors by enforcing the obligations affecting their conscience executes the intention in which those obligations originate. The instances in which Courts of Law have applied the maxim "Allegans contraria non est audiendus" are instances of inconsistent titles, whether to the same subject as a contemporaneous estate for life, and in tail, in the same land (see *Jenkins*, Cent. 1, Case 27); or the claim of a tenant under and against his landlord (mentioned by Lord Rosslyn, 2 Ves. jr. 696); or to different subjects as dower at once in the land taken and in the land given in exchange (see the case cited, 3 Leon.

1081. But whatever may be the truth of the case as to the recognition of the doctrine of election in Courts of Law, it is

271, Perk. § 319); the assertion of one title being incomplete without a negation of the other. It is a maxim not of morality but of logic, and compels election between claims, in respect not of the injustice but of the technical impracticability of their contemporaneous assertion. In Courts of Law the suitor is permitted to assert rights which, so far as the intention of the parties constitutes repugnancy, are confessedly repugnant. If a man make a feoffment in fee of lands or tenements, either before or after marriage, to the use of the husband for life, and after to the use of A for life, and then to the use of the wife for life in satisfaction of her dower, this is no jointure within the statute, &c.; and albeit in that case A should die, leaving the husband, and after the death of the husband the wife entereth, yet this is no bar of her dower, but she shall have her dower also. Co. Litt. 36 *b*, and see 4 Co., 2 *b*, Wilmot's Opinions, p. 188; 9 Mod. 152. So if A disseises B, tenant for life or in fee, of the manor of Dale, and afterwards gives the manor of Dale to B and his heirs in full satisfaction of all his rights and actions which he has in or for the manor of Dale, which B accepts; yet B may enter into the manor of Dale, or recover it in any real action. 4 Co. 1 *b*. No legal principle is better established than that on which these decisions proceed; namely, that a freehold right shall not be barred by collateral satisfaction. Co. Litt. 3 *b*, Doct. Plac. 17. The like assertion of rights morally repugnant has been sanctioned in many of the cases in which the courts have overruled a plea of accord and satisfaction (see Peyton's Case, 9 Co. 77; Grymes v. Blofield, Cro. El. 541; Co. Litt. 212); the plaintiff being permitted on technical grounds to enforce a claim for which he had received a compensation. A devise or bequest of that which is not the property of the testator is void at law. Bransby v. Grantham, Plowd. 525, 526; Litt. § 287; Co. Litt. 185 *b*; Perk. § 526; Godolph. Orph. Leg. Pt. 3, ch. 6, § 5; Swinb. on Wills, Pt. 3, § 3, n. 8, § 5, prope fin. § 6, n. 17; Doct. & Stu. l. 2, ch. 25, p. 126. "If a man bequeath to one another man's horse, in the law of the realm the legacy is void to all intents; and he to whom the legacy is made shall neither have the horse nor the value of the horse." Id. l. 2, ch. 55, p. 300, and see 3 Co. 29 *a*. To suppose that more favor would be shown to a clause in a deed purporting to pass the property of a stranger would be to contradict the established principle of construction. Being void thereof to all intents, such clause, whether in a deed or in a will, is inoperative at law either for transferring the subject or for qualifying a previous valid gift. To convert it into a condition, according to the equitable practice, by incorporation with a distinct clause, to which in terms it contains no reference, would be inconsistent with the rule that conditions imposed by the particular intention of the individual (as distinguished from conditions founded in the nature of the relation or contract between the parties, and by us denominated conditions in law) must, conformably to the feudal principle (Craig, Jus Feud. l. 2, dieg. 5, § 4), be expressed. Co. Litt. 201 *a*. Many decisions may be found on the question, What words annexed to the clause of gift for the purpose of connecting it with a distinct clause constitute a condition? "Ea intentione, ad affectum," which are sufficient in a will (Co. Litt. 236 *b*), are not sufficient in a deed (Co. Litt. 204 *a*). But in no case, it is believed, has a Court at Law inferred a condition from words applicable only to another sub-

very certain that it is principally enforced in Courts of Equity, where indeed the jurisdiction to compel the party to make an

ject, and void in their obvious sense, as purporting to pass an estate not the property of the author of the clause. The general principle of the law on the subject of repugnant rights is illustrated by the decisions on the concurrent claims to jointure and to dower. The Statute of Uses (27th Hen. VIII. ch. 10) having transferred the legal estate to the cestui que use, all women then married would have become dowable of lands held to the use of their husbands, retaining their title to lands settled on them in jointure. To prevent this injustice, it is by that statute (§ 6) declared that a woman having an estate in jointure with her husband (five species of which are enumerated) shall not be entitled to dower. And a subsequent clause (§ 9) reserves to the wife a right to refuse a jointure assured during marriage. See Wilmot's Opinions, p. 184 et seq. It has been decided that the species of estates enumerated are proposed only as examples; and the courts have in construction extended the operation of the statute to other instances within its principle though not within its words. *Vernon's Case*, 4 Co. 1. By the effect of this statute therefore no widow can claim both jointure and dower: jointure before marriage is a peremptory bar of dower; jointure after marriage she has an option to renounce. Lord Redesdale, in support of the proposition, that election is a principle of law (2 Sch. & Lefr. 451), has referred to 3 Leonard, 273. That report (which is cited in 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. Dower B.) contains only the argument of Egerton, Solicitor-General. But the case (*Butler v. Baker*) is fully reported in 3 Co. 25; Poph. 87; 1 And. 348; and the decision proceeded on the construction of the statute. The passage to which Lord Redesdale refers (3 Leon. 272 and 273) is no more than a dictum of Egerton in his argument. It is true however that the demandant in a writ of dower might be barred by plea of entry and acceptance of lands settled in jointure after marriage (*Doctrina Plac.* p. 149). See the form of pleading, Co. Entr. 172 *a*. But it is also true that the plea is founded on the Act of Hen. VIII. The Act having declared jointure a bar to dower, but reserved to the widow the option of refusing a jointure made after marriage, the question in that case was, "Whether the widow had accepted or refused the jointure?" If she had not refused under the 9th, she was barred of dower by the 6th section. The acceptance of the jointure constituting the case there specified, the widow was barred, not by her agreement, but by the statute (*Dyer*, 317 *a*). And it is abundantly clear that acceptance alone without the operation of the statute would not have formed a bar. *Vernon's Case*, 4 Co. 1; *Duchess of Somerset's Case*, *Dyer*, 97 *b*. In *Gosling v. Warburton* (Cro. El. 128, reported under various names, 1 Leon. 136, Owen, 154), also cited by Lord Redesdale and also referred to in Eq. Ca. Ab. ubi supra, a rent-charge was devised expressly "in recompense of dower." And the decision establishes only that such a benefit so devised is a jointure within the extended construction of the statute, and cannot be claimed after a recovery of dower. The series of decisions under this statute (the only instances in which the doctrine of election has been applied at law in a manner analogous to its application in equity) being founded expressly on the provisions of the statute, in contrast to the rules of the common law, constitute (it is conceived) a conclusive proof that the doctrine of election is equitable only. And one of the earliest instances (*Lacy v. Anderson*, ante) in which the

election is admitted to be exclusive. But independent of this broad and general ground of jurisdiction, the doctrine must be exclusively enforced in equity in all cases of mere trust estates; or where there is the intervention of complicated cross equities between different persons claiming in different degrees and under different limitations and titles; or where conveyances are necessary to be decreed; or where the recompense is not of a nature capable of being applied as a bar at law. Thus (to put a plain case) at the common law no collateral recompense made in satisfaction of dower or of a right of freehold could be pleaded in bar of such right of freehold or of dower.¹ But in equity it would be clearly held obligatory; and the party would be perpetually enjoined against asserting the title at law, or put to an election, as the circumstances of the case might require.²

1082. In the actual application of the doctrine of election Courts of Equity proceed upon principles which are wholly incapable of being enforced in the like manner by Courts of Law. Thus for example suppose a case of election under a will which disposes of other property of a devisee, and the devisee should elect to hold his own property and renounce the benefit of the devise under the will, or (as the compendious phrase is) should

equitable doctrine was enforced is the case of a copyhold estate devised and accepted in satisfaction of dower, which not being either within the strict or the extended import of the statute, a jointure would not have constituted a bar at law. And the aid of equity was requisite to prevent the disappointment of the testator's express intention. Accordingly many authorities occur in which the doctrine of election is described as exclusively equitable. In the report of *Noys v. Mordaunt*, by Chief Baron Gilbert, it is distinctly stated that "although the three daughters shall at law take their proportion of the entailed lands as co-heirs in tail, yet the eldest daughter in equity shall have an equivalent out of the fee-simple lands." Rep. in Eq. 3. Lord Hardwicke repeatedly refers to that case, which he considered the first of the kind, as founded on equity (1 Ves. 306; 3 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 178, 179), a benevolent equity (3 Atk. 715); and describes the right to compel election as derived from an equity of the Court of Chancery (2 Atk. 629). That description is in substance adopted by Lord Eldon (6 Dow, R. 179). Lord Chief Justice De Grey has accurately distinguished between the mode of indirectly disposing of the property of a stranger by express condition at law or by implied condition in equity (3 Ves. 530). And Lord Commissioner Eyre describes the practice of putting devisees to election as a strong operation of a Court of Equity (4 Bro. C. C. 24; 1 Ves. jr. 523).¹

¹ Co. Litt. 36 b; 1 Swanst. R. 426, 427, note; ante, § 1080, note 2.

² Ibid.: *Lawrence v. Lawrence*, 2 Vern. 366, and Mr. Raithby's note (1); 1 Swanst. R. 398, note.

elect against the will — in such a case it is clear that the party disappointed of his bequest or devise by such an election would at law be wholly remediless. The election would terminate all the interest of the parties respectively in the subject-matter of the devise to them. The election to hold his own estate would of course maintain the original title of the devisee; and his renunciation of the intended benefit in the estate devised to him would leave the same to fall into the residuum of the testator's estate as property undisposed of.

1083. But the subject is contemplated in a very different light by Courts of Equity; for in the event of such an election to take against the instrument Courts of Equity will treat the substituted devise not as an extinguished title, but as a trust in the devisee for the benefit of the disappointed claimants to the amount of their interest therein; or, as it has been well expressed, they will assume jurisdiction to sequester the benefit intended for the refractory donee, in order to secure compensation to those whom his election disappoints.¹ (a)

1084. The reasoning by which this doctrine is sustained has been stated by Sir William Grant in his usual clear and felicitous manner. 'If,' said he, 'the will is in other respects so framed as to create a case of election, then not only is the estate given to the heir under an implied condition that he shall confirm the whole of the will, but in contemplation of equity the testator means, in case the condition shall not be complied with, to give the disappointed devisees out of the estate over which he had a power a benefit correspondent to that which they are deprived of by such non-compliance. So that the devise is read as if it were to the heir absolutely if he confirm the will; if not, then in trust for the disappointed devisees as to so much of the estate given to him as shall be equal in value to the estate intended for them.'² (b)

¹ *Gretton v. Haward*, 1 Swanston, 441, note; *Green v. Green*, 2 Meriv. R. 86, s. c. 19 Ves. 665; *Pulteney v. Lord Darlington*, cited in *Green v. Green*, 2 Meriv. 93, 94, and in *Cavan v. Pulteney*, 2 Ves. jr. 560.

² *Welby v. Welby*, 2 V. & Beam. 190, 191.

(a) So where a widow elects to waive the provisions of her husband's will, under the statutes in regard to waiver. *Roe v. Roe*, 6 C. E. Green, 253; *Plympton v. Plympton*, 6 Allen, 178; *Firth v. Denny*, 2 Allen, 468.

(b) See *Griggs v. Gibson*, L. R. 1 Eq. 685; *Howells v. Jenkins*, 1 DeG.

1085. Another point has arisen in equity (and which indeed must be deemed one which could arise only in equity), and that is whether a devisee electing against the will thereby forfeits the whole of the benefit proposed for him, or so much only as is requisite to compensate by an equivalent those claimants whom he has disappointed, so that he may entitle himself to the surplus. In other words does such an election induce an absolute forfeiture, or only impose an obligation on the renouncing party to indemnify the claimants whom he disappoints? There is to be found in the authorities much contrariety of opinion incidentally expressed upon this point. But the fair result of the modern leading decisions is that in such a case there is not an absolute forfeiture, but there is a duty of compensation (at least where the case admits of compensation) or its equivalent;¹ and that the surplus after

¹ See *Tibbits v. Tibbits*, 19 Ves. 662, 663; s. c. 2 Meriv. R. 96, note (a). Lord Eldon, in *Green v. Green*, 19 Ves. p. 667, took a distinction between cases of election arising under deeds and those arising under wills, and said: 'I have looked into all the text-writers, the cases reported, and all in manuscript of which they are in possession, to see how far the doctrine of this court is settled, whether election requires the party to give up the whole, or only to make compensation for that which he does not permit to go according to the instrument against which he claims. It is impossible to reconcile the doctrine, as it is to be collected from the whole mass of the cases; the text in some asserting that the party must abide by the instrument in toto, in others, according to the language of Lord Chief Justice De Grey, in *Pulteney v. Lord Darlington*, that the devised interest is to be sequestered until satisfaction is made to the disappointed devisee. It is remarkable that in all the cases except one, *Bigland v. Huddleston*, the question arose upon wills affecting title under other instruments. But in that case, although it was argued that the doctrine of election does not apply to a deed, it was determined that it does. And it seems to have been thought that the party having some other interest sought to be affected by the deed must either give up altogether what he is to take under it, or must abide by it altogether. When it is settled that the principle of election does not apply to a deed, as it is a contract, it is very difficult to say compensation only is to be made. In this instance the defendant's father on his marriage agrees to settle the Lawford estate, and makes other provisions, thereby becoming a purchaser of the estate of his wife; and being tenant in tail he did not effectually convey by suffering a recovery. The question in equity therefore is, whether the son shall take his mother's estate without making good that contract under which his mother's estate was purchased. And I incline to think that, electing against a settlement, he is

J. & S. 617; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 1 DeG. 128 Mass. 152; *Holt v. Rice*, 54 N. H. & S. 152; *Synge v. Synge*, L. R. 15 398; *Smith v. Guild*, 34 Maine, 443; Eq. 389; *Pennsylvania Co. v. Stokes*, *Havens v. Sackett*, 15 N. Y. 365; 1 61 Penn. St. 136; *Watson v. Watson*, *Jarman, Wills*, 443 (5th Am. edit.).

such compensation does not devolve upon the heir as a residuum undisposed of by the will but belongs to the donee, the purpose being satisfied for which alone Courts of Equity will control his legal right.¹ In this respect the doctrine of Courts of Equity

bound to give up the whole benefit to which he is entitled under it, and not merely to make compensation. I do not believe that it will be possible satisfactorily to settle this question without doing that which I find impossible, and which under the present pressure of business cannot be expected from the registers, to enable me to interpret the language of the court, as it appears in the reports, by looking at the decrees; but my present opinion, subject to contradiction upon such a search and to what may be urged on hearing the cause is, that a man claiming under a marriage settlement is a purchaser under it, and if he will not give the price intended by the parties to be paid at his cost, he cannot take under it; and therefore this defendant must give up altogether the estates comprised in this settlement if he chooses to insist on his title to the Lawford estate. In one of the latest cases, *Thellusson v. Woodford*, where this doctrine is very ably discussed, it is laid down generally that a person shall not claim an interest under an instrument without giving full effect to that instrument as far as he can; and therefore having an interest under a will shall not be permitted to defeat the disposition, where it is in his power, and yet take under the will; the principle of election being plain and intelligible that if a person being about to dispose of his own property includes in his disposition, either from mistake or not, property of another, an implication arises that the benefit under that will shall be taken upon the terms of giving effect to the whole disposition. That was upon a will; yet there is authority enough to say that in that case the party is only to give up sufficient to compensate those who are disappointed; but my difficulty on a marriage settlement is that it operates a contract by the parties for all who are to take under it, and how one shall take the subject and retain the price. I doubt whether the principle stated by Lord Chief Justice De Grey, "that the equity of this court is to sequester the devised interest quousque until satisfaction is made to the disappointed devisee," can apply to such a case as this. Is it possible in a Court of Equity to say that where a man purchases his wife's estate for the issue of the marriage his son shall be permitted to withhold the price and disappoint that contract of which he takes the benefit? But see Mr. Belt's note to *Freke v. Lord Barrington*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 285, note (3).

¹ Mr. Swanston's note in *Gretton v. Haward*, 1 Swanst. 433; *Green v. Green*, 2 Meriv. R. 93; *Tibbits v. Tibbits*, 2 Meriv. R. 96, note; s. c. *Jacob*, R. 317; 1 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, 435 and note. This note of Mr. Swanston contains an elaborate review of all the leading dicta and authorities, and settles down into the doctrine stated in the text. See also *Pulteney v. Darlington*, cited in *Lady Cavan v. Pulteney*, 2 Ves. jr. 560, and 1 Swanst. 438, note, and Lord Rosslyn's judgment in 2 Ves. jr. 560; *Welby v. Welby*, 2 V. & Beam. 190, 191; *Rancllyffe v. Parkyns*, 6 Dow, R. 149; *Dashwood v. Peyton*, 18 Ves. 49 (a); *Rich v. Cockell*, 9 Ves. 379; 1 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, 435 and note; *Ker v. Wanchope*, 1 Bligh, R. 1. From what has been stated by Swanston in a preceding note (1 Swanst. 396, note), the civil law is, in his view, different; the election against the will being a forfeiture of the

differs, or has been supposed to differ, from that laid down in the civil law. In that law (it is said) an election against the will amounts to an absolute renunciation and forfeiture of all the bounty given by the will, and compensation to the disappointed claimants is unknown.¹

whole bounty of the testator. Mr. Sugden (*Sugden on Powers*, ch. 6, § 2, pp. 380, 381, 3d edit.) insists that the true rule in the English law is or should be the same.

¹ Ante, § 1079; Mr. Swanston's note to *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. 396, 2. The propriety of this doctrine of Courts of Equity in regard to both points admits of a most ample vindication, however artificial it may at first seem upon a superficial survey. It has been expounded and vindicated by the same learned writer in a masterly commentary, and his language scarcely admits of abridgment without injury to its force. 'Assuming,' says he, 'that the doctrine of election is equitable only, the infliction of forfeiture on a devisee electing to take against the will beyond the extent of compensation to those whom his election disappoints, would be inconsistent with the principle on which the doctrine rests. By the assumption, the devise of the testator's property has vested the legal estate in the devisee. But a Court of Equity (in the contemplation of which his conscience is affected by the implied condition) interfering to control his legal right for the purpose of executing the intention of the testator, is justified in its interference so far only as that purpose requires. In the common case of election to take against a will containing a devise of the property of the testator to his heir, and a second devise of the property of the heir to a stranger, the express intention of the testator that the heir should enjoy the subject of the first devise and the stranger the subject of the second, is defeated by the refusal of the heir to convey the latter. And a Court of Equity therefore restrains him in the enjoyment of the first, till the condition under which, in the contemplation of that court, it was conferred on him is satisfied. The intention of the testator, having become impracticable in the prescribed form, is executed by approximation, or, in the technical phrase, *cy pres*. The devise to the stranger, rendered void as a gift of the specific subject, is effectuated as a gift of value, and effectuated at the expense of the heir by whose interference its strict purport has been defeated. By this arrangement the intention of the testator in favor of the stranger, though defeated in form, is in substance accomplished; his intention in favor of the heir, equally express, remains to be considered. If the value of the estate retained by the heir exceeds the value of the estate designed for him, his own act is his indemnity. The benefit which he enjoys transcends the intention of the testator. But if the value of the estate of which the court deprives him exceeds the value of the estate of which he deprives the devisee, what disposition is to be made of the surplus? Considered as a gift of value (and on that principle the equitable arrangement is founded), the devise to the stranger entitles him to an equal amount, but is no authority for bestowing on him more. And the undisputed intention of the testator being that the subjects of both devises should be enjoyed by the heir and the devisee, what is not transferred to the devisee must remain with the heir. A Court of Equity which assumes jurisdiction to mitigate the rigor of legal conditions, and substitute for a formal a substantial performance, would act with little

1086. In regard to the point when an election may be insisted on or not, everything must (it is obvious) depend upon the language of the particular will; and it is difficult therefore to lay down many general rules on the subject. On the one hand it may be stated that in order to raise a case of election there must be a clear intention expressed on the part of the testator to give that which is not his property.¹ (a) A mere recital in a will that A is entitled to certain property, but not declaring the intention of the testator to give it to him, would not be a sufficient demonstration of his intention to raise an election.² So if a debtor by his will should recite the amount of the debt and erroneously calculate the sum and direct the payment of it, and

consistency in enforcing, by the technical doctrine of forfeiture, to the eventual disappointment of the testator's intention, a condition not expressed in the will but supplied by the construction of the court for the single purpose of executing that presumed intention. In the instance of pecuniary claims the question can scarcely arise; since in a choice between two sums of money no probable motive exists for electing the smaller. But supposing that case as a gift to a stranger of the benefit of a settlement, under which the heir of the testator was entitled to £1,000, and a bequest of £5,000 to the heir, and election by him to take under the settlement; by the deduction of £1,000 from the bequest in satisfaction of the disappointed legatee, and by payment to the heir of the remaining £4000, together with the sum due under the settlement, the intention of the testator would be executed in substance though not in form. The heir would take £5,000 and the legatee £1,000. By any other arrangement that intention, which must inevitably be violated in form, would be substantially defeated. The case of specific gifts may indeed involve some difficulty of appreciation by the existence of local attachments, which admit neither accurate estimation nor adequate compensation. But it is on the principle of appreciation that the court interferes to transfer to one party that which is expressly and at law effectually given to another. And the difficulty has been repeatedly encountered. Should any case present impediments of this nature practically insurmountable, the doctrine of compensation might become in that instance inapplicable, but would not for that reason cease to be the general rule of the court. By the doctrine of compensation, and the process of sequestration for executing it (though justly described as a strong operation), the intention of the testator is, so far as circumstances admit, effected. By the doctrine of forfeiture that intention would be defeated.'

¹ Swanst. R. note, pp. 441, 442.

¹ Attorney-Gen. v. Earl of Lonsdale, 1 Sim. R. 105.

² Dashwood v. Peyton, 18 Ves. 41; Forrester v. Cotton, Ambl. R. 388; s. c. 1 Eden, R. 532, 535, and note (c); Blake v. Bunbury, 1 Ves. jr. 515, 523.

(a) Havens v. Sackett, 15 N. Y. 45 Mo. 160; Bull v. Church, 5 Hill, 365; Pennsylvania Co. v. Stokes, 61 206; s. c. 2 Denio, 430. Penn. St. 136; O'Reilly v. Nicholson,

also should bequeath to the creditor a legacy, in such a case the creditor would not be put to his election. (a) But he might claim both and dispute the calculation of the amount; for in such a case it is not clear that the testator did not mean to pay the full amount of the actual debt.¹

1087. Upon the same ground a case of election cannot ordinarily arise where property is devised in general terms; as a devise of 'all my real estate in A,' which estate is subject to the claims of a devisee or legatee; for it is not apparent that he meant to dispose of any property but what was strictly his own subject to that charge.

1087 a. Upon similar grounds, where a testatrix gave a legacy to B in satisfaction of all claims upon the estate, he having at the time a claim upon the testatrix in respect to a legacy under the will of C, it was held that evidence of there being no other claim by B against the testatrix was inadmissible; and that B was not therefore compellable to elect between the benefit under the will of the testatrix and that of C.² The obvious reason for the decision is that the language of the testatrix did not by any means clearly point to any extinguishment of the claim under the will of C, and might well be satisfied by supposing it used solely with reference to any claims *ex directo* against her estate.

1088. Again if a testator should bequeath property to his wife, manifestly with the intention of its being in satisfaction of her dower, it would create a case of election.³ (b) But such an intention must be clear and free from ambiguity. (c) And it will not be inferred from the mere fact of the testator's making

¹ *Clarke v. Guise*, 2 Ves. 617, 618.

² *Dixon v. Samson*, 2 Younge & Coll. 566.

³ 3 Wooddes. Lect. 59, p. 493; *Arnold v. Kempstead*, Ambl. R. 466; s. c. 2 Eden, R. 237, and note, and cases therein cited; 1 Eq. Abridg. 218, B. 1, pl. 1; *Villareal v. Galway*, Ambl. R. 682; s. c. 1 Bro. Ch. R. 292, notes; *Fuller v. Yates*, 8 Paige, R. 325.

(a) See *Box v. Barrett*, L. R. 3 Eq. 244.

(b) This matter is regulated by statute in many States. *Gough v. Manning*, 26 Md. 347; *Ramsour v. Ramsour*, 63 N. Car. 231; *Carder v. Fayette Co.*, 16 Ohio St. 353; *Plympton v. Plympton*, 6 Allen, 178.

(c) *Bull v. Church*, 5 Hill, 206; s. c. 2 Denio, 430; *Savage v. Burnham*, 17 N. Y. 561, 571; *Lord v. Lord*, 23 Conn. 327; *Fulton v. Fulton*, 30 Miss. 586; *Higginbotham v. Cornwell*, 8 Gratt. 83; *Parker v. Sowerby*, 4 DeG. M. & G. 321.

a general disposition of all his property, although he should give his wife a legacy, for he might intend to give only what was strictly his own subject to dower. There is no repugnancy in such a devise or bequest to her title to dower.¹ (a) Besides, the right to dower being in itself a clear legal right, an intent to exclude that right by a voluntary gift ought to be demonstrated either by express words or by clear and manifest implication. In order to exclude it, the instrument itself ought to contain some provision inconsistent with the operation of such legal right.² (b) So the mere gift of an annuity by the testator to his

¹ *Ibid*; *French v. Davies*, 2 Ves. jr. 576, 577; *Lawrence v. Lawrence*, 2 Vern. 366, and *Raithby's note*; 1 Swanst. R. 398, note; *Greatorex v. Cary*, 6 Ves. 615; *Kitson v. Kitson*, Prec. Ch. 352; *Foster v. Cook*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 347; *Fuller v. Yates*, 8 Paige, R. 325.

² *Birmingham v. Kirwan*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 452, 453. See also *Pearson v. Pearson*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 292, and *Mr. Belt's note*; *Lord Dorchester v. Earl of Effingham*, Cooper, Eq. R. 319; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 59, p. 493; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 55, pp. 57, 58. In *Harrison v. Harrison* (1 Keen, R. 767), Lord Langdale said: 'The principle applicable to cases of this kind is that where a testator makes provision for his widow out of his real estates she will not be excluded from dower unless the enjoyment of dower together with the provision made by the will appears to be inconsistent with the intention of the testator as it is to be collected from the language of the will. The application of this principle has frequently occasioned considerable difficulty, and the cases are somewhat conflicting. A rent-charge to a wife has been held not to be a bar of dower in the absence of circumstances showing an intention to exclude her from it.' Lord Redesdale's remarks also on this point, in *Birmingham v. Kirwan*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 452, deserve to be cited at large. 'The principle,' says he, 'then, that the wife cannot have both dower and what is given in lieu of dower being acknowledged at law as well as in equity, the only question in such cases must be whether the provision alleged to have been given in satisfaction of dower was so given or not. If the provision results from contract, the question will be simply whether that was part of the contract. But if the provision be voluntary, a pure gift, the intention must either be expressed in the form of the gift, or must be inferred from the terms of it. It is however to be collected from all the cases that as the right to dower is in itself a clear legal right, an intent to exclude that right by voluntary gift must be demonstrated either by express words or by clear and manifest implication. If there be anything ambiguous or doubtful, if the court cannot say that it was clearly the intention to exclude, then the averment that the gift was made in lieu of dower cannot be supported. And to make a case of election

(a) But see *Colgate v. Colgate*, 8 C. E. Green, 372; *Atkinson v. Littlewood*, L. R. 18 Eq. 595. considered at length); *Cummings v. Cummings*, 51 Mo. 261; *Wigley v. Beauchamp*, Ib. 544; *Camden Ins. Assoc. v. Jones*, 23 N. J. Eq. 171.

(b) See *Bending v. Bending*, 3 Kay & J. 257 (where the subject is

widow, although charged upon all his property, is not sufficient to put her to her election between that and dower, even although the will contains a gift of the whole of the testator's real estate to another person.¹ So the gift of a portion of his real estate to his widow for life or during widowhood is not sufficient to put her to an election as to the residue of his real estate.² The reason is the same in all these cases.

1089. It is upon a similar ground that the doctrine of election has been held not to be applicable to cases where the testator has some present interest in the estate disposed of by him, although it is not entirely his own. In such a case, unless there is an intention clearly manifested in the will or (as it is sometimes called) a demonstration plain, or necessary implication, on his part to dispose of the whole estate, including the interest of third persons, he will be presumed to intend to dispose of that which he might lawfully dispose of, and of no more.³ (a)

that is necessary; for a gift is to be taken as pure until a condition appear. This I take to be the ground of all the decisions. *Hitchen v. Hitchen*, Prec. Ch. 133, proceeds clearly on this ground, and all the cases seem to have followed it. And the only question made in all the cases is, whether an intention not expressed by apt words could be collected from the terms of the instrument. Cases of this description can be used only to assist the judgment of the court in deciding what may be deemed sufficient manifestation of intention. And the result of all the cases of implied intention seems to be that the instrument must contain some provision inconsistent with the assertion of a right to demand a third of the lands, to be set out by metes and bounds, &c.' In *Fuller v. Yates*, 8 Paige, R. 325, 328, 329, Mr. Chancellor Walworth said: 'The right of dower being a legal right, the wife cannot be deprived of it by a testamentary disposition in her favor, so as to put her to an election, unless the testator has manifested his intention to deprive her of dower, either by express words or necessary implication. It is not pretended in this case that the language of the will in respect to the provisions for the wife is at all inconsistent with her claims to dower in the residue of the testator's real estate. The cases on the subject of implied manifestation of intention to exclude the right of dower appear to establish this principle, that, to put the wife to her election, the will must contain provisions which are wholly inconsistent with her claim of dower in the particular portion of the estate as to which the claim of dower is made.' Mr. Eden's note to *Arnold v. Kempstead*, 2 Edeu, R. 237, is very valuable on this subject.

¹ *Holdich v. Holdich*, 2 Y. & Coll. New R. 18, 21, 22.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Rancllyffe v. Parkyns*, 6 Dow, R. 149 to 179, 185; *Blake v. Bunbury*, 1 Ves. jr. 515, 523.

(a) See *Grissell v. Swinhoe*, L. R. 7 Eq. 291; *Wilkinson v. Dent*, L. R. 6 Ch. 339.

1090. Other exceptions may easily be put to the general doctrine of election. Thus for instance if a man should by his will give a child or other person a legacy or portion in lieu or satisfaction of a particular thing expressed, that would not exclude him from other benefits, although it might happen to be contrary to the will; for Courts of Equity will not construe it as meant in lieu of everything else when the testator has said it is in lieu of a particular thing.¹ (a)

1091. Again if a legatee should decline one benefit, charged with a portion given him by a will, he would not be bound to decline another benefit, unclogged with any burden given him by the same will.² (b) So if a legatee cannot obtain a particular benefit designed for him by a will, except by contradicting some part of it, he will not be precluded by such contradiction from claiming other benefits under it. The ground of all these exceptions is that it is not apparent from the face of the will that the testator meant to exclude the party from all benefits under the will unless in all respects the purposes of the will were fulfilled by him.³ (c) But if it should be so apparent or fairly inferable

¹ East v. Cook, 2 Ves. 23; Dillon v. Parker, 1 Swanst. R. 404, 405, note.

² Andrews v. Trinity Hall, 9 Ves. 534; 1 Swanst. 402, note.

³ Mr. Swanston in his learned note on this point says (1 Swanst. R. 405): 'The rule of not claiming by one part of an instrument in contradiction to another has exceptions (Lord Hardwicke, 2 Ves. 33, and see Vern. & Scriv.

(a) See Wilkinson v. Dent, L. R. 6 Ch. 339.

(b) In Wollaston v. King, L. R. 8 Eq. 165, 174, Vice-Chancellor James, referring to the rule in Whistler v. Webster, 2 Ves. 367, — that no man shall claim any benefit under a will without conforming as far as he can and giving effect to everything in it whereby any disposition is made showing an intention that such a thing shall take place, — said that the rule had not been applied in Carver v. Bowles, 2 Russ. & M. 301, and later cases. The rule to be deduced from these cases, he declared, was that election was to be applied between a gift under a will and a claim dehors the will and adverse to it; it was not to be applied between one clause in a will and an-

other clause in the same will. 'It would seem a very strange thing,' he says, 'that in construing the same instrument the court, dealing with a clause in which a fund is expressed to be given partly to A and partly to B, should hold that, the gift to A being void, the testator's intention is that B should take the whole; and then coming to another clause in which another fund is given to B, and no mention of A at all, it should hold that there is an implied condition that B should give back part of that which it was the testator's intention that he should take.'

(c) See Blaiklock v. Grindle, L. R. 7 Eq. 215; Coutts v. Acworth, L. R. 9 Eq. 519.

from the nature of the different benefits conferred by the will, there the legatee would be put to his election to take all or to reject all.¹

1092. It may be added that the doctrine of election is not applied to the case of creditors. They may take the benefit of a devise for payment of debts, and also enforce their legal claims upon other funds disposed of by the will; for a creditor claims not as a mere volunteer, but for a valuable consideration, and *ex debito justitiæ*.²

53); and the ground of the exceptions seems to be a particular intention denoted by the instrument different from that general intention the presumption of which is the foundation of the doctrine of election. Several cases have been, and several more may be, in which a man by his will shall give a child or other person a legacy or portion in lieu or satisfaction of particular things expressed, which shall not exclude him from another benefit, though it may happen to be contrary to the will, for the court will not construe it as meant in lieu of everything else when he has said a particular thing. Lord Hardwicke, *East v. Cook*, 2 Ves. 33. Upon that principle it was decided in *Bor v. Bor*, 3 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 167 (see Vern. & Scriv. 53, 54) that the testator having by express proviso made a disposition in the event of his not possessing power to devise certain estates, no implied condition arose against the heir, disappointing the devisee but complying with the proviso. So a legatee who cannot obtain a benefit designed for him by the will except by contradicting some part of it will not be precluded by such contradiction from claiming other benefits under it. *Huggins v. Alexander*, cited 2 Ves. 31. The intention being equal in favor of each part of the testamentary disposition, no reason is afforded for controlling one in order to accomplish the other. Under a will containing a bequest to the testator's widow in satisfaction of all dower or thirds which she might claim out of his real or personal estate, or either of them, and a residuary bequest, which failed, the widow, accepting the specific bequest, was not excluded from her distributive share of the undisposed residue. For if the court could (which it cannot), on a question between the next of kin, advert to the will, it would find there no evidence of an intention to exclude the widow in their favor.' *Pickering v. Lord Stamford*, 3 Ves. jr. 332, 492. Other exceptions might be mentioned, as for example the doctrine of election does not apply as between appointees under a power executed by will where there is an excessive execution of the power so that it is void as to some of the appointees and good as to others. In such cases the appointees whose shares are valid will participate equally with those whose shares are void in the property of which the appointment fails. 1 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, 430, note (b); *Id.*: 440; *Bristow v. Ward*, 2 Ves. Jr. 336; *Sugden on Powers*, ch. 6, § 2, pp. 384, 385 (3d edit.).

¹ *Talbot v. Earl of Radnor*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 252.

² *Kidney v. Coussmaker*, 12 Ves. 154; 1 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, 437, note (5). The Master of the Rolls, in *Kidney v. Coussmaker* (12 Ves. 154), speaking on this subject, says: 'Another objection made for the widow is that the creditors take a benefit under the will of the testator by the devise for payment of the debts generally, and therefore they shall not be permitted

1093. On the other hand it is sufficient to raise a case of election in equity that the testator does dispose of property which is not his own, without any inquiry whether he did so knowing it not to be his own, or whether he did so under the erroneous supposition that it was his own. If the property was known not to be his own, it would be a clear case of election. If it was supposed erroneously to be his own, still there is no certainty that his intention to devise it would have been changed by the mere knowledge of the true state of the title, and the court will not speculate upon it.¹ So although a part of the benefits proposed

to disappoint that part of the will by which a provision is made for the widow; that is, that the doctrine of election is to be applied to creditors. It is utterly inapplicable. It never has been so applied, and half the decrees upon marshalling assets are wrong if there is any ground for that claim. It is true, creditors by simple contract cannot have any right except by marshalling against the real estate, unless the testator thinks fit to devise it for satisfaction of the debts generally. Yet they have never been held to stand in the same light as legatees. When the testator lets in such creditors by a charge, it is now settled, whatever doubt may formerly have been entertained upon it, that creditors, under a charge of debts and legacies, are to be paid in preference to legatees; and though the Statute of Fraudulent Devises would undoubtedly prevent a devise for payment of legacies so as to disappoint creditors by specialty, it would not prevent a devise for payment of debts generally, though the effect would be to let in creditors by simple contract, to the prejudice of creditors by specialty. If there is any foundation for this doctrine of election, the case never could have happened where there was a charge upon any part of the estate for debts; whereas the creditors by specialty are permitted, and the creditors by simple contract are by marshalling permitted, to follow the devised estates if there are no estates descended, or if the descended estates have been applied. In this case the decree is wrong upon this doctrine, for the legatees are disappointed by the specialty creditors taking the personal estate.' See also Mr. Swanston's note to *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. R. 408; *Day v. Day*, 2 P. Will. 418; *Earl of Darlington v. Pulteney*, 3 Ves. jr. 385; *Carr v. Eastbrooke*, 3 Ves. 564.

¹ *Whistler v. Webster*, 2 Ves. jr. 370; *Thellusson v. Woodford*, 13 Ves. 220; *Welby v. Welby*, 2 Ves. & Beam. 199; Mr. Swanston's note to *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. 407; 1 Powell on Devises, 435, Jarman's note. This is now the established doctrine, although there are former declarations of opinion to the contrary, which proceeded upon the grounds of the civil law already stated. Ante, § 1078. See *Cull v. Showell*, Ambler, R. 727, and Mr. Blunt's note (4); 3 Wooddes. Lect. Appx. 1; Id. Lect. 59, pp. 493, 494; 2 Sch. & Lefr. 267; *Forrester v. Cotton*, 1 Eden, R. 532, 535, and notes (a) and (c); s. c. Ambler, R. 389, 390. The doctrine of the civil law is apparently different. 'Quod autem diximus, alienam rem posse legari, ita intelligendum est; si defunctus sciebat alienam rem esse; non si ignorabat. Forsitan enim si scivisset alienam rem esse, non legasset.' Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 20, § 4. We have seen that the English doctrine takes the opposite view from the doubt whether

by a will should fail, the remainder may constitute a case for an election.¹

1094. Upon the ground of intention also, where a testator has an absolute power to dispose of the subject and an intention is clearly expressed in his will to exercise that power, it will be sufficient to raise a case of election.² Therefore if a testator having an absolute power to dispose of an estate should devise it to his heir, although in such a case the heir would take by descent, and the devise be inoperative, whether he admitted or disputed the will; yet as to another estate of the heir which was disposed of by the testator in his will without title, he would be put to his election. For in every such case the heir ought to elect between the estate devised, which comes to him by the bounty of the testator, and his own claims, which are adverse to the will. The estate, descending to the heir under an election made by him to claim against the will, ought to be subject in his hands to the same implied condition as if he had taken it by devise.³ (a) So if upon the language of a will it is apparent that it is the testator's intention to dispose of all his property at the time of his death, that intention will be considered as raising a case of election in an heir who claims title to the after-purchased real estate of the testator, and at the same time is a devisee under the will. Thus where a testator made a devise and bequest of all his estate and effects, both real and personal, which he should die possessed of, interested in, or entitled to, to trustees for the benefit of his grandchildren, one of whom was his heir at law, and he afterwards purchased other real estate, it was held that upon the true interpretation of the words of the will the testator meant to pass to the trustees not only the estates he had at the date of the will, but all that he should own and possess

the intention would have been changed by knowledge of the fact. See also *Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 20, §§ 10, 11*, where other curious cases are put.

¹ *Newman v. Newman*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 186; 1 Swanst. R. 402, note.

² *Sugden on Powers*, ch. 5, § 2, p. 384 (3d edit.); *Whistler v. Webster*, 2 Ves. jr. 367.

³ Mr. Swanston's note to *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. R. 402; *Welby v. Welby*, 2 Ves. & Beam. 187, 190; *Thellusson v. Woodford*, 13 Ves. 224, and note (a); *Anon. Gilb. Eq. R. 15*. See *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 4, p. 128, note (3) (2d edit.).

(a) See *Dewar v. Maitland*, L. R. 2 Eq. 834.

at the time of his death, and therefore the heir at law ought to be put to his election.¹ (a)

1095. It was at one time supposed that the doctrine of election was not applicable to the case of persons claiming a remote interest in property disposed of in a manner adverse to other rights; as for instance to a remainder-man claiming after an estate tail in the property disposed of.² The principle of such an exception seems extremely questionable, for (as has been well remarked) the doctrine of election is applied to interests, not in respect of their amount, but of their inconsistency with the testator's intention. And to assume their remoteness or their value as a criterion of the existence or absence of that intention would introduce great uncertainty, which in questions of property is perhaps the worst defect of the law.³

1096. It may be added that when a party by his will disposes of the absolute right in property in which he has a limited interest only, he necessarily shows an intention to extinguish all other conflicting adverse rights, whether they are present or future, vested or contingent; and consequently it must be wholly unimportant whether the interests so extinguished are great or small, immediate or remote, valuable or trifling. The duty of election then, so far as intention goes, is equally the same in strength and presumption in all cases of this sort, as it imports the gift of one thing to be in lieu or extinguishment of the other. Accordingly the doctrine is now well established that the doctrine of election is equally applicable to all interests whether they are immediate or remote, vested or contingent, of value or of no value, and whether these interests are in real or in personal estate.⁴

¹ *Churchman v. Ireland*, 4 Sim. R. 520; s. c. 1 Russ. & Mylne, 250; *Thellusson v. Woodford*, 13 Ves. 209; 1 Dow, Parl. R. 249; overruling *Back v. Kett*, Jacob, R. 534; *Naylor v. Wetherell*, 4 Sim. R. 114. See *Allen v. Anderson*, 5 Hare, R. 169.

² See *Bor v. Bor*, cited 3 Bro. Parl. Cas. by Tomlins, 178, note, 1 Swanst. 407, note.

³ Mr. Swanston's note, 1 Swanst. R. 408.

⁴ *Wilson v. Lord Townshend*, 2 Ves. jr. 697; *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. 408, note; *Webb v. Earl of Shaftsbury*, 7 Ves. 488; 1 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, p. 434, note; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 40; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 5, p. 537*. A curious point has arisen in regard to the doctrine of election, in cases where a will is not executed so as to pass real estate under the Statute

(a) See *Hance v. Truwitt*, 2 Johns. & H. 216.

1097. Questions have also arisen in Courts of Equity as to what acts or circumstances should be deemed an election on the part of the person bound to make it. We say acts or circumstances; for positive acts of acceptance or of renunciation are not indispensable. Presumptions equally strong may arise from long acquiescence, or from other circumstances of a stringent nature.¹ (a) Upon such a subject no general rule can be laid down; but every case must be left to be decided upon its own particular circumstances rather than upon any definite abstract

of Frauds, and yet is good as a will of personalty. The question is, whether the heir can take a bequest of personalty under the will without at the same time confirming the devises made of the real estate. It has been decided that in a will of freehold estates not so executed as to pass real estate no such case of election arises, and that the devises are to be deemed blotted out of the will, and the will to be read as if they were not contained in it, although it would be otherwise if there was an express condition annexed to the bequest of the personalty. (b) But in case of a specific devise of unsurrendered copyhold the heir would be put to his election. Sir William Grant, in *Brodie v. Barry* (2 Ves. & Beam. 130), said: 'I do not understand why a will, though not executed so as to pass real estate, should not be read for the purpose of discovering in it an implied condition concerning real estate annexed to a gift of personal property, as it is admitted it must when such condition is expressly annexed to such gift. For if by a sound construction such condition is rightfully inferred from the whole instrument, the effect seems to be the same as if it were expressed in words. And then if it be rightly decided that a will defectively executed is not to be read against the freehold heir, I have been sometimes inclined to doubt whether any will ought to be read against the copyhold heir; a will, however executed, being as inoperative for the conveyance of copyhold estate (without a surrender) as a will defectively executed is for the conveyance of a freehold estate.' Lord Kenyon, in *Cary v. Askew* (1 Cox, R. 244), and Lord Eldon, in *Sheddon v. Goodrich* (8 Ves. 496, 497), expressed doubts of a similar nature. But all these judges admitted the distinction to be clearly established by the authorities. See *Hearle v. Greenbank*, 3 Atk. 715; s. c. 1 Ves. 306, 307; *Thellusson v. Woodford*, 13 Ves. 220, 221; *Boughton v. Boughton*, 2 Ves. 12; *Allen v. Poulton*, 1 Ves. 121; *Cookes v. Hellier*, 1 Ves. 234; Mr Swanston's note, 1 Swanst. R. 406; Mr. Jarman's note to 1 Powell on Devises, 440; *Allen v. Anderson*, 5 Hare, R. 168.

¹ *Tibbets v. Tibbets*, 19 Ves. 662.

(a) *Reynard v. Spence*, 4 Beav. 103; *Camden Ins. Assoc. v. Jones*, 8 C. E. Green, 171; *Gale v. Gale*, 48 Ill. 471; *Fytche v. Fytche*, L. R. 7 Eq. 494.

(b) See *Kearney v. Macomb*, 1 C. E. Green, 189. But see *Maxwell v. Hyslop*, L. R. 4 Eq. 407; Van

Dyke's Appeal, 60 Penn. St. 481. In *Hance v. Truwhitt*, 2 Johns. & H. 216, an express devise of after-acquired realty, made when the devise was inoperative, put the heir to election. See also *Dewar v. Maitland*, L. R. 2 Eq. 834; *Orrell v. Orrell*, L. R. 6 Ch. 302.

doctrine. Before any presumption of an election can arise it is necessary to show that the party acting or acquiescing was cognizant of his rights.¹ When this is ascertained affirmatively, it may be further necessary to consider whether the party intended an election; ² (a) whether the party was competent to make an election, for a feme covert, an infant, or a lunatic will not be bound by an election; ³ (b) whether he can restore the other persons affected by his claim to the same situation as if the acts had not been performed or the acquiescence had not existed; and whether there has been such a lapse of time as ought to preclude the court from entering upon such inquiries, upon its general doctrine of not entertaining suits upon stale demands or after long delays.⁴

1098. Questions have also arisen in Courts of Equity as to the time when and the circumstances under which an election may be required to be made. The general rule is that the party is not bound to make any election until all the circumstances are known and the state and condition and value of the funds are clearly ascertained; for until so known and ascertained it is impossible for the party to make a discriminating and deliberate choice, such as ought to bind him to reason and justice.⁵ (c) If there-

¹ *Dillon v. Parker*, 1 Swanst. 359, 381; *Edwards v. Morgan*, 13 Price, R. 782; s. c. 1 McClell. 541; 1 Bligh, R. 401.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Frank v. Frank*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 171.

⁴ Mr. Swanston's note, 1 Swanst. 382, where the principal authorities are collected. See *Brice v. Brice*, 2 Molloy, R. 21.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Newman v. Newman*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 186; *Boynton v. Boynton*, 1

(a) See *Wilson v. Thornbury*, L. R. 10 Ch. 239.

(b) Concerning election by persons under disability see *Barrow v. Barrow*, 4 Kay & J. 409 (explaining *Lassence v. Tierney*, 1 Mac. & G. 551, and *Field v. Moore*, 19 Beav. 176); *Griggs v. Gibson*, L. R. 1 Eq. 685; *Storring v. Borren*, 55 Barb. 595; *Tiernan v. Roland*, 15 Penn. St. 430. In these cases it is held that the doctrine may be applied. See also *Campbell v. Ingilby*, 21 Beav. 567; s. c. 1 DeG. & J. 393; *Willoughby v. Middleton*, 2 Johns. & H. 344; *Brown v. Brown*, L. R. 2 Eq. 481; *Codrington v. Lind-*

say, L. R. 8 Ch. 578; *Wall v. Wall*, 11 Jur. 403; *Whittle v. Henning*, 2 Phill. 731; *Thynne v. Glengall*, 2 H. L. Cas. 131.

(c) *Wilson v. Thornbury*, L. R. 10 Ch. 239; *Dewar v. Maitland*, L. R. 2 Eq. 834; *Thurston v. Clifton*, 21 Beav. 447; *Kreiser's Appeal*, 69 Penn. St. 194; *Macknet v. Macknet*, 29 N. J. Eq. 54; *Evans's Appeal*, 51 Conn. 435; *Watson v. Watson*, 128 Mass. 152, 155. The cases show that an election made in entire ignorance of one's rights under the law is not binding. See ante, vol. 1, pp. 116, 117, note.

fore he should make a choice in ignorance of the real state of the funds, or under a misconception of the extent of the claims on the fund elected by him, it will not be conclusive on him.¹ (a) And on the other hand he will be entitled, in order to make an election, to maintain a bill in equity for a discovery, and to have all the necessary accounts taken to ascertain the real state of the funds.² (b)

1099. These remarks may suffice on the subject of election, a doctrine of no inconsiderable nicety and difficulty in its natural administration in equity; and we shall now proceed to the kindred doctrine of SATISFACTION. Satisfaction may be defined in equity to be the donation of a thing, with the intention, expressed or implied, that it is to be an extinguishment of some existing right or claim of the donee. It usually arises in Courts of Equity as a matter of presumption where a man, being under an obligation to do an act (as to pay money), does that by will which is capable of being considered as a performance or satisfaction of it, the thing performed being *ejusdem generis* with that which he has engaged to perform. Under such circumstances, and in the absence of all countervailing circumstances, the ordinary presumption in Courts of Equity is that the testator has done the act in satisfaction of his obligation.³

1100. It is certainly not a little difficult to vindicate the extent to which this doctrine has been carried in Courts of Equity as a matter of presumption. What is given by a will ought from the character of the instrument ordinarily to be deemed as given as a mere bounty, unless a contrary intention is apparent on the face of the instrument;⁴ or, as it has been well expressed, whatever is given by a will is, *prima facie*, to be intended as a bounty or benevolence.⁵ Under such circumstances the natural course of

Bro. Ch. R. 445; *Wake v. Wake*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 255; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 335; *Whistler v. Webster*, 2 Ves. jr. 371; *Chalmers v. Storril*, 2 V. & Beam. 222; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (l).

¹ *Ibid.*; *Kidney v. Coussmaker*, 12 Ves. 136, 152.

² *Ibid.* See *Pigott v. Bagley*, 1 McClel. & Younge, 569.

³ 1 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, 433, note (4).

⁴ *Clark v. Sewel*, 3 Atk. 97.

⁵ *Eastwoode v. Vincke*, 2 P. Will. 616.

(a) *Macknet v. Macknet*, 29 N. J. Eq. 54.

(b) But see *Douglas v. Douglas*, L. R. 12 Eq. 617.

reasoning would be that in order to displace this presumption a clear expression of a contrary intention should be made out on the face of the will.¹ But the doctrine of Courts of Equity has proceeded upon an opposite ground; and the donation is held to be a satisfaction, unless that conclusion is repelled by the nature of the gift, the terms of the will, or the attendant circumstances. For it has been said that a man shall be intended to be just before he is kind; and when two duties happen to interfere at the same point of time, that which is the most honest and best is to be preferred.²

¹ But see *Weall v. Price*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 267, where Sir John Leach intimates that the rule is as it ought to be, but without stating any reasons. See also *Jones v. Morgan*, 2 Younge & Coll. 403, 412.

² 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 5, note (l). In *Pym v. Lockyer*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 29, 35, Lord Cottenham said: 'All the decisions upon questions of double portions depend upon the declared or presumed intention of the donor. The presumption of equity is against double portions, because it is not thought probable when the object appears to be to make a provision, and that object has been effected by one instrument, that the repetition of it in a second should be intended as an addition to the first. The second provision therefore is presumed to be intended as a substitute for, and not as an addition to, that first given; but when the gift is a mere bounty, there is no ground for raising any presumption of intention as to its amount, although such amount be comprised in two or more gifts. The first question to be asked is, whether the sums given are to be considered as portions or as mere gifts; and upon this subject certain rules have been laid down, all intended to ascertain and to work out the intention of the giver. In the case of a parent a legacy to a child is presumed to be intended to be a portion, because providing for the child is a duty which the relative situation of the parties imposes upon the parent; but that duty which is imposed upon a parent may be assumed by another, who for any reason thinks proper to place himself in that respect in the place of a parent; and when that is so, the same presumption arises against his intending a first gift to take effect as well as a second, because both, in such cases, are considered to be portions. Whether the donor had for this purpose assumed the office of a parent so as to invest his gift with the character of a portion may be proved by extrinsic evidence, such as the general conduct of the donor towards the children, or by intrinsic evidence, from the nature and terms of the gift. If the former be alone relied upon, it may prevail, although it should appear that the donor did not assume all the duties of a parent, or effectually perform those which he had undertaken; the question being merely whether the facts proved fairly lead to the conclusion that he intended to provide a portion for the child and not merely to bestow a gift. Upon this point *Powys v. Mansfield*, founded upon *Carver v. Bowles* (2 Russ. & Mylne, 301), and many other cases, is conclusive. Such evidence of general conduct towards the child is of far less importance than that which relates to the pecuniary provision for it, whether that be found in the instruments containing the gifts or in extrinsic circumstances; and as part of such extrinsic circumstances, the general conduct of the donor towards the family, and par-

1101. But although this may be fair reasoning where there is a deficiency of assets to satisfy both claims or duties, yet it is utterly impossible to apply it to the great mass of cases in which the doctrine of implied satisfaction has prevailed, and where there has been no deficiency of assets to discharge all the claims. The truth is that the doctrine was introduced originally upon very unsatisfactory grounds, and it now stands more upon authority than upon principle. And a strong disposition has been manifested in modern times not to enlarge the sphere of its operation, but to lay hold of any circumstances to establish exceptions to it.¹ We shall presently see that it is somewhat differently applied in cases of creditors, properly so called, from what it is in cases of portions and advancements to children; for in the latter cases the presumption of satisfaction is more readily entertained, and acted upon more extensively, than in the former.²

1102. It is obvious, from this description of the doctrine of satisfaction, that the presumption is not conclusive, but may be rebutted by other circumstances attending the will. If the benefit given to the donee possessing the right or claim is different in specie from that to which he is entitled, the presumption of its being given in satisfaction will not arise unless there be an express declaration, or a clear inference from other parts of the will, that such is the intention of the testator.³ (a) The presumption may be rebutted not only by intrinsic evidence thus derived from the terms of the will itself, but it may also be rebutted by extrinsic evidence, as by declarations of the testator touching the subject, or by written papers explaining or confirming the intention.⁴

1103. Thus for example land given by a will is not deemed to be given in satisfaction of money due to the devisee; and money given by a will is not deemed to be given in satisfaction of an interest of the legatee in land, unless there is something more in the will explanatory of the intention of the testator.⁵ Accord-

tionably towards the other children of it, may very properly be included in the consideration of his object and intentions.' Post, § 1105, note.

¹ *Clarke v. Sewel*, 3 Atk. 97.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Powell on Devises*, by Jarman, 433, note (4).

⁴ *Weall v. Rice*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 251, 263, 268.

⁵ *Bellasis v. Uthwatt*, 1 Atk. 426, 427; *Bengough v. Walker*, 15 Ves. 507, 512; (b) *Chaplin v. Chaplin*, 3 P. Will. 247.

(a) *Gilliam v. Chancellor*, 43 Miss. 437.

(b) See *In re Lawes*, 20 Ch. D. 81.

ingly it was laid down by Lord Hardwicke in respect to the doctrine of satisfaction, that when a bequest is taken to be by way of satisfaction for money already due to the donee, the thing given in satisfaction must be of the same nature and attended with the same certainty as the thing in lieu of which it is given; and that land is not to be taken in satisfaction for money or money for land.¹

1104. In regard also to cases where the thing given is ejusdem generis with that due to the donee, the presumption that it is given in satisfaction does not necessarily arise, nor is it, as has been already intimated, universally conclusive. To make the presumption of satisfaction hold in any such cases, it is necessary that the thing substituted should not be less beneficial either in amount, or certainty, or value, or time of enjoyment, or otherwise, than the thing due or contracted for.² The notion of satisfaction implies the doing or giving of something equivalent to the right extinguished. And it would be a very unjustifiable course to arraign the justice of the testator by presuming that he meant to ask a favor instead of performing a duty.

1105. But where the thing substituted is ejusdem generis, and it is clearly of a much greater value and much more beneficial to the donee than his own claim, there the presumption of an intended satisfaction is generally allowed to prevail.³ (a) Whether the

¹ *Ibid.*; *Barrett v. Beckford*, 1 Ves. 521; *Bengough v. Walker*, 15 Ves. 512; (b) *Masters v. Masters*, 1 P. Will. 423, 424.

² *Blandy v. Widmore*, 1 P. Will. 324, Mr. Cox's note (1); *Lechmere v. Earl of Carlisle*, 3 P. Will. 225, 226; *Atkinson v. Webb*, 2 Vern. 478.

³ See 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 4*, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (l); *Id.* Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1,

(a) If they are of equal value, the presumption is strengthened; and so if they are similar. *Atkinson v. Littlewood*, L. R. 18 Eq. 595, in which however the soundness of the rule is questioned. On the other hand it is settled, as stated by the author in § 1109, that the satisfaction of a mere debt due by a parent to a child by an advancement arises only when the sum advanced equals or exceeds the debt. *Reade v. Reade*, 9 L. R. Ir. 409, 424, 435; *Plunket v. Lewis*, 3 Hare, 322; *Chichester v. Coventry*, L. R. 2 H. L. 71. See *In re Lawes*,

20 Ch. D. 81. But if the parent's obligation was to provide a portion for his child, then a payment of a sum less than the amount to be provided will, in the absence of other intention, be treated as an advancement pro tanto. *Pym v. Lockyer*, 5 Mylne & C. 29, *infra*, p. 442, note; *Reade v. Reade*, *supra*. The presumption however is still against double portions. *Reade v. Reade*, *supra*; *In re Pollock*, 28 Ch. D. 552; note (b) to § 1109; also § 1202, and notes.

(b) As to this case see *In re Lawes*, 20 Ch. D. 81.

presumption of an intended satisfaction pro tanto ought to be made in any case where the things are ejusdem generis but less than the claim of the donee, is a matter upon which some diversity of opinion appears to exist; but the weight of authority is certainly in favor of it in cases of portions and advancements.¹

note (a); *Rickman v. Morgan*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 394; 1 *Roper on Legacies*, by White, ch. 6, pp. 317 to 336; *Bellasis v. Uthwatt*, 1 Atk. 426, Mr. Sanders's note; 2 *Roper on Legacies*, by White, ch. 18, pp. 58 to 108; *Weall v. Rice*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 251, 267, 268.

¹ *Ibid.* The point has been recently decided by Lord Cottenham. *Pym v. Lockyer*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 29, 34, 35, 45 to 55. In this case his lordship reviewed the principal authorities and said: 'When upon the first argument of this case I had come to the conclusion that the testator had placed himself in loco parentis, and that the effect of the portions upon the provisions by the will was therefore to be the same as if the testator had been the father of the children, I was startled at the consequences of such a decision, if the rule generally received in the profession and laid down in all the text-books of authority, and apparently founded upon the highest authority, was to regulate the division of the property; the rule to which I refer being, that a portion "advanced by a father to a child will be a complete ademption of a legacy, though less than the testamentary portion." 1 *Rop. Leg.* 318. I could not but feel that in the case before me, and in every other, the effect of the rule would be to defeat the intention of the parent. A father who makes his will dividing his property amongst his children must be supposed to have decided what, under the then existing circumstances, ought to be the portion of each child, not with reference to the wants of each, but attributing to each the share of the whole which, with reference to the wants of all, each ought to possess. If subsequently upon the marriage of any one of them it becomes necessary or expedient to advance a portion for such child, what reason is there for assuming that the apportionment between all ought therefore to be disturbed? The advancement must naturally be supposed to be of the particular child's portion; and so the rule assumes, as it precludes the child advanced from claiming the sum given by the will as well as the sum advanced. So far the rule is founded on good sense and adapted to the ordinary transactions of mankind. The supplying the wants of one child for an advancement is not permitted to lessen or destroy the provisions made for the others by giving both provisions to the child advanced; but the supposed rule that the larger legacy is to be adeemed by the smaller provision appears to me not to be founded on good sense, and not to be adapted to the ordinary transactions of mankind, and to be subversive of the obvious intention of the parent. Can it be assumed as a proposition so general as to be the foundation of a rule of property in the absence of any expressed intention, that the marriage of one child and the advancing a portion to such child furnishes ground for the father's altering the mode of distributing his property amongst his children by taking from the portion previously destined for that child, and to the same extent adding to the provision for the others? Is it not on the contrary the usual course and practice that the father upon a child's marriage parts with the control over as little as possible, preferring to reserve to himself the power of disposing of the residue of the portion

1106. We are however carefully to distinguish between cases of satisfaction properly so called and cases of the performance

destined for such child as its future circumstances and situation may require? In doing so the father is not influenced only by the natural preference of bounty to obligation, but adopts a course which he may well be supposed to think most beneficial for his children. Where then is the ground of the presumption that he intended by advancing part of what he had destined as the portion of that child to deprive that child of the remainder? The argument in favor of the proposition appears to me to be founded upon technical reasoning as to the term "portion," without due consideration of the sense in which that term is used. The giving a portion to a child is said to be a moral debt, but of the amount of which the parent is the only judge; and although the parent has by his will adjudged the amount of that moral debt to be a certain sum, he is supposed by the settlement to have departed from that judgment and to have substituted the amount settled; and this only because the one provision and the other are considered as a portion. This however assumes the portion settled to be intended as a substitution of the portion given by the will, and such intention if proved would remove all doubt; but the question is whether such intention is to be presumed in the absence of all proof. Is it not more reasonable to suppose that the intention as to the amount of the portion remains the same, and that the sum settled is only an advance of part of what the will declares to have been the intended amount of the whole? There is no reason for supposing the sum advanced to be the whole portion intended for the child; and if so, there can be no reason for assuming it to be substituted for the whole. The effect of a portion advanced by a parent upon a legacy before given is called an *ademption*; but if the principle of *ademption* be applied to this case, the consequence now under consideration will not follow. The gift or alienation of part of what constitutes a specific legacy will not destroy the legacy as to what remains. So the admitted exceptions to this general rule do not seem very consistent with the existence of that part of it now under consideration. The rule is said not to apply when the testamentary portion and the subsequent advancement are not *ejusdem generis*. This may be very reasonable as indicative of intention, but it is not easy to discover why, if one thousand pounds advanced is to be an *ademption* of a ten thousand pounds legacy, a gift of stock in trade of the value of £1,500 is not to be an *ademption* of a legacy of £500 which in *Holmes v. Holmes*, 1 Bro. C. C. 555, (a) it was held not to be. So a testamentary gift of a residue or part of a residue is said not to be *adeemed* by a subsequent advancement, because the amount is uncertain; but in that case the child, if sole residuary legatee, takes as advancement part of what it would, if no such advancement had been made, have taken as residue. The gift under the will operates, though diminished by the amount of the advancement. The Statute of Distributions, the customs of London and York, and the whole doctrine of *hotchpot*, proceed upon the principle that advancement by a parent does not operate as substitution for, but as part satisfaction of, what the child would otherwise be entitled to; the object being to produce equality and not, according to the rule contended for, inequality between the children. It appears to me therefore that all reasoning and all analogy are against the supposed rule. It

(a) This case is overruled in *In re Lawes*, 20 Ch. D. 81.

of agreements or covenants. In the latter cases the acts of the party are strictly in pursuance of the contract; in the former they are a substitute or equivalent for the contract, and not intended as a fulfilment of it.¹ Some cases which have actually passed into judgment may illustrate this distinction. Thus where A on his marriage by articles covenanted to leave his wife B, if she should survive him, £620, and that his executors should pay it in three months after his decease, and A died intestate and without issue, whereby his wife (who survived him) became en-

remains to be examined whether the authorities are such as to make it my duty to act upon it; and I cannot but express the satisfaction I have felt at having had the cases so thoroughly examined. I think the profession and the public are much indebted to those whose industry and ability have brought the real state of this question so satisfactorily before me.' After reviewing the authorities he added: 'The result of a careful examination of the authorities is that there is not sufficient authority to support the supposed rule, but that on the contrary the weight of authority is decidedly against it; and as it cannot be supported upon principle, and is in its operation generally destructive of the interests which parents have intended for their children, I think it my duty, notwithstanding the manner in which it has been received in the profession, to decline adopting or following it, and therefore to declare that the advancements upon the respective marriages in this case are to be taken as adoptions, pro tanto only, of the legacies before given.'

¹ In *Goldsmid v. Goldsmid* (1 Swanst. R. 219), the Master of the Rolls said: 'An important distinction exists between satisfaction and performance. Satisfaction supposes intention. It is something different from the contract, and substituted for it.' The subject is treated more fully in *Roper on Legacies*, by White, vol. 2, ch. 18, § 4, pp. 105 to 108. It is there said: 'In the discussion of questions of this nature two descriptions of cases have occurred; the one consists of cases called cases of performance, the other of cases of satisfaction. The cases considered in the present section are instances of the former class in which there has been a covenant by a husband to leave or pay to his wife a sum of money at his death, and he dies intestate; and his wife's distributive share of his personalty, under the statute, is equal to or more than the sum stipulated under the covenant. In that case he is held to have performed through the operation of the law what he had covenanted to do. The other case is where the wife takes a benefit to an equal or greater extent under the husband's will, to which the same reasoning is not applicable. But although the bequest is not a performance, still it may be inferred that the testator intended it as a satisfaction of the covenant so as to raise a case of election. Satisfaction, as Sir Thomas Plumer observes, supposes intention; it is something different from the subject of the contract and substituted for it. And the question always arises, Was the thing intended as a substitute for the thing covenanted? — a question entirely of intent. But with reference to performance the question is, Has that identical act which the party contracted to do, been done? Mr. Cox, in his edition of Peere Williams's Reports, has favored the profession with a valuable note upon this subject.' See also *Devese v. Pontet*, Prec. Ch. by Finch, p. 240, note; s. c. 1 Cox, 188.

titled to a moiety of his personal estate, which was more than the £620, the question arose whether the distributive share of B should be deemed a satisfaction or rather a due performance of the covenant; for the covenant was not broken, the wife being administratrix. And it was held to be a due performance, although it is called in the report a satisfaction.¹ So where A covenanted by marriage articles that his executors should in three months after his decease pay his wife £3,000, and by his will he gave all his property to his executors in trust, to divide it in such ways, shares, and proportions as to them should appear right. The trust failed, whereby his estate became divisible according to the Statute of Distributions, and his wife survived him. It was held that her distributive share being greater than £3,000 was a satisfaction of the covenant.²

1107. The ground of each of these decisions seems to have been that there was no breach of the covenant; and as the widow by mere operation of law through the Statute of Distributions received from her husband a larger sum than he had covenanted to pay her, it ought to be held a full performance of his covenant. These decisions do not seem to stand on a very firm foundation as illustrations of the doctrine of satisfaction; for (as has been well observed) considerable doubt might have been entertained whether of two claims so distinct the satisfaction of one ought to be considered as a satisfaction of the other. But Courts of Equity would now hardly deem it fit to re-examine and upon principle to discuss the point thus settled by them, which has been at rest for more than a century.³ The distinction however between performance of a covenant and satisfaction of a covenant, which grows out of these decisions, may not be unimportant; for there may be a presumptive performance *pro tanto* in such cases

¹ *Blandy v. Widmore*, 1 P. Will. 324, and Mr. Cox's note (1); s. c. 2 Vern. 709; *S. P. Lee v. Cox*, 3 Atk. 422; s. c. 1 Ves. R. 1; *S. P. Richardson v. Elphinstone*, 2 Ves. jr. 463, 464; *Haynes v. Mico*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 129 to 131; *Kirkman v. Kirkman*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 96, 100; *Garthshore v. Chalie*, 10 Ves. 9 to 14; *Wilcox v. Wilcox*, 2 Vern. 558; *Lechmere v. Earl of Carlisle*, 3 P. Will. 225; *Rickman v. Morgan*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 394, 395; *Goldsmid v. Goldsmid*, 1 Swanst. 219, 221, and note (c); *Wilson v. Pigott*, 2 Ves. jr. 356; *Wathan v. Smith*, 4 Madd. R. 325, 331; *Twisden v. Twisden*, 9 Ves. 427.

² *Goldsmid v. Goldsmid*, 1 Swanst. 211.

³ *Ibid.*

which will be recognized in equity, whatever may be the rule as to a presumptive satisfaction *pro tanto* in other cases.¹ (*a*)

1108. And here it may be remarked that the doctrine of satisfaction and also of performance of covenants arising from bequests in wills was well known in the civil law;² and it was probably derived from that source, with some variations, into our jurisprudence. Thus in the Digest a case is put of a father covenanting on his daughter's marriage to give her a certain sum as a dotal portion, and afterwards leaving a legacy to her to the same amount; and it was there held that it amounted to a satisfaction of the portion.³ And other cases are put of a like nature, where parol evidence was held admissible to establish the intention of satisfaction.⁴

1109. Questions of satisfaction usually come before Courts of Equity in three classes of cases: (1) in cases of portions secured by a marriage settlement; (2) in cases of portions given by will and an advancement of the donee afterwards in the life of the testator; (3) in cases of legacies to creditors. It may be convenient as well as proper in our brief survey of this subject to examine the doctrine separately in respect to each of these classes, as the application of it is not, or at least may not be, precisely the same throughout in all of them.⁵ The first class may be illustrated by stating the case where a portion or provision is secured to a child by marriage settlement or otherwise, and the parent or person standing in *loco parentis* (*b*) afterwards by will gives

¹ *Garthshore v. Chalie*, 10 Ves. 9 to 16; *Wilcox v. Wilcox*, 2 Vern. 558; *Blandy v. Widmore*, 1 P. Will. 324, Mr. Cox's note (1); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (l).

² See post, § 1114, and note 5.

³ Dig. Lib. 30, tit. 1, l. 84, § 6; post 1114.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 30, tit. 1, l. 123.

⁵ See *Hinchcliffe v. Hinchcliffe*, 3 Ves. 527, where Lord Alvanley intimated that there might be a difference between cases of portions by settlement and cases of legacies by will as to subsequent advancements.

(*a*) An absolute bequest of one-fifth of the testator's estate to a son is not a satisfaction of a covenant to assure one-fifth to trustees for the son for life, with remainders to others; and the son will be entitled to a fifth of what remains after satisfying the

covenant and other debts. But an election so to take will determine his life estate under the settlement. *McCarogher v. Whieldon*, L. R. 3 Eq. 236.

(*b*) The presumption prevailing against double portions or a double

the same child a legacy without expressly directing it to be in satisfaction of such portion or provision. In such a case if the legacy be of a sum as great as or greater than the portion or provision, if it be ejusdem generis, if it be equally certain with the latter and subject to no contingency not applicable to both, and if it be shown that it is not given for a different purpose, then it will be deemed a complete satisfaction.¹ (a) If the legacy be less in amount than the portion or provision, or if it be payable at a different period or periods, then, although there is some diversity of opinion upon the subject, the weight of authority is that it may be or will be deemed a satisfaction pro tanto, or in full, according to the circumstances.² (b)

¹ Ante, §§ 1102, 1103; *Bellasis v. Uthwatt*, 1 Atk. R. 427, Mr. Saunders's note; *Chaplin v. Chaplin*, 3 P. Will. 245, 247; 2 *Roper on Legacies*, by White, ch. 18, pp. 68 to 108; 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 4*, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (l); 2 *Madd. Ch. Pr.* 33; *Weall v. Rice*, 2 *Russ. & Mylne*, 267. In this last case Sir John Leach said: 'The rule of the court is, as in reason I think it ought to be, that if a father makes a provision for a child by settlement on her marriage, and afterwards makes a provision for the same child by his will, it is prima facie to be presumed that he does not mean a double provision. But this presumption may be repelled or fortified by intrinsic evidence derived from the nature of the two provisions, or by extrinsic evidence. Where the two provisions are of the same nature, or there are but slight differences, the two instruments afford intrinsic evidence against a double provision. Where the two provisions are of a different nature the two instruments afford intrinsic evidence in favor of a double provision. But in either case extrinsic evidence is admissible of the real intention of the testator. It is not possible to define what are to be considered as slight differences between two provisions. Slight differences are such as in the opinion of the judge leave the two provisions substantially of the same nature; and every judge must decide that question for himself.' See also *Jones v. Morgan*, 2 *Young & Coll.* 403, 412; *Wharton v. Earl of Durbam*, 3 *Mylne & Keen*, 478.

² *Ibid.*; ante, § 1105 and note; 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 4*, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (l); 2 *Roper on Legacies*, by White, ch. 18, §§ 1, 2, pp. 69 to 95. It is

provision is not confined to gifts by a parent or a person in loco parentis, but arises whenever the legacy and gift are both in fulfilment of the same natural or moral obligation of providing for the legatee. In re *Pollock*, 28 Ch. D. 552 (C. A.).

(a) *Reade v. Reade*, 9 L. R. Ir. 409, 424, 435; ante, § 1105, note (a). See *Bennet v. Bennet*, 10 Ch. D. 474; note to § 1203. A voluntary bond given by way of portion to one to whom the donor stands in loco paren-

tis is satisfied by a subsequent gift or portion of a larger sum. In re *Lawes*, 20 Ch. D. 81. And this though the subsequent gift is by way of a share of stock in trade, if taken at a specified value. *Ib.*, overruling *Holmes v. Holmes*, 1 Bro. C. C. 555, and criticising *Bengough v. Walker*, 15 Ves. 507. See note 1 to § 1105.

(b) In re *Pollock*, 28 Ch. D. 552; *Thynne v. Glengall*, 2 H. L. Cas. 131. See also *Hopwood v. Hopwood*, 5 Jur. n. s. 897.

1110. We have already had occasion to intimate the doubts which may be justly entertained as to the correctness of the reasoning by which Courts of Equity have been led to these results.¹ As an original question, at least where the assets are sufficient to satisfy the portion as well as the legacy, the natural presumption would be that the testator intended the latter as a bounty in addition to the duty already contracted for; a bounty fit for a parent to bestow, and far more reputable to his sense of moral and religious obligation than a mere dry performance of his positive contract recognized by law and resting on a valuable consideration. But here as well as in many other cases, we must be content to declare ‘*Ita lex scripta est* ;’ it is established, although it may not be entirely approved. Even a small variance in the time of payment, or other trifling differences where the value is substantially the same, will not vary the application of the rule, as the present inclination of Courts of Equity is against raising double portions.² (a)

sometimes provided in marriage settlements that if any advancement on marriage or otherwise shall be made by a parent *in his lifetime*, such advancement shall be deemed made as a part or the whole of the portion provided for in the settlement, unless the contrary appear in writing. In such cases it has been made a question whether a legacy given by the parent by will amounts to a satisfaction *pro tanto*, as an advancement or portion in his lifetime. It has been decided that it is. (b) *Onslow v. Mitchell*, 18 Ves. 490, 494; *Leake v. Leake*, 10 Ves. 489, 490; 2 *Roper on Legacies*, by White, ch. 18, § 3, pp. 95 to 104. And (it seems) in such case it is immaterial whether it be the gift of a particular legacy or of a residue. *Ibid.* But a share from the parent arising from intestacy would not be deemed a satisfaction. *Ibid.*; *Twisden v. Twisden*, 9 Ves. 413, 427.

¹ Ante, § 1100.

² *Ibid.*; *Onslow v. Mitchell*, 18 Ves. 492, 493; *Twisden v. Twisden*, 9 Ves. 427; *Sparkes v. Cator*, 3 Ves. 530, 535; 2 *Roper on Legacies* by White, ch. 18, § 2, p. 90. But see *Weall v. Rice*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 267, 268; where Sir John Leach intimates that the rule is right. This whole subject is very fully considered in *Roper on Legacies*, by White, vol. 2, ch. 18, pp. 68 to 108. The doctrine as now held is thus summed up: ‘Where a parent is under obligation by articles of settlement to provide portions for his children, and he afterwards by will or codicil makes a provision for those children, it is a

(a) Double portions were allowed in *Paget v. Grinfall*, L. R. 6 Eq. 7. Indeed the courts have steadily maintained that it is always a question of intention, and where the limitations of the gift essentially differ from the nature of the covenants of the settle-

ment, there is no satisfaction. *Chichester v. Coventry*, L. R. 2 H. L. 71. As to the question what law should prevail in a case of conflict of laws concerning double portions see *Campbell v. Campbell*, L. R. 1 Eq. 383.

(b) *In re Pollock*, 28 Ch. D. 552.

1111. The second class may be illustrated by reference to the case where a parent or other person in loco parentis bequeaths a legacy to a child or grandchild, and afterwards in his lifetime gives a portion or makes a provision for the same child or grandchild without expressing it to be in lieu of the legacy. (a) In such a case, if the portion so received or the provision so made, on marriage or otherwise, be equal to or exceed the amount of the legacy, if it be certain and not merely contingent, if no other distinct object be pointed out, and if it be ejusdem generis, then it will be deemed a satisfaction of the legacy, or, as it is more properly expressed, it will be held an ademption of the legacy.¹ If the portion or provision be less than the amount of

well-established rule of equity that such subsequent testamentary provision shall be considered a satisfaction or performance of the obligation. We have seen that upon questions of satisfaction of debts by legacies, trifling points of difference between the debts and legacies were adjudged sufficient to repel the presumption of satisfaction. But with respect to the satisfaction of portions the rule of presumption is much more favored; the inclination of the Court of Equity being against raising double portions. If therefore the legacies be less in amount than the portions, or payable at different periods, the legacies will notwithstanding be considered satisfactions, either in full or in part, according to circumstances. But though these circumstances of difference are considered insufficient to rebut the presumption of satisfaction, yet where the legacy is contingent or given with a view to some other purpose, the rule of the court is different, and such legacies are not considered as a satisfaction. The inclination however is so strong against double portions that it has been decided that although no legacy is given by a will, yet if by the intestacy of the parent a distributive share of his personal or any real estate devolves upon the child, of equal or greater value than the portion, it shall be a satisfaction of the portion.⁷

¹ *Bellasis v. Uthwatt*, 1 Atk. 427, Mr. Saunders's note; 1 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 6, pp. 318 to 329; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1 (a); *Copley v. Copley*, 1 P. Will. 146; *Ex parte Pye and Ex parte Dubost*, 18 Ves. 140; *Hinchcliffe v. Hinchcliffe*, 3 Ves. 526, 527; *Sparkes v. Cator*, 3 Ves. 535, 542; *Tolson v. Collins*, 4 Ves. 490, 491; *Wallace v. Pomfret*, 11 Ves. 305; *Warren v. Warren*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 305, Mr. Belt's note (1); *Trimmer v. Bayne*, 7 Ves. 515; *Ellison v. Cookson*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 308, 309; *Pym v. Lockyer*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 29; ante, § 1105, and note. Of course the contrary is true where the legacy is not certain but contingent, where it is not ejusdem generis, and where it is stated to be for other objects. 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (a). The question may sometimes arise, who is properly deemed to stand in loco parentis to another. It was held by the Vice-Chancellor (Sir L. Shadwell) that no person can be deemed to stand in loco

(a) Two facts must be established it should be in satisfaction of or a substitute for the bequest. *Van Houten v. Post*, 32 N. J. Eq. 709.

the legacy, it will at all events be deemed a satisfaction pro tanto; ¹ (a) and if the difference between the amounts be slight,

parentis to a child whose father is living and who resides with and is maintained by the father according to his means. He added it may be very different where the father, though living, does not maintain the child, and the latter does not live with him, but lives with the person assuming to stand in loco parentis. *Powys v. Mansfield*, 6 Sim. R. 528. But upon an appeal to the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cottenham) this decree was reversed. On that occasion his Lordship said: 'No doubt the authorities leave in some obscurity the question as to what is to be considered as meant by the expression, universally adopted, of one in loco parentis. Lord Eldon however, in *Ex parte Pye*, has given to it a definition which I readily adopt, not only because it proceeds from his high authority, but because it seems to me to embrace all that is necessary to work out and carry into effect the object and meaning of the rule. Lord Eldon says it is a person "*meaning to put himself in loco parentis; in the situation of the person described as the lawful father of the child.*" But this definition must, I conceive, be considered as applicable to those parental offices and duties to which the subject in question has reference, namely, to the office and duty of the parent to make provision for the child. The offices and duties of a parent are infinitely various, some having no connection whatever with making a provision for a child; and it would be most illogical, from the mere exercise of any such offices or duties by one not the father, to infer an intention in such person to assume also the duty of providing for the child. The relative situation of the friend and of the father may make this unnecessary, and the other benefits most essential. Sir William Grant's definition is, "A person assuming the parental character or discharging parental duties;" which may seem not to differ much from Lord Eldon's definition, namely, the referring to the intention rather than to the act of the party. The Vice-Chancellor says it must be a person who has so acted towards the child as that he has thereby imposed upon himself a moral obligation to provide for it; and that the designation will not hold where the child has a father with whom it resides and by whom it is maintained. This seems to infer that the locus parentis assumed by the stranger must have reference to the pecuniary wants of the child, and that Lord Eldon's definition is to be so understood; and so far I agree with it. But I think the other circumstances required are not necessary to work out the principle of the rule or to effectuate its object. The rule, both as applied to a father and to one in loco parentis, is founded upon the presumed intention. A father is supposed to intend to do what he is in duty bound to do, namely, to provide for his child according to his means. So one who has assumed that part of the office of a father is supposed to intend to do what he has assumed to himself the office of doing. If the assumption of the character be established, the same inference and presumption must follow. The having so acted towards

¹ *Pym v. Lockyer*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 29; ante, § 1105, and note.

(a) *Kirk v. Eddowes*, 3 Hare, 509. In re *Peacock*, L. R. 14 Eq. 236; But small amounts given from time to time will not be so considered. *Leighton v. Leighton*, L. R. 18 Eq. 459. *Watson v. Watson*, 33 Beav. 574;

it may be deemed a complete satisfaction or ademption.¹ But if

a child as to raise a moral obligation to provide for it affords a strong inference in favor of the fact of the assumption of the character; and the child having a father with whom it resides, and by whom it is maintained, affords some inference against it; but neither is conclusive. If indeed the Vice-Chancellor's definition were to be adopted, it would still be to be considered whether in this case Sir John Barrington had not subjected himself to a moral obligation to provide for his brother's children, and whether such children can be said to have been maintained by their father. A rich unmarried uncle taking under his protection the family of a brother who has not the means of adequately providing for them, and furnishing, through their father, to the children the means of their maintenance and education, may surely be said to intend to put himself, for the purpose in question, in loco parentis to the children, although they never leave their father's roof. An uncle so taking such a family under his care will have all the feelings, intentions, and objects, as to providing for the children, which would influence him if they were orphans. For the purpose in question, namely, providing for them, the existence of the father can make no difference. If then it shall appear from an examination of the evidence that Sir John Barrington did afford to his brother the means of maintaining, educating, and bringing up his children according to their condition of life, and that the father had no means of his own at all adequate to that purpose; that this assistance was regular and systematic, and not confined to casual presents, the repetition of which could not be relied upon; that he held out to his brother and his family that they were to look to him for their future provision, — it will surely follow, if that were material, that Sir John Barrington had so acted towards the children as to impose upon himself a moral obligation to provide for them, and that the children were in fact maintained by him and not by their father. But it has been said that Sir John Barrington would not have been guilty of any breach of moral duty if he had permitted the property to descend to his brother. Undoubtedly he would not, because that would have been a very rational mode of providing for the children; but if he had reason to suppose that his brother would act so unnaturally as to leave the property away from his children, Sir John Barrington would have been guilty of a breach of moral duty towards the children in leaving the property absolutely to their father. I should therefore feel great difficulty in coming to a conclusion that Sir John Barrington had not placed himself in loco parentis to these children, if I thought everything necessary for that purpose which the Vice-Chancellor has thought to be so. Adopting however as I do the definition of Lord Eldon, I proceed to consider whether Sir John Barrington did mean to put himself in loco parentis to the children so far as related to their future provision. Parol evidence has been offered upon two points: first, to prove the affirmative of this proposition; secondly, to prove by declarations and acts of Sir John

¹ Ibid.; *Suisse v. Lord Lowther*, *The (English) Jurist*, April 1, 1843; s. c. 2 *Hare*, R. 424, 432, 438; 5 *Mylne & Craig*, 29. In this last case Lord Cottenham said: 'All the decisions upon questions of double portions depend upon the declared or presumed intention of the donor. The presumption of equity is against double portions, because it is not thought probable when the object appears to be to make a provision, and that object has been effected

the difference be large and important, there the presumption of an

Barrington, that he intended the provision made by the settlement should be in substitution of that made by the will. That such evidence is admissible for the first of these purposes appears to me necessarily to flow from the rule of presumption. If the acts of a party standing in loco parentis raise in equity a presumption which could not arise from the same acts of another person not standing in that situation, evidence must be admissible to prove or disprove the facts upon which the presumption is depended, namely, whether, in the language of Lord Eldon, he had *meant* to put himself in loco parentis; and as the fact to be tried is the intention of the party, his declarations as well as his acts must be admissible for that purpose. And if the evidence establish the fact that Sir John Barrington did mean to place himself in loco parentis, it will not be material to consider whether his declarations of intention as to the particular provision in question be admissible per se, because the presumption against the double portions which in that case will arise, being attempted to be rebutted by parol testimony, may be supported by evidence of the same kind.'

by one instrument, that the repetition of it in a second should be intended as an addition to the first. The second provision therefore is presumed to be intended as a substitution for and not as an addition to that first given; but when the gift is a mere bounty, there is no ground for raising any presumption of intention as to its amount, although such amount be comprised in two or more gifts. The first question to be asked is, whether the sums given are to be considered as portions or as mere gifts; and upon this subject certain rules have been laid down, all intended to ascertain and to work out the intention of the giver. In the case of a parent a legacy to a child is presumed to be intended to be a portion, because providing for the child is a duty which the relative situation of the parties imposes upon the parent; but that duty which is imposed upon a parent may be assumed by another, who for any reason thinks proper to place himself in that respect in the place of a parent, and when that is so, the same presumption arises against his intending a first gift to take effect as well as a second, because both in such cases are considered to be portions. Whether the donor had for this purpose assumed the office of a parent, so as to invest his gift with the character of a portion, may be proved by extrinsic evidence, such as the general conduct of the donor towards the children, or by intrinsic evidence, from the nature and terms of the gift. If the former be alone relied upon, it may prevail, although it should appear that the donor did not assume all the duties of a parent, or effectually perform those which he had undertaken; the question being merely whether the facts proved fairly lead to the conclusion that he intended to provide a portion for the child and not merely to bestow a gift. Upon this point *Powys v. Mansfield*, founded upon *Carver v. Bowles*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 301, and many other cases, is conclusive. Such evidence of general conduct towards the child is of far less importance than that which relates to the pecuniary provision for it, whether that be found in the instruments containing the gifts or in extrinsic circumstances; and as part of such extrinsic circumstances the general conduct of the donor towards the family, and particularly towards the other children of it, may very properly be included in the consideration of his object and intentions.'

intention of substituting the portion for the legacy will not be allowed to prevail.¹

1112. The ground of this doctrine seems to be that every such legacy is to be presumed as intended by the testator to be a portion for the child or grandchild, whether called so or not; and that afterwards, if he advances the same sum upon the child's marriage, or any other occasion, he does it to accomplish his original object, as a portion, and that under such circum-

¹ See 1 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 6, § 1, p. 324; *Shudal v. Jekyll*, 2 Atk. 516, 519; *Debeze v. Mann*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 164; s. c. 1 Cox, R. 346; *Trimmer v. Bayne*, 7 Ves. 515 to 518; *Ex parte Pye*, 18 Ves. 140, 152 to 154; *Powys v. Mansfield*, 6 Sim. 328; *Weall v. Rice*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 251, 267, 268; *Jones v. Morgan*, 2 Younge & Coll. 403, 412. In this case Lord Abinger said he knew of no distinction as to this point, whether the portion was by a will or by a deed. In *Wharton v. Earl of Durham*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 479, Lord Brongham said: 'It is equally certain, and flows equally from the same principles, that we are not to weigh in golden scales the provisions made, and to determine against ademption merely because the two differ in amount or even in kind. A difference of amount has never been held sufficient proof of accumulation; and it has been distinctly held that the circumstance of the sums being payable at different times, and other indifferences, so they be slight, say the books, will not countervail the general presumption of an intention to adeem. The cases of *Ex parte Pye* and *Ex parte Dubost* before Lord Eldon, *Hartopp v. Hartopp* before Sir William Grant, and the discussion of the question raised on Sir Joseph Jekyll's will in favor of his niece, sufficiently illustrate this proposition. Nevertheless no case has gone so far as to show that a difference such as the one in this case will have no effect upon the application of the principle; a difference no less than this, that the one portion would have gone to the issue of any marriage contracted by the child, while the other was confined to the offspring of a single bed. On the contrary the cases, especially *Roome v. Roome*, *Baugh v. Read*, and *Spinks v. Robins*, show that differences not greater than this, perhaps less considerable, will suffice to exclude ademption. And one of those cases (*Baugh v. Read*), though ill reported, shows the impossibility of extending the principle of ademption to a legacy where the provision subsequently made was expressed to be in satisfaction of a different claim. The child was entitled to £1,800 under her grandfather's will, and her father had left her a legacy of £8,000. By her settlement the husband covenanted to release the claim to her legacy of £1,800, in consideration of £5,000 portion given by the father, which was expressed to be in satisfaction of the grandfather's legacy. It is to be observed that the question raised there was not whether this should operate as a total ademption of the £8,000 legacy given by the father's will, but only pro tanto. However the court held it not even to be pro tanto an ademption; and yet after satisfying the £1,800 of the grandfather's will there remained upwards of £3,000 over to go in ademption of the father's legacy.'^(a)

(a) But this decision was reversed on appeal to the House of Lords. 3 Clark & F. 146; 10 Blioh, n. s. 526.

stances it ought to be deemed an intended satisfaction or ademption of the legacy rather than an intended double portion. And where the sum advanced is less than the legacy, still it may fairly be presumed that the testator, having acted merely in the discharge of a moral obligation, may, from a change of his own views or of his own circumstances, be satisfied that the portion ought to be less.¹ (a)

¹ *Ibid.*; *Pym v. Lockyer*, 5 Mylne & Craig, R. 20, 34, 35. See the remarks of Lord Cottenham, quoted ante, § 1111, note. The reasoning of Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram, in *Suisse v. Lowther*, 2 Hare, R. 424, 434, 435, upon the same point is important. He there said: "The language of the court in those cases is that it "leans against double portions,"—a rule which, though sometimes called technical, Lord Cottenham, in *Pym v. Lockyer* (5 Mylne & Craig, 34, 46), said was founded on good sense, and could not be disregarded without disappointing the intentions of donors. But although the presumption is that a parent does not give a child a double portion, it does not follow that every sum of money which a parent may give, even to a child, is intended as a portion. The court has never added up small sums in order to show that if the child claims those sums, as well as the larger provision made for him by the parent, he would be taking a double portion. The question whether the sums given are to be taken as part of the child's portion or not has often arisen; and if the word "portion" or "provision" or any similar word is used in the second gift, the court has said the use of that term showed that the sum was given as a provision or "portion" for the child; and then it is sometimes regarded as a second portion, against which the court presumes. According to Lord Cottenham's decision in *Pym v. Lockyer* (for the first time deciding that point), it is taken to be a satisfaction pro tanto. The older cases rather incline to the proposition that if it were a portion, though less than the portion given by any former instrument, it was to be taken as satisfaction in toto. The reasoning however is that the use of the word "portion," or "provision," or any similar word, shows that the testator meant to repeat his former gift, and then the rule applies. In the case of persons not being parent and child, but assumed to stand in loco parentis, the word "portion" or "provision"

(a) Where there are successive irrevocable appointments in favor of the same person, they will be held prima facie substitutional, and election may be enforced. *England v. Lavers*, L. R. 3 Eq. 63. But where the provisions are part of the same scheme of the donor, and intended to be substitutionary, it makes no case of election that one of the provisions fails through defect of power. Thus where the testator appointed property to his daughters equally, who were objects of the power, and then disposed of all his

residuary estate to the same daughters in the same way, and directed that the share to which each daughter should become entitled under his will and the appointment should be held in trust for the daughters for life, with remainder to their children, who were not objects of the power, it was held that the daughters took absolute interests under the appointment, and that no case of election against their children was presented. *Churchill v. Churchill*, L. R. 5 Eq. 44.

1113. Now to say the least of it, this is extremely artificial reasoning, and such as an ingenuous mind may find it extremely difficult to follow. Lord Eldon has so characterized it. After admitting it to be the unquestionable doctrine of the court that where a parent gives a legacy to a child, not stating the purpose with reference to which he gives it, the court understands him as giving it as a portion, he has strongly remarked: ‘And by a sort of artificial rule, in the application of which legitimate children have been very harshly treated upon an artificial notion that the father is paying a debt of nature, and a sort of feeling upon what is called a leaning against double portions, if the father afterwards advances a portion on the marriage of that child, though of less amount, it is a satisfaction of the whole or in part. And in some cases it has gone a length consistent with the principle, but

has been used for a different purpose. It has been used in order to show that the party intended to place himself in that situation, and to establish a quasi parental character; and when that was done, the rule as to double portions has been applied. But if there is a simple gift, and the donor has not acted towards the donee in a way to show that he has assumed a particular character,—a quasi parental situation,—in that case it is nothing more than mere bounty to a stranger. I am not aware of any technical sense of the word “provision” upon which stress has been laid, except in the cases to which I have adverted. No question can arise on the effect of a gift in the nature of a portion in any such sense as these bequests of the Marquis to Suisse. In the doctrine with regard to double portions, some principles have however been laid down which bear very strongly upon the case before me. The rule of presumption, as I before said, is against double portions as between parent and child, and the reason is this: a parent makes a certain provision for his children by his will if they attain twenty-one, or marry, or require to be settled in life; he afterwards makes an advancement to a particular child. Looking at the ordinary dealings of mankind, the court concludes that the parent does not, when he makes that advancement, intend the will to remain in full force, and that he has satisfied in his lifetime the obligation which he would otherwise have discharged at his death; and having come to that conclusion, as the result of general experience, the court acts upon it, and gives effect to the presumption that a double portion was not intended. If on the other hand there is no such relation, either natural or artificial, the gift proceeds from the mere bounty of the testator, and there is no reason within the knowledge of the court for cutting off anything which has in terms been given. The testator may give a certain sum by one instrument and precisely the same sum by another; there is no reason why the court should assign any limit to that bounty, which is wholly arbitrary. The court as between strangers treats several gifts as *prima facie* cumulative. The consequence is, as Lord Eldon observed (18 Ves. 147), that a natural child who is in law a stranger to the father stands in a better situation than a legitimate child, for the advancement in the case of the natural child is not *prima facie* an ademption.’

showing the fallacy of much of the reasoning, that the portion, though much less than the legacy, has been held a satisfaction in some instances upon this ground, that the father, owing what is called a debt of nature, is the judge of that provision by which he means to satisfy it; and although at the time of making the will he thought he could not discharge that debt with less than £10,000, yet by a change of his circumstances and of his sentiments upon moral obligation, it may be satisfied by the advance of a portion of £5,000.¹ In addition to this strong language, it may be added that Courts of Equity make out this sort of doctrine, not upon any clear intention of the testator anywhere expressed by him; but they first create the intention, and then make the parent suggest all the morals and equities of the case upon their own artificial modes of reasoning, of which it is not too much to say that scarcely any testator could ever have dreamed.²

¹ *Ex parte Pye*, and *Ex parte Dubost*, 18 Ves. 151. It is not a little remarkable that the Lord Chancellor, in *Hartop v. Whitmore* (1 P. Will. 682), should have said: 'If a father gives a daughter a portion by his will, and afterwards gives to the same daughter a portion in marriage, this, by the laws of all other nations as well as of Great Britain, is a revocation of the portion given by the will; for it will not be intended, unless proved that the father designed two portions to one child.' We should be glad to know where the learned chancellor found such a rule recognized by all nations. See also *Weall v. Rice*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 251, 267; ante, § 1110. note.

² Lord Thurlow, in *Grave v. Salisbury* (1 Bro. Ch. R. 425, 426), spoke in express disapprobation of the doctrine. 'The court,' said he, 'has however certainly presumed against double portions; and although it has encouraged that conjecture with a degree of sharpness I cannot quite reconcile myself to, whenever an express provision is made directly or as a portion by a parent or person in loco parentis, I will not displace the rule laid down by wiser men, that it shall be a satisfaction, however reluctant I may be to follow it.' On the other hand, Sir John Leach, in *Weall v. Rice*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, R. 251, 267, thought the rule right; and Lord Brougham, in *Wharton v. The Earl of Durham*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 478, expressed a similar opinion. He said: 'That the presumption of law is against double portions no one questions any more than that the rule is founded on good sense. For the parent being only bound by a duty of imperfect obligation to make provision for the child, and being the sole judge what that provision shall be, must, generally speaking, be supposed, when he makes a second arrangement by settlement or otherwise, to put it in the stead of a former one made by will, and not to do that twice over which no law could compel him to do once. Nevertheless, as has oftentimes happened with legal principles, there has been a tendency to push the presumption once established beyond the bounds which the principle it was founded upon would reasonably warrant; and because the doctrine was sound, that a second provision should be taken as substitutionary for a former one, it seems

1114. It has been supposed that the origin of this particular doctrine is to be found in the civil law, and that it was transferred from hence into the Equity Jurisprudence of England.¹ But Lord Thurlow has expressed a doubt whether the doctrine of the civil law proceeds so far, and whether it is there taken up on the idea of a debt, or is not rather considered as a presumption repellable by evidence.² The language attributed to his Lordship on this occasion seems not exactly to express his true meaning, for in the Equity Jurisprudence of England the presumption may be rebutted by evidence.³ His meaning probably was that the matter was a mere matter of presumption arising from the whole circumstances of the will; and that there was no such rule in the civil law as that in English Jurisprudence, namely, that *prima facie* such a portion subsequently given was an ademption of the legacy. No one can doubt that in many cases such a presumption may arise from the circumstances; as for example in a case put in the civil law. A father by his will devised certain lands to his daughter, and afterwards gave the same lands to her as a marriage portion. It was held to be an ademption of the devise. ‘*Filia legatorum non habet actionem, si ea quæ ei in testamento reliquit, vivus pater postea in dotem dederit.*’⁴ So

to have been almost concluded that it never could be accumulative. At least, the leaning of the courts has frequently gone so far as to make violent presumptions against the conclusions to be plainly drawn from facts indicating an intention which excluded the general supposition of ademption; and observations have been more than once made in this place, indicating the opinion of the court that the principle had been pressed quite far enough, and ought to receive no more extension. The rule then, as it now stands, must be taken to be this: the second provision will be held to adeem the first, — say the marriage portion to adeem the legacy, — unless from the circumstances of the case an intention appears that the child or other person towards whom the testator has placed himself in *loco parentis* shall take both; and there is to be no leaning, still less any straining, against inferring such an intention from circumstances any more in this than in any other case.’ The case of *Wharton v. the Earl of Durham* was reversed in the House of Lords. 10 Bligh, R. 526. But it left the general principle untouched. See also *Pym v. Lockyer*, 5 Mylne and Craig, R. 24, 34, 35, and *Suisse v. Lord Lowther*, 2 Hare, R. 424, 434, 435; ante, § 1112, and note.

¹ See ante, § 1108.

² *Grave v. Salisbury*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 427.

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 2, ch. 1, note (a); *Debeze v. Mann*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 165, 519; s. c. 1 Cox, R. 346; *Shudal v. Jekyll*, 2 Atk. 512; *Trimmer v. Bayne*, 7 Ves. 515 to 518; 1 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 6, § 2, pp. 338 to 353; *Ellison v. Cookson*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 252, 307; s. c. 3 Bro. Ch. R. 60; 1 Ves. jr. 100; 2 Cox, R. 220; *Guy v. Sharpe*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 589.

⁴ Cod. Lib. 6, tit. 37, l. 11; 2 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 11, art. 11.

it was held in the same law to be a revocation of the legacy of a debt if it was afterwards collected of the debtor by the testator in his lifetime. The like rule was applied where after the devise of specific property the testator alienated in his lifetime.¹ 'Testator supervivens, si eam rem quam reliquerat vendiderit, extinguitur fideicommissum.'² These cases are so obvious as necessary and intentional adempments of the legacies, that they require no artificial rules of interpretation to expound the intent. And yet the civil law was so far from favoring adempments that even in these cases it admitted proof that the testator did not intend to adeem the legacy; the rule being, 'Si rem suam legaverit testator, posteaque eam alienaverit; si non adimendi animo vendidit, nihilominus deberi.'³ And again: 'Si rem suam testator legaverit eamque necessitate urgente alienaverit, fideicommissum peti posse, nisi probetur adimere ei testatorem voluisse. Probationem autem mutatae voluntatis ab hæredibus exigendam.'⁴ These cases are sufficient to show how widely variant the doctrine on this subject is in the civil law from that which now prevails in equity.⁵

1115. There are however in Equity Jurisprudence certain established exceptions to this doctrine of constructive satisfaction or ademption of legacies which deserve particular notice. In the first place it does not apply to the case of a devisee of a mere residue, for it has been said that a residue is always changing. It may amount to something or be nothing; and therefore no fair presumption can arise of its being an intended satisfaction or ademption.⁶ (a)

¹ Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 11, art. 12 to 14, 22.

² Id. § 11, art. 13, note; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 34, tit. 4, n. 8, 9.

³ Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 20, § 12; Id. §§ 10, 11.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 32, tit. 3, l. 11, § 12; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 34, tit. 4, n. 8.

⁵ See Pothier, Pand. Lib. 34, tit. 4, n. 8 to 10. Many cases like these have been adjudged precisely in the same way in Equity Jurisprudence as they were in the civil law. Thus an alienation by the testator in his lifetime of the subject-matter of a legacy of the same thing. *Hambling v. Lister, Ambler, R. 402*. So the receipt or recovery of a debt due by the legatee, which had been bequeathed to him, is an ademption of a legacy of the same debt. *Rider v. Wager, 2 P. Will. 330; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 74 to 78; 1 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 5, § 1, pp. 286 to 313.*

⁶ *Watson v. The Earl of Lincoln, Ambler, R. 327; Farnham v. Phillips, 2*

(a) But see *Thynne v. Glengall, 2 Dawson, L. R. 4 Eq. 504; Montefiore H. L. Cas. 131, where this distinction v. Guedalla, 6 Jur. n. s. 329*. These cases show that a gift of the residue, is overturned. And see *Dawson v.*

1116. Another exception to this doctrine of constructive ademption of legacies may be gathered from the qualification already annexed to the enunciation of it in the preceding pages. It is there limited to the case of a parent or of a person standing in loco parentis. In relation to parents it is applicable only to legitimate children; and in relation to persons standing in loco parentis it is also applicable generally to legitimate children only, unless the party has voluntarily placed himself in loco parentis to a legatee not standing either naturally or judicially in that predicament. All other persons are, in contemplation of law, treated as strangers to the testator.¹

Atk. 216; *Smith v. Strong*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 493; *Freemantle v. Bankes*, 5 Ves. 79. It was said by Lord Hardwicke, in *Farnham v. Phillips* (2 Atk. 216), that there is no case where the devise has been of a residue (for that is uncertain, and at the time of the testator's death may be more or less), in which a subsequent portion given has been held to be an ademption of a legacy. This seems now accordingly to be the established construction. *Smith v. Strong*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 493; *Watson v. Earl of Lincoln*, Ambler, R. 325, and Mr. Blunt's notes (1) to (5); *Freemantle v. Bankes*, 5 Ves. 79; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (a). Is there in this respect any difference between the gift of a residue as an ademption of a legacy, and the gift of a residue as an advancement or satisfaction, pro tanto, of a portion secured by a marriage settlement? In *Devese v. Pontet*, 1 Cox, R. 188, s. c. Prec. in Ch. by Finch, 240, note, it was held that bequest of a residue was not any satisfaction of a pecuniary marriage portion, even though there was in the same will a bequest of specific personal property to the party exceeding the stipulated portion. See also *Bengough v. Walker*, 15 Ves. 513, 514; 1 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 6, § 1, p. 226; *Ackworth v. Ackworth*, 1 Bro. Ch. 307, note. How would it be in the case of a settlement stipulating for a portion, and that if any advancement should be made in the lifetime of the parent it should be a part satisfaction, unless expressly declared in writing to the contrary, and then a legacy of a residue to the party entitled to such a portion? Would it be a satisfaction or not? See 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 18, § 3, p. 95, &c.; ante, § 1110, and note 2. In the case of a portion secured by settlement a distributive share in a case of intestacy to the full amount of the portion will be deemed a satisfaction. Ante, § 1110, and note; *Moulson v. Moulson*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 82; 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 18, § 4, pp. 105 to 108. But it will not be deemed a satisfaction of a clause in a marriage settlement respecting an advancement in the *lifetime* of the settler. Ante, § 1109, and note; 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 18, § 4, pp. 105 to 108; *Garthshore v. Chalie*, 10 Ves. 15.

¹ See ante, § 1111, note 1, and *Powys v. Mansfield*, 6 Sim. 528; s. c. 3

like any other bequest, is deemed or the mere uncertainty of the amount of not by subsequent portions, according to the intention to be derived; and but see *Graham v. Roseburgh*, 47 Mo. 111; post, § 1122. See that the question does not turn upon also *Sims v. Sims*, 2 Stockt. 158.

1117. But this doctrine of the constructive ademption of legacies has never been applied to legacies to mere strangers,¹ unless under very peculiar circumstances, such as where the legacy is given for a particular purpose and the portion is afterwards, in the lifetime of the party, given exactly for the same purpose and for none other.² (a) Except in cases standing upon such peculiar circumstances, and which therefore seem to present a very cogent presumption of an intentional ademption, the rule prevails that a legacy to a stranger, legitimate or illegitimate, is not adeemed by a subsequent portion or advancement in the lifetime of the testator without some expression of such intent manifested in the instrument or by some writing accompanying the portion or advancement.³

1118. The reason commonly assigned for this doctrine is, that as there is no such obligation upon such a testator to provide for the legatee as subsists between a parent and child, no inference can arise that the testator intended by the subsequent gift or advancement to perform any such duty in præsentî instead of performing it at his death; and there is no reason why a person may not be entitled to as many gifts as another may choose to bestow upon him.⁴ That this reasoning is extremely unsatisfactory as well as artificial may be unhesitatingly pronounced. It leads to this extraordinary conclusion: that a testator in intendment of law means to be more bountiful to strangers than to his own

Mylne & Craig, R. 359; *Pym v. Lockyer*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 29, 34, 35, 46; *Suisse v. Lowther*, 2 Hare, R. 424, 434, 435; ante, § 1113, and note.

¹ 1 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 6, § 2, p. 329; *Pym v. Lockyer*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 24, 34, 35, 46; *Suisse v. Lowther*, 2 Hare, R. 424, 434, 435. See the remarks of Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram, cited ante, § 1112, note.

² *Debeze v. Mann*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 165, 519, 521; s. c. 1 Cox, 346; *Monck v. Lord Monck*, 1 B. & Beatt. 303; *Rosewell v. Bennett*, 3 Atk. 77; *Roome v. Roome*, 3 Atk. 181.

³ Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 6, § 2, pp. 331 to 336; *Shudal v. Jekyll*, 2 Atk. 516; *Powell v. Cleaver*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 500; ex parte *Dubost*, 18 Ves. 152, 153; *Whetherby v. Dixon*, Cooper, Eq. R. 279; *Grave v. Lord Salisbury*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 425; 18 Ves. 152; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 2, § 1, note (a).

⁴ 1 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 6, § 2, pp. 331, 333; *Pym v. Lockyer*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 29, 34, 35; ante, § 1112, and note; *Suisse v. Lowther*, 2 Hare, R. 424, 434, 435.

(a) See *Parkhurst v. Howell*, L. R. 6 Ch. 136.

children; that by a legacy to his children he means not to gratify his feelings or affections, but merely to perform his duty; but that by a legacy to strangers he means to gratify his feelings, affections, or caprices, without the slightest reference to his duty. What makes the doctrine still more difficult to be supported upon any general reasoning is, that grandchildren, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, nephews and nieces, as well as natural children, are deemed strangers to the testator in the sense of the rule (unless he has placed himself towards them in loco parentis); and that they are in a better condition not only than legitimate children, but even than they would be if the testator formerly acted in loco parentis.¹ Considerations and consequences like these may well induce us to pause upon the original propriety of the doctrine. It is however so generally established that it cannot be shaken but by overthrowing a mass of authority which no judge would feel himself at liberty to disregard.²

1119. The third and last class of cases to which we have alluded as connected with the doctrine of satisfaction is where a legacy is given to a creditor. And here the general rule is, that where the legacy is equal to or greater in amount than an existing debt, where it is of the same nature, where it is certain and not contingent, and where no particular motive is assigned for the gift, — in all such cases the legacy is deemed a satisfaction of the debt.³ The ground of this doctrine is that a testator shall be presumed to be just before he is kind or generous. And therefore, although a legacy is generally to be taken as a gift, yet when it is to a creditor it ought to be deemed to be an act of justice and not of bounty, in the absence of all countervailing circumstances, according to the maxim of the civil law, ‘Debitor non præsumitur donare.’⁴

1120. Some of the observations which have been already made

¹ Ibid.; ex parte Dubost, 18 Ves. 152, 153; ante, § 1111, and note 1, as to who is to be deemed to stand in loco parentis. See also Powys v. Mansfield, 6 Sim. R. 528; s. c. 3 Mylne & Craig, R. 359.

² Questions of another nature often arise as to what constitutes an advancement of a child, within the meaning of that term in the Statute of Distributions (22d and 23d Charles II. ch. 10). The principal cases on the subject will be found collected in 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 507, 516.

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (l); Talbott v. Duke of Shrewsbury, Prec. Ch. 394; Jeffs v. Wood, 2 P. Will. 131, 132.

⁴ Ibid.; Rawlins v. Powell, 1 P. Will. 229. See the distinction between cases of debts paid in full before and after the will, 3 Hare, R. 281, 298.

apply, although with diminished force, to this class of cases. For where a man has assets sufficient both for justice and generosity, and where the language of the instrument imports a donation and not a payment, it seems difficult to say why the ordinary meaning of the words should not prevail.¹ (a) Where the sum is precisely the same with the debt, it may be admitted that there arises some presumption, and under many circumstances it may be a cogent presumption, of an intention to pay the debt. But where the legacy is greater than the debt, the same force of presumption certainly does not exist; and if it is less than the debt, then (as we shall presently see) the presumption is admitted to be gone.

1121. It is highly probable that this doctrine was derived from the civil law, where it is clearly laid down, but with limitations and qualifications in some respects different from those which are recognized in Equity Jurisprudence.² Where the debt was absolutely due, and for the same precise sum, a legacy to the same amount was deemed a satisfaction of it. But if there was a difference even in the time of payment between the debt and the legacy, the latter was not a satisfaction. ‘*Sin autem, neque modo, neque tempore, neque conditione, neque loco, debitum differatur, inutile est legatum.*’³ And so if the legacy was more than the debt, it seems that it was not a satisfaction. ‘*Quotiens debitor creditori suo legaret, ita inutile esse legatum, si nihil interesset creditoris ex testamento potius agere quam ex pristina obligatione.*’⁴

1122. But although the rule as to a legacy being an ademption of a debt is now well established in equity, yet it is deemed to have so little of a solid foundation either in general reasoning or as a just interpretation of the intention of the testator, that slight circumstances have been laid hold of to escape from it and to create exceptions to it.⁵ (b) The rule therefore is not allowed

¹ See *Chancey's Case*, 1 P. Will. 410, and Mr. Cox's note (1); *Fowler v. Fowler*, 3 P. Will. 354.

² Pothier, *Pand. Lib. 34, tit. 3, n. 30 to 34.*

³ Pothier, *Pand. Lib. 34, tit. 3, n. 31*; *Dig. Lib. 30 (Lib. prim. de Leg.)*, tit. 1, l. 29; *Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 20, § 14.*

⁴ Pothier, *Pand. Lib. 34, tit. 3, n. 33.*

⁵ See *Goodfellow v. Burchett*, 2 Vern. 298, and Mr. Raithby's note; *Chan-*

(a) See *Parker v. Coburn*, 10 Al- 129; *Van Riper v. Van Riper*, 1
len, 82. Green's Ch. 1; *Gilliam v. Brown*, 43

(b) See *Smith v. Smith*, 1 Allen, Miss. 641.

to prevail where the legacy is of less amount than the debt, even as a satisfaction pro tanto; nor where there is a difference in the times of payment of the debt and of the legacy; nor where they are of a different nature as to the subject-matter or as to the interest therein; (a) nor where a particular motive is assigned for the gift; nor where the debt is contracted subsequently to the will; nor where the legacy is contingent or uncertain; (b) nor where there is an express direction in the will for the payment of debts; (c) nor where the bequest is of a residue;¹ (d) nor where the debt is a negotiable security;² nor where the debt is upon an open and running account.³ (e) And as to a debt strictly so called, there is no difference whether it is a debt due to a stranger or to a child.⁴

1123. On the other hand where a creditor leaves a legacy to his debtor and either takes no notice of the debt or leaves his intention doubtful, Courts of Equity will not deem the legacy as either necessarily or prima facie evidence of an intention to release or extinguish the debt; but they will require some evidence, either on the face of the will or aliunde, to establish such an intention.⁵

1123 a. Closely allied to the subject of election and satisfaction in cases of legacies is the doctrine as to what is called the cumu-

cey's Case, 1 P. Will. 410, Mr. Cox's note (1); *Nichols v. Judkin*, 2 Atk. 301; *Richardson v. Greese*, 3 Atk. 68; 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 17, pp. 28 to 67; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (l); *Bell v. Coleman*, 5 Madd. R. 22.

¹ *Ibid.*; *Barrett v. Beckford*, 1 Ves. 519; *Devese v. Pontent*, 1 Cox, 188; s. c. Prec. Ch. by Finch, 240, note.

² *Carr v. Estabrooke*, 3 Ves. 564.

³ *Rawlins v. Powell*, 1 P. Will. 229.

⁴ *Tolson v. Collins*, 4 Ves. 483. The principal cases on this subject will be found collected in 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 17, pp. 28 to 67; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 5, note (l); *Goodfellow v. Burchett*, 2 Vern. 298, Mr. Raithby's note; *Chancey's Case*, 1 P. Will. 410, Mr. Cox's note; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 33 to 49; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 114 to 116.

⁵ 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 17, p. 28; *Id.* § 4, pp. 61 to 66.

(a) *Cloud v. Clinkenbeard*, 8 B. Mon. 397.

(b) *Dey v. Williams*, 2 Dev. & B. Eq. 66.

(c) *Strong v. Williams*, 12 Mass. 391.

(d) *Graham v. Roseburgh*, 47 Mo. 111. But see note (a), § 1115.

(e) Nor where the legacy is given to the creditor's wife. *Hall v. Hill*, 1 Dru. & War. 94; *Mulheran v. Gillespie*, 12 Wend. 349.

lation of legacies, or when and under what circumstances legacies given by different instruments or wills are to be deemed cumulative or not. The general rule here is, that where legacies are given by different instruments the presumption is *prima facie* that two legacies are intended, and that the last is not a mere repetition of the former; nor will the fact that each legacy is for the same amount in money operate to repel the presumption that they are cumulative, unless indeed there are other circumstances to repel it. (a) As for example if the testator connects a motive with both, and that motive is the same, the double coincidence will induce the court to believe that repetition and not accumulation is intended. A *fortiori* where each instrument gives precisely the same thing, as a horse, or a coach, or a particular diamond ring; or the language shows by express declaration or natural implication that the testator intends a mere repetition, the presumption of accumulation is completely repelled.¹

¹ *Hooley v. Hatton*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 390, note; *Heming v. Clutterbuck*, 1 Bligh, n. s. 479; *Hunt v. Beach*, 5 Madd. R. 358; *Suisse v. Lowther*, 2 Hare, R. 432. In this last case Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram said: 'On questions of repetition or accumulation most of the judges have referred, as Lord Eldon did in the case of *Hemming v. Gurrey* (2 Sim. & Stu. 311; 1 Bligh, n. s. 479; s. c. nom. *Heming v. Clutterbuck*), to the judgment in *Hooley v. Hatton* (1 Bro. C. C. 390, n.), as containing a sound exposition of the law upon the subject; and in the case of *Hurst v. Beach* (5 Madd. 358), Sir John Leach drew his conclusion from the cases with great precision, and as it appears to me with great accuracy. He stated the rule to be that where legacies are given by different instruments, the presumption is *prima facie* that two legacies are intended. But inasmuch as if a testator were by one instrument to give a particular ring, or horse, or specific chattel, and were by another instrument to give precisely the same thing, it would follow that the second must be a repetition, so if the bounty given by one instrument be in terms a repetition of that which has gone before, the court has presumed that the second was intended to be repetition and not accumulation. It is clearly decided however that the mere fact that the amount is the same is not such an identification of the second with the first as would prevent both from taking effect as cumulative; but if in addition to the amounts being the same the testator connects a motive with both, and the express motive is also the same, the double coincidence induces the court to believe that repetition and not accumulation was intended. Except in such cases, and the class of cases to which I am about to advert, the court does not infer that repetition was the object unless it be so declared, or it is to be collected from the words of the will itself. The presumption in the case of several gifts by different instruments being in favor of accumulation, it is clear that the claim of the plaintiff in this case

(a) See *England v. Lavers*, L. R. 3 Eq. 63; *Wilson v. O'Leary*, L. R. 7 Ch. 448.

must be strengthened by any circumstances of difference between the two gifts, — whether it be found in the amount, in the character in which it is given, in the mode of employment, in the extent of the interest, or in the motive for the bounty. All these considerations tend, in the judgment of the court, to support the argument in favor of accumulation. Now in the legacy to Suisse by the last codicil there is a particular description of Suisse, which imports a motive of a later date than the former legacies; he is described as “an excellent man,” — and the amount being different and less beneficial to Suisse than the amount of the previous gifts to him, this adds to the presumption already in his favor that a distinct gift was intended; and the only question therefore is, whether there is anything in the word “provide,” as used in the last codicil, which should lead the court to the construction that the legacy is not cumulative.’

CHAPTER XXXI.

EXPRESS TRUSTS. — APPLICATION OF PURCHASE-MONEY.

1124. IT is in cases of trusts under wills also that questions often arise as to the payment of purchase-money to the trustees, and as to the cases in which the purchaser is bound to look to the due application of purchase-money. This subject therefore, although it may equally apply to other cases of trusts created *inter vivos*, may be conveniently treated of in this place. It has been remarked by a very learned writer that Courts of Equity have in part remedied the mischiefs (if they can be deemed mischiefs) arising from the admission of trusts with respect to the *cestui que trust* or beneficiary, by making persons paying money to the trustee, with notice of the trust, answerable in some cases for the proper application of it to the purposes of the trust. But at the same time he thinks it questionable whether the admission of the doctrine is not in general productive of more inconvenience than real good; for although in many instances it is of great service to the *cestui que trust*, as it preserves his property from peculation and other disasters to which, if it were left to the mere discretion of the trustee it would necessarily be subject, yet on the other hand it creates great embarrassments to purchasers in many cases, and especially where, as in cases of infancy, the parties in interest are incapable of giving a valid assent to the receipt and application of the purchase-money by the trustee.¹

¹ Mr. Butler's note to *Co. Litt.* 290 *b*, note (1), § 12; in *Balfour v. Wel-*
land, 16 Ves. 156, Sir William Grant expressed his dissatisfaction with the
doctrine in the following terms: 'The objection is, that if they misemploy
the price the purchaser may be called upon to pay the money over again; in
other words that the purchaser is bound to see to the application of the
purchase-money. I think the doctrine upon that point has been carried

1125. The doctrine is not universally true that a purchaser having notice of a trust is bound to see that the trust is in all cases properly executed by the trustee. (a) As applied to the cases of sales, authorized to be made by trustees for particular purposes (which is the subject of our present inquiries), the doctrine is not absolute that the purchaser is bound to see that the money raised by the sale is applied to the very purposes indicated by the trust. On the contrary there are many qualifications and limitations of the doctrine in its actual application to sales both of personal and of real estate.

1126. The best method of ascertaining the true nature and extent of these qualifications and limitations will be by a separate consideration of them as applied to each kind of estate, since the rules which govern them are in some respects dissimilar, owing to the greater power which a testator has over his real than he has over his personal estate.¹ In regard to real estate it is well known that at the common law it was not bound even for the specialty debts of the testator, except in the hands of his heir; although by a statute in England (3 W. & M. ch. 14) it is made liable for such debts in the hands of his devisee. But as to simple contract debts, until a very recent period the real estate of deceased persons was not liable for the payment of any such debts. The Statute of 3d and 4th William IV. ch. 104, has made all such real estate liable as assets in equity for the payment of all their debts, whether due on simple contract or by specialty.² In America the law has been generally altered; and

farther than any sound equitable principle will warrant. Where the act is a breach of duty in the trustee, it is very fit that those who deal with him should be affected by an act tending to defeat the trust of which they have notice. But where the sale is made by the trustee in performance of his duty, it seems extraordinary that he should not be able to do what one should think incidental to the right exercise of his power; that is, to give a valid discharge for the purchase-money.' See also Mr. Sugden's remarks, Sugden on Vendors, ch. 11, § 1, pp. 515, 523 to 531 (7th edit.); Id. (9th edit.), ch. 11, vol. 2, pp. 30 to 56.

¹ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 11, p. 515 (7th edit.); Id. (9th edit.), vol. 2, ch. 1, p. 30.

² Williams's Law of Executors and Administrators, Pt. 4, B. 1, ch. 2, § 1, p. 1204 (2d edit.), (1838).

(a) An executor or administrator to require evidence from him, that is unlike a trustee in one respect, — what he is doing is necessary for the due execution of the trust. *Oceanic Nav. Co. v. Sutherland*, 16 Ch. D. 236, 244, James, L. J.

such real estate is made liable to the payment of all sorts of debts as auxiliary to the personal assets. But as to personal estate it was at the common law, and still remains in both countries, directly liable to the payment of all debts; or, as it is commonly expressed, it goes to the executors as assets for creditors, to be applied in a due course of administration.¹ It is therefore in a strict sense a trust fund for the payment of debts generally.² We shall presently see how this consideration bears upon the topic now under discussion.

1127. The general principle of Courts of Equity in regard to the duty of purchasers (not especially exempted by any provision of the author of the trust), in cases of sales of property or charges on property under trusts (for there is no difference in point of law between sales and charges), to see to the application of the purchase-money is this; that wherever the trust or charge is of a defined and limited nature the purchaser must himself see that the purchase-money is applied to the proper discharge of the trust, but wherever the trust is of a general and unlimited nature, he need not see to it.³ (a) Thus for example if a trust is

¹ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 11, p. 515 (7th edit.); *Id.* (9th edit.), vol. 2, ch. 11, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*

³ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 352, 496; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 103; 1 Powell on Mortgages, ch. 9, pp. 214 to 250, Coventry & Rand's edit. In *Elliot v. Merryman*, Barnard. Ch. R. 78 (cited and approved in *Shaw v. Borrer*, 1 Keen, R. 574), the Master of the Rolls said: 'The general rule is that if a trust directs that land should be sold for payment of debts generally, the purchaser is not bound to see that the money be rightly applied. If the trust directs that lands should be sold for the payment of certain debts, mentioning in particular to whom those debts are owing, the purchaser is bound to see that the money is applied for payment of those debts. The present case indeed does not fall within either of these rules, because here lands are not given to be sold for the payment of debts, but are only charged with such payment. However the question is, whether that circumstance makes any difference, and his Honor was of opinion that it did not. And if such a distinction was to be made, the consequence would be that whenever lands are charged with the payment of debts generally they could never be discharged of that trust without a suit in this court, which would be extremely inconvenient. No instances have been produced to show that in any other respect the charging land with the payment of debts differs from the directing them to be sold for such a purpose; and therefore there is no reason that a difference should be established in this respect. The only objection that seemed to be of weight with regard to this matter is, that where lands are appointed to be sold for the payment of

(a) *Goodrich v. Proctor*, 1 Gray, 567, 570.

created to sell for the payment of a portion, or of a mortgage, there the purchaser must see to the application of the purchase-money to that specified object. If on the other hand a trust is created, or a devise is made, or a charge is established by a party for the payment of debts generally, the purchaser is exempted from any such obligation.¹ (a)

1127 *a*. Upon this ground, where a testator by his will charged his real estate with the payment of debts generally, and afterwards devised his real estate to a trustee upon certain trusts for other persons, it was held that the trustee had a right to sell or mortgage the estate so charged for the payment of the debts; and that upon such sale or mortgage the purchaser or mortgagee was not bound to look to the application of the purchase or mortgage money.²

1128. Let us in the first place consider the doctrine in its application to personal estate, including therein leasehold estates, which are equally with personal chattels subject to the payment of debts. And here the rule is that the personal estate, being liable for the payment of the debts of the testator generally, the purchaser of the whole or of any part of it is not, upon the principle already stated, bound to see that the purchase-money is applied by the executor to the discharge of the debts; for the trust is general and unlimited, it being for the payment of all debts. It is true that there is an apparent exception to the rule;

debts generally, the trust may be said to be performed as soon as those lands are sold; but where they are only charged with the payment of debts, it may be said that the trust is not performed till these debts are discharged. And so far indeed it is true that where lands are charged with the payment of annuities, those lands will be charged in the hands of a purchaser, because it was the very purpose of making the lands a fund for that payment that it should be a constant and subsisting fund; but where lands are not burdened with such a subsisting charge, the purchaser ought not to be bound to look to the application of the money; and that seems to be the true distinction.' See also *Shaw v. Borrer*, 1 Keen, R. 559, 575, 576; post, § 1131; *Wood v. White*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 460, 481, 482.

¹ *Elliot v. Merryman*, Barnard. Ch. R. 78; s. c. 2 Atk. 42, cited and approved in *Shaw v. Borrer*, 1 Keen, R. 573, 574; *Walker v. Smallwood*, Ambler, R. 676; *Bonney v. Ridgard*, 1 Cox, R. 145; *Jenkins v. Hill*, 6 Ves. 654; *Braithwaite v. Britain*, 1 Keen, R. 206, 222.

² *Ball v. Harris*, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 264; *Eland v. Eland*, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 420; post, § 1131, note.

(a) *Goodrich v. Proctor*, 1 Gray, 567, 570.

and that is, that he must be a bona fide purchaser without notice that there are no debts, and he must not collude with the executor in any wilful misapplication of the assets.¹ But this proceeds upon the ground of fraud, which is of itself sufficient to vacate any transaction whatsoever.

1129. It will not make any difference in the application of this general doctrine as to the personal estate, that the testator has directed his real estate to be sold for the payment of his debts, whether he specifies the debts or not, or that he has made a specific bequest of a part of his personal estate for a particular purpose, or to a particular person, although such specific bequest is known to the purchaser, if he has no reason to suspect any fraudulent purpose.² The ground of this doctrine is that otherwise it would be indispensable for a person before he could become the purchaser of any personal estate, specifically bequeathed, to come into a Court of Equity to have an account taken of the assets of the testator and of the debts due from him, and in order to ascertain whether it was necessary for the executor to sell, which would be a most serious inconvenience, and greatly retard the due settlement of estates.³

1130. In the next place in regard to real estate.⁴ Where there is a devise of real estate for the payment of debts generally, or the testator charges his debts generally upon his real estate, and

¹ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 11, § 2, pp. 535, 536, 538 to 540 (7th edit.); Id. vol. 2, ch. 11, § 1, pp. 32 to 40 (9th edit.); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 6, § 2, and note (*t*); Co. Litt. 290 *b*, Butler's note (1), § 12; Bonney *v.* Ridgard, 1 Cox, R. 145; Hill *v.* Simpson, 7 Ves. 152; ante, §§ 422 to 424; Field *v.* Schieffelin, 7 John. Ch. R. 155 to 160; 1 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 7, § 2, pp. 374 to 396.

² Ibid.: Co. Litt. 290 *b*, Butler's note (1), § 12; Humble *v.* Bill, 2 Vern. 444, and Mr. Raithby's note; Ewer *v.* Corbet, 2 P. Will. 148; Nugent *v.* Gifford, 1 Atk. 463; Elliot *v.* Merryman, 2 Atk. 41; Crane *v.* Drake, 2 Vern. 616, and Mr. Raithby's note (4); Langley *v.* Earl of Oxford, Ambler, R. 17, and Id. App. C. Blunt's edit. p. 795; McLeod *v.* Drummond, 14 Ves. 353; s. c. 17 Ves. 153; Keane *v.* Robarts, 4 Madd. R. 332; Andrew *v.* Wrigley, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 125. See Shaw *v.* Borrer, 1 Keen, R. 559.

³ Ewer *v.* Corbet, 2 P. Will. 148; Langley *v.* Earl of Oxford, Ambler, R. 17; Id. App. C. p. 797, Blunt's edit.

⁴ I have contented myself with drawing from Mr. Sugden's learned Treatise on Vendors and Purchasers (ch. 11, § 1, pp. 517 to 535, 7th edit.; Id. ch. 11, vol. 2, pp. 30 to 57, 9th edit.) nearly all the materials used in this part of the subject. See also 1 Powell on Mortgages, ch. 9, pp. 214 to 250, Coventry & Rand's edit.

the money is raised by the trustee by sale or mortgage, the same rule applies as in cases of personalty, that the purchaser or mortgagee is not bound to look to the application of the purchase-money; (a) and for the same reason, namely, the unlimited and general nature of the trust, and the difficulty of seeing to the application of the purchase or mortgage money, without an account of all the debts and assets, under the superintendence of Courts of Equity.¹ (b)

1131. In the case of sales of real estate for the payment of debts generally the purchaser is not only not bound to look to the application of the purchase-money, but if more of the estate is sold than is sufficient for the purposes of the trust, it will not be to his prejudice.² Nor will it make any difference in cases of this sort whether the testator charges both his personal and real estate with payment of his debts, or the real only; for ordinarily the personal estate, unless specially exempted, is the primary fund, and if exempted, still the charge on the real estate is general and unlimited.³ Nor will it make any difference whether the devise directs a sale of the real estate for the payment of debts, or only charges the real estate therewith.⁴ Nor will it make any difference that the trust is only to sell, or is a charge for so much as the personal estate is deficient to pay the debts.⁵

¹ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 11, § 1, pp. 517, 518 (7th edit.); Id. ch. 11, § 1, vol. 2, pp. 32 to 40 (9th edit.); Co. Litt. 290 b, Butler's note (1), § 12; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, ch. 6, § 2, and notes (k), (l); 1 Eq. Abr. 358, C. pl. 1, 4; Williamson v. Curtis, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 96; Powitt v. Guyon, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 186, and Mr. Belt's note; Balfour v. Welland, 16 Ves. 151; ante, § 1127, note; Shaw v. Borrer, 1 Keen, R. 559, 573 to 576; Ball v. Harris, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 269; Eland v. Eland, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 420; Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat. R. 421, 442, 443.

² Ibid.; Spaulding v. Shalmer, 1 Vern. 301.

³ Ibid.; Co. Litt. 290 b, Butler's note (1), § 12; Cutler v. Coxeter, 2 Vern. 302; French v. Chichester, 2 Vern. 568; Shaw v. Borrer, 1 Keen, R. 559, 575, 576.

⁴ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 11, § 1, pp. 522, 523 (7th edit.); Id. ch. 11, vol. 2, pp. 37 to 39 (9th edit.); Elliot v. Merryman, Barnard. R. 78; Shaw v. Borrer, 1 Keen, R. 559, 574 to 576; Ball v. Harris, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 264; Eland v. Eland, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 420; ante, § 1127.

⁵ Ibid.; p. 531; Co. Litt. 290 b, Butler's note (1), § 12.

(a) Oceanic Nav. Co. v. Sutherland, 16 Ch. D. 236, 244; Storry v. Walsh, 18 Beav. 559; Greatham v. Cotton, 34 Beav. 615.

(b) Goodrich v. Proctor, 1 Gray,

Nor will it make any difference that a specific part of the real estate is devised for a particular purpose or trust, if the whole real estate is charged with the payment of debts generally by the will.¹ If however the trustees have only a power to sell, and not

¹ This point was directly decided in *Shaw v. Borrer*, 1 Keen, R. 559, 574 to 576. That was the case of a will which charged the real estate generally with the payment of debts and devised an advowson on a special trust. The trustees (one of whom was also executor) had sold the advowson; and the question was whether they could make a good title without the institution of a suit to ascertain whether there was a deficiency of the personal assets, and whether the purchaser was bound to see to the application of the purchase-money. It was held that he was not. Lord Langdale on that occasion said: 'It seems therefore clear that a charge of this nature has been and ought to be treated as a trust, which gives the creditors a priority over the special purposes of the devise; and no doubt is raised but that on the application of the creditors the court would, in a suit to which the executors were parties, compel the trustees for special purposes to raise the money requisite for payment of the debts. If so, is there any good reason to doubt but that the trustees and executors may themselves do that which the court would compel them to do on the application of the creditors? Though the advowson is devised to trustees for special purposes, the testator has in the first instance charged all his estates with payment of his debts. The charge affects the equitable but not the legal estate; and upon the construction the trusts of the will affect this estate, first, in common with the testator's other property for the payment of debts, and next, separately for the special purposes mentioned in the will. Possibly upon the testator's death it might not be necessary to resort to the real estate at all for the payment of the testator's debts. And if it should be necessary to resort to the real estate, some part ought, in a due administration, to be applied in payment of debts before other parts; and it is said that the necessity for raising money to pay the debts out of the real estate, and, if such necessity exists, the proper selection of that part of the real estate which ought to be first sold, ought to appear, and can only be proved by the master's report in a suit for the administration of assets. It is true that if the administration of assets devolves on the court by the institution of a suit for the purpose, the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction acts with all practicable caution, and proceeds in strict conformity with its established rules. But this is a caution exercised not for the benefit of the creditors or at their instance, for they ask nothing, and have a right to nothing, but payment of their debts; and the question is not what the court thinks it right to do for the benefit of the persons who have claims subject to the debts, but whether the estate subject to debts by the will, and sold and conveyed by the devisees for special purposes at the instance of the executors, would remain in the hands of the purchaser subject to any claims created by or founded on the will; or whether there is any obligation to see that done which the court would do in a suit to administer assets. An argument is deduced from the statutes which has made real estates assets in Courts of Equity for payment of simple-contract debts; but it does not appear to me that the rule which the legislature has thought fit to apply in cases where the real estate is not charged with payment of debts is necessarily to be applied in cases where the testator has charged his real estate with such

an estate devised to them, then, unless the personal estate be deficient, the power to sell does not arise.¹

1181 *a*. The rule in all these cases that the purchaser or mortgagee is not bound to look to the application of the purchase-money, is subject to an obvious exception, that if the purchaser or mortgagee is knowingly a party to any breach of trust by the sale or mortgage, it shall afford him no protection.² One obvious example of this is where a devisee himself has a right to sell, but he sells to pay his own debt, which is a manifest breach of trust, and the party who concurs in the sale is aware or has notice of the fact that such is its object; for in such a case they are coadjutors in the fraud.³

1182. But where in cases of real estate the trust is for the payment of legacies or of specified or scheduled debts, the rule is different; for they are ascertained, and the purchaser may see, and in the view of a Court of Equity he is bound to see, that the money is actually applied in discharge of them.⁴ On the other hand cases may occur where the devise is for the payment of debts generally, and also for the payment of legacies, and then the trust becomes a mixed one. In such a case the purchaser is not bound to see to the application of the purchase-money; because to hold him liable to see the legacies paid would in fact involve him in the necessity of taking an account of all the debts and assets.⁵ (*a*)

payment. And on the whole, considering that the charge creates or constitutes a trust for the payment of debts, or as Lord Eldon in one place, adopting the language of Lord Thurlow, expressed it, that "a charge is a devise of the estate in substance and effect pro tanto to pay the debts," and conceiving that the purchaser is not bound either to inquire whether other sufficient property is applicable, or ought to be applied first in payment of debts, or to see to the application of the purchase-money, I think that the exception must be overruled.' The same doctrine was expressly affirmed by Lord Cottenham in *Ball v. Harris*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 264, 267. See also *Elliot v. Merryman*, *Barnard. Ch. R.* 78; *Bailey v. Ekins*, 7 Ves. 319, 323; *Dolton v. Hewen*, 6 Madd. R. 9; ante, § 1127 *a*.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Eland v. Eland*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 420, 427; *Watkins v. Check*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 199.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Horn v. Horn*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 448. The purchaser under a decree is bound to see that the directions of the decree are obeyed. *Colclough v. Sterum*, 3 Blyth, R. 181.

⁵ *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 11, § 2, p. 518 (7th edit.); *Id.* ch. 11, § 1, vol. 2,

(*a*) See *Dowling v. Hudson*, 17 expressed to be for the payment of *Beav.* 248. And where the trust is debts and legacies, it will make no

1133. Where the time directed by the devise for a sale of the real estate is arrived, and the persons entitled to the money are

pp. 32, 33, of 9th edit.; Co. Litt. 200 *b*, Butler's note (1), § 12; *Rogers v. Skillicome*, Ambler, R. 188, and Mr. Blunt's note; *Eland v. Eland*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 420; *Watkins v. Cheek*, 2 Sim. & Stu. R. 199; *Johnson v. Kennett*, 6 Simons, R. 384; s. c. 3 Mylne & Keen, 624. In *Eland v. Eland*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 420, 427, Lord Cottenham, commenting on these cases, said: 'With respect to *Watkins v. Cheek*, which was one of the cases, it is only necessary to observe that the ground on which Sir John Leach rested his decision is wholly inapplicable here. Whether the circumstances of that case were sufficiently strong to justify the conclusion at which the learned judge arrived, it is not material to consider, the question being only as to the principle upon which Sir John Leach proceeded. Now the principle of that decision is one which has been long established, and which does not in the least interfere with the rule that where the debts are charged generally the purchaser or mortgagee is not bound to see to the application of the money, — a rule introduced from the peculiarity and necessity of the case. That rule however is subject to this obvious exception, that if the mortgagee or purchaser is party to a breach of trust, it can afford him no protection. One obvious example is, where a devisee has a right to sell but he sells to pay his own debt, which is a manifest breach of trust, and the party who concurs in the sale is aware or has notice of the fact that such is its object. That is the whole of the principle laid down in *Watkins v. Cheek*, and whether the facts in that case were strong enough to support the decision is a different and not now a material question. It is only necessary to refer to two or three sentences in the judgment to show that such was the principle. [His Lordship here read part of Sir John Leach's judgment, and proceeded:] That case therefore would be a very good authority here, provided the present case afforded evidence of the mortgagee being party to a breach of trust committed by the devisee. The other case cited was *Johnson v. Kennett*, which no doubt would carry the doctrine a great deal further; for there was no evidence in that case of any breach of trust. But then the purchasers had reason to believe, from the nature of the transaction itself, that the debts had been paid off; and being of that opinion upon the evidence, the Vice-Chancellor considered that the case was the same as if nothing but legacies had been originally charged, in which case not being protected by an immediate charge of debts, the purchaser would not be exonerated from his liability to see the money properly applied. If that doctrine had been supported, it would have gone far to destroy the rule altogether; because before it can come to that the mortgagee must (and if he is to be liable he must in every case) go into an investigation of the fact of how far the debts have been discharged, — exactly

difference that the purchaser had notice that there were no debts, and that this was so when the testator died. The form of such a bequest implies a confidence in the trustee in regard to the application of the purchase-money; and in such a case it

would be unreasonable to require the purchaser to look to its application. *Stroughill v. Anstey*, 1 DeG. M. & G. 635. See also *Andrews v. Sparhawk*, 13 Pick. 393; *Hauser v. Shore*, 5 Ired. Eq. 357; *Cadbury v. Duval*, 10 Barr, 267.

infants or are unborn, there the purchaser is not bound to see to the application of the purchase-money, because he might otherwise be implicated by a trust of long duration.¹ But if an estate is charged with a sum of money payable to an infant at his majority, there the purchaser is bound to see the money duly paid on his arrival at age; for the estate will remain chargeable with it in his hands.²

1134. Where the trusts are defined and yet the money is not merely to be paid over to third persons, but it is to be applied

that liability to which the law considers that he should not be subjected. That was one of the two grounds on which the Vice-Chancellor rested his judgment in *Johnson v. Kennett*, namely, that the transaction afforded evidence that all the debts had been paid; the other being that from the form of the conveyance it appeared that the party who sold was dealing with the purchasers as owner of the estate. The latter ground is manifestly untenable. What evidence is it of a breach of trust that a party having such an estate, subject to such a charge, sells the estate as his own? He is in truth the owner, subject to a charge; and it is his duty to satisfy the debts, which the sale may be the very means of enabling him to do. When *Johnson v. Kennett* was brought by appeal before Lord Lyndhurst, his Lordship reversed the decree, and observed that the rule of a purchaser being protected from seeing to the application of his purchase-money by a general charge of debts and legacies, had reference to the state of things at the death of the testator; and that if the debts were afterwards paid, leaving the legacies charged, that could not vary the rule. I entirely concur in that opinion; otherwise the mortgagee must in every case in which there is a charge of legacies take upon himself to investigate and ascertain whether the debts have been paid or not. Taking then *Watkins v. Cheek* as proceeding upon the ground of fraud, and taking *Johnson v. Kennett*, decided by Lord Lyndhurst on appeal, as maintaining and not impeaching the rule, I have no doubt that the rule rests exactly as it did before those cases were determined, and has not been shaken by either of them. The present is the case of a devise subject to the payment of debts and legacies; and according to the master's report here is a debt not paid. How then does the case stand? According to the decision, the mortgagee has a right to hold the estate discharged of any obligation to see to the application of the purchase-money, except in so far as she by her own deed undertakes to be responsible. She is only purchaser of so much of the estate as may remain after payment of the annuity and legacies, — and there is no dispute as to her being liable to that extent, — while she is protected from seeing to the application of the mortgage-money beyond. If so, she is then entitled to the whole of the proceeds of the estate as his security, ultra the amount of the excepted legacies, and that amount has been deducted; and so far the mortgagee is safe from any other claim.'

¹ *Sngden on Vendors*, ch. 11, § 1, p. 519 (7th edit.); *Id.* ch. 11, § 1, vol. 2, pp. 32 to 34 (9th edit.); *Sowarsby v. Lacy*, 4 Madd. R. 142; *Lavender v. Stanton*, 6 Madd. R. 46; *Breedon v. Breedon*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 413.

² *Ibid.*; *Dickinson v. Dickinson*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 19.

by the trustees to certain purposes which require on their part time, deliberation, and discretion, it seems that the purchaser is not bound to see to the due application of the purchase-money; ¹(*a*) as where it is to pay all debts which shall be ascertained within eighteen months after the sale, or where the trustees are to lay out the money in the funds or in the purchase of other lands upon certain trusts.² (*b*)

1135. These are some of the most important and nice distinctions which have been adopted by Courts of Equity upon this intricate topic; and they lead strongly to the conclusion to which not only eminent jurists but also eminent judges have arrived, that it would have been far better to have held in all cases that the party having the right to sell had also the right to receive the purchase-money, without any further responsibility on the part of the purchaser as to its application.

¹ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 11, § 1, pp. 520, 521 (7th edit.); Id. ch. 11, § 1, vol. 2, pp. 35, 36 (9th edit.); *Balfour v. Welland*, 16 Ves. 151; *Wormley v. Wormley*, 8 Wheat. R. 421, 442, 443.

² *Ibid.*; *Wormley v. Wormley*, 8 Wheat. R. 422, 442, 443.

(*a*) *Locke v. Lomas*, 5 DeG. & S. saus. 375; *Redheimer v. Pyson*, 1 326; *Parker v. Clarkson*, 4 W. Va. Spear, Eq. 135; *Nicholls v. Peak*, 1 407. Beasl. 69.

(*b*) See *Lining v. Peyton*, 2 De-

CHAPTER XXXII.

EXPRESS TRUSTS. — CHARITIES.

1136. It is in cases of wills also that we most usually find provisions for public CHARITIES; and to the consideration of this subject, constituting as it does a large and peculiar source of equity jurisdiction under the head of Trusts, we shall now proceed.¹

1137. It is highly probable that the rudiments of the law of charities were derived from the Roman or civil law.² One of the earliest fruits of the Emperor Constantine's real or pretended zeal for Christianity was a permission to his subjects to bequeath their property to the church.³ This permission was soon abused to so great a degree as to induce the Emperor Valentinian to enact a mortmain law, by which it was restrained.⁴

¹ A considerable portion of the succeeding account of Charities, and of the jurisdiction exercised by Courts of Equity touching the same is, with some additions and alterations, a transcript of the note (1) in the Appendix to 4 Wheaton, Rep. pp. 1 to 23. It becomes necessary therefore to say that that note was written by me at the request of that able and learned reporter, with an express understanding that its author should not then be made known. I now reluctantly disclose the authorship. But in discussing the same subject (which I had fully examined at the time, when I prepared my opinion in the case of *The Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Smith*, since published in the Appendix to 3 Peters's Reports, 481 to 593), it became impossible for me in the present work to avoid going over the same ground, in language or manner substantially different from that note; and I have been compelled therefore to make the present avowal, since I should otherwise seem to have appropriated so large a portion of the labors of another.

² In Lord Chief Justice Wilmut's notes of his opinions (pp. 53, 54) it is said: 'Donations for public purposes were sustained in the civil law, and applied when illegal *cy pres* to other purposes, one hundred years before Christianity was the religion of the Empire.' And for this is cited Dig. Lib. 33, tit. 2, De Usu Usufruc. Legatarum, §§ 16, 17.

³ Cod. Theodos. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 4.

⁴ Cod. Theodos. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 20. To those who may not be familiar with the term 'mortmain,' it may be proper to state that the statutes in

But this restraint was gradually relaxed; and in the time of Justinian it became a fixed maxim of Roman Jurisprudence that legacies to pious uses (which included all legacies destined for works of piety or charity, whether they related to spiritual or to temporal concerns) were entitled to peculiar favor and to be deemed privileged testaments.¹

1138. Thus for example a legacy of ornaments for a church, a legacy for the maintenance of a clergyman to instruct poor children, and a legacy for their sustenance, were esteemed legacies to pious and charitable uses.² In all these cases the bequests had their charitable motives independent of the consideration of the merit of the particular legatees. But other legacies, although not of a pious or charitable nature, but yet for objects of a public nature or for a general benefit, were also deemed entitled to the like encouragement and protection. Thus for example a legacy destined for some public ornament or for some public use, such as to build a gate for a city, or for the embellishment and improvement of a public street or square, or as a prize to persons excelling in an art or science, was deemed a privileged legacy and of complete validity.³ ‘*Si quid relictum sit civitatibus, omne valet, sive in distributionem relinquatur, sive in opus, sive in alimenta, vel in eruditionem puerorum, sive quid aliud.*’⁴ Again: ‘*Civitatibus legari potest etiam, quod ad honorem ornatumque civitatis pertinet. Ad ornatum; puta, quod instruendum forum,*

England which prohibit corporations from taking lands by devise, even for charities, except in certain special cases, are generally called the Statutes of Mortmain, *mortua manu*, — for the reason of which appellation Sir Edward Coke offers many conjectures. But (says Mr. Justice Blackstone, 1 Black. Comm. 479) there is one which seems more probable than any that he has given us; namely, that these purchases being usually made by ecclesiastical bodies, the members of which (being professed) were reckoned dead persons in law, land therefore holden by them might with great propriety be said to be held in *mortua manu*. The word is now commonly employed to designate all prohibitory laws which limit, restrain, or annul, gifts, grants, or devises of lands and other corporeal hereditaments to charitable uses. See on this subject 2 Black. Comm. 268 to 274.

¹ 2 Domat, Civil Law, B. 4, tit. 2, § 6, art. 1, 2, 7, pp. 168 to 170, by Strahan; Ferrier, Dict. h. t.; Swinburne, Pt. 1, § 16, p. 103; Trustees of Baptist Association *v.* Hart's Executors, 4 Wheat. R. 1; s. c. 3 Peters, R. App. 481.

² 2 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 6, art. 1, p. 168, art. 2, p. 169.

³ 2 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 6, art. 3, p. 169.

⁴ *Ibid.*; art. 6, p. 170; Dig. Lib. 30, tit. 1, l. 117.

theatrum, stadium, legatum, fuerit. Ad honorem; puta, quod ad munus edendum, venationemve, ludos scenicos, ludos Circenses, relictum fuerit; aut, quod ad divisionem singulorum civium vel epulam, relictum fuerit. Hoc amplius, quod ad alimenta infirmæ ætatis (puta, senioribus, vel pueris, puellisque), relictum fuerit; ad honorem civitatis pertinere respondetur.¹

1139. The construction of testaments of this nature was most liberal; and the legacies were never permitted to be lost, either by the uncertainty or failure of the persons or objects for which they were destined. Hence if a legacy was given to the church or to the poor generally, without any description of what church or what poor, the law sustained it by giving it, in the first case, to the parish church of the place where the testator lived, and in the latter case to the hospital of the same place; and if there was none, then to the poor of the same parish.² The same rule was applied where instead of a bare legacy the testator appointed as his heir, or devisee, or legatee, the church or the poor. It was construed to belong to the church or the poor of the parish where he resided.³ So if a legacy were given to God (as seems sometimes to have been the usage in the time of Justinian), it was construed to be a legacy to the church of the parish where the testator resided.⁴

1140. If the testator himself had designated the person by whom the charity was to be carried into effect, he was compellable to perform it. If no person was designated, the bishop or ordinary of the place of the testator's nativity might compel its due execution.⁵ And in all cases where the objects were indefinite the legacy was carried into effect under the direction of the judge who had cognizance of the subject.⁶ So if a legacy was given for a definite object which either was previously accomplished or which failed, it was nevertheless held valid, and applied under judicial discretion to some other object.⁷ Thus for example if the testator had left a legacy for building a parish church or an apartment in a hospital, and before his death the church or

¹ Ibid.; Dig. Lib. 30, tit. 1, l. 122.

² 2 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 6, art. 1, p. 169; Ferriere, Dict. h. t.

³ 2 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 6, art. 4, p. 169.

⁴ Ibid.; Novellæ, 141, cap. 9.

⁵ 2 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 6, art. 5, p. 169; Cod. Lib. 1, tit. 3, l. 28, § 1.

⁶ 2 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 6, art. 5, p. 169; Swinburne, Pt. 1, § 16, p. 104.

⁷ 2 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 6, art. 6, p. 170.

apartment had been built, or it was not necessary or useful, the legacy did not become a nullity, but it was applied by the proper functionary to some other purposes of piety or charity.¹ And we shall presently see that the like doctrine has been carried to a great extent in the jurisprudence of England on the same subject.

1141. The high authority of the Roman law, coinciding with the religious notions of the times, could hardly fail to introduce these principles of pious legacies into the common law of England, and the zeal and learning of the ecclesiastical tribunals must have been constantly exercised to enlarge their operation. Lord Thurlow² was clearly of opinion that the doctrine of charities grew up from the civil law, and Lord Eldon,³ in assenting to that opinion, has judiciously remarked, that at an early period the ordinary had the power to apply a portion of every man's personal estate to charity; and when afterwards the statute compelled a distribution, it is not impossible that the same favor should have been extended to charity in wills, which by their own force purported to authorize such a distribution. Be the origin however what it may, it cannot be denied that many of the privileges attached to pious legacies have been for ages incorporated into the English law.⁴ Indeed in former times the construction of charitable bequests was pushed to the most alarming extravagance. And although it has been in a great measure checked in later and more enlightened times, there are still some anomalies in the law on this subject which are hardly reconcilable with any sound principles of judicial interpretation or with any proper exercise of judicial authority.

1142. The history of the law of charities prior to the Statute of the 43d of Elizabeth, ch. 4, which is emphatically called the Statute of Charitable Uses, is extremely obscure. It may nevertheless be useful to endeavor to trace the general outline of that history, since it may materially assist us in ascertaining how far the present authority and doctrines of the Court of Chancery in regard to charitable uses depend upon that statute, and how far

¹ *Ibid.*

² *White v. White*, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 12.

³ *Moggridge v. Tackwell*, 7 Ves. 36, 69; *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. 55, 94, 95.

⁴ *Swinb. on Wills*, Pt. 1, § 16, pp. 66 to 73; *Trustees of Baptist Association v. Smith*, 3 Peters, R. App. 481 to 483.

they arise from its general jurisdiction, as a Court of Equity, to enforce trusts, and especially to enforce trusts to pious uses.¹

1143. It is not easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion on this head. Until a comparatively recent period, and indeed until the Report of the Commissioners on the Public Records, published by Parliament in 1827 (to which our attention will be more directly drawn hereafter), few traces could be found, in the volumes of printed reports or otherwise, of the exercise of this jurisdiction in any shape prior to the Statute of Elizabeth. The principal if not the only cases then to be found were decided in the Courts of Common Law, and generally turned upon the question whether the uses were void or not within the statutes against superstitious uses.² One of the earliest cases is Porter's Case,³ which was a devise of lands, devisable by custom, to the testator's wife in fee, upon condition that she should assure the lands devised for the maintenance and continuance of a free school and certain almsmen and almswomen; and it appeared that the heir had entered for condition broken, and conveyed the same lands to the Queen. It was held that the use being for charity was a good and lawful use, and not void by the statutes against superstitious uses, and that the Queen might well hold the land for the charitable uses. Lord Loughborough, in commenting on this case, observed: 'It does not appear that this court (that is, Chancery) at that period had cognizance upon informations for the establishment of charities. Prior to the time of Lord Ellesmere,⁴ as far as the tradition

¹ Mr. Justice Baldwin, in his very learned and elaborate judgment on the will of Sarah Zane, in the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania, April Term, 1833 (which is in print), has gone into a full consideration of this whole subject, and collected many cases antecedent to the Statute of Elizabeth, which may lead to some question whether the origin commonly assigned to charitable uses is perfectly correct. I have however left the text as it is, upon the authority of the English judges, as a minute inquiry into the subject would lead the reader too far aside from the direct object of these Commentaries. But the judgment of Mr. Justice Baldwin will amply reward a diligent perusal. Mr. Boyle, in his work on Charities, B. 1, ch. 1, pp. 1 to 63 (1837), has given a concise view of the statutes respecting charities prior to that of the 43d Elizabeth. See also *Shotwell v. Mott*, 2 Sandford, R. 45.

² See Mr. Justice Baldwin's opinion in the case of Sarah Zane's will, Cir. Ct. Pennsylvania, April Term, 1833.

³ 1 Co. 22 *b* in 34 and 35 Elizabeth. See also a like decision in *Partridge v. Walker*, cited 4 Co. 116 *b*; *Martidale v. Martin*, Co. Eliz. 288; *Thetford School*, 8 Co. 130.

⁴ Sir Thomas Egerton was made Lord Chancellor in 39 Elizabeth, 1596, and was created Lord Ellesmere, 1 James I., 1603.

of the times immediately following goes, there were no such informations as that upon which I am now sitting (that is, an information to establish a charity), but they made out their case as well as they could by law.'¹

1144. So that the result of Lord Loughborough's researches on this point was, that until about the period of enacting the Statute of Elizabeth bills were not filed in chancery to establish charities. It is remarkable that Sir Thomas Egerton and Lord Coke, who argued Porter's Case for the Queen, although they cited many antecedent cases, refer to none which were not decided at law. And the doctrine established by Porter's Case is, that if a feoffment is made to a general legal use not superstitious, although indefinite, although no person is in esse who could be the cestui que use, yet the feoffment is good; and if the use is bad, the heir of the feoffor will be entitled to enter, the legal estate remaining in him.²

1145. The absence therefore of all authority derived from any known antecedent equity decisions, upon an occasion when they would probably have been used if any existed, did certainly seem very much to favor the conclusion of Lord Loughborough. And in the absence of any such known antecedent decisions it was not a rash conjecture, for it would be but a conjecture, that Porter's Case having established that charitable uses not superstitious were good at law, the Court of Chancery, in analogy to other cases of trusts, immediately afterwards held the feoffees to such uses accountable in equity for the due execution of them; and that the inconveniences felt in resorting to this new and anomalous proceeding, from the indefinite nature of some of the uses, gave rise within a few years to the Statute of 43 Elizabeth, ch. 4.³

¹ Attorney-Gen. v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. 714, 726. In *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftesbury*, 2 P. Williams, 119, Sir Joseph Jekyll, M. R., said: 'In like manner, in case of charity, the King has pro bono publico an original right to superintend the case thereof; so that, abstracted from the Statute of Elizabeth relating to charitable uses and antecedent to it as well as since, it has been every day's practice to file informations in chancery in the attorney-general's name, for the establishment of charities.' Lord Somers, in *Cary v. Bertie*, 2 Vern. R. 333, 342, made remarks to somewhat the same purpose, which Sir Joseph Jekyll cited and approved. Post, § 1148; Attorney-Gen. v. Brereton, 2 Ves. 425, 427.

² 3 Ves. jr. 726.

³ There was in fact an act passed respecting charitable uses in 39 Eliza-

1146. This view might also have some tendency to reconcile the language of Lord Loughborough with that of an opposite character used upon other occasions by other chancellors and judges in reference to the jurisdiction of chancery over charities,¹ as it would show that in cases of feoffments to charitable uses bills to establish those uses might in fact have been introduced or brought into familiar practice by Lord Ellesmere about five years before the Statute of Elizabeth. This would be quite consistent with the fact that such bills were not sustained where the donation was to charity generally, and no trust estate was interposed, and no legal estate was devised to support the uses. It is very certain that at law devises to charitable uses generally without interposing a trustee, and devises to a non-existing corporation or to an unincorporated society, would have been, and in fact were, held utterly void for want of a person having a sufficient capacity to take as devisee.² (a) The Statute of Elizabeth in favor of charitable uses cured this defect,³ and provided (as we shall hereafter have occasion more fully to consider) a new mode of enforcing such uses by a commission under the direction of the Court of Chancery.

1147. Shortly after this statute it became a matter of doubt whether the Court of Chancery could grant relief by original bill in cases within that statute, or whether the remedy was not confined to the proceeding by commission under the statute. That doubt remained until the reign of Charles II., when it was settled in favor of the jurisdiction of the court by original bill.⁴ On one occasion when this very question was argued before him, Lord Keeper Bridgman declared that 'the King as pater patriæ may

beth, ch. 9; but it was repealed by the Act of 43 Elizabeth, ch. 4. Com. Dig. Charitable Uses, N. 14.

¹ See ante, § 1143, note; post, § 1148.

² Anon. 1 Ch. Cas. 207; Attorney-Gen. v. Tancred, 1 W. Bl. 90; s. c. Ambler, R. 351; Collinson's Case, Hob. R. 136; s. c. Moore, 888; Widmore v. Woodruffe, Ambler, R. 636, 640; Com. Dig. Devise, K.; Baptist Association v. Hart's Ex'ors, 4 Wheat. R. 1.

³ Com. Dig. Charitable Uses, N. 11; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2 N. 10.

⁴ Attorney-Gen. v. Newman, 1 Ch. Cas. 157; s. c. 1 Lev. 284; Eyre v. Countess of Shaftesbury, 2 P. Will. 119; Attorney-Gen. v. Brereton, 2 Ves. 425, 427; West v. Knight, 1 Ch. Cas. 134; Anon. 1 Ch. Cas. 267; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 3, pl 2, ch. 1, § 1; Parish of St. Dunstan v. Beauchamp, 1 Ch. Cas. 193.

(a) McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15, 22; Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198.

inform for any public benefit for charitable uses before the Statute of 30 [43] of Elizabeth for Charitable Uses. But it was doubted the court could not by bill take notice of that statute so as to grant a relief according to that statute upon a bill.'¹ On another occasion soon afterwards, where the devise was to a college, and was held void at law by the judges for a misnomer on a bill to establish the devise as a charity, the same question was argued; Lord Keeper Finch (afterwards Lord Nottingham) held the devise good as an appointment under the Statute of Elizabeth; and he 'decreed the charity, though before the statute no such decree could have been made.'² It would seem therefore to have been the opinion of Lord Nottingham that an original bill would not before the Statute of Elizabeth lie to establish a charity where the estate did not pass at law to which the charitable uses attached.

1148. On the other hand the language of other judges leads to the conclusion that antecedent to the Statute of Elizabeth the Court of Chancery did, in virtue of its inherent authority, exercise a large jurisdiction in cases of charities. In *Eyre v. Shaftesbury*³ Sir Joseph Jekyll said in the course of his reasoning on another point: 'In like manner in the case of charity the King pro bono publico has an original right to superintend the care thereof, so that, abstracted from the Statute of Elizabeth relating to charitable uses and antecedent to it as well as since, it has been every day's practice to file informations in chancery in the attorney-general's name for the establishment of charities.' In *The Bailiffs &c. of Burford v. Lenthall*,⁴ Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said: 'The courts have mixed the jurisdiction of bringing informations in the name of the attorney-general with

¹ *Attorney-Gen. v. Newman*, 1 Ch. Cas. 157. See also 2 Black. Comm. 427; *Lord Falkland v. Bertie*, 2 Vern. 342; *Gilb. Eq. R.* 172. See also *Attorney-Gen. v. Mayor, &c. of Dublin*, 1 Bligh, R. (n. s.) 347, 348; *Wilmot's Notes*, 24; *Shelford on Mortg. & Charities*, ch. 4, p. 267; *Corpr. of Ludlow v. Greenhouse*, 1 Bligh, R. (n. s.) 48, *Wellbeloved v. Jones*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 43; *Attorney-Gen. v. Brown*, 1 Swanst. R. 265, 290, 291. In *Attorney-Gen. v. Mayor of Dublin*, 1 Bligh (n. s.), Rep. 312, 347, Lord Redesdale said that the Statute of Elizabeth gave a new remedy, but created no new law respecting charities.

² *Anon.* 1 Ch. Cas. 267.

³ 2 P. Will. 103, 118. Cited also 7 Ves. jr. 63, 87; and by Mr. Ch. Justice Wilmot, in *Wilmot's Notes of Cases*, 24.

⁴ *Atk.* 550 (1743).

the jurisdiction given them under the Statute of Elizabeth, and proceed either way according to their discretion.'

1149. In a subsequent case,¹ which was an information filed by the attorney-general against the master and governors of a school, calling them to account in chancery as having the general superintendency of all charitable donations, the same learned chancellor, in discussing the general jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery on this head, and distinguishing the case before him from others because the trustees or governors were invested with the visitatorial power, said: 'Consider the nature of the foundation. It is at the petition of two private persons by charter of the Crown, which distinguishes this case from cases of the Statute of Elizabeth on charitable uses, or cases before that statute, in which this court exercised jurisdiction of charities at large. Since that statute, where there is a charity for the particular purposes therein, and no charter given by the Crown to found and regulate it unless a particular exception out of the statute, it must be regulated by commission. But there may be a bill by information in this court founded on its general jurisdiction, and that is from necessity; because there is no charter to regulate it, and the King has a general jurisdiction of this kind. There must be somewhere a power to regulate. But where there is a charter with proper powers, there is no ground to come into this court to establish that charity; and it must be left to be regulated in the manner the charter has put it or by the original rules of law. Therefore, though I have often heard it said in this court if an information is brought to establish a charity and praying a particular relief and mode of regulation, and the party fails in that particular relief, yet that information is not to be dismissed, but there must be a decree for the establishment.² That is always with this distinction where it is a charity at large or in its nature before the Statute of Charitable Uses; but not in the case of charities incorporated and established by the King's charter under the great seal, which are established by proper authority allowed.' And again: 'It is true that an information in the name of the attorney-general as an officer of the Crown was not a head of the Statute of Charitable Uses, because that original jurisdiction

¹ Attorney-Gen. v. Middleton (1751), 2 Ves. 327.

² S. P. Attorney-Gen. v. Brereton, 2 Ves. 425, 427; post, § 1163.

was exercised in this court before. But that was always in cases now provided for by that statute; that is, charities at large not properly and regularly provided for in charters of the Crown.'

1150. It was manifestly therefore the opinion of Lord Hardwicke, that, independent of the Statute of Elizabeth, the Court of Chancery did exercise original jurisdiction in cases of charities at large, which he explains to mean charities not regulated by charter. But it does not appear that his attention was called to discriminate between such as could take effect at law by reason of the interposition of a feoffee or devisee capable of taking, and those where the purpose was general charity without the interposition of any trust to carry it into effect. The same remark applies to the dictum by Sir Joseph Jekyll.

1151. In a still later case,¹ which was an information to establish a charity and aid a conveyance in remainder to certain officers of Christ's College to certain charitable uses, Lord Keeper Henley (afterwards Lord Northington) is reported to have said: 'The conveyance is admitted to be defective, the use being limited to certain officers of the corporation and not to the corporate body; and therefore there is a want of proper persons to take in perpetual succession. The only doubt is whether the court shall supply this defect for the benefit of the charity under the Statute of Elizabeth. And I take the uniform rule of this court before, at, and after the Statute of Elizabeth to have been, that where the uses are charitable, and the person has in himself full power to convey, the court will aid a defective conveyance to such uses. Thus though devises to corporations were void under the Statute of Henry VIII., yet they were always considered as good in equity if given to charitable uses.' And he then proceeded to declare that he was obliged, by the uniform course of precedents, to assist the conveyance; and therefore he established the conveyance expressly under the Statute of Elizabeth.

1152. There is some reason to question whether the language here imputed to Lord Northington is minutely accurate. His Lordship manifestly aided the conveyance as a charity in virtue of the Statute of Elizabeth. And there is no doubt that it has been the constant practice of the court since that statute to aid defects in conveyances to charitable uses. But it is by no means

¹ Attorney-Gen. v. Tancred, 1 W. Bl. 90; s. c. Ambler, 351; 1 Eden, R. 10.

clear that such defects were aided before that statute. The old cases, although arising before the statute, were deemed to be within the reach of that statute by its retrospective language, and were expressly decided on that ground.¹ The very case put, of devises to corporations which are void under the Statute of Henry VIII. and are held good solely by the Statute of Elizabeth, shows that his Lordship was looking to that statute; for it is plain that a devise void by statute cannot be made good upon any principles of general law. What therefore is supposed to have been stated by him as being the practice before the statute is probably, if not founded in the mistake of the reporter, an inadvertent statement of the learned chancellor. The same case is reported in another book, where the language reported to have been used by him is: 'The constant rule of the court has always been, where a person has a power to give and makes a defective conveyance to charitable uses, to supply it as an appointment; as in Jesus's College, Collison's Case, in Hobart, 136.'² Now Collison's Case was expressly held to be sustainable only as an appointment under the Statute of Elizabeth; and this shows that the language of his Lordship was probably meant to be limited to cases governed by that statute.

1153. In a more recent charity case Sir Arthur Piggott, in argument, said: 'The difference between the case of individuals and that of charities is founded on a principle which has been established ever since the Statute of Charitable Uses, in the reign of Elizabeth, and has been constantly acted upon from those days to the present.' Lord Eldon adopted the remark, and said: 'I am fully satisfied as to all the principles laid down in the course of this argument, and accede to them all.' His Lordship then proceeded to discuss the most material of the principles and cases from the time of Elizabeth, and built his reasoning, as indeed he had built it before, upon the supposition that the doctrine in chancery, as now established, rested mainly on that statute.³

¹ Collison's Case, Hob. R. 136; s. c. Moore, 888; Ibid. 822: Sir Thomas Middleton's Case, Moore, 889; Rivett's Case, Moore, 890, and the cases cited in Raithby's note to Attorney-Gen. v. Rye, 2 Vern. 453; Duke on Charit. 74, 77, 83, 84, 105 to 113; Bridg. on Charit. 279, 366, 370, 380.

² Ambler, R. 351.

³ Mills v. Farmer, 1 Meriv. R. 55, 86, 94, 100; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7

1154. Such were the principal cases, or at least the principal cases which my own researches have brought to my notice, at the time when the present work was first published, wherein the jurisdiction of chancery over charities, antecedent to the Statute of Elizabeth, had been directly or incidentally discussed. The circumstance that no cases prior to that time could then be found in Equity Jurisprudence; the tradition that had passed down to our own times that original bills to establish charities were first entertained in the time of Lord Ellesmere; the fact that the cases immediately succeeding that statute, in which devises void at law were held good in equity as charities, might have been argued and sustained upon the general jurisdiction of the court if it then existed, and yet were exclusively argued and decreed upon the footing of that statute. These facts and circumstances did certainly seem to afford a strong presumption that the jurisdiction of the court to enforce charities where no trust is interposed, and where no devisee is in esse, and where the charity is general and indefinite both as to persons and objects, mainly rests upon the constructions (whether ill or well founded is now of no consequence) of the Statute of Elizabeth. And accordingly that conclusion was arrived at and sustained on a very important occasion by the Supreme Court of the United States.¹ (a)

1154 a. Since that period however the subject has undergone a more full and elaborate consideration, both in Great Britain and

Ves. 36; *Attorney-Gen. v. Bowyer*, 3 Ves. 714, 726. See the remarks of Lord Eldon in the more recent cases of *Attorney-Gen. v. Skinner's Company*, 2 Rep. R. 420, and Sir John Leach, in *Attorney-Gen. v. Brentwood School*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 376, and Lord Redesdale's remarks in the *Attorney-Gen. v. Corpor. of Dublin*, 1 Bligh, R. 347 (N. S.).

¹ This whole subject was most elaborately considered and all the leading authorities investigated by Mr. Ch. Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court in the case of the *Baptist Association v. Hart's Ex'ors* (4 Wheat. R. 1). In that case the court arrived at the conclusion, upon a full survey of all the authorities, that charities, where no legal interest is vested, and which are too vague to be claimed by those for whom the beneficial interest was intended, could be established by a Court of Equity either exercising its ordinary jurisdiction or exercising the prerogative of the King as *parens patriæ*, before the Statute of Elizabeth. See also *Gallejo v. Attorney-Gen.*, 2 Leigh, R. 450, 3 Kent, Comm. Lect 68, p. 508, note (d), 4th edit.

(a) See *McCord v. Ochiltree*, 8 Blackf. 15; *Grimes v. Harmon*, 35 Ind. 198.

in America. Lord Eldon, in a case calling for an expression of his opinion upon the point in 1826, took occasion to observe: 'It may not be quite clear that these instruments originally void were held to be valid merely by the effect of the 43d of Elizabeth. It might have been supposed that there was in the court a jurisdiction to render effective an imperfect conveyance for charitable purposes, and the statute has perhaps been construed with reference to such, the supposed jurisdiction of this court; so that it was not by the effect of the 43d Elizabeth alone, but by the operation of that statute on a supposed antecedent jurisdiction in the court, that void devises to charitable purposes were sustained. Out of that supposed jurisdiction this construction of the statute may have arisen.'¹ In 1834, in the case of the Brentwood Grammar School, a charity founded in the reign of Philip and Mary came under the consideration of Sir John Leach, the Master of the Rolls, and it then appeared that the charity was mainly to found and endow a grammar school at Brentwood, and was established by a decree of the Court of Chancery as early as the 12th of Elizabeth, although it included also a provision for the support of 'five poor folks in Southweald;' and Sir John Leach, upon the bill before him for the establishment of a proper scheme for the charities, affirmed the original decree.² Lord Redesdale, in a very important case before the House of Lords in 1827, expressed himself to the following effect: 'We are referred to the Statute of Elizabeth with respect to charitable uses, as creating a new law upon the subject of charitable uses. That statute only created a new jurisdiction, it created no new law; it created a new and ancillary jurisdiction; a jurisdiction borrowed from the elements which I have mentioned; a jurisdiction created by a commission to be issued out of the Court of Chancery to inquire whether the funds given for charitable purposes had or had not been misapplied, and to see to their proper application; but the proceedings of that commission were made subject to appeal to the Lord Chancellor, and he might reverse or affirm what they had done, or make such order as he might think fit for reserving the controlling jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery as it existed before the passing of that statute, and there can be no doubt that by

¹ Attorney-Gen. v. Skinner's Company, 2 Russ. Ch. R. 407, 420.

² Attorney-Gen. v. Brentwood School, 1 Mylne & Keen, 376.

information by the attorney-general the same thing might be done. While proceedings under that statute were in common practice (as appears in that collection which is called Duke's Charitable Uses), you will find it stated that in certain cases, although a commission might issue under the statute, an information by the attorney-general was the better remedy. In process of time indeed it was found that the commission of charitable uses was not the best remedy, and that it was better to resort again to the proceedings by way of information in the name of the attorney-general. The right which the attorney-general has to file an information is a right of prerogative; the King, as *parens patriæ*, has a right by his proper officer to call upon the several courts of justice, according to the nature of their several jurisdictions, to see that right is done to his subjects who are incompetent to act for themselves, as in the case of charities and other cases; the case of lunatics, where he has also a special prerogative to take care of the property of a lunatic, and where he may grant the custody to a person who as a committee may proceed on behalf of the lunatic; or where there is no such grant, the attorney-general may proceed by his information.¹

1154 *b*. On a still more recent occasion in Ireland Lord Chancellor Sugden examined the whole subject with great diligence and learning, and reviewed historically the leading authorities. The conclusion at which he arrived was, that there is an inherent jurisdiction in equity in cases of charity, and that charity is one of those objects for which a Court of Equity has at all times interfered to make good that which at law was an illegal or informal gift; and that cases of charity in Courts of Equity in England were valid independently of and previous to the Statute of Elizabeth.² But the most authentic and at the same time the most satisfactory information upon the whole subject is to be found in the report of the Commissioners upon the Public Records, published by Parliament in 1827. From this most important document it appears by a great number of cases previous to the statute that cases of charities where there were trustees

¹ Attorney-Gen. *v.* The Mayor &c. of Dublin, 1 Bligh (n. s.), R. 312, 347, 348. See also Corporation of Ludlow *v.* Greenhouse, 1 Bligh (n. s.), R. 61, 62, 68.

² The Incorporated Society *v.* Richards, 1 Connor & Lawson, R. 58; s. c. 1 Drury & Warren, R. 258.

appointed for general and indefinite charities as well as for specific charities were familiarly known to and acted upon and enforced in the Court of Chancery. In some of these cases the charities were not only of an uncertain and indefinite nature, but, as far as can be gathered from the records, they were also cases where there were either no trustees appointed, or the trustees were not competent to take.¹

1154 *c.* The subject has also of late years undergone a very elaborate discussion in the American courts, and especially in the Supreme Court of the United States, in the interesting and important case of Mr. Girard's Will, in which all the leading authorities were examined and criticised. In this case the court held that there was a jurisdiction in chancery over charitable trusts antecedent to the Statute of Elizabeth, and that although the statute was never in force in Pennsylvania, yet that the common law of that State had always recognized the chancery jurisdiction in cases of charities.² (*a*)

1155. But however extensive the jurisdiction may originally have been over the subject of charities, and however large its application, it is very certain that since the Statute of Elizabeth no bequests are deemed within the authority of chancery, and capable of being established and regulated thereby, except bequests for those purposes which that statute enumerates as charitable, or which by analogy are deemed within its spirit and intendment.³ A bequest may in an enlarged sense be charitable, and yet not within the purview of the statute. Charity, as Sir William Grant (the Master of the Rolls) has justly observed, in

¹ 1 Cooper's Public Records, 355, Calendar of Proceedings in Chancery. See also *Vidal v. Girard's Executors*, 2 Howard, S. C. R. 155, 196.

² *Vidal, &c. v. Girard's Executors*, 2 Howard, S. C. R. 127.

³ See 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 19, § 1, pp. 111, 112; *Nash v. Morley*, 5 Beav. R. 177, 182, 183.

(*a*) See *Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich*, 45 Maine, 552; *Burbank v. Whitney*, 24 Pick. 146; *Going v. Emery*, 16 Pick. 107; *Burr v. Smith*, 7 Vt. 241; *Andrew v. New York Bible Soc.*, 4 Sandf. 156; *Ayres v. Methodist Church*, 3 Sandf. 351; *Wheeler v. Smith*, 9 How. 55; *McCord v. Ochiltree*, 8 Blackf. 15, 21 (overruled by *Grimes v. Harmon*, 35 Ind. 198, so far as it holds that the Statute of Elizabeth was in force in Indiana); *Beall v. Fox*, 4 Ga. 404; *Carter v. Balfour*, 19 Ala. 814; *Dickson v. Montgomery*, 1 Swan, 348; *Fountain v. Ravenel*, 17 How. 369; *Williams v. Williams*, 4 Seld. 525; *Bascom v. Albertson*, 34 N. Y. 584; *Norris v. Thompson*, 4 C. E. Green, 307; *Howard v. American Peace Soc.*, 49 Maine, 288.

its widest sense, denotes all the good affections men ought to bear towards each other; in its more restricted and common sense, relief to the poor. In neither of these senses is it employed in the Court of Chancery.¹ In that court it means such charitable bequests only as are within the letter and the spirit of the Statute of Elizabeth.

1156. Therefore where a testatrix bequeathed the residue of her personal estate to the Bishop of D to dispose of the same 'to such objects of benevolence and liberality as the bishop in his own discretion shall most approve of,' and she appointed the bishop her executor, on a bill brought to establish the will and declare the residuary bequest void, the bequest was held void upon the ground that objects of benevolence and liberality were not necessarily charitable within the Statute of Elizabeth, and were therefore too indefinite to be executed. On that occasion it was said by the court that no case had yet been decided in which the court had executed a charitable purpose, unless the will had contained a description of that which the law acknowledged to be a charitable purpose, or had devoted the property to purposes of charity in general, in the sense in which that word is used in the Court of Chancery. The devise here was of a trust of so indefinite a nature that it could not be under the control of the court, so that the administration of it could be reviewed by the court, or so that if the trustee died the court itself could execute the trust. It fell therefore within the rule of the court, that where a trust is ineffectually declared, or fails, or becomes incapable of taking effect, the party taking it shall be deemed a trustee, if not for those who were to take by the will, for those who are to take under the disposition of the law. And the residue was accordingly decreed to the next of kin.² (a)

¹ *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 9 Ves. 399; s. c. 10 Ves. 522; *Brown v. Yeale*, 7 Ves. 50, note (a); *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36; *Attorney-Gen. v. Bowyer*, 3 Ves. 714, 726; *Coxe v. Basset*, 3 Ves. 155; post, § 1183. *Nightingale v. Goulburn*, 5 Hare, R. 484.

² *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 9 Ves. 399; s. c. 10 Ves. 522; *Trustees of Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors*, 4 Wheat. 1, 33, 39, 43 to 45; ante, §§ 979 a, 1071 to 1073; post, §§ 1183, 1197 a.

(a) Bequests to the following objects have been held invalid: To 'benevolent purposes.' *James v. Allen*, 3 Mer. 19. A power of appointment 'among such benevolent, religious, or charitable institutions' as the donee might think proper. *Norris v. Thomson*, 4 C. E. Green, 307; s. c. 5 C. E.

1156 *a.* Upon the like ground a bequest of personalty to trustees to be applied 'for the relief of domestic distress, assisting

Green, 489. 'To the trustees of Mount Zion Chapel, where I attend, the money to be appropriated according to statement appended,' no statement being appended. *Aston v. Wood*, L. R. 6 Eq. 419. The sum of '£6,000 for a hospital, to increase till it amount to [blank], for supporting [blank] boys.' *Ewen v. Bannerman*, 2 Dow & C. 74. 'To Roman Catholic priests, for prayers for the repose of the testatrix's soul.' *West v. Shuttleworth*, 2 Mylne & K. 681. 'To Roman Catholic bishops and their successors' in Ireland, no such body being known to the law. *Attorney-Gen. v. Power*, 1 Ball & B. 145. 'For the propagation of the Gospel in foreign lands.' *Carpenter v. Miller*, 3 W. Va. 174. 'For the maintenance of a Jeshuba, or assembly for reading the Jewish law, and advancing their holy religion.' *Da Costa v. De Pas*, Ambl. 228; s. c. 2 Swanst. 487, note. 'For the political restoration of the Jews to Jerusalem.' *Habershon v. Vardon*, 7 Eng. L. & E. 228; s. c. 15 Jur. 961. 'To the Infidel Society in Philadelphia, hereafter to be incorporated, for the purpose of building a hall for the free discussion of religion, politics,' &c. *Zeissweiss v. James*, 63 Penn. St. 465. See *State v. Warren*, 28 Md. 338, the Statute of Eliz. not being in force. 'To trustees to be appointed in another State for an educational institution there.' *Bascom v. Albertson*, 34 N. Y. 584, the St. Eliz. not being in force in New York.

Gifts to the following objects have been held valid: 'To benevolent and charitable purposes, with recommendation to apply it to domestic servants.' *Miller v. Rowan*, 5 Clark & F. 99. 'To charitable and deserving objects.' *In re Sutton*, 26 Ch. D. 464. 'In the service of my Lord and Master.' *Powerscourt v. Powerscourt*, 1 Molloy, 616. 'Public and private

charities, and to establish a life-boat.' *Johnston v. Swan*, 3 Madd. 457. 'To be distributed in charity, either to private individuals or public institutions.' *Horde v. Suffolk*, 2 Mylne & K. 59. 'For promoting charitable purposes, as well of a public as of a private nature, and more especially in relieving distressed persons.' *Waldo v. Caley*, 16 Ves. 206. 'To such charities as shall be deemed most useful by the executor of [one to whom the property mentioned was given for life].' *Wells v. Doane*, 3 Gray, 201. 'For the poor orphans of the state of N. C.' *Miller v. Atkinson*, 63 N. Car. 537. 'For the colored people' of a particular city or State. *Meeting Street Baptist Soc. v. Hall*, 8 R. I. 234; *Ex parte Lindley*, 32 Ind. 367. But see *Grimes v. Harmon*, 35 Ind. 198 ('to the Orthodox Protestant clergymen of D' for 'the education of colored children,' there being no such organized body in D); *Needles v. Martin*, 33 Md. 609. 'For the Welch circulating charity schools, and for the increase and improvement of Christian knowledge, and promoting religion as most conducive to the said charitable purposes; and moreover to buy Bibles and other religious books, to be divided amongst poor pious persons.' *Attorney-Gen. v. Stepney*, 10 Ves. 22. To the 'suffering poor' of a town *Howard v. American Peace Soc.*, 49 Maine, 288; *In re Birkett*, 9 Ch. D. 576. The sum of '£1,000 to poor housekeepers as A shall appoint.' *Attorney-Gen. v. Pearce*, 2 Atk. 87. 'Towards establishing a bishopric in America.' *Attorney-Gen. v. Chester*, 1 Bro. C. C. 444. 'For repairs of a monument.' *Willis v. Brown*, 2 Jur. 987. 'For the perpetual endowment or maintenance of two schools.' *Kirkbank v. Hudson*, 7 Price, 213. 'To the poor inhabitants of S forever.' *Attorney-Gen. v. Clarke*, 1 Ambl. 422.

indigent but deserving individuals, or encouraging undertakings of general utility,' has been held void for vagueness and uncer-

'To promote the knowledge of the Catholic Christian religion among the poor and ignorant inhabitants of S.' *West v. Shuttleworth*, 2 Mylne & K. 684. 'For the use of Roman Catholic priests in and near London.' *Attorney-Gen. v. Gladstone*, 13 Sim. 7. 'Charitable, beneficial, and public works' at Dacca, Bengal, for the exclusive benefit of the natives. *Mitford v. Reynolds*, 1 Phill. 185. 'For such charities and other public purposes as might lawfully be in T.' *Delany v. Macdermot*, L. R. 5 Eq. 60; s. c. 3 Ch. 676. 'Poor pious persons, male and female.' *Nash v. Morley*, 5 Beav. 177. For a hospital for persons 'sick of the small-pox or any other infectious distemper.' *Attorney-Gen. v. Kell*, 2 Beav. 575. 'To ten worthy men, including some learned men, to purchase meat and wine fit for the service of the two nights of the Passover.' *Strans v. Goldsmid*, 8 Sim. 614. 'To the widows and orphans of L.' *Attorney-Gen. v. Comber*, 2 Sim. & S. 93. For putting out 'our poor relations' as apprentices. *White v. White*, 7 Ves. 422. For preaching a sermon on Ascension Day, for keeping the chimes of the church in repair, and for payment to be made to the singers in the gallery. *Turner v. Ogden*, 1 Cox, 316. For supplying water to the town of C for the inhabitants. *Jones v. Williams*, 2 Ambl. 651. For the improvement of the city of Bath. *Howse v. Chapman*, 4 Ves. 542; *Attorney-Gen. v. Heelis*, 2 Sim. & S. 67. 'For the benefit, advancement, and propagation of education and learning in every part of the world, as far as circumstances will permit.' *Whicker v. Hume*, 14 Beav. 509. 'To the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to be appropriated to the benefit and advantage of Great Britain.' *Nightingale v. Goulburn*, 5 Hare, 484; s. c. 2 Phill. 594.

'For purposes conducing to the good of the county of W and the parish of L especially.' *Attorney-Gen. v. Lonsdale*, 1 Sim. 105. See *Attorney-Gen. v. Carlisle*, Ib. 437; *Attorney-Gen. v. Browne*, 1 Swanst. 265; *Attorney-Gen. v. Dublin*, 1 Bligh, n. s. 312. For the repair of a family tomb. *Lloyd v. Lloyd*, 2 Sim. (n. s.) 255; s. c. 10 Eng. L. & E. 139. (Secus if for the repair of the testator's tomb merely: Ib.; *In re Birkett*, 9 Ch. D. 576. See *In re Williams*, 5 Ch. D. 735; *Wilkinson v. Lindgren*, L. R. 5 Ch. 570.) Or of an ornamental window in a church, though in memory of a particular person. *Hoare v. Osborne*, L. R. 1 Eq. 585. To trustees 'to be by them applied for the promotion of agricultural or horticultural improvements, or other philosophical or philanthropic purposes,' at their discretion. *Rotch v. Emerson*, 105 Mass. 431. Residuary personality (following legacies to various charitable institutions) 'to and amongst the different institutions, or to any other religious institution or purpose, as A and B might think proper.' *Wilkinson v. Lindgren*, L. R. 5 Ch. 570. For the 'schooling' of the children of a school district, and for the poor of a county. *Heuser v. Harris*, 42 Ill. 425. For 'a school-house and school, to be taught by a female or females, wherein no book of instruction is to be used to teach except spelling-books and the Bible.' *Tainter v. Clark*, 5 Allen, 66. For the benefit of a 'Friends' meeting,' it appearing that they applied their funds only to religious worship, schools, aiding the sick, &c., and the purchase and repair of burying-grounds. *Dexter v. Gardner*, 7 Allen, 243. To a society for the support of poor women; such being a charity, though a fee is charged for admission. *Gooch v. Association for Relief*, 109 Mass. 558.

Some of the foregoing cases, it will

tainty, and as not being within the scope of the Statute of Elizabeth.¹

1157. Upon the like principles a bequest in these words, 'In case there is any money remaining, I should wish it to be given in private charity,' has been held inoperative; for the objects are too general and indefinite, not being within the Statute of Elizabeth, and not being so ascertained that the trust could be controlled or executed by a Court of Equity.² So a bequest to trustees, to such charitable or public purpose or purposes, person or persons, as the trustees should in their discretion think fit, has been held void; for it is in effect a gift in trust, to be absolutely disposed of in any manner that the trustees might think fit, consistent with the laws of the land, which is too general and undefined to be executed.³ So a bequest for such benevolent, religious, and charitable purposes as the trustees should in their discretion think most beneficial, has been held void upon the ground of its generality, as it did not limit the gift to cases of charity, but

¹ *Kendall v. Granger*, 5 Beav. R. 300.

² *Ommaney v. Butcher*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 260, 270. See 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 19, § 6, pp. 215 to 222; *Vesey v. Jamson*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 69; post, § 1183.

³ *Vesey v. Jamson*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 69.

be noticed, turn on the question of definiteness, some on the question whether the object is a charity. Further as to what are charities see *Attorney-Gen. v. Merrimac Manuf. Co.*, 14 Gray, 586; *Saltonstall v. Sanders*, 11 Allen, 44; *Drury v. Natick*, 10 Allen, 69; *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen, 539; *Craig v. Franklin*, 58 Maine, 479; *Swift v. Beneficial Soc.*, 73 Penn. St. 362; *Thomson v. Shakespeare*, 6 Jur. (N. s.) 281; *Chamberlayne v. Brockett*, L. R. 8 Ch. 206; *Beaumont v. Oliveira*, L. R. 6 Eq. 524; 4 Ch. 309; *In re Clark*, 1 Ch. D. 497; *American Academy v. Harvard College*, 12 Gray, 582; *Loscomb v. Wintringham*, 7 Eng. L. & E. 164. As to definiteness of objects, *Wetmore v. Parker*, 52 N. Y. 450; *Holmes v. Mead*, *Ib.* 332; *Attorney-Gen. v. Soule*, 28 Mich. 153; *Birchard v. Scott*, 39 Conn. 63; *Trierson v. General Assembly*, 7 Heisk. 683.

Where the gift to a charity is of a surplus, and that surplus cannot be ascertained by reason of the failure of the prior gift, the gift of the surplus must, it seems, fail. Otherwise where the gift to the charity is merely subject to an honorary trust of uncertain amount. See *Hunter v. Bullock*, L. R. 14 Eq. 45. And where the whole is given to trustees, to apply as much as is necessary to a non-charitable purpose, to which the money cannot be applied, it is a good gift of the whole to the charity. *Fisk v. Attorney-Gen.*, L. R. 4 Eq. 521. So where a testator gave £600, the income to be devoted to keeping tombstones in order and the balance to pious Methodists, it was held a good gift to such persons, the prior gift having failed. *Dawson v. Small*, L. R. 18 Eq. 114.

extended it to those of benevolence also.¹ So a bequest to executors of a fund to apply it to and for such charitable and other purposes as they shall think fit, without being accountable to any persons for their disposition thereof, has been held void on account of its indefiniteness.²

1158. So that it appears from these cases that since the Statute of Elizabeth the Court of Chancery will not establish any trusts for indefinite purposes of a benevolent nature not charitable within the purview of that statute, although there is an existing trustee in whom it is vested; but it will declare the trust void, and distribute the property among the next of kin. And yet if there were an original jurisdiction in chancery over all bequests, charitable in their own nature and not superstitious, to establish and regulate them independent of the statute, it is not easy to perceive why an original bill might not be sustained in that court to establish such a bequest, especially where a trustee is interposed to effectuate it; for the statute does not contain any prohibition of such a bequest.

1159. The statute itself begins by a recital that lands, goods, money, &c., had been given, &c., heretofore to certain purposes (which it enumerates in detail), which lands, &c., had not been employed according to the charitable intent of the givers and founders by reason of frauds, breaches of trusts, and negligence in those that should pay, deliver, and employ the same. It then enacts that it shall be lawful for the Lord Chancellor, &c., to award commissions under the great seal to proper persons, to inquire by juries of all and singular such gifts, &c., breaches of trusts, &c., in respect to such gifts, &c., heretofore given, &c., or which shall hereafter be given, &c., 'to or for any the charitable and godly uses before rehearsed;' and upon such inquiry to set down such orders, judgments, and decrees, as the lands, &c., may be duly and faithfully employed to and for such charitable uses before rehearsed, for which they were given; 'which orders, judgments, and decrees, not being contrary to the orders, statutes,

¹ *Williams v. Kershaw*, cited 1 Keen, R. 232. But where the bequest was for such religious and charitable purposes as the major part of the trustees should think proper, it was held to be a good bequest to charity within the Statute of Elizabeth. *Baker v. Sutton*, 1 Keen, R. 224, 232, 233.

² *Ellis v. Selby*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 286, 298, 299; ante, § 979 *a*; post, § 1183.

or decrees of the donors and founders, shall stand firm and good, according to the tenor and purpose thereof, and shall be executed accordingly until the same shall be undone and altered by the Lord Chancellor, &c., upon complaint, by any party grieved, to be made to them.' Then follow several provisions excepting certain cases from the operation of the statute which are not now material to be considered. The statute then directs the orders, &c., of the commissioners to be returned, under seal, into the Court of Chancery, &c., and declares that the Lord Chancellor, &c., shall and may 'take such orders for the due execution of all or any of the said judgments, orders, and decrees, as to them shall seem fit and convenient.' And lastly the statute enacts that any person aggrieved with any such orders, &c., may complain to the Lord Chancellor &c. for redress therein; and upon such complaint the Lord Chancellor, &c., may by such course as to their wisdom shall seem meetest, the circumstances of the case considered, proceed to the examination, hearing, and determining thereof; 'and upon hearing thereof shall and may annul, diminish, alter, or enlarge the said orders, judgments, and decrees of the said commissioners as to them shall be thought to stand with equity and good conscience according to the true intent and meaning of the donors and founders thereof;' and may tax and award costs against the persons complaining without just and sufficient cause of the orders, judgments, and decrees before mentioned.¹

1160. The uses enumerated in the preamble of the statute as charitable, are gifts, devises, &c., for the relief of aged, impotent, and poor people; for maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners; for schools of learning, free schools, and scholars of universities; for repairs of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks, and highways; for education and preferment of orphans; for or towards the relief, stock, or maintenance for houses of correction; for marriages of poor maids; for supportation, aid, and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed; for relief or redemption of prisoners or captives; and for aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteenths, setting out of soldiers,

¹ See the statute of 43d Elizabeth, ch. 4, at large, 2 Co. Inst. 707; Bridgman on Duke on Charit. ch. 1, pl. 1. These sections, from § 1143 to § 1159, are taken almost literally from 3 Peters, R. App. 486 to 496.

and other taxes.¹ These are all the classes of uses which the statute in terms reaches.

1161. From this summary statement of the contents of the statute it is apparent that the authority conferred on the Court of Chancery in relation to charitable uses is very extensive; (*a*) and it is not at all wonderful, considering the religious notions of the times, that the statute should have received the most liberal, not to say in some instances the most extravagant, interpretation. It is very easy to perceive how it came to pass that as power was given to the court in the most unlimited terms to annul, diminish, alter, or enlarge the orders and decrees of the commissioners, and to sustain an original bill in favor of any party aggrieved by such order or decree, the court arrived at the conclusion that it might by original bill do that in the first instance which it certainly could do circuitously upon the commission.² And as in some cases where the trust was for a definite object, and the trustee living, the court might upon its ordinary jurisdiction over trusts compel an execution of it by an original bill independent of the statute,³ we are at once let into the origin of the practice of mixing up the jurisdiction by original bill with the jurisdiction under the statute, which Lord Hardwicke alluded to in the passage already quoted,⁴ and which at that time was inveterately established. This mixture of the jurisdiction serves also to illustrate the remark of Lord Nottingham in the case already cited;⁵ where upon an original bill he decreed a devise to charity void at law to be good in equity as an appointment; although before the Statute of Elizabeth no such decree could have been made.⁶

1162. Upon the whole it seems now to be the better opinion

¹ *Ibid.*; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, note (*b*).

² See *The Poor of St. Dunstan v. Beauchamp*, 1 Ch. Cas. 193; 2 Co. Inst. 711; *Bailiffs, &c., of Burford v. Lenthall*, 2 Atk. 551; 15 Ves. 305.

³ *Attorney-Gen. v. Dixie*, 13 Ves. 519; *Ex parte Kirkby Ravensworth Hospital*, 15 Ves. 305; *Green v. Rutherford*, 1 Ves. 462; *Attorney-Gen. v. Earl of Clarendon*, 17 Ves. 491, 499; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (*a*); *Cooper, Eq. Pl.* 292.

⁴ *Bailiffs, &c., of Burford v. Lenthall*, 2 Atk. 550; ante, § 1148.

⁵ *Anon.* 1 Ch. Cas. 267; ante, § 1147.

⁶ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, note (*d*); ante, § 1147.

(*a*) See now in England, 16 & 17 of Manchester, 18 Ch. D. 596; *Glen Vict. ch. 137*; *Attorney-Gen. v. Dean v. Gregg*, 21 Ch. D. 513.

that the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over charities where no trust is interposed, or where there is no person in esse capable of taking, or where the charity is of an indefinite nature, is to be referred (*a*) to the general jurisdiction of that court anterior to the Statute of Elizabeth. This opinion is supported by the preponderating weight of the authorities speaking to the point, and particularly by those of a very recent date which appear to have been most thoroughly considered. The language too of the statute lends a confirmation to this opinion and enables us to trace what would otherwise seem a strange anomaly to a legitimate origin. (*b*)

1163. Be this as it may, it is very certain that the Court of Chancery will now relieve by original bill or information upon gifts and bequests within the Statute of Elizabeth; and informations by the attorney-general to settle, establish, or direct such charitable donations are very common in practice.¹ Indeed the mode of proceeding by commission under the Statute of Elizabeth has been long abandoned, and the mode of proceeding by information by the attorney-general is now become absolutely universal, so as to amount to a virtual extinguishment of the former remedy.² But where the gift is not a charity within the statute, no information lies in the name of the attorney-general to enforce it.³ (*c*) And if an information is brought in the name of the attorney-general, and it appears to be such a charity as the court ought to support, although the information is mistaken in the title or in the prayer of relief, yet the bill will not be dismissed; but the court will support it and establish the charity in such manner as by law it may.⁴ However the juris-

¹ Com. Dig. Chancery, 2, N. 1. The proceedings by commission appear practically to have almost fallen into disuse. Edin. Rev. No. lxii. p. 383.

² Corporation of Ludlow *v.* Greenhouse, 1 Blyth (N. S.), R. 61, 62, 68.

³ Attorney-Gen. *v.* Hewer, 2 Vern. 387.

⁴ Attorney-Gen. *v.* Smart, 1 Ves. 72; Attorney-Gen. *v.* Jeanes, 1 Atk. 355; Attorney-Gen. *v.* Brereton, 2 Ves. 425; Attorney-Gen. *v.* Middleton, 2 Ves. 327;

(*a*) Qu. 'is not to be referred,' &c.? of view by the author, indicated in So quoted in 4 Kent, Comm. 508, note, §§ 1154 *a*-1154 *c*.

and so printed in earlier editions (e. g. the 2d ed.) of this work. The section would agree better with preceding sections if the 'not' were there. It (b) See Preachers' Aid Soc. *v.* Rich, 45 Maine, 552, and cases cited ante, § 1154 *c*.

may have been omitted upon a change (c) Attorney-Gen. *v.* Soule, 28 Mich. 153.

diction of chancery over charities does not exist where there are local visitors appointed; for it then belongs to them and their heirs to visit and control the charity.¹

1164. As to what charities are within the purview of the statute, it may be proper to say a few words in this place in addition to what has been already suggested,² although it is impracticable to go into a thorough review of the cases.³ It is clear that no superstitious uses are within the purview of it; such as are gifts of money for the finding or maintenance of a stipendiary priest; or for the maintenance of an anniversary or obiit; or of any light or lamp in any church or chapel; or for prayers for the dead; or for such purposes as the superior of a convent or her successor may judge expedient.⁴ It is equally well settled (as we have seen) that all bequests which in a broad and comprehensive sense may be deemed charities, such as objects of benevolence, liberality, and expanded humanity, are not charities within the purview of the statute; but they must be within the specific enumeration of objects in the statute, to entitle them to be enforced in the Court of Chancery.⁵ But there are certain uses which, though not within the strict letter, are yet deemed charitable within the equity of the statute. Such is money given to maintain a preaching minister; to maintain a schoolmaster in a parish; for the setting up a hospital for the relief of poor people; for the building of a sessions house for a city or county; for the making of a new or for the repairing of an old pulpit in a church; for the buying of a pulpit cushion or pulpit cloth; or for the setting of new bells where there are none, or for mending of them where they are out of order.⁶

Attorney-Gen. *v.* Parker, 1 Ves. 43; s. c. 2 Atk. 576; Attorney-Gen. *v.* Whiteley, 11 Ves. 241, 247. Ante, § 1149.

¹ Attorney-Gen. *v.* Price, 3 Atk. 108; Attorney-Gen. *v.* Governors of Harrow School, 2 Ves. 552.

² Ante, §§ 1155 to 1158.

³ They are enumerated with great particularity in Duke on Charitable Uses, by Bridgman; in Com. Dig. Charitable Uses; 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 19, §§ 1 to 5, pp. 109 to 164. See also 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (b).

⁴ Duke on Charit. 105; Bridgman on Duke on Charit. 349, 466; Adams *v.* Lambert, 4 Co. Rep. 104; Smart *v.* Prujean, 6 Ves. jr. 567.

⁵ Ante, §§ 1155 to 1158.

⁶ Duke on Charit. 105, 113; Bridgman on Duke on Charit. 354; Com. Dig. Charitable Uses, N. 1; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (b); Jeremy on Equity Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 6, § 2, pp. 238, 239.

1165. Charities are also so highly favored in the law that they have always received a more liberal construction than the law will allow in gifts to individuals.¹ In the first place the same words in a will, when applied to individuals, may require a very different construction when they are applied to the case of a charity. If a testator gives his property to such person as he shall hereafter name to be his executor, and afterwards he appoints no executor, or if having appointed an executor the latter dies in the lifetime of the testator and no other person is appointed in his stead, — in either of these cases, as these bequests are to individuals, the testator will be held intestate, and his next of kin will take the estate. But if a like bequest be given to the executor in favor of a charity, the Court of Chancery will in both instances supply the place of an executor and carry into effect that very bequest which in the case of individuals must have failed altogether.²

1166. Again, in the case of an individual, if an estate is devised to such person as the executor shall name, and no executor is appointed, or if, one being appointed, he dies in the testator's lifetime and no other is appointed in his place, the bequest becomes a mere nullity. Yet such a bequest, if expressed to be for a charity, would be good; and the Court of Chancery would in such a case assume the office of an executor and execute it.³ So if a legacy is given to trustees to distribute in charity and they all die in the testator's lifetime, although the legacy becomes thus lapsed at law (and if the trustees had taken to their own use it would have been gone forever), yet it will be enforced in equity.⁴

1167. Again, although in carrying into execution a bequest to an individual the mode in which the legacy is to take effect is deemed to be of the substance of the legacy, yet where the legacy is to charity, the Court of Chancery will consider charity as the substance; and in such cases, and in such cases only, if the

¹ 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 19, § 5, pp. 164 to 222.

² *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 55, 96; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36.

³ *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 55, 94; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 37; *Attorney-Gen. v. Jackson*, 11 Ves. 365, 367.

⁴ *Attorney-Gen. v. Hickman*, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 193; s. c. *Bridgman on Duke on Charit.* 476; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 517; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 464; s. c. 7 Ves 36; *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. 55, 100; *White v. White*, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 12.

mode pointed out fail, it will provide another mode by which the charity may take effect, but by which no other charitable legatees can take.¹ (a) A still stronger case is, that if the testator has expressed an absolute intention to give a legacy to charitable purposes, but he has left uncertain or to some future act the mode by which it is to be carried into effect, there the Court of Chancery, if no mode is pointed out, will of itself supply the defect and enforce the charity.² Therefore it has been held that if a man devises a sum of money to such charitable uses as he shall direct by a codicil annexed to his will, or by a note in writing, and he afterwards leaves no direction by note or codicil, the Court of Chancery will dispose of it to such charitable purposes as it thinks fit.³ So if a testator bequeaths a sum for such a school as he shall appoint, and he appoints none, the Court of Chancery may apply it for what school it pleases.⁴

1168. The doctrine has been pressed yet further; and it has been established that if the bequest indicate a charitable intention, but the object to which it is to be applied is against the policy of the law, the court will lay hold of the charitable intention and execute it for the purpose of some other charity agreeably to the law in the room of that contrary to it.⁵ Thus a sum of money bequeathed to found a Jews' synagogue has been enforced by the Court of Chancery as a charity, and judicially transferred to the benefit of a foundling hospital!⁶ And a be-

¹ *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 55, 100; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36; *Attorney-Gen. v. Berryman*, 1 Dickens, 168; *Denyer v. Druce*, 1 Tamlyn, R. 32; 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 19, § 5, art. 3, pp. 175 to 181; *Attorney-Gen. v. Ironmongers' Company*, 1 Craig & Philipps, 208, 222, 225; s. c. 2 Beav. R. 313; post, § 1170 a; *Attorney-Gen. v. The Coopers' Company*, 3 Beav. R. 29; *Attorney-Gen. v. The Drapers' Company*, 2 Beav. R. 508; post, §§ 1178, 1181.

² *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 55, 95; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36; *White v. White*, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 12.

³ *Attorney-Gen. v. Syderfin*, 1 Vern. 224; s. c. 2 Freem. R. 261, and recognized in *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 55, and *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36, 70.

⁴ 2 Freem. R. 261; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36, 73, 74.

⁵ *Da Costa v. De Pas*, 1 Vern. 251; *Attorney-Gen. v. Guise*, 2 Vern. 266; *Cary v. Abbot*, 7 Ves. 490; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36, 75; *Bridgman on Duke on Charit. Uses*, 466; *De Themmines v. De Bonneval*, 5 Russ. R. 288, 292; *Attorney-Gen. v. Power*, 1 B. & Beatt. 145.

⁶ *Id.*, and *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 55, 100; post, § 1182.

(a) *Heuser v. Harris*, 42 Ill. 425.

quest for the education of poor children in the Roman Catholic faith has been decreed in chancery to be disposed of by the King at his pleasure under his sign manual.¹ (*a*)

1169. Another principle equally well established is, that if the bequest be for charity it matters not how uncertain the persons or the objects may be, or whether the persons who are to take are in esse or not, or whether the legatee be a corporation capable in law of taking or not, or whether the bequest can be carried into exact execution or not; for in all these and the like cases the court will sustain the legacy and give it effect according to its own principles.² (*b*) And where a literal execution becomes inexpedient or impracticable, the court will execute it as nearly as it can according to the original purpose, or (as the technical expression is) *cy pres*.³ (*c*) This doctrine seems to have been borrowed from the Roman law; for by that law donations for

¹ *Cary v. Abbot*, 7 Ves. 490; *De Themmines v. De Bonneval*, 5 Russ. R. 292; *Trustees of Baptist Association v. Smith*, 4 Wheat. R. 1; s. c. 3 Peters, R. App. 481 to 485.

² Post, § 1181. *Gower v. Mainwaring*, 2 Ves. 87, 89, per Lord Hardwicke.

³ *Attorney-Gen. v. Oglander*, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 166; *Attorney-Gen. v. Green*, 2 Bro. Ch. Cas. 492; *Frier v. Peacock*, Rep. temp. Finch, 245; *Attorney-Gen. v. Boulton*, 2 Ves. jr. 380; *Bridgman on Duke on Charit. Uses*, 355; *Baptist Association v. Hart's Ex'ors*, 4 Wheat. R. 1; s. c. 3 Peters, R. App. 481; *Ingles v. Trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor*, 3 Peters, R. 99; *Attorney-Gen. v. Wansay*, 15 Ves. 232; see *Trustees of Baptist Association v. Smith*, 4 Wheat. R. 1, 39, 43. Ante, § 1074; post, § 1176.

(*a*) No such power belongs to our courts as that exercised under the King's sign manual in such cases; though the *cy pres* doctrine prevails in this country as more narrowly exercised in England by virtue of mere equity jurisdiction. *Moore v. Moore*, 4 Dana, 366; *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen, 539, 576-590; *Grimes v. Harmon*, 35 Ind. 198. This may explain some of our cases in which it is said that the doctrine of *cy pres* must be rejected, that branch of it exercised by the sign manual being the special object of disapproval. See e. g. *Methodist Church v. Remington*, 1 Watts, 226. For other cases see *Beekman v. Bonsor*, 23 N. Y. 298, 308; *Williams v. Williams*, 4 Seld. 527;

Owens v. Missionary Soc., 14 N. Y. 380; *Attorney-Gen. v. Dutch Church*, 36 N. Y. 452.

(*b*) See *Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich*, 45 Maine, 552; *Tappan v. Deblois*, Ib. 122; *Bliss v. American Bible Soc.*, 2 Allen, 334; *Philadelphia v. Fox*, 64 Penn. St. 169; *Academy of Visitation v. Clemens*, 50 Mo. 167; *Meeting Street Baptist Soc. v. Hail*, 8 R. I. 234. But see *New v. Bonaker*, L. R. 4 Eq. 655. Neither change of name nor of location of a corporation to which a gift is made will avoid the gift. *Girard v. Philadelphia*, 7 Wall. 1.

(*c*) See *Heuser v. Harris*, 42 Ill. 425; *McIntire v. Zanesville*, 17 Ohio St. 352; note (*a*) to § 1168.

public purposes were sustained, and were applied when illegal cy pres to other purposes, at least one hundred years before Christianity became the religion of the empire.¹

1170. Thus a devise of lands to the church wardens of a parish (who are not a corporation capable of holding lands) for a charitable purpose, although void at law, will be sustained in equity.² So if a corporation for whose use a charity is designed is not in esse and cannot come into existence but by some future act of the Crown, as for instance a gift to found a new college, which requires an act of incorporation, the gift will be held valid and the court will execute it.³ (a) So if a devise be to an existing corporation by a misnomer which makes it void at law, it will be held good in equity.⁴ (b) So where a devise was to the poor generally, the court decreed it to be executed in favor of three public charities in London.⁵ So a legacy towards establishing a bishop in America was held good although none was yet appointed.⁶ So where a bequest of £1,000 was 'to the Jews' Poor, Mile End,' and there were two charitable institutions for Jews at Mile End, it not appearing which of the charities was meant, the court held that the fund ought to be applied cy pres, and divided the bequest between the two institutions.⁷ (c)

¹ Per Lord Chief Justice Wilmot, *Wilmot's Notes*, pp. 53, 54, citing *Dig. Lib. 33, tit. 2, §§ 16, 17, De Usu et Usufruct Legatorum*.

² 1 *Burus, Ecc. Law*, 226; *Duke*, 33, 115; *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 2 N. 2; *Attorney-Gen. v. Combe*, 2 Ch. Cas. 13; *Rivett's case*, *Moore*, 890; *Attorney-Gen. v. Bowyer*, 3 Ves. jr. 714; *West v. Knight*, 1 Ch. Cas. 135; *Highmore on Mortm.* 204; *Tothill*, 34; *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 *Meriv. R.* 55.

³ *White v. White*, 1 *Bro. Ch. Cas.* 12; *Attorney-Gen. v. Downing*, *Ambl. R.* 550, 571; *Attorney-Gen. v. Dowyer*, 3 Ves. jr. 714, 727; *Inglis v. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor*, 3 *Peters*, 99.

⁴ *Anon.* 1 Ch. Cas. 267; *Attorney-Gen. v. Plat*. *Rep. temp. Finch*, 221.

⁵ *Attorney-Gen. v. Peacock*, *Rep. temp. Finch*, 245; *Owens v. Bean*, *Id.* 395; *Attorney-Gen. v. Syderfin*, 1 *Vern.* 224; *Clifford v. Francis*, 1 *Freem. R.* 330.

⁶ *Attorney-Gen. v. Bishop of Chester*, 1 *Bro. Ch. Cas.* 444.

⁷ *Bennett v. Hayter*, 2 *Beav. R.* 81.

(a) *Swasey v. American Bible Soc.*, 57 *Maine*, 523. Secus perhaps where the Statute of Elizabeth is not in force. *State v. Warren*, 28 *Md.* 338; *Zeissweiss v. James*, 63 *Penn. St.* 465.

(b) *Minot v. Boston Asylum*, 7 *Met.* 417; *Tucker v. Seamen's Aid Soc.*, *Ib.* 188; *Winslow v. Cummings*,

3 *Cush.* 359. So if there is doubt as to which of two was intended, extrinsic evidence will be received. *Bodman v. American Tract Soc.*, 9 *Allen*, 447; *In re Maguire*, *L. R.* 9 *Eq.* 632; *Hosea v. Jacobs*, 98 *Mass.* 65.

(c) See *In re Kilvert*, *L. R.* 12 *Eq.* 183; s. c. 7 *Ch.* 170.

1170 *a*. And where a charity is so given that there can be no objects, the court will order a new scheme to execute it. But if objects may, though they do not at present, exist, the court will keep the fund for the old scheme.¹ (*a*) And when the specified objects cease to exist, the court will new-model the charity.² (*b*) Thus where there was a bequest of the residue of the testator's estate to a company to apply the interest of a moiety 'unto the redemption of British slaves in Turkey or Barbary,' one fourth to charity schools in London and its suburbs, and one fourth towards necessitated freemen of the company, there being no British slaves in Turkey or Barbary to redeem, the court directed a master to approve of a new scheme *cy pres*; and in that case it further approved a scheme to give the moiety of the charities to the other fourth parts which were bequeathed.³ (*c*)

¹ *Attorney-Gen. v. Oglander*, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 160.

² *Attorney-Gen. v. City of London*, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 171; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 243.

³ *Attorney-Gen. v. The Ironmongers' Company*, 2 Beav. R. 313. On this occasion Lord Langdale said: 'With respect to the order of reference it is now necessary that some construction should be given to it, and I am of opinion that the master was bound to consider whether there could be a *cy pres* application for the first purpose before he proceeded to consider the propriety of the application to the second purpose. But then I am by no means of opinion that he was bound to consider it precisely in the same manner as he would have been bound to do if there had been no other charitable purpose mentioned in the will. Where a fund is to be disposed of *cy pres*, the court, for the sake of making a disposition, is bound to act upon the suggestions which are before it, however remote, and it is rather astute in ascertaining some application in conformity more or less with the intention of the testator. The case however is different where there are other charitable purposes mentioned in the testator's will itself, and in which a comparison may be instituted between the probability of the testator resorting to something very remote from his original intention and something far less remote from the other objects which are specifically mentioned in the will. I quite agree with the view which has been taken upon the subject in the argument, — that if it could have been found that there was a clear and close approximation to any purpose analogous to the first, the master ought to have preferred it to the second and third, distinctly mentioned in the will; but if such approximation were so remote that there would be very great difficulty in making out the similarity, and it appeared probable that if the subject had been in the con-

(*a*) See *Attorney-Gen. v. Stewart*, L. R. 14 Eq. 17. in the charity, see *Attorney-Gen. v. St. John's Hospital*, L. R. 1 Ch. 92.

(*b*) But see *Fisk v. Attorney-Gen.*, L. R. 4 Eq. 521. And as to change of circumstances, requiring alterations (c) See *Hoare v. Osborne*, L. R. 1 Eq. 585. But see *New v. Bonaker*, L. R. 4 Eq. 655.

1171. In further aid of charities the court will supply all defects of conveyances where the donor hath a capacity and a

temptation of the testator he would have preferred the other two objects mentioned in his will, then I think it became the duty of the master to look to those second objects and lay aside the first.' This decree was varied upon appeal by Lord Cottenham, 1 Craig & Phillips, 508, 522. On this occasion his Lordship said: 'It is obviously true that if several charities be named in a will and one fail for want of objects, one of the others may be found to be cy pres to that which has failed; and if so, its being approved by the testator ought to be an additional recommendation; but such other charity ought not, as I conceive, to be preferred to some other more nearly resembling that which has failed. That point however is not open upon the present report, which was made under an order directing the master in settling a scheme to have regard, as near as may be, to the intention of the testator as to the bequest contained in his will touching British captives, and having regard also to the other charitable bequests in the said will. By this I understand that the first subject to be considered is the intention of the testator, to be discovered from the gift in favor of British slaves; subordinately to which, and if possible consistently with it, the other charities are to be considered; and this I conceive would have been the course to be pursued if there had not been any such special directions. Assuming this to be the rule, it appears that the first charity is most general in its objects, being applicable to all British persons who should happen to be in a particular situation; and the second is limited to persons in London and its suburbs; and that the third is confined to freemen of a particular company in London. It would seem therefore that although there is no possibility of benefiting the British community at large in the mode intended by the testator, none being found in the situation he anticipated, it would yet be more consistent with his intention that the same community should enjoy the benefit of his gift in any other way than that it should be confined to any restricted portion of such community. In considering the manner in which such benefit should be conferred, it is very reasonable and proper to look to other provisions in his will in order to see whether he has indicated any preference to any particular mode of administering charity. If a testator had given part of his property to support hospitals for leprosy in any part of England, and another part to a particular hospital, it would be reasonable to adopt the support of hospitals as the mode of applying the disposable funds; but there would not be any ground for giving the whole to the particular hospital. The only case referred to as giving any countenance to such a principle is the unreported case of *Attorney-Gen. v. Bishop of Llandaff*, cited 2 Mylne & Keen, 586, and stated in the master's report in *Attorney-Gen. v. Gibson*, dated 23d of July, 1835. See this case mentioned in 2 Beavan, R. 317, n. It is however to be observed that there is no appearance of that case having been discussed; and that the trust which failed was as unlimited as to the description of slaves as the present; and that the scheme may have been adopted upon the principle I act upon in adopting the second gift in this testator's will as indicative of his preference for a particular charity, and therefore to be preferred in the absence of any other more resembling the object of that which has failed. It may also be observed that the scholarships in that case appear to have been open to every description of candidate. If Lord Eldon had thought this the correct principle to act upon, he would, in *Mills v. Farmer*

disposable estate, and his mode of donation does not contravene the provisions of any statute.¹ The doctrine is laid down with

(19 Ves. 483), have given the whole funds to the two charities named, instead of referring it to the master to approve of a scheme for distributing the funds; having regard, it is true, to those two objects named, which was proper for the purpose of ascertaining what description of charity was most likely to be in conformity with the views of the testator. To assume, because a testator names two charities in his will, that he would have given the amount of both legacies to one if he had foreseen that the other could not be carried into effect, and therefore to give the provision intended for the object which fails to the other, is, or may be, totally inconsistent with the doctrine of *cy pres*. The two objects may be wholly unconnected, and there may be other charities closely connected with that which the testator intended to favor; but, as indicative of the testator's general views and intentions, it may be very proper to observe the course he has pursued in his gifts to other charities. I think therefore that in the absence of any objects bearing any resemblance to the object which has failed, it is very proper to look to the second gift, but only as a guide to lead to what the testator would probably have done himself, and therefore not to be followed further than may be proper to attain that object; but with regard to the third object I cannot see any grounds for considering it as indicative of the testator's general views, or any reason for supposing that he would under any circumstances have wished that provision increased. The objects are restricted within the narrow limits, and it is in that respect in direct contrast with the extended nature of the first gift; but what appears to me to be conclusive against any reference to the third gift is, that the testator has expressed his reasons for the gift, which can have no application to the moiety undisposed of. He says that the third gift is in consideration of the company's "care and pains in the execution of his will." It is true that this compensation is given to the company in the shape of a provision for necessitous decayed freemen of the company, their widows and children, and no doubt is a charity; but in looking for evidence of the testator's general views and intentions with reference to the kind of charities to be favored, it cannot be inferred that he preferred the distressed freemen of the company to all others, because he made a provision for them as a consideration for services to be performed by the company; and this consideration has already increased in a greater ratio than the income of the property, it being well known that a large property may be administered at a less percentage than a small one. I am therefore of opinion that this third gift cannot be referred to for any purpose in settling a scheme for the application *cy pres* of the funds intended for the first; but I think the most reasonable course to be adopted is to look at the second gift as indicative of the kind of charity preferred by the testator, but making it as general in its application as the first was intended to be, that is open to all who might stand in need of its assistance; which leads to this conclusion, that it should be applied in support of charity schools without any restriction as to place, where the education is according to the Church of England, but not to exceed £20 per year to any one.'

¹ Case of Christ's College, 1 W. Bl. 90; Attorney-Gen. v. Rye, 2 Vern. 453, and Raithby's notes; Rivett's Case, Moore, 890; Attorney-Gen. v. Burdet, 2 Vern. 755; Attorney-Gen. v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. jr. 714; Damus's Case, Moore, 822; Collison's Case, Hob. 136; Mills v. Farmer, 1 Meriv. R. 55; Attorney-Gen. v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. jr. 714; 1 Drury & Warren, R. 308.

great accuracy by Duke,¹ who says that a disposition of lands, &c., to charitable uses is good, 'albeit there be defect in the deed or in the will by which they were first created and raised, either in the party trusted with the use, where he is misnamed, or the like, or in the party or parties for whose use, or that are to have the benefit of the use, or where they are not well named or the like, or in the execution of the estate, as where livery of seisin or attornment is wanting, or the like. And therefore if a copyholder doth dispose of copyhold land to a charitable use without a surrender, or a tenant in tail convey land to a charitable use without a fine, or a reversion without attornment or insolvency, and in divers such like cases, &c., this statute shall supply all the defects of assurance; for these are good appointments within the statute.'² But a parol devise to charity out of lands being defective as a will, which is the manner of the conveyance which the testator intended to pass it by, can have no effect as an appointment which he did not intend.³ Yet it has nevertheless been held where a married woman, administratrix of her husband, and entitled to certain personal estates belonging to him (namely a chose in action), afterwards intermarried, and then during coverture made a will disposing of that estate partly to his heirs and partly to charity, that the bequest, although void at law, was good as an appointment under the Statute of Elizabeth for this reason, 'that the goods in the hands of administrators are all for charitable uses; and the office of the ordinary and of the administrator is to employ them to pious uses; and the kindred and children have no property nor pre-eminence but under the title of charity.'⁴

1172. With the same view the Court of Chancery was in former times most astute to find out grounds to sustain charitable bequests. Thus an appointment to charitable uses under a will

¹ Duke on Charit. Uses, §4. 85; Bridgman on Duke on Charit. Uses, 355.

² Duke on Charit. Uses, §4. 85; Bridg. on Duke on Charit. Uses, 355; Christ's Hospital v. Hawes, Bridgman on Duke on Charit. Uses, 371; 1 Burn's Eccl. Law, 226; Tuffnell v. Page, 2 Atk. 37; Tay v. Slaughter, Prec. Ch. 16; Attorney-Gen. v. Rye, 2 Vern. 453; Rivett's Case, Moore, 890; Kenson's Case, Hob. 136; Attorney-Gen. v. Burdet, 2 Vern. R. 755; 1 Drury & Warren, R. 308.

³ Jennor v. Harper, Prec. Ch. 389; 1 Burn's Eccl. Law, 226, and see Attorney-Gen. v. Bains, Prec. Ch. 271.

⁴ Damas's Case, Moore, 822.

that was precedent to the Statute of Elizabeth, and so was utterly void, was held to be made good by the statute.¹ So a devise which was not within the statute was nevertheless decreed as a charity, and governed in a manner wholly different from that contemplated by the testator, although there was nothing unlawful in his intent; the Lord Chancellor giving as his reason, 'summa est ratio quæ pro religione facit.'² So where the charity was for a weekly sermon to be preached by a person to be chosen by the greatest part of the best inhabitants of the parish, it was treated as a wild direction; and a decree was made that the bequests should be to maintain a catechist in the parish to be approved by the bishop.³

1173. So although the Statute of Wills of Henry VIII. did not allow devises of lands to corporations to be good, yet such devises to corporations for charitable uses were held good as appointments under the Statute of Elizabeth.⁴ Lord Chancellor Cowper, in a case where he was called upon to declare a charitable bequest valid, notwithstanding the will was not executed according to the Statute of Frauds, and in which these cases were cited, observed: 'I shall be very loath to break in upon the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries in this case, as there are no instances where men are so easily imposed upon as the time of their dying, under the pretence of charity. . . . It is true the charity of judges has carried several cases on the Statute of Elizabeth great lengths; and this occasioned the distinction between operating by will and by appointment, which surely the makers of that statute never contemplated.'⁵

1174. It has been already intimated that the disposition of modern judges has been to curb this excessive latitude of construction assumed by the Court of Chancery in early times. But however strange some of the doctrines already stated may seem to us, as they have seemed to Lord Eldon, yet they cannot now be shaken without doing that (as he has said) in effect which no judge will avowedly take upon himself to do, to reverse decisions that have been acted upon for centuries.⁶ (a)

¹ *Smith v. Stowell*, 1 Ch. Cas. 195; *Collison's Case*, Hob. R. 136.

² *Attorney-Gen. v. Combe*, 2 Ch. Cas. 18.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Griffith Flood's Case*, Hob. 136.

⁵ *Att'y-Gen. v. Bains*, Prec. Ch. 271, and see *Adlington v. Cann*, 3 Atk. 141.

⁶ *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36, 87.

(a) This of course does not apply to America.

1175. A charity must be accepted upon the same terms upon which it is given, or it must be relinquished to the right heir; for it cannot be altered by any new agreement between the heir of the donor and the donees.¹ And where several distinct charities are given to a parish for several purposes, no agreement of the parishioners can alter or divert them to any other uses.²

1176. The doctrine of cy pres as applied to charities was formerly pushed to a most extravagant length.³ But this sensible distinction now prevails, that the court will not decree the execution of the trust of a charity in a manner different from that intended, except so far as it is seen that the intention cannot be literally executed. In that case another mode will be adopted, consistent with the general intention; so as to execute it, although not in mode, yet in substance. If the mode should become by subsequent circumstances impossible, the general object is not to be defeated, if it can in any other way be obtained.⁴ Where there are no objects remaining to take the benefit of a charitable corporation, the court will dispose of its revenues by a new scheme, upon the principle of the original charities cy pres. (a) A new scheme will not however be ordered if the institution is a permanent one and the object of the testator was to benefit that institution generally, although the particular trustee named may have died in the lifetime of the testator; but the legacy will be ordered to be paid over to the proper officer of the institution.⁵

1177. The general rule is, that if lands are given to a corporation for any charitable uses which the donor contemplates to last forever, the heir never can have the land back again. But if it

¹ Attorney-Gen. v. Platt, Rep. temp. Finch, 221, and see Margaret and Regius Professors in Cambridge, 1 Vern. 55.

² Mann v. Ballet, 1 Vern. 43; 1 Eq. Abr. 99, pl. 4; and see Attorney-Gen. v. Gleg, 1 Atk. 356; Ambl. 373.

³ Attorney-Gen. v. Minshall, 4 Ves. jr. 11, 14; Attorney-Gen. v. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. jr. 141; ante, §§ 1168 to 1171.

⁴ Attorney-Gen. v. Boulton, 2 Ves. 380, 387; s. c. 3 Ves. jr. 220; Attorney-Gen. v. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. jr. 141; Attorney-Gen. v. Stepney, 10 Ves. 22; Attorney-Gen. v. Ironmongers' Company, 2 Mylne & Keen, 576, 586, 588; s. c. 1 Craig & Phillips, 220, 227; s. c. 2 Beav. R. 313; Attorney-Gen. v. The Coopers' Co., 3 Beav. R. 29; Attorney-Gen. v. The Drapers' Co., 2 Beav. R. 508; Martin v. Marghan, 14 Simons, R. 280; ante, §§ 1167, 1170.

⁵ Walsh v. Gladstone, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 290.

(a) Not in this country. Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539.

should become impracticable to execute the charity as expressed, another similar charity will be substituted so long as the corporation exists.¹ (a) If the charity does not fail, but the trustees or corporation fail, the Court of Chancery will substitute itself in their stead and thus carry on the charity.²

1178. When the increased revenues of a charity extend beyond the original objects, the general rule as to the application of such increased revenues is that they are not a resulting trust for the heirs at law, but they are to be applied to similar charitable purposes, and to the augmentation of the benefits of the charity.³ (b)

1179. In former times the disposition of chancery to assist charities was so strong that in equity the assets of the testator were held bound to satisfy charitable uses before debts or legacies, although at law the assets were held bound to satisfy debts before charities. But even at law charities were then preferred to other legacies.⁴ And this indeed was in conformity to the civil law, by which charitable legacies are preferred to all others.⁵ This doctrine however is now altered, and charitable legacies in case of a deficiency of assets abate in proportion as well as other pecuniary legacies.⁶

1180. Courts of Equity have in modern times also shown a disinclination to marshal the testator's assets in favor of any charitable bequests given out of a mixed fund of real and per-

¹ Attorney-Gen. v. Wilson, 3 Mylne & Keen, 362, 372.

² Attorney-Gen. v. Hicks, Highmore on Mortmain, 336, 353, &c.

³ Attorney-Gen. v. Earl of Winchelsea, 4 Bro. Ch. Cas. 373; Highmore on Mortm. 187, 327, Ex parte Jortin, 7 Ves. 340; Attorney-Gen. v. Mayor of Bristol, 2 Jac. & Walk. 321; Attorney-Gen. v. Dixie, 2 Mylne & Keen, 342; Bridgman on Duke on Charit. Uses, 588; Attorney-Gen. v. Hurst, 2 Cox, R. 364; Attorney-Gen. v. Wilson, 3 Mylne & Keen, 362, 372; Attorney-Gen. v. The Ironmongers' Company, 2 Mylne & Keen, 576, 586, 588; s. c. 2 Beav. R. 313; 1 Craig & Phillips, 220, 227; Attorney-Gen. v. The Drapers' Company, 2 Beav. R. 508; Attorney-Gen. v. The Coopers' Company, 3 Beav. R. 29; ante, §§ 1167, 1170; post, § 1181.

⁴ High. on Mortm. 67; Swinb. on Wills, Pt. 1, § 16, p. 72.

⁵ Fielding v. Bound, 1 Vern. 230.

⁶ Id., and Raithby's note (2).

(a) See Goode v. McPherson, 51 L. R. 7 Eq. 353; Attorney-Gen. v. Mo. 126; Attorney-Gen. v. Hankey, L. R. 16 Eq. 140, note; In re Prison Charities, Ib. 129. Marchant, L. R. 3 Eq. 424; Merchant Tailors' Co. v. Attorney-Gen., L. R. 11 Eq. 35; s. c. 6 Ch. 512; Attorney-Gen. v. Wax Chandlers' Co. L. R. 8

(b) See Attorney-Gen. v. Trinity Church, 9 Allen, 422; In re Latymer, Eq. 452; s. c. 5 Ch. 503.

sonal estate without any distinction whether the real estate were freehold or leasehold estate, or pure personal estate, or mixed personal estate, and whether these bequests have been particular or residuary, by refusing to direct the debts and other legacies to be paid out of the real estate and reserving the personal to fulfil the charity, although the charity would be void as to the real estate.¹ So that in effect the court appropriates the fund as if no legal objection existed to applying any part of it to the charity bequests, and then holds that so much of these bequests fails as would in that way be to be paid out of the prohibited fund.² The ground of this doctrine is said to be that a Court of Equity is not warranted to set up a rule of equity contrary to the common rules of the court merely to support a bequest which might otherwise be contrary to law. Formerly indeed a different rule prevailed, and a marshalling of the assets was allowed in favor of charities; so that where there were general legacies and the testator had charged his estate with the payment of all his legacies, if the personal estate were not sufficient to pay the whole, the court would direct the charity to be paid out of the real estate, so that the will might be performed in toto.³

1180 *a.* But the modern decisions have completely overturned the old rule, whether wisely or not it is perhaps too late to inquire. The present doctrine has proceeded a step further, and where there is a fund of pure personalty and mixed personalty both applicable to the payment of debts and legacies, and the charitable legacies are charged on the pure personalty and the other legacies and debts are charged on the remainder of the fund, if there is a deficiency of the assets to pay all the debts and legacies, the charity legacies are held to have failed in the proportion

¹ Highmore on Mortm. 355; 1 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 15, § 6, p. 835; *Mogg v. Hodges*, 2 Ves. 52; *Middleton v. Spicer*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 201; *Ridges v. Morrison*, 1 Cox, R. 180; *Walker v. Childs, Ambler*, R. 524; *Foster v. Blagnen, Ambler*, 704; *Makeham v. Hooper*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 153; *Attorney-Gen. v. Earl of Winchelsea*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 380, and Belt's note (3); *Attorney-Gen. v. Hurst*, 2 Cox, R. 360; *Attorney-Gen. v. Tindall*, 2 Eden, R. 209, 210; *Attorney-Gen. v. Caldwell, Ambler*, R. 635; *Curtis v. Hutton*, 14 Ves. 537; *Hobson v. Blackburn*, 1 Keen, R. 273; *Williams v. Kershaw*, Id. 274, note; *Shelford on Mortmain*, 234; ante, § 569; *The Philanthropic Society v. Kemp*, 4 Beav. R. 581.

² *Williams v. Kershaw*, 1 Keen, R. 274, note.

³ *Attorney-Gen. v. Graves*, Ambl. R. 158, and Mr. Blunt's notes (2), (3); *Arnold v. Chapman*, 1 Ves. 108; *Attorney-Gen. v. Tyndall*, 2 Eden, R. 211; *Attorney-Gen. v. Tompkins*, Ambl. R. 217.

of the mixed personalty to the pure personalty. Therefore where the testator directed the charity legacies to be paid out of his pure personal estate, and not out of his leasehold or other real estates, and by the same will charged his leasehold estates with the payment of his debts and funeral and testamentary expenses and legacies not given to charities, and the pure personalty was insufficient to pay the debts, expenses, and legacies, the court refused to marshal the assets so as to charge the leasehold estates with the debts, expenses, or charities, not charitable, but held that the charity legacies failed in the proportion of the mixed personalty to the pure personalty.¹ (a)

1181. It has been already stated that charitable bequests are not void on account of any uncertainty as to the persons or as to the objects to which they are to be applied.² Almost all the cases on this subject have been collected, compared, and commented on by Lord Eldon, with his usual diligence and ability, in two recent decisions. The result of these decisions is that if the testator has manifested a general intention to give to charity, the failure of the particular mode by which the charity is to be effected will not destroy the charity. For the substantial intention being charity, equity will substitute another mode of devoting the property to charitable purposes, although the formal intention as to the mode cannot be accomplished.³ The same

¹ *The Philanthropic Society v. Kemp*, 4 Beav. R. 581.

² *Ante*, § 1169.

³ The first was the case of *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. R. 36, where the testatrix gave the residue of her personal estate to James Vaston, his executors and administrators, 'desiring him to dispose of the same in such charities as he shall think fit, recommending poor clergymen who have large families and good characters, and appointed Mr. Vaston one of her executors: Mr. Vaston died in her lifetime, of which she had notice; but the will remained unaltered. The next of kin claimed the residue as being lapsed by the death of Mr. Vaston; but the bequest was held valid, and established. In the next case, *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 55, the testator by his will, after giving several legacies, proceeded, 'the rest and residue of all my effects I direct may be provided for promoting the gospel in foreign parts and in England; for bringing up ministers in different seminaries and other charitable purposes, as I do intend to name hereafter, after all my worldly property is disposed of to the best advantage.' The bill was filed by the next of kin, praying an account and distribution of the residue, as being undisposed of by the will or

(a) But in general where the will must be done. *Gaskin v. Rogers*, directs that the assets shall be marshalled in favor of the charity, this L. R. 2 Eq. 284; *Wigg v. Nicholl*, L. R. 14 Eq. 92.

principle is applied when the persons or objects of the charity are uncertain or indefinite, if the predominant intention of the testator is still to devote the property to charity.¹ (a) In like manner if the original funds are more than sufficient for the specified objects of charity, the surplus will be applied to other similar purposes.² (b)

1182. All these doctrines proceed upon the same ground ; that is, the duty of the court to effectuate the general intention of the testator.³ And accordingly the application of them ceases whenever such general intention is not to be found. If therefore it is clearly seen that the testator had but one particular object in his mind, as for example to build a church at W, and that purpose cannot be answered, the next of kin will take, there being in such a case no general charitable intention.⁴ So if a fund should be given in trust to apply the income to printing and promoting the doctrines of the supremacy of the Pope in ecclesiastical affairs in England, the trust would be held void on grounds of public policy, (c) and the property would go to the personal representatives of the party creating the trust ; and it would not be liable to be applied to other charitable purposes by

any codicil of the testator. The Master of the Rolls held the residuary bequest to charitable purposes void for uncertainty, and because the testator expressed not a present but a future intention to devise this property. Lord Eldon however upon an appeal reversed the decree and established the bequest as a good charitable bequest, and directed it to be carried into effect accordingly. *Attorney-Gen. v. The Drapers' Company*, 2 Beav. R. 508; *Attorney-Gen. v. The Coopers' Company*, 3 Beav. R. 29; ante, §§ 1167, 1170.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Attorney-Gen. v. Earl of Winchelsea*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 373, 379; *Attorney-Gen. v. Hurst*, 2 Cox, R. 364; *Attorney-Gen. v. Wilson*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 362, 372; *Attorney-Gen. v. The Drapers' Company*, 2 Beav. R. 508; *Attorney-Gen. v. The Coopers' Company*, 3 Beav. R. 29; ante, §§ 1167, 1178.

³ *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 65, 79, 81, 94, 95, 99; *Legge v. Asgill*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 265, note.

⁴ *Attorney-Gen. v. Hurst*, 2 Cox, R. 354, 365; *Corbyn v. French*, 4 Ves. 419, 433; *De Garcin v. Lawson*, 4 Ves. 433, note; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 6, § 2, pp. 243 to 245.

(a) For examples see § 1156 and note.

(b) Or given to the same donee if that be a charitable society. *Attorney-Gen. v. Trinity College*, 24 Beav. 383.

(c) So of a gift to relieve persons from the penalties of violating a law. *Thrupp v. Collett*, 26 Beav. 126, 147.

the Crown, because it was not intended to be a general trust for charity.¹ (a) Even in the case of gifts or bequests to superstitious uses, which (as we have seen) are not held to be void, but the funds are applied in chancery to other lawful objects of charity,² the professed ground of the doctrine is (though certainly it is a most extraordinary sort of interpretation of intention) that the party has indicated a general purpose to devote the property to charity; and therefore although his specified object cannot be accomplished, yet his general intention of charity is supposed to be effectuated, by applying the funds to other charitable objects.³ How Courts of Equity could arrive at any such conclusion it is not easy to perceive, unless indeed where the nature of the gift necessarily led to the conclusion that the object specified was a favorite though not an exclusive object of the donor. To such cases it has in modern times been practically and justly limited.⁴

¹ *De Themmines v. De Bonneval*, 5 Russ. R. 288.

² *Ante*, § 1168.

³ *Ibid.*; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 69 to 83; *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 9 Ves. 399; s. c. 10 Ves. 522; *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 99 to 101; *Ommaney v. Butcher*, 1 Turn. & Russ. R. 260, 270. In *De Themmines v. De Bonneval* (5 Russ. R. 297), the Master of the Rolls said: 'The policy of the law will not permit the execution of a superstitious use. But the court avails itself of the general intention to give the property to charity, although the particular charity chosen by the founder be superstitious; and it effectuates the general intention by devoting the fund to some other charitable purpose.' How can the court presume an intention of the testator to give to charity generally, when he has expressed himself only as to a particular object, that is, as to a superstitious use?

⁴ This practical application of the doctrine was strongly illustrated in a recent case, where a testator gave the residue of his estate to trustees, positively forbidding them to diminish the capital by giving away any part thereof, or that the interest and profit arising be applied to any other use or uses than in the will directed, namely, one half yearly, and every year forever, unto the redemption of British slaves in Turkey and Barbary; one fourth part yearly, and every year forever, unto charity schools in the city and suburbs of London, &c., and not giving to any one above £20 a year; and the other fourth to other specified uses. The question was, What was to become of the income of the moiety for the redemption of the British slaves in Turkey and Barbary, there being, from the altered circumstances of the countries,

(a) A bequest for the assistance of execution. *Shrewsbury v. Hornby*, 5 Hare, 406. See also *Miller v. Gable*, 2 Denio, 492; *Scott v. Curle*, 9 B. Mon. 17; *infra*, § 1191 a, and note.

1183. Hence it has become a general principle in the law of charities, that if the charity be of a general, indefinite, and mere

no objects of this bounty. The Master of the Rolls said on that occasion that the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity with respect to charitable bequests is derived from their authority to carry into execution the trusts of any will or other instrument, and the court is to proceed according to the intention expressed in the will or testament; that the court in the present case had no authority to apply the moiety to any other use, as it would not be executing the expressed intention of the testator; and that it could only be applied to some other use, by a new scheme, under the sanction of the legislature. Upon appeal Lord Chancellor Brougham reversed the decree and held that the court might apply it to a new scheme *cy pres*. Upon this occasion he said: 'When a testator gives one charitable fund to three several classes of objects, unless he excludes by most express provisions the application of one portion to the purpose to which the others are destined, it is clear that the court may thus execute his intention, in the event of an impossibility of applying that portion to its original destination. The character of charity is impressed on the whole fund. There is good sense in presuming that had the testator known that one object was to fail he would have given its appropriated fund to the increase of the funds destined to other objects of his bounty; and there is convenience in acting as he would himself have done. This is the foundation of the doctrine *cy pres*, &c. I should have been disposed to favor the relators' argument, on which the decree must rest, had the will been that one half should be employed in redeeming captives, and in no other way whatever; or that the two fourths should be employed in other charities, and no more than these two fourths in those or any such charities. But that is far from being the case. The testator says: "The capital shall not be diminished by giving away any part thereof, and the interest shall not be applied to any other use or uses than those hereinafter mentioned." The object of this general prohibition plainly is to secure the whole fund, principal and interest, to charitable uses; to forbid any alienation of the capital and any diversion of the income to any other purposes than those which he specifies. The expression, "use or uses," even literally taken, lets in all the charities specified, provided the fund be given among them and not otherwise applied. Undoubtedly the funds must be applied in the proportions specified, — one half to one and one fourth to each of the two other objects; and it would be a breach of trust to give part of the moiety to either of the two other purposes as long as there remained captives to redeem. But then it would be just as much a breach of trust without the prohibitory clause as with it, &c. So in the case of a charity where I bequeath £100 to one object and £50 each to two other objects of bounty, my trustees violate their duty if they give less than £100 to the one and more than £50 to each of the other two; and that, whether I use words of exclusion such as "no otherwise," "no other charities," &c., or omit to use them. But when the one object fails the doctrine of *cy pres* becomes applicable, although it has no place in legacies to individuals; and the intention to which the court is to approximate will be gathered from the other gifts and from the gift itself. Should words be used which positively exclude such an approximation, as for instance if there be an express direction that each of the charities named shall have so much, and neither more nor less, and one shall not be extended in case the objects of another fail, — then clearly the doctrine can have no place.

private nature, or not within the scope of the Statute of Elizabeth, it will be treated as utterly void and the property will go to the next of kin. For in such a case, as the trust is not ascertained, it must either go as an absolute gift to the individual selected to distribute it, or that individual must be a trustee for the next of kin.¹ If the testator means to create a trust and the trust is not effectually created, or fails, the next of kin must take.² On the other hand if the party selected to make the distribution is to take it, it must be upon the ground that the testator did not intend to create a trust, but to leave it entirely to the discretion of the party to apply the fund or not. The latter position is repugnant to the very purpose of the bequest, and therefore the interpretation is that it is the case of a frustrated and void trust.³

1184. It has been made a question whether a Court of Equity sitting in one jurisdiction can execute any charitable bequests for foreign objects in another jurisdiction. The established doctrine seems to be in favor of executing such bequests.⁴ (a) Of course this must be understood as subject to the implied excep-

But that is because the will of the testator has expressly said so; and by acting against his clear intent the court would not be executing *cy pres* (as near as possible), but departing as far as possible from that intent. This cannot be said of the general words used here, which are abundantly satisfied if no part of the capital is given away at all, and no part of the interest to any other than the specified purposes. Nor is the will at all violated by applying the undisposed and undisposable surplus of one branch to increase the objects of the other branches of the same charity.' *Attorney-Gen. v. Ironmongers' Company*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 576, 580, 586 to 589. See also *Hayter v. Trego*, 5 Russ. 113.

¹ *Ante*, §§ 979 *a*, 979 *b*, 1156, 1157; *post*, § 1197 *a*; *Trustees of Baptist Association v. Hart's Ex'rs*, 4 Wheat. R. 1, 33, 39, 43 to 45; *Stubbs v. Sargon*, 2 Keen, R. 255; *Ommaney v. Butcher*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 260, 270, 271; *Fowler v. Garlike*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 232.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ommaney v. Butcher*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 260, 270; *Attorney-Gen. v. Pearson*, 7 Sim. R. 290; *Stubbs v. Sargon*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 507; *ante*, §§ 979 *b*, 1068.

⁴ *Attorney-Gen. v. City of London*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 171; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 243; *Attorney-Gen. v. Lepine*, 2 Swanst. R. 181; s. c. 19 Ves. 309; *Oliphant v. Hendrie*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 571, and Mr. Belt's note (1); *Society for Propagating the Gospel v. Attorney-Gen.*, 3 Russ. R. 142. In the case of Mr. Boyle's

(a) *Taylor v. Bryn Mawr College*, *Attorney-Gen. v. Sturge*, 19 Beav. 597; 34 N. J. Eq. 101; *Chamberlain v. New v. Bonaker*, L. R. 4 Eq. 655. *Chamberlain*, 43 N. Y. 437. See also

tion that the objects of the charities are not against the public policy or laws of the State where they are sought to be enforced or put into execution; for no State is under any obligation to give effect to any acts of parties which contravene its own policy or laws. (a) Upon this ground where a bequest was given by the will of a testator in England in trust for certain nunneries in foreign countries, it was held void, and the Court of Chancery refused to enforce it.¹ Upon the same ground a pecuniary legacy given for such purposes as the superior of a foreign convent or her successor shall judge most expedient was held void.²

will the bequest was not limited, in terms, to foreign countries or objects, but it was applied to a foreign object under a decree of the Court of Chancery; and when that object failed, a new scheme was directed. *Attorney-Gen. v. City of London*, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 171; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 243. There are several other cases in which charities for foreign objects have been carried into effect. In the *Provost, &c. of Edinburgh v. Aubery*, Ambl. R. 236, there was a devise of £3,500, South Sea Annuities, to the plaintiffs, to be applied to the maintenance of poor laborers residing in Edinburgh and the towns adjacent. Lord Hardwicke said he could not give any directions as to the distribution of the money, that belonging to another jurisdiction, that is, to some of the courts in Scotland; and therefore he directed that the annuities should be transferred to such persons as the plaintiffs should appoint, to be applied to the trusts in the will. So in *Oliphant v. Hendrie*, where A by will gave £300 to a religious society in Scotland, to be laid out in the purchase of heritable securities in Scotland, and the interest thereof to be applied to the education of twelve poor children, the court held it a good bequest. 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 571. In *Campbell v. Radnor* the court held a bequest of £7,000, to be laid out in the purchase of lands in Ireland, and the rents and profits to be distributed among poor people in Ireland, &c., to be valid in law. 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 271. So a legacy towards establishing a bishop in America was supported, although no bishop was then established. *Attorney-Gen. v. Bishop of Chester*, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 444. In the late case of *Curtis v. Hutton* a bequest of personal estate for the maintenance of a charity (a college) in Scotland was established. 14 Ves. 537. And in another still more recent case a bequest in trust to the magistrates of Inverness in Scotland, to apply the interest and income for the education of certain boys, was enforced as a charity. *Mackintosh v. Townsend*, 16 Ves. 330. See also *Trustees of Baptist Association v. Smith*, 3 Peters, R. App. 500 to 503. Nor is the uniformity of the cases broken in upon by the doctrine in *De Garcin v. Lawson*, 4 Ves. jr. 433, note. There the bequests were to Roman Catholic clergymen, or for Roman Catholic establishments; and were considered as void and illegal, being equally against the policy and the enactments of the British legislature. See also 3 Peters, R. 500 to 503.

¹ *De Garcin v. Lawson*, 4 Ves. 433, note.

² *Smart v. Prujean*, 6 Ves. 567; *De Themmines v. De Bonneval*, 5 Russ. R. 292, 297.

(a) See *Taylor v. Bryn Mawr College*, 34 N. J. Eq. 101.

But where a testator bequeathed the remainder of his property to the Government of Bengal to be applied to charitable, beneficial, and public works at and in the City of Decca in Bengal, it was held to be a valid charity.¹

1185. But every bequest which, if it were to be executed in England would be void under its mortmain laws, is not as a matter of course held to be void solely on that account when it is to be executed in a foreign country. There must be some other ingredient making it reprehensible in point of public policy generally, or bringing it within the reach of the mortmain acts. Thus for example money bequeathed by a will to be laid out in lands abroad (as in Scotland) may be a valid bequest and executed by an English Court of Equity, when money to be laid out in lands in England would be held a void bequest as contrary to the mortmain acts of England.²

1186. Where money is bequeathed to charitable purposes abroad, which are to be executed by persons within the same territorial jurisdiction where the Court of Equity sits, the latter will secure the fund and cause the charity to be administered under its own direction. But where the charity is to be established abroad and is to be executed by persons there, the court not having any jurisdiction to administer, it will simply order the money to be paid over to the proper persons in the foreign country, who are selected by the testator as the instruments of his benevolence; and will leave it to the foreign local tribunals to see to its due administration.³ (a)

1187. It is clear upon principle that the Court of Chancery merely in virtue of its general jurisdiction over trusts, indepen-

¹ *Mitford v. Raynolds*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 185.

² *Oliphant v. Hendrie*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 571, and Mr. Belt's note; *Mackintosh v. Townsend*, 16 Ves. 330; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 50; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (b).

³ *The Provost of Edinburgh v. Aubery*, Ambler, R. 236; *Attorney-Gen. v. Lepine*, 2 Swanst. R. 181; s. c. 19 Ves. 309; *Emery v. Hill*, 1 Russ. R. 112; *Minet v. Vulliamy*, 1 Russ. R. 113, note.

(a) *Taylor v. Bryn Mawr College*, 34 N. J. Eq. 101; *Chamberlain v. Chamberlain*, 43 N. Y. 487. But where money was bequeathed by an English will to the President of the United States and others to found a college in Pennsylvania for a purpose which had failed, and the trustees disclaimed, it was held that the bequest fell into the residue. *New v. Bonaker*, L. R. 4 Eq. 655.

dently of the special jurisdiction conferred by the Statute of 43d Elizabeth, ch. 4, must in many cases have a right to enforce the due performance of charitable bequests; for (as has been well observed) the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity with respect to charitable bequests is derived from their general authority to carry into execution the trusts of a will or other instrument according to the intention expressed in that will or instrument.¹ We shall presently see that this is strictly true in all cases where the charity is definite in its objects, is lawful, and is to be executed and regulated by trustees who are specially appointed for the purpose.² But there are many cases (as we shall also see) in which the jurisdiction exercised over charities in England can scarcely be said to belong to the Court of Chancery as a Court of Equity, and where it is to be treated as a personal delegation of authority to the chancellor or as an act of the Crown through the instrumentality of that dignitary.³

1188. The jurisdiction exercised by the chancellor under the Statute of 43d Elizabeth, ch. 4, over charitable uses, is held to be personal in him and not exercised in virtue of his ordinary or extraordinary jurisdiction in chancery; and in this respect it resembles the jurisdiction exercised by him in cases of idiots and lunatics, which is exercised purely as the personal delegate of the Crown.⁴ Where a commission has issued under that statute, any person excepting to the decree of the commissioners is treated as a plaintiff in an original cause in chancery, and the respondents as defendants; and in the examination of witnesses in the cause thus brought by way of appeal before the chancellor, neither side is bound by what appeared before the commissioners; but they may set forth new matter if they think proper. If it were not considered on such an appeal as an original cause, the court could know nothing of the merits; for the evidence before a jury or before the commissioners under the commission is not taken in writing, but is *viva voce*; and therefore it could not be known to the appellate court.⁵

¹ *Attorney-Gen. v. Ironmongers' Company*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 581; post, § 1191.

² Post, § 1191.

³ Post, §§ 1188, 1190.

⁴ 3 Bl. Comm. 427, 428.

⁵ *Corporation of Burford v. Lenthall*, 2 Atk. 552; 3 Black. Comm. 427; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1 and note (a).

1189. But as the Court of Chancery may also proceed in many although not in all cases of charities by original bill, as well as by commission under the Statute of Elizabeth, the jurisdiction has become mixed in practice; that is to say, the jurisdiction of bringing informations in the name of the attorney-general has been mixed with the jurisdiction given to the chancellor by the statute.¹ So that it is not always easy to ascertain in what cases he acts as a judge administering the common duties of a Court of Equity and in what cases he acts as a mere delegate of the Crown administering its peculiar duties and prerogatives. And again there is a distinction between cases of charity where the chancellor is to act in the Court of Chancery, and cases where the charity is to be administered by the King by his sign manual. But in practice the cases have often been confounded from similar causes.² (a)

1190. The general doctrine in England is, that the King as *pater patriæ* has a right to guard and enforce all charities of a public nature by virtue of his general superintending power over the public interests, where no other person is intrusted with that right.³ (b) Wherever therefore money is given to charity generally and indefinitely, without any trustees pointed out who are to administer it, there does not seem to be any difficulty in considering it as a personal trust devolved upon the King as a constitutional trustee to be administered by him, through the only proper functionary known to that government, namely, the Lord Chancellor, who is emphatically for all public purposes of this sort styled the keeper of his conscience.⁴ In such a case it is not

¹ *Ibid.*; 3 Black. Comm. 427; Anon. 1 Ch. Cas. 267; *West v. Knight*, 1 Ch. Cas. 134.

² *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 83 to 86.

³ 3 Black. Comm. 427; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch 1, § 1, note (a); *Attorney-Gen. v. Middleton*, 2 Ves. 327; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 35, 83; *Cary v. Bertie*, 2 Vern. 333, 342; *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 119.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. Introd. xxvii.; *Cary v. Bertie*, 2 Vern. 333, 342; *Mitf. Pl. by Jeremy*, 7, 39, 101, note (g); *Bailiffs of Burford v. Lenthall*, 2 Atk. 551. In all these cases the mode in which the establishment and administration of the charity is usually accomplished is upon an information filed by the attorney-general *ex officio*, at the relation of some informant, upon which the Lord Chancellor acts generally in the same manner and by the same proceedings as he would upon a bill in chancery. The whole matter of charities

(a) See *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen, 539. (b) *Heuser v. Harris*, 42 Ill. 425.

ordinarily very important whether the chancellor acts as the special delegate of the Crown, or the King acts under the sign manual through his chancellor guiding his discretion. In practice however it has been found very difficult to distinguish in what cases the one or the other course ought, upon the strict principles of prerogative, to be adopted. For where money has been given to trustees for charity generally without any objects selected, the charity has sometimes been administered by the King under his sign manual and sometimes by the Court of Chancery. Lord Eldon, after a full review of all the cases, came to the conclusion (which is now the settled rule) that where there is a general indefinite purpose of charity, not fixing itself upon any particular object, the disposition and administration of it are in the King by his sign manual.¹ But where the gift is to trustees with general objects or with some particular objects pointed out, there the Court of Chancery will take upon itself the administration of the charity, and execute it under a scheme to be reported by a master.²

has been regulated by recent statutes (52 Geo. 3, ch. 101; 59 Geo. 3, ch. 91), so that proceedings may now in many cases be had to establish and execute them in a more brief and summary manner than formerly. See 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (a); 3 Bl. Comm. 427; *Reeve v. Attorney-Gen.*, 3 Hare, R. 197, 199.

¹ In cases of superstitious uses the charity has been held to be subject to the administration of the Crown, under the sign manual, as an indefinite purpose of charity. See *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 100, 101; *De Themmines v. De Bonneval*, 5 Russ. R. 292, 293; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, note (i); *Attorney-Gen. v. Herrick*, Ambler, R. 712; *Da Costa v. De Pas*, Ambler, R. 228; s. c. 2 Swanst. R. 489, note; 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 19, § 2, pp. 111 to 117.

² *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36, 75, 85, 86; *Attorney-Gen. v. Matthews*, 2 Lev. 167; *Attorney-Gen. v. Herrick*, Ambler, R. 712; *Da Costa v. De Pas*, Ambler, R. 228, and Mr. Blunt's note; s. c. 2 Swanst. 489, note; *Mills v. Farmer*, 1 Meriv. R. 55; *Attorney-Gen. v. Wansay*, 15 Ves. 231; *Ommaney v. Butcher*, 1 Turn. & Russ. R. 260, 270; *Paice v. Archbishop of Canterbury*, 14 Ves. 372; *Waldo v. Caley*, 16 Ves. 206; *Attorney-Gen. v. Price*, 17 Ves. 371; 3 Peters, R. 498 to 500; 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 19, § 5, pp. 164 to 215; *Reeve v. Attorney-Gen.*, 3 Hare, R. 191, 197. The following statement of the practice of the Court of Chancery in regard to charities, taken from Mr. Fonblanque on Equity (Vol. 2, B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, note i), may not be unacceptable as a further illustration of the mode of effectuating the objects. 'With respect to gifts to charitable uses, where no specific description of objects is pointed out, the Court of Chancery will, in respect to the general charitable purpose appearing, direct the mode of giving it effect. *Attorney-Gen. v. Herrick*, Ambler, R. 712; *Attorney-Gen. v. the Paint-*

1191. But where a charity is definite in its objects and lawful in its creation, and it is to be executed and regulated by trustees whether they are private individuals or a corporation, there the administration properly belongs to such trustees, and the King as *pater patriæ* has no general authority to regulate or control the administration of the funds. In all such cases however, if there be any abuse or misuse of the funds by the trustees, the Court of Chancery will interpose, at the instance of the attorney-general or the parties in interest, to correct such abuse or misuse of the funds. But in such cases the interposition of the court is properly referable to its general jurisdiction, as a Court of Equity, to prevent abuses of a trust, and not to any original right to direct the management of a charity or the conduct of the trustees.¹ (*a*) Indeed if the trustees of the charity should grossly abuse their trust, a Court of Equity may go the length of taking it away from them and commit the administration of the charity to other hands.² But this is no more than the court will do in proper cases for any gross abuse of other trusts.

ers' Company, 2 Cox, R. 56. And this is agreeable to the rule of the civil law, which is so peculiarly favorable to charities, that legacies to pious or public uses shall not fail from the want of certainty as to the particular object intended. See 2 Domat, Civ. Law, 161, 162. If not only the general purpose appear, but also a particular description of persons or objects be referred to, though as between such persons or objects the party has made no selection, yet the court will confine its discretion in supplying such omissions within the limits of such general description. *White v. White*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 12; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 517; *Attorney-Gen. v. Clarke*, Amb. 422; *Waller v. Childs*, Amb. 524; *Attorney-Gen. v. Wansay*, 15 Ves. 231. If the object of the gift be certain but not at present in existence, yet if its existence may be expected hereafter, the court will neither consider the gift lapsed nor apply it to a different use. *Aylet v. Dodd*, 2 Atk. 238; *Attorney-Gen. v. Lady Downing*, Amb. 571; *Attorney-Gen. v. Oglander*, 3 Bro. Ch. Rep. 166. But if the charity or object of the gift be precisely pointed out and fail, it seems then, in general, that it shall not be applied to another. *Attorney-Gen. v. Bishop of Oxford*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 379; *Attorney-Gen. v. Goulding*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 429. But see also *Attorney-Gen. v. City of London*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 171; 1 Ves. jr. 243; *Shanley v. Baker*, 4 Ves. 732.¹

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (*a*); *Id.* § 3, note (*i*); *Attorney-Gen. v. Middleton*, 2 Ves. 328; *Cook v. Duckenfield*, 2 Atk. 567, 569; *Attorney-Gen. v. Foundling Hospital*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 165; s. c. 2 Ves. jr. 42; *Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Smith*, 4 Wheat. 1; s. c. 3 Peters, R. App. 498 to 500.

² *Attorney-Gen. v. Mayor of Coventry*, 7 Bro. Parl. Cas. 236; *Attorney-Gen. v. Earl of Clarendon*, 17 Ves. 491, 499; *Attorney-Gen. v. Utica Insur-*

(*a*) See *Attorney-Gen. v. Boucherett*, 25 Beav. 116; *Attorney-Gen. v. Moore*, 4 C. E. Green, 503.

1191 *a*. Some doctrines on the subject of what constitutes such an abuse or misuse of charitable trusts, and especially of trusts of a religious nature by trustees, have been recently promulgated, which are of such deep interest and general application that they seem to require a brief notice in this place. (*a*) Thus where a meeting-house was founded by certain Protestant Dissenters, and the property vested in trustees upon the trust to be used 'for the worship and service of God,' it has been held that no doctrines ought to be allowed to be taught in it which were opposed to the opinions of the founders, although those opinions were not expressed in the trust deed and no particular doctrines were there required to be taught; and that it would be a breach of trust in the trustees to allow any other doctrines than those of the founders to be so taught. So that if the founders were Trinitarians, no Unitarian doctrine should be allowed to be taught there; and e converso, if the founders were Unitarian, the doctrines of Trinitarians should not there be taught. The effect of this doctrine is to expound the language of the instrument not upon its own terms, but to incorporate into them the presumed parol intentions of the parties not expressed in the instrument. It hence assumes, as a necessary result, that the founders never could intend that any other religious doctrines than what they themselves then professed should be taught therein throughout all future times.¹

ance Company, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 389; Bridgman on Duke on Char. Uses, 574, &c.; In re Chertsey Market, 6 Price, R. 261. Under what circumstances a Court of Equity will sanction the alienation of charitable property, see Attorney-Gen. v. South Sea Company, 4 Beav. R. 453. (*b*)

¹ Attorney-Gen. v. Pearson, 7 Sim. R. 290; Attorney-Gen. v. Shore, 7 Sim. R. 309, note. In this latter case, commonly known as the case of Lady Hewley's charity, Lord Lyndhurst, in giving judgment, stated the general ground of the doctrine in these words: 'In every case of charity, whether the object of the charity be directed to religious purposes or to purposes purely civil, it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intent of the founder, provided this can be done without infringing any known rule of law. It is a principle that is uniformly acted upon in Courts of Equity. If, as they have stated, the terms of the deed of foundation be clear and precise in the language and clear and precise in the application, the course of the court is free from difficulty. If on the other hand the terms which are made use of are obscure, doubtful, or equivocal, either in themselves or in the application of

(*a*) A charitable society cannot dissolve and divide the funds among themselves. In re New South Church, 13 Allen, 497.

(*b*) Brown v. Meeting St. Baptist Soc., 9 R. I. 177.

1192. It seems that with a view to encourage the discovery of charitable donations given for indefinite purposes it is the practice for the Crown to reward the persons who make the communication, if they can bring themselves within the scope of the charity, by giving them a part of the fund; and the like practice, whether well or ill founded, takes place also in relation to escheats.¹

them, it then becomes the duty of the court to ascertain by evidence as well as it is able what was the intent of the founder of the charity, in what sense the particular expressions were used. It is a question of evidence, and that evidence will vary with the circumstances of each particular case. It is a question of fact to be determined, and the moment the fact is known and ascertained, then the application of the principles is clear and easy. It can scarcely be necessary to cite authorities in support of these principles. They are founded in common sense and common justice; but if it were necessary to refer to any authority, I might refer to the case which has been already mentioned, the case of the Attorney-General *v.* Pearson, and to another case which was cited at the bar, the case in the House of Lords. Throughout those judgments the principles which have been stated were acknowledged and acted upon by a noble and learned judge, of more experience in Courts of Equity, and more experience in questions of this nature, than any other living person. I look upon it then that these principles are clear and established; that they admit of no doubt whatever.' The case was finally carried to the House of Lords, where the decree of the court below was affirmed, but upon grounds somewhat different from and more qualified than those which governed in that court. Upon that occasion the judges of the Courts of Law were called upon to express their opinions; and not agreeing in their views, they delivered their opinions seriatim, all being in favor of the affirmance of the decree except Mr. Justice Maule. The opinions are full of learning and instruction upon that most difficult question, how far parol evidence is admissible, of the opinions of the donor to explain and modify the sense of the language used by him. The report in the House of Lords will be found in 9 Clark & Fin. 355. See also 1 Greenl. on Ev. § 295, note 1, 2d edit. It is not my design to enter into any comments upon the doctrine stated in the text. That the judgments are free from difficulty, and that they stand upon as unquestionable principles as the learned judges suppose in their reasoning, may admit of serious doubt and discussion. No such doctrine has as yet ever been promulgated in America; and from the peculiar circumstances of the country and the diversity of religious opinions it is improbable that it ever will be. But see ante, § 1182, note; *Miller v. Gable*, 2 Denio, R. (N. Y.) 492. (a)

¹ Per Lord Eldon, in *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36, 71.

(a) The English rule has since been adopted in some cases *Princeton v. Adams*, 10 Cush. 129, 132; *Kniskern v. Lutheran Church*, 1 Sandf. Ch. 439. See also *Attorney-Gen. v. Bunce*, L. R. 6 Eq. 563 (where there had been a gradual change in the society from membership in one religious denomination to another); *Roshi's Appeal*, 69 Penn. St. 462; *Schorr's Appeal*, 67 Penn. St. 138; *Attorney-Gen. v. Moore*, 4 C. E. Green, 503.

1192 *a*. It seems that the Statute of Limitations and the bar from lapse of time will not be allowed to prevail in cases of charitable trusts in the same manner as it would in cases of mere private trusts. Thus in the case of a charitable trust where a corporation had purchased with notice of the trust, and had held the property under an adverse title for one hundred and fifty years, it was decided that the corporation should reconvey the property upon the original trusts.¹

1193. These are the principal doctrines and decisions under the Statute of Elizabeth respecting charitable uses, which it seems most important to bring in review before the learned reader. It may not be useless to add that the Statute of Mortmain and Charities of the 9th of Geo. II. ch. 36, has very materially narrowed the extent and operation of the Statute of Elizabeth, and has formed a permanent barrier against what the statute declares to be a 'public mischief,' which 'had of late greatly increased by many large and improvident alienations or dispositions, made by languishing and dying persons or others, to uses called charitable uses, to take place after their deaths, to the disherison of their lawful heirs.' (*a*)

1194. This Statute of 9th George II. ch. 36, was never extended to or adopted by the American Colonies generally.² But certain of the provisions of it and of the older Statutes of Mortmain³ have been adopted by some of the States of the Union.⁴ And it deserves the consideration of every wise and enlightened American legislator, whether provisions similar to those of this celebrated statute are not proper to be enacted in this country with

¹ Attorney-Gen. *v.* Christ's Hospital, 3 Mylne & Keen, 344.

² Attorney-Gen. *v.* Stewart, 2 Meriv. R. 143.

³ The 7th of Edw. I. stat. 2, De Religiosis; the 13th of Edw. I. ch. 32; the 15th of Richard II. ch. 5; and the 23d of Hen. VIII. ch. 10.

⁴ Binney, R. App. 626; Laws of New York, sess. 36, ch. 60, § 4; Jackson *v.* Hammond, 2 Cain. Cas. in Err. 337.

(*a*) The following recent cases among others touch this subject: In *re* Watmough, L. R. 8 Eq. 272; *Booth v. Carter*, L. R. 3 Eq. 757; *Sinnott v. Herbert*, L. R. 7 Ch. 232; *Lewis v. Allenby*, L. R. 10 Eq. 668; *Nethersole v. School for Blind*, L. R. 11 Eq. 1; *Chester v. Chester*, L. R. 12 Eq. 444; *Wilkinson v. Barber*, L. R. 14 Eq. 96; *Springett v. Jennings*, L. R. 10 Eq. 488; *Jones v. Badley*, L. R. 3 Eq. 635; s. c. 3 Ch. 362; *Ashworth v. Munn*, 15 Ch. D. 363; *Holdsworth v. Davenport*, 3 Ch. D. 185; *Mitchell v. Moberly*, 6 Ch. D. 655; *Chandler v. Howell*, 4 Ch. D. 651.

a view to prevent undue influence and imposition upon pious and feeble minds in their last moments, and to check an unfortunate propensity (which is sometimes found to exist under a bigoted fanaticism), the desire to acquire fame as a religious devotee and benefactor at the expense of all the natural claims of blood and parental duty.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

IMPLIED TRUSTS.

1195. WE have now, in pursuance of the plan already laid down,¹ gone over some of the most important branches of express trusts, and shall next proceed to the consideration of some of the more usual cases of IMPLIED TRUSTS, including therein cases of constructive and resulting trusts.² Implied trusts may be divided into two general classes: first, those which stand upon the presumed intention of the parties; secondly, those which are independent of any such intention and are forced upon the conscience of the party by operation of law; as for example in cases of meditated fraud, imposition, notice of an adverse equity, and other cases of a similar nature. It has been said to be a general

¹ Ante, §§ 980 to 982.

² Lord Nottingham's judgment, in *Cook v. Fountain*, 3 Swanst. R. 585, contains a classification of trusts and of the general principles which regulate implied trusts. 'All trusts,' said he, 'are either, first express trusts which are raised and created by act of the parties; or implied trusts which are raised or created by act or construction of law. Again, express trusts are declared either by word or writing; and these declarations appear either by direct and manifest proof or violent and necessary presumption. These last are commonly called presumptive trusts; and that is when the court upon consideration of all circumstances, presumes there was a declaration either by word or writing, though the plain and direct proof thereof be not extant. In the case in question there is no pretence of any proof that there was a trust declared either by word or in writing; so the trust, if there be any, must either be implied by the law or presumed by the court. There is one good, general, and infallible rule, that goes to both these kinds of trusts. It is such a general rule as never deceives; a general rule to which there is no exception; and that is this; the law never implies, the court never presumes, a trust but in case of absolute necessity. The reason of this rule is sacred; for if the Chancery do once take liberty to construe a trust by implication of law, or to presume a trust unnecessarily, a way is opened to the Lord Chancellor to construe or presume any man in England out of his estate. And so at last every case in court will become *casus pro amico*.'

rule that the law never implies and a Court of Equity never presumes a trust except in case of absolute necessity.¹ Perhaps this is stating the doctrine a little too strongly. The more correct exposition of the general rule would seem to be that a trust is never presumed or implied as intended by the parties unless, taking all the circumstances together, that is the fair and reasonable interpretation of their acts and transactions.

1196. And first let us consider such implied trusts as are founded in the supposed intention of the parties. The most simple form perhaps in which such an implied trust can be presented is that of money or other property delivered by one person to another, to be by the latter paid or delivered over to and for the benefit of a third person. In such a case (as we have seen²) the party so receiving the money or other property holds it upon a trust; a trust necessarily implied from the nature of the transaction in favor of such beneficiary, although no express agreement has been entered into to that effect.³ But even here the trust is not under all circumstances absolute; for if the trust is purely voluntary and without any consideration, and the beneficiary has not become a party to it by his express assent after notice of it, it is revocable; (*a*) and if revoked, then the original trust is gone and an implied trust results in favor of the party who originally created it.⁴

1196 *a*. Another form in which a resulting trust may appear is where there are certain trusts, created either by will or deed, which fail in whole or in part, (*b*) or which are of such an indefi-

¹ *Cook v. Fountain*, 3 Swanst. R. 591, 592.

² Ante, § 1041; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 5.

³ 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 61, p. 307, 3d edit.; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 5.

⁴ Ante, §§ 972, 1036 *b*, 1041 to 1043; *Linton v. Hyde*, 2 Madd. R. 94; *Priddy v. Rose*, 3 Meriv. R. 102; *Dearle v. Hall*, 3 Russ. R. 1; *Loveridge v. Cooper*, 3 Russ. R. 30; *Page v. Broom*, 4 Russ. R. 6; *Wallwyn v. Coutts*, 3 Meriv. R. 707; s. c. 3 Simons, R. 14; *Garrard v. Lord Lauderdale*, 3 Simons, R. 1; s. c. 2 Russ. & Mylne, 451; *Leman v. Whitely*, 4 Russ. R. 427.

(*a*) See *Paul v. Paul*, 19 Ch. D. 47, reversing 15 Ch. D. 580, and deciding that a settlor cannot revoke a trust which he has finally and conclusively declared, though in favor of a volunteer. See also *Light v. Scott*, 88 Ill. 239.

(*b*) It was early held, in a case in

which Lord Mansfield dissented from the opinion of the majority, that where the trusts had all failed by the decease of the cestui que trust, and the grantor had also deceased, both without heirs, thus making a case for an escheat but for the creation of the trust, equity had no power to compel the trustee to

nite nature that Courts of Equity will not carry them into effect, or which are illegal in their nature and character, or which are fully executed and yet leave an unexhausted residuum. In all such cases there will arise a resulting trust to the party creating the trust, or to his heirs and legal representatives, as the case may require.¹

¹ *Stubbs v. Sargeon*, 2 Keen, R. 255; *Ommaney v. Butcher*, 1 Turn. & Russ. R. 260, 270; *Wood v. Cox*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 684; s. c. 1 Keen, 317; *Cook v. Hutchinson*, 1 Keen, 42, 50; ante, §§ 979 *a*, 979 *b*, 1071, 1073, 1156, 1157, 1183. In *Cook v. Hutchinson*, 1 Keen, R. 42, 50, where a father made a deed to a son upon certain trusts for himself, his wife, and her children by him, after his decease, and no trust was declared of the surplus, it was held that there was no resulting trust to the father, and that the son took the surplus. On this occasion Lord Langdale said: 'Upon this deed a question is made whether there is or is not a resulting trust to the grantor as to the surplus, with respect to which there is no declaration of trust; and for the purpose of determining that question it is necessary to look carefully to the language of the deed and to the circumstances of the particular case. In general, where an estate or fund is given in trust for a particular purpose, the remainder, after that purpose is satisfied, will result to the grantor; but that resulting trust may be rebutted even by parol evidence, and certainly cannot take effect where a contrary intention, to be collected from the whole instrument, is indicated by the grantor. The distinctions applicable to cases of this kind are pointed out in the case of *King v. Denison*, by Lord Eldon, who adopts the principles laid down by Lord Hardwicke in *Hill v. The Bishop of London*. The conclusion to which Lord Hardwicke comes is, that the question, whether there is or is not a resulting trust, must depend upon the intention of the grantor. "No general rule," he observes, "is to be laid down unless where a real estate is devised to be sold for payment of debts, and no more is said; there it is clearly a resulting trust. But if any particular reason occurs why the testator should intend a beneficial interest to the devisee, there are no precedents to warrant the court to say it shall not be a beneficial interest." Let us consider what was the intention of the grantor of this deed. The father, being upwards of eighty years of age, executes a deed which recites that he was desirous of settling the property to which he was entitled, therein described, in such manner as to make a provision for himself during his life, and for his wife and children after his death, and for such other purposes as were thereafter expressed. This was the object he had in view; this was

convey the estate to the Crown to perfect the title by escheat. *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 W. Black. 123; s. c. 1 Eden, 177. This practically established the right (though the point itself was expressly left undecided) of the trustee to hold the property. And the later decisions confirmed this position. *Fawcett v. Lowther*, 2 Ves. 300; *Middleton v. Spicer*, 1 Bro. C. C. 201; *Walker v.*

Denne, 2 Ves. jr. 170; *Williams v. Lonsdale*, 3 Ves. 752; *Cox v. Parker*, 22 Beav. 168. See also *Smith v. Spencer*, 6 DeG. M. & G. 631; *Peacock v. Stockford*, 7 DeG. M. & G. 129; *Dunne v. Dunne*, *Ib.* 207; *Ware v. Watson*, *Ib.* 248. But the rule has finally been changed by statute. 47 & 48 Vict. ch. 71, § 4.

1197. Another common transaction which gives rise to the presumption of an implied resulting use or trust is where a conveyance is made of land or other property without any consideration, express or implied, or any distinct use or trust stated. In such a case the intent is presumed to be that it shall be held by the grantee for the benefit of the grantor as a resulting trust.¹ But if there be an express declaration that it is to be in trust or for the use of another person, nothing will be presumed against such a declaration. And if there be either a good or a valuable consideration, there equity will immediately raise a use or trust correspondent to such consideration,² in the absence of any controlling declaration or other circumstances.

1198. This is in strict conformity to the rule of the common law applied to resulting uses, which indeed were originally nothing but resulting trusts. Thus a feoffment made without consideration was at a very early period of the common law held to be made for the use of the feoffor.³ Lord Bacon, after repudiating a distinction set up in *Dyer*, 146 *b*, assigning the origin of this doctrine to the time of the statute *Quia emptores*, said: 'The intendment of an use to the feoffor, where the feoffment was made without consideration, grew long after when uses waxed general, and for this reason; because when feoffments were made it grew doubtful whether the estates were in use or in purchase, because purchases were things notorious, and uses were things secret. The chancellor thought it more convenient

his intention as expressed in the instrument. He proceeds to make a release and assignment of the property comprised in the deed to his son "upon the trusts thereafter declared concerning the same;" and when he comes to declare those trusts he does not exhaust the whole of the property. But I am of opinion that this is immaterial; for after having carefully looked through the whole of this deed I have come to the conclusion, considering the relation between the parties, and the object and purport of the instrument, that the father intended to part with all beneficial interest in the property, and that he meant his son to have the benefit of that part of the property of which the trusts are not expressly declared.' See *Fowler v. Garlike*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 232; post, § 1200. (a)

¹ 2 Black. Comm. 330; Bac. Abr. Uses and Trusts (1); Id. Trusts (C); Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 3. See also *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Eden, R. 206, 207; post, § 1200.

² *Ibid.*; post, § 1199.

³ *Ibid.*; *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, R. 92, 93; post, § 1201.

(a) See *Aston v. Wood*, L. R. 6 Eq. 419.

to put the purchaser to prove his consideration than the feoffor and his heirs to prove the trust, and so made the intendments towards the use, and put the proof upon the purchaser.'¹ Be the origin of the doctrine however as it may, it is firmly established in Equity Jurisprudence in matters of trust. And it is not in any manner affected by the provisions of the Statute of Frauds of 29th Charles II. ch. 3; for that statute contains an express exception of 'trusts arising by implication, and transferred and extinguished by acts of law.'² (a)

1199. The same principle applies to cases where a man makes a feoffment or other conveyance and parts with or limits a particular estate only, and leaves the residue undisposed of. In such a case the residue will result to the use of the feoffor or grantor; even though the feoffment or conveyance be made for a consideration. For it is the intent which guides the use; and here the party having expressly declared a particular estate of the use, the presumption is that if he had intended to part with the residue, he would have declared that intention also.³ This distinction however is to be observed in cases where a consideration, although purely nominal, is stated in the deed. If no uses

¹ Bacon on Uses, 317; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 2, § 1, and note (d); Id. § 2, notes (h), (i).

² Co. Litt. 290 b, Butler's note, § 8; Bac. Abr. Trusts (C); Lamplugh v. Lamplugh, 1 P. Will. 112, 113; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 2, § 4, note (m); Id. ch. 5, § 5, note (q); ante, § 972. In cases within the Statute of 29 Charles II., ch. 3, it is not necessary that the trust should be in writing. It is sufficient if it is manifested and proved by writing; that is, there should be evidence in writing proving that there was such a trust. Sugden on Vendors, ch. 15, § 1, pp. 612 to 614 (7th edit.).

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 1, note (a); Id. § 4, notes (m), (n); Id. ch. 6, § 1, note (a); Co. Litt. 23; Shortridge v. Lampugh, 2 Lord Raym. 798; s. c. 7 Mod. 71; Lloyd v. Spillet, 2 Atk. 149, 150; Pybus v. Mitford, 1 Vent. 372; Benbow v. Townsend, 1 Mylne & Keen, 506; post, § 1202.

(a) Livermore v. Aldrich, 5 Cush. 431; Kendall v. Mann, 11 Allen, 15, 17; Titcomb v. Morrill, 10 Allen, 15, 17. An oral agreement to hold premises voluntarily conveyed by absolute deed, for the benefit of the grantor does not create a trust 'by implication' of law. Campbell v. Brown, 129 Mass. 23; Titcomb v. Morrill, supra. See Bartlett v. Bartlett, 14

Gray, 278; Gerry v. Stimson, 60 Maine, 186; Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. 469; Jackson v. Cleveland, 15 Mich. 469. Aliter, it seems, if the grantee acts in a relation of confidence (e. g. as guardian) towards him for whom he declares to hold. Snell v. Elam, 2 Heisk. 82. See Johnson v. Dougherty, 3 C. E. Green, 406.

are declared, the grantee will take the whole use; and there will be no resulting use for the grantor, because the payment even of a nominal consideration shows an intent that the grantee should have some use; and no other being specified, he must take the whole use. But where a particular use is declared, there the residue of the use results to the grantor; for the presumption that the grantor meant to part with the whole use is thereby repelled.¹

¹ *Ibid.* As the doctrine of resulting uses and trusts is founded upon a mere implication of law, it may be proper here to observe that parol evidence is generally admissible for the purpose of rebutting such resulting use or trust. See 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 3, note (l), and cases there cited; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 86 to 94. See *Benhow v. Townsend*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 506; post, § 1202; *Cripps v. Jee*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 472. The late case of *Leman v. Whitney* (4 Russ. R. 422) stands upon the utmost limits of the doctrine of the inadmissibility of parol evidence as to resulting trusts. A son had conveyed an estate to his father nominally as purchaser for the consideration expressed in the deed of £400, but really as a trustee, in order that the father, who was in better credit than the son, might raise money upon it by way of mortgage for the use of the son. The father died shortly afterwards, before any money was raised, having by his will made a general devise of all his real estate. The case was held by Sir John Leach to be within the Statute of Frauds, and that parol evidence was not admissible to prove the trust. On this occasion the learned judge said: 'There is here no pretence of fraud, nor is there any misapprehension of the parties with respect to the effect of the instruments. It was intended that the father should by legal instruments appear to be the legal owner of the estate. There is here no trust arising or resulting by the implication or construction of law. The case of *Cripps v. Jee* is the nearest to this case in its circumstances. There the estate being subject to certain incumbrances the grantor mortgaged the equity of redemption by deeds of lease and release to two persons of the name of Rogers, as purchasers for a consideration stated in the deed; the real intention of the parties being that the Rogerses should be mere trustees for the grantor and should proceed to sell the estate, and after paying the incumbrances should pay the surplus money to the grantor. In the book of accounts of one of the Rogerses there appeared an entry in his handwriting of a year's interest paid to an incumbrancer on the estate on an account of the grantor, and other entries of the repayment of that interest to Rogers by the grantor; and there was also evidence of a note and bond given by the Rogerses to a creditor of the grantor, in which they stated themselves to be trustees of the estate of the grantor. Lord Kenyon held that this written evidence being inconsistent with the fact that the Rogerses were the actual purchasers of the equity of redemption, further evidence was admissible to prove the truth of the transaction. Unfortunately there is here no evidence in writing which is inconsistent with the fact that the father was the actual purchaser of this estate; and it does appear to me that to give effect to the trust here would be in truth to repeal the Statute of Frauds. Considering myself bound therefore to treat this case as a purchase by the father from the plaintiff, there does however

1200. The same principle applies to cases where the whole of the estate is conveyed or devised, but for particular objects and purposes or on particular trusts. In all such cases, if those objects or purposes or trusts, by accident or otherwise, fail and do not take effect, or if they are all accomplished and do not exhaust the whole property, there a resulting trust will arise for the benefit of the grantor or devisor and his heirs.¹ (a)

1201. Upon similar grounds, where a man buys land in the name of another and pays the consideration money, the land will generally be held by the grantee in trust for the person who so pays the consideration money.² (b) This as an established doc-

arise an equity for the plaintiff which, consistently with the facts stated and proved, and under the prayer for general relief, he is entitled to claim. It is stated and proved that no part of the alleged price or consideration of £400 was ever paid by the father to the plaintiff; and the plaintiff therefore, as vendor, has a lien on the estate for this sum of £400, and the decree must be accordingly.' Ante, § 1196 a; *Squire v. Harder*, 1 Paige, R. 494.

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 1, note (a); Id. B. 2, ch. 8, § 2, note (a); *Cruse v. Barley*, 3 P. Will. 20, and Mr. Cox's note (1); *Ripley v. Waterworth*, 7 Ves. 425, 435; 2 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, ch. 3, pp. 32 to 36, and ch. 5, pp. 77 to 102; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 61, p. 307 (4th edit.); *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, p. 13; Id. pp. 130, 131; *Hobart v. Countess of Suffolk*, 2 Vern. 644; *Hill v. Bishop of London*, 1 Atk. 618 to 620; *Robinson v. Taylor*, 1 Ves. jr. 44; s. c. 2 Bro. Ch. R. 589; *Stanfield v. Habergham*, 10 Ves. 273; *Tregonwell v. Sydenham*, 3 Dow, R. 194; *Chitty v. Parker*, 2 Ves. jr. 271; ante, §§ 1156 to 1158, 1183.

² Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 W. 3; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 1, note (a); 3 Wooddes. Lect. 57, pp. 438, 439; Co. Litt. 290 b, *Butler's note* (1), § 8;

(a) *Northen v. Carnegie*, 4 Drew. 587; *In re Pollard*, 32 L. J. Ch. 657; *Easterbrooks v. Tillinghast*, 5 Gray, 17; *Fisk v. Attorney-Gen.*, L. R. 4 Eq. 521; *Wild v. Banning*, L. R. 2 Eq. 577.

A gift 'of the whole or any part' of the income of a fund for the maintenance of a person does not carry the surplus income. Secus if the gift were of the whole income for such purpose. *In re Sanderson*, 3 Kay & J. 497. *In Clarke v. Hilton*, L. R. 2 Eq. 810, a gift to a grandson, subject to certain trusts which did not exhaust the fund, was held to give him a beneficial interest in the surplus. See *Straat v. Uhrig*, 56 Mo. 482.

(b) Or where a man buys land for,

and with money of, another, taking title in his own name, to hold for him who furnished the money. *Kendall v. Mann*, 11 Allen, 15; *Click v. Click*, 1 Heisk. 607. See *Mallory v. Mal-lory*, 5 Bush, 464; *Gibson v. Foote*, 40 Miss. 788; *Thomas v. Chicago*, 55 Ill. 403; *Dryden v. Hanway*, 31 Md. 254; *Green v. Drummond*, Ib. 71; *Kelley v. Jenness*, 50 Maine, 455; *Roberts v. Ware*, 40 Cal. 634; *Waterman v. Seeley*, 28 Mich. 77; *Six v. Shaner*, 26 Md. 415; *Glidewell v. Spangh*, 26 Ind. 319. Payment must be made at the time, or in pursuance of an agreement made at the time. *Barnard v. Jewett*, 97 Mass. 87; *Nixon's Appeal*, 63 Penn. St. 279. But payment may be made in land. *Clark v. Clark*, 43 Vt. 685.

trine is now not open to controversy. But there are exceptions to it, which stand upon peculiar reasons (to be presently noticed),

Sugden on Vendors, ch. 15, § 2, pp. 615 to 620 (7th edit.); Bac. Abr. Uses (I.); Id. Trusts (C.); *Younge v. Peachy*, 2 Atk. 256; *Lloyd v. Spillet*, 2 Atk. 150, and Mr. Sanders's note (2); *Scott v. Fenhoulet*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 69, 70; *Lane v. Dighton*, Ambler, R. 409, 411; *Finch v. Finch*, 15 Ves. 50; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 350; *Wray v. Steele*, 2 V. & Beam. 388; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 98; *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 John. Ch. R. 582; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. R. 405; *Steere v. Steere*, 5 John. Ch. R. 1; *Powell v. Monson and Brimfield Manufacturing Company*, 3 Mason, R. 362, 363; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 61, pp. 305, 306 (4th edit.). 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 97, 98, 108; *Jackson v. Moore*, 6 Cowen, R. 706; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1*, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 85 to 94. Mr. Sanders, in his note (2) to *Lloyd v. Spillet*, 2 Atk. 150, referring to this same position as it is there laid down by Lord Hardwicke, remarks, 'With respect to this position the following observations occur. If the consideration money is expressed in the deed to be paid by the person in whose name the conveyance is taken, and nothing appears in such conveyance to create a presumption that the purchase-money belonged to another, then parol proof cannot be admitted after the death of the nominal purchaser to prove a resulting trust, for that would be contrary to the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries. *Kirk v. Webb*, Prec. Ch. 84; *Walter de Chirton's Case*, Ibid. 88; *Heron v. Heron*, Ibid. 163; *Newton v. Preston*, Ibid. 103; *Gascoyne v. Thuring*, 1 Vern. 336; *Hooper v. Eyles*, 2 Vern. 480; *Crop v. Norton*, 2 Atk. 75. But if the nominal purchaser in his lifetime gives a declaration of or confesses the trust, then it takes it out of the statute. *Ambrose v. Ambrose*, 1 P. Will. 322; *Ryall v. Ryall*, 1 Atk. 59, 60. In *Lane v. Dighton*, Ambl. R. 409, there was evidence, in Mr. Dighton's handwriting, that the trust stocks had been sold and the money laid out from time to time in the purchase of land. So if it appears on the face of the conveyance (whether by recital or otherwise) that the purchase was made with the money of a third person, that will create a trust in his favor. *Kirk v. Webb*, Prec. Ch. 84; *Deg v. Deg*, 2 P. Will. 414; *Ryall*

Or in services. *White v. Sheldon*, 4 Nev. 280; *Lyon v. Lyon*, 1 Tenn. Ch. 225.

If title is taken in the name of another to save the land from creditors, it has been held that no trust will be raised. *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 4 C. E. Green, 549. But see *Hutchins v. Heyward*, 50 N. H. 491. And compare *Owens v. Owens*, 8 C. E. Green, 60; *Harvey v. Varney*, 98 Mass. 118. In Massachusetts an executory contract in writing to convey land conveyed to the grantee in fraud of creditors is valid, though perhaps it could not be specifically enforced. *Harvey v. Varney*, supra. Contra in New Jersey. *Owens v. Owens*, 8 C. E. Green, 60.

See *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 4 C. E. Green, 549, 562; *Baldwin v. Campfield*, 4 Halst. Ch. 891. But even in New Jersey a naked trustee of land, the title to which is vested in the cestui que trust, may be compelled to convey to the beneficiary in accordance with the trustee's written declaration of trust, though the conveyance was made to the trustee in fraud of creditors. *Owens v. Owens*, supra.

Of course an oral agreement or declaration of trust to reconvey to a voluntary grantor would not be binding. *Campbell v. Brown*, 129 Mass. 23; *Titcomb v. Morrill*, 10 Allen, 15; supra, note to § 1198.

and which are quite consistent with the general doctrine. The clear result of all the cases, without a single exception, is (as has been well said by an eminent judge) that the trust of the legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold, or leasehold; whether taken in the names of the purchaser and others jointly, or in the name of others without the purchaser; whether in one name or several, whether jointly or successively (*successivè*), results to the man who advances the purchase-money. This is a general proposition, supported by all the cases, and there is nothing to contradict it. (a) And it goes on a strict analogy to the rule of the

v. Ryall, 1 Atk. 59; *Young v. Peachy*, 2 Atk. 257.' As to the proper proof of the payment of the purchase-money in such a case, Mr. Maddock, in his treatise on the Principles and Practice in Chancery (vol. 2, p. 98), says: 'Such proof may appear either from expressions or recitals in the purchase-deed (See 2 Vern. 168; Prec. Ch. 104; *Kirk v. Webb*, *Ibid.* 84, cited 1 Sanders on Uses, p. 258); or from some memorandum or note of the nominal purchaser (*O'Hara v. O'Neal*, 2 Eq. Abr. 745); or from his answer to a bill of discovery (*Cottingham v. Fletcher*, 2 Atk. 155; but see *Edwards v. Moore*, 4 Ves. 23, cited 1 Sand. 258); or from papers left by him and discovered after his death (*Ryall v. Ryall*, *Ambl. R.* 413; *Lane v. Dighton*, *Ibid.* 409). But whether after the death of the supposed nominal purchaser parol proof alone is admissible against the express declaration of the deed, has been a subject of controversy (see 1 Sand. on Uses, p. 259, and the note to *Lloyd v. Spillet*, 2 Atk. 150; *Roberts on Frauds*, p. 99; *Sugd. Vend. and Purch.* 616, 617 (7th edit.); 2 *Sugden on Vendors*, pp. 136, 137, 9th edit.), although it seems it may. See *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 511.' See also *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 John. Ch. R. 582, where the subject is very fully and learnedly discussed by Mr. Chancellor Kent in his judgment. See also *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. R. 404. (b)

(a) *Lee v. Browder*, 51 Ala. 288; *Pinney v. Fellows*, 15 Vt. 538; *Hays v. Quay*, 68 Penn. St. 263; *Harvey v. Ledbetter*, 48 Miss. 95; *Hutchins v. Heyward*, 50 N. H. 491; *McCarroll v. Alexander*, 48 Miss. 128; *Woodford v. Stephens*, 51 Mo. 443; *Pamphrey v. Brown*, 5 W. Va. 107; *Blodgett v. Hildreth*, 103 Mass. 484. And there may be a resulting trust pro tanto in favor of one who furnishes part of the purchase-money. *Kelley v. Jenness*, 50 Maine, 455. But it must be a specific aliquot part. *McGowan v. McGowan*, 14 Gray, 119; *Olcott v. Bynum*, 17 Wall. 44. See further as to payment of part *Dudley v. Bachelder*, 53 Maine, 403; *Fleming v. McHale*, 47 Ill. 282; *Thalman v. Canon*, 24 N. J. Eq. 127; *Roberts v. Ware*, 40 Cal. 634. Actual payment is held necessary. *Remington v. Campbell*, 60 Ill. 516.

Whether a secret purpose in an agent to get money to buy land for himself which the principal desires him to buy for him, together with dissuasion by the agent of the principal against acting in the matter, is fraud, the agent having accordingly bought for himself, see *Collins v. Sullivan*, 135 Mass. 461. And see *Walker v. Locke*, 5 Cush. 90; *Haigh v. Kaye*, L. R. 7 Ch. 469; *Jenkins v. Eldredge*, 3 Story, 181.

(b) *Blodgett v. Hildreth*, 103 Mass. 484; *Johnson v. Quarles*, 46 Mo. 423.

common law that where a feoffment is made without consideration the use results to the feoffor.¹ In truth it has its origin in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the money means the purchase to be for his own benefit rather than for that of another; and that the conveyance in the name of the latter is a matter of convenience and arrangement between the parties for other collateral purposes. The same doctrine is applied to cases where securities are taken in the name of another person. As if A takes a bond in the name of B for a debt due to himself, B will be a trustee of A for the money.²

1201 *a*. But the doctrine is strictly limited to cases where the purchase has been made in the name of one person and the purchase-money has been paid by another. For where a man employs another person by parol as an agent to buy an estate for him, and the latter buys it accordingly in his own name, and no part of the purchase-money is paid by the principal, there, if the agent denies the trust and there is no written agreement or document establishing it, he cannot by a suit in equity compel the agent to convey the estate to him; for (as has been truly said) that would be decidedly in the teeth of the Statute of Frauds.³ (*a*)

1201 *b*. There is an exception to the doctrine of a resulting trust in favor of a purchaser who pays the money and takes the conveyance in the name of a third person, which stands upon a principle of public policy, and that is that Courts of Equity will never raise a resulting trust where it would contravene any

¹ Lord Ch. Baron Eyre, in *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, R. 92, 93; ante, § 1198; 2 Sugden on Vendors, ch. 15, § 2, pp. 134, 135 (9th edit.); Id. pp. 615 to 617 (7th edit.); *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. R. 405 to 410.

² *Ebrand v. Dancer*, 2 Ch. Cases, 26; s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. 382, pl. 11; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 101; *Lloyd v. Read*, 1 P. Will. 607; *Rider v. Kidder*, 10 Ves. 366.

³ *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 1 Eden, 515; s. c. 4 East, 577, note; 2 Sugden on Vendors, ch. 15, § 2, p. 139 (9th edit.). See also *Rastel v. Hutchinson*, 1 Dick. 44; *Rex v. Boston*, 4 East, R. 572; *Crop v. Norton*, 2 Atk. 74; s. c. 9 Mod. R. 233; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. R. 405, 408 to 410; post, § 1206. But see post, § 1207 *a*.

(*a*) *Collins v. Sullivan*, 135 Mass. 461; *Howland v. Blake*, 97 U. S. 624; *Watson v. Erb*, 33 Ohio St. 35; *Kendall v. Mann*, 11 Allen, 15, 17; *Bostleman v. Bostleman*, 24 N. J. Eq. 103; *Remington v. Campbell*, 60 Ill. 516; *Burden v. Sheridan*, 36 Iowa, 125.

statutable provisions founded in public policy, or would assist the parties in evading these provisions. (a) Thus if an alien for the purpose of evading any law of a State prohibiting aliens from holding real estate should purchase land and pay the money, and take a conveyance in the name of a third person without any written declaration of trust, these Courts of Equity would never raise or enforce a resulting trust in favor of the alien purchaser in fraud of the rights of the State or the law of the land.¹

1202. But there are other exceptions to the doctrine of a resulting or implied trust, even where the principal has paid the purchase-money, as has been already intimated; or perhaps more properly speaking as the resulting or implied trust is, in such cases, a mere matter of presumption, it may be rebutted by other circumstances established in evidence, and even by parol proofs which satisfactorily contradict it.² And resulting or implied trusts in such cases may in like manner be rebutted, as well to part of the land as to part of the interest in the land purchased in the name of another.³ Thus where A took a mortgage in the name of B, declaring that he intended the mortgage to be for B's benefit, and that the principal after his own death should be B's, and A received the interest therefor during his lifetime, it was held that the mortgage belonged to B after the death of A.⁴ But a more common case of rebutting the presumption of a trust is where the purchase may be fairly deemed to be made for another from motives of natural love and affection. Thus for example if a parent should purchase in the name of a son, the purchase

¹ *Leggett v. Dubois*, 5 Paige, R. 114.

² *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, R. 93; 1 Eq. Abr. 3, pl. 1 to 5, pp. 380, 381; *Lloyd v. Read*, 1 P. Will. 607; *Graham v. Graham*, 1 Ves. jr. 275; *Maddison v. Andrew*, 1 Ves. 57, 61; *Co. Litt.* 290 *b*, *Butler's note* (1), § 8; *Ryall v. Ryall*, 1 Atk. 59; *s. c. Ambler*, R. 413; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 405; *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 John Ch. R. 582; *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 1 Eden, R. 515; *Leuch v. Leuch*, 10 Ves. 517; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 15, § 2, pp. 615 to 628 (7th edit.); *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 4 W. 4; *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 506; *Cook v. Hutchinson*, 1 Keen, R. 42, 50, 51.

³ *Lane v. Dighton*, *Ambler*, R. 409; *Lloyd v. Spillet*, 2 Atk. 150; *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 506; *ante*, § 1199.

⁴ *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 506; *ante*, § 1199.

(a) See *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 4 C. E. Ch. 469; *Miller v. Davis*, 50 Mo. 572; *Green*, 549; *Ownes v. Ownes*, 8 C. E. *Wheeler v. Kirtland*, 23 N. J. Eq. 18; *Green*, 60; *Harvey v. Varney*, 98 *Closs v. Bopp*, *ib.* 270. *Mass.* 118; *Haigh v. Kaye*, L. R. 7

would be deemed *prima facie* as intended as an advancement, so as to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust for the parent.¹ (a) But this presumption that it is an advancement may be rebutted by evidence manifesting a clear intention that the son shall take as a trustee.² (b)

1203. The moral obligation of a parent to provide for his children is the foundation of this exception, or rather of this rebutter of a presumption; since it is not only natural, but reasonable in the highest degree, to presume that a parent by purchasing in the name of a child means a benefit for the latter in discharge of this moral obligation, and also as a token of parental affection. (c) This presumption in favor of the child being thus founded in natural affection and moral obligation ought not to be frittered away by nice refinements.³ It is perhaps rather to be lamented that it has been suffered to be broken in upon by any sort of evidence of a merely circumstantial nature.⁴ (d)

¹ *Sidmouth v. Sidmouth*, 2 Beav. R. 447.

² *Ibid.*; *Scawin v. Scawin*, 1 Y. & Coll. New R. 65.

³ *Finch v. Finch*, 15 Ves. 50; *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, R. 93, 94; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 2, and notes (d), (i); *Lord Gray v. Lady Gray*, 1 Eq. Abr. 381, pl. 6; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 88 to 90; *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 4 W. 4.

⁴ Lord Ch. Justice Eyre, in *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, R. 92, has discussed this matter with great ability. 'It is the established doctrine,' said he, 'of a Court of Equity that this resulting trust may be rebutted by circumstances in evidence. The cases go one step further, and prove that the circumstance of one or more nominees being a child or children of the purchaser, is to operate by rebutting the resulting trust. And it has been determined in so many cases that the nominee being a child shall have such operation as a circumstance of evidence, that we should be disturbing landmarks if we suffered

(a) *Bennet v. Bennet*, 10 Ch. D. 474; *In re de Visme*, 2 DeG. J. & S. 17; *Gilbert v. Gilbert*, 2 Abb. Dec. 256; *Farrell v. Lloyd*, 69 Penn. St. 239.

(b) *Fowkes v. Pascoe*, L. R. 10 Ch. 343; *Marshal v. Crutwell*, L. R. 20 Eq. 328. So of a check given by a father to pay his son's debt. *In re Blockley*, 29 Ch. D. 250.

(c) *Bennet v. Bennet*, 10 Ch. D. 474. In this case it is laid down that where one person stands in such a relation to another as to create an obligation to make provision for him, and

there is either a purchase or an investment in the name of the latter, or in the joint names of both, of an amount which would constitute a provision, the presumption of a gift arises. The presumption of gift arises from a moral obligation to give. *Jessel, M. R.* See ante, §§ 1105, 1109, and notes. But this, it is declared, does not apply to a mother. *Ib.*; *Holt v. Frederick*, 2 P. Wms. 357; *In re de Visme*, 2 DeG. J. & S. 17. But see *Sayre v. Hughes*, L. R. 5 Eq. 376.

(d) See *McGinniss v. Edgell*, 39 Iowa, 419.

1204. The same doctrine applies to the ease of securities taken in the name of a child. The presumption is that it is intended

either of these propositions to be called in question; namely, that such circumstance shall rebut the resulting trust, and that it shall so do as a circumstance of evidence. I think it would have been a more simple doctrine if the children had been considered as purchasers for a valuable consideration. Natural love and affection raised a use at common law; surely then it will rebut a trust resulting to the father. This way of considering it would have shut out all the circumstances of evidence which have found their way into many of the cases, and would have prevented some very nice distinctions and not very easy to be understood. Considering it as a circumstance of evidence, there must be, of course, evidence admitted on the other side. Thus it was resolved into a question of intent, which was getting into a very wide sea without very certain guides. In the most simple case of all, which is that of a father purchasing in the name of his son, it is said that this shows the father intended an advancement, and therefore the resulting trust is rebutted. But then a circumstance is added to this, namely, that the son happened to be provided for; then the question is, Did the father intend to advance a son already provided for? Lord Nottingham could not get over this; and he ruled that in such a case the resulting trust was not rebutted; and in *Pole v. Pole*, in *Vesey*, Lord Hardwicke thought so too. And yet the rule in a Court of Equity, as recognized in other cases, is, that the father is the only judge as to the question of a son's provision. That distinction therefore of the son being provided for or not, is not very solidly taken or uniformly adhered to. It is then said that a purchase in the name of a son is a *prima facie* advancement; and indeed it seems difficult to put it in any way. In some of the cases some circumstances have appeared which go pretty much against that presumption; as where the father has entered and kept possession, and taken the rents; or where he has surrendered or devised the estate; or where the son has given receipts in the name of the father. The answer given is, that the father took the rents as guardian of his son. Now would the court sustain a bill by the son against the father for these rents? I should think it pretty difficult to succeed in such a bill. As to the surrender and devise, it is answered that these are subsequent acts; whereas the intention of the father, in taking the purchase in the son's name, must be proved by concomitant acts; yet these are pretty strong acts of ownership, and assert the right, and coincide with the possession and enjoyment. As to the son's giving receipts in the name of the father, it is said that the son being under age, he could not give receipts in any other manner. But I own this reasoning does not satisfy me. In the more complicated cases, where the life of the son is one of the lives to take in succession, other distinctions are taken. If the custom of the manor be that the first taken might surrender the whole lease, that shall make the other lessees trustees for him. But this custom operates on the legal estate, not on the equitable interest; and therefore this is not a very solid argument. When the lessees are to take *successivè*, it is said that, as the father cannot take the whole in his own name, but must insert other names in the lease, then the children shall be trustees for the father. And to be sure, if the circumstance of a child being the nominee is not decisive the other way, there is a great deal of weight in this observation. There may be many prudential reasons for putting in the life of a child in preference to that of any other person. And if,

as an advancement unless the contrary is established in evidence.¹ And the like presumption exists in the case of a purchase of a husband in the name of his wife, and of securities taken in her name. (a) Indeed the presumption is stronger in the case of a wife than of a child, for she cannot at law be the trustee of her husband. The same rule applies to the case of a joint purchase by the husband in the name of himself, his wife, and his daughters; and it will be presumed an advancement and provision for the wife and his daughter, and the husband and wife will be held to take one moiety by entireties, and the daughter to take the other moiety.²

1205. Hence also it is that where a purchase is made by a father in the joint names of himself and of a child unprovided for (whatever may be the case as to a child otherwise provided for), if the father dies, the child will hold the estate and have the benefit thereof by survivorship against the heir at law of the father, and against all volunteers claiming under the father, and also against purchasers from him with notice.³ (b) So where a

in that case, it is to be collected from circumstances whether an advancement was meant, it will be difficult to find such as will support that idea. To be sure, taking the estate in the name of the child, which the father might have taken in his own, affords a strong argument of such an intent. But where the estate must necessarily be taken to him in succession, the inference is very different. These are the difficulties which occur from considering the purchase in the son's name as a circumstance of evidence only. Now if it were once laid down that the son was to be taken as a purchaser for a valuable consideration, all these matters of presumption would be avoided.' The cases are also fully collected in Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 89 to 92. See *Cook v. Hutchinson*, 1 Keen, 42, 50.

¹ *Ebrand v. Dancer*, 2 Ch. Cas. 26; s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. 382, pl. 11; *Lloyd v. Read*, 1 P. Will. 607; *Rider v. Kidder*, 10 Ves. 366; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 101; *Scawin v. Scawin*, 1 Younge & Coll. New R. 65.

² 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 3; *Back v. Andrew*, 2 Vern. R. 120; *Cook v. Hutchinson*, 1 Keen, R. 42, 50.

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 2, note (d). Mr. Atherley, in his *Treatise on Marriage Settlements*, ch. 33, pp. 473 to 484, and Mr. Sugden, in his *Treatise on Vendors and Purchasers*, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2, pp. 607 to 628 (7th edit.), have ex-

(a) See *Hill v. Pine River Bank*, 45 N. H. 300; *Groff v. Rohrer*, 35 Md. 327; *Cairns v. Colburn*, 104 Mass. 274; *Cotton v. Wood*, 25 Iowa, 43; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 16 Minn. 512; *Thomas v. Chicago*, 55 Ill. 403; *Peiffer v. Lytle*, 58 Penn. St. 386; In re *Curteis*, L. R. 14 Eq. 217. But see *Persons v. Persons*, 25 N. J. Eq. 250.

(b) See *Fowkes v. Pascoe*, L. R. 10 Ch. 343; *Batstone v. Salter*, *Ib.* 431; *Marshal v. Crutwell*, L. R. 20 Eq. 328.

father transferred stock from his own name into the joint names of his son and of a person whom the father and son employed as their banker to receive dividends, and the father told the banker to carry the dividends, as they were received, to the son's account, and they were accordingly received and enjoyed by the son during his father's lifetime, it was held that the transfer created an executed trust for the son, and that he was absolutely entitled to the stock.¹

1206. In the case of joint purchases made by two persons who advance and pay the purchase-money in equal proportions and take a conveyance to them and their heirs, it constitutes a joint-tenancy, that is, a purchase by them jointly of the chance of survivorship, and of course the survivor will take the whole estate. This is the rule at law, and it prevails also in equity under the same circumstances; for unless there are controlling circumstances, equity follows the law.² (a) But wherever such circumstances occur, Courts of Equity will lay hold of them to prevent a survivorship and create a trust; for joint-tenancy is not favored in equity.³ Thus if a joint purchase is made in the name of one of the purchasers, and the other pays or secures his share of the purchase-money, he will be entitled to his share as a resulting trust.⁴ So if two persons advance a sum of money by way of mortgage and take a mortgage to them jointly, and

examined this whole subject with great care and ability; and the learned reader is referred to these works for a full statement of the doctrines and the cases. See also 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 99, 100.

¹ *Crabb v. Crabb*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 511; ante, §§ 1149, 1202.

² *Lake v. Gibson*, 1 Eq. Abridg. p. 290, A. pl. 3; *Moyse v. Gayles*, 2 Vern. 385; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 4, § 2, note (g); *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 17, § 1, pp. 607 to 615 (7th edit.); 2 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 15, § 1, pp. 127 to 132 (9th edit.); *Rigden v. Vallier*, 2 Ves. 258; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 102. See also *Caines v. Lessee of Grant*, 5 Binn. R. 119.

³ *Ibid.*; *Parteriche v. Powlet*, 1 West. R. 7; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, p. 86; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 102.

⁴ *Wray v. Steele*, 2 Ves. & B. 388. Under the English Registry Acts, in cases of a joint purchase of a ship by two persons, and the bill of sale taken in the name of one, no trust would arise in favor of the other. *Ex parte Houghton*, 17 Ves. 251; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 101, 102; *Ex parte Yallop*, 15 Ves. 60; *Abbott on Shipp.* P. 1, ch. 2, pp. 33 to 35; 2 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 35, § 2, pp. 139, 140 (9th edit.).

(a) *Robinson v. Preston*, 4 Kay & 342; *Honore v. Hutchings*, 8 Bush, J. 505; *Bone v. Pollard*, 24 Beav. 283; 687; *Maloy v. Sloans*, 44 Vt. 311. *Cipperly v. Cipperly*, 4 Thomp. & C.

one of them dies, the survivor shall not have the whole money due on the mortgage, but the representative of the deceased party shall have his proportion as a trust; for the nature of the transaction as a loan of money repels the presumption of an intention to hold the mortgage as a joint-tenancy.¹ So if two persons jointly purchase an estate and pay unequal proportions of the purchase-money, and take the conveyance in their joint names, in case of the death of either of them there will be no survivorship; for the very circumstance that they have paid the money in unequal proportions excludes any presumption that they intended to bargain for the chance of survivorship.² They are therefore deemed to purchase as in the nature of partners,

¹ *Petty v. Styward*, 1 Ch. Rep. 31 [57]; s. c. 1 Eq. Abridg. 290, pl. 1; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 4, § 4, note (g); *Rigden v. Vallier*, 2 Ves. 258; s. c. 3 Atk. 731; 2 Powell on Mortg. 671, by Coventry & Rand, and notes; *Randall v. Phillips*, 3 Mason, R. 378.

² Mr. Vesey in his note (b) to *Jackson v. Jackson*, 9 Ves. 597, 598, doubts the soundness of the distinction between an equality and an inequality of advances in the purchase of an estate by joint purchasers, as leading to a different conclusion as to the right of survivorship. 'If,' says he, 'the advance of consideration generally will not prevent the legal right, the mere inequality of proportion which may naturally be attributed to the relative value of the lives ought not to have that effect.' On the other hand Mr. Sugden thinks the distinction satisfactory and well founded. 'Where,' says he, 'the parties advance the money equally, it may fairly be presumed that they purchased with the view to the benefit of survivorship. But where the money is advanced in unequal proportions, and no express intention appears to benefit the one advancing the smaller proportion, it is fair to presume that no such intention existed. The inequality of proportion can scarcely be attributed to the relative value of the lives; because neither of the parties can be supposed not to know that the other may, immediately after the purchase, compel a legal partition of the estate, or may sever the joint-tenancy by a clandestine act.' *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 15, § 1, p. 607, note I. (7th edit.); S. P. and note; 2 *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 15, § 1, pp. 127, 128, note I. (9th edit.). There is much force in these observations of the latter learned author. But the real ground of the distinction probably is that joint-tenancy is not favored in equity; that where there is nothing demonstrating an apparent intent to vary the rule of law, it must prevail; so that in cases of equal advances no such intent is apparent. But that where the advances are unequal, there is nothing in the transaction necessarily leading to the conclusion that the parties mean to follow the rule of law; and then a Court of Equity is not bound to presume any intention to follow it; since it may work an inequality in point of right and justice. In other words a Court of Equity will not adopt a rule of law which has no foundation in general justice or convenience, unless it is compelled to do so by the absence of all circumstances which will enable it to control it. See ante, § 1201.

and to intend to hold the estate in proportion to the sums which each has advanced.¹

1207. The same rule is uniformly applied to joint purchasers in the way of trade, and for purposes of partnership and for other commercial transactions by analogy to, and in expansion and furtherance of, the great maxim of the common law, 'Jus accrescendi inter mercatores pro beneficio commercii locum non habet.'² In cases therefore where real estate is purchased for partnership purposes and on partnership account, it is wholly immaterial in the view of a Court of Equity in whose name or names the purchase is made and the conveyance is taken, whether in the name of one partner or of all the partners, whether in the name of a stranger alone or of a stranger jointly with one partner. In all these cases, let the legal title be vested in whom it may, it is in equity deemed partnership property not subject to survivorship, and the partners are deemed the cestuis que trust thereof.³ A Court of Law may, nay must, in general, view it only according to the state of the legal title. And if the legal title is vested in one partner or in a stranger, a bona fide purchaser of real estate from him, having no notice either express or constructive of its being partnership property, will be entitled to hold it free from any claim of the partnership.⁴ But if he has such notice, then in equity he is clearly bound by the trust; and he takes it cum onere exactly like every other purchaser of a trust estate.⁵

1207 *a*. But although generally speaking whatever is purchased

¹ *Lake v. Gibson*, 1 Eq. Abridg. 290, A. pl. 3; *Rigden v. Vallier*, 2 Ves. R. 258; *Caines v. Grant's Lessee*, 5 Binn. 119. But see 2 Sugden on Vendors, pp. 131 to 135; *Id.* 139 (9th edit.); the case of joint purchasers where one pays all the money; ante, p. 445.

² Co. Litt. 182 *a*; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 4, § 2, and note (*h*); *Lake v. Craddock*, 3 P. Will. 158; *Jackson v. Jackson*, 9 Ves. 591, 593, 597.

³ *Bell v. Phyn*, 7 Ves. 453; *Ripley v. Waterworth*, 7 Ves. 425, 435; *Townsend v. Devaynes*, *Montague on Partn.* 97, in note; *Balmain v. Shore*, 9 Ves. 500; *Lake v. Craddock*, 3 P. Will. 158; s. c. Sugden on Vendors, ch. 15, pp. 607 to 614 (7th edit.); *Jackson v. Jackson*, 9 Ves. 591, 593, 594, 597; *Selkrig v. Davies*, 2 Dow, R. 231; *Collyer on Partn. B.* 2, ch. 1, § 1, art. 4, pp. 68 to 70; *Hoxie v. Carr*, 1 Sumner, R. 182 to 186; ante, §§ 674, 675; *Fawcett v. Whitehouse*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 132.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*; and especially *Hoxie v. Carr*, 1 Sumner, R. 182, 183. We have already seen (ante, § 674) that such real estate, belonging to a partnership, is generally, if not universally, treated as personal property of the partnership. Ante, § 675; post, §§ 1243, 1253.

with partnership property to be used for partnership purposes is thus treated as a trust for the partnership in whosoever name the purchase may be made, yet there may be cases in which, from the nature of the thing purchased, the partner in whose name it is purchased may upon a dissolution of the partnership be entitled to hold it as his own, so that it will be trust property *sub modo* only. Thus for example an office may be purchased or a license be obtained in the name of a partner out of the partnership funds (as for example a stockbroker's license, or the office of a clerk in court), to be used during the continuance of the partnership for partnership purposes by the person obtaining the same. But it will not follow that, upon the dissolution of the partnership, such partner is to hold the same and act as a stockbroker or clerk in court, performing all the duties alone for the benefit of the other partners.¹

1208. Another illustration of the doctrine of implied and resulting trusts arises from the appointment of an executor of a last will and testament. In cases of such an appointment the executor is entitled, both at law and in equity (for in this respect equity follows the law), to the whole surplus of the personal estate, after payment of all debts and charges for his own benefit, unless it is otherwise disposed of by the testator.² The inclination of Courts of Equity has been strongly evinced to lay hold of any circumstances which may rebut the presumption of such a gift to the executor; and some very nice and curious distinctions have been taken in England in order to escape from the operation of the general rule. In America the surplus is by law universally distributable among the next of kin in the absence of all contrary expressions of intention by the testator, and therefore it is scarcely necessary to present these distinctions at large. In general it may be stated that at law the appointment of an executor vests in him all the personal estate of the testator, and the surplus after the payment of all debts will belong to him. But in equity, if it can be collected from any circumstance or expression in the will that the testator intended his executor to have only the office and not the beneficial interest, such intention will receive effect, and the executor will be deemed a trustee for

¹ *Clark v. Richards*, 1 *Younge & Coll.* 351, 384, 385.

² 2 *Madd. Ch. Pr.* 83 to 85; 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 2, ch. 2, § 5, note (*k*); *Jeremy on Eq. B.* 1, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 122 to 129.

those on whom the law would have cast the surplus in cases of a complete intestacy.¹ (a)

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 3, note (k); ante, § 1065; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 83, 84. Mr. Fonblanque has collected most of the distinctions on this subject in his learned note (k), above referred to. The following extract is made from that note, as every way useful to students. 'The cases,' says he, 'upon the subject are numerous, and not easily reconcilable. I will however endeavor to extract the several rules which have governed their decision. 1. As the exclusion of the executor from the residue is to be referred to the presumed intention of the testator that he should not take it beneficially, an express declaration that he should take as trustee will of course exclude him; *Pring v. Pring*, 2 Vern. 99; *Graydon v. Hicks*, 2 Atk. 18; *Wheeler v. Sheers*, Mosely, 288, 301; *Dean v. Dalton*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 634; *Bennet v. Bachelor*, 3 Bro. Ch. 23; 1 Ves. jr. 63; (b) and the exclusion of one executor as a trustee will consequently exclude his co-executor; *White v. Evans*, 4 Ves. 21; unless there be evidence of a contrary intention; *Williams v. Jones*, 10 Ves. 77; *Pratt v. Sladdeu*, 14 Ves. 193; *Dawson v. Clark*, 15 Ves. 416; and see *Dalton v. Dean*, to show that a direction to reimburse the executors their expenses is sufficient to exclude them. 2 Bro. R. 634. 2. Where the testator appears to have intended by his will to make an express disposition of the residue, but by some accident or omission such disposition is not perfected at the time of his death, as where the will contains a residuary clause but the name of the residuary legatee is not inserted, the executor shall be excluded from the residue. Bp. of *Cloyne v. Young*, 2 Ves. 91; *Lord North v. Pardon*, 2 Ves. 495; *Hornsby v. Finch*, 2 Ves. jr. 78; *Oldham v. Carleton*, 2 Cox, R. 400. (c) 3. Where the testator has by his will disposed of the residue of his property, but by the death of the residuary legatee in the lifetime of the testator it is undisposed of at the time of the testator's death. *Nichols v. Crisp*, Amb. 769; *Bennet v. Bachelor*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 28. 4. The next class of cases in which an executor shall be excluded from the residue is where the testator has given him a legacy expressly for his care and trouble; which, as observed by Lord Hardwicke in Bp. of *Cloyne v. Young*, 2 Ves. 97, is a very strong case for a resulting trust, not on the foot of giving all and some, but that it was evidence that the testator meant him as a trustee for some other, for whom the care and trouble should be, as it could not be for himself. *Foster v. Munt*, 1 Vern. 473; *Rachfield v. Careless*, 2 P. Will. 157; *Cordel v. Noden*, 2 Vern. 148; *Newstead v. Johnstone*, 2 Atk. 46. (d) 5. Though the objection to the executor's taking part and all has been thought a very weak and insufficient ground for excluding him from the residue, as the testator might intend the particular legacy to him in case of the personal estate falling short, yet it has been

(a) See *Bird v. Harris*, L. R. 9 Eq. 204; *Wager v. Wager*, 89 N. Y. 161.

(b) See *Barrs v. Fewkes*, 2 Hem. & M. 60; *Clarke v. Hilton*, L. R. 2 Eq. 810; *Read v. Stedman*, 26 Beav. 495.

(c) See *Travers v. Travers*, L. R. 14 Eq. 275.

(d) Even where the residue was given 'absolutely' to the executors, 'charged' with certain legacies, there being pecuniary legacies to the executors they were held excluded from beneficial interest in the residue, in *Saltmarsh v. Barrett*, 29 Beav. 474; s. c. 3 DeG. F. & J. 279.

1209. In like manner at law a testator by the appointment of his debtor to be his executor extinguishes his debt, and it can-

allowed to prevail; and it is now a settled rule in equity that if a sole executor has a legacy generally and absolutely given to him (for if given under certain limitation, which will be hereafter considered, it will not exclude), he shall be excluded from the residue. *Cook v. Walker*, cited 2 Vern. 676; *Joslin v. Brewitt*, Bunb. 112; *Davers v. Dewes*, 3 P. Will. 40; *Farrington v. Knightly*, 1 P. Will. 544; *Vachell v. Jefferies*, Prec. Ch. 170; *Petit v. Smith*, 1 P. Will. 7. Nor will the circumstance of the legacy being specific be sufficient to entitle him. *Randall v. Bookey*, 2 Vern. 425; *Southcot v. Watson*, 3 Atk. 229; *Martin v. Rebow*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 154; *Nesbit v. Murray*, 5 Ves. 149. Nor will the testator's having bequeathed legacies to his next of kin vary the rule. *Bayley v. Powell*, 2 Vern. 361; *Wheeler v. Sheers*, Mosely, 288; *Andrew v. Clark*, 2 Ves. 162; *Kennedy v. Stainsby*, E. 1755, stated in a note, 1 Ves. jr. 66; for the rule is founded rather on a presumption of intent to exclude the executor than to create a trust for his next of kin, and therefore if there be no next of kin, a trust shall result for the Crown. *Middleton v. Spicer*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 201. (a) 6. Where the testator appears to have intended to dispose of any part of his personal estate. *Urquhart v. King*, 7 Ves. 225. 7. Where the residue is given to the executors as tenants in common, and one of the executors dies, whereby his share lapses, the next of kin, and not the surviving executors, shall have the lapsed share. *Page v. Page*, 2 P. Will. 489; 1 Ves. jr. 66, 542. With respect to co-executors, they are clearly within the first three stated grounds on which a sole executor shall be excluded from the residue. And as to the fourth ground of exclusion, it seems to be now settled that a legacy given to one executor expressly for his care and trouble will, though no legacy be given to his co-executor, exclude. *White v. Evans*, 4 Ves. 21. As to the fifth ground of exclusion of a sole executor, several points of distinction are material in its application to co-executors. A sole executor is excluded from the residue by the bequest of a legacy, because it shall not be supposed that he was intended to take part and all. But if there be two or more executors, a legacy to one is not within such objection, for the testator might intend a preference to him pro tanto. *Colesworth v. Brangwin*, Prec. Ch. 323; *Johnson v. Twist*, cited 2 Ves. 166; *Buffar v. Bradford*, 2 Atk. 220. So where several executors have unequal legacies, whether pecuniary or specific, they shall not be thereby excluded from the residue. *Brasbridge v. Woodroffe*, 2 Atk. 69; *Bowker v. Hunter*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 328; *Blinkhorn v. Feast*, 2 Ves. 27. But where equal pecuniary legacies are given to two or more executors, a trust shall result for those on whom, in case of an intestacy, the law would have cast it. *Petit v. Smith*, 1 P. Will. 7; *Carey v. Goodinge*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 110; *Muckleston v. Brown*, 6 Ves. 64. But see *Heron v. Newton*, 9 Mod. 11. Qu. Whether distinct specific legacies, of equal value, to several executors will exclude them? It now remains to consider in what cases an executor shall not be excluded from the residue. Upon which it may be stated as a universal rule that a Court of Equity will not interfere to the prejudice of the executor's legal right, if such legal right can be reconciled with the intention of the testator, expressed by or to be collected from his will. And therefore even the bequest of a legacy to the executor shall not exclude if such legacy be consistent with the

(a) See *Read v. Stedman*, 26 Beav. 495.

not be revived, although a debt due by an administrator would only be suspended. The reason of the difference is that the one is the act of the law and the other is the act of the party.¹ But in equity a debt due by an executor is not extinguished; and it will go to the same party who would be entitled to the surplus estate if the debt were due from a third person.²

1210. Another illustration of the doctrine of implied trusts arises from acts done by trustees apparently within the scope and objects of their duty. Thus for instance if a trustee, authorized to purchase lands for his cestuis que trust or beneficiaries, should purchase lands with the trust money and take the conveyance in his own name, without any declaration of the trust, a Court of Equity would in such a case deem the property to be held as a resulting trust for the persons beneficially entitled thereto.³ For in such a case a Court of Equity will presume that the party meant to act in pursuance of his trust and not in violation of it. So where a man has covenanted to lay out money in the purchase of lands, or to pay money to trustees to be laid out in the purchase of lands, if he afterwards purchases lands to the amount, they will be affected with the trust; for it will be presumed, at least until the contrary absolutely appears, that he purchased in fulfilment of his covenant.⁴ In every such

intent that the executor shall take the residue; as where a gift to the executor is an exception out of another legacy. *Griffith v. Rogers*, Prec. Ch. 231; *Newstead v. Johnstone*, 2 Atk. 45; *Southcot v. Watson*, 3 Atk. 229. Or where the executorship is limited to a particular period, or determinable on a contingency, and the thing bequeathed to the executor upon such contingency taking place is bequeathed over. *Hoskins v. Hoskins*, Prec. Ch. 263. Or where the gift is only a limited interest, as for the life of the executor. *Lady Granville v. Duchess of Beaufort*, 1 P. Will. 114; *Jones v. Westcome*, Prec. Ch. 316; *Nourse v. Finch*, 1 Ves. jr. 356. Or where the wife is executrix, and the bequest is of her paraphernalia. *Lawson v. Lawson*, 7 Bro. P. C. 521; *Ball v. Smith*, 2 Vern. 675; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 59, pp. 495 to 503.⁷

¹ *Hudson v. Hudson*, 1 Atk. 461.

² *Ibid.*; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 49, pp. 504, 505; *Phillips v. Phillips*, 1 Ch. Cas. 292; *Brown v. Selwin*, Cas. t. Talbot, 240.

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 1, note (c); *Deg v. Deg*, 2 P. Will. 414; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 15, § 3, pp. 628 to 630 (7th edit.); *Lane v. Dighton*, Ambler, R. 409; *Perry v. Phellips*, 4 Ves. R. 107; s. c. 17 Ves. 173; *Bennet v. Mayhew*, cited 1 Bro. Ch. R. 232; 2 Bro. Ch. R. 287.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Sowden v. Sowden*, 1 Cox, R. 165; s. c. 1 Bro. Ch. R. 582; *Wilson v. Foreman*, 1 Dick. 593; s. c. cited and commented on in 10 Ves. 519; *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 516; *Gartshore v. Chalie*, 10 Ves. 9; *Lewis v. Madocks*, 17 Ves. 58; *Perry v. Phellips*, 17 Ves. 173; *Savage v. Carroll*, 1 B. & Beatt. 265;

case however it must be clear that the land has been paid for out of the trust money; and if this appears, a trust will be implied not only when the party may be presumed to act in execution of the trust, but even when the investment is in violation of the trust. For in every such case, where the trust money can be distinctly traced, a Court of Equity will fasten a trust upon the land in favor of the persons beneficially entitled to the money.¹ (a)

1211. Upon grounds of an analogous nature the general doctrine proceeds that whatever acts are done by trustees in regard to the trust property shall be deemed to be done for the benefit of the cestui que trust and not for the benefit of the trustee.² If therefore the trustee makes any contract, or does any act in regard to the trust estate for his own benefit, he will nevertheless be held responsible therefor to the cestui que trust, as upon an implied trust. Thus for example if a trustee should purchase a lien or mortgage on the trust estate at a discount, he would not be allowed to avail himself of the difference, but the purchase would be held a trust for the benefit of the cestui que trust.³ So

Waite v. Horwood, 2 Atk. 159; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 15, § 3, pp. 628 to 630 (7th. edit.); Id. § 4, pp. 630 to 634; Atherley on Marr. Sett. ch. 28, pp. 412 to 415; Id. pp. 434 to 442.

¹ Ibid.; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & Selw. 562; Cunard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Peters, S. C. R. 448; Liebman v. Harcourt, 2 Meriv. 513; Chedworth v. Edwards, 8 Ves. 46; s. c. 1 Madd. Ch. P. 128, note (e); Ryall v. Ryall, 1 Atk. 59; s. c. Ambler, R. 412, 413; Lane v. Dighton, Ambler, R. 409; Atherley on Marr. Sett. ch. 28, pp. 442 to 444; Bennett v. Mayhew, cited 1 Bro. Ch. R. 232, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 287; Buckeridge v. Glasse, 1 Craig & Phillips, 126. In the case of a purchase of land by a trustee in his own name in pursuance of the trust, the cestui que trust is entitled to the estate. But where it is purchased with trust money in violation of the trust, Mr. Atherley is of opinion that the cestui que trust has a lien only on the estate, and not a right to the estate. There is much sound sense in the distinction; but he admits that Bennet v. Mayhew is apparently against it. Atherley on Marr. Sett. ch. 28, pp. 443, 444. It is of course to be understood that the cestui que trust is not in any case, where the trust money is invested in lands or other things in fraud or breach of the trust, bound to take the land or to insist on his lien. He has an election to do so or not. Ibid.; Oliver v. Pratt, 3 How. Sup. Ct. R.

² Ante, § 322; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 61, pp. 306, 307 (3d edit.); Davoue v. Fanning, 2 John. Ch. R. 252.

³ Green v. Winter, 1 John. Ch. R. 26; Morret v. Parke, 2 Atk. 54; Forbes v. Ross, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 430; Van Horn v. Fonda, 5 John. Ch. R. 409; Evestorn v. Tappan, 5 John. Ch. R. 514.

(a) So too where the fund is in stocks. Ex parte Cooke, 4 Ch. D. 123. vested in personalty, as in railway See §§ 1255 et seq.

if a trustee should renew a lease of the trust estate, he would be held bound to account to the cestui que trust for all advantages made thereby.¹ And if a trustee should misapply the funds of the cestui que trust, the latter would have an election either to take the security or other property in which the funds were wrongfully invested, or to demand repayment from the trustee of the original funds.²

1211 *a*. The same principle will apply to persons standing in other fiduciary relations to each other. Thus for example if an agent who is employed to purchase for another purchases in his own name or for his own account, he will be held to be a trustee of the principal at the option of another.³ So if he is employed to purchase up a debt of his principal and he does so at an undervalue or discount, the principal will be entitled to the benefit thereof, in the nature of a trust.⁴ In this predicament sureties are also held to be who purchase up the securities of the principal on which they are sureties; and the principal will be entitled to the benefit of every such purchase at the price given for them.⁵

1212. Another class of cases illustrating the doctrine of implied trusts is that which embraces what is commonly called the equitable conversion of property. By this is meant an implied or equitable change of property from real to personal, or from personal to real, so that each is considered transferable, transmissible, and descendible, according to its new character as it arises out of the contracts or other acts and intentions of the parties. This change is a mere consequence of the common doctrine of Courts of Equity, that where things are agreed to be done they are to be treated for many purposes as if they were actually done.⁶ Thus (as we have already had occasion to consider) where a contract is made for the sale of land, the vendor

¹ *Holdridge v. Gillespie*, 2 John. Ch. R. 30; *Griffin v. Griffin*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 352; *James v. Dean*, 11 Ves. 392; *Nesbitt v. Tredenick*, 1 B. & Beatt. 46, 47; *Wilson v. Troup*, 2 Cowen, R. 195.

² *Steele v. Babcock*, 1 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 527.

³ *Ante*, § 316; *Lees v. Nuttall*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 53; *s. c.* *Tamlyn's Rep.* 382; *Carter v. Palmer*, 11 Bligh, R. 397, 418, 419. But see *ante*, § 1201 *a*.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ante*, § 316; *Reed v. Norris*, 2 Mylne & Craig, 361, 374.

⁶ See *Pulteney v. Darlington*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 237; *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Eden, R. 186, 194, 195; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 9, note (*t*), and *ante*, §§ 61 *a*, 789, 790, and note 2, p. 112; *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 4 W. 10.

is in equity immediately deemed a trustee for the vendee of the real estate, and the vendee is deemed a trustee for the vendor of the purchase-money. Under such circumstances the vendee is treated as the owner of the land, and it is devisable and descendible as his real estate. On the other hand the money is treated as the personal estate of the vendor, and is subject to the like modes of disposition by him as other personalty, and is distributable in the same manner on his death.¹ So land articed to be sold and turned into money is reputed money; and money articed or bequeathed to be invested in land is ordinarily deemed to be land.²

1213. So if money is devised to be laid out in the purchase of land which is to be settled on one and his heirs, the person for whose benefit the purchase is to be made may come into a Court of Equity and have the money paid to him without any purchase of the land; for he has a complete title to the same as owner.³ But if he should die before any purchase is made or the money is paid, so that the question comes between his heir or devisee and executors or administrators which of them shall have the money, in such a case Courts of Equity will decree it to the heir or devisee, precisely as if the land had been purchased in his lifetime upon the ground above stated.⁴

1213 *a.* So if real estate be charged with the payment of debts,

¹ Ante, §§ 789 to 792, and note 2 to § 790; *Craig v. Leslie*, 3 Wheat. R. 577; *Beverly v. Peter*, 10 Peters, R. 532, 533.

² Ante, § 790, and note 1; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 58, pp. 466 to 468; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 108 to 110; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 4, § 1, p. 160 (7th edit.); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 9, and notes (*s*), (*t*); Id. B. 1, ch. 4, § 2, note (*n*); *Atherley on Marr. Sett.* ch. 28, pp. 428 to 430; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 1, § 2, p. 95; *Fletcher v. Ashburner*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 497, and Mr. Belt's note. The parties may elect to treat it otherwise if they choose. Ante, § 793, and note 1. The subject of equitable conversion is treated very fully in Leigh and Dalzell's Treatise on the equitable doctrine of the conversion of property. See also 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 8, § 2, and note (*a*); ante, note 2 to § 790, and the very valuable note of Mr. Cox to *Cruse v. Barley*, 3 P. Will. 22, note (1); 2 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, ch. 4, pp. 60 to 76; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 108 to 112. Lord Thurlow was of opinion against the original propriety of the doctrine. After quoting what he called the cant expression that in equity what is to be done is considered as done, he added: 'Either that idea should have been carried fully out, or it should have been abandoned. I think it should have been the latter' See Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 10, 4 W. 15, 16.

³ Ante, §§ 790, 793; post, § 1250.

⁴ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 8, § 2, and note (*a*); Id. § 3.

so far as may be necessary for the payment of such debts it will be treated as converted into personal estate. But unless the testator or other party has indicated a different intention, the real estate will not be deemed converted out and out, but it will retain its character of realty so far as the charge does not extend, until it is actually converted.¹

1214. In general Courts of Equity do not incline to interfere to change the quality of the property as the testator or intestate has left it, unless there is some clear act or intention by which he has unequivocally fixed upon it throughout a definite character either as money or as land. For (it has been said) there is not a spark of equity between the next of kin and the heir as to the right of property in such cases; and therefore the general principle adopted is that the heir shall take all the property which has attached to it the quality of real estate, if there is not some other definite and specific purpose to which it is entirely devoted.²

1214 *a*. What circumstances do or do not amount to proof of an absolute intention to convert real property into personal or personal into real property is sometimes a question of nice consideration and intrinsic difficulty. Thus where a testatrix devised a real estate and afterwards sold it, and the purchase was not completed until after her death, the question arose to whom the purchase-money belonged, whether to her personal representatives or to the devisee; and it was held that it belonged to the former, notwithstanding the Statute of 1 Vict. ch. 23, § 23, respecting wills.³ So where A contracted to sell a real estate,

¹ *Bourne v. Bourne*, 2 Hare, R. 35, 38.

² *Chitty v. Parker*, 2 Ves. jr. 271; *Cruse v. Barley*, 3 P. Will. 20, and Mr. Cox's note (1); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 8, § 2, note (a); ante, §§ 790 to 794.

³ *Fanar v. Earl of Winterton*, 5 Beav. R. 1, 8. In this case Lord Langdale said: 'The question whether the devisees can have any interest in that part of the purchase-money which was unpaid depends on the rights and interests of the testatrix at the time of her death. She had contracted to sell her beneficial interest. In equity she had alienated the land, and instead of her beneficial interest in the land she had acquired a title to the purchase-money. What was really hers in right and equity was not the land but the money, of which alone she had a right to dispose; and though she had a lien upon the land and might have refused to convey till the money was paid, yet that lien was a mere security, in or to which she had no right or interest except for the purpose of enabling her to obtain the payment of the money. The beneficial interest in the land which she had devised was not at her disposition, but was

and the contract was valid at the time of his death, but the purchaser by his laches lost his right of a specific performance, it was held that the real estate belonged to the next of kin as personal estate, and not to the heir at law.¹ (a)

by her act wholly vested in another at the time of her death; and the case is clearly distinguishable from cases in which testators, notwithstanding conveyances made after the dates of their wills, have retained estates or interests in the property which remain subject to their disposition.'

¹ *Curre v. Bowyer*, 5 Beav. R. 6, note; *Moor v. Rainsbeck*, 12 Simon, 139.

(a) But it was held in *Nelson v. Hagerstown Bank*, 27 Md. 51, that where land was sold under decree during the lifetime of the owner, and the sale was not confirmed till after his death, there was no conversion. So where, for convenience of selling, a deed was made by several owners to one person, the deed providing for the distribution of proceeds among the grantors. *Lynn v. Gephart*, 27 Md. 547.

That a devisee is an alien and cannot take real estate is not sufficient ground for inferring an intention that he should take as personalty. *Sharp v. St. Sauveur*, L. R. 7 Ch. 343.

The exercise of the right of conversion may be delegated e. g. to the donee of a power or to trustees, as well as exercised by the owner of the estate. *Webb v. Sadler*, L. R. 14 Eq. 533; s. c. 8 Ch. 419; *In re Ibbitson*, L. R. 7 Eq. 226; *Atwell v. Atwell*, L. R. 13 Eq. 23. In the first of these cases a marriage settlement contained a power of appointment among the children of the marriage. In default of appointment the estates were limited to the use of such children, shares to vest at twenty-one or marriage. A power of sale was given, with provisions for reinvesting the proceeds in real estate, but not an absolute trust for sale. A son attained twenty-one and died. The donee of the power afterwards appointed two fourths of the fund to living children, without appointing the rest, and declared that in case of sale the parties interested in

the fund should take as personal estate; he afterwards sold under the power. The court held that the real estate was converted, at least in regard to the two fourths which had been appointed.

But where proceeds of the sale of land had been invested by trustees in government stocks, and had so remained for fifty years, and the interests under the will had vested, it was held that the trustees had no power to convert the property into real estate. *Rich v. Whitfield*, L. R. 2 Eq. 583.

The grant of a mere power of sale however does not work a conversion unless it is imperative. *Edward's Appeal*, 47 Penn. St. 144; *Anewalt's Appeal*, 42 Penn. St. 414. But it seems that if it clearly appear to have been the testator's intention that land should be sold, there will be a conversion though the trustee, donee, or executor be not absolutely directed to sell; for the owner may of course exercise the right of conversion himself. *Dodge v. Pond*, 23 N. Y. 69.

As to the power of a guardian to convert see *Singleton v. Love*, 1 Head, 357.

It seems the courts cannot, by any power of their own merely, effect a conversion, further at all events than is actually necessary in the administration of justice. Thus it is that land damages for land taken under the law of eminent domain remain land. *Durando v. Durando*, 23 N. Y. 331. So too it is that the surplus proceeds of the sale of land of a decedent,

1215. In the next place we may enter upon the consideration of that class of implied trusts arising from what are properly called equitable liens, by which we are to understand such liens as exist in equity, and of which Courts of Equity alone take cognizance. A lien (as has been already said)¹ is not, strictly speaking, either a *jus in re* or a *jus ad rem*; that is, it is not a property in the thing itself, nor does it constitute a right of action for the thing. It more properly constitutes a charge upon the thing.

1216. At law a lien is usually deemed to be a right to possess and retain a thing until some charge upon it is paid or removed.²

¹ Ante, § 506; *Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough*, 2 P. Will. 491; *Ex parte Knott*, 11 Ves. 617.

² Ante, § 506; *Ex parte Heywood*, 2 Rose, Cas. 355, 357.

ordered by court for the payment of debts and the like, remain real estate. *Oberle v. Leech*, 3 C. E. Green, 346, 575. And see *Jones v. Edwards*, 8 Jones, 336; *Pence v. Pence*, 11 Ohio St. 290; *Varnum v. Meserve*, 8 Allen, 158. So again where land of a female infant is sold by decree of court, the proceeds will be treated as realty, so far at least as the common-law rights of the husband are concerned. *Woods v. Reeves*, 5 Jones, Eq. 271. But where the testator's widow, who was a life tenant, and the devisees in remainder petitioned for a sale of real estate, which was decreed accordingly, it was held that the proceeds retained the character of real estate as regarded the widow, but that as regarded the devisees there was a conversion. *Large's Appeal*, 54 Penn. St. 383.

Of course conversion through the courts may be effected by operation of statute; but even then, it seems, only in so far as the statute reasonably interpreted requires, having regard to the interests of all parties to be affected. See in regard to the first part of the proposition *Arnold v. Dixon*, L. R. 19 Eq. 113; *Steed v. Preece*, L. R. 18 Eq. 192; *Wallace v. Greenwood*, 16 Ch. D. 32; *Mordaunt v. Benwell*, 19 Ch. D. 302. In regard to the

qualifying part, *Foster v. Foster*, 1 Ch. D. 588; *Mildway v. Quicke*, 6 Ch. D. 553.

Concerning the time when the conversion is deemed to take place, where that is not expressly fixed by the instrument which authorizes or which effects the conversion, it is held that where a will simply requires real estate to be converted into money, it is to be treated as converted from the time of the testator's death. *Wurt v. Page*, 4 C. E. Green, 365. See also *Ex parte McBee*, 63 N. Car. 332; *Green v. Johnson*, 4 Bush, 164; *Hocker v. Gentry*, 3 Met. (Ky.) 463; *Rawlings v. Landes*, 2 Bush, 158; *Smithers v. Hooper*, 23 Md. 273; *Scudder v. Vanarsdale*, 2 Beasl. 109; *Ross v. Drake*, 37 Penn. St. 373; *High v. Worley*, 33 Ala. 196. So of the converse case of the conversion of personalty. *Taylor v. Johnson*, 63 N. Car. 381. And where an act of Parliament provided for the extinction of rights of holders of certain navigation shares which were realty, upon their transfer to a certain railway company, which was to pay for the same in shares of its own stock, it was held that the shares were converted from the time of the passage of the act. *Cadman v. Cadman*, L. R. 13 Eq. 470.

There are few liens which at law exist in relation to real estate. The most striking of this sort undoubtedly is the lien of a judgment creditor upon the lands of his debtor. But this is not a specific lien on any particular land; it is a general lien over all the real estate of the debtor, to be enforced by an *elegit* or other legal process upon such part of the real estate of the debtor as the creditor may elect.¹ The lien itself is treated as a consequence of the right to take out an *elegit*; and it is applied not only to present real estate in possession, but also to reversionary interests in real estate.² In respect to personal property a lien is generally (perhaps in all cases with the exception only of certain maritime liens, such as seaman's wages and bottomry bonds) recognized at law to exist only when it is connected with the possession or the right to possess the thing itself. Where the possession is once voluntarily parted with, the lien is ordinarily at law gone.³ Thus for example the lien on goods for freight,

¹ *Averell v. Wade*, 1 Lloyd & Goold's Rep. 252.

² *U. S. v. Morrison*, 4 Peters, R. 124; *Harris v. Pugh*, 4 Bing. R. 335; *Burton v. Smith*, 13 Peters, R. 464; *Gilbert on Executions*, 38, 39; 2 *Tidd, Practice* (9th edit.), 1034.

³ *Heywood v. Waring*, 4 Camp. R. 291; *Story on Bailm.* § 440; *Hollis v. Claridge*, 4 Taunt. R. 807; *Chase v. Westmore*, 5 M. & Selw. 180; *Hanson v. Meyer*, 6 East, R. 614; *Hartly v. Hitchcock*, 1 Starkie, R. 408. Lord Ellenborough, in *Heywood v. Waring*, 4 Campb. R. 295, said: 'Without possession there can be no lien. A lien is a right to hold. And how can that be held which was never possessed?' Even at the common law there may be a right approaching to a lien without possession of personal property. This has been recently held in the case of *Dodsley v. Varley*, 12 Adolph. & Ellis, R. 632, where Lord Denman, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'The facts were that the wool was bought while at the plaintiff's; the price was agreed on, but it would have to be weighed; it was then removed to the warehouse of a third person, where Bamford collected the wools which he purchased for defendant from various persons, and to which place the defendant sent sheeting for the packing up of such wools. There it was weighed, together with the other wools, and packed, but it was not paid for. It was the usual course for the wool to remain at this place until paid for. No wish was expressed to take the opinion of the jury on the fact of agency, the defendant's counsel acquiescing in that of the judge, provided the circumstances would amount to it in point of law. We agree that they might; therefore all these must be taken to be the acts of the defendant. Then, he has removed the plaintiff's wool to a place of deposit for his own wools; he has weighed it with his other purchases of wools; he has packed it in his own sheeting; everything is complete but the payment of the price. It was argued that because by the course of dealing he was not to remove the wool to a distance before payment of the price, the property had not passed to him, or that the plaintiff retained such a lien on it as

the lien for the repairs of domestic ships, and the lien on goods for a balance of accounts, are all extinguished by a voluntary surrender of the thing to which they are attached.¹ Liens at law generally arise either by the express agreement of the parties, or by the usage of trade which amounts to an implied agreement, or by mere operation of law.²

1216 *a*. In enforcing liens at law Courts of Equity are in general governed by the same rules of decision as Courts of Law, with reference to the nature, operation, and extent of such liens.³ But in some special cases Courts of Equity will give aid to the enforcement and satisfaction of liens in a manner utterly unknown at law. Thus for example at law a creditor is only entitled to have a moiety of the lands of the judgment debtor extended upon an *elegit*, and must wait until he can be reimbursed for the amount of his judgment out of the rents and profits. But where the payment of the judgment cannot be attained at all by a mere application of the rents and profits (as if the interest upon the judgment exceeds the annual rents and profits), or where the payment cannot be obtained out of the rents and profits within a reasonable time, Courts of Equity will accelerate the payment by decreeing a sale of the moiety of the lands; for it would be gross injustice to the judgment creditor to compel him to wait for satisfaction of his debt out of the assets of his debtor for an unreasonable length of time, when he had a clear lien on the property

was inconsistent with the notion of an actual delivery. We think that upon this evidence the place to which the wools were removed must be considered as the *defendant's* warehouse, and that he was in actual possession of it there as soon as it was weighed and packed; that it was thenceforward at his risk, and if burnt must have been paid for by him. Consistently with this however the plaintiff had not what is commonly called a lien determinable on the loss of possession, but a special interest, sometimes, but improperly, called a lien, growing out of his original ownership, independent of the actual possession, and consistent with the property being in the defendant. This he retained in respect of the term agreed on that the goods should not be removed to their ultimate place of destination before payment. But this lien is consistent, as we have stated, with the possession having passed to the buyer, so that there may have been a delivery to and actual receipt by him.'

¹ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 3, § 10; *Id.* Pt. 3, ch. 1, § 7, p. 171; *Ex parte Deeze*, 1 Atk. 228; *Ex parte Shank*, 1 Atk. 234; *Franklin v. Hosier*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 341; *Ex parte Bland*, 2 Rose, Cas. 91.

² Post, §§ 1240, 1241.

³ *Gladstone v. Birley*, 2 Meriv. R. 403; *Oxenham v. Esdaile*, 2 Younge & Jer. 500; *Leeds v. Marine Insurance Company*, 6 Wheat. R. 565.

for the full amount.¹ For the same reason Courts of Equity will accelerate payment by directing a sale where the real estate, bound by the judgment, is a mere dry reversion; for in such a case there must, or at least there may unavoidably, be a long delay before the party can be paid out of the rents and profits.²

1216 *b*. Courts of Equity will also enforce the security of a judgment creditor against the equitable interest in the freehold estate of his debtor, treating the judgment as in the nature of a lien upon such equitable interest. But in all cases of this sort the judgment creditor must have pursued the same steps as he would have been obliged to do to perfect his lien if the estate had been legal. (*a*) Thus for example it is necessary for the judgment creditor to sue out an *elegit* at law before his lien will be treated as complete. If therefore he seeks relief in equity against the equitable freehold estate of his debtor, it is equally indispensable for him first to sue out an *elegit*; for until that time he has not made a final election. And not only must the suing out of an *elegit* be proved, but it must also be averred in the bill, otherwise the latter will be demurrable.³

¹ *Stileman v. Ashdown*, Ambler, R. 13; s. c. 2 Atk. 477, 608; *Burton v. Smith*, 13 Peters, R. 464; 2 Tidd, Pract. (9th edit.) 935; *O'Gorman v. Coynyn*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 137, 150; *Tennent's Heirs v. Patton*, 6 Leigh, R. 196.

² *Ibid.*; *Countts v. Walker*, 2 Leigh, R. 268; *Burton v. Smith*, 13 Peters, R. 464; see also *Robinson v. Tonge*, 3 P. Will. 398, 401; *Tyndale v. Warre*, Jacob, R. 212; ante, 1064 *a*.

³ *Neate v. Duke of Marlborough*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 407, 415. On this occasion Lord Cottenham said: 'In the first place I find Lord Redesdale not only laying it down that it is necessary that the judgment creditor, suing in this court, should have issued an *elegit*, but expressly saying that if that is not done it is a ground of demurrer. And there was great force in the argument at the bar, that though his Lordship's attention had been distinctly called to the point, yet when a subsequent edition of his Treatise on Pleading was published, and, as I have always understood, under his superintendence, the same passage was preserved. I also find Lord Lyndhurst stating it as a general rule, though that was not the point on which the decision of the appeal before him was to turn, that an *elegit* is necessary. For myself, I never entertained the least doubt of it; and certainly, though I have not had particular occasion to look into the question, if I had been asked what the rule of the court was, I should at once have answered that when a party comes here as a judgment creditor, for the purpose of having the benefit of his judgment, he must have sued out execution upon the judgment. And in all the author-

(*a*) *Carver v. Peck*, 131 Mass. 291; *Reubens v. Joel*, 3 Kern. 488, 490, *Smith v. Hurst*, 10 Hare, 30; *McDermutt v. Strong*, 4 Johns. Ch. 687; 514.

1216 *c.* It is upon the same ground that where there is a special debt binding the heirs, and the debtor dies, whereby a

ities referred to, though in some of them the distinction appears to be so far taken that in the case of a *fieri facias* the creditor must go the whole length of having a return, there is no case, except the solitary one in Dickens, which decides that the suing out of the *elegit* is not necessary as a preliminary step. With respect to authority therefore there can be no doubt; for there is not only the authority of Lord Redesdale and that of Lord Lyndhurst in the House of Lords, but there is also what is stated at the bar to be the uniform understanding and practice of the profession. The conclusion at which I arrive however as to what on principle ought to be the rule, is derived from a consideration of the nature of the jurisdiction which the court exercises in such cases. That jurisdiction is not for the purpose of giving effect to the lien, which is supposed to be created by the judgment. It is true that for certain purposes the court recognizes a title by the judgment; as for the purpose of redeeming, or, after the death of the debtor, of having his assets administered. But the jurisdiction there is grounded simply upon this, that inasmuch as the court finds the creditor in a condition to acquire a power over the estate by suing out the writ, it does what it does in all similar cases; it gives to the party the right to come in and redeem other incumbrancers upon the property. So again after the debtor is dead, if, under any circumstances, the estate is to be sold, the court pays off the judgment creditor, because it cannot otherwise make a title to the estate; and the court never sells the interest of a debtor subject to an *elegit* creditor. That was very much discussed in the case of *Tunstall v. Trappes*. But there was there a necessity for a sale; and the question was not as to the right of the judgment creditor against his debtor, he being willing, but where, from other circumstances, a sale having become indispensable, it was necessary to clear the estate from the claims of parties who had charges upon it. It is therefore not correct to say that, according to the usual acceptation of the term, the creditor obtains a lien by virtue of his judgment. If he had an equitable lien, he would have a right to come here to have the estate sold; but he has no such right. What gives a judgment creditor a right against the estate is only the act of Parliament; for, independently of that, he has none. The act of Parliament gives him, if he pleases, an option by the writ of *elegit*, — the very name implying that it is an option, — which, if he exercises, he is entitled to have a writ directed to the sheriff, to put him in possession of a moiety of the lands. The effect of the proceeding under the writ is, to give to the creditor a legal title, which, if no impediment prevent him, he may enforce at law by ejectment. If there be a legal impediment, he then comes into this court, not to obtain a greater benefit than the law, that is, the act of Parliament, has given him, but to have the same benefit, by the process of this court, which he would have had at law if no legal impediment had intervened. How then can there be a better right; or how can the judgment, which, per se, gives the creditor no title against the land, be considered as giving him a title here? Suppose he never sues out the writ, and never therefore exercises his option, is this court to give him the benefit of a lien to which he has never chosen to assert his right? The reasoning would seem very strong that, as this court is lending its aid to the legal right (and Lord Redesdale expressly puts it under that head, namely, the right to recover in ejectment), the party must have previously armed him-

lien attaches upon all the lands descended in the hands of his heirs, Courts of Equity will interfere in aid of the creditor, and in proper cases accelerate the payment of the debt. At law the creditor can only take out execution against the whole lands, and hold them as he would under an *elegit* until the debt is fully paid.¹ But in equity the creditor will also be entitled to an account of the rents and profits received by the heir since the descent cast. And Courts of Equity will go further, and decree a sale of the inheritance in order to accelerate the payment of the debt, if it cannot otherwise be satisfied within a reasonable period.² The same doctrine is applied to reversions after an estate for life, and even after an estate tail; for they will be decreed to be sold to satisfy a bond debt of the ancestor which binds the heir, in order to accelerate the payment of the debt.³ And indeed Courts of Equity have in the case of advowsons gone further, and have decreed an advowson in gross to be sold to satisfy a bond creditor, holding such an advowson to be assets at law, even if not extendible on an *elegit*.⁴

1217. But there are liens recognized in equity whose existence is not known or obligation enforced at law, and in respect to which Courts of Equity exercise a very large and salutary jurisdiction.⁵ In regard to these liens it may be generally stated that self with that which constitutes his legal right; and that which constitutes the legal right is the writ. This court in fact is doing neither more nor less than giving him what the act of Parliament and an ejectionment would, under other circumstances, have given him at law.'

¹ Bac. Abridg. Heir & Ancestor, H. 1; 2 Tidd. Pract. (9th edit.) pp. 936 to 938.

² *Curtis v. Curtis*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 633, 634; *Tyndale v. Warre*, Jacob, R. 212; ante, § 628, note, pp. 583, 584; see ante, § 1064 a.

³ *Tyndale v. Warre*, Jacob, R. 212.

⁴ *Robinson v. Tonge*, 3 P. Will. 308, 401; *Kinaston v. Clark*, 2 Atk. 204, 206. There have been doubts whether an advowson in gross was assets at law; but the weight of authority certainly is, that it is. See Lord Hardwicke's opinion in *Westfaling v. Westfaling*, 3 Atk. 464, 465; Co. Litt. 374 b, Com. Dig. Assets, 2 G. 1; *Robinson v. Tonge*, 3 P. Will. 401; s. c. 3 Bro. Parl. Cas. 556. Sir Thomas Plumer however in *Tyndale v. Warre* (Jacob, R. 221), held that an advowson in gross was not assets at law; but still, if not, it was assets in equity. His words were: 'It would seem therefore that the circumstance of its not being applicable to the payment of debts by a court of law does not decide what is to be done here; as in the case of an advowson, which yields no present profit, and is not assets at law, and yet is decreed to be sold in equity.'

⁵ *Gladstone v. Birley*, 2 Meriv. R. 403. See *Leeds v. Mer. Insurance Co.*, 6 Wheat. R. 565.

they arise from constructive trusts. They are therefore wholly independent of the possession of the thing to which they are attached as a charge or incumbrance, and they can be enforced only in Courts of Equity.¹ The usual course of enforcing a lien in equity, if not discharged, is by a sale of the property to which it is attached.² Of this we have a strong illustration in the well-known doctrine of Courts of Equity, that the vendor of land has a lien on the land for the amount of the purchase-money, (*a*) not only against the vendee himself, and his heirs and other privies in estate, but also against all subsequent purchasers having notice that the purchase-money remains unpaid.³ To the extent of the

¹ See ante, §§ 1047, 1058 to 1065.

² *Neate v. Duke of Marlborough*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 407, 415; ante, § 1216 *b*, note 1.

³ Ante, §§ 788, 789, 1216, note; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 151 to 154 (3d edit.); *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 W. Bl. 150; s. c. 1 Eden, R. 210; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 329, 337, 339, 342 to 350; *Garson v. Green*, 1 John. Ch. R. 308; *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 132; *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. R. 402, 403; *Bayley v. Greenleaf*, 7 Wheat. R. 46; *Daniels v. Davison*, 16 Ves. 249; s. c. 17 Ves. 433; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 3, note (*c*); 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 105, 106; *McLearn v. McLellan*, 10 Peters, 625, 640. Sir Thomas Clarke (the Master of the Rolls), in *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 W. Black. R. 150; s. c. 1 Eden, R. 211, said: 'Where a conveyance is made prematurely, before money paid, the money is considered as a lien on that estate in the hands of the vendee. So where money was [is] paid prematurely, the money would be considered as a lien on the estate of the vendor for the personal representatives of the purchaser, which would leave things in statu quo. Mr. Sugden seems to have doubted whether this lien exists in favor of the vendee, who has paid the purchase-money. For alluding, as it should seem, to such a case, he says: "Where a lien is raised for purchase-money under the usual equity in favor of a vendor, it is for a debt really due to him, and equity merely provides a security for it. But in the case under consideration equity must not simply give a security for an existing debt, it must first raise a debt against the

(*a*) In New England such lien can exist only by virtue of written agreement. *Ahrend v. Odiorne*, 118 Mass. 261; *Arlin v. Brown*, 44 N. H. 102; *Perry v. Grant*, 10 R. I. 334; *Atwood v. Vincent*, 17 Conn. 575. The lien, it is commonly held, is not an equitable estate in the land; it has no existence, it is said, until established by decree of court, and then is subject to other equities. *Hightower v. Rigsby*, 56 Ala. 126; *Gilman v. Brown*, 1 Mason, 191; *Wooten v. Bellinger*, 17 Fla. 289. In this view the lien is only a

trust; and this appears to be the view of the author. Some courts however consider it as in the nature of an equitable mortgage, qualifying the purchaser's ownership; while still other courts deny that it is either. *Wooten v. Bellinger*, supra.

Equity cannot make a decree in personam for a deficiency on a bill to enforce a vendor's lien or to foreclose a mortgage. *Cobb v. Duke*, 36 Miss. 60; *Canal Bank v. Hudson*, 111 U. S. 66, 76.

lien the vendee becomes a trustee for the vendor; and his heirs and all other persons claiming under them with such notice are treated as in the same predicament.¹ (a)

1218. This lien of the vendor of real estate for the purchase-money is wholly independent of any possession on his part; and it attaches to the estate as a trust equally, whether it be actually conveyed or only be contracted to be conveyed.² It has often

express agreement of the parties. The purchase-money was a debt due to the vendor, which, upon principle, it would be difficult to make him repay. What power has a Court of Equity to rescind a contract like this? The question might perhaps arise if the vendor was seeking relief in equity; but in this case he must be a defendant. If it should be admitted that the money cannot be recovered, then of course he must retain the estate also until some person appears who is by law entitled to require a conveyance of it." Sugden on Vendors, ch. 5, p. 258 (7th edit.); Id. vol. 1, p. 284 (9th edit.). Lord Eldon cited the same position of Sir Thomas Clarke, in his very words, without objection or observation, in *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 345. And afterwards, in the same case (p. 353), he used language importing an approval of it. "This," said he, "comes very near the doctrine of Sir Thomas Clarke, which is very sensible, that where the conveyance or the payment has been made by surprise (meaning, it is supposed, 'prematurely,' in the sense of Sir T. Clarke), there shall be a lien." The ground asserted by Mr. Sugden for his doubt does not seem sufficient to sustain it. He assumes that there is no debt between the parties, which is the very matter in controversy; for in the view of a Court of Equity the payment of the purchase-money may well be deemed a loan upon the security of the land until it has been conveyed to the vendee. At least there is quite as much reason to presume it as there is to presume the land, when conveyed, to be still a security for the purchase-money due to the vendor. In the latter case, though there is a debt due by the vendee, it does not follow that it is a debt due by the land. In the former, if the estate cannot be conveyed and is not conveyed, the money is really a debt due to the vendee. At all events in equity it is not very clear what principle is impugned by deeming the money a lien upon the ground of presumed intention. See also *Oxenham v. Esdaile*, 3 Y. & Jerv. 264; *Ludlow v. Grayall*, 11 Price, R. 58. In *Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea*, 1 P. Will. 278, 282, Lord Chancellor Cowper said: "Articles made for a valuable consideration and the money paid, will, in equity, bind the estate and prevail against any judgment creditor mesne between the articles and the conveyance."

¹ 4 Kent. Comm. Lect. 58, p. 152 (3d edit.); *McLearn v. McLellan*, 10 Peters, R. 625, 640.

² Sugden on Vendors, ch. 12, p. 541 (7th edit.); *Smith v. Hubbard*, 2 Dick. R. 730; *McLearn v. McLellan*, 10 Peters, R. 625, 640; *Dodsley v. Varley*, 12 Adolph. & Ellis, 632, 633; ante, § 1216, and note.

(a) The lien may, it seems, be enforced against a married woman who purchases land. *Carpenter v. Mitchell*, 54 Ill. 126; *Gordon v. Manning*, 44 Miss. 756. Though the husband gives his notes for the purchase-money. *Davis v. Pearson*, 44 Miss. 508.

been objected that the creation of such a trust by Courts of Equity is in contravention of the policy of the Statute of Frauds.¹ But whatever may be the original force of such an objection, the doctrine is now too firmly established to be shaken by any mere theoretical doubts.² Courts of Equity have proceeded upon the ground that the trust, being raised by implication, is not within the purview of that statute, but is excepted from it. It is not perhaps so strong a case as that of a mortgage implied by a deposit of the title-deeds of real estate, which seems directly against the policy of the statute, but which nevertheless has been unhesitatingly sustained.³

1219. The principle upon which Courts of Equity have proceeded in establishing this lien in the nature of a trust is, that a person who has gotten the estate of another ought not in conscience as between them to be allowed to keep it and not to pay the full consideration money. A third person having full knowledge that the estate has been so obtained ought not to be permitted to keep it without making such payment, for it attaches to him also as a matter of conscience and duty. It would otherwise happen that the vendee might put another person into a predicament better than his own, with full notice of all the facts.⁴

1220. It has been sometimes suggested that the origin of this lien of the vendor might be attributed to the tacit consent or implied agreement of the parties. But although in some cases it may be perfectly reasonable to presume such a consent or agreement, the lien is not, strictly speaking, attributable to it, but stands independently of any such supposed agreement.⁵ (a) On other occasions the lien has been treated as a natural equity having its foundation in the earliest principles of Courts of Equity.⁶ Thus it has been broadly contended that according to the law of all nations the absolute dominion over property sold

¹ Stat. 29 Charles II. 3.

² Coote on Mortg. 227; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 339.

³ Ante, § 1020; post, § 1230.

⁴ See *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. R. 340, 347, 349.

⁵ *Nairn v. Prowse*, 6 Ves. 752; *Chapman v. Tanner*, 1 Vern. R. 267.

⁶ *Chapman v. Tanner*, 1 Vern. R. 267, 268; *Blackburne v. Gregson*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 424; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 5, § 8.

(a) *Simpson v. McAllister*, 56 Ala. Nichols v. Glover, 41 Ind. 24; *Cordova* 228; *Roper v. Day*, 48 Ala. 509; *v. Hood*, 17 Wall. 1.

is not acquired by the purchaser until he has paid the price or has otherwise satisfied it, unless the vendor has agreed to trust to the personal credit of the buyer.¹ For a thing may well be deemed to be unconscientiously obtained, when the consideration is not paid.² Upon this ground the Roman law declared the lien to be founded in natural justice. 'Tamen recte dicitur, et jure gentium, id est, jure naturali, id effici.'³ And therefore when Courts of Equity established the lien as a matter of doctrine, it had the effect of a contract, and the lien was held to prevail although perhaps no actual contract had taken place.⁴

1221. The true origin of the doctrine may with high probability be ascribed to the Roman law, from which it was imported into the Equity Jurisprudence of England.⁵ By the Roman law the vendor of property sold had a privilege or right of priority of payment in the nature of a lien on the property for the price for which it was sold, not only against the vendee and his representatives, but against his creditors and also against subsequent purchasers from him. For it was a rule of that law, that although the sale passed the title and dominion in the thing sold, yet it also implied a condition that the vendee should not be master of the thing so sold, unless he had paid the price or had otherwise satisfied the vendor in respect thereof, or a personal credit had been given to him without satisfaction. 'Quod vendidi,' said the Digest, 'non aliter fit accipientis quam si aut pretium nobis solutum sit aut satis eo nomine factum, vel etiam fidem habuerimus emptori sine ulla satisfactione.'⁶ 'Ut res emptoris fiat, nihil interest utrum solutum sit pretium, an eo nomine fidejussor

¹ By Mr. Scott and Mr. Mitford, in argument, in *Blackburne v. Gregson*, 1 Cox, R. 94.

² *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 135. It was formerly doubted, in consequence of an expression which fell from Lord Hardwicke, in *Pollexfen v. Moore*, 3 Atk. R. 273, whether this lien of the vendor could exist in favor of a third person; as for example if the vendor, having such a lien, should exhaust the personal estate of the deceased purchaser, whether legatees should have a right to stand in his place against the real estate in the hands of the heir, as upon the marshalling of the assets. That doubt is now removed, and the affirmative established in *Selby v. Selby*, 4 Russell, R. 336. See also Lord Eldon's remarks in *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 338, 344; and Sir Wm. Grant's decision in *Trimmer v. Bayne*, 9 Ves. 209; and Sugden on Vendors, ch. 12, pp. 549 to 556 (7th edit.); *Id.* vol. 2, pp. 73 to 76 (9th edit.).

³ Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 1, § 41.

⁴ *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 337.

⁵ *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 344.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 19; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 41, tit. 1, n. 60.

datus sit.'¹ The doctrine was still more explicitly laid down in the Institutes. 'Venditiæ vero res, et traditiæ, non aliter emptori acquiruntur, quam si is venditori pretium solverit, vel alio modo ei satisfecerit; veluti expromissore aut pignore dato. Sed si is qui vendidit fidem emptoris sequutus fuerit, dicendum est statim rem emptoris fieri.'² The rule was equally applied to the sale of movable and of immovable property, and equally applied whether there had been a delivery of possession to the vendee or not. If there was no such delivery of possession, then the vendor might retain the property as a pledge until the price was paid. If there was such a delivery of possession, then the vendor might follow the property into the hands of any person to whom it had been subsequently passed, and reclaim it or the price.³ 'Venditor enim, quasi pignus, retinere potest eam rem quam vendidit.'⁴ And a part payment of the price did not exonerate the property from the privilege or lien for the residue. 'Hæreditatis venditiæ pretium pro parte accepit,' said the Digest, quoting Scævola, 'reliquum emptore non solvente, quæsitum est, an corpora hæreditaria pignoris nomine teneantur? Respondi; nihil proponi cur non teneantur.'⁵

1222. This close analogy, if not this absolute identity of the English doctrine of the lien of the vendor with that of the Roman Law of privilege on the same subject, seems to demonstrate a common origin; although in England the lien is ordinarily confined to cases of the sale of immovables, and it does not extend to movables where there has been a transfer of possession.⁶ (a)

¹ Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 53; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 41, tit. 1, n. 60.

² Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 1, § 41.

³ 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 4; Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 1, § 41. The same rule exists in the French law in regard to immovables. But in regard to movables, when delivered to the vendee, there is no sequel (as it is phrased in the French law) by way of privilege or lien against the property, except while it remains in the hands of the purchaser. If he has sold it, the right of privilege or lien for the price is gone. 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 4, and note.

⁴ Id. Dig. Lib. 19, tit. 1, l. 13, § 8; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 41, tit. 1, n. 60, 61; Id. Lib. 19, tit. 1, n. 5.

⁵ 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 4; Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 4, l. 22; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 19, tit. 1, n. 5.

⁶ See *Blackburne v. Gregson*, 1 Cox, R. 100; *arguendo*, *Mackreth v. Sym-*

(a) See *Ex parte Western Assur. Soc.*, L. R. 11 Eq. 164; *Foxworth v. Bullock*, 44 Miss. 457. If a note is given for the price of land and person-

alty, the payee can enforce a lien pro tanto for the price of the land. *Swain v. Cato*, 34 Texas, 395.

There are however some exceptions from the doctrine in each law, founded upon the same general principle, but admitting of some diversity in respect to its practical application.

1223. We have seen that the lien by the Roman law ceased (1) where the price was actually paid; (2) where anything was taken in satisfaction of the price, although payment had not been positively made; (3) where a personal credit was given to the vendee excluding any notion of a lien. 'Aut pretium nobis solutum sit,' said the Digest; 'aut satis eo nomine factum, vel etiam fidem habuerimus emptori sine ulla satisfactione.'¹ Pothier has deduced the conclusion that in the civil law the question whether a personal credit was given to the vendee or not was to be judged of by all the circumstances of the case. Whenever it was doubtful whether such credit was given or not, there it was not to be presumed unless made certain by the vendee.² In every other case either a payment or a satisfaction of the price was necessary to discharge the property. The giving of a pledge or security for the price was deemed equivalent to payment. 'Qualibet ratione, si venditori de pretio satisfactum est, veluti expromissore aut pignore dato, proinde sit ac si pretium solutum esset.'³

1224. Now the same principle is applied in English Jurispru-

mons, 15 Ves. 344. See *Haggerty v. Palmer*, 6 John. Ch. R. 437; *Cowell v. Simpson*, 16 Ves. 278, 280, 281.

¹ Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 19; Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 1, § 41. Vinnius distinguishes between a payment and a satisfaction. 'Satisfaciendi verbum generalius est quam solvendi. Qui solvit, utique et satisfacit; at non omnis satisfactio solutio est. Satisfacit, et qui non liberatur; veluti, si quis fidejussorem vel pignora det; solutione vero obligatio tollitur.' Vinnius also says that a personal credit given to the vendor without satisfaction is a waiver of the lien. For, commenting on the words of the Institute, 'Sed si is qui vendidit, fidem emptoris sequutus fuerit,' he says: 'Id est, fidem emptori de pretio habuerit sine ulla satisfactione.' What will amount to such personal credit, he adds, depends on circumstances; but an agreement for postponement of payment to a future day would be such a personal credit, and would discharge the lien. 'Quod ex circumstantiis æstimandum; veluti si dies solutioni dicta sit.' And for this he cites the Code. Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 54, l. 3. He then proceeds: 'Aut si, cum emptor pecuniam ad manum non haberet, venditor dixerit; I, licet; nunc non requiro; postea dabis' Vinn. ad Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 1, § 41, Comm. (2).

² Pothier, Pand. Lib. 41, tit. 1, note 60. In this position Vinnius agrees with Pothier, contrary to what is held by some other jurists. 'In dubio qui rem emptori tradit, non videtur sequi fidem emptoris, nisi emptor contrarium doceat.' Vinn. ad Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 1, § 41, Comm. (3).

³ Dig. Lib. 18, tit. 1, l. 53; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 41, tit. 1, n. 60; Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 1, § 41.

dence. Generally speaking, the lien of the vendor exists; and the burden of proof is on the purchaser to establish that in the particular case it has been intentionally displaced or waived by the consent of the parties.¹ (a) If under all the circumstances it remains in doubt, then the lien attaches. The difficulty lies in determining what circumstances are to be deemed sufficient to repel or displace the lien, or to amount to a waiver of it. And upon the authorities this is left in such a state of embarrassment that a learned judge has not hesitated to say that it would have been better at once to have held that the lien should exist in no case, and that the vendor should suffer the consequences of his want of caution; or to have laid down the rule the other way so distinctly that a purchaser might be able to know without the judgment of a court in what cases it would and in what it would not exist.² At present that certainty cannot be generally affirmed.

1225. In the first place it seems that if upon the face of the conveyance the consideration is expressed to be paid, and even if a receipt therefor is indorsed upon the back of it, and yet in point of fact the purchase-money has not been paid, the lien is not gone, but it attaches against the vendee and all persons claiming as volunteers or with notice under him.³ (b)

1226. In the next place the taking of a security for the payment of the purchase-money is not of itself, as it was in the Roman law, a positive waiver or extinguishment of the lien.⁴ It

¹ *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 342, 344, 348, 349; *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 135, 136; *Nairn v. Prowse*, 6 Ves. 752; *Garson v. Green*, 1 John. Ch. R. 308, 309; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 12, pp. 541 to 560 (7th edit.); *Id.* vol. 2, ch. 12, pp. 57 to 76 (9th edit.).

² *Lord Eldon*, in *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 340.

³ *Ibid.* 15 Ves. 337, 339, 340, 350; *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 135, 136; *Winter v. Anson*, 3 Russ. 488; s. c. 1 Sim. & Stu. 434; *Saunders v. Leslie*, 2 B. & Beatt. 514, 515; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 12, pp. 541 to 557 (7th edit.); *Id.* vol. 2, ch. 12, pp. 57 to 76 (9th edit.). *Lord Redesdale*, in *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 135, said, 'If a person claiming as a purchaser admitted that the consideration was not paid, this would be taken prima facie as a fraud, and it would lie on him to show that it was not a fraud.'

⁴ *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 342, 344, 347 to 349; *Nairn v. Prowse*,

(a) *Moore v. Worthy*, 56 Ala. 163; *Moore v. Worthy*, 56 Ala. 163; *Simpson v. McAllister*, *Ib.* 228.

(b) *Manly v. Slason*, 21 Vt. 271; *v. Marlowe*, 51 Ala. 478.

is perhaps to be regretted that it has not been so held; as when a rule so plain is once communicated, if the vendor should not take an adequate security he would lose his lien by his own fault.¹ But the taking of a security has been deemed at most as no more than a presumption, under some circumstances, of an intentional waiver of the lien, and not as conclusive of the waiver.² And if a security is taken for the money, the burden of the proof has been adjudged to lie on the vendee to show that the vendor agreed to rest on that security and to discharge the land.³ Nay even the taking of a distinct and independent security, as for instance of a mortgage on another estate, or of a pledge of other property, has been deemed not to be conclusive evidence that the lien is waived.⁴ The taking of bills of exchange drawn on and

6 Ves. 759, 760; *Garson v. Green*, 1 John. Ch. R. 308; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 152, 153 (3d edit.). This subject was very fully examined by Lord Eldon in his elaborate judgment in *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 330, 336, 342. In one part of that judgment he used the following language: 'If I had found it laid down in distinct and inflexible terms that where the vendor of an estate takes a security for the consideration, he has no lien that would be satisfactory; as when a rule so plain is once communicated, the vendor, not taking an adequate security, loses the lien by his own fault. If on the other hand a rule has prevailed, as it seems to me, that it is to depend not upon the circumstance of taking a security, but upon the nature of the security, as amounting to evidence (as it is sometimes called), or to declaration plain, or manifest intention (the expressions used upon other occasions), of a purpose to rely not any longer upon the estate, but upon the personal credit of the individual, it is obvious that a vendor taking a security, unless by evidence, manifest intention, or declaration plain he shows his purpose, cannot know the situation in which he stands, without the judgment of a court how far that security does contain the evidence, manifest intention, or declaration plain upon that point. That observation is justified by a review of the authorities, from which it is clear that different judges would have determined the case differently. And if some of the cases that have been determined had come before me, I should not have been satisfied that the conclusion was right.' It is greatly to be regretted that the English Jurisprudence, instead of dealing in nice distinctions, had not followed out the plain and convenient rule of the civil law, that the taking of any security or giving any credit was an extinguishment of the lien.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 135, 136; *Saunders v. Leslie*, 2 B. & Beatt. R. 514, 515.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Saunders v. Leslie*, 1 Ball & Beatt. R. 514, 515. In *Nairn v. Prowse*, 6 Ves. 752, where the question was, whether the taking of a special security, by way of pledge, was a waiver of the lien, Sir William Grant (Master of the Rolls) held that it was. Upon that occasion he said, 'Upon the question as to the claim set up by Mitchell to a lien, it is now settled that equity gives the vendor a lien for the price of the estate sold, without any

accepted by a third person, or by the purchaser and a third person, has also been deemed not to be a waiver of the lien, but to be

special agreement. But supposing he does not trust to that, but carves out a security for himself, it still remains matter of doubt, and has not received any positive decision, whether that does or does not amount to a waiver of the equitable lien, so as to preclude the vendor from resorting back to that lien, the security proving insufficient. Without entering into that question, whether every security necessarily amounts to a waiver, it is impossible to contend that there may not be a security that will have that effect, that will be a waiver. By conveying the estate without obtaining payment a degree of credit is necessarily given to the vendee. That credit may be given upon the confidence of the existence of such a lien. The knowledge of that may be the motive for permitting the estate to pass without payment. Then it may be argued that taking a note or a bond cannot materially vary the case. A credit is still given to him, and may be given from the same motive; not to supersede the lien, but for the purpose of ascertaining the debt and countervailing the receipt indorsed upon the conveyance. But if the conveyance be totally distinct and independent, will it not then become a case of substitution for the lien, instead of a credit given because of the lien? Suppose a mortgage was made upon another estate of the vendee, will equity at the same time give him what is in effect a mortgage upon the estate he sold; the obvious intention of burdening one estate being that the other shall remain free and unincumbered? Though in that case the vendor would be a creditor if the mortgage proved deficient, yet he would not be a creditor by lien upon the estate he had conveyed away. The same rule must hold with regard to any other pledge for the purchase-money. In this case the vendor trusts to no personal security of the vendee, but gets possession of a long annuity of £100 a year; which, according to the rise or fall of stock, might or might not be sufficient for the purchase-money. He has therefore an absolute security in his hands, not the personal security of the vendee. Could the vendee have any motive for parting with his stock but to have the absolute dominion over the land? It is impossible it could be intended that he should have this double security, — an equitable mortgage and a pledge; which latter, if the stock should rise a little, would be amply sufficient to answer the purchase-money.' Lord Eldon, in *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 348, in commenting on this case, said: 'The Master of the Rolls, in his judgment, admitting the general doctrine as to the vendor's lien, observes upon the question whether a security taken will be a waiver, that by conveying the estate without payment a degree of credit is given to the vendee which may be given upon the confidence of the existence of such lien. And it may be argued that taking a note or a bond cannot materially vary the case; a credit is still given to him, and may be given from the same motive, not to supersede the lien, but for the purpose of ascertaining the debt and countervailing the receipt indorsed upon the conveyance. There is great difficulty to conceive how it should have been reasoned almost in any case that the circumstance of taking a security was evidence that the lien was given up, as in most cases there is a contract under seal for payment of the money. The Master of the Rolls having before observed that there may be a security which will have the effect of a waiver, proceeds to express his opinion that, if the security be totally distinct and independent, it will then become a case of substitution for the lien instead of a credit given on account

merely a mode of payment.¹ (a) And it has been laid down as clear doctrine that in general where a bill, note, or bond is given for the whole or a part of the purchase-money, the vendor does not lose his lien for so much of the purchase-money as remains unpaid, even though it is secured to be paid at a future day, or not until after the death of the purchaser.²

of the lien; meaning that not a security but the nature of the security may amount to satisfactory evidence that a lien was not intended to be reserved. And [he] puts the case of the mortgage of another estate, or any other pledge, as evidence of an intention that the estate sold shall remain free and unincumbered. It must not however be understood that a mortgage taken is to be considered as a conclusive ground for the inference that a lien was not intended; as I could put many instances that a mortgage of another estate for the purchase-money would not be decisive evidence of an intention to give up the lien, although in the ordinary case a man has always greater security for his money upon a mortgage than value for his money upon a purchase. And the question must be, whether, under the circumstances of that particular case, attending to the worth of that very mortgage, the inference arises. In the instance of a pledge of stock does it necessarily follow that the vendor, consulting the convenience of the purchaser by permitting him to have the chance of the benefit, therefore gives up the lien which he has? Under all the circumstances of that case the judgment of the Master of the Rolls was satisfied that the conclusion did follow. But the doctrine as to taking a mortgage or a pledge would be carried too far, if it is understood as applicable to all cases that a man taking one pledge therefore necessarily gives up another; which must, I think, be laid down upon the circumstances of each case, rather than universally.⁷

¹ *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 135, 136; *Gibbons v. Baddall*, 2 Eq. Abr. 682, note; *Grant v. Mills*, 2 Ves. & B. 306; *Cooper v. Spottiswoode*, Tamlyn, R. 21; *Ex parte Peake*, 1 Madd. R. 349; *Ex parte Loring*, 2 Rose, R. 79; *Saunders v. Leslie*, 2 B. & Beatt. 514; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 12, pp. 544 to 549 (7th edit.); *Id.* vol. 2, ch. 12, pp. 57 to 67 (9th edit.).

² *Winter v. Lord Anson*, 3 Russ. R. 488, 490, overruling the Vice-Chancellor's decision; s. c. 1 Sim. & Stu. 434. See *Fawell v. Heelis*, Ambler, R. 724, and Mr. Blunt's note. How far the taking of an independent and dis-

(a) But see as to additional security *Way v. Patty*, 1 Ind. 102; *Sears v. Smith*, 2 Mich. 243; *Vail v. Foster*, 4 Comst. 312; *Follett v. Reese*, 20 Ohio, 546; *Boynton v. Champlin*, 42 Ill. 57; *McClure v. Harris*, 12 B. Mon. 261; *Johnson v. Sugg*, 13 Smedes & M. 346. It is clear that to take the note of the buyer is not a waiver of the lien, and it is difficult to understand how the taking other security can be treated as indicating an intention to forego

the right. *Burrus v. Roulhac*, 2 Bush, 39. But if the taking of collateral security of a third person be considered presumptive evidence of a waiver (*Way v. Patty* and other cases supra), the presumption may readily be overturned either by evidence of express agreement or of facts indicative of intention at the time to retain the lien. *Fonda v. Jones*, 42 Miss. 792; *Manly v. Slason*, 21 Vt. 271; *Sanders v. McAfee*, 41 Ga. 684; *Hallock v.*

1227. The lien of the vendor is not confined to himself alone, but in case of his death it extends to his personal representa-

tion. Security from a third person would affect the lien has not perhaps been absolutely decided in England. *Grant v. Mills*, 2 Ves. & Beam. 306, 309. Indeed the whole doctrine respecting the effect of taking a security is established in England upon grounds not very satisfactory under any circumstances. See *Ex parte Loring*, 2 Rose, Cas. 80. In the case of *Gilman v. Brown*, 1 Mason, R. 212, the whole doctrine was reviewed at large, and a different conclusion was arrived at from that stated in the text. The following extract may not be wholly unacceptable as presenting the reasoning opposed to that maintained in some of the late English authorities: 'The doctrine that a lien exists on the land for the purchase-money, which lies at the foundation of the decision of the commissioners as well as of the present defence, deserves a very deliberate consideration. It can hardly be doubted that this doctrine was borrowed from the text of the civil law; and although it may now be considered as settled as between the vendor and vendee and all claiming under the latter with notice of the non-payment of the purchase money, yet its complete establishment may be referred to a comparatively recent period. Lord Eldon has given us an historical review of all the cases (*Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 329), from which he deduces the following inferences. First, that, generally speaking, there is such a lien. Secondly, that in those general cases in which there would be a lien, as between vendor and vendee, the vendor will have the lien against a third person who had notice that the money was not paid. These two points, he adds, seem to be clearly settled; and the same conclusion has been adopted by a very learned chancellor of our own country.

Smith, 3 Barb. 267; *Ex parte Western Assur. Soc.*, L. R. 11 Eq. 164; *Dureth v. Briggs*, 47 Mo. 356. And where the lien is expressly retained in the deed, the evidence of subsequent waiver must, it seems, be such as would show satisfaction of a mortgage debt. *Hines v. Perkins*, 2 Heisk. 395; *Mitchell v. Butt*, 45 Ga. 162.

It has been held that the taking in part payment a note secured by a lien upon another tract does not waive the lien in question. *Denny v. Steakly*, 2 Heisk. 156; *Shinn v. Fredericks*, 56 Ill. 439. While to take in payment a deed of another tract is held a waiver, though the title to that tract fail. *Willard v. Reas*, 26 Wis. 540. See however *Duke v. Balme*, 16 Minn. 306; *McDole v. Purdy*, 23 Iowa, 277. Taking back a mortgage was in *Young v. Wood*, 11 B. Mon. 123, and in *Pease v. Kelly*, 3 Oreg. 417, considered a waiver. Contra

Wasson v. Davis, 34 Texas, 159. See *Armstrong v. Ross*, 5 C. E. Green, 109. Indeed it seems clear in principle that it is not the mere taking of a security which destroys the lien; there must be something in the facts of the case, or in the nature of the security taken, which is inconsistent with the existence of the lien, and destructive of it. *Angus v. McLachlan*, 23 Ch. D. 330, commenting on *Cowell v. Simpson*, 16 Ves. 275. See also *Manly v. Slason*, 21 Vt. 271; *Bach v. Symes*, T. & R. 87, 92; *Hewison v. Guthrie*, 2 Bing. N. C. 755, 759. Further see *Wood v. Sullens*, 44 Ala. 686; *Gordon v. Manning*, 44 Miss. 756; *Effinger v. Ralston*, 21 Gratt. 430; *McLaurie v. Thomas*, 39 Ill. 291; *Hecht v. Spears*, 27 Ark. 229; *Jones v. Doss*, Ib. 518; *Wilkes v. Smith*, 4 Heisk. 86; *Young v. Atkins*, Ib. 529; *Thorpe v. Dunlap*, Ib. 674; *Harville v. Lowe*, 47 Ga. 214.

tives.¹ It may also be enforced in favor of a third person, notwithstanding the doubts formerly expressed by Lord Hardwicke.²

Garson v. Green, 1 John. Ch. R. 308. The rule however is manifestly founded on a supposed conformity with the intention of the parties upon which the law raises an implied contract; and therefore it is not inflexible, but ceases to act where the circumstances of the case do not justify such a conclusion. What circumstances shall have such an effect seems indeed to be a matter of a good deal of delicacy and difficulty. And the difficulty is by no means lessened by the subtle doubts and distinctions of recent authorities. It seems indeed to be established that *prima facie* the purchase-money is a lien on the land; and it lies on the purchaser to show that the vendor agreed to waive it (*Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 132; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 329; *Garson v. Green*, 1 John. Ch. Rep. 308); and a receipt for the purchase-money, indorsed upon the conveyance, is not sufficient to repel this presumption of law. But how far the taking a distinct security for the purchase-money shall be held to be a waiver of the implied lien has been a vexed question. There is a pretty strong if not decisive current of authority to lead us to the conclusion that merely taking the bond, note, or covenant of the vendee himself for the purchase-money will not repel the lien; for it may be taken to countervail the receipt of the payment usually indorsed on the conveyance. *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 132; *Nairn v. Prowse*, 6 Ves. 752; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 329; *Blackburne v. Gregson*, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 420; *Garson v. Green*, 1 John. Ch. R. 308; *Gibbons v. Baddall*, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 682, note; *Coppin v. Coppin*, 2 P. Will. 291; cases cited in *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 12, p. 541 (7th edit.), &c. But where a distinct and independent security is taken, either of other property or of the responsibility of third persons, it certainly admits of a very different consideration. There the rule may properly apply, that ‘*expressum facit cessare tacitum* ;’ and where the party has carved out his own security the law will not create another in aid. This was manifestly the opinion of Sir William Grant in a recent case, where he asks, “If the security be totally distinct and independent, will it not then become a case of substitution for the lien instead of a credit given because of the lien?” And he then puts the case of a mortgage on another estate for the purchase-money, which he holds to be a discharge of the lien, and asserts that the same rule must hold with regard to any other pledge for the purchase-money. *Nairn v. Prowse*, 6 Ves. 752. And the same doctrine was asserted in a very early case where a mortgage was taken for a part only of the purchase-money, and a note for the residue. *Bond v. Kent*, 2 Vern. 281. Lord Eldon, with his characteristic inclination to doubt, has hesitated upon the extent of this doctrine. He seems to consider that whether the taking of a distinct security will have the effect of waiving the implied lien or not depends altogether upon the circumstances of each case, and that no rule can be laid down universally; and that therefore it is impossible for any purchaser to know, without the judgment of a court, in what cases a lien would and in what cases it would not exist. His language is, “If, on the other hand, a rule has prevailed (as it seems to me) that it is to depend, not upon the circumstance of taking a security, but upon the nature of the security as amounting to evidence (as it is sometimes

¹ Ante, §§ 788 to 791, 1216, 1217.

² *Pollexfen v. Moore*, 3 Atk. 273; ante, § 1220, note.

As for example it may be enforced by marshalling assets in favor of legatees and creditors, and giving them the benefit by the way

called), or to declaration plain, or manifest intention (the expression used on other occasions) of a purpose to rely not any longer upon the estate, but upon the personal credit of the individual, it is obvious that a purchaser taking a security, unless by evidence, manifest intention, or declaration plain he shows his purpose, cannot know the situation in which he stands, without the judgment of a court how far that security does contain the evidence, manifest intention, or declaration plain upon that point." *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 329, 342; *Austin v. Halsey*, 6 Ves. jr. 475. If indeed this be the state of the law upon this subject, it is reduced to a most distressing uncertainty. But on a careful examination of all the authorities I do not find a single case in which it has been held, if the vendor takes a personal collateral security binding others as well as the vendee, as for instance a bond or note with a surety or an indorser, or a collateral security by way of pledge or mortgage, that under such circumstances a lien exists on the land itself. The only case that looks that way is *Elliot v. Edwards*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 181, where, as Lord Eldon says, the point was not decided. And it was certainly a case depending upon its own peculiar circumstances, where the surety himself might seem to have stipulated for the lien by requiring a covenant against an assignment of the premises without the joint consent of himself and the vendor. Lord Redesdale too has thrown out an intimation (*Hnghes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 132) that it must appear that the vendor relied on it as security; and he puts the case: "Suppose bills given as part of the purchase-money, and suppose them drawn on an insolvent house, shall the acceptance of such bills discharge the vendor's lien? They are taken not as a security, but as a mode of payment." In my humble judgment this is begging the whole question. If upon the contract of purchase the money is to be paid in cash, and bills of exchange are afterwards taken in payment which turn out unproductive, there the receipt of the bills may be considered as a mere mode of payment. But if the original contract is that the purchase-money shall be paid at a future day, and acceptances of third persons are to be taken for it, payable at such future day, or a bond with surety payable at such future day, I do not perceive how it is possible to assert that the acceptances or bond are not relied on as security. It is sufficient however that the case was not then before his Lordship, and that he admits that taking a distinct security would be a waiver of the lien. On the other hand there are several cases in which it is laid down that if other security be taken, the implied lien on the land is gone. To this effect certainly the case of *Fawell v. Heelis* (*Ambler*, R. 724; s. c. 2 Dick. R. 485) is an authority however it may on its own circumstances have been shaken. And the doctrine is explicitly asserted and acted upon in *Nairn v. Prowse*, 6 Ves. jr. 752. See also *Bond v. Kent*, 2 Vern. 281. In our own country a very venerable judge of equity has recognized the same doctrine. He says: "The doctrine that the vendor of land not taking a security nor making a conveyance retains a lien upon the property is so well settled as to be received as a maxim. Even if he hath made a conveyance, yet he may pursue the land in the possession of the vendee or of a purchaser with notice. But if he hath taken a security, or the vendee hath sold to a third person without notice, the lien is lost." *Cole v. Scott*, 2 Wash. R. 141. Looking to the principle upon which the original doctrine of lien is established, I have no

of substitution to the vendor when he seeks payment out of the personal assets of the vendee.¹ So if a subsequent incumbrancer

hesitation to declare that taking the security of a third person for the purchase-money ought to be held a complete waiver of any lien upon the land, and that in a case standing upon such a fact it would be very difficult to bring my mind to a different conclusion. At all events it is prima facie evidence of a waiver; and the onus is on the vendor to prove by the most cogent and irresistible circumstances that it ought not to have that effect. Such was the result of my judgment upon an examination of the authorities, when a very recent case before the Master of the Rolls first came to my knowledge. I have perused it with great attention, and it has not in any degree shaken my opinion. The case there was of acceptances of the vendee and of his partner in trade taken for the payment of the purchase-money. It was admitted that there was no case of a security given by a third person in which the lien had been held to exist. But the Master of the Rolls, without deciding what would be the effect of a security, properly so denominated, of a third person, held in conformity to the opinion of Lord Redesdale that bills of exchange were merely a mode of payment, and not a security. This conclusion he drew from the nature of such bills, considering them as mere orders on the acceptor to pay money of the drawer to the payee; and that the acceptor was to be considered, not as a surety for the debt of another, but as paying the debt out of the debtor's funds in his hands. *Grant v. Mills*, 2 Ves. & Beam. R. 309. With this conclusion of the Master of the Rolls I confess myself not satisfied, and desire to reserve myself for the case when it shall arise in judgment. It is founded on very artificial reasoning, and not always supported in point of fact by the practice of the commercial world. The distinction however on which it proceeds admits by a very strong implication that the security of a third person would repel the lien. If indeed the point were new, there would be much reason to contend that a distinct security of the party himself would extinguish the lien on the land, as it certainly does the lien upon personal chattels. *Cowell v. Simpson*, 16 Ves. jr. 275. In applying the doctrine to the facts of the present case, I confess that I have no difficulty in pronouncing against the existence of a lien for the unpaid part of the purchase-money. The property was a large mass of unsettled and uncultivated lands, to which the Indian title was not as yet extinguished. It was, in the necessary contemplation of all parties, bought on speculation, to be sold out to sub-purchasers, and ultimately to settlers. The great objects of the speculation would be materially impaired and embarrassed by any latent incumbrance the nature and extent of which it might not always be easy to ascertain, and which might by a subdivision of the property be apportioned upon an almost infinite number of purchasers. It is not supposable that so obvious a consideration should not have been within view of the parties; and, viewing it, it is very difficult to suppose that they could mean to create such an incumbrance. A distinct and independent security was taken by negotiable notes payable at a future day. There is no pretence that the notes were a mere mode of payment, for the indorsers were by the theory of the law and in fact conditional sureties for the payment. And in this respect the case is distinguishable from that of receiv-

¹ Ante, § 1220, note 2; *Selby v. Selby*, 4 Russ. R. 336; *Mackreth v. Symons*, 15 Ves. 339, and note (a); *Id.* 345.

or purchaser from the vendee is compelled to discharge the lien of the vendor, he will in like manner be entitled to stand substituted in his place against other claimants under the vendor on the estate, and to have the assets marshalled in his favor.¹ (a)

ing bills of exchange, where by the theory of the law the acceptor is not a surety, but merely pays the money of the drawer in pursuance of his order. *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 132; *Grant v. Mills*, 2 Ves. & Beam. R. 309. The securities themselves were, from their negotiable nature, capable of being turned immediately into cash; and in their transfer from hand to hand they could never have been supposed to draw after them in favor of the holder a lien on the land for their payment. But I pass over these and some other peculiar circumstances of this case, and put it upon the broad and general doctrine that here was the security of a third person taken as such, and that extinguished any implied lien for the purchase-money.' See also *Brown v. Gilman*, 4 Wheat. R. 290 to 292; *Fish v. Howland*, 1 Paige, R. 20; *Stafford v. Van Rensselaer*, 9 Cowen, R. 316. Mr. Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries (4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, pp. 151 to 153 (3d edit.)), has summed up the general doctrine, as well as the exceptions to it, with great clearness and accuracy. He holds that the better opinion is, that taking a note, bond, or covenant of the vendee himself is not a waiver of the lien, for such instruments are only the ordinary evidence of a debt. But that taking a note, bill, or bond, with a distinct security, or taking a distinct security exclusively by itself, either in the shape of real or personal property from the vendee, or taking the responsibility of a third person, is evidence that the vendor does not repose upon the lien but upon an independent security, and it discharges the lien. This conclusion he deduces from a survey of the American as well as the English authorities. See also 1 Foul. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 3, note (e); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 5, § 8, note (D).

¹ *Manlove v. Bale*, 1 Vern. 84. It was decided in *Clark v. Royle* (3 Sim. R. 499) that where A conveyed an estate to B, and in consideration thereof B covenanted with A to pay an annuity to him of £60 for life, and £3,000 to other persons in event of his (B's) marrying, the covenant did not create a lien on the estate in favor of the persons entitled to the £3,000. See also *Foster v. Blackstone*, 1 Mylne & K. 296, 310.

(a) But if notes given for the purchase-money are assigned by the vendor, the lien, it is held, will not on this account pass. *Thompson v. Pyland*, 3 Head, 537; *Green v. Demoss*, 10 Humph. 371; *Dixon v. Dixon*, 1 Md. Ch. 220; *Lindsey v. Bates*, 42 Miss. 397; *Ross v. Heintzen*, 36 Cal. 313. But see *Johns v. Sewell*, 33 Ind. 1; *Watt v. White*, 33 Texas, 421.

Indeed it is said that when the vendor transfers the purchaser's note for value without indorsing it, or by an indorsement without recourse, and

without an engagement that it shall be paid, the lien becomes extinguished. *Hightower v. Rigsby*, 56 Ala. 126; (criticising *White v. Stover*, 10 Ala. 443); *Hall v. Click*, 5 Ala. 363.

If however the vendor has not parted with the title, or if he has by agreement retained an express lien, an assignee of the note for the purchase-money may enforce the lien. *Thompson v. Pyland*, 3 Head, 537; *Robinson v. Harbour*, 42 Miss. 795; *Hutton v. Moore*, 26 Ark. 382. But comp. *Sheppard v. Thomas*, 26 Ark. 617; *Hurlock*

1228. We have already had occasion to state that the lien of the vendor exists against the vendee and against volunteers and purchasers under him with notice or having an equitable title only.¹ But it does not exist against purchasers under a conveyance of the legal estate made bona fide for a valuable consideration without notice, if they have paid the purchase-money.² (a) The lien will also prevail against assignees claiming by a general assignment under the bankrupt and insolvent laws ;³ and against assignees claiming under a general assignment made by a failing debtor for the benefit of creditors ; for in such cases the assignees are deemed to possess the same equities only as the debtor himself would possess.⁴ So it will prevail against a judgment creditor

¹ Ante, § 1225.

² Ante, §§ 788, 789; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 12, § 3, p. 557 (7th edit.); 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 105, 106; *Cator v. Bolingbroke*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 302; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 336, 339 to 341, 347, 353, 354; *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. Ch. R. 402, 403.

³ *Blackburne v. Gregson*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 420, by Belt; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 12, § 3, p. 557 (7th edit.); *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 Ves. 100; *Grant v. Mills*, 2 Ves. & Beam, 306; *Chapman v. Tanner*, 1 Vern. 267; *Ex parte Peake*, 1 Madd. R. 356.

⁴ *Fawell v. Heelis*, Ambler, R. 726; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 12, § 3, p. 558 (7th edit.). See *Bayley v. Greenleaf*, 7 Wheat. R. 54, 55.

v. Smith, 39 Md. 436. Thus the holder by assignment of notes given for the purchase-money of land, where a bond for title has been given by the vendor, may in equity enforce his claim by subjecting the land to its payment, against the holder of the title bond and purchasers from him with notice. *Hutchinson v. Crane*, 100 Ill. 269; *Wright v. Troutman*, 81 Ill. 374. And where the purchaser at the request of the vendor makes the notes for the purchase-money payable to a third person by way of gift from the vendor, the payee can enforce a lien. *Hamilton v. Gilbert*, 2 Heisk. 680; *Latham v. Staples*, 46 Ala. 462.

The rule of vendor's lien applies in favor of an equitable owner, e. g. by title bond, who procures a conveyance direct from the holder of the legal title to the purchaser. *Johns v. Sewell*, 33 Ind. 1.

A surety for the purchase-money

will on payment be subrogated to the benefit of the lien; and if the purchaser has sold in the mean time and received only part payment, his lien for the balance will, it seems, be postponed to the lien to which his surety becomes subrogated on payment in whole or in part by him. The surety's position indeed may be shown in a still stronger light. In *Carter v. Sims*, 2 Heisk. 166, the original vendor took notes of a sub-purchaser in part payment, and a surety, who had paid the balance, was held to have acquired thereby a lien prior in right to that of the original vendor himself in respect of the notes of the sub-purchaser. Again where one pays the purchase-money in relief of the purchaser, he will be entitled to a lien with priority over the purchaser's homestead rights. *Magee v. Magee*, 51 Ill. 500.

(a) *Boon v. Barnes*, 23 Miss. 136.

of the vendee before an actual conveyance of the estate has been made to him; ¹ (a) and as it should seem also against such a judgment creditor after the conveyance, for each party as a creditor would have a lien on the estate sold, with an equal equity; and in that case the maxim applies, 'Qui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure.'² (b)

1229. But there is a clear distinction between the case of such a general assignment to assignees for the benefit of creditors generally, and a particular assignment to specified creditors for their particular security or satisfaction. The former are deemed to take as mere volunteers, and not as purchasers for a valuable consideration strictly so called.³ The latter, if a conveyance of the property has been actually made and they have no notice of the purchase-money being unpaid to the vendor, are deemed entitled to the same equities as any other bona fide particular purchasers.⁴

1230. Liens of an analogous nature may be created by a deposit of title-deeds as a security for advances of money, thus constituting an equitable mortgage on the estate included in the title-deeds. But this subject has been already considered in a previous part of these Commentaries.⁵

¹ Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 P. Will. 278; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 58, p. 154 (2d edit.).

² See Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. R. 56; and Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 354.

³ Brown v. Heathcote, 1 Atk. 160, 162; Jewson v. Moulson, 2 Atk. 417, 420; Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. R. 87, 100; Worrall v. Morlar, cited in Mr. Cox's note to 1 P. Will. 459; Com. Dig. Bankrupt, D. 19; Scott v. Surman, Willes, R. 402, and the Register's note; Simond v. Hilbert, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 729; ante, § 1038; post, § 1411.

⁴ Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 100; Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. R. 56, 57.

⁵ Ante, § 1020.

(a) See Walton v. Hargroves, 42 Miss. 18. But see Ellis v. Temple, 4 Cold. 315.

(b) The lien will not, it seems, prevail against the judgment creditor where the creditor made his advance on the faith of a record title apparently perfect. Hulett v. Whipple, 58 Barb. 224. See Adams v. Buchanan, 49 Mo. 64; McCann v. White, Ib. 96; Watt v. White, 33 Texas, 421. Other securities must be exhausted before

the lien can be enforced against judgment creditors. Watt v. White, supra.

Where the debt is outlawed, a revival of it will not revive the lien against judgment creditors. Avent v. McCorkle, 45 Miss. 221. Compare Ruth's Appeal, 54 Penn. St. 173.

A mechanic's lien takes precedence, it seems, in Louisiana, of the vendor's lien. Jamison v. Barelli, 20 La. An. 452.

1231. So liens may be created on the purchase-money due on the sale of an estate in favor of a vendee, if it is agreed that the money shall be deposited in the hands of a third person to be applied in discharge of prior incumbrances to the extent of such incumbrances.¹ Indeed there is generally no difficulty in equity in establishing a lien not only on real estate but on personal property, or on money in the hands of a third person, wherever that is a matter of agreement at least against the party himself, and third persons who are volunteers or have notice. For it is a general principle in equity that as against the party himself, and any claiming under him voluntarily or with notice, such an agreement raises a trust.² (a) Thus for example if a tenant for life of real estate should by covenant agree to set apart and pay the whole or a portion of the annual profits of that estate to trustees for certain objects, it would create a lien in the nature of a trust on those profits against him and all persons claiming as volunteers or with notice under him.³ So if a father on the marriage of his son should covenant to settle lands of a particular annual value on his son, this would create a lien for that amount on his real estate generally, if he should die before he had settled any such lands according to his covenant.⁴ So if a person should covenant that he will on or before a certain day secure an annuity by a charge upon freehold estates, or by investment in the funds, or by the best means in his power, such covenant will

¹ *Farr v. Middleton*, Prec. Ch. 174, 175.

² *Collyer v. Fallon*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 469, 475, 476; *Legard v. Hodges*, 1 Ves. jr. 478; ante, §§ 1039 to 1058; *Dodsley v. Varley*, 12 Adolph. & Ellis, 632.

³ *Legard v. Hodges*, 4 Ves. jr. 478.

⁴ *Roundell v. Breary*, 2 Vern. R. 482. (b) See also *Power v. Bailey*, 1 Ball & Beatt. 49; *Gardner v. Townsend*, Coop. Eq. R. 303. But see post, § 1249 and note 2, the cases where such a covenant would be a lien and where it would not. The distinction in the cases seems generally to be between a covenant to settle particular lands and a covenant to settle lands generally, not specifying any in particular. The former constitutes a lien in the particular lands specified. The latter does not on the lands generally.

(a) *Pinch v. Anthony*, 8 Allen, 536.

(b) As to this case, and as to *Wellesley v. Wellesley* in the next note, see *Mornington v. Keane*, 2 DeG. & J. 292. It is here declared that a covenant on or before a certain day, either by charge on freehold estates, or by an

investment in the funds, or by the best means which might be then in his power, to secure the payment of an annuity to a trustee for the wife of the covenantor, is not sufficient to create a charge on the covenantor's property. See post, § 1249.

create a lien upon any property to which he becomes entitled before the date of the covenant and the day so limited for its performance.¹

1232. Upon similar principles, where a vendee has sold the estate to a bona fide purchaser without notice, if the purchase-money has not been paid, the original vendor may proceed against the estate for his lien, or against the purchase-money in the hands of such purchaser for satisfaction; for in such a case the latter not having paid his money takes the estate cum onere, at least to the extent of the unpaid purchase-money. And this proceeds upon a general ground that where trust-money can be traced, it shall be applied to the purposes of the trust.²

1233. But although a lien will be created in favor of a vendor for the purchase-money on the sale of an estate, yet if the consideration of the conveyance is a covenant to pay an annuity to the vendor, and another covenant to pay a part of the money to

¹ *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 561. In this case Lord Cottenham said: 'That this court will grant a specific performance of an agreement for a grant of an annuity cannot now be questioned; and this agreement appears to me to contain within itself all that is necessary to give it legal validity; but if this court is to execute the agreement, it must do so according to the terms of it. The terms are, on a day certain to charge the annuity on lands, or on an investment of stock, or by the best means in his power. I think it quite immaterial, for the present purpose, whether this gave to the husband an option, or whether he has other lands besides these vested in these defendants, upon which he can now charge the annuity; because the bill alleges that he refuses to charge it in any manner, and this court will not permit him, under the pretence of exercising an option, to evade the performance of his contract. In *Deacon v. Smith* (3 Atk. 323) there was an option; but it did not prevent the court from acting upon the one alternative. The property acquired by the arrangement of December, 1834, must be considered as subsequently acquired property; but that contracts to charge property subsequently acquired will be enforced is sufficiently established. *Lyde v. Mynn* and the cases upon which that decision was founded are conclusive upon that subject. The contract is not to purchase lands for the purpose of the agreement; but one alternative is to charge lands in February, 1835, and at that time he had a power of charging lands. It is the same as a contract to charge such lands as he might have at that time; and if so, such was *Metcalfe v. The Archbishop of York* (1 Mylne & Craig, 547; s. c. 6 Sim. 224) and *Lyde v. Mynn* (1 Mylne & Keen, 683; s. c. 4 Sim. 505), and such was *Tooke v. Hastings*, as reported in 2 Vern. 97. In *Lewis v. Maddocks* (17 Ves. 48), a contract, upon marriage, to settle all personal estate of which the husband might become possessed during the coverture was enforced against an estate he had purchased in part, with personal property so acquired.'

² See *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 511; *Ex parte Morgan*, 12 Ves. 6; post, §§ 1255 to 1262.

third persons, it seems that the latter, not being parties to the conveyance, will not generally have any lien thereon for the payment of such money ; for they stand in no privity to establish a lien, at least unless the original agreement import an intention to create such a lien.¹

1233 *a.* Another class of cases affected by similar principles, and where a sort of marshalling of securities or rights of priority between different incumbrancers and different purchasers may exist, is where a lien covers several parcels of land and the owner thereof subsequently conveys some of the parcels to different purchasers or incumbrancers ; in such cases the question arises, Who, as between the owner and the subsequent incumbrancers and purchasers, and also as between the incumbrancers and purchasers themselves, is primarily chargeable with the lien, and which of the lands is to be first subjected to the charge ? The general rule now acted upon by Courts of Equity is, that where there is a lien upon different parcels of land for the payment of the same debt, and some of those lands still belong to the person who in equity and justice owes or ought to pay the debt, and other parcels of the land have been transferred by him to third persons, his part of the land as between himself and them shall be primarily chargeable with the debt. (*a*) This would seem highly reasonable as to the original incumbrancer.² But it has been further held that if he has sold or transferred different parcels of the land at different times to different persons as incumbrancers or purchasers, there as between themselves they are to be charged in the reverse order of the time of the transfers to them ; that is to say the parcels last sold are to be first charged to their full value and so backwards until the debt is fully paid ; for it is said that the last purchasers are to take only as far as they may without disturbing the rights of the prior incumbrancers or purchasers, who being prior in point of time have a superiority of right.³ (*b*) But there seems great reason to doubt

¹ *Clark v. Royle*, 3 Sim. R. 409 ; *Foster v. Blackstone*, 1 M. & Keen, 297 ; *Colyear v. Countess of Mulgrave*, 2 Keen, 81, 98 ; ante, § 1227, and note 1, p. 574.

² See the authorities cited in next note.

³ *Gill v. Lyon*, 1 John. Ch. R. 447 ; *Stevens v. Cooper*, 1 John. Ch. R. 425 ;

(*a*) But see ante, vol. 1, § 484. 267 (overruling *Presbyterian Cong. v.*

(*b*) See *Cowden's Estate*, 1 Barr, Wallace, 3 Rawle, 109) ; *Holden v.*

whether this last position is maintainable upon principle ; for as between the subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers, each trusting to his own security upon the separate estate mortgaged to him, it is difficult to perceive that either has in consequence thereof any superiority of right or equity over the other.¹ On the contrary there seems strong ground to contend that the original incumbrance or lien ought to be borne ratably between them according to the relative values of the estates. And so the doctrine has been asserted in the ancient as well as the modern English cases on the subject.²

1234. Another species of lien is that which results to one joint owner of any real estate, or other joint property from repairs and improvements made upon such property for the joint benefit and for disbursements touching the same. This lien, as we shall presently see, sometimes arises from a contract express or implied between the parties, and sometimes it is created by Courts of Equity upon mere principles of general justice, especially where

Clowes v. Dickinson, 5 John. Ch. R. 235; *Stoney v. Shultz*, 1 Hill, Ch. R. 500; *James v. Hubbard*, 1 Paige, R. 228; *Gouverneur v. Lynch*, 2 Paige, R. 300; *Guion v. Knapp*, 6 Paige, R. 35; *Skeel v. Spraker*, 8 Paige, R. 182; *Patty v. Pease*, 8 Paige, R. 277; *Schryser v. Teller*, 9 Paige, R. 173; *Commercial Bank of Erie v. Western Reserve Bank*, 11 Ohio (Stanton) R. 444, 452; ante, §§ 506, 634 *a*; *Hartley v. O'Flaherty*, Lloyd & Goold, R. 216; temp. Plunk.

¹ Ante, §§ 477, 478, 483.

² Ante, §§ 477, 478, 483; *Sir W. Herbert's Case*, 3 Co. R. 12; *Barnes v. Rackster*, 1 Younge & Coll. New Rep. 401; ante, § 634 *a*. See also *Lanoy v. Duchess of Athol*, 2 Atk. 448; *Aldrich v. Cooper*, 8 Ves. 391; *Averall v. Wade*, 1 Lloyd & Goold, R. 252; *Bugden v. Bignold*, 2 Younge & Coll. New R. 377; *The American Law Magazine* for April, 1844, art. 5, pp. 64 to 82; *Sofer v. Kemp*, 6 Hare, R. 155.

Pike, 24 Maine, 427; *Wikoff v. Davis*, 3 Green, Ch. 24; *Chase v. Woodbury*, 6 Cush. 143; *Bradley v. George*, 2 Allen, 392; *George v. Kent*, 7 Allen, 16; *Gaskill v. Line*, 2 Beasl. 400; *Mount v. Potts*, 8 C. E. Green, 188; *Stuyvesant v. Hall*, 2 Barb. Ch. 151; *Lyman v. Lyman*, 32 Vt. 79; *Carter v. Neal*, 24 Ga. 546; *Life Ins. Co. v. Cutler*, 3 Sandf. 176; *Dickey v. Thompson*, 8 B. Mon. 312; *McCullum v. Turpie*, 32 Ind. 146; *Lock v. Fulford*, 52 Ill. 166; *Barney v. Myers*, 28 Iowa, 472; *Payne v. Avery*, 21 Mich. 524. But where each parcel is sold subject to

the mortgage, they contribute ratably, not inversely. *Briscoe v. Power*, 47 Ill. 447; *Hoy v. Bramhall*, 4 C. E. Green, 74, 563; *Barney v. Myers*, supra.

Where there have been partial releases, the residue is liable in proportion to its value (with reference to the lots released) at the time of the release. *Stillman v. Stillman*, 6 C. E. Green, 126; *Taylor v. Short*, 27 Iowa, 361. But this is only where there is actual notice of equities against such release. *Inglehart v. Crane*, 42 Ill. 261; *George v. Wood*, 9 Allen, 80.

any relief is sought by the party who ought to pay his proportion of the money expended in such repairs and improvements; for in such cases the maxim well applies, 'Nemo debet locupletari ex alterius incommodo.'¹

1235. And in the first place in respect to repairs, improvements, and disbursements upon real estate. It seems that at the common law if there are two tenants in common or joint-tenants of a house or mill, and it should fall into decay and the one is willing to repair and the other is not, he that is willing to repair shall have a writ de reparatione facienda; for owners are bound, pro bono publico, to maintain houses and mills which are for the habitation and use of man.² It is not perhaps quite certain, from the manner in which this doctrine is laid down, whether the writ applied merely to repairs on other things constituting real estate or appurtenant thereto. But it seems clear that it did not extend to improvements (not being repairs) made upon real estate generally, nor to any cases where the repairs were made under an express or implied contract; for in the latter case contribution could be obtained in a common action founded on the contract.

1236. But the doctrine of contribution in equity is larger than it is at law; and in many cases repairs and improvements will be held to be not merely a personal charge, but a lien on the estate itself. Thus for example it has been held that if two or more persons make a joint purchase, and afterwards one of them lays out a considerable sum of money in repairs or improvements and dies, this will be a lien on the land and a trust for the representatives of him who advanced it.³

¹ Jenkyns's Cent. 4; Branch, Maxims, 124; post, §§ 1237, 1238; Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 206.

² Co. Litt. 200 b; Loring v. Beacon, 4 Mass. R. 576; Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass. R. 65; Fitz. N. Brev. 127 a. In Converse v. Ferre (11 Mass. R. 326) it was said by Mr. Chief Justice Parker, in delivering the opinion of the court, that no action lies at the common law by one tenant in common, who has expended more than his share in repairing the common property, against the deficient tenants. But this seems not easily reconcilable with what is said in Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass. R. 70, 71. See Registrum Brev. 153, and Fitz. N. Brev. 127. There certainly may be a distinction between a right by action to compel repairs and a right of contribution in invitum after repairs made. (a)

³ Lake v. Craddock, 1 Eq. Abr. 291; s. c. 3 P. W. 158; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2,

(a) See Calvert v. Aldrich, 99 Mass. 74.

1237. In many cases of this sort the doctrine may proceed upon the ground of some express or implied agreement as to the repairs and improvements between the joint purchasers and an implied lien following upon such an agreement.¹ But Courts of Equity have not confined the doctrine of compensation or lien for repairs and improvements to cases of agreement or of joint purchases. They have extended it to other cases where the party making the repairs and improvements has acted bona fide and innocently, and there has been a substantial benefit conferred on the owner, so that *ex æquo et bono* he ought to pay for such benefit.² (a) Thus where a tenant for life under a will has gone on to finish improvements permanently beneficial to an estate which were begun by the testator, Courts of Equity have deemed the expenditure a charge for which the tenant is entitled to a

ch. 4, § 2, note (g); Sugden on Vendors, ch. 15, § 1, p. 637 (7th edit.). See also *Scott v. Nesbitt*, 14 Ves. 444. Mr. Sugden, in his *Treatise on Vendors* (ch. 15, § 1, p. 611, 7th edit.; *Id.* vol. 2, ch. 15, § 1, pp. 131, 132, 9th edit.), says: It seems that where two or more persons purchase an estate, and one for instance pays all the money, and the estate is conveyed to them both, the one who paid the money cannot call upon those who paid no part of it to repay him their shares of the purchase-money, or to convey their shares of the estate to him; for by payment of all the money he gains neither a lien nor a mortgage, because there is no contract for either. Nor can it be construed a resulting trust, as such a trust cannot arise at an after period; and perhaps the only remedy he has is to file a bill against them for a contribution. See *Wood v. Birch*, and *Wood v. Norman*, Rolls, 7 and 8 March, 1804, the decree in which case does not however authorize the observation; but the author conceives it to follow from what fell from the Master of the Rolls at the hearing. Whenever therefore two persons agree to purchase an estate, it should be stipulated in the agreement that if by the default of either of them the other shall be compelled to pay the whole or greater part of the purchase-money the estate shall be conveyed to him, and he shall hold the entirety against the other and his heirs, unless he or they shall within a stated time repay the sum advanced on their account, with interest in the mean time. But it has been held that if one of two joint-tenants of a lease renew at his own expense, and the other party repay the full benefit of it, the one advancing the money shall have a charge on the other moiety of the estate for a moiety of his advances on account of the fines, although such other moiety of the estate be in strict settlement at the time of the renewal. The case was considered to fall within the principle upon which mortgagees who renew leasehold interests have been decreed entitled to charge the amount upon the lands (*Hamilton v. Denny*, 1 Ball. & Beatt. 199).³

¹ See *Gladstone v. Birley*, 2 Meriv. R. 403.

² See Sugden on Vendors, ch. 16, § 10, pp. 720, 721 (7th edit.); ante, 799 b.

(a) See *Rathbun v. Colton*, 15 Pick. 471.

lien.¹ (a) So where a party lawfully in possession under a defective title has made permanent improvements, if relief is asked in equity by the true owner he will be compelled to allow for such improvements.² (b) So money bona fide laid out in improvements

¹ *Hibbert v. Cooke*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 552.

² *Robinson v. Ridley*, 6 Madd. R. 2. See also *Attorney-Gen. v. Baliol College*, 9 Mod. R. 411; *Bright v. Boyd*, 1 Story, R. 478. In this case the question was much discussed whether a bona fide purchaser under a defective title without notice was entitled to be paid for his improvements upon the estate against the true owner. On that occasion the judge who delivered the opinion of the court said: 'The other question as to the right of the purchaser, bona fide and for a valuable consideration, to compensation for permanent improvements made upon the estate which have greatly enhanced its value, under a title which turns out defective, he having no notice of the defect, is one upon which, looking to the authorities, I should be inclined to pause. Upon the general principles of Courts of Equity, acting ex æquo et bono, I own that there does not seem to me any just ground to doubt that compensation under such circumstances ought to be allowed to the full amount of the enhanced value, upon the maxim of the common law, "Nemo debet locupletari ex alterius incommodo;" or, as it is still more exactly expressed in the Digest, "Jure naturæ æquum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiores." Dig. lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 206. I am aware that the doctrine has not as yet been carried to such an extent in our Courts of Equity. In cases where the true owner of an estate, after a recovery thereof at law from a bona fide possessor for a valuable consideration without notice, seeks an account in equity as plaintiff against such possessor for the rents and profits, it is the constant habit of Courts of Equity to allow such possessor (as defendant) to deduct therefrom the full amount of all the meliorations and improvements which he has beneficially made upon the estate, and thus to recoup them from the rents and profits. 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. §§ 799 a, 799 b, 1237, 1238, 1239; *Green v. Biddle*, 8 Wheat. R. 77, 78, 79, 80, 81. So if the true owner of an estate holds only an equitable title thereto, and seeks the aid of a Court of Equity to enforce that title, the court will administer that aid only upon the terms of making compensation to such bona fide possessor for the amount of his meliorations and improvements of the estate beneficial to the true owner. See also 2 Story, Eq. Jurisp. § 799 b, and note; *Id.* §§ 1237, 1238. In each of these cases the court acts upon an old and established maxim in its jurisprudence, that he who seeks equity must do equity. *Ibid.* But it has been supposed that Courts of Equity do not and ought not to go further, and to grant active relief in favor of such a bona fide possessor, making permanent meliorations and improvements, by sustaining a bill brought by him therefor against the true owner after he has recovered the premises at law. I find that Mr.

(a) See *Sohier v. Eldredge*, 103 Mass. 345, 351. But see *Floyer v. Bankes*, L. R. 8 Eq. 115; *Taylor v. Foster*, 22 Ohio St. 255. *Barnum*, 31 Md. 425; *Sale v. Crutchfield*, 8 Bush, 636; *Miner v. Beekman*, 50 N. Y. 337; *Smith v. Drake*, 8 C. E. Green, 302; *North Hudson R. Co. v. Booraem*, 28 N. J. Eq. 450.

(b) *Canal Bank v. Hudson*, 111 U. S. 66, 83. See *McLaughlin v.*

on an estate by one joint owner will be allowed on a bill by the other if he ask for a partition.¹ So if the true owner stands by

Chancellor Walworth, in *Putnam v. Ritchie* (6 Paige, R. 390, 403, 404, 405), entertained this opinion, admitting at the same time that he could find no case in England or America where the point had been expressed or decided either way. Now if there be no authority against the doctrine, I confess that I should be most reluctant to be the first judge to lead such a decision. It appears to me, speaking with all deference to other opinions, that the denial of all compensation to such a bona fide purchaser in such a case, where he has manifestly added to the permanent value of an estate by his meliorations and improvements, without the slightest suspicion of any infirmity in his own title, is contrary to the first principles of equity. Take the case of a vacant lot in a city, where a bona fide purchaser builds a house thereon, enhancing the value of the estate to ten times the original value of the land, under a title apparently perfect and complete, is it reasonable or just that in such a case the true owner should recover and possess the whole without any compensation whatever to the bona fide purchaser? To me it seems manifestly unjust and inequitable thus to appropriate to one man the property and money of another who is in no default. The argument, I am aware, is that the moment the house is built it belongs to the owner of the land by mere operation of law, and that he may certainly possess and enjoy his own. But this is merely stating the technical rule of law by which the true owner seeks to hold what, in a just sense, he never had the slightest title to,—that is, the house. It is not answering the objection, but merely and dryly stating that the law so holds. But then, admitting this to be so, does it not furnish a strong ground why equity should interpose and grant relief? I have ventured to suggest that the claim of the bona fide purchaser under such circumstances is founded in equity. I think it founded in the highest equity; and in this view of the matter I am supported by the positive dictates of the Roman law. The passage already cited shows it to be founded in the clearest natural equity. “*Jure naturæ æquum est.*” And the Roman law treats the claim of the true owner, without making any compensation, under such circumstances, as a case of fraud or ill faith. “*Certe,*” says the Institutes, “*illud constat; si in possessione constituto ædificatore, soli Dominus petat domum suam esse, me solvat pretium materiæ et mercedis fabricarum; posse cum per exceptionem doli mali repelli; utique si bonæ fidei possessor qui ædificavit. Nam scienti, alienum solum esse, potest objici culpa, quod ædificaverit temere in eo solo, quod intelligebat alienum esse.*” Just. Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, §§ 30, 32; 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 799 *b*; Viun. Com. ad. Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, § 30, n. 3, 4, pp. 194, 195. It is a grave mistake, sometimes made, that the Roman law merely confined its equity or remedial justice on this subject to a mere reduction from the amount of the rents and profits of the land. See *Green v. Biddle*, 8 Wheat. R. 79, 80. The general doctrine is fully expounded and supported in the Digest, where it is applied, not to all expenditures upon the estate, but to such expenditures only as have enhanced the value of the estate (*quatenus pretiosior res facta est*) (Dig. lib. 20, tit. 1, l. 29, § 2; Dig. lib. 6, tit. 1, l. 65; Id. l. 38; Pothier, Pand. lib. 6, tit. 1, n. 43, 44, 45, 46, 48), and beyond what he has been reimbursed by the rents and profits. Dig. lib. 6, tit. 1, l. 48. The like principle has been adopted into

¹ *Swan v. Swan*, 8 Price, 518.

and suffers improvements to be made on an estate without notice of his title, he will not be permitted in equity to enrich himself by the loss of another, but the improvements will constitute a

the law of the modern nations, which have derived their jurisprudence from the Roman law; and it is especially recognized in France, and enforced by Pothier with his accustomed strong sense of equity and general justice and urgent reasoning. Pothier, *De la Propriété*, n. 343 to 353; Code Civil of France, art. 552, 555. Indeed some jurists, and among them Cujacius, insist, contrary to the Roman law, that even a mala fide possessor ought to have an allowance of all expenses which have enhanced the value of the estate, so far as the increased value exists. Pothier, *De la Propriété*, n. 350; Vinn. ad. *Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, l. 30, n. 4, p. 195*. The law of Scotland has allowed the like recompense to bona fide possessors making valuable and permanent improvements; and some of the jurists of that country have extended the benefit to mala fide possessors to a limited extent. Bell, *Comm. on Law of Scotland*, p. 139, § 538; Ersk. *Inst. b. 3, tit. 1, § 11*; 1 *Stair, Inst. b. 1, tit. 8, § 6*. The law of Spain affords the like protection and recompense to bona fide possessors as founded in natural justice and equity. 1 *Mor. & Carl. Partid. b. 3, tit. 28, l. 41, pp. 357, 358*; *Asa & Manuel, Inst. of Laws of Spain, 102*. Grotius, Puffendorf, and Rutherford all affirm the same doctrine as founded in the truest principles *ex æquo et bono*. Grotius, *b. 2, ch. 10, §§ 1, 2, 3*; Puffend. *Law of Nat. & Nat. b. 4, ch. 7, § 61*; Rutherford. *Inst. b. 1, ch. 9, § 4, p. 7*. There is still another broad principle of the Roman law which is applicable to the present case. It is that where a bona fide possessor or purchaser of real estate pays money to discharge any existing incumbrance or charge upon the estate, having no notice of any infirmity in his title, he is entitled to be repaid the amount of such payment by the true owner seeking to recover the estate from him. *Dig. lib. 6, tit. 1, l. 65*; Pothier, *Pand. lib. 6, tit. 1, n. 43*; Pothier, *De la Propriété*, n. 343. Now in the present case it cannot be overlooked that the lands of the testator now in controversy were sold for the payment of his just debts under the authority of law, although the authority was not regularly executed by the administrator in his mode of sale, by a non-compliance with one of the prerequisites. It was not therefore in a just sense a tortious sale; and the proceeds thereof, paid by the purchaser, have gone to discharge the debts of the testator, and so far the lands in the hands of the defendant (Boyd) have been relieved from a charge to which they were liable by law. So that he is now enjoying the lands free from a charge which in conscience and equity he and he only, and not the purchaser, ought to bear. To the extent of the charge from which he has been thus relieved by the purchaser, it seems to me that the plaintiff, claiming under the purchaser, is entitled to reimbursement, in order to avoid a circuitry of action, to get back the money from the administrator, and thus subject the lands to a new sale, or at least in his favor in equity to the old charge. I confess myself to be unwilling to resort to such a circuitry in order to do justice where, upon the principles of equity, the merits of the case can be reached by affecting the lands directly with a charge, to which they are *ex æquo et bono* in the hands of the present defendant clearly liable.' The point was afterwards directly affirmed when the case came again before the court in 2 *Story, R. 605*; ante, §§ 387, 388, 799 *a*, 799 *b*.

lien on the estate.¹ For it has been well said, ‘*Jure naturæ æquum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiores.*’² A fortiori this doctrine will apply to cases where the parties stand in a fiduciary relation to each other; as where an agent stands by, and without notice of his title suffers his principal to spend money in improvements upon the agent’s estate.³

1238. In all cases of this sort however the doctrine proceeds upon the ground either that there is some fraud or that the aid of a Court of Equity is required; for if a party can recover the estate at law, a Court of Equity will not, unless there is some fraud, relieve a purchaser or bona fide possessor on account of money laid out in repairs and improvements.⁴

1239. The civil law seems to have proceeded upon a far broader principle of natural justice. For by that law any bona fide possessor, as for instance a creditor who had laid out money in preserving, repairing, or substantially improving an estate, was allowed a privilege or lien for such meliorations. ‘*Creditor qui ob restitutionem ædificiorum crediderit, in pecuniam quam crediderit privilegium exigendi habebit.*’⁵ ‘*Pignus insulæ creditori datum, qui pecuniam ob restitutionem ædificii exstruendi mutuum dedit, ad eum quoque pertinebit qui redemptori, domino mandante, nummos ministravit.*’⁶ Indeed Domat lays it down as a general doctrine that those whose money has been laid out on improvements of an estate, such as making a plantation or erecting buildings upon it, or augmenting the apartments of a house, or for other like causes, have by the civil law a privilege upon those improvements as upon a purchase with their own money.⁷

¹ *Green v. Biddle*, 8 Wheat. R. 1, 77, 78; *Shine v. Gough*, 1 B. & Beatt. 444; *Cawdor (Lord) v. Lewis*, 1 Younge & Coll. 427; ante, §§ 385, 387, 388, 799 a, 799 b; *Bright v. Boyd*, 1 Story, R. 478, 493.

² Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 206.

³ *Lord Cawdor v. Lewis*, 1 Younge & Coll. 427.

⁴ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 16, § 10, pp. 721, 722 (7th edit.); Id. ch. 22, § 1, vol. 3, pp. 436, 437 (10th edit.). See also *Moore v. Cable*, 1 John. Ch. R. 385; *Green v. Winter*, 1 John. Ch. R. 26, 39; *Putnam v. Ritchie*, 6 Paige, R. 390, 403 to 405; *Bright v. Boyd*, 1 Story, R. 478, 494 to 497; ante, §§ 388, 389, 799 a, 799 b, and note.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 12, tit. 1, l. 25; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 6, 7; *Bright v. Boyd*, 1 Story, R. 478, 494 to 497.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 2, l. 1; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 5 to 7; ante, § 1237, note.

⁷ 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 7; ante, § 1237, note.

1240. In the first place in respect to repairs, improvements, and disbursements upon personal property. Here the civil law gave a privilege or lien upon the thing in favor of all artificers and other persons who had laid out their money in such meliorations. Thus it is said: 'Quod quis navis fabricandæ, vel emendæ, vel armandæ, vel instruendæ, causa, vel quoquo modo crediderit vel ob navem venditam petat, habet privilegium post fiscum.'¹

1241. The like privilege or lien does not exist in English Jurisprudence in respect to domestic ships.² But in America it has been held to exist in regard to foreign ships repaired in home ports, and also in regard to domestic ships repaired in foreign ports, in favor of artificers and material-men.³ And a master of a ship who has paid for such repairs is substituted in point of claim to the rights of such artificers and material-men. He has also by our law a lien on the freight for his disbursements on the voyage,⁴ although the lien has been recently denied in England.⁵

1242. Upon another point also some diversity of judgment has been expressed; and that is how far as between part-owners a lien exists on the ship itself for any expenses incurred by one or more of them beyond their shares in building, repairing, or fitting out the ship upon a joint voyage. In respect to the proceeds of

¹ Dig. Lib. 42, tit. 5, l. 34, 26; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 7, 9; Story, Comm. on Agency, §§ 355 to 357; ante, § 506.

² Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 10, p. 108, § 11, p. 109 (edit. 1829); Ex parte Bland, 2 Rose, Cas. 91; Watkinson v. Bernardiston, 2 P. Will. 367; Stewart v. Hall, 2 Dow, R. 29. See Hussey v. Christie, 13 Ves. 594; Ex parte Halkett, 3 V. & Beam. 135.

³ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 15, note by Story (1) (edit. 1829); The Aurora, 1 Wheat. R. 105; The General Smith, 4 Wheat. R. 438; The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. R. 409, 416; Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Peters, R. 324; ante, § 1216.

⁴ Abbott on Shipp. ubi supra; Ex parte Cheesman, 2 Eden, R. 181; The Ship Packet, 3 Mason, R. 263, 264; Hodson v. Butts, 3 Cranch, 140; Milward v. Hallett, 2 Cain. R. 77; White v. Baring, 4 Esp. R. 22; ante, § 1216.

⁵ In the case of Hussey v. Christie (9 East, R. 426), the Court of King's Bench decided that the master has no such lien on the freight. Lord Eldon seems to have entertained a different opinion in Hussey v. Christie, 13 Ves. 594; Ex parte Halkett, 3 Ves. & B. 135; s. c. 19 Ves. 474. So did Lord Northington in Ex parte Cheesman, 2 Eden, 181. In the case of Smith v. Plummer, 1 Barn. & Ald. 575, the Court of King's Bench held that the master had no lien even on the freight for his disbursements on the voyage on account of the ship. That doctrine has not been adopted in America, and seems not quite reconcilable with prior decisions. See also Richardson v. Campbell, 5 Barn. & Ald. 203, note (a).

the joint adventure on the voyage, no doubt seems to be entertained that they are liable to the disbursements and charges of the outfit in the nature of a lien, and therefore that no part-owner can take any portion of the profits until after such expenditures are paid and deducted. In this respect the part-owners are treated as partners in the joint adventure.¹ But the point whether the ship itself is liable for such expenditures as constituting a lien on it turns upon somewhat different considerations. Lord Hardwicke held that the ship was so liable, and that the part-owners of a ship, although tenants in common and not joint-tenants, have a right notwithstanding to consider the chattel as used in partnership, and liable as partnership effects to pay all debts whatever to which any of them are liable on account of the ship.² Lord Eldon has expressed a directly contrary opinion, and has held the ship not to be liable for such expenditures.³ (a)

¹ Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 1, ch. 3, §§ 9, 10, pp. 77, 78 (edit. 1829).

² *Doddington v. Hallet*, 1 Ves. R. 497, and Belt's Supplement, 205, 206; Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 1, ch. 3, § 10, p. 78 (edit. 1829).

³ *Ex parte Younge*, 2 Ves. & B. 242; *Ex parte Harrison*, 2 Rose, Cas. 76, 78. Mr. Abbott, in his treatise on Shipping, expressed doubts as to the correctness of Lord Hardwicke's judgment. Lord Eldon, in *Ex parte Younge*, 2 Ves. & Beam. 242, adopted Mr. Abbott's doubts; and the remarks of the latter, having been omitted in the last English edition, I take the liberty to restore them. They are as follows: 'It seems to have been considered that part-owners might have a lien on each other's shares of a ship, as partners in trade have on each other's shares of their merchandise. But I do not find this point to have been ever decided, and there is a material difference between the two cases. Partners are at law joint-tenants of their merchandise. One may dispose of the whole property. But part-owners are tenants in common of a ship. One cannot sell the share of another. And if this general lien exists, must prevail against a purchaser, even without notice; which does not seem consistent with the nature of the interest of a tenant in common. It is true indeed that as long as the ship continues to be employed by the same persons no one of them can be entitled to partake of the profits until all that is due in respect to the part he holds in the ship has been discharged. But as one part-owner cannot compel another to sell the ship, there does not appear to be any mode by which he can enforce against the other's share of the ship, in specie, the payment of his part of the expenses.' In *Mumford v. Nicoll*, 4 John. Ch. R. 522, Mr. Chancellor Kent acted upon the authority of the case, *Ex parte Younge*, in opposition to the case of *Doddington v. Halkett*. But his decree was overturned by the Court of Appeals, in 20 John. R. 611, where the majority of the judges who delivered their opinions seemed inclined to support the opinion of Lord Hardwicke. And in the case before them,

(a) See *Green v. Briggs*, 6 Hare, B. Mon. 458; 3 Kent, Comm. 40, 155. 395. But see *Brodie v. Howard*, 17 Further Maclachlan, Merchant Ship-C. B. 109; *Hewitt v. Sturdevant*, 4 ping, 96, 107.

1243. Another species of tacit or implied trust, or perhaps, strictly speaking, of tacit or implied pledge or lien, is that of each partner in and upon the partnership property, whether it consists of lands or stock or chattels or debts, as his indemnity against the joint debts, as well as his security for the ultimate balance due to him for his own share of the partnership effects.¹ (a) We have already had occasion to allude to this sort of lien in considering joint purchases in the name of one partner, and it is only necessary here to refer to it in this more general form.²

1244. Another class of implied liens or trusts arises where property is conveyed inter vivos, or is bequeathed or devised by last will and testament, subject to a charge for the payment of debts or to other charges in favor of third persons.³ In such cases, although the charge is treated as between the immediate parties to the original instrument as an express trust in the property, which may be enforced by such parties or their proper representatives, yet as between the trustee and cestuis que trust who are to take the benefits of the instrument it constitutes an implied or constructive trust only, — a trust raised by Courts of Equity in their favor, as an interest in rem capable of being enforced by them directly by a suit brought in their own names and right. Thus for example if a devise is made of real estate charged with the payment of debts generally, it may be enforced by any one or more creditors against the devisee, although there is no privity of contract between him and them.⁴

1245. There is also a distinction between a devise of an estate

which was somewhat special in its circumstances, where the parties were part-owners and engaged in a partnership adventure in which the ship was eventually sold, and one of the part-owners got possession of the proceeds, the court held him entitled to retain for outfits, repairs, and expenses incurred by him for the voyage, but not for a general balance due on former voyages and adventures.

¹ Collyer on Partn. B. 2, ch. 1, § 1, p. 65; *West v. Skipp*, 1 Ves. 239, 456; *Hoxie v. Carr*, 1 Sumner, R. 181, 182; *Nicoll v. Mumford*, 4 John. Ch. R. 522; *Lake v. Gibson*, 1 Eq. Abr. A. 3, pp. 290, 291; ante, §§ 674, 675; post, § 1253.

² Ante, § 1207; post, § 1253. See also ante, §§ 674, 675.

³ See *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 1, § 2*, pp. 94 to 134.

⁴ See *King v. Denison*, 1 Ves. & B. 272, 276.

(a) No trust is created where assets are divided on dissolution with undertakings by each partner to pay certain specific debts. *Giddings v. Palmer*, 107 Mass. 269.

in trust to pay debts and other charges, and a devise of an estate charged with or subject to debts or other charges. In the former case the devise is construed to be a mere trust to pay the debts or other charges, giving no beneficial interest to the devisee, but holding him, after the debts and charges are paid, a mere trustee for the heir as to the residue. In the latter case the devise is construed to convey the whole beneficial interest to the devisee, subject only to the payment of the debts or other charges. The distinction may seem nice, but it is clearly established as a matter of intention.¹ (a)

1246. Charges of the nature which we are now considering are often created by the express and positive declarations of deeds and wills; but they not infrequently also arise by implication, from general forms of expression used in such instruments. Thus in cases of wills a testator often devises his estate 'after payment of his debts,' or 'his debts being first paid;' or he begins by directing 'that all his debts shall be paid,' and afterwards he makes a full disposition of his estate. (b) The question in such cases has often arisen, whether his debts are to be treated as a charge upon his real estate; or in other words, whether he has given all his real estate to the devisees, subject to and charge-

¹ King v. Denison, Ves. & Beam. 273; Hill v. Bishop of London, 1 Atk. R. 620; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. R. 582, 583; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 112. Lord Eldon, in King v. Denison, 1. Ves. & Beam. 272, stated this distinction in a very clear manner. 'But I will here,' said he, 'point out the nicety of distinction, as it appears to me, upon which this court has gone. If I give to A and his heirs all my real estate charged with my debts, that is a devise to him for a particular purpose, but not for that purpose only. If the devise is upon trust to pay my debts, that is a devise for a particular purpose and nothing more; and the effect of those two modes admits just this difference. The former is a devise of an estate of inheritance for the purpose of giving the devisee the beneficial interest subject to a particular purpose. The latter is a devise for a particular purpose with no intention to give him any beneficial interest. Where therefore the whole legal interest is given for the purpose of satisfying trusts expressed, and those trusts do not in their execution exhaust the whole, so much of the beneficial interest as is not exhausted belongs to the heir. But where the whole legal interest is given for a particular purpose, with an intention to give to the devisee of the legal estate the beneficial interest, if the whole is not exhausted by that particular purpose the surplus goes to the devisee, as it is intended to be given to him.'

(a) See Gardner v. Gardner, 3 settlement of real estate, with a provision for the payment of debts at Mason, 178.

(b) As to the effect upon a testator's general personal estate of a death, see Trott v. Buchanan, 28 Ch. D. 446.

able with his debts, in aid of his personal estate. The settled doctrine now is, that the debts in all such cases constitute by implication a charge on the real estate;¹ for whether the direction be in the introduction or in any other part of the will, that all the debts of the testator shall be paid, or the devise be of his real estate after the payment of all his debts, it is deemed equally clear that he intends that all his debts shall be paid; which in case of a deficiency of his personal assets can be done only by charging his real estate. The testator is thus deemed to intend to perform an act of justice before he does an act of generosity. This course of decision has undoubtedly been produced by a strong desire on the part of Courts of Equity to prevent gross injustice to creditors, and to compel debtors to do that which is morally right and just; or, as it has been expressively said, that men may not sin in their graves.² (a)

1247. The principal exceptions to this doctrine seem to be reducible to two heads; first, where the testator after generally directing his debts to be paid (without charging any funds expressly) has provided or pointed out a specific fund for that purpose;³ secondly, where the debts are directed to be paid by

¹ *King v. Denison*, 1 Ves. & B. 273, 274; *Knightly v. Knightly*, 2 Ves. jr. 328; *Shallcross v. Findon*, 3 Ves. 738; *Williams v. Chitty*, 545; *Clifford v. Lewis*, 6 Madd. Ch. Pr. 33; *Lupton v. Lupton*, 2 John. Ch. R. 623; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 483 to 488. The cases are very fully and ably collected by Mr. Jarman in his edition of *Powell on Devises*, vol. 2, ch. 34, pp. 644 to 653; *Graves v. Graves*, 8 Sim. R. 43, 54 to 56. This last case was exceedingly strong. The testator by his will directed all his debts, legacies, and personal charges to be paid as soon as conveniently might be after his death; afterwards he devoted a particular estate to the payment of his debts, legacies, and personal charges in aid of his personal estate; and he devised the residue of his estate in strict settlement. It was held that the preliminary words charged all his real estate, and that the subsequent words did not cut down the intent to the particular estate; but that all the real estate was liable if the specific real estate would not pay all the debts, legacies, and personal charges. *Dover v. Gregory*, 10 Simons, R. 393; *Parker v. Marchant*, 1 Younge & Coll. New R. 290.

² *Thomas v. Britnell*, 2 Ves. 314; 2 *Powell on Devises*, by Jarman, ch. 34, p. 653; *Price v. North*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 83.

³ *Thomas v. Britnell*, 2 Ves. 313; 2 *Powell on Devises*, by Jarman, ch. 34, pp. 653, 654. But see *Graves v. Graves*, 8 Sim. R. 43; *supra*, § 1246, note 1; *Price v. North*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 83.

(a) See *Corwine v. Corwine*, 24 N. 319; *Chapin v. Waters*, 116 Mass. 140; *J. Eq. 579*, *Gurlick v. Clark*, 3 Thomp. Lapham v. Clapp, 10 R. I. 543. & C. 315; *Bynum v. Hill*, 71 N. Car.

the executors and no lands are devised to them to which by implication the debts could be attached.¹ (a) Each of these exceptions proceeds upon the same ground of presumed intention in the testator. If the testator assigns a specific fund for the payment of his debts, that (naturally enough) is construed to exclude any intention to appropriate a more general fund for the same purpose; 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.'² (b) If the testator directs a particular person to pay, he is presumed, in the absence of all other circumstances, to intend him to pay out of the funds with which he is intrusted, and not out of other funds over which he has no control. If the executor is pointed out as the person to pay, that excludes the presumption that other persons not named are required to pay.³ (c) The distinc-

¹ *Brydges v. Landen*, cited 3 Ves. jr. 550; *Keeling v. Brown*, 5 Ves. 359; *Powell v. Robins*, 7 Ves. 209; *Willan v. Lancaster*, 3 Russ. R. 108; 2 *Powell on Devises*, by Jarman, ch. 34, p. 654; *Symons v. James*, 2 *Younge & Coll. New R.* 301.

² But see *Graves v. Graves*, 8 Sim. R. 43, 54 to 56; ante, § 1246, note 1.

³ The same general doctrine, with the like exceptions, will perhaps apply to cases where legacies as well as debts are in question, although formerly a distinction was certainly taken between them. See *Knightly v. Knightly*, 2 Ves. jr. 328; *Chitty v. Williams*, 3 Ves. 551; *Keeling v. Brown*, 5 Ves. 361; *Davis v. Gardner*, 2 P. Will. 187, and Mr. Cox's note (1); *Trött v. Vernon*, Prec. Ch. 430; 2 *Powell on Devises*, by Jarman, ch. 34, pp. 659 to 663; 1 *Roper on Legacies*, by White, ch. 12, § 2, pp. 574 to 595. Where the executor is devisee of the real estate, a direction to him to pay debts and legacies will amount to a charge of both debts and legacies on the real estate. *Aubrey v. Middleton*, 2 Eq. Abr. 497, pl. 16; *Alcock v. Sparhawk*, 2 Vern. 228; s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. 198, pl. 4; *Barker v. Duke of Devonshire*, 3 Meriv. R. 310; 2 *Powell on Devises*, by Jarman, ch. 34, pp. 657, 658. But if a limited interest were given in the realty to the executor, or to one of the executors only, it might be different. See *Keeling v. Brown*, 5 Ves. 359. Where a testator devised his lands in trust to be sold, declaring that the produce should go in the same manner as the personal estate, and afterwards he made a bequest of his personal estate 'after payment of his debts,' it was held that the real estate was charged with the debts. *Kidney v. Coussmaker*, 1 Ves. jr. 436. A devise of the residue of the testator's estate, with a previous direction to pay debts and legacies, will amount to a charge upon the real estate. *Hassel v. Hassel*, 2 Dick. R. 526; *Aubrey v. Middleton*, 2 Eq. Abr. 497, pl. 16; *Bench v. Biles*, 4 Madd. R. 187; 2 *Powell on Devises*, by Jarman, ch. 34, pp. 657,

(a) See *Wisden v. Wisden*, 2 Smale & G. 396; *Cook v. Dawson*, 3 DeG. F. & J. 127.

(b) See *Doolittle v. Hilton*, 63 Me. 537.

(c) See *Corwine v. Corwine*, 8 C. E. Green, 368; *Wertz's Appeal*, 69 Penn. St. 173; *Brisben's Appeal*, 70 Penn. St. 405.

tion seems very nice, but it is intelligible in theory, however difficult it may be in its application to particular cases.

1247 *a*. Perhaps it would have been more satisfactory and conformable to the real intention of the testator in all cases of this sort, to have held that where the testator directed all his debts to be paid without specifying any particular fund out of which they were exclusively to be paid, it should, in the absence of all positive controlling words, be construed as a general declaration that all his debts should be paid out of his estate, whether real or personal (the latter being the primary and the former the secondary fund for this purpose), without any regard to the person who might be directed as executor, or otherwise, to pay them; except that he was to be deemed the immediate trustee, or conduit, through whom the duty was to be discharged. But whether this suggestion be well founded or not, it is certain that the more recent authorities do not appear to place any stress upon the fact that the executor is himself directed to pay the debts, if he be also devisee of the estate, or residuary legatee and devisee, as well as executor; for in such a case the presumption that he is solely to pay out of the personal estate or funds in his hands as executor is repelled by showing that the real estate is also under his control and management. Therefore where the testator by his will directed all his just debts and funeral charges to be paid and satisfied by his executor thereafter named, and then after giving legacies and an annuity he gave all his real and personal estate to his nephew A, and absolutely appointed him executor, it was held that the debts were chargeable on the real estate.¹ So where the testator ordered all his just debts and funeral charges, and the charges of proving his will, to be fully discharged by his executor thereafter named, and after giving several pecuniary legacies he devised to his son A all his copyhold estates which had been surrendered to the use of his will, and gave him the rest and residue of his estate and effects of what nature or kind soever, and appointed him sole executor and

661. The distinctions in many of the cases are extremely nice, and it is not practicable to give them at large without occupying too large a space in this work. See also *Henvell v. Whitaker*, 3 Russ. R. 343; *Dover v. Gregory*, 10 Simons, R. 393.

¹ *Henvell v. Whitaker*, 3 Russ. R. 343; *Finch v. Hattersley*, 3 Russ. R. 345, note.

residuary legatee, it was held that the debts were chargeable upon the real estate.¹ (a)

1248. Another class of implied liens or trusts arises, or rather is continued by implication, where a party who takes an estate which is already subject to a debt or other charge makes himself personally liable by his own express contract or covenant for the

¹ *Dover v Gregory*, 10 Simons, R. 393, 399. On this occasion the Vice-Chancellor (Sir L. Shadwell) said: 'I perfectly well recollect that the case of *Henvell v. Whitaker* was argued with great earnestness on both sides, and I must say that in my opinion the decision in that case is right. I am willing that this will should be construed according to the intention of the testator. First of all, there is a plain intention that the executor should pay the debts and the funeral expenses, of course; and it does not amount to an evidence of intention that he is not to pay the debts, because he is to pay the funeral expenses. And as the testator says, "I order and ordain that all my just debts and funeral expenses, and the charges of proving this my will, shall be fully discharged by my executor hereinafter named," he denotes an intention that his executor should pay his debts, and should pay them by the means which the testator has supplied him with, either by a gift of property or by suffering it to descend. If the heir had been a stranger, there would have been sufficient in the will to enable him to take the fee. There is an intention that he should pay the debts; and the fact that the testator gives the copyholds without words of inheritance shows that he meant that the debts should be paid out of the copyholds. The court in construing a will is bound to give a meaning to every word if it can, and not to reject any words as being surplusage if it can be avoided. I admit that the expression "residuary legatee" ordinarily would apply to a person who is to take the undisposed-of personal estate. But where the testator has given all the rest and residue of his estate and effects whatsoever or wheresoever, or of what nature or kind soever, unto and to the use of his son, John Ayer, and then says, "whom I hereby appoint sole executor and residuary legatee of this my will," those words may be fairly construed to mean that he intended his son should take all his property, of every description, which he had not before given. I think that I am bound by the case of *Henvell v. Whitaker* to hold that the debts in this case are charged on the copyholds.' See *Parker v. Marchant*, 1 Younge & Coll. New R. 290. See, when the personal estate is deemed exonerated by a charge of debts upon the real estate, *Colville v. Middleton*, 3 Beav. R. 570.

(a) See *Harper v. Munday*, 7 DeG. M. & G. 369; ante, § 1246. 'Where there is a direction that the executors shall pay the testator's debts, followed by a gift of all his real estate to them, either beneficially or in trust, all the debts will be payable out of all the estate so given to them. The same rule applies whether the executors take the whole beneficial interest, as in *Henvell v. Whitaker*, 3 Russ. 343, or

only a life interest, as in *Finch v. Hattersley*, *Ib.* 345 a, or no beneficial interest at all, as in *Hartland v. Murrell*, 27 Beav. 204.' Fry, J. in *Bailey v. Bailey*, 12 Ch. D. 268, 273; *Jessell, M. R.*, in *In re Tanqueray-Williaume*, 20 Ch. D. 465, 476. See the last case and *Stroughill v. Anstey*, 1 DeG. M. & G. as to the time when it may be presumed by a purchaser that the debts have been paid.

same debt or charge. In such a case the original lien or charge is not only not (*a*) displaced thereby, but the real estate is treated throughout as the primary fund. So that in case of the death of the debtor, as between his heirs, devisees, and distributees the debt if paid out of his personal assets will still be deemed a primary charge upon the real estate, and as such followed in favor of creditors, legatees, and others entitled to the personal assets.¹ Thus for example where a settler upon a marriage settlement created a trust term in his real estate for the raising of portions, and also covenanted to pay the amount of the portions, it was held to be a charge primarily on the real estate, and the personal estate to be auxiliary only. On that occasion it was said by the Master of the Rolls (Sir William Grant): 'It is difficult to conceive how a man can make himself a debtor (although by the same instrument he charges the real estate) without subjecting his personal assets in the first instance to the payment of the debt. Here the settler certainly makes himself a debtor by his covenant. Where a person becomes entitled to an estate subject to a charge and then covenants to pay it, the charge still remains primarily on the real estate, and the covenant is only a collateral security; because the debt is not the original debt of the covenantor.'² (*b*)

¹ Ante, §§ 574, 1003; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 397.

² Lechmere v. Charlton, 15 Ves. 197, 198; McLearn v. McLellan, 10 Peters, R. 625; ante, § 1003; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 397. There are many other cases in

(*a*) This word, which appears in editions of the time of the author, has disappeared from editions since his death. Of course it belongs in the text.

(*b*) At common law there were two distinct cases of the sort referred to in the text: —

1. The deviser himself creates a charge upon the land devised by him. In that case his personalty still was to pay off the charge, unless he manifested in the will a different purpose. *Hewes v. Dehon*, 3 Gray, 205, 208. If then the creditor enforced payment out of the land, a trust arose against the legatees and distributees to make the devisee good. And the case would be similar where the party who created

the incumbrance died intestate; if the land was taken, the heir would have the benefit of the trust. See *Hewes v. Dehon*, supra.

2. The deviser (or intestate) acquires an estate already incumbered. In that case the land devised (or descended) subject to the charge must, both at common law and by statute, have had to pay off the same, unless the decedent manifested a different purpose. See ante, §§ 501, 571, 572, 576; *Hewes v. Dehon*, supra; *McLenahan v. McLenahan*, 3 C. E. Green, 101. If in this case the creditor has enforced payment out of the personalty, a trust arises in favor of the legatees or distributees, as affected,

1249. It may be considered as a general rule (though not as a universal rule) that a covenant by a settler to convey and settle

which, although the party covenants to pay money, the land is treated as the primary fund to be applied to discharge the debt. Some of these cases have already been mentioned under the head of Marshalling Assets, in the first volume of this work. Ante, §§ 574 to 576. A curious question arose in the case of *McLeran v. McLellau*, 10 Peters, R. 625. There A had purchased a plantation on which he put slaves, and paid part of the purchase-money in his lifetime and gave a judgment for the residue. He then died, leaving his son B his devisee of the land and slaves. B, in order to obtain possession of the land mortgaged, gave his own bond, secured by a mortgage on the land and slaves, for the remaining unpaid part of the judgment. B afterwards died,

against the devisee (or heir). But if in this second case the devisor entered into any personal undertaking with the creditor to pay off the charge, this at common law shifted the burden from the land to the personal estate bequeathed. It was not enough however to charge the personalty that the devisor might have been compelled to pay off the incumbrance between himself and the original debtor who had created the charge. *Scott v. Beecher*, 5 Madd. 96. That would always be the case between the grantor and the grantee of an incumbered estate. *Campbell v. Shrum*, 3 Watts, 60; *Trevor v. Perkins*, 5 Whart. 244. To have the effect referred to, the devisor must have made himself by contract personally and directly liable at law for the debt, to the owner of the incumbrance. Even giving a covenant or bond for the purpose would not be enough 'unless accompanied with circumstances showing a decided intention to make thereby the debt personally his own.' *Cumberland v. Codrington*, 3 Johns. Ch. 229, 257, 272; *Tweddell v. Tweddell*, 2 Bro. C. C. 101, 152; *Butler v. Butler*, 5 Ves. 534.

The rule of the common law has however been changed by statute in England and in some of the States of the Union. By that change the land must pay off the incumbrance in both cases (i. e. whether the devisor or intestate created the incumbrance or ac-

quired the land after it was created), unless in the case of a will there shall be a different expression of intention, or, in New York, an 'express direction in the will.' 17 & 18 Vict. ch. 113; 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 69; 40 & 41 Vict. ch. 34; 1 Rev. Stats. N. Y. 749, ed. 1829; 1 Edmonds's Stats. at Large, 790, § 4.

It is not enough to charge the personalty under such statutes, even where the debt is the proper debt of the devisor, that the devisor has directed his executor to pay all his debts. *Woolstencroft v. Woolstencroft*, 6 Jur. n. s. 866. And the same would be true of a residuary gift of real and personal estate 'subject to the payment of debts.' *Lewis v. Lewis*, L. R. 13 Eq. 218.

The same sort of implied trust from the disturbance of the estate may arise of course where there is no expression of intention, direct or indirect, on the part of the testator or intestate. In such a case the intention of the law in regard to the settlement of the estate supplies the place of the decedent's will, and governs between the beneficiaries. And if between them one branch of the estate has been unduly affected by the payment of debts, a trust will be implied in favor of those who have suffered, requiring those who have had the temporary advantage to make good the situation. See ante, §§ 503, 561, 570.

lands (not specifying any in particular), will not constitute a specific lien on his lands; and the covenantee will be deemed a

leaving a part of the debt unsatisfied, and afterwards the mortgage was foreclosed, and the debt paid by a sale of the lands decreed on the foreclosure. The next of kin of A were aliens, capable of taking his personal estate but incapable of taking lands; and the latter therefore descended to other persons who were citizens. One question was, whether under all the circumstances the unpaid purchase-money ought to be borne out of the personal estate or out of the real estate of B. The heirs of the real estate insisted that it ought to be paid out of the personal estate, and so they were entitled to come on the personal estate for the amount for which the land was sold. The court held that it ought to be apportioned on both funds. Mr. Justice McLean, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'The important question must now be considered, how this mortgage debt shall be discharged. Shall it be paid out of the real estate, or out of the personal, or out of both? That the land should not be wholly exempt from this incumbrance is clear by every rule of equity which applies to cases of this description. In addition to the consideration that the mortgage binds the land, the fact that a considerable part of the debt was incurred for its purchase cannot be wholly disregarded. Nor would it comport with the principles of equity to make the whole debt a charge upon the land to the exemption of the personal property, as the lien of the mortgage covers the personal as well as the real property, and as at least a part of the debt was contracted on other accounts than the purchase of the land. The rights of the foreign heirs, under the laws of Georgia, are to be regarded equally as those of the domestic heirs. Each have interests in the property of the deceased, which are alike entitled to the consideration and protection of a Court of Chancery. Suppose James H. M'Learn had died leaving a will, by which he devised different tracts of land to different persons capable of taking by devise, and the entire real estate was encumbered by a mortgage or other lien, which, after the will took effect, had been paid by sale of one of the tracts of land. Could a Court of Chancery hesitate, in such a case, to require a contribution from the devisees not affected by the sale, so as to make the lien a charge upon all the land? The plainest dictates of justice would require this, whether regard be had to the rights of the devisees or to the intention of the testator. And is not the case put analogous to the one under consideration? By the act of the elder M'Learn, his property, both real and personal, was incumbered. The heirs, both foreign and domestic, of the younger M'Learn, who take this property, take it charged with the continued incumbrance. That James M'Learn had a right, and was bound to continue this charge upon his property, no one will dispute. He might have left the debt, with the consent of the creditor, if there had been no prior lien, to be discharged out of his estate, as the law authorized; and in such case it would have been payable out of the personal estate. Or he might have made the debt a specific charge on his personal property or on his real. But he did neither. He charged its payment, in pursuance of the judgment lien, on his property, both personal and real. This lien, as between the distributees, fixes the rule by which their rights must be decided. The domestic heirs cannot claim to receive the land free from the lien of the mortgage, nor can the foreign heirs claim the personal property exempt from it. In equity it would seem that each description of heirs should contribute to the payment of

creditor by specialty only.¹ But in some cases of this sort in favor of a dowress Courts of Equity have established a lien upon

the mortgage debt in proportion to the fund received. This rule, while it would do justice to the parties, would give effect to the intention of the ancestor. That intention is clearly shown by the lien created on the property, and by the rules of equity such intention must be regarded. The decision of this case must rest upon familiar and well-established principles in equity; and these principles will be shown by a reference to adjudicated cases. In the case of *Pollexfen v. Moore*, 3 Atk. 272, it appears Moore in his lifetime agreed to purchase an estate from the plaintiff for £1,200, but died before he had paid the whole purchase-money. Moore, by will, after giving a legacy of £800 to the defendant, his sister, devises the estate purchased, and all his personal estate, to John Kemp, and makes him his executor. The executor commits a devastavit on the personal estate, and dies, and the estate descends upon his son and heir at law. Pollexfen brought his bill against the representative of the real and personal estate of Moore and Kemp, to be paid the remainder of the purchase-money. Mrs. Moore, the sister and legatee of Thomas Moore, brings her cross-bill, and prays, if the remainder of the purchase-money should be paid to Pollexfen out of the personal estate of Moore and Kemp, that she may stand in his place, and be considered as having a lien upon the purchased estate for her legacy of £800. And the Lord Chancellor said "that the estate which has descended from John Kemp, the executor of Moore, upon Bayle Kemp, comes to him liable to the same equity as it would have been against the father, who has misapplied the personal

¹ Sugden on Vendors, ch. 15, § 4, p. 633 (7th edit.); *Freemoult v. Dedire*, 1 P. Will. 429; *Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea*, 1 P. Will. 277; *Williams v. Lucas*, 1 P. Will. 430, Mr. Cox's note (1); s. c. 2 Cox, R. 160; *Berrington v. Evans*, 3 Younge & Coll. 384, 392. Mr. Fonblanque says (1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 5, § 7, note *d*) that a covenant to settle or convey particular lands will not create at law a lien upon the land; but that in equity such a covenant, if for a valuable consideration, will be deemed a specific lien on the lands, and decreed against all persons claiming under the covenantor, except purchasers for a valuable consideration, and without notice of such covenant. For which he cites *Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea*, 1 P. Will. 282; *Freemoult v. Dedire*, 1 P. Will. 429; *Jackson v. Jackson*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 462 (which turned on the execution of a power), and *Coventry v. Coventry*, 2 P. Will. 222; 1 Str. R. 596; *Gilb. Eq. R.* 160; s. c. at the end of Francis's *Maxims in Equity* (edit. 1739). He adds in the next note (2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 5, § 7, note *e*) that a general covenant to settle lands of a certain value, without mentioning any lands in particular, will not create a specific lien on any of the lands of the covenantor, and therefore cannot be specifically decreed in equity (*Freemoult v. Dedire*, 1 P. Will. 429); but if the covenantor expressly declare the settlement to be in execution of his power over lands, though the particular land to be charged be not specified, equity will ascertain them. For which he cites *Coventry v. Coventry*, ubi supra. This apparent exception proceeds upon the ground that the power, being to be executed out of particular lands, is a specification when executed of the particular lands to be charged. But see ante, § 1131, p. 472, and note 1.

real property by what has been called a very subtle equity, where perhaps it would be difficult to maintain it in ordinary cases.

estate; and in order to relieve Mrs. Moore I will direct Pollexfen to take his satisfaction upon the purchased estate, because he has an equitable lien both upon the real and personal estate, and will leave this last fund open, that Mrs. Moore, who can at most be considered only as a simple contract creditor, may have a chance of being paid out of the personal assets." This case shows that in England the rule which requires the personal property to be first applied in the payment of debts is deviated from where the justice of the case and the rights of parties interested require it. Had the debt due to Pollexfen been directed to be paid out of the personal property, it would have left no part of that fund to pay the legacy of Mrs. Moore; and for this reason the debt was decreed to be paid out of the land. Now if the mortgage debt in the present case shall be directed to be paid out of the personal fund, it would defeat the foreign heirs, whose claim to the property, under the law of Georgia, cannot be less strong than a bequest. In 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. 252, it is laid down as between the representatives of the real and personal estate, that the land is the primary fund to pay off a mortgage. And in 2 Bro. 57, Lord Kenyon, as Master of the Rolls, laid down the same rule: that where an estate descends or comes to one subject to a mortgage, although the mortgage be afterwards assigned, and the party enter into a covenant to pay the money borrowed, yet that shall not bind his personal estate. There is no doctrine better established than that the purchase of land subject to a mortgage debt does not make the debt personal; and on the question being raised, such debt has been uniformly charged on the land. And this principle is not changed where additional security has been given. In the case of *Evelyn v. Evelyn*, 2 P. Wms. 659, where A mortgaged the land for £1,500, his son B covenanted with the assignee of the mortgagee to pay the money. He succeeded to the premises after the death of his father, and died intestate. The question was, whether his personal estate under the covenant should be applied in payment of the mortgage; and it was decided that the land should be charged, and the covenant was only considered as additional security. In the case of *Waring v. Ward*, 7 Ves. 334, Lord Eldon says: "The principle upon which the personal estate is first liable in general cases is that the contract primarily is a personal contract, the personal estate receiving the benefit; and being primarily a personal contract, the land is bound only in aid of the personal obligation to fulfil that personal contract." It has long been settled therefore that upon a loan of money, the party meaning to mortgage in aid of the bond, covenant, or simple contract debt, if there is neither bond nor covenant, his personal estate, if he dies, must pay the debt for the benefit of the heir. But suppose a second descent cast, and the question arises, the personal estate of the son and his real estate having descended to the grandson; then the personal estate of the son shall not pay it, as it never was the personal contract of the son. And this is the well-established rule on this subject. If the contract be personal, although a mortgage be given, the mortgage is considered in aid of the personal contract; and on the decease of the mortgagor his personal estate will be considered the primary fund, because the contract was personal. But if the estate descend to the grandson of the mortgagor, then the charge would be upon the land, as the debt was not the personal debt of the immediate ancestor. And so if the contract was in regard to the realty, the debt

Thus where a man before marriage gave a bond to convey sufficient freehold or copyhold estates to raise £600 per annum for

is a charge on the land. It is in this way that a Court of Chancery, by looking at the origin of the debt, is enabled to fix the rule between distributees. In the case under consideration the mortgage was given by James H. M'Learn, but was not given to secure a debt created by him. The mortgage merely changed the security, but did not affect the extent of the judgment lien. And this judgment was obtained chiefly for the purchase-money of the estate. In effect the debt for which the judgment was obtained against Archibald M'Learn, and for which the mortgage was given, constituted an equitable lien on the land; and had the mortgage covered only the land, it must have been considered the primary fund. The debt for which the mortgage was given was not the personal contract of James H. M'Learn, but the contract of his ancestor in the purchase of the estate. But if the contract was personal, and might have been a charge on the personal estate devised to James H. M'Learn, yet the character of the debt in this respect is changed in the hands of the present heirs. In the language of Lord Eldon this debt cannot be a charge on the personalty, because it was not created by the personal contract of James H. M'Learn. This, under the authorities cited, would be the rule for the payment of the mortgage debt if James H. M'Learn had not executed a mortgage on the personal as well as the real property, which as devisee he received from his father. This mortgage on the personal property cannot be considered in the light of additional security to the lien which before existed. If it could be considered in this light, the land would still be the primary fund, and the personal mortgage as surety or auxiliary to the land. But this mortgage can in no respect be considered as additional security. It might have been so considered in reference to the equitable lien of the vendor for the purchase-money, as such lien was limited to the land; but the lien of the judgment obtained against the ancestor of James H. M'Learn, and for which the mortgage was substituted, extended, as before remarked, to the personal as well as real estate of the defendant. The debt then for which the mortgage was given did not arise from the personal contract of James H. M'Learn, but by the contract of his ancestor; and the mortgage was given in discharge of the judgment. This created no new lien upon the personal property. It came to James H. M'Learn under the will of his father, subject to the lien of the judgment. The mortgage then did not and was not intended to create any new charge upon the personalty, but to continue in a different form that which already existed. In this view the charge upon the personal estate can no more be disregarded than the charge upon the real; and in this respect this case differs from the cases referred to. The charge on both funds under the mortgage may be compared to a will devising the funds to the respective heirs now before the court, as the statute provides, and leaving the debts as a charge upon his real and personal property. Can any one doubt that such a bequest would be considered by a Court of Chancery as a charge upon both funds? Now although James H. M'Learn has made no will, as in the supposed case, yet he gave a mortgage to continue the charge on the personal property, which existed under the judgment; and the law of Georgia fixes the rule of descent. This act of the ancestor, connected with the Georgia law of descent, gives as decided and clear a direction to the property, both real and personal, under the mortgage, as if in his last will James

his intended wife in bar of dower, and the intended wife, by a memorandum subscribed to the bond, declared her free acceptance of the jointure in bar and satisfaction of dower, and the marriage took effect, and the husband died without having conveyed any such estates, it was decreed that she should be deemed specialty creditor, and entitled to be paid the arrears of her annuity out of his personal estate in the course of administration; and if that was not sufficient, then out of the real estates in the settlement of which he was tenant in tail, provided such deficiencies did not exceed the amount of the dower which she would have been entitled to thereout in case she had not accepted the annuity for her life.¹

1250. Another class of implied trusts which may be mentioned under this head is that which arises under contract or otherwise by operation of law from a claim which may be directly enforced at law against one party, but to the due discharge of which another party is ultimately liable. In such a case a Court of Equity treats it as a trust by the party ultimately liable, which may be directly enforced in favor of the party ultimately entitled to the benefit of it. In other words a Court of Equity will make the party immediately liable, who is or may be at law or in equity made ultimately liable. Thus for example if a chose in action not negotiable at all or not negotiable by the local law, except to create a legal right of action between the immediate debtor or indorser and his immediate indorsee or assignee, should be passed to a remote assignee or indorsee, the latter would be entitled in equity directly to sue the party who was ultimately or circuitously liable for the debt to the antecedent holder or creditor.² Upon the same ground if a trust is created for the benefit of a party who is to be the ultimate receiver of the money or other thing which constitutes the subject-matter of the trust, he may sustain a suit in equity to have the money or other thing

H. M'Learn had so devised it. Both funds being charged with the mortgage debt must be applied to its payment in proportion to their respective amounts. And as the property, both real and personal, has been converted into money, the proportionate part of each can be applied to this payment without difficulty.' See also *Berrington v. Evans*, 3 Younge & Coll. 384, 392.

¹ *Foster v. Foster*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 489, 493; s. c. under the name of *Tew v. Earl of Winterton*, 1 Ves. jr. 451; *Sugden on Vendors*, ch. 15, § 4, pp. 633, 634 (7th edit.); 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 471, 472. See ante, § 1231.

² *Riddle v. Mandeville*, 5 Cranch, 322; ante, § 1087 a.

directly paid or delivered to himself;¹ (a) for in such a case he is entitled to dispose of it as the absolute owner.

1251. Another illustration of implied trusts may be found in the common case of a suit in equity by a creditor of an estate to recover his debt from legatees or distributees who have received payment of their claims from the executor (acting by mistake but bona fide and without fault) before a due discharge of all the debts. In such a case the executor who has so distributed the assets may be sued at law by the creditor. But the legatees and distributees, although there was an original deficiency of assets, are not at law suable by the creditor. Yet he has a clear right in equity, in such a case, to follow the assets of the testator into their hands as a trust fund for the payment of his debt. The legatees and distributees are in equity treated as trustees for this purpose; for they are not entitled to anything except the surplus of the assets after all the debts are paid. Besides, they, in the case put, being ultimately responsible to pay the debt to the executor out of such assets, if the executor should be compelled to pay it to the creditor by a suit at law, may be made immediately liable to the creditor in equity.² But the other is the more broad and general ground, as the creditor may sometimes have a remedy where the executor, if he has paid over the assets, might not have any against the legatees or distributees.³

1252. Perhaps to this same head of implied trusts upon presumed intention (although it might equally well be deemed to fall under the head of constructive trusts by operation of law) we may refer that class of cases where the stock and other property of private corporations is deemed a trust fund for the payment of the debts of the corporation; so that the creditors have a lien or right of priority of payment on it, in preference to any of the stockholders in the corporation. Therefore if a corpora-

¹ *Russel v. Clarke's Executors*, 7 Cranch, 69, 97; *McCall v. Harrison*, 1 Brock. Cir. R. 126; ante, §§ 790 to 793, 1213.

² *Riddle v. Mandeville*, 5 Cranch, R. 329, 330; ante, §§ 90 to 92, and notes.

³ *Ibid.*; *Anon.* 1 Vern. 162; *Newman v. Barton*, 2 Vern. 205; *Noel v. Robinson*, 1 Vern. 94, and Mr. Cox's note (1).

(a) See *Buck v. Swasey*, 35 Maine, Wis. 659; *Exchange Bank v. Rice*, 41, 52; *Cromwell v. Brooklyn Ins. Co.*, 107 Mass. 37, 42. 44 N. Y. 42; *Powers v. Powers*, 28

tion is dissolved, the contracts of such corporation are not thereby deemed extinguished, but they survive the dissolution of the corporation, and the creditors may enforce their claims against any property belonging to the corporation which has not passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser; for such property will be held affected with a trust primarily for the creditors of the company, and subject to their right secondarily for the stockholders in proportion to their interests therein.¹ Upon the like ground the capital stock of an incorporated bank is deemed a trust fund for all the debts of the corporation; and no stockholder can entitle himself to any dividend or share of such capital stock until all the debts are paid. And if the capital stock should be divided, leaving any debts unpaid, every stockholder receiving his share of the capital stock would in equity be held liable pro rata to contribute to the discharge of such debts out of the fund in his own hands.² This however is a remedy which can be obtained in equity only; for a Court of Common Law is incapable of administering any just relief, since it has no power of bringing all the proper parties before the court, or of ascertaining the full amount of the debts, the mode of contribution, the number of the contributors, or the cross equities and liabilities which may be absolutely required for a proper adjustment of the rights of all parties as well as of the creditors.³ (a)

1253. A case of an analogous nature is that of partnership property on which the joint creditors in case of insolvency are deemed in equity to have a right of priority of payment before the private creditors of any separate partner. The joint prop-

¹ *Mumma v. The Potomac Company*, 8 Peters, R. 281, 286.

² *Wood v. Dummer*, 3 Mason, R. 308; *Vose v. Grant*, 15 Mass. R. 505, 517, 522; *Spear v. Grant*, 16 Mass. R. 9, 15; *Curson v. African Company*, 1 Vern. R. 121; s. c. *Skinner*, R. 84.

³ *Ibid.*

(a) So the officers of a corporation may be restrained from applying the property of the corporation to any illegal purpose, and of course compelled to make restitution when any such illegal application has been made. *Frost v. Belmont*, 6 Allen, 152; *Citizens' Loan Assoc. v. Lyon*, 29 N. J. Eq. See further as to what will justify interference *Merchants' Line v. Waganer*,

71 Ala. 581; *Dimpfell v. Ohio R. Co.*, 110 U. S. 209; *Detroit v. Dean*, 106 U. S. 537; *Hawes v. Oakland*, 104 U. S. 450; *Brewer v. Boston Theatre*, 104 Mass. 378; ante, vol. 1, p. 332.

The relation of trustees and cestuis que trust subsists between directors of companies and the shareholders. *Flitcroft's Case*, 21 Ch. D. 519, 525. See vol. 1, p. 332, note.

erty is deemed a trust fund, primarily to be applied to the discharge of the partnership debts against all persons not having a higher equity.¹ A long series of authorities (as has been truly said) has established this equity of the joint creditors to be worked out through the medium of the partners ;² that is to say, the partners have a right inter sese to have the partnership property first applied to the discharge of the partnership debts, and no partner has any right except to his own share of the residue ; and the joint creditors are in case of insolvency substituted in equity to the rights of the partners as being the ultimate cestuis que trust of the fund to the extent of the joint debts. The creditors indeed have no lien, but they have something approaching to a lien ; that is, they have a right to sue at law, and by judgment and execution to obtain possession of the property ;³ and in equity they have a right to follow it as a trust into the possession of all persons who have not a superior title. But in the mean time the creditors cannot prevent the partners from transferring it by a bona fide alienation.⁴

1254. Having considered some of the more important classes of implied trusts arising from the presumed intention of the parties, we may next pass to the consideration of those implied trusts (or perhaps, more properly speaking, those constructive trusts) which are independent of any such intention and are forced upon the conscience of the party by the mere operation of law. Some cases of this sort have been already incidentally mentioned under former heads. But a concise review of the general doctrine seems indispensable in this place to a thorough understanding of equitable jurisdiction.

1255. One of the most common cases in which a Court of Equity acts upon the ground of implied trusts in invitum is where a party has received money which he cannot conscientiously withhold from another party.⁵ It has been well remarked

¹ Ante, §§ 675, 1207, 1243.

² *Campbell v. Mullet*, 2 Swanst. R. 574; *West v. Skip*, 1 Ves. 237, 455; *Ex parte Ruffin*, 6 Ves. 126 to 128; *Wood v. Dummer*, 3 Mason, R. 312, 313; *Murray v. Murray*, 5 John. Ch. R. 60; *Taylor v. Fields*, 4 Ves. 396; *Young v. Keighley*, 15 Ves. 557; ante, §§ 675, 1207, 1243.

³ *Ibid.*; *Ex parte Ruffin*, 6 Ves. 126 to 128; *Ex parte Williams*, 11 Ves. 3, 5, 6; *Ex parte Kendall*, 17 Ves. 521, 526.

⁴ Ante, § 675.

⁵ *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 2 A. 1; *Id.* 4 W. 5.

that the receiving of money which consistently with conscience cannot be retained is in equity sufficient to raise a trust in favor of the party for whom or on whose account it was received.¹ (a) This is the governing principle in all such cases. And therefore whenever any interest arises, the true question is, not whether money has been received by a party of which he could not have compelled the payment, but whether he can now, with a safe conscience, *ex æquo et bono* retain it.² Illustrations of this doctrine are familiar in cases of money paid by accident, or mistake, or fraud. (b) And the difference between the payment of money under a mistake of fact, and a payment under a mistake of law, in its operation upon the conscience of the party, presents the equitable qualifications of the doctrine in a striking manner.³

1256. It is true that Courts of Law now entertain jurisdiction in many cases of this sort, where formerly the remedy was solely in equity; as for example in an action of *assumpsit* for money had and received, where the money cannot conscientiously be withheld by the party;⁴ following out the rule of the civil law, '*Quod conditio indebiti non datur ultra quam locupletior factus est qui accepit.*'⁵ But this does not oust the general jurisdiction of Courts of Equity over the subject-matter, which had for many ages before been in full exercise, although it renders a resort to them for relief less common as well as less necessary than it formerly was.⁶ Still however there are many cases of this sort

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (b).

² *Ibid.*

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (b); ante, §§ 111, 140 to 142.

⁴ *Farmer v. Arundel*, 2 W. Black. R. 824; *Moses v. Macferland*, 2 Burr. 1012; *Bize v. Dickason*, 1 Term. R. 185; *Bilbie v. Lumley*, 2 East, R. 469.

⁵ 2 Burr. 1011. See also Dig. Lib. 12, tit. 6, *passim*.

⁶ Ante, § 60.

(a) See ante, § 1211; *Scott v. Rand*, 118 Mass. 215; *Child v. Thorley*, 16 Ch. D. 151. Thus one who has a debt due from a trustee or an executor who is a trustee, and, knowing that it is a private debt, should apply, or allow to be applied, the estate of the testator or a trust fund of any description in payment of that debt, that being in no way connected with the trust fund, must repay all the money so applied. *Child v. Thorley*, 16 Ch. D. 151; *Wilson v. Moore*, 1 Mylne & K. 337.

(b) Or theft. Equity will e. g. charge land, paid for in part with money known to have been stolen from a bank, with a trust in favor of the bank. *National Bank v. Barry*, 125 Mass. 20. See *Newton v. Porter*, 69 N. Y. 133.

where it is indispensible to resort to Courts of Equity for adequate relief, and especially where the transactions are complicated, and a discovery from the defendant is requisite.¹

1257. Another instance perhaps more comprehensive in its reach in which Courts of Equity act by creating trusts in invitum is where a party purchases trust property, knowing it to be such, from the trustee in violation of the objects of the trust. In such a case Courts of Equity (as we have before had occasion to state²) force the trust upon the conscience of the guilty party, and compel him to perform it, and to hold the property subject to it, in the same manner as the trustee himself held it.³ (a) It has been truly said by an eminent judge that the only thing to be inquired of in a Court of Equity in cases of this sort is, whether the property bound by the trust has come into the hands of persons who were either compellable to execute the trust or to preserve the property for the persons entitled to it.⁴ It is upon this ground and this alone that persons colluding with the executor or administrator in a known misapplication of the assets of the estate are made responsible for the property in their hands; for they are treated as purchasers with notice, and thus as mere trustees of the parties who are entitled to the assets, the latter being a trust fund under the administration of the executor or administrator.⁵

1258. Upon similar principles, wherever the property of a party has been wrongfully misapplied, or a trust fund has been wrongfully converted into another species of property, if its iden-

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note (b); ante, §§ 110 to 116, 140 to 151.

² Ante, §§ 395 to 405; 4 Kent, Comm. Lect. 60 (4th edit.). See also 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 6, § 1, note (a); Id. § 2, note (h). See also Powell v. Monson and Brimfield Manuf. Co., 3 Mason, R. 347; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 28.

³ 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 103, 104; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2, ch. 3, pp. 281, 282; ante, § 395; Adair v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 243, 262; Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Seton, 1 Peters, R. 309; Wilson v. Mason, 1 Cranch, R. 100; Russell v. Clark's Ex'rs, 7 Cranch, R. 69, 97; Murray v. Ballou, 1 John. Ch. R. 566.

⁴ Lord Redesdale, in Adair v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 262. See also Leigh v. Macauley, 1 Younge & Coll. 265, 266.

⁵ Ante, §§ 422, 423; Hill v. Simpson, 7 Ves. 166.

(a) See Child v. Thorley, 16 Ch. 708; Stroud v. Gwyer, 6 Jur. n. s. D. 151; Wilson v. Moore, 1 Mylne & 719; Smith v. Perry, 56 Ala. 266; K. 337; In re Hallett, 13 Ch. D. 696, Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 401.

tity can be traced, it will be held in its new form liable to the rights of the original owner or cestui que trust.¹ (a) The general proposition which is maintained both at law and in equity upon this subject is, that if any property in its original state and form is covered with a trust in favor of the principal, no change of that state and form can divest it of such trust or give the agent or trustee converting it or those who represent him in right (not being bona fide purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice) any more valid claim in respect to it than they respectively had before such change. An abuse of a trust can confer no rights on the party abusing it or on those who claim in privity with him.² This principle is fully recognized at law, in all cases where it is susceptible of being brought out, as a ground of action or of defence in a suit at law. In Courts of Equity it is adopted with a universality of application.³

1259. Thus for instance if A is trusted by B with money to purchase a horse for him, and A purchases a carriage with that money in violation of the trust, B is entitled to the carriage and may, if he chooses so to do, sue for it at law.⁴ So if A entrusts money with a broker to buy Bank of England stock for him, and he invests the money in American stocks, A is entitled to and may maintain an action at law for those stocks, in whose-

¹ A fortiori if the property has been rightfully sold by an agent or trustee, if the proceeds of the sale can be distinctly and separately traced, the property belongs in equity and often in law to the principal. Thus for example if a factor sells goods consigned to him for sale, and takes notes for the purchase-money, those notes, if he fails, will belong to his principal, and not to his own assignees or representatives. *Ex parte Dumas*, 1 Atk. 232, 233; *Scott v. Surman*, Willes, R. 400; *Thompson v. Perkins*, 3 Mason, R. 232; *Burdett v. Willett*, 2 Vern. R. 638; *Grigg v. Cocks*, 4 Simon, R. 438; ante, § 1232; *Wilkins v. Stearns*, 1 Younge & Coll. New R. 431.

² *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 M. & Selw. 574 to 576. (b) The judgment of Lord Ellenborough in this case is very masterly, and deserves an attentive perusal. *Conrad v. Atlantic Insur. Co.*, 1 Peters, S. C. R. 448; *Oliver, &c. v. Pratt*, 3 How. Sup. Ct. R.

³ *Ibid.*; *Hassal v. Smithers*, 12 Ves. 119; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 1, note (c); *Murray v. Lylburn*, 2 John. Ch. R. 441; *Lewin on Trustees*, ch. 11, § 2, pp. 201 to 204.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 Manle & Selw. 574, 575, 576.

(a) *Clapp v. Emery*, 98 Ill. 523, 531; *Smith v. Perry*, 56 Ala. 266; 123. *Newton v. Porter*, 69 N. Y. 133; *National Bank v. Barry*, 125 Mass. 20. (b) See *Ex parte Cooke*, 4 Ch. D.

soever hands he finds them, not being a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice.¹ (a) It matters not in the slightest degree into whatever other form different from the original the change may have been made, whether it be that of promissory notes, or of goods, or of stock; for the product of a substitute for the original thing still follows the nature of the thing itself so long as it can be ascertained to be such. (b) The right ceases only when the means of ascertainment fail; which of course is the case when the subject-matter is turned into money, and mixed and confounded in a general mass of property of the same description.² (c)

1260. Cases may readily be put where this doctrine would be enforced in equity under circumstances in which it could not be applied at law. Thus for instance if a trustee in violation of his duty should lay out the trust money in land and take a conveyance in his own name, the cestui que trust would be without any relief at law. But a Court of Equity would hold the cestui que trust to be the equitable owner of the land, and would decree it to him accordingly; not upon any notion of his having ratified the act, but upon the mere ground of a wrongful conversion creating in foro conscientiæ a trust in his favor.³ (d)

1261. Upon similar grounds, where a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary relation makes a profit out of any transactions within the scope of his agency or authority, that profit will belong to his cestui que trust; for it is a constructive fraud upon the latter to employ that property contrary to the trust and to retain the profit of such misapplication; and by operation of

¹ Ibid. See *Ord v. Noël*, 5 Madd. R. 438; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 29.

² Ibid.; *Copeman v. Gallant*, 1 P. Will. 319, 320; *Ryall v. Rolle*, 1 Atk. 172; *Leigh v. Macauley*, 1 Younge & Coll. 260, 265.

³ *Lane v. Dighton*, *Ambler*, R. 409, 411, 413; 3 M. & Selw. 579; *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 511, 517; *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 John. Ch. R. 582; *Lewis v. Madocks*, 17 Ves. 57, 58; *Phayre v. Peree*, 3 Dow, R. 116; *Sngden on Vendors*, ch. 15, § 3, p. 628 (7th edit.); *Liebman v. Harcourt*, 2 Meriv. R. 513; *Murray v. Lyburn*, 2 John. Ch. R. 442, 443.

(a) *Stroud v. Gwyer*, 6 Jur. n. s. 719. See *Ex parte Cooke*, 4 Ch. D. 123.

(c) *May v. Le Claire*, 11 Wall. 217.

(b) *Smith v. Perry*, 56 Ala. 266; *Clapp v. Emery*, 98 Ill. 523, 531; *In re Hallett*, 13 Ch. D. 696.

(d) Nor will the Statute of Limitations run in favor of a trustee against the cestui que trust ordinarily. *Lister v. Pickford*, 11 Jur. n. s. 649.

equity the profit is immediately converted into a constructive trust in favor of the party entitled to the benefit.¹ (a) For the like reason a trustee becoming a purchaser of the estate of his cestui que trust is deemed incapable of holding it to his own use, and it may be set aside by the cestui que trust.² Nor is the doctrine confined to trustees strictly so called. It extends to all other persons standing in a fiduciary relation to the party, whatever that relation may be.³ (b)

1262. In cases of this sort the cestui que trust (the beneficiary) is not at all bound by the act of the other party. He has therefore an option to insist upon taking the property, or he may disclaim any title thereto and proceed upon any other remedies to which he is entitled either in rem or in personam.⁴ (c) The substituted fund is only liable to his option.⁵ But he cannot insist upon opposite and repugnant rights. Thus for example if a trustee of land has sold the land in violation of his trust, the beneficiary cannot insist upon having the land and also the notes given for the purchase-money; for by taking the latter, at least so far as respects the purchaser, he must be deemed to affirm the sale. On the other hand by following his title in the land he repudiates the sale.⁶

1263. So where an executor or trustee instead of executing any trust as he ought, as by laying out the property either in well-secured real estates or in government securities, takes upon

¹ *Fawcett v. Whitehouse*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 132, 149; ante, § 321; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 30; *Giddings v. Eastman*, 5 Paige, R. 501.

² Ante, §§ 321, 322; *Giddings v. Eastman*, 5 Paige, R. 561.

³ Ante, §§ 315 to 328; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, pp. 141 to 149; *Wormley v. Wormley*, 8 Wheat. R. 421, 438; *Bulkley v. Wilford*, 2 Clark & Finnel. R. 177; *Brown v. Lynch*, 1 Paige, R. 147; *Fellows v. Fellows*, 4 Cowen, R. 682; *Giddings v. Eastman*, 5 Paige, R. 561.

⁴ *Docker v. Somes*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 655.

⁵ *Watts v. Girdlestone*, 6 Beav. R. 188, 190, 191; post, § 1273 (a).

⁶ *Murray v. Lylburn*, 2 John. Ch. R. 441, 442, 444, 445; *Murray v. Ballou*, 1 John. Ch. R. 581.

(a) See *Stroud v. Gwyer*, 6 Jur. n. s. 719. on the part of the cestui que trust to indemnify the trustee. *Raby v.*

(b) See *In re Hallett*, 13 Ch. D. 696, infra, p. 616, note (a). *Ridehalgh*, 7 DeG. M. & G. 104; *Butler v. Butler*, 5 Ch. D. 554, 557.

(c) The receipt by a cestui que trust of benefits from a breach of trust which he induced the trustee to commit creates, it is held, no liability. See however *Sawyer v. Sawyer*, 28 Ch. D. 595, a case of a married woman cestui que trust, entitled for her separate use.

himself to dispose of it in another manner, or where, being intrusted with stock, he sells it in violation of his trust, — in every such case the parties beneficially entitled have an option to make him replace the stock or other property; or if it is for their benefit, to affirm his conduct and take what he has sold it for with interest, or what he has invested it in, and if he has made more, they may charge him with that also.¹ But they cannot insist upon repugnant claims, such as for instance in the case of a sale of stock to have the stock replaced, and to have interest (instead of the dividends), or to take the money and have the dividends as if it had remained stock.²

1264. Wherever a trustee is guilty of a breach of trust by the sale of the trust property to a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, the trust in the property is extinguished.³ But if afterwards he should repurchase or otherwise become entitled to the same property, the trust would revive and reattach to it in his hands; for it will not be tolerated in equity that a party shall by his own wrongful act acquire an absolute title to that which he is in conscience bound to preserve for another. In equity even more strongly than at law the maxim prevails that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong.⁴ Even at law if a disseisor alienes the land and descent is cast, and afterwards the disseisor reacquires the land by descent or purchase, the disseisee may re-enter, although otherwise the mesne descent cast would have barred his entry.⁵

1265. The truth is that Courts of Equity in regard to fraud, whether it be constructive or actual, have adopted principles exceedingly broad and comprehensive in the application of their remedial justice; and especially where there is any fraud touching property, they will interfere and administer a wholesome justice, and sometimes even a stern justice in favor of innocent

¹ *Pocock v. Reddington*, 5 Ves. 800; *Harrison v. Harrison*, 2 Atk. 121; *Bostock v. Blakeney*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 653; *Forrest v. Elwes*, 4 Ves. 497; *Earl Powlet v. Herbert*, 1 Ves. jr. 297; *Byrchell v. Bradford*, 6 Madd. R. 235.

² *Ibid.*, and *Long v. Stewart*, 5 Ves. 800, note (a); *Crackelt v. Bethune*, 1 J. & Walk. 586.

³ This proposition must be taken with the qualification that the purchase-money has been paid.

⁴ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 5, and note (p); *Bovey v. Smith*, 2 Ch. Cas. 124; s. c. 1 Vern. R. 84; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 25.

⁵ *Ibid.*, and Litt. § 395; Co. Litt. 242 a.

persons who are sufferers by it without any fault on their own side. This is often done by converting the offending party into a trustee and making the property itself subservient to the proper purposes of recompense by way of equitable trust or lien.¹ Thus a fraudulent purchaser will be held a mere trustee for the honest but deluded and cheated vendor.² A person who has fraudulently procured a fine to be levied in his favor by an idiot or lunatic will be held a trustee for the benefit of the persons who are prejudiced by the fraud.³ A person who lies by and without notice suffers his own estate to be sold or incumbered in favor of an innocent purchaser or lender will be held a trustee of the estate for the latter.⁴ An heir preventing a charge or devise of an estate to another by a promise to perform the same personally will be held a trustee for the latter to the amount of the charge or beneficial interest intended.⁵ An agent authorized to purchase an estate for another, who purchases the same for himself, will be held a trustee of his principal.⁶ But it is unnecessary to pursue this subject further, as many illustrations of a like nature have been already given under the heads of Actual Fraud and Constructive Fraud.⁷

1266. Having thus gone over most of the important heads of Equity Jurisprudence falling under the denomination of express or implied trusts, we shall conclude this subject by a short review of some of the doctrines as to the nature and extent of the responsibility of trustees and as to the remedies which may be resorted to, to enforce a due performance of trusts.

1267. It is not easy, in a great variety of cases, to say what the precise duty of a trustee is, and therefore it often becomes indispensable for him before he acts to seek the aid and direction of a Court of Equity. (a) We have already seen that his acts done

¹ See 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 2, note (k).

² Ante, §§ 191, 204, 218, 228, 229, 238, 239, 244, 251, 254, 313, 315, 334.

³ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 2, note (k).

⁴ Ante, §§ 384 to 390.

⁵ Ante, §§ 252, 256, 382, 768.

⁶ Ante, § 316.

⁷ Ante, §§ 395 to 412, 437 to 439.

(a) See *Fairbanks v. Belknap*, 135 Mass. 179, 181; *Proctor v. Heyer*, 122 Mass. 525, *Richardson v. Hall*, 124 Mass. 228; *Minot v. Taylor*, 129 Mass. 160; *Dodge v. Morse*, *Ib.* 423; *Macy*

v. Nantucket, 121 Mass. 351; *Treadwell v. Cordis*, 5 Gray, 341; *Treadwell v. Salisbury Manuf. Co.*, 7 Gray, 393; *Clay v. Gurley*, 62 Ala. 14; *Cowles v. Pollard*, 51 Ala. 445.

to the prejudice of the cestui que trust (or beneficiary) are sometimes such as are binding and cannot be recalled, and sometimes are such as a Court of Equity will not punish by treating them as breaches of trust.¹ But the cases in which such acts will be deemed violations of trust for which a trustee will be held responsible in equity are difficult to be defined. It has been often said that what he may be compelled to do by a suit he may voluntarily do without a suit. But this (as we have also seen) is a doctrine requiring many qualifications and by no means to be generally relied on for safety.²

1268. In a general sense a trustee is bound by his implied obligation to perform all those acts which are necessary and proper for the due execution of the trust which he has undertaken.³ But as he is supposed merely to take upon himself the trust as a matter of honor, conscience, friendship, or humanity, and as he is not entitled to any compensation for his services, at least not without some express or implied stipulation for that purpose,⁴ (a)

¹ Ante, §§ 977 to 979, 995, 997.

² Ante, § 979; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 2, and note (c).

³ Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 25; *Fyler v. Fyler*, 3 Beav. R. 550.

⁴ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 3; *Manning v. Manning*, 1 John. Ch. R. 527, 532 to 535. *Arnold v. Garner*, 2 Phillips, Ch. R. 231. The same rule refusing compensation to trustees and to others standing in similar relations is found in the Roman law, and was probably thence transferred into Equity Jurisprudence. Mr. Chancellor Kent has elaborately defended it, in his opinion in the case of *Manning v. Manning*, 1 John. Ch. R. 534, from which the following extract is made: 'Nor does the rule strike me as so very unjust, or singular and extraordinary; for the acceptance of every trust is voluntary and confidential, and a thousand duties are required of individuals in relation to the concerns of others, and particularly in respect to numerous institutions, partly of a private and partly of a public nature, in which a just indemnity is all that is expected and granted. I should think it could not have a very favorable influence on the prudence and diligence of a trustee, were we to promote, by the hope of reward, a competition, or even a desire, for the possession of private trusts that relate to the moneyed concerns of the helpless and infirm. To allow wages or commissions for every alleged service, how could we prevent abuse? The infant or the lunatic cannot watch their own interest. "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" The rule in question has a sanction in the wisdom

(a) See *Clack v. Carlton*, 7 Jur. Green, 136; *Commonwealth v. Eagle* n. s. 441; *Crosskill v. Bower*, 32 Beav. 86; *Tyrrell v. Bank of London*, 10 H. L. Cas. 26; *Barrett v. Hartley*, L. R. 2 Eq. 789. How far the right to compensation is affected by misconduct see *McKnight v. Walsh*, 8 C. E. Ins. Co., 14 Allen, 344; *Succession of Liles*, 24 La. An. 490; *Walker v. Walker*, 9 Wall. 743; *Belknap v. Belknap*, 5 Allen, 468; *Tatum v. McLellan*, 56 Miss. 352.

he would seem, upon the analogous principle applicable to bailments, bound only to good faith and reasonable diligence, and,

of the Roman law, which equally with ours refused a compensation, and granted an indemnity to the trustee of the minor's estate. The maxim in that law was that "lucrum facere ex pupilli tutela tutor non debet." And the tutor or curator was entitled only to his reasonable and just expenses incurred in behalf of the estate, such as travelling charges, costs of suit, &c., unless a certain allowance was granted by the person by whom he was appointed. "Sumptuum qui bona fide in tutelam, non qui in ipsos tutores fiunt, ratio haberi solet; nisi ab eo, qui eum dat, certum salarium ei constitutum est. Item sumptus litis tutor reputabit, et viatica, si ex officio necesse habuit aliquo excurrere vel proficisci." Dig. 26, tit. 7, l. 33; Idem, 26, tit. 7, l. 58; Idem, 27, tit. 3, l. 1, 9. It is probable that this same principle which we find in some, has been infused into the municipal law of most, of the nations of Europe, because most of them have adopted the civil law. Domat, B. 2, tit. Tutors, tit. 2, § 3, art. 5, 35; Ersk. Inst. B. 1, tit. 7, §§ 31, 32. The same rule was known in the early age of the common law and applied to the guardian in socage. He was entitled only to his allowance for his reasonable costs and expenses when called to render an account of the guardianship of the estate of the ward. Litt. § 123. And this was the provision in the statute of Marlbridge, 52 H. III. ch. 17, declaring the duties of the guardian in socage, "Salvis ipsis custodibus rationabilibus misis suis." The rule has been also applauded by great equity judges in England in modern times. Lord Cottenham, in *Home v. Pringle*, 8 Clark & Fin. 264, 287, expressed a strong approval of the rule, and said in the case where a trustee had been appointed cashier to the trustees, 'This is the real question, because it is not necessary to hold that the appointment is illegal in order to maintain the principle that the party who, having accepted the office of trustee, which, unless otherwise provided for by the trust, must be performed gratuitously, accepts another office inconsistent with that of trustee, shall not be permitted to derive any emolument out of the trust property in respect of such employment. That the office of trustee and of factor or cashier to the property are inconsistent cannot be disputed. If the execution of the trust requires such appointment, it becomes the duty of the trustee to exercise his discretion and judgment in the selection of the officers and his vigilant superintendence of their proceedings when appointed; all which is lost to the trust when a trustee is appointed to the execution of those duties; therefore the Courts of Equity in England in such cases refuse to the trustee any remuneration which would come to others from the appointment, which produces the salutary effect of deterring trustees from making such appointments when not actually required, and when such necessity exists preserves to the trust the superintendence and control of the trustees over the officer they may appoint. I should be sorry to give any sanction to a contrary practice in Scotland. There can be no reason for any difference in the rule upon this subject in the two countries. The benefit of the rule as acted upon in England is not disputed, and as there is no decision to the contrary, there cannot be any reason for sanctioning a contrary rule in Scotland.' I confess that I have not been able quite so clearly to see or so strongly to approve the policy of the rule. Trusts may be very properly considered as matters of honor and kindness and of a conscientious desire to fulfil the wishes and objects of friends and relatives. But the duties and responsibilities of the office of a trustee are suf-

as in case of a gratuitous bailee, liable only for gross negligence.¹ It would be difficult however to affirm that Courts of Equity do in fact always limit the responsibility of trustees, or measure their acts by such a rule.² (a)

1269. In respect to the preservation and care of trust property it has been said that a trustee is to keep it as he keeps his own. And therefore if he is robbed of money belonging to his cestui que trust without his own default or negligence (or perhaps, strictly speaking, without his own gross default or negligence),³ he will not be chargeable. He is even allowed in equity to establish by his own oath the amount so lost, for he cannot possibly in ordinary cases have any other proof.⁴ So if he should deposit the money with a banker in good credit to remit it to the proper place by a bill drawn by a person in due credit, and the banker or drawer of the bill should become bankrupt, he would

ficiently onerous and perplexing in themselves, and mistakes, even of the most innocent nature, are sometimes visited with severe consequences. Nor can any one reasonably expect any trustee to devote his time or services to a very watchful care of the interests of others when there is no remuneration for his services, and there must often be a positive loss to himself in withdrawing from his own concerns some of his own valuable time. To say that no one is obliged to take upon himself the duty of a trustee is to evade and not to answer the objection. The policy of the law ought to be such as to induce honorable men, without a sacrifice of their private interest, to accept the office, and to take away the temptation to abuse the trust for mere selfish purposes as the only indemnity for services of an important and anxious nature. The very circumstance that trustees now often stipulate for a compensation before accepting the office, and that Courts of Equity now sanction such an allowance, is a distinct proof that the rule does not work well, and is felt to be inconvenient or unreasonable in practice. The rule to disallow compensation to trustees has not been generally adopted in America. See *Meacham v. Sterne*, 9 Paige, 399; *Barrel v. Joy*, 16 Mass. R. 22; *Dewey v. Allen*, 1 Pick. 147.

¹ Story on Bailments, §§ 173, 174; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 4, note (i). See also Dig. Lib. 26, tit. 7, l. 7, § 2.

² See *Short v. Waller*, 9 Beav. R. 497.

³ Story on Bailments, §§ 174, 183.

⁴ *Morley v. Morley*, 2 Ch. Cas. 2; *Knight v. Lord Plimouth*, 3 Atk. 480; s. c. 1 Dick. R. 120, 127; *Jones v. Lewis*, 2 Ves. 240; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 4.

(a) See *Speight v. Gaunt*, 22 Ch. D. 727; s. c. 9 App. Cas. 1; *Bostock v. Floyer*, L. R. 1 Eq. 26; *Sculthorpe v. Tipper*, L. R. 13 Eq. 232; *Hobday v. Peters*, 28 Beav. 603; *Ex parte Greaves*, 8 DeG. M. & G. 291; *Hopgood v. Parkin*, L. R. 11 Eq. 74; *Sutton v. Wilders*, L. R. 12 Eq. 373; *Briggs v. Taylor*, 28 Vt. 180; *Cavender v. Cavender*, 114 U. S. 464.

not be responsible.¹ (a) The rule in all cases of this sort is that where a trustee acts by other hands, either from necessity or conformably to the common usage of mankind, he is not to be made answerable for losses.² (b)

¹ *Knight v. Lord Plimouth*, 3 Atk. 480; *Jones v. Lewis*, 2 Ves. 240, 241; *Rowth v. Howell*, 3 Ves. 564; *Massey v. Banner*, 4 Madd. R. 416, 417; *Ex parte Belchier & Parsons*, *Ambler*, R. 219, and *Mr. Blunt's note* (4); *Adams v. Claxton*, 6 Ves. 226; 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 2*, ch. 7, § 4.

² *Ex parte Belchier v. Parsons*, *Ambler*, R. 219. The same rule applies here as in cases of personal representatives of a deceased party, who are treated as trustees. In *Clough v. Bond*, 3 *Mylne & Craig*, 490, 496, *Lord Cottenham*, speaking on this subject, said: 'It will be found to be the result of all the best authorities upon the subject that, although a personal representative, acting strictly within the line of his duty and exercising reasonable care and diligence, will not be responsible for the failure or depreciation of the fund in which any part of the estate may be invested, or for the insolvency or misconduct of any person who may have possessed it, yet if that line of duty be not strictly pursued, and any part of the property be invested by such personal representative in funds or upon securities not authorized, or be put within the control of persons who ought not to be intrusted with it, and a loss be thereby eventually sustained, such personal representative will be liable to make it good, however unexpected the result, however little likely to arise from the course adopted, and however free such conduct may have been from any improper motive. Thus if he omit to sell property when it ought to be sold, and it be afterwards lost without any fault of his, he is liable; *Phillips v. Phillips* (2 *Freem. Ch. Ca.* 11); or if he leave money due upon personal security which, though good at the time, afterwards fails. *Powell v. Evans* (5 *Ves.* 839); *Tebbs v. Carpenter* (1 *Madd.* 290). And the case is stronger if he be himself the author of the improper investment, as upon personal security or an unauthorized fund. Thus he is not liable upon a proper investment in the 3 per cents for a loss occasioned by the fluctuations of that fund; *Peat v. Crane* (2 *Dick.* 499, note); but he is for the fluctuations of any unauthorized fund. *Hancom v. Allen* (2 *Dick.* 498); *Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth* (7 *Ves.* 137. See p. 150). So when the loss arises from the dishonesty or failure of any one to whom the possession of part of the estate has been intrusted. Necessity, which includes the regular course of business in administering the property, will in equity exonerate the personal representative. But if without such necessity he be instrumental in giving to the person failing possession of any part of the property, he will be liable, although the person possessing it be a co-executor or co-administrator. *Langford v. Gascoyne* (11 *Ves.* 333); *Lord Shipbrook v. Lord Hinchinbrook* (11 *Ves.* 252; 16 *Ves.* 477); *Underwood v. Stevens* (1 *Mer.* 712). And see *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 *Sim.* 265; *Broadhurst v. Balguy*, 1 *Younge & Coll. New R.* 16, 28.

(a) See *Fry v. Tapson*, 28 *Ch. D.* 727; s. c. 9 *App. Cas.* 1. Thus a trustee may employ a broker to effect investments of the trust-money where that is the common course. *Ib.* See *Myrick*, 17 *Minn.* 408. *Ex parte Cooke*, 4 *Ch. D.* 123.

(b) *Speight v. Gaunt*, 22 *Ch. D.*

1270. In all cases however in which a trustee places money in the hands of a banker he should take care to keep it separate and not mix it with his own in a common account; for if he should so mix it, he would be deemed to have treated the whole as his own, and he would be held liable to the cestui que trust for any loss sustained by the banker's insolvency.¹ (a)

1271. In respect to the manner of managing funds and laying out money on securities, and even in respect to allowing trust money to remain in the hands of debtors, considerable strictness is required by the rules of Courts of Equity. It has been remarked by Lord Hardwicke that these rules should not be laid down with a strictness to strike terror into mankind acting for the benefit of others and not for their own;² and that as a trust is an office necessary in the concerns between man and man, and which if faithfully discharged is attended with no small degree of trouble and anxiety, it is an act of great kindness in any one to accept it. To add hazard or risk to that trouble, and to subject a trustee to loss which he could not foresee and consequently not prevent, would be a manifest hardship and would be deterring every one from accepting so necessary an office.³

¹ *Massey v. Banner*, 4 Madd. Ch. R. 416, 417, *Freeman v. Fairlie*, 3 Meriv. R. 29; *Clarke v. Tipping*, 9 Beav. R. 284.

² *Ex parte Belchier & Parsons*, Ambler, R. 219; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 1142.

³ *Knight v. Earl of Plimouth*, 1 Dick. R. 126, 127; s. c. 3 Atk. 480; 2 Madd-

(a) *School District v. First National Bank*, 102 Mass. 174; *Cook v. Addison*, L. R. 7 Eq. 466; *Brown v. Adams*, 21 Law T. n. s. 71; In re *Hallett*, 13 Ch. D. 696; *National Bank v. Insurance Co.*, 104 U. S. 54. See *Gibert v. Gonord*, 54 L. J. Ch. 439. Compare *Stroud v. Gwyer*, 6 Jur. n. s. 719. Where an estate is bought partly with trust money and partly with other money, the cestui que trust is not entitled to the whole estate; he is only entitled to a lien upon the estate for the amount of the trust fund. In re *Pumfrey*, 22 Ch. D. 255, 260. A fortiori where the trustee has mixed the trust fund, even money, with his own, the cestui que trust cannot elect to take the property bought because it was not bought with the trust fund, but simply with a mixed fund. In re

Hallett, 13 Ch. D. 696. In this case it was declared that there was no distinction in this respect between an express trustee, an agent, a bailee, a collector of rents, or other person in a fiduciary position. The Master of the Rolls overruled *Ex parte Dale*, 11 Ch. D. 772, and several early cases.

A bank receiving money deposited in a fiduciary way cannot claim any lien upon it against the depositor. *National Bank v. Insurance Co.*, 104 U. S. 54; *Knatchbull v. Hallett*, 13 Ch. D. 696 (that the depositor need not be technically a trustee); *Farmers' Bank v. King*, 57 Penn. 202; *Van Alen v. American Bank*, 52 N. Y. 1 (that notice to the bank is not necessary). See *Gibert v. Gonord*, 54 L. J. Ch. 439.

1272. There is manifest good sense in these remarks. But it would be difficult to affirm that the rules of Courts of Equity have always proceeded upon so broad and liberal a basis. The true result of the considerations here suggested would seem to be, that where a trustee has acted with good faith in the exercise of a fair discretion and in the same manner as he would ordinarily do in regard to his own property, he ought not to be held responsible for any losses accruing in the management of the trust property.¹ On the contrary Courts of Equity have laid down some artificial rules for the exercise of the discretion of trustees, which import (to say the least) extraordinary diligence and vigilance in the management of the trust property.

1273. Thus for example if a trustee should lay out trust funds in any stock in which a Court of Equity itself is not in the habit of directing funds in its own possession to be laid out, although there should be no mala fides, yet if the stock should fall in value he would be held responsible for the loss.² (a) In other words a Court of Equity will in such cases require that a trustee should act with all the scrupulous circumspection, caution, and wisdom with which the court itself, from its long experience and superior means of information, is accustomed to act; a doctrine certainly somewhat perilous to trustees, and startling to uninstructed minds. It is, to adopt the language of Lord Bacon, substituting for the private conscience of the trustee 'the general conscience of the realm, which is chancery.'³

Ch. Pr. 114; *Powell v. Evans*, 5 Ves. 843; *Thompson v. Brown*, 4 John. Ch. R. 629.

¹ See *Hart v. Ten Eyck*, 2 John. Ch. R. 76; *Thompson v. Brown*, 4 John. Ch. R. 619, 629.

² *Hancom v. Allen*, 2 Dick. 498; *Trafford v. Boehm*, 3 Atk. 444; *Adye v. Fenilleteau*, 2 Dick. R. 499, note; s. c. 1 Cox, 24; *Peat v. Crane*, 2 Dick. 449, note. See also *Jackson v. Jackson*, 1 Atk. 513; *Knight v. Earl of Plymouth*, 1 Dick. R. 126, 127; *Holland v. Hughes*, 16 Ves. 114; *Fyler v. Fyler*, 3 Beav. R. 550.

³ Bacon on Uses, by Rowe, p. 10.

(a) See *Stewart v. Sanderson*, L. R. 10 Eq. 26; *Budge v. Gummow*, L. R. 7 Ch. 719; *Whitney v. Smith*, L. R. 4 Ch. 513; *In re Colne Co.*, 1 DeG. F. & J. 53; *Harris v. Harris*, 29 Beav. 107; *Ungless v. Tuff*, 30 L. J. Ch. 784; *Wynne v. Warren*, 2 Heisk. 118; *Smith v. Byers*, 41 Ga. 439. Further as to investments in England see 22 & 23 Vict. ch. 35; 23 & 24 Vict. ch. 38; 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 132; 34 & 35 Vict. ch. 47, § 13; *In re Wedderburn*, 9 Ch. D. 112; *In re Langford*, 2 Johns. & H. 458; *Equitable Soc. v. Fuller*, 1 Johns. & H. 379; *In re Speight*, 22 Ch. D. 727.

1273 *a*. If trustees are directed to invest trust-money in government or other securities or real security, and they do neither, they are responsible at the option of the cestuis que trust, either for the money or the stock which might have been purchased therewith at the time when the investment ought to have been made.¹

1274. So if a trustee should invest trust-money in mere personal securities, however unexceptionable they might seem to be, in case of any loss by the insolvency of the borrower he would be held responsible; for in all cases of this sort Courts of Equity require security to be taken on real estate, or on some other thing of permanent value.² (*a*) Nay, it will be at the peril of the trustee, if trust-money comes to his hands (such as a debt due from a

¹ *Watts v. Girdlestone*, 6 Beav. R. 188, 190; ante, § 1262. See the Jurist, vol. 9 (1845), p. 227.

² *Adey v. Feuilliteau*, 1 Cox, R. 24; *Ryder v. Bickerton*, 3 Swanst. R. 80; s. c. 1 Eden, R. 149, note, and Mr. Eden's note (*a*), p. 150; *Holmes v. Dring*, 2 Cox, R. 1; *Wilkes v. Steward*, Cooper, Eq. R. 6. Even a bond of several persons is not distinguished from the bond of one person. 'It was never heard of,' said Lord Kenyon, Master of the Rolls, 'that a trustee could lend an infant's money on private security. This is a rule that should be rung in the ears of every person who acts in the character of a trustee; for an act may very probably be done with the best and honestest intention, yet no rule in a Court of Equity is so well established as this.' *Holmes v. Dring*, 2 Cox, R. 1, 2. Lord Northington, in *Harden v. Parsons* (1 Eden, R. 148), laid down a much more limited doctrine, and held that a letting of money on personal security was not per se gross negligence and a breach of trust, and that other circumstances must be shown to charge the trustee. He said: 'It is agreed that there is no text-writer that lays down the rule, nor any case which establishes it. If so, we must resort to the inquiry into the nature of the office and duty of a trustee as considered in a Court of Equity. No man can require or with reason expect a trustee to manage his property with the same care and discretion that he would his own. Therefore the touchstone by which such cases are to be tried is, whether the trustee has been guilty of a breach of trust or not. If he has been guilty of gross negligence, it is as bad in its consequences as fraud, and is a breach of trust. The lending of trust-money on a note is not a breach of trust without other circumstances crassæ negligentiaë.' But the later cases have entirely overthrown this doctrine, however reasonable it may seem to be. *Ibid.*, Mr. Eden's note (*a*). See also *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swanst. R. 62, 63. Mr. Chancellor Kent, in *Smith v. Smith*, 4 John. Ch. 281, 441, seemed inclined to adopt the doctrine of Lord Northington, and to think the modern English rule as to lending money on personal security too strict.

(*a*) The present state of law is far from uniform on this subject. See *French*, 125 Mass. 410; *Worrall's Appeal*, 22 Penn. St. 44; *Ackerman v. Emott*, 4 Barb. 626; 1 *Perry, Trusts*, §§ 453 et seq., 459. *Harding v. Larned*, 4 Allen, 426; *Clark v. Garfield*, 8 Allen, 427; *Richardson v. Boynton*, 12 Allen, 138; *Brown v.*

third person), to suffer it to remain upon the mere personal credit of the debtor, although the testator who created the trust had left it in that very state.¹ The principle is even carried further; and in cases of personal securities taken by a trustee he is made responsible for all deficiencies, and is also chargeable for all profits if any are made; so that he acquires a double responsibility, although in such cases he may have acted with entire good faith in the exercise of what he supposed to be a sound discretion.² (a)

1275. In relation to trust-property it is the duty of the trustee, whether it be real estate or be personal estate, to defend the title at law in case of any suit being brought respecting it; to give notice, if it may be useful and practicable, of such suit to his cestui que trust; to prevent any waste or delay or injury to the trust-property; (b) to keep regular accounts;³ to afford accurate information to the cestui que trust of the disposition of the trust-property; and if he has not all the proper information, to seek for it and if practicable to obtain it.⁴ (c) Finally, he is to act in relation to the trust-property with reasonable diligence, and in cases of a joint trust he must exercise due caution and vigilance in respect to the approval of and acquiescence in the acts of his co-trustees; for if he should deliver over the whole management to the others and betray supine indifference or gross negligence in regard to the interests of the cestui que trust, he will be held responsible.⁵

¹ *Lowson v. Copeland*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 156, and Mr. Belt's note; *Powell v. Evans*, 5 Ves. 844; *Tibbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Madd. R. 290.

² *Adye v. Feuilliteau*, 3 Swanst. R. 84, note; s. c. 1 Cox, R. 24. See *Holmes v. Dring*, 2 Cox, R. 1.

³ *Freeman v. Fairlie*, 3 Meriv. R. 29, 41; *Pearse v. Green*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 135, 140; *Adams v. Clifton*, 1 Russ. R. 297.

⁴ *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swanst. R. 58, 73.

⁵ *Oliver v. Court*, 8 Price, R. 127; post, § 1280.

(a) As to the liability of trustees upon subscription for shares in companies on behalf of the trust estate see *Lumsden v. Buchanan*, 4 Macq. 950; *Eager v. Barnes*, 31 Beav. 579; In re *Glasgow*, 4 App. Cas. 581; *Bell's Case*, Ib. 550; *Buchan's Case*, Ib. 583; *Ker's Case*, Ib. 599; *Cunninghame v. Glasgow Bank*, Ib. 607.

(b) He should keep leasehold property free from the risk of forfeiture. In re *Fowler*, 16 Ch. D. 723.

(c) A trustee cannot object that the performance of his duties would be inconvenient, or burdensome, or involve him in litigation. *First Nat. Ins. Co. v. Salisbury*, 130 Mass. 303.

1276. These remarks apply to the ordinary case of a trustee having a general discretion and exercising his powers without any special directions. But where special directions are given by the instrument creating the trust, or special duties are imposed upon the trustee, he must follow out the objects and intentions of the parties faithfully, and be vigilant in the discharge of his duties. There are necessarily many incidental duties and authorities belonging to almost every trust, which are not expressed. But these are to be as steadily acted upon and executed as if they were expressed. It would be impossible, in a work like the present, to make even a general enumeration of these incidental duties and authorities of a trustee, as they must always depend upon the peculiar objects and structure of the trust.¹

1277. In regard to interest upon trust funds the general rule is that if a trustee has made interest upon those funds, or ought to have invested them so as to yield interest, he shall in each case be chargeable with the payment of interest.² (a) In some cases Courts of Equity will even direct annual or other rests to be made, the effect of which will be to give to the cestui que trust the benefit of compound interest. But such an interposition requires extraordinary circumstances to justify it.³ (b) Thus

¹ The works of Mr. Hampson and Mr. Willis on the duties and responsibilities of trustees contain an enumeration of many particulars. In all cases of doubt it is best to act under the direction of a Court of Equity, which trustees at all times have a right to ask. See Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 133, 134; Leech v. Leech, 1 Ch. Cas. 249.

² 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 6, note (p); Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 5, pp. 543, 544; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, pp. 145, 146; Dunscomb v. Dunscomb, 1 John. Ch. R. 508; Manning v. Manning, Id. 527; Schieffelin v. Stewart, 1 John. Ch. R. 620.

³ Raphael v. Boehm, 11 Ves. 91; s. c. 13 Ves. 407, 590; Schieffelin v. Stewart, John. Ch. R. 620; Evertson v. Tappen, 5 John. Ch. R. 497, 517; Dornford v. Dornford, 12 Ves. 127; Connecticut v. Jackson, 1 John. Ch. R. 13; Foster v. Foster, 2 Bro. Ch. 616; Davis v. May, 19 Ves. 383; Sevier v. Greenway, 19 Ves. 413; Webber v. Hunt, 1 Madd. R. 13; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 5, p. 545; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 114, 115.

(a) See Commonwealth v. Eagle Ins. Co., 14 Allen, 344, 348; Anderson v. Gregg, 44 Miss. 170; Knapp v. Marshall, 56 Ill. 362; Stroud v. Gwyer, 6 Jur. N. S. 719; Docker v. Somes, 2 Mylne & K. 655; Vyse v. Foster, L. R. 8 Ch. 309; s. c. 7 H. L. 318.

(b) See Walker v. Walker, 9 Wall. 743; Hook v. Payne, 14 Wall. 252; King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76; McKnight v. Walsh, 8 C. E. Green, 136; Ogden v. Larrabee, 57 Ill. 389; Vaughan v. Bibb, 46 Ala. 153; Nelson v. Booth, 5 Jur. N. S. 28.

for example if a trustee, in manifest violation of his trust, has applied the trust funds to his own benefit and profit in trade, or has sold out the trust stock and applied the proceeds to his own use, or has conducted himself fraudulently in the management of the trust funds, or has wilfully refused to follow the positive directions of the instrument creating the trust as to investments, — in these and the like cases Courts of Equity will apply the rule of annual or semi-annual rests, if it will be most for the benefit of the cestui que trust.¹ The true rule in equity in such cases is, to take care that all the gain shall go to the cestui que trust.²

1278. The object of this whole doctrine is to compensate the cestui que trust, and to place him in the same situation as if the trustee had faithfully performed his own proper duty. It has even a larger and more comprehensive aim founded in public policy, which is, to secure fidelity by removing temptation and by keeping alive a sense of personal interest and personal responsibility.³ It seems however to have been of a comparatively late introduction into Equity Jurisprudence, and probably was little known in England at an earlier period than the reign of Charles the Second.⁴

1279. The Roman law acted with the same protective wisdom and foresight. In that law if a guardian or other trustee was guilty of negligence in suffering the money of his ward to remain idle, he was chargeable at least with the ordinary interest. ‘*Quod si pecunia mansisset in rationibus pupilli, præstandum quod bona fide percepisset aut percipere potuisset, sed fœnori dare, cum potuisset, neglexisset, cum id, quod ab alio debitore nomine usurarum cum sorte datur, ei qui accipit totum sortis vice fungitur, vel fungi debet.*’⁵ But where the guardian or other trustee went beyond the point of mere negligence and was guilty of a gross abuse of his trust, the Roman law sometimes

¹ Ibid.

² *Schieffelin v. Stewart*, 1 John. Ch. R. 620, 624, 625; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch 7, § 6, note (p); *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 5, pp. 543, 544; *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 4 W. 25.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.; *Ratcliffe v. Graves*, 1 Vern. R. 196, 197; s. c. 2 Ch. Cas. 152.

⁵ *Dig. Lib.* 26, tit. 7, l. 58, § 1; *Id.* l. 7, §§ 3, 4; *Dunscomb v. Dunscomb*, 1 John. Ch. R. 510, 511; 1 *Domat*, B. 2, tit. 1, § 3, art. 22, 27; *Pothier, Pand. Lib.* 27, tit. 3, n. 45 to 51.

inflicted upon him a grievous interest in the nature of a compound interest, but often greatly exceeding it.¹ ‘*Quoniam ubi quis ejus pecuniam, cujus tutelam negotiave administrat, aut magistratus municipii publicam in usus suos convertit, maximas usuras præstat. Sed istius diversa causa est, qui non sibi sumsit ex administratione nummos, sed ab amico accepit, et ante negotiorum administrationem. Nam illi de quibus constitutum est (cum gratuitam certe integram et abstinentem omni lucro præstare fidem deberent) licentia, qua videntur abuti, maximis usuris, vice cujusdam pœnæ, subjiciuntur.*’²

1280. In cases where there are several trustees the point has often arisen how far they are to be deemed responsible for the acts of each other. The general rule is that they are responsible only for their own acts, and not for the acts of each other, unless they have made some agreement by which they have expressly agreed to be bound for each other, or they have by their own voluntary co-operation or connivance enabled one or more to accomplish some known object in violation of the trust.³ (a) And the mere fact that trustees who are authorized to sell lands for money or to receive money jointly execute a receipt therefor to the party who is debtor or purchaser will not ordinarily make either liable, except for so much of the money as has been received by him, although ordinarily in the case of executors it would be different. The reasons assigned for the doctrine and the difference are as follows. Trustees have all equal power, interest, and authority, and cannot act separately as executors may, but must join both in conveyances and receipt. For one trustee cannot sell without the other, or make a claim to receive more of the consideration money, or to be more a trustee than the other. It would therefore be against natural justice to charge them (seeing they are thus compellable either not to act at all or to act together) with each other's receipts, unless there

¹ See Pothier, Pand. Lib. 27, tit. 3, n. 47; 1 Domat, B. 5, tit. 5, § 1, art. 14.

² Dig. Lib. 3, tit. 5, l. 38. See also Dig. Lib. 26, tit. 7, l. 7, §§ 4 to 10; Cod. Lib. 5, tit. 56, Pothier, Pand. Lib. 3, tit. 5, n. 43; 2 Voet ad Pand. Lib. 26, tit. 7, § 9; Schieffelin v. Stewart, 1 John. Ch. R. 628, 629.

³ Ante, § 1275; Taylor v. Roberts, 3 Alab. R. n. s. 83.

(a) Bernard v. Bagshaw, 9 Jur. n. s. 220.

be some default or negligence on their own part independent of joining in such receipt.¹ (a)

1280 a. But it is otherwise with regard to executors; for where there are two executors, it is clear that each has a several right to receive the debts due to the estate, and all other assets which shall come to his hands, and he is consequently solely responsible for the assets which he receives. They are therefore not compellable to join in receipts, (b) and each is competent by his own separate receipt to discharge any debtor to the estate. If then they join in a receipt, it is their own voluntary act, and equivalent to an admission of their willingness to be jointly accountable for the money.² It follows a fortiori that if one executor after receiving the assets voluntarily pays them over to the other executor, he becomes responsible for the due application and administration of those assets by the other executor.³

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, 5; *Fellows v. Mitchell*, 1 P. Will. 83, and Mr. Cox's note (1); *Churchill v. Lady Hobson*, 1 P. Will. 241, and Mr. Cox's note (1); *Leigh v. Barry*, 3 Atk. 584; *Ex parte Belchier v. Parsons, Ambler*, 219, and Mr. Blunt's note. See *Hulme v. Hulme*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 682.

² *Ibid.*; *Murrell v. Cox*, 2 Vern. 570; *Aplyn v. Brewer*, Prec. Ch. 173; *Moses v. Levi*, 3 Younge & Coll. 359, 367.

³ *Edmonds v. Crenshaw*, 14 Peters, R. 166. On this occasion Mr. Justice M'Lean, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'Where there are two executors in a will it is clear that each has a right to receive the debts due to the estate, and all other assets which shall come into his hands, and he is responsible for the assets he receives. This responsibility results from the right to receive and the nature of the trust; and how can he discharge himself from this responsibility? In this case the defendant has attempted to discharge himself from responsibility by paying over the assets received by him to his co-executor. But such payment cannot discharge him. Having received the assets in his capacity of executor, he is bound to account for the same; and he must show that he has made the investment required by the will, or in some other mode, and in conformity with the trust has applied the funds. One executor, having received funds, cannot exonerate himself and shift the trust to his co-executor by paying over to him the sums received. Each executor has a right to receive the debts due to the estate and discharge the debtors; but this rule does not apply as between the executors. They stand upon equal

(a) See *Hunter v. Hunter*, 50 Mo. 445; *Stowe v. Bowen*, 99 Mass. 194; *Lee v. Sankey*, L. R. 15 Eq. 204; *Charlton v. Durham*, L. R. 4 Ch. 433. The rule that a trustee is liable only for his own receipts does not apply where one trustee assists or enables another to receive the money, as by joining with him in a release for the money. *Thompson v. Finch*, 22 Beav. 316. See *Pearce v. Pearce*, *Ib.* 248. (b) Nor can they be compelled to join in a petition to the Probate Court to sell real estate. *Southwick v. Morrell*, 121 Mass. 520.

So if one executor knows that the assets received by the other executor are not applied according to the trusts of the will or in a due course of administration, and he stands by and acquiesces in it or suffers the assets to be wasted by such executor without any effort to require or compel a due execution of the trusts, and a due application of the assets in the course of the administration thereof, he will be held liable for any waste or misapplication of such assets.¹ It will be otherwise however if one executor has

ground, having equal rights and the same responsibilities. They are not liable to each other, but each is liable to the cestuis que trust to the full extent of the funds he receives. *Douglass v. Satterlee*, 11 Johns. 16; *Fairfax's Executors v. Fairfax*, 5 Cranch. 19.'

¹ *Clark v. Clark*, 8 Paige, R. 152; *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. R. 472. In this last case Lord Langdale said: 'There can be no doubt that if an executor knows that the moneys received by his co-executor are not applied according to the trusts of the will, and stands by and acquiesces in it without doing anything on his part to procure the due execution of the trusts, he will in respect of that negligence be himself charged with the loss; but in cases of this kind it is always to be observed that the testator himself having invested certain persons with the character of executors has trusted them to the extent to which the law allows them to act as executors; and in that character each has a separate right of receiving and of giving discharges for the property of the testator. In this particular case the testator having money in the funds, and other property to a considerable amount, directed certain annuities to be paid, and bequeathed his residuary estate in the mode stated. Both executors proved the will, and thereupon each of them became entitled to receive the property. One of them did receive the property,—the dividends upon the stocks and funds, and the other personal estate. If Mr. Nixon knew that his co-executor was misapplying the moneys thus received, and acquiesced in it, he became himself liable, because he was a witness and an acquiescing party to the misapplication or breach of trust; but if he was not aware of the misapplication, I know of no case in which the court has gone the length of saying that an executor shall be held personally answerable for standing by and permitting his co-executor to do that which, for anything he knows to the contrary, was a performance of the trusts of the will. In this case it is clear Mr. Nixon must have known there was stock in the funds. He might have known that the dividends arising from that stock were from time to time received by Mr. Mills; knowing that, he might nevertheless have full reason to believe that they were duly applied according to the trusts and directions of the will in satisfaction of the annuities, or of the rent of the leasehold estates possessed by the testator at his death, and which was payable out of the whole estate. The argument for the plaintiffs proceeds upon this, that you are to impute to Mr. Nixon a knowledge of all that he might have known. It is said he proved the will, and must therefore have known its contents, and what was to be done in pursuance of the trusts; this is a presumption which I think the law itself will draw, and he must therefore be taken to have known the contents of the will; then it is argued that on proving the will he was bound to make a statement upon oath respecting the value of the property, and therefore became

no knowledge of the receipt, or misapplication, or waste of the assets by the other.¹

1281. The propriety of the doctrine which in favor of trustees makes them liable only for their own acts and receipts has never been questioned, and indeed stands upon principles of general justice. It has been well said that it seems to be substantial injustice to decree a man to answer for money which he did not receive, at the same time that the charge upon him by his joining in the receipt is but *notional*.² There is a good deal more question as to the distinction which is made unfavorably in regard to executors. In truth upon general reasoning it seems difficult to maintain its sound policy or practical convenience or intrinsic equity. It has on this account been sometimes struggled against. But it is now finally established as a general rule in the Equity Jurisprudence of England, although perhaps not universally in that of America.³ (a)

acquainted with the particulars. He might have had some knowledge of it to the limited extent which can be known on such occasions; but I cannot impute to him a knowledge of the exact state or amount of the property or of the claims upon it, or the clear amount of the balance in the hands of his co-executor. I certainly do not recollect any case in which the principle has been carried to the extent to which it has been here pressed; and if in this case I were to charge Mr. Nixon generally with all the assets received by his co-executor, I must in every other case say that an executor who does not personally act, and who having no reason to suspect any misapplication by his co-executor permits him to act alone, is liable for every misapplication committed by his co-executor; I do not think I can lay down any such rule.' Post, §§ 1283, 1284.

¹ Ibid.

² Lord Cowper, in *Fellows v. Mitchell*, 1 P. Will. 83.

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 5, and note (l); Mr. Cox's note (1) to *Fellows v. Mitchell*, 1 P. Will. 83, and to *Churchill v. Lady Hobson*, 1 P. Will. 241, and Mr. Eldon's note to *Westley v. Clarke*, 1 Eden, R. 360; *Murrell v. Cox*, 2 Vern. 570. Lord Harcourt struggled against it in *Churchill v. Lady Hobson*, 1 P. Will. 241. In *Westley v. Clarke* (1 Eden, R. 357), Lord Northington shook it to its very foundation. His Lordship there said: 'This bill is brought by a legatee to charge two executors with assets not actually received by them, but for which they had given a receipt; and by that, as the plaintiffs insist, made themselves liable for the actual receipt of the money by the third. And the claim is founded on this, that it is a general rule in this court that if executors join in a receipt they make themselves all liable in solido, because it is an unnecessary act, as each executor has an absolute power over the personal assets and rights of the testator. And that the contrary rule holds with respect to trustees; that they are not answerable for joint

(a) See *Stowe v. Bowen*, 99 Mass. 194.

1282. But although the general rule in regard to trustees is that they shall be liable only for their own acts and receipts,

receipts, each in solido, but only in proportion to what they actually receive. But though there are distinctions in the books concerning the acts of trustees and those of executors, according to the cases cited for that purpose, yet those distinctions seem not to be taken with precision sufficient to establish a general rule; for a joint receipt will charge trustees in solido each, if there is no other proof of the receipt of the money. As if a mortgage is devised in trust to three trustees, and the mortgagor with his witness meets them to pay it off; the money is laid on the table, and the mortgagor having obtained a reconveyance and receipt for his money withdraws, each trustee is answerable in solido. On the contrary, in the case of *Churchill v. Hobson*, where executors gave a joint receipt, only one was held liable. And this authority, which is not an exception of any particular case but an exception grounded on circumstances, shows there is no such rule. So that the rule seems to amount to no more than that a joint receipt given by executors is a stronger proof that they actually joined in the receipt, because generally they have no occasion to join for conformity. But if it appears plainly that one executor only received and discharged the estate indebted, and assigned the security, and the others joined afterwards without any reason and without being in a capacity to control the act of their co-executor either before or after that act was done, what grounds has any court in conscience to charge him? Equity arises out of a modification of acts where a very minute circumstance may make a case equitable or iniquitous. And though former authorities may and ought to bind the determination of subsequent cases with respect to rights, as in the right of curtesy or dower, yet there can be no rule for the future determination of this court concerning the acts of men.' Lord Alvanley admitted the rule with great reluctance in *Hovey v. Blakeman* (4 Ves. 607, 608), insisting that it was not conclusive; and his remarks have great cogency and clearness. But it is now established by what must be deemed overruling authority. See *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 114; *Scurfield v. Howes*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 94, 95; *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves 197 to 199 (in which Lord Eldon vindicated the rule against the objections taken to it); *Brice v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 324; *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 242; *Joy v. Campbell*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 341; *Shipbrook v. Lord Hinchinbrook*, 16 Ves. 477, 479, 480. In the recent case of *Moses v. Levi* (3 Younge & Coll. 359, 367) Mr. Baron Alderson affirmed the rule, and held that one executor who had paid over money to his co-executor for the purpose of paying the same to residuary legatees was guilty of negligence, and therefore liable for the misapplication of the money by the co-executor. He then added: 'If the case stood on this ground alone, it appears to me that it would come within the principle of *Lord Shipbrook v. Lord Hinchinbrook* (11 Ves. 252), *Underwood v. Stevens* (1 Meriv. R. 712), and *Langford v. Gascoyne* (11 Ves. 333), in which it is laid down generally that if an executor permits his co-executor to obtain possession of money which he had at any time in his own possession, and afterwards the co-executor misapplies the money, both executors are personally responsible. And that it would not fall within the case of *Bacon v. Bacon* (5 Ves. 331) and that class of cases, in which it was held that the executor shall be allowed the benefit of what he has handed over to his co-executor in the due and ordinary course of the administration of the testator's estate.' Mr. Chancellor Kent, in his reasoning in *Monell v. Monell* (5 John. Ch. R. 283), so far as it goes, seems to

yet some nice distinctions have been indulged by Courts of Equity which require notice in this place. Thus for example it has been said that where they join in a receipt for money, and it is not distinguishable on the face of the receipt, or by other proper proofs, how much has been received by one and how much by the other trustee, it is reasonable to charge each with the whole.¹ The case has been likened to that of a man wilfully mixing his own corn or money with that of another, where he who has made the difficulty shall not be permitted to avail himself of it, but if there is any loss he shall bear it himself.²

1283. Perhaps the truest exposition of the principle which ought in justice to regulate every case of this sort, whether it be the case of executors or of guardians or of trustees, is that which has been adopted by a learned equity judge in our own country. It is that if two executors, guardians, or trustees join in a receipt for trust-money, it is *prima facie*, although not absolutely conclusive, evidence that the money came to the hands of both. But either of them may show by satisfactory proof that his joining in the receipt was necessary or merely formal, and that the money was in fact all received by his companion. And without such satisfactory proof he ought to be held jointly liable to account to the *cestui que trust* for the money upon the fair implication resulting from his acts, that he did not intend to exclude a joint responsibility.³ But wherever either a trustee or an executor by his own negligence or laches suffers his co-trustee or co-executor to receive and waste the trust fund or assets of the testator when he has the means of preventing such receipt and waste by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, then and in such a case such trustee or executor will be held per-

repel the distinction between trustees and executors. See also *Manahan v. Gibbons*, 19 John. R. 427, 440; *Sutherland v. Brush*, 7 John. Ch. R. 22, 23; *Crosse v. Smith*, 7 East, R. 256, 257.

¹ *Fellows v. Mitchell*, 1 P. Will. 83; s. c. 2 Vern. 504, 515; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 5.

² *Ibid.*; *Hart v. Ten Eyck*, 2 John. Ch. R. 108; *Mumford v. Murray*, 6 John. Ch. R. 1, 16.

³ *Monell v. Monell*, 5 John. Ch. R. 296. See also *Harvey v. Blakeman*, 4 Ves. 596; *Crosse v. Smith*, 7 East, R. 244; *Scurfield v. Howes*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 93, and Mr. Belt's notes; *Westley v. Clarke*, 1 Eden, R. 357; *Joy v. Campbell*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 341; *Sutherland v. Brush*, 7 John. Ch. R. 22.

sonally responsible for the loss occasioned by such receipt and waste of his co-trustee or co-executor.¹

1283 *a*. The mere appointment by the trustees of one of them to be the factor of the others for the property is not of itself such a breach of trust as subjects the other trustee to all the consequences of it, nor does it make them liable as such for permitting the factor trustee to retain balances in his hands unless they are thereby guilty of gross negligence. Still however by the appointment of such trustee as factor they become liable for his default as agent, although not as trustee, in the same way that they would be liable for the defaults of any other person whom they might appoint to the office.² And a trustee by becoming the factor or cashier of the trust-property does not thereby incur any additional liability in respect to its management beyond what he was subject to as trustee.³

1284. Again if by any positive act, direction, or agreement of one joint executor, guardian, or trustee, the trust-money is paid over and comes into the hands of the other when it might and should have been otherwise controlled or secured by both, there each of them will be held chargeable for the whole.⁴ So if

¹ *Clark v. Clark*, 8 Paige, R. 152; ante, § 845 *a*; *Edmonds v. Cronshaw*, 14 Peters, R. 166; *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. R. 472; ante, §§ 1280, 1280 *a*.

² *Horne v. Pringle*, 8 Clark & Fin. R. 264, 286, 287, 288, 289.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ *Gill v. Attorney-General*, Hardres, R. 314; *Lord Shipbrook v. Lord Hinchinbrook*, 16 Ves. 479, 480; *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 116; *Underwood v. Stevens*, 1 Meriv. R. 712; *Adair v. Shaw*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 272; *Joy v. Campbell*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 341; *Monell v. Monell*, 5 John. Ch. R. 294 to 296; *Bone v. Cooke*, 1 McClelland, R. 168. It is not easy to reconcile the language used in all the cases as to what acts, directions, and omissions of one trustee shall make him chargeable. Lord Redesdale, in *Joy v. Campbell* (1 Sch. & Lefr. 341), states the doctrine thus: 'The distinction seems to be this with respect to a mere signing; that if a receipt be given for the mere purposes of form, then the signing will not charge the person not receiving. But if it be given under circumstances purporting that the money, though not actually received by both executors, was under the control of both, such a receipt shall charge. And the true question in all those cases seems to have been, whether the money was under the control of both executors. If it was so considered by the person paying the money, then the joining in the receipt by the executor who did not actually receive it amounted to a direction to pay his co-executor, for it could have no other meaning. He became responsible for the application of the money just as if he had received it. But this does not apply to what is done in the discharge of a necessary duty of the executor; for example an executor living in London is to pay debts in Suffolk, and remits money to

one trustee should wrongfully suffer the other to detain the trust-money a long time in his own hands without security, or should lend it to the other on his simple note, or should join with the other in lending it to a tradesman upon insufficient security,—in all such cases he will be deemed liable for any loss.¹ A fortiori one trustee will be liable who has connived at or been privy to an embezzlement of the trust-money by another; or if it is mutually agreed between them that one shall have the exclusive management of one part of the trust-property and the other of the other part.²

1284 *a*. But here it may be important to take notice of another illustration of the doctrine that Courts of Equity administer their aid only in favor of persons who exercise due diligence to enforce their rights and are guilty of no improper acquiescence or delay, upon the maxim so often referred to, ‘Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, æquitas subvenit.’ Hence if there be a clear breach of trust by a trustee, yet if the cestui que trust or beneficiary has for a long time acquiesced in the misconduct of the trustee, with full knowledge of it, a Court of Equity will not relieve him, but leave him to bear the fruits of his own negligence or infirmity of purpose.³ (*a*)

his co-executor to pay these debts. He is considered to do this of necessity. He could not transact business without trusting some persons; and it would be impossible for him to discharge his duty if he is made responsible where he remitted to a person to whom he would have given credit, and would in his own business have remitted money in the same way. It would be the same were one executor in India and another in England, the assets being in India but to be applied in England. There the co-executor is appointed for the purpose of carrying on such transaction; and the executor is not responsible, for he must remit to somebody; and he cannot be wrong if he remits to the person in whom the testator himself reposed confidence.’

¹ *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 114; *Keble v. Thomson*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 112; *Langston v. Ollivant, Cooper*, R. 33; *Caffrey v. Darby*, 6 Ves. 488; *Bone v. Cooke*, 1 McClell. R. 168; *Brice v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 319; *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves. 197, 198; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 5, note (*k*); *Mumford v. Murray*, 6 John. Ch. R. 1, 16.

² 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 5, note (*k*) and (*l*); *Gill v. Attorney-Gen.*, Hardres, 314; *Boardman v. Mossman*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 68; *Bate v. Scales*, 14 Ves. 402; *Oliver v. Court*, 8 Price, 127.

³ *Broadhurst v. Balguay*, 1 Younge & Coll. New R. 16, 28 to 32.

(*a*) *James v. James*, 55 Ala. 525; of relief that the cestui que trust, with Ashurst’s Appeal, 60 Penn. St. 54, knowledge of the breach of trust, obtains from the trustee part of that to 315. It is not a waiver of the right

1285. In cases of a breach of trust the question has arisen, in what light the debt created by such breach of trust is to be viewed; whether it is to be deemed a debt by simple contract, and so binding upon the personal assets only of the trustee, or a debt by speciality. At law, so far as any remedy exists there, the debt is treated as a simple contract debt, even though the trust arises under a deed executed by the trustees, and contains a clause that no trustee shall be chargeable or accountable for any money arising in execution of the trust, except what he shall actually receive, unless there be some correspondent covenant also on the part of the trustees. For this is a common clause of indemnity in trust deeds; and the true sense of it is, that the trustees shall not be accountable for more than they receive. They are in fact accountable for what they actually receive, but not accountable as under a covenant.¹

1286. The rule in Courts of Equity is the same. The debt created by a breach of trust is there considered but as a simple contract debt even although circumstances of fraud appear;² unless indeed there be some acknowledgment of the debt by the trustee under seal. (a) But in cases of this sort if the specialty creditors exhaust the personal assets, Courts of Equity will let a simple contract creditor of this sort, equally with other simple contract creditors, stand in the place of the specialty creditors in order to obtain satisfaction out of the real estate of the testator.³

1287. Courts of Equity will not only hold trustees responsible for any misapplication of trust-property and any gross negligence or wilful departure from their duty in the management of it, but they will go further, and in cases requiring such a remedy they will remove the old trustees and substitute new ones.⁴ (b)

¹ *Bartlett v. Hodgson*, 1 T. Rep. 42, 44.

² *Vernon v. Vawdry*, 2 Atk. 119; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 1, note (b); 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 114.

³ *Cox v. Bateman*, 2 Ves. 18, 19.

⁴ *January v. Rutherford*, 9 Paige, R. 273.

which he is entitled, unless an intention so to do can be clearly inferred from the facts. *Harston v. Tenison*, 20 Ch. D. 109. As to the consent of a married woman *cestui que trust*, not being *sui juris*, see *Fletcher v. Green*, 33 Beav. 426; *Dixon v. Dixon*, 9 Ch. D. 587.

(a) See *Isaacson v. Harwood*, L. R. 3 Ch. 225; *Holland v. Holland*, L. R. 4 Ch. 449.

(b) See *Lathrop v. Smalley*, 8 C. E. Green, 192; *Attorney-Gen. v. Garri-son*, 101 Mass. 223; *Attorney-Gen. v. Barbour*, 121 Mass. 568; *In re Eastern R. Co.*, 120 Mass. 412; *Satterfield*

Indeed the appointment of new trustees is an ordinary remedy, enforced by Courts of Equity in all cases where there is a failure of suitable trustees to perform the trust, either from accident, or from the refusal of the old trustees to act, or from their original or supervenient incapacity to act, or from any other cause.¹

1288. The doctrine seems to have been carried so far by the courts as to remove a joint trustee from a trust who wished to continue in it, without any direct or positive proof of his personal default, upon the mere ground that the other co-trustees would not act with him; for in a case where a trust is to be executed, if the parties have become so hostile to each other that they will not act together, the very danger to the due execution of the trust and the due disposition of the trust fund requires such an interposition to prevent irreparable mischief.²

1289. But in cases of positive misconduct Courts of Equity have no difficulty in interposing to remove trustees who have abused their trust.³ It is not indeed every mistake or neglect of duty, or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees, which will induce Courts of Equity to adopt such a course.⁴ But the acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust-property, or to show a want of honesty, or a want of a proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity. (a)

¹ *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 663, 664; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 7, § 1, note (a); *Lake v. De Lambert*, 4 Ves. 592; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 133; *Millard v. Eyre*, 2 Ves. jr. 94; *Buchanan v. Hamilton*, 5 Ves. 722; *Hibbard v. Lambe*, Ambler, R. 309; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 7.

² *Uvedale v. Ettrick*, 2 Ch. Cas. 130; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 7.

³ *Portsmouth v. Fellows*, 5 Madd. R. 450; *Mayor, &c. of Coventry v. Attorney-Gen.* 2 Bro. Parl. Rep. 236; s. c. 7 Bro. Parl. R. by Tomlins, 235.

⁴ *Attorney-Gen. v. Coopers' Company*, 19 Ves. 192.

v. John, 53 Ala. 127; *Hussey v. Coffin*, 1 Allen, 354; *Drake v. Green*, 10 Allen, 124; *In re Moravian Soc.*, 26 Beav. 101 (temporary absence); *Ewing v. Ewing*, 38 Ind. 390 (departure from the State); *In re Bridgman*, 6 Jur. n. s. 1065 (bankruptcy). Upon the question who should be appointed see *In re Tempest*, L. R. 1 Ch. 485. A joint stock company, whose directors are appointed for a definite period, has

no inherent power to remove them. *Imperial Hotel Co. v. Hampson*, 23 Ch. D. 1. Secus, it seems, in England, of the head of a municipal corporation, in a case of incapacity. *Ib.* p. 7, *Jessel, M. R.*

(a) *Satterfield v. John*, 53 Ala. 127; *Lathrop v. Smalley*, 8 C. E. Green, 192; *Cavender v. Cavender*, 114 U. S. 464.

1290. Before concluding the subject of trusts it may be proper to say a few words in regard to such trusts as either attach to trust-property situate in a foreign country, or are properly to be executed in a foreign country. The considerations belonging to this branch of Equity Jurisprudence are not indeed limited to cases of trust; and therefore we shall here bring them together in one view, as for the most part they are equally applicable to every subject within the reach of equitable relief.

1291. The jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in regard to trusts as well as to other things is not confined to cases where the subject-matter is within the absolute reach of the process of the court called upon to act upon it, so that it can be directly and finally disposed of or affected by the decree. If the proper parties are within the reach of the process of the court, it will be sufficient to justify the assertion of full jurisdiction over the subject-matter in controversy.¹(a) The decrees of Courts of Equity do indeed primarily and properly act in personam, and at most collaterally only in rem.² Hence (as we have already seen) the specific performance of a contract for the sale of lands lying in a foreign country will be decreed in equity whenever the party is resident within the jurisdiction of the court.³ So an injunction will under the like circumstances be granted to stay proceedings in a suit in a foreign country.⁴

1292. These are not however peculiar or privileged cases for the exercise of jurisdiction; for Courts of Equity will in all other cases where the proper parties are within the territorial sovereignty, or within the reach of the territorial process, administer full relief, although the property in controversy is actually situate in a foreign country, unless indeed the relief which is asked is of a nature which the court is incapable of administering. Many instances of this sort may readily be adduced to illustrate this general doctrine and its exceptions. Thus a party resident in

¹ Mead v. Merrit, 2 Paige, R. 402; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, R. 606, 615; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 27.

² Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. R. 444; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, R. 615.

³ Ante, § 743; Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. R. 444.

⁴ Ante, §§ 899, 900.

(a) But see Jenkins v. Lester, 131 Mass. 355; Leland v. Smith, Ib. 358, note.

England who is a joint tenant of land situate in Ireland, may be decreed to account for the profits of such land in the Court of Chancery in England.¹ But a bill for a partition of lands situate in Ireland will not be entertained in a Court of Chancery in England; because (as has been said) it is in the realty, and the court cannot award a commission into Ireland; and a bill for a partition is in the nature of a writ of partition at the common law, which lieth not in England for lands in Ireland.²

1293. The same doctrine is applied to cases of trusts attached to land in a foreign country. They may be enforced by a Court of Equity in the country where the trustee is a resident, and to whose process he may rightfully be subjected.³ It is also applied to cases of mortgages of lands in foreign countries. And a bill to foreclose or redeem such a mortgage may be brought in any Court of Equity in any other country where the proper parties are resident.⁴ It was aptly said by Lord Kenyon, when Master of the Rolls, in a case then before him: 'It was not much litigated that the Courts of Equity here have an equal right to interfere with regard to judgments and mortgages upon the lands in a foreign country as upon lands here. Bills are often filed upon mortgages in the West Indies. The only distinction is that this court cannot act upon the land directly, but acts upon the conscience of the person here.' And after citing some cases to this effect, he added: 'These cases clearly show that with regard to any contract made in equity between persons in this country respecting lands in a foreign country, particularly in the British dominions, this court will hold the same jurisdiction as if they were situate in England.'⁵

1294. The same doctrine is applied to cases of frauds touching contracts or conveyances of real property situate in a foreign country. Thus if a rent-charge is fraudulently obtained on lands

¹ Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 X. 4 W. 27; *Cartwright v. Pettus*, 2 Ch. Cas. 214.

² *Cartwright v. Pettus*, 2 Ch. Cas. 214; *Carteret v. Petty*, 2 Swanst. R. 323; s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. C. 133; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 X. 4 E. 4 W. 27; *Earl of Kildare v. Eustace*, 2 Ch. Cas. 188; s. c. 1 Vern. 419, 422; 1 Eq. Abr. 133, C. 4.

³ *Earl of Kildare v. Eustace*, 1 Vern. 419, 422; 1 Eq. Abr. 133.

⁴ *Toller v. Carteret*, 2 Vern. 494; s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. 134, pl. 5, Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 X.

⁵ *Lord Cranstown v. Johnston*, 3 Ves. jr. 182; *Earl of Derby v. Duke of Athol*, 1 Ves. R. 202; *Gascoine v. Douglas*, 2 Dick. 431.

lying in Ireland, a bill to set it aside will be sustained in the Court of Chancery in England if the defendant is a resident there.¹ Courts of Equity have gone even further, and have in effect as between the parties overhauled the judgments of foreign courts and even the sales made under those judgments, where fraud has intervened in those judgments, or a grossly inequitable advantage has been taken. In such cases they do not indeed disregard such judgments, or directly annul or control them; but they arrive at the equities between the parties in the same manner as they would if the proceedings had been mere matters in pais, subject to their general jurisdiction.²

1295. In some instances language has been used which may be supposed to limit the jurisdiction to cases where the lands, though situate abroad, are yet within the general sovereignty of the nation exerting the equitable jurisdiction; as for instance suits in the Chancery of England in regard to contracts, trusts, frauds, and other matters touching lands in Ireland or in the Colonies of Great Britain. Lord Hardwicke on one occasion said on this subject: ‘The different Courts of Equity are held under the same Crown, though in different dominions; and therefore, considering this as a court abroad, the point of jurisdiction is the same as if in Ireland. And it is certain where the provision is in England, let the cause of suit arise in Ireland or the plantations, if the bill be brought in England, as the defendant is here, the courts do “agere in personam,” and may by compulsion of the person and process of the court compel him to do justice.’³ But this language, properly interpreted, was meant to apply only to the case then before the court, which was a suit respecting matters arising in a British colony and subjected to judicial decision there. Upon any other interpretation it would be inconsistent with the principles upon which Courts of Equity profess to act in matters of jurisdiction:

1296. Indeed Lord Hardwicke himself in another case where a bill was brought for possession of land in Scotland, and for a discovery of the rents and profits, deeds and writings thereof, and

¹ Earl of Arglasse *v.* Muschamp, 1 Vern. 75.

² Lord Cranstown *v.* Johnston, 3 Ves. jr. 140; Jackson *v.* Petrie, 10 Ves. 165; White *v.* Hall, 12 Ves. 321; Story on Conflict of Laws, §§ 544, 545; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 X. 4 W. 27.

³ Foster *v.* Vassall, 3 Atk. 589.

of fraud in obtaining the deeds, asserted the jurisdiction as to the fraud and discovery, and said that this would have been a good bill as to fraud and discovery, if the lands had been in France and the persons were resident here; for the jurisdiction of the court as to frauds is upon the conscience of the party.¹

1297. The same principle has been asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States in its broadest form; and it has been held that in cases of fraud, of trust, or of contract, the jurisdiction of a Court of Equity is sustainable wherever the person may be found, although lands not within the jurisdiction of that court may be affected by the decree.²

1298. Still it must be borne in mind that the doctrine is not without limitations and qualifications; and that to justify the exercise of the jurisdiction in cases touching lands in a foreign country the relief sought must be of such a nature as the court is capable of administering in the given case. (a) We have already seen that a bill for a partition of lands in a foreign country will not be entertained in a Court of Equity, upon the ground that the relief cannot be given by issuing a commission to such foreign country.³ Perhaps a more general reason might be given, founded upon the principles of international law; and that is, that real estate cannot be transferred or partitioned or charged, except according to the laws of the country in which it is situated.

1299. Another case illustrative of the same qualification may be put, which has actually passed into judgment. A bill was brought in the English Court of Chancery for the delivery of the possession of a moiety of land in St. Christopher's, and likewise for an account of the rents and profits thereof. Upon demurrer it was held that the court had no jurisdiction to put persons into possession in a place where they had their own methods on such occasions, to which the party might have recourse; for lands in the plantations (it was said) are no more under the jurisdiction of the court than lands in Scotland, for it 'agit in personam' only. But the bill as to the rents and profits was retained.⁴

¹ *Angus v. Angus*, 1 West. R. 23.

² *Massie v. Watts*, 6 Cranch, 160.

³ Ante, § 1292; *Cartwright v. Pettus*, 2 Ch. Cas. 214; s. c. 1 Eq. Abridg. 133; *Carteret v. Petty*, 2 Swanst. R. 323.

⁴ *Roberdeau v. Rous*, 1 Atk. 543; ante, §§ 1295, 1296.

(a) See *Jenkins v. Lester*, 131 Mass. 355.

1300. The like decision was made in another case already alluded to, upon a bill brought in the same court for possession of lands in Scotland, and for a discovery of the rents and profits, deeds and writings thereof, and fraud in obtaining the deed. A plea was put in, insisting that the matter was without the jurisdiction of the court. But it was overruled, and the court said that it could act upon the person as to the fraud and discovery.¹ So where a bequest was made for a charity to be administered in Scotland, the English Court of Chancery declined to take the administration of it into its own hands, deeming it proper to be acted on by the Courts of Scotland.²

¹ *Angus v. Angus*, 1 West. R. 23; ante, § 1296.

² *Provost, &c. of Edinburgh v. Auber, Ambler*, R. 226; *Attorney-Gen. v. Lepine*, 2 Swanst. R. 182; *Emery v. Hill*, 1 Russell, R. 112; *Minet v. Vulliamy*, Id. 113, note; ante, §§ 1184 to 1186.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.

1301. HAVING thus gone over some of the principal heads of trusts which are cognizable in equity, we shall now proceed to another important branch of equity jurisdiction, to wit, that which is exercised in cases of PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES for breaches of conditions and covenants. Originally in all cases of this sort there was no remedy at law, but the only relief which could be obtained was exclusively sought in Courts of Equity. Now indeed by the operation of statutes made for the purpose relief may be obtained at law both in England and America in a great variety of cases, although some cases not within the purview of these statutes are still cognizable in equity alone. The original jurisdiction however in equity still remains, notwithstanding the concurrent remedy at law ;¹ and therefore it properly falls under the present head. (a)

1302. Before entering upon the examination of this subject it may be well to say a few words in regard to the nature and effect of conditions at the common law, as it may help us more distinctly to understand the nature and extent of equity jurisdiction in regard to conditions. At law (and in general the same is equally true in equity) if a man undertakes to do a thing either by way of contract or by way of condition, and it is practicable to do the thing, he is bound to perform it or he must suffer the ordinary consequences ; that is to say, if it be a matter of contract he will be liable at law for damages for the non-performance ; if it be a

¹ See ante, § 63 a ; *Seton v. Slade*, 7 Ves. 274.

(a) A bill to restrain forfeiture cannot be maintained if it does not show any danger of irreparable injury. *Walker v. Brooks*, 125 Mass. 241. Secus if it does. *Ib.* ; *Florence Sewing Machine Co. v. Grover Sewing Machine Co.*, 110 Mass. 1.

condition, then his rights dependent upon the performance of the condition will be gone by the non-performance. The difficulty which arises is to ascertain what shall be the effect in cases where the contract or condition is impossible to be performed; or where it is against law; or where it is repugnant in itself or to the policy of the law.¹

1303. In regard to contracts, if they stipulate to do anything against law or against the policy of the law, or if they contain repugnant and incompatible provisions, they are treated at the common law as void; for in the first case the law will not tolerate any contracts which defeat its own purposes, and in the last case the repugnancy renders it impossible to ascertain the intention of the parties; and until ascertained it would be absurd to undertake to enforce it. On the other hand if the parties stipulate for a thing impossible to be done, and known on both sides to be so, it is treated as a void act and as not intended by the parties to be of any validity.² But if only one party knows it to be impossible and the other does not, and is imposed upon, the latter may compel the former to pay him damages for the imposition.³ So if the thing is physically possible but not physically possible for the party, still it will be binding upon him if fairly made; for he should have weighed his own ability and strength to do it.⁴

1304. In regard to conditions they may be divided into four classes: (1) Those which are possible at the time of their creation, but afterwards become impossible either by the act of God or by the act of the party; (2) Those which are impossible at the time of their creation; (3) Those which are against law or public policy, or are mala in se or mala prohibita; (4) Those which are repugnant to the grant or gift by which they are created or to which they are annexed.⁵ The general rule of the

¹ See Butler's-note (1) to Co. Litt. 206 *a*, and 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 1, and notes (a), (b), (c).

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 1, and note (a); Id. § 2; Id. § 3, note (r); Id. § 4, note (s); Pullerton v. Agnew, 1 Salk. 172; Com. Dig. Condition, D. 1.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Thornborrow v. Whiteacre, 2 Ld. Raym. 1164. A Court of Equity would relieve against a contract like that in 2 Ld. Raym. 1164, and James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. R. 111, upon the ground of fraud, or imposition, or unconscionable advantage taken of the party. Ante, §§ 188, 331.

⁵ This is the classification by Mr. Butler in his learned note (1) to Co Litt. 206 *a*; and it is copied by Mr. Fonblanque into his note to 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1,

common law in regard to conditions is that if they are impossible at the time of their creation, or afterwards become impossible by the act of God or of the law or of the party who is entitled to the benefit of them (as for example the feoffor of an estate or the obligee of a bond), or if they are contrary to law, or if they are repugnant to the nature of the estate or grant, they are void. But if they are possible at the time and become subsequently impossible by the act of the party who is to perform them, then he is treated as in delicto, and the condition is valid and obligatory upon him. But the operation of this rule will or may, as we shall presently see, under different circumstances of its application produce directly opposite results.¹

ch. 4, § 1, note (c); Id. § 3, notes (q), (r); Id. § 4, notes (s), (t), (u). See also Com. Dig. Condition, D. 1 to 8.

¹ Lord Coke's Comments, Co. Litt. 206 *a*, on this subject are very valuable, and part of them are therefore here extracted. He begins by remarking that there are divers diversities which are worthy of observation, and then he adds: 'First between a condition annexed to a state in lands or tenements upon a feoffment, gift in tail, &c., and a condition of an obligation, recognizance, or such like. For if a condition annexed to lands be possible at the making of the condition, and become impossible by the act of God, yet the state of the feoffee, &c., shall not be avoided. As if a man maketh a feoffment in fee upon condition that the feoffor shall, within one year, go to the city of Paris about the affairs of the feoffee, and presently after the feoffor dieth, so as it is impossible by the act of God that the condition should be performed, yet the estate of the feoffee is become absolute; for though the condition be subsequent to the state, yet there is a precedency before the re-entry, namely, the performance of the condition. And if the land should by construction of law be taken from the feoffee, this should work a damage to the feoffee, for that the condition is not performed which was made for his benefit. And it appeareth by Littleton that it must not be to the damage of the feoffee; and so it is if the feoffor shall appear in such a court the next term, and before the day the feoffor dieth, the estate of the feoffee is absolute. But if a man be bound by recognizance or bound with condition, that he shall appear the next term in such a court, and before the day the conusee or obligor dieth, the recognizance or obligation is saved; and the reason of the diversity is because the state of the land is executed and settled in the feoffee, and cannot be redeemed back again but by matter subsequent, namely, the performance of the condition. But the bond or recognizance is a thing in action, an executory, whereof no advantage can be taken until there be a default in the obligor; and therefore in all cases where a condition of a bond, recognizance, &c., is possible at the time of the making of the condition, and before the same can be performed, the condition becomes impossible by the act of God, or of the law, or of the obligee, &c., there the obligation, &c., is saved. But if the condition of a bond, &c., be impossible at the time of the making of the condition, the obligation, &c., is single. And so it is in case of a feoffment in fee with a condition subsequent that is impossible, the state of the feoffee is

1305. In the view of the common law a condition is considered as impossible only when it cannot by any human means take effect; as for example that the obligee shall go from the church of St. Peter at Westminster to the church of St. Peter at Rome within three hours. But if it be only in a high degree improbable, and such as it is beyond the power of the obligee to effect, it is then not deemed impossible.¹

1306. Conditions of all these various kinds will have a very different operation where they are conditions precedent, from what they will have where they are conditions subsequent. Thus for example if an estate is granted upon a condition subsequent, that is to say, to be performed after the estate is vested, and the condition is void for any of the causes above stated, there the estate becomes absolute.² But if the condition is precedent or to be performed before the estate vests, there the condition being void the estate which depends thereon is void also, and the grantee shall take nothing by the grant; for he hath no estate until the condition is performed.³ Thus if a feoffment is made to a man in fee simple on condition that unless he goes from England to Rome in twenty-four hours, or unless he marries A before such a day, and she dies before that day or marries the feoffor, or unless he kills another, or in case he alienes in fee, and then and in every such case the estate shall be void and determine, — in all these cases the condition is void or impossible, and being a condition subsequent the estate is absolute in the feoffee.⁴ But if on the other hand a grant be made to a man that if he kills another, or if he goes from England to Rome within twenty-four hours, or if he marries A before such a day and before that day she dies, or if he does not aliene an estate before such a day and he has already aliened it, then and in that event he shall have an estate in fee, — in all these cases, the condition being void or impossible and being a condition precedent, no estate ever vests in the grantee.⁵

absolute; but if the condition precedent be impossible, no state or interest shall grow thereupon.' See also Butler's note to *Co. Litt.* 206 *b*, 207 *a*; post, § 1307.

¹ *Co. Litt.* 206 *a*, and Mr. Butler's note (1); *Com. Dig.* Condition, D. 2.

² 2 *Black. Comm.* 156, 157; *Com. Dig.* Condition, D. 1 to 4; *Co. Litt.* 206 *a*; 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 1, ch. 4, § 1, note (c).

³ *Ibid.*; *Cary v. Bertie*, 2 *Vern. R.* 339, 340.

⁴ 2 *Black. Comm.* 157; *Co. Litt.* 206 *a*.

⁵ *Ibid.*

1307. On the other hand if a bond or other obligation be upon a condition which is impossible, illegal, or repugnant at the time when it is made, the bond is single and the obligor is bound to pay it. But if the condition be possible at the time when it is made and afterwards becomes impossible by the act of God or of the law or of the obligee, there the bond is saved and the obligor is not bound to pay it.¹ (a) So if the condition is in the disjunctive and gives liberty to do one thing or another at the election of the obligor; and both are possible at the time but one part afterwards by the act of God or of the obligee becomes impossible, the obligation is saved.² But if one part only was possible at the time, then the other part if possible ought to be performed.³

1308. The Roman law, if it does not entirely coincide with the common law on the subject of conditions, is in many respects

¹ Com. Dig. Condition, D. 1; *Thornborow v. Whiteacre*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1164; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 1, note (b); *Graydon v. Hicks*, 2 Atk. 18; *Jones v. Earl of Suffolk*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 528; Co. Litt. 206 a; ante, § 1304; 1 Roll. Abridg. 450, pl. 10; *Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 3, ch. 11, § 3*. Although the general rule seems to be, as stated in the text, that where the condition although possible becomes afterwards impossible to be performed, the obligation is saved, yet it is not to be taken as universally true, either at law or in equity, that where a covenant or contract is to be performed by a party (not secured or sought to be enforced by a penalty), and he is afterwards prevented from performing it by the act of God or by inevitable casualty, that he is thereby exonerated from the covenant or contract, and not liable in damages for the non-performance. The contrary is certainly true in a variety of cases. But it is not easy, if indeed it be practicable, to reconcile all the authorities, or to say exactly in what cases the performance is excused or not. Ante, §§ 101 to 104. See *Abbott on Shipp. Pt. 3, ch. 1, §§ 14 to 16 b*; *Id. ch. 2, § 3*; *Id. Pt. 3, ch. 7, §§ 17, 19*; *Barker v. Hodgson*, 3 Maule & Selw. 267; *Edwin v. East India Company*, 2 Vern. 210, 212; *Blight v. Page*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 295, note; *Sjoerds v. Luscombe*, 16 East, 201; *Shubrick v. Selmond*, 3 Burr. R. 1637; *Paradine, v. Jane*, Aley, R. 27; *Brecknock Canal Company v. Pritchard*, 6 Term R. 750; *Atkinson v. Ritchie*, 10 East, R. 530; *Bullock v. Dommitt*, 6 Term R. 650; *Madeiras v. Hill*, 8 Bing. R. 231, 235. Many of the cases on both sides are collected in *Story on Bailm. §§ 25, 35, 36*, and in *Platt on Covenants, Pl. 6, ch. 2, pp. 582 to 584*; and *Chitty on Contracts, by Perkins, pp. 567, 569 (Am. edit. 1839)*.

² Com. Dig. Condition, D. 1; *Laughter's Case*, 5 Co. R. 21; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 3, and note (g).

³ *Ibid.*

(a) As to impossibility of performing building contracts see *Roberts v. Bury Comm'rs*, L. R. 4 C. P. 755; *s. c. 5 C. P. 310*; *Jones v. St. John's College*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 115.

founded on similar considerations. If an impossible condition was annexed to a stipulation, the stipulation was by that law void. ‘*Si impossibilis conditio obligationibus adjiciatur, nihil valet stipulatio.*’¹ ‘*Item, quod leges fieri prohibent, si perpetuam causam (prohibitionis) servaturum est, cessat obligatio.*’² That rule of course applied to the case where the condition constituted a part of the stipulation. ‘*Impossibilium nulla obligatio est.*’² Pothier states the doctrine of the civil law in the following manner: The condition of a thing impossible, unlawful, or contrary to good morals, under which one promises anything renders the act absolutely void when it lies in fescence (in faciendo), and no obligation springs from it.⁴ As if I have promised you a sum of money upon condition that you make a triangle without angles, or that you shall go naked through the streets.⁵

1309. In another place a distinction is taken in the Roman law approaching nearer to that in the common law. ‘*Impossibilis conditio cum in faciendum concipitur, stipulationibus obstat; aliter atque si talis conditio inseratur stipulationi, si in cœlum non ascenderit; nam utilis et præsens est, et pecuniam creditam continet.*’⁶

1310. A condition was accounted impossible in the Roman law when it consisted of a thing of which nature forbids the existence. ‘*Impossibilis autem conditio habetur cui natura impedimento est, quominus existat.*’⁷ But a stipulation which was not possible to be complied with by the party stipulating, but was possible to another person, was held obligatory. ‘*Si ab eo stipulatus sim qui efficere non possit quum alii possibile sit; jure factam obligationem, Sabinus scribit.*’⁸ The same principles were still more emphatically expounded in other places in the Digest. ‘*Non solum stipulationes impossibili conditione applicatæ nullius momenti sunt; sed etiam cæteri quoque contractus (veluti emptiones, locationes) impossibili conditione interposita, æque nullius momenti sunt. Quia in ea re quæ ex duorum*

¹ Inst. B. 3, tit. 20, § 11; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 45, tit. 1, n. 40, 98.

² Pothier, Pand. Lib. 45, tit. 1, n. 39; Dig. Lib. 45, tit. 1, l. 35, § 1.

³ Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 185.

⁴ Pothier, Oblig. n. 204.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 45, tit. 1, l. 7; Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 20, § 11; Pothier, Oblig. n. 204; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 45, tit. 1, n. 98.

⁷ Ibid.; Inst. Lib. 3, tit. 20, § 11.

⁸ Dig. Lib. 45, tit. 1, l. 137, § 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 45, tit. 1, n. 39.

plurimumve consensu agitur, omnium voluntas spectetur; quorum, procul dubio, in hujusmodi actu talis cogitatio est, ut nihil agi existiment apposita ea conditione quam sciant esse impossibile.¹

1311. From what has been already said it is obvious that if a condition or covenant was possible to be performed, there was an obligation on the party at the common law to perform it punctiliously. If he failed so to do, it was wholly immaterial whether the failure was by accident, or mistake, or fraud, or negligence. In either case his responsibility dependent upon it became absolute, and his rights dependent upon it became forfeited or extinguished. Thus for example if a bond was made with a penalty of £1,000 upon condition that if £100 were paid to the obligee on or before a certain day it should be void, if it was not paid at the day from any cause whatsoever, except the fault of the obligee, the obligation became single, and the obligor was compellable at law to pay the whole penalty. So if an estate was conveyed upon condition that if a certain sum of money was paid to the grantee on or before a certain day it should be void (which constituted what we now call a mortgage), if the money was not paid at the day, the estate became (as we have seen), at law, absolute.² So (as has been already stated) if a sale was made of an estate to be paid for at a particular day, if the money was not paid at the day, the right of the vendee to enforce a performance of the contract at law was extinguished. On the other hand if the vendor was unable or neglected, at the day appointed, to make a conveyance of the estate, the sale as to him became utterly incapable of being enforced at law.³

1312. Courts of Equity do not hold themselves bound by such rigid rules, but they are accustomed to administer as well as to refuse relief in many cases of this sort, upon principles peculiar to themselves; sometimes refusing relief, and following out the strict doctrines of the common law as to the effect of conditions and conditional contracts; and sometimes granting relief upon doctrines wholly at variance with those held at the common law. It may be necessary therefore to consider each distinct class of cases separately, so that the principles which govern in each may be more clearly developed.

¹ Dig. Lib. 44, tit. 7, l. 31; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 45, tit. 1, n. 98.

² Ante, §§ 1004, 1012.

³ Ante, §§ 771, 772, 776, 777.

1313. In the first place as to relief in cases of penalties annexed to bonds and other instruments the design of which is to secure the due fulfilment of the principal obligation.¹ The origin of equity jurisdiction in cases of this sort is certainly obscure, and not easily traced to any very exact source. It is highly probable that relief was first granted upon the ground of accident, or mistake, or fraud, and was limited to cases where the breach of the condition was by the non-payment of money at the specified day. In such cases Courts of Equity seem to have acted upon the ground that by compelling the obligor to pay interest during the time of his default the obligee would be placed in the same situation as if the principal had been paid at the proper day.² They wholly overlooked (as has been said) the consideration that the failure of payment at that day might be attended with mischievous consequences to the obligee, which (in a rational sense) never could be cured by any subsequent payment thereof with the addition of interest.³ Upon this account doubts have sometimes been expressed as to the solidity of the foundation on which the doctrine of affording relief in such cases rests.⁴

1314. But whatever may be the origin of the doctrine, it has been for a great length of time established and is now expanded so as to embrace a variety of cases not only where money is to be paid but where other things are to be done and other objects are contracted for. In short the general principle now adopted is, that wherever a penalty is inserted merely to secure the performance or enjoyment of a collateral object, the latter is considered as the principal intent of the instrument, and the penalty is deemed only as accessory, and therefore as intended only to secure the due performance thereof or the damage really incurred by the non-performance.⁵ (a) In every such case the

¹ Mr. Evans, in a learned note to Pothier on Obligations (Vol. 2, Number 12, pp. 81 to 111), has given a very elaborate review of the doctrine of penal obligations, to which I invite the particular attention of the reader. See also Newland on Contracts, ch. 17, pp. 307 to 311.

² Reynolds v. Pitt, 19 Ves. 140.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. See Hill v. Barclay, 18 Ves. 58, 60.

⁵ Sloman v. Walter, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 418; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 2,

(a) If the penalty consist merely performance of the contract will be in requiring performance of what is become due later, it will, it seems, be enforced, or at least will not be relieved

true test (generally if not universally¹) by which to ascertain whether relief can or cannot be had in equity is to consider whether compensation can be made or not. If it cannot be made, then Courts of Equity will not interfere. If it can be made, then if the penalty is to secure the mere payment of money, Courts of Equity will relieve the party upon paying the principal and interest.² If it is to secure the performance of some collateral act or undertaking, then Courts of Equity will retain the bill and will direct an issue of quantum damnificatus; and when the amount of damages is ascertained by a jury upon the trial of such an issue, they will grant relief upon payment of such damages.³

1315. The same doctrine has been applied by Courts of Equity to cases of leases where a forfeiture of the estate and an entry for the forfeiture is stipulated for in the lease in case of the non-payment of the rent at the regular days of payment; for the right of entry is deemed to be intended to be a mere security for the payment of the rent.⁴ (a) It has also been applied to cases

note (d); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 6, § 4, note (h); *Skinner v. Dayton*, 2 John. Ch. R. 535; *Sanders v. Pope*, 12 Ves. 282; *Davis v. West*, 112 Ves. 475.

¹ Post, § 1320.

² *Ibid.*; 2 Foul. Eq. B. 5, ch. 1, § 1, and notes (a), (b). *Elliott v. Turner*, 13 Simons, R. 477.

³ *Astley v. Weldon*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 346, 350; *Hardy v. Martin*, 1 Cox, R. 26; *Skinner v. Dayton*, 2 John. Ch. R. 534, 535; *Benson v. Gibson*, 3 Atk. 395; *Errington v. Aynesley*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 343; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 D. 2.

⁴ In *Hill v. Barclay* (18 Ves. 58) Lord Eldon, speaking of the relief given in cases of non-payment of rent, said it was 'upon a principle long acknowl-

against. Thus a stipulation in a compromise of a debt by taking a mortgage for a smaller sum, that if that is not paid at a stated time, the whole debt shall revive appears to be valid even in equity. *Thompson v. Hudson*, L. R. 2 Eq. 612; s. c. 2 Ch. 255; 4 H. L. 1. So too equity will refuse to relieve against an agreement that on failure to pay when due an instalment of a debt, the whole debt shall then be treated as due. *Sterne v. Beck*, 11 Week. R. 791. And it has been declared that equity will not relieve against a covenant that, on underletting or removing goods from premises a year's rent shall be paid in advance.

Derinott v. Wallack, 1 Wall. 61. Indeed it has been held that equity will not relieve against an agreement that if deferred purchase-money is not paid at the day agreed, a certain higher rate of interest shall be charged. *Herbert v. Salisbury Ry. Co.*, L. R. 2 Eq. 221. Secus of a stipulation that if interest is not paid when due, a higher rate may be charged. *Parker v. Butcher*, L. R. 3 Eq. 762; *infra*, p. 652, note.

Reasonable fines of a society will not be relieved against. *Parker v. Butcher*, *supra*; *Shannon v. Howard Assoc.*, 36 Md. 383.

(a) See ante, § 776, and note (a); *Wilson v. Jones*, 1 Bush, 173;

where a specific performance of contracts is sought to be enforced, and yet the party has not punctually performed the contract on his own part but has been in default.¹ (a) And in cases of this sort admitting of compensation there is rarely any distinction allowed in Courts of Equity between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent; for it has been truly said that although the distinction between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent is known and often mentioned in Courts of Equity, yet the prevailing though not the universal distinction as to condition there is between cases where compensation can be made and cases where it cannot be made, without any regard to the fact whether they are conditions precedent or conditions subsequent.²

edged in this court, but utterly without foundation.' Why without foundation? It proceeds upon the intelligible principle that the right of re-entry is intended as a mere security. If it is so intended, there is the same ground for relief as in case of a forfeiture by non-payment of the money due upon a mortgage at the day appointed. Nobody doubts the justice and conscientiousness of interfering in the latter case. Why is it not equally proper in the former?

¹ Ante, §§ 771 to 778; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 4, note (h); *Davis v. West*, 12 Ves. 475; *Sanders v. Pope*, 12 Ves. 282; *Peachy v. the Duke of Somerset*, 1 Str. R. 453; *Wadman v. Calcrafft*, 10 Ves. 67, 70; *Hill v. Barclay*, 18 Ves. 58, 59; s. c. 16 Ves. 403, 405.

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 1, note (c); *Id.* B. 1, ch. 6, § 4, note (h); *Id.* ch. 6, § 5, and note (k); *Bertie v. Falkland*, 2 Vern. 339, 344; s. c. 1 Salk. 479; *Popham v. Bampffield*, 1 Vern. 83, and Mr. Raithby's note (1); *Hayward v. Angell*, 1 Vern. R. 223; *Grimston v. Bruce*, 1 Salk. 156; *Taylor v. Popham*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 168; *Hollinrake v. Lister*, 1 Russ. R. 508; *Rose v. Rose*, Ambl. R. 332; *Wyllie v. Wilkes*, Doug. R. 522; *Woodman v. Blake*, 2 Vern. 222; *Cage v. Russell*, 2 Vent. R. 352; *Wallis v. Crimes*, 1 Ch. Cas. 89. There is some diversity in the cases upon the subject of conditions precedent and conditions subsequent as acted upon in Chancery. Thus for example it was said in *Popham v. Bampffield* (1 Vern. 83) that there was a difference between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent; 'for precedent conditions must

Gregory v. Wilson, 9 Hare, 683; s. c. 10 Eng. L. & E. 138. Like relief has been afforded at law by stay of proceedings where there was no gross negligence or wilful default. *Atkins v. Chilson*, 11 Met. 112.

(a) But equity will not enforce performance of an agreement for a lease where there have been breaches of the agreement which would have amounted to a forfeiture had a lease been granted.

Gregory v. Wilson, 9 Hare, 683. See *Rankin v. Lay*, 2 DeG. F. & J. 65; *Rogers v. Tudor*, 6 Jur. n. s. 692. Indeed in England equity will not refuse to decree specific performance of a contract to renew a lease except for a gross breach, if there is no clause of re-entry. *Hare v. Burges*, 5 Week. R. 585. But see *Gannett v. Albee*, 103 Mass. 372. Further see ante, § 776, note (a).

1316. The true foundation of the relief in equity in all these cases is that as the penalty is designed as a mere security, if the party obtains his money or his damages he gets all that he expected and all that in justice he is entitled to.¹ And notwithstanding the objections which have been sometimes urged against it this seems a sufficient foundation for the jurisdiction. In reason, in conscience, in natural equity, there is no ground to say because a man has stipulated for a penalty in case of his omission to do a particular act (the real object of the parties being the performance of the act), that if he omits to do the act he shall suffer an enormous loss wholly disproportionate to the injury to the other party. If it be said that it is his own folly to have made such a stipulation, it may equally well be said that the folly of one man cannot authorize gross oppression on the other side. And law as a science would be unworthy of the name if it did not to some extent provide the means of preventing the mischiefs of improvidence, rashness, blind confidence, and credulity on one side, and of skill, avarice, cunning, and a gross violation of the principles of morals and conscience on the other. There are

be literally performed, and this court (a Court of Equity) will never vest an estate where by reason of a condition precedent it will not vest at law. But of conditions subsequent which are to divest an estate it is otherwise. Yet of conditions subsequent there is this difference to be observed; for against all conditions subsequent this Court (of Equity) cannot nor ought to relieve. When the court can in any case compensate the party in damages for the non-precise performance of the condition, there it is just and equitable to relieve.' In the case of *Hayward v. Angell* (1 Vern. R. 223) the Lord Keeper said: 'In all cases where the matter lies in compensation, be the condition precedent or subsequent, he thought there ought to be relief.' In *Cary v. Bertie* (2 Vern. R. 339) Lord Holt, assisting the Lord Chancellor, said: 'In cases of conditions subsequent that are to defeat an estate these are not favored in law; and if the condition becomes impossible by the act of God, the estate shall not be defeated or forfeited. And a Court of Equity may relieve to prevent the divesting of an estate, but cannot relieve to give an estate that never vested.' The Lord Chancellor in the same case said: 'As the condition was the performance of a collateral act, and did not lie in compensation, he did not see anything that could be a just ground for relief in a Court of Equity.' *Id.* p. 344; s. c. 1 Salk. 231. We shall presently see that in some cases of forfeiture for breach of covenant Courts of Equity will not grant relief upon the principle that compensation can be made. In *Wallis v. Crimes* (1 Ch. Cas. 90) the Lord Keeper decided that wherever a condition precedent was in the nature of a penalty, equity ought to relieve. See also *Bland v. Middleton*, 2 Ch. Cas. 1.

¹ *Skinner v. Dayton*, 2 John. Ch. R. 535; *Peachy v. The Duke of Somerset*, 1 Str. 447, 453; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 4, note (h).

many cases in which Courts of Equity interfere upon mixed grounds of this sort. There is no more intrinsic sanctity in stipulations by contract than in other solemn acts of parties which are constantly interfered with by Courts of Equity upon the broad ground of public policy or the pure principles of natural justice. Where a penalty or forfeiture is designed merely as a security to enforce the principal obligation, it is as much against conscience to allow any party to pervert it to a different and oppressive purpose as it would be to allow him to substitute another for the principal obligation. The whole system of Equity Jurisprudence proceeds upon the ground that a party having a legal right shall not be permitted to avail himself of it for the purposes of injustice, or fraud, or oppression, or harsh and vindictive injury.¹ (a)

¹ See Newland on Contracts, ch. 17, pp. 307 to 311. Lord Eldon has taken uncommon pains to express his dissatisfaction with the principle of allowing relief in equity against penalties and forfeitures, and also of the dispensation with a punctilious performance of contracts by Courts of Equity. In *Hill v. Barclay*, 18 Ves. 59, 60, he used the following language: 'The original cases upon this subject are of different sorts. The court has very long held in a great variety of classes of cases that in the instance of a covenant to pay a sum of money the court so clearly sees, or rather fancies, the amount of damage arising from non-payment at the time stipulated that it takes upon itself to act as if it was certain that, giving the money five years afterwards with interest, it gives a complete compensation. That doctrine has been recognized without any doubt upon leases with reference to non-payment of rent, upon conditions precedent as to acts to be done, payment of money in cases of specific performance, and various other instances. But the court has certainly affected to justify that right which it has assumed, to set aside the legal contracts of men, dispensing with the actual specific performance, upon the notion that it places them as near as can be in the same situation as if the contract had been with the utmost precision specifically performed. Yet the result of experience is that where a man, having contracted to sell his estate, is placed in this situation that he cannot know whether he is to receive the price when it ought to be paid, the very circumstance that the condition is not performed at the time stipulated may prove his ruin, notwithstanding all the court can offer as compensation.' See also s. c. 16 Ves. 403, 405. The whole argument of Lord Eldon is that Courts of Equity decree what they presume is a compensation, but what in a given case may be no just compensation. Now in the first place this is no objection to an interference in all

(a) See *National Land Co. v. Perry*, 23 Kans. 140; *Gram v. Wasey*, 45 Mich. 223. The fact that a penalty is intended to enforce performance is no obstacle to specific performance. Ante, § 715. But where the intention is to set a true value upon the breach

of covenant, equity will not interfere to prevent a breach. *Carnes v. Nesbitt*, 7 Hurl. & N. 778; *Wolf Creek Co. v. Shultz*, 71 Penn. St. 180; *White v. Arlett*, 1 Bond, 319; *Hamaker v. Schroers*, 49 Mo. 406; *Shute v. Hamilton*, 3 Daly, 462.

1316 *a*. The same principle of general justice is applied in favor of the party entitled to the security of the penalty wherever the other party has unreasonably deprived him of his right to enforce it until it is no longer adequate to secure his rights. (*a*) Hence it is that Courts of Equity will decree the obligee of a bond interest beyond the penalty of the bond where by unfounded and protracted litigation the obligor has prevented the obligee from prosecuting his claim at law for a length of time which has deprived the latter of his legal rights when they might otherwise have been made available at law. In such cases Courts of Equity do no more than supply and administer within their own jurisdiction a substitute for the original legal rights of the obligee of which he has been unjustifiably deprived by the misconduct of the obligor.¹ So if a mortgagor has given a bond with a penalty as well as a mortgage for the security of a debt, although

cases where a complete and adequate compensation can be given, but only to an interference where the facts establish that there cannot be such a complete and adequate compensation. And this is the very exception which, theoretically at least, Courts of Equity adopt. In the next place it is supposed by Lord Eldon (*Reynolds v. Pitt*, 19 Ves. 140) that interest for the delay of payment of money is not or may not be an adequate compensation for the omission to pay at the time appointed. That objection equally applies to the allowance of interest at law as a compensation. It may in a given case be inadequate to the particular loss sustained by the creditor, yet it is uniformly acted upon without hesitation, and the creditor will not be permitted to recover a greater compensation. The reason is that interest is a certain and general rule adapted to ordinary circumstances; and it would be inconvenient to go into a particular examination of all the circumstances of each case in order to ascertain the loss or injury. The general rule of interest is adopted because it meets the ordinary grievance and compensates for it. All general rules must work occasional mischiefs. Besides there would be injustice in compelling a debtor to pay losses of a collateral nature not embraced in or connected with his own contract, over which he could have no control, and which might be imputable to the rashness or improvidence or want of skill of his creditor. No system of laws could provide for all the remote consequences of the non-performance of any act. Human justice must stop, as it ought, at the direct and immediate and necessary consequences of acts and omissions, and not aim beyond a reasonable indemnification for them. At least the common law of England, equally with equity, has adopted this as the basis of its usual remedial justice.

¹ *The East India Company v. Campion*, 11 Bligh, R. 159, 187, 188. See also *Pulteney v. Warren*, 6 Ves. 92; *Grant v. Grant*, 3 Russ. R. 598; s. c. 3 Sim. R. 340; *Duvall v. Terrey*, Shower, Parl. Cas. 15; *Hale v. Thomas*, 1 Vern. R. 349, 350; *Peers v. Baldwin*, 2 Eq. Abridg. 611; post, § 1522.

(*a*) See *Barnett v. Nichols*, 56 Miss. 622.

the creditor suing on the bond can recover no more than the penalty even when the interest due thereon exceeds it, yet if he sues on the mortgage Courts of Equity will decree him all the interest due upon the debt, although it exceeds the penalty; for the bond is but a collateral security.¹ And in such a case it will not make any difference that the mortgage is given by a surety.²

1317. It is not improbable that Courts of Equity adopted this doctrine of relief in cases of penalties and forfeitures from the Roman law, where it is found regularly unfolded and sustained upon the clear principles of natural justice. The Roman law took notice not only of conditions strictly so called, but also of clauses of nullity and penal clauses. The former were those in which it was agreed that a covenant should be null or void in a certain event; the latter were those where a penalty was added to a contract for non-performance of that which was stipulated.³ The general doctrine of that law was that clauses of nullity and penal clauses were not to be executed according to the rigor of their terms. And therefore covenants were not of course dissolved, nor forfeitures or penalties positively incurred, if there was not a punctilious performance at the very time fixed by the contract. But the matter might be required to be submitted to the discretion of the proper judicial tribunal, to decide upon it according to all the circumstances of the case and the nature and objects of the clauses.⁴ Indeed penalties were in that law treated altogether, as in reason and justice they ought to be, as a mere security for the performance of the principal obligation.⁵

1318. But we are carefully to distinguish between cases of penalties strictly so called and cases of liquidated damages. The latter properly occur when the parties have agreed that in case one party shall do a stipulated act or omit to do it, the other party shall receive a certain sum as the just, appropriate, and conventional amount of the damages sustained by such act or omission. In cases of this sort Courts of Equity will not interfere to grant relief, but will deem the parties entitled to fix their own meas-

¹ Clarke v. Lord Abingdon, 17 Ves. 106.

² Ibid.

³ 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 1, § 4, art. 18, pp. 50, 51.

⁴ Domat, B. 1, tit. 1, § 4, art. 19, p. 51; Dig. Lib. 45, tit. 1, l. 135, § 2; Id. l. 122; Pothier, Oblig. n. 345, 349, 350.

⁵ Pothier, Oblig. n. 341, 342, 345.

ure of damages;¹ provided always that the damages do not assume the character of gross extravagance or of wanton and unreasonable disproportion to the nature or extent of the injury. But on the other hand Courts of Equity will not suffer their jurisdiction to be evaded merely by the fact that the parties have called a sum damages which is in fact and in intent a penalty, or because they have designedly used language and inserted provisions which are in their nature penal and yet have endeavored to cover up their objects under other disguises. (a) The principal difficulty in cases of this sort is to ascertain when the sum stated is in fact designed to be *nomine pœnæ*, and when it is properly designed as liquidated damages.² (b)

¹ *Skinner v. White*, 17 John. R. 339.

² *Lowe v. Peers*, 4 Burr. 22, 25; *Astley v. Weldon*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 346; *Skinner v. Dayton*, 2 John. Ch. R. 535; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 2, note (d). Many of the cases are collected in Mr. Evans's note to Pothier on Obligations (Vol. II. No. 12, pp. 85 to 98). See also Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, Pt. 1, ch. 4, § 3, pp. 477, 478; Eden on Injunct. ch. 2, p. 21, and note (e); *Shiel v. McNett*, 9 Paige, 101.

(a) *Ropes v. Upton*, 125 Mass. 258; *Bird v. Lake*, 1 Hem. & M. 111; *Howard v. Woodward*, 34 L. J. Ch. 47; s. c. 10 Jur. n. s. 1123. See *Coles v. Sims*, 5 DeG. M. & G. 1; ante, p. 23, note (a).

(b) As the really difficult cases on this subject turn mainly upon the interpretation to be put upon the particular language of the contract, it is doubtful how far cases not precisely in point can be regarded as guides. The following cases however contain a variety of examples of the rulings of the courts upon special provisions: *Kemble v. Farren*, 6 Bing. 141; *Hinton v. Sparkes*, L. R. 3 C. P. 161; *Wallis v. Smith*, 21 Ch. D. 243; *In re Newman*, 4 Ch. D. 724; *Atkyns v. Kinnear*, L. R. 4 Ex. 776; *Magee v. Lavell*, L. R. 9 C. P. 107; *Betts v. Burch*, 4 Hurl. & N. 506; *Ranger v. Great Western Ry. Co.*, 5 H. L. Cas. 72; *Sparrow v. Paris*, 7 Hurl. & N. 594; *Cushing v. Drew*, 97 Mass. 445; *Streeper v. Williams*, 48 Penn. St. 450; *Dwinel v. Brown*, 54 Maine, 468;

Morse v. Rathbun, 42 Mo. 594; *Hise v. Foster*, 17 Iowa, 23; *Streeter v. Rush*, 25 Cal. 67; *Lightner v. Menzel*, 35 Cal. 452; *Ryan v. Martin*, 16 Wis. 57; *Gobble v. Linder*, 76 Ill. 157; *Wallis v. Carpenter*, 13 Allen, 19; *Shreve v. Brereton*, 51 Penn. St. 175; *Colwell v. Lawrence*, 36 N. Y. 71; *Staples v. Parker*, 41 Barb. 648; *Long v. Towl*, 42 Mo. 545; *First Orthodox Church v. Walrath*, 27 Mich. 392; *Cook v. Finch*, 19 Minn. 407; *Lee v. Overstreet*, 44 Ga. 507.

The language of able judges in late cases upon this perplexing subject will show the difficulties that have beset the way of even a general rule. 'If the substance of the agreement is that a party shall not do a particular act, and that is the evident object and purpose of the agreement, and it is provided that if there is a breach of this agreement the party shall pay a stated sum, which does not clearly appear to be an alternative which he has the right to adopt instead of performing his contract, there would seem to be no

1319. In the next place in regard to cases of forfeitures. It is a universal rule in equity never to enforce either a penalty or a forfeiture.¹ (a) Therefore Courts of Equity will never aid in the

¹ *Livingston v. Tompkins*, 4 John. Ch. R. 431; *Popham v. Bampffield*, 1 Vern. 83; *Carey v. Bertie*, 2 Vern. R. 339; ante, § 1315, note 1; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 5; *Horsburg v. Baker*, 1 Peters, R. 232, 236.

reason why a Court of Equity should not restrain him from doing the act, and thus carry out the intention of the parties.' *Ropes v. Upton*, 125 Mass. 258, 260, *Endicott, J.* That is, the insertion of a sum as liquidated damages will not necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of equity. *Ib.*

A dictum of Lord Coleridge in *Magee v. Lavell*, L. R. 9 C. P. 107, 111, has been the subject of some discussion. The learned Chief Justice there says: 'The general principle of law appears to me to be, where a contract contains a variety of stipulations of different degrees of importance, and one large sum is stated at the end to be paid on breach of performance of any of them, that must be considered as a penalty.' *Jessel, M. R.*, says of this dictum: 'It is exactly opposed to what Lord Ch. J. Tindal says in *Kemble v. Farren*, 6 Bing. 141. The mere fact of the stipulation varying in importance cannot show that the parties did not fix a sum where the damage is not ascertainable, but I am bound to say that though that is my opinion, and that I should have thought it was quite clear, I find that in the case of *In re Newman*, 4 Ch. D. 724, 731, a decision of the Court of Appeal, that dictum is approved of.' *Wallis v. Smith*, 21 Ch. D. 243, 264.

It seems to be only another way of putting the dictum of Lord Coleridge to say that where a sum of money is stated to be payable either by way of liquidated damages or by way of penalty for breach of stipulations, all or some of which are, or one of which is, for the payment of a sum of money of less amount, that is a penalty. *Wallis*

v. Smith, 21 Ch. D. 243, 256; *In re Newman*, 4 Ch. D. 724. But *Jessel, M. R.*, thinks this bad law, though binding upon him. *Wallis v. Smith, supra.*

Where the sum to be forfeited is for breaches of uncertain nature and amount, it is a case of liquidated damages. *Wallis v. Smith; Kemble v. Farren*, 6 Bing. 141.

Some cases however are settled with sufficient clearness. Thus where the sum to be dealt with is already in the hands of a stakeholder or a third person by way of deposit, and that deposit is to be applied in payment of the sum, it is a case of liquidated damages. *Wallis v. Smith*, at p. 250; *Hinton v. Sparkes*, L. R. 3 C. P. 161; *Lea v. Whitaker*, L. R. 8 C. P. 70; *Magee v. Lavell*, L. R. 9 C. P. 107, 116.

Again an agreement by a borrower of money at a stipulated rate of interest that if he does not pay the interest when due, he will pay 1 per cent as 'commission' per month upon what he ought to have paid until he shall pay what was due, is not a penalty and is lawful. *General Credit Co. v. Glegg*, 22 Ch. D. 549. Secus however of an agreement to pay interest at a certain rate, but if not duly paid, then at a certain higher rate. *Hollis v. Wyse*, 2 Vern. 289; *Strode v. Parker*, *Ib.* 316; *Parker v. Butcher*, L. R. 3 Eq. 762; ante, p. 645, note.

(a) *Keller v. Lewis*, 53 Cal. 113; *White v. Port Huron R. Co.*, 13 Mich. 356; *Warner v. Bennett*, 31 Conn. 468; *Smith v. Jewett*, 40 N. H. 530; *United States v. McRae*, L. R. 4. Eq. 327.

divesting of an estate for a breach of a covenant on a condition subsequent,¹ although they will often interfere to prevent the divesting of an estate for a breach of a covenant or condition.²

1320. But there seems to be a distinction taken in equity between penalties and forfeitures. In the former, relief is always given if compensation can be made, for it is deemed a mere security.³ (a) In the latter, although compensation can be made relief is not always given. It is true that the rule has been often laid down, and was formerly so held, that in all cases of penalties and forfeitures (at least upon a condition subsequent) Courts of Equity would relieve against the breach of the condition and the forfeiture if compensation could be made, even although the act or omission was voluntary.⁴ (b) The same doctrine was formerly applied in many cases of conditions precedent where the parties could be put in the same situation as if they had been strictly performed.⁵

1321. But the doctrine at present maintained seems far more narrow. It is admitted indeed that where the condition or forfeiture is merely a security for the non-payment of money (such as a right of re-entry upon non-payment of rent), there it is to be treated as a mere security and in the nature of a penalty, and is accordingly relievable.⁶ But if the forfeiture arises from the breach of any other covenants of a collateral nature, as for example of a covenant to repair, there, although compensation might be ascertained, and made upon an issue quantum damnificatus, yet it has been held that Courts of Equity ought not to relieve, but should leave the parties to their remedy at law.⁷ (c)

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ante, § 1314.

⁴ Ante, § 1315, note 1; *Popham v. Bampfield*, 1 Vern. 35; *Hayward v. Angell*, 1 Vern. R. 222; *Northcote v. Duke, Ambler*, R. 513; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 4, and note (g); *Sanders v. Pope*, 12 Ves. 289; *Cage v. Russel*, 2 Vent. 352; *Wafer v. Mocato*, 9 Mod. R. 112; *Hack v. Leonard*, 9 Mod. R. 91; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 L.

⁵ See *Taylor v. Popham*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 168; *Hollinrake v. Lister*, 1 Russ. R. 508; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2 Q. 4, 7, 8.

⁶ Ante, § 1315, and note (2); *Hill v. Barclay*, 16 Ves. 403, 405; s. c. 18 Ves. 58, 60; *Wadham v. Calcraft*, 10 Ves. 68, 69; *Reynolds v. Smith*, 19 Ves. 140.

⁷ *Wadham v. Calcraft*, 10 Ves. 68, 69; *Hill v. Barclay*, 16 Ves. 403, 405; s. c. 18 Ves. 59, 60, 61; *Reynolds v. Pitt*, 19 Ves. 140, 241; *Bracebridge v. Buckley*, 2 Price, R. 200. The contrary doctrine was maintained in *Hack v. Leonard*, 9 Mod. R. 91; and *Webber v. Smith*, 2 Vern. R. 103.

(a) *Henry v. Tupper*, 29 Vt. 358.

(b) *Henry v. Tupper*, supra.

(c) *Klein v. Insurance Co.* 104 U. S. 88. See also *Wheeler v. Con-*

1322. It is not perhaps very easy to see the ground of this distinction between these two classes of cases. It is rather stating

necticut Ins. Co., 82 N. Y. 543; Hagar v. Buck, 44 Vt. 285; Gregory v. Wilson, 9 Hare, 683; Nokes v. Gibbon, 3 Drew. 681; Croft v. Goldsmid, 24 Beav. 312; Hills v. Rowland, 4 DeG. M. & G. 430. A fortiori if, where the provision for forfeiture is not to be treated as a security, compensation cannot be made for a breach, will equity refuse to relieve (unless the case can be brought within some qualification of the rule). Klein v. Insurance Co., supra.

But notwithstanding the strong terms in which the rule is sometimes declared, as in the case last cited, there are circumstances under which both Courts of Law and Courts of Equity will refuse to entertain a forfeiture, though the provision for a forfeiture is an independent one, that is, not inserted merely as a security. The following are circumstances of the kind:—

1. Where there has afterwards been a waiver (which of course implies knowledge) of the delinquency or the forbidden act. Whitehead v. Bennett, 9 Week. R. 626; Bridges v. Longman, 24 Beav. 27; Bodine v. Exchange Ins. Co., 51 N. Y. 117; Wing v. Harvey, 5 DeG. M. & G. 265; Buckbee v. United States Ins. Co., 18 Barb. 541.

2. Where the alleged forfeiture was properly due to the prior or contemporaneous act or conduct of the party seeking to avail himself of the forfeiture, or of such party's agent; as where an insurance agent with apparent authority dispenses with a provision of the policy requiring payment of the premium in advance or on a particular day. Boehen v. Williamsburgh Ins. Co., 35 N. Y. 131; Bodine v. Exchange Ins. Co., 51 N. Y. 117; Miller v. Life Insurance Co., 12 Wall. 285; Southern Ins. Co. v. Booker, 9 Heisk. 606; Sheldon v. Connecticut Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 207; Bragdon v. Appleton Ins. Co., 42 Maine,

259. Or where residence of the assured in a forbidden country is sanctioned by the underwriter's agent. Wing v. Harvey, 5 DeG. M. & G. 265. So where there has been a practice on the part of the one who claims the forfeiture of apprising the opposite party concerning the time, place, or mode of performance, the omission to do which without warning has naturally misled the plaintiff into the particular delinquency or act. Helme v. Philadelphia Ins. Co., 61 Penn. St. 107; Insurance Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S. 572; Buckbee v. United States Ins. Co., 18 Barb. 541; Union Ins. Co. v. Pottker, 33 Ohio St. 459; Mayer v. Mutual Ins. Co., 38 Iowa, 304. So also where there has been a practice of waiving strict performance, apt to mislead and actually misleading in the particular case. Buckbee v. United States Ins. Co., supra. The following cases further illustrate this head: In re Albert Assurance Co., L. R. 9 Eq. 703; Insurance Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S. 572; Insurance Co. v. McCain, Ib. 84; Hagar v. American Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 435.

3. Possibly a general custom in the particular business to do some act towards the plaintiff the omission of which would be apt to lead to the delinquency. Helme v. Philadelphia Ins. Co., supra. But it is worthy of consideration whether any general custom of disregarding a proper stipulation of a contract should bind one who has not so participated therein as to be justly treated as guilty of misleading the plaintiff.

4. A state of things, such as war, making it unlawful or highly unsafe, to perform at the stipulated time; performance being tendered within a reasonable time after the removal or cessation of the difficulty. Cohen v. New York Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 610; Sands v. N. Y. Ins. Co., Ib. 626; Wheel-

the distinction than the reason of it to assert that in the one case the amount of damages by the non-payment of the rent is certain and fixed; in the other case the damages are uncertain and unliquidated. But in the case of a penalty such a distinction is wholly repudiated, because the penalty is treated as a security. The forfeiture is also treated as a security in cases of non-payment of rent. And in other cases of covenant, if the damages are capable of being ascertained by a jury, and will in a legal and equitable sense be an adequate compensation, the reason is not very clear why under such circumstances the forfeiture may not be equally treated as a security for such damages. The most probable ground for the distinction is, what has been judicially hinted at, that it is a dangerous jurisdiction; that very little information upon it can be collected from the ancient cases, and scarcely any from those in modern times; that it was origi-

er *v. Connecticut Ins. Co.*, 82 N. Y. 543, 551. But if performance, not being illegal, is still reasonably possible or safe, the delinquency will not, it is conceived, be excused.

5. Accidental omission where, if injury result to the other party, compensation can readily be made, and time is not of the essence of the contract. *Henry v. Tupper*, 29 Vt. 358. See *Klein v. Insurance Co.*, 104 U. S. 88; *Wheeler v. Connecticut Ins. Co.*, 82 N. Y. 543. If time is of the essence of the engagement, as with regard to the day of payment of insurance premiums, it seems clear that mere accident will not excuse the breach; for the parties have stipulated for exact performance. See note (a) to § 78, vol. 1; also the two cases last cited, *supra*. To prevent the forfeiture there should be some added equity. Thus it is held in insurance cases that neither the sickness nor the insanity of the insured at the time for payment of the premium will excuse non-payment then, for another might pay for the insured. *Klein v. Insurance Co.*, *supra*; *Wheeler v. Connecticut Ins. Co.* *supra*. In the first of these cases it was held immaterial that the plaintiff,

in whose favor the insurance ran, did not know of the contract at the time when the payment in question became due. The assured, it was said, was her agent, and she was bound by his knowledge. Indeed there appears to be no distinction between wilful or obstinate and accidental neglect; and this whether the question relate to time or to any other matter of agreement, such as a covenant to repair in a lease. See *Gregory v. Wilson*, 9 Hare, 683, 689, as to covenants to repair, explaining expressions of Lord Eldon in *Hill v. Barclay*, 18 Ves. 56, and in *Reynolds v. Pitt*, 19 Ves. 134. But where the delinquency is purely accidental, the court will doubtless be more readily inclined to look into the nature of the contract and the special circumstances of the case to see if the forfeiture may not be overlooked. See *Henry v. Tupper*, 29 Vt. 358. Whether the breach consist in the non-payment of money or of some other stipulated act is immaterial, as the foregoing cases show and as *Henry v. Tupper* expressly decides. And this must be true of all questions, as well as of accident, touching forfeiture.

nally adopted in cases of penalties and forfeitures for the breach of pecuniary covenants and conditions upon unsound principles; and therefore that it ought not to be extended, as it rarely works real compensation or places the parties upon an equality and mutuality of rights and remedies.¹ It has been further insisted that the authorities do not bear out the proposition that Courts of Equity will, in cases of forfeiture for the breach of any covenant, give relief upon the principle of compensation.²

1323. Indeed the doctrine seems now to be asserted in England, that in all cases of forfeiture for the breach of any covenant other than a covenant to pay rent, no relief ought to be granted in equity, unless upon the ground of accident, mistake, fraud, or surprise, although the breach is capable of a just compensation.³ (a) And the same rule is applied to cases where there is not only a clause for re-entry, in case of non-payment of rent, but also a proviso that if the rent is not duly paid the lease shall be void; for the construction put in equity upon this latter clause is, that it is a mere security for the payment of the rent.⁴ Indeed a strong inclination has been exhibited, even in the Courts of Law, to construe such a proviso to make the lease voidable, and not absolutely void, so as to make any subsequent receipt of

¹ See the opinions expressed by Lord Eldon in *Wadham v. Calcraft*, 10 Ves. 67; *Hill v. Barclay*, 16 Ves. 403, 405; s. c. 18 Ves. 58 to 64; *Reynolds v. Pitt*, 19 Ves. 140, 141; *Ex parte Vaughan*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 434. Mr. Baron Wood's opinion in *Bracebridge v. Buckley*, 2 Price, R. 200, contains the reasons for the opposite doctrine, which are well worthy of consideration. Mr. Chancellor Kent, in *Skinner v. Dayton*, 2 John. Ch. R. 535, seems to have held the same doctrine as Mr. Baron Wood. See also *Livingston v. Tompkins*, 4 John. Ch. R. 431; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 1, note (c); *Id.* ch. 6, § 4, notes (g) and (h); *Id.* § 5, note (k); *Keating v. Sparrow*, 1 B. & Beat. 373, 374; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 2, pp. 21 to 26; *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 2 Q. 3 to 5, 8, 9.

² *White v. Warner*, 2 Meriv. R. 459.

³ *Eaton v. Lyon*, 3 Ves. 692, 693; *Bracebridge v. Buckley*, 2 Price R. 200; *Hill v. Barclay*, 16 Ves. 403, 405; s. c. 18 Ves. 58 to 64; *Rolfe v. Harris*, 2 Price, R. 206, note; *White v. Warner*, 2 Meriv. R. 459; *Eden on Injunct.* ch. 2, pp. 22, 23, and Mr. Eden's note to *Northcote v. Duke*, 2 Eden, R. 322; *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 2 Q. 2 to 4.

⁴ *Bowser v. Colby*, 1 Hare, Ch. R. 109, 130.

(a) See *Weston v. Metropolitan Asylums Dist.*, 8 Q. B. D. 387; s. c. 9 Q. B. D. 404. Relief will be granted against a grossly inequitable forfeiture. *National Land Co. v. Perry*, 23 Kans. 140.

rent or other act affirming the lease to be a confirmation thereof.¹ Whether this narrow limitation of the doctrine is defensible

¹ *Ibid.*; *Arnsby v. Woodward*, 6 Barn. & Cressw. 519; *Rede v. Farr*, 6 M. & Selw. 121. In *Bowser v. Colby*, 1 Hare, Ch. R. 109, 128, 130 to 132, this whole subject was examined with great ability by Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram. On that occasion he said: 'The next point taken was that there are two different species of provisos in leases; in some a common clause of re-entry on non-payment of rent, thereby determining the lease and nothing more; in others a proviso declaring that if the rent is not paid the lease shall be void, and there being in this case a proviso, "that the lease shall become absolutely void," it is said that there is now nothing for the court to act upon, — no lease existing which it can restore to the tenant, and therefore that the court will not interfere. If it could have been shown that a Court of Equity gave relief only before the landlord had entered, the argument might have been well founded; but inasmuch as in most of the cases relief has been given upon bills filed after the landlord has entered, the argument must be fallacious, for when the landlord has entered, the lease is equally at an end in a Court of Law, whether there is a proviso for re-entry simply or a proviso that it is to be void on non-payment of rent. It is said however that the contract of the parties is different, — that where it is declared that the lease shall become absolutely void on non-payment of the rent, the true construction is that the parties mean the lease shall in fact be at an end, and no relief shall be given against the consequence of the non-payment of rent. I can by no means accede to this construction. The legal effect in one case is that if the landlord re-enters, the lease is determined; in the other case it is determined without his re-entry. The contract of the parties is that in one case the lease shall not be at an end by the mere non-payment of rent unless the landlord shall re-enter, and then that it shall be at an end; and in the other case that the non-payment of rent alone shall determine the lease. In both cases the same consequence is to follow, though from different acts. In both the contract is the same in this sense, that there are certain acts to take place which are to determine the lease altogether. The indenture of demise in this case, after the covenants for payment of rent, rendering the accounts, and against the demise or assignment of the premises, provides that if the lessee should not pay the reserved rents within a given time, or should make default in the performance of the other covenants on his part, or should become insolvent, or the term should be taken in execution, then it shall be lawful for the lessor to re-enter upon and repossess the premises as in his former estate and to expel the lessee. If the proviso had ended here, it would have been no more than the common power of re-entry in the case of a breach of covenant; and if the landlord entered under this power, the legal consequence would follow, that the lease would become to all intents and purposes forfeited, and the term would be void. The remainder of the proviso, that "the lease, as to the term hereby granted, shall in that case be forfeited, and the same term shall cease and determine and be utterly null and void, as if the same had never been made and created," expresses nothing more than what the law itself would imply if those words had not been found there. It appears from the case of *Taylor v. Knight*, and from Lord Eldon's observations in *Hill v. Barclay*, that the court formerly used to consider (the lease being gone at law by the re-entry), that the only way it could give relief was by creating a new lease until the statute, recognizing the right of the tenant to be

upon the original principles which seem to have guided Courts of Equity in interfering in cases of penalties and forfeitures, namely, that they are to be treated as mere securities for the performance of the stipulated acts, and not strictly as conditions to limit and determine rights and estates *ex rigore juris*, according to the common law, may perhaps admit of serious question.¹ But

relieved, dispensed with that form of relief, and declared that the last lease should be deemed to have continuance. The analogy to the case of mortgages fortifies the same reasoning. The object of the proviso in both cases is to secure to the landlord the payment of his rent; and the principle of the court is, — whether right or wrong is not the question, — that if the landlord has his rent paid him at any time it is as beneficial to him as if it were paid upon the prescribed day. It is not however necessary that I should pronounce any opinion upon the case of a lease being absolutely void, for in this case I think it was voidable only. The most recent case I have been able to find on the subject is a case of *Arnsby v. Woodward*. A lease had been granted, with a proviso that if the rent should be in arrear for twenty-one days after demand made, or if any of the covenants should be broken, the term thereby granted, or so much thereof as should be then unexpired, “should cease, determine, and be utterly void, and it should be lawful to and for” the landlord “upon the demised premises wholly to re-enter, and the same to hold to his own use, and to expel” the lessee. There the declaration that the lease shall be void by the non-payment precedes the power of re-entry, a consequence of law which of course attaches to the forfeiture of the lease. In this case the clause of re-entry comes first and the declaration of the legal consequences follows. In that case, *Doe v. Bancks*, and another case of *Rede v. Farr*, were cited; and Lord Tenterden holding that, notwithstanding those clear words making it void, the acceptance of subsequent rent would keep the lease alive, said that, taking the two clauses together, the sound construction of them gave to the landlord a right to re-enter, to be exercised or not at his election; otherwise the latter clause, “it shall be lawful to re-enter,” would have no effect. He had no difficulty, except that the words which declared the lease void preceded the common power to enter; but if he might transpose those words and put the right to re-enter first there would be no difficulty, because the other would be a mere legal consequence. This is a strong case when it is considered that all the old cases went to show that where the construction of the proviso made the lease actually void, no acceptance of rent could set up a term which had ceased by the very contract of the parties. I do not mean to give any opinion of what in abstract cases would be the difference in a Court of Equity between the effect of the common power of re-entry and a clause that the lease shall be void. It is not difficult to suggest circumstances in which the court might give no relief where the lease was to be void; as for example if the landlord sought the assistance of the court to give effect to the forfeiture. I found myself upon the construction of the words in the proviso now before me, in which construction I am supported by the judgment of the Court of Queen’s Bench, in *Arnsby v. Woodward*. I consider it in effect only a clause for re-entry, and the case is therefore in that view one in which a Court of Equity is enabled to give relief.’ See also *Harris v. Tronp*, 8 Paige, R. 423.

¹ Suppose a mortgage were made upon a condition to perform certain cove-

in the present state of the authorities this restricted doctrine may be affirmed to possess a general if not a conclusive weight in the English Courts of Equity. Perhaps in America the doctrine would be received with more hesitation; and it has been held in a contract for the sale of land reserving to the vendor a right to hold the contract forfeited, if the vendee should make default in due payment of the purchase-money, that the vendor was not at liberty to enforce the forfeiture suddenly without previous notice to the vendee; and that any receipt of a part of the purchase-money after default of due payment will, or at least may, amount to a waiver of the forfeiture.¹ (a) This seems to proceed upon the general ground that such a reservation is but a mere security for the purchase-money.

1324. Be this as it may, it is clearly established that Courts of Equity will not interfere in cases of forfeiture for the breach of covenants and conditions where there cannot be any just compensation decreed for the breach. Thus for example in the case of a forfeiture for the breach of a covenant, not to assign a lease without license or to keep leasehold premises insured, or to renew a lease within a given time, no relief will be given; for they admit of no just compensation or clear estimate of damages.² (b)

1325. It is upon grounds somewhat similar, aided also by considerations of public policy and the necessity of a prompt per-

nants, and among other things a covenant to repair, and there should be a breach of the covenant, would a Court of Equity refuse to allow the mortgagor to redeem, upon making full compensation? In the case of a bond, with condition to repair, would a Court of Equity refuse, after a breach to interfere, to prevent the recovery of the penalty, if compensation could be made?

¹ *Harris v. Troup*, 8 Paige, R. 425.

² *Grimston v. Lord Bruce & ux.* 1 Salk. 156; 2 Vern. R. 594; *Wafer v. Mocato*, 9 Mod. R. 112; *Lovat v. Lord Ranelagh*, 3 V. & Beam. 24; *Rolfe v. Harris*, 2 Price, R. 206, n.; *White v. Warner*, 2 Meriv. R. 459; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 6, § 12, and note (c); *City of London v. Mitford*, 14 Ves. 58; *Reynolds v. Pitt*, 19 Ves. 134; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2 Q. 3, 8 to 10.

(a) Compare *Griggs v. Landis*, 6 C. E. Green, 494; *Wing v. Harvey*, 5 DeG. M. & G. 255; *Buckbee v. United States Ins. Co.*, 18 Barb. 541; *Helme v. Philadelphia Ins. Co.*, 61 Penn. St. 107; *Union Ins. Co. v. Pottker*, 33 Ohio St. 459; ante, § 1321, note c.

(b) See the changes in England effected by the statutes 22 & 23 Vict. ch. 35, § 4, and the Conveyancing Act of 1881, § 14; and see *Quilter v. Mapleson*, 9 Q. B. D. 672; *Ex parte Dyke*, 22 Ch. D. 410.

formance in order to accomplish public or corporate objects, that Courts of Equity, in cases of the non-compliance by stockholders with the terms of payment of their instalments of stock at the times prescribed, by which a forfeiture of their shares is incurred under the by-laws of the institution, have refused to interfere by granting relief against such forfeiture.¹ (a) The same rule is, for

¹ *Sparks v. Proprietors of Liverpool Water Works*, 13 Ves. 433, 434. *Prendergast v. Turton*, 1 Younge & Coll. New R. 98, 110 to 112. This case was a mining concern, and by one of the regulations if any instalments called for were not punctually paid, the shares should be forfeited as well as the prior instalments which had been paid. The directors had declared the shares of the plaintiff forfeited. The bill was brought to reinstate the plaintiff in his rights. On this occasion Mr. Vice-Chancellor Bruce said: 'The point which has struck me from the beginning (and upon which everything that could be said has been said by counsel) is the time at which the suit has been instituted, having regard to the peculiar nature of the property and the circumstances of the case. This is a mineral property,—a property therefore of a mercantile nature, exposed to hazard, fluctuations, and contingencies of various kinds, requiring a large outlay, and producing perhaps a considerable amount of profit in one year and losing it the next. It requires, and of all properties perhaps the most requires, the parties interested in it to be vigilant and active in asserting their rights. This rule, frequently asserted by Lord Eldon, is consonant with reason and justice. Lord Eldon always acted upon it, and has been followed by subsequent judges of great knowledge, experience, and eminence. Now in the present case, conceding for the sake of argument that the shareholders could not be compelled to contribute beyond £50 a share, and did no wrong in declining to make advances beyond that sum, yet the result of all the circumstances of this case appears to have been that the mine could not be carried on without further outlay. The plaintiffs objected to this further outlay; and then a considerable discussion ensued which was substantially concluded in 1828. Some subsequent letters were written, but they did not, I think, materially vary that state of the case. The residence of the plaintiffs was occasionally in Jersey and occasionally in England; but they never appear to have been absent from the Queen's dominions. In this state of things, the concern not improving, and the plaintiff and Miss Kent refusing to contribute to its necessities beyond the amount already stated, some parties are found who are willing to stem the difficulties and incur the hazard; and from this period through several years, down to 1835, they venture to carry on the concern. In 1836 affairs begin to look better, and the mine, whether legally or illegally, wisely or unwisely, is in that year new modelled, and the shareholders are turned into what are called scrip-holders. Matters go on in this manner in 1836 and 1837, and it was not till November, 1837, when the result of the struggle had appeared, that, after a profit had been made by the unassisted efforts of those who still adhered to the speculation, the plaintiff and Miss Kent applied for and claimed their shares. Negotiations were then set on foot, demands and refusals took place in the ordinary way, and it was not till September, 1838, that the bill was filed; but the demand may be taken

(a) See *Ludlow v. Dutch Ry. Co.*, 21 Beav. 43.

the same reasons, applied to cases of subscription to government loans, where the shares of the stock are agreed to be forfeited by the want of a punctual compliance with the terms of the loan as to the time and mode and place of payment.¹ (a)

1826. Where any penalty or forfeiture is imposed by statute upon the doing or omission of a certain act, there Courts of Equity will not interfere to mitigate the penalty or forfeiture if incurred; for it would be in contravention of the direct expression of the legislative will.² (b) The same principle is generally (perhaps not universally) applied to cases of forfeiture founded upon the customs of manors, and the general customs of certain kinds of estates such as copyholds; for in all these cases the forfeiture is treated as properly founded upon some positive law or some customary regulations which had their origin in sound public policy, and ought to be enforced for the general benefit.³

as made in 1837. I was anxious, being impressed very much with Mr. Simpkinson's opening of the case, as it related to the conduct of the directors to have the time which so elapsed in some way accounted for, — to have the chasm between the years 1828 and 1837 in some manner filled up, — to have the conduct of the plaintiffs during that time in some measure explained, — to have the case placed in a position upon which the court could fasten itself in order to give the plaintiffs that property which they might have been entitled to had they presented themselves here in due time. But I am unable to find the means of doing this. Here is a mineral property, the subject of great uncertainty and fluctuation. After its character has been established with much difficulty, — after a period of nine years, during which they rendered no assistance to the concern, a claim is brought forward by those who are now willing to share in its prosperity. It appears to me that although this is a case to be decided in equity only, and at the hearing, and not on any interlocutory motion, it is impossible to say (consistently with my views of what are the principles of this court) that the plaintiffs can be assisted.'

¹ Ibid.

² *Peachy v. Duke of Somerset*, 1 Str. R. 447, 452 to 455; *Keating v. Sparrow*, 1 B. & Beatt. 373, 374.

³ *Peachy v. Duke of Somerset*, 1 Str. R. 447, 452; s. c. *Prec. Ch.* 568, 570, 574. But see *Nash v. Earl of Derby*, 2 Vern. 537, and Mr. Raithby's note (1); *Thomas v. Porter*, 1 Ch. Cas. 95; *Hill v. Barclay*, 18 Ves. 64.

(a) But the terms of forfeiture must be strictly pursued. *Johnson v. Garden Gully Co. v. McLister*, 1 App. Cas. 39.

Lyttle's Iron Agency, 5 Ch. D. 687; (b) *Powell v. Redfield*, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 45.

CHAPTER XXXV.

INFANTS.

1327. WE shall next proceed to the consideration of another portion of the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of Equity, partly arising from the peculiar relation and personal character of the parties who are the proper objects of it, and partly arising from a mixture of public and private trusts of a large and interesting nature. The jurisdiction here alluded to is that which is exercised over the persons and property of infants, idiots, lunatics, and married women.

1328. And in the first place as to the jurisdiction over the persons and property of INFANTS. The origin of this jurisdiction in Chancery (for to that court it is practically confined, as the Court of Exchequer, as a Court of Equity, does not seem entitled to exercise it¹) is very obscure, and has been a matter of much juridical discussion. The common manner of accounting for it has been thought by a learned writer to be quite unsatisfactory.² It is that the King is bound by the law of common right to defend his subjects, their goods, chattels, lands, and tenements; and therefore in the law every royal subject is taken into the King's protection. For which reason an idiot or lunatic who cannot defend or govern himself, or order his lands, tenements, goods, or chattels, the King of right, as *parens patriæ*, ought to

¹ 3 Black. Comm. 427; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a). Mr. Justice Blackstone (3 Black. Comm. 427) has said: 'The Court of Exchequer can only appoint a guardian ad litem to manage the defence of the infant if a suit be commenced against him; a power which is incident to the jurisdiction of every court of justice. But when the interest of a minor comes before the court judicially, in the progress of a cause, or upon a bill for that purpose filed, either tribunal, indiscriminately, will take care of the property of the infants.' See also 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a); *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Bligh, n. s. 136, 137.

² Hargrave's note (70) to Co. Litt. 89 a, § 16.

have in his custody and rule him and them.¹ And for the same reason the King, as *parens patriæ*, ought to have the care of the persons and property of infants where they have no other guardian of either.²

1329. The objection urged against this reasoning is, that it does not sufficiently account for the existing state of the jurisdiction; for there is a marked distinction between the jurisdiction in cases of infancy and that in cases of lunacy and idiocy. The former is exercised by the chancellor in the Court of Chancery as a part of the general delegation of the authority of the Crown *virtute officii*, without any special warrant; whereas the latter is exercised by him by a separate commission under the sign manual of the King, and not otherwise.³ It is not safe or correct therefore to reason from one to the other, either as to the nature of the jurisdiction or as to the practice under it.⁴

1330. An attempt has also been made to assign a different origin to the jurisdiction and to sustain it, by considering guardianship as in the nature of a trust; and that therefore the jurisdiction has a broad and general foundation, since trusts are the peculiar objects of equity jurisdiction.⁵ But this has been thought to be an overstrained refinement; for although guardianship may properly be denominated a trust in the common acceptation of the term, yet it is not so in the technical sense in which the term is used by lawyers, or in the Court of Chancery. In the latter trusts are invariably applied to property (and especially to real property) and not to persons.⁶ It may be added that guardianship considered as a trust would equally be within the jurisdiction of all the Courts of Equity; whereas in England it is limited to the chancellor sitting in chancery.⁷

1331. An attempt has also been made to derive the jurisdiction

¹ Fitz. N. B. 232; *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 118; *Beverley's Case*, 4 Co. R. 123, 124.

² *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 118, 119; 3 Black. Comm. 427; *Cary v. Bertie*, 2 Vern. 333, 342.

³ Co. Litt. 89 *a*, *Hargrave's note* (70), § 16; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a); *Sheldon v. Fortescue Aland*, 3 P. Will. 104, 107, and *Mr. Cox's note A.*; *Sherwood v. Sanderson*, 19 Ves. 285.

⁴ *Ex parte Whitfield*, 2 Atk. 315; *Ex parte Phillips*, 19 Ves. 122.

⁵ See *Duke of Beaufort v. Berty*, 1 P. Will. 705; post, §§ 1343 to 1345.

⁶ Co. Litt. 89 *a*, *Hargrave's note* (70), § 16.

⁷ Ante, § 1328; post, §§ 1343, 1349, 1351; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a).

from the writ of Ravishment of Ward, and the writ *De Recto de Custodia*, at the common law, but with as little success. For, independently of the consideration that these writs were returnable into a Court of Common Law, it is not easy to see how a jurisdiction to decide between contending competitors for the right of guardianship can establish a general authority in the Court of Chancery to appoint a guardian in all cases where one happens to be wanting.¹

1332. It has been further suggested that the appointment of guardians in cases where the infants had none belonged to the chancellor in the Court of Chancery before the erection of the Court of Wards; and that upon the abolition of that court it reverted to the King in his Court of Chancery as the general protector of all the infants in the kingdom.² But this (it has been objected) is rather an assertion than a proof of the jurisdiction; for it is difficult to trace it back to any such ancient period. The earliest instance which has been found of the actual exercise

¹ Co. Litt. 89 *a*, Hargrave's note (70), § 16; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (*a*).

² *Ibid.*; 3 Black. Comm. 426, 427; *Morgan v. Dillon*, 9 Mod. R. 139, 140; 1 Wooddes. Lect. 17, p. 463; *Hughes v. Science*, Macpherson on Infants, ch. 6, p. 74, and Appendix. In this case Lord Hardwicke said: 'The court has originally exercised a superintendent jurisdiction over guardians in behalf of infants, to prevent abuses either in their persons or estates, as well as in behalf of the Crown and inferior lords who had formerly a great interest in the wardship of infants. Afterwards the Court of Wards being created took the jurisdiction out of the Chancery for the time. But as soon as that court came to be dissolved, the jurisdiction devolved again upon this court, and infants have ever since been considered as under the immediate care of chancery.' Post, § 1333, note; s. c. *Ambler*, R. 302, note (2). Mr. Fonblanque has upon this subject remarked: 'From this it might be inferred that the jurisdiction of the Court of Wards and Liveries was protective of infants in general; whereas the Statute of Henry VIII., by which the Court of Wards was erected, expressly confines the jurisdiction of that court to wards of the Crown. And it is scarcely necessary to remark that when a new court is erected it can have no other jurisdiction than that which is expressly conferred; for a new court cannot prescribe. 4 Inst. 200. But if the statute 32 H. VIII. does not confer a general jurisdiction in the case of infants, but merely a particular jurisdiction as to wards of the court, it should seem to follow that the general superintendence of the Crown over infants as *pater patriæ*, if it existed at common law, was not affected by the statute except in those cases to which it expressly refers. What those cases were are particularly enumerated by the statute, and also in the instructions to the Court of Wards and Liveries, prefixed to Ley's Reports. See also Reeve's Hist. Eng. Law, v. 4, p. 259.' 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (*a*).

of the jurisdiction by the chancellor to appoint a guardian upon petition without bill is said to be that of Hampden in the year 1696. Since that period indeed it has been constantly exercised without its once being called in question. Mr. Hargrave has not hesitated to say that although the jurisdiction is now unquestionable, yet it seems to have been an usurpation, for which the best excuse was that the case was not otherwise sufficiently provided for.¹ He has added, that although the care of infants as well as of idiots and lunatics should be admitted to belong to the Crown, yet that something further is necessary to prove that the chancellor is the person constitutionally delegated to act for the King.²

1333. Notwithstanding the objections thus urged against the legitimacy of the origin of the jurisdiction, it is highly probable that it has a just and rightful foundation in the prerogative of the Crown, flowing from its general power and duty as *parens patriæ*, to protect those who have no other lawful protector.³ It has been well said that it will scarcely be controverted that in every civilized State such a superintendence and protective power does somewhere exist. If it is not found to exist elsewhere, it seems to be a just inference, from the known prerogatives of the Crown as *parens patriæ* in analogous cases, to presume that it

¹ Hargrave's note (70), § 16, Co. Litt. 89 *a*; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a). There is very great reason to question this conclusion of the learned author; nor is it very likely that at so late a period as 1696 a clear usurpation of an authority of this nature should have been either claimed by the Chancellor or tolerated by Parliament. In Fitzherbert's *Natura Brevium* (p. 27, L.), a very ancient work of great authority, it is said that 'the King, by his letters patent, may make a general guardian for an infant, to answer for him in all actions or suits brought or to be brought in all manner of courts.' It is added, 'And the infant shall have a writ in the Chancery for to remove his guardian, directed unto the justices, and for to receive another, &c.; and the court at their discretion may remove the guardian and appoint another guardian.'

² *Ibid.*

³ The learned reader is referred to the elaborate note of Mr. Hargrave to Co. Litt. 89 *a*, note (70), § 16, for the objections to the jurisdiction, which are there fully considered; and also to the equally elaborate note of Mr. Fonblanque (2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a)) for the answers to those objections. The view of the matter taken in the text is almost exclusively derived from the note of Mr. Fonblanque. Lord Eldon, in *De Manneville v. De Manneville* (10 Ves. 63, 64), after referring to the notes of Mr. Hargrave and Mr. Fonblanque, stated that 'the latter had stated the principle very correctly.' See also *Morgan v. Dillon*, 9 Mod. 139, 140.

vests in the Crown.¹ It is no slight confirmation of this inference that it has been constantly referred to such an origin in all the judicial investigations of the matter,² as well as in the discussions of very learned elementary writers.³

1334. Assuming then that the general care and superintendence of infants did originally vest in the Crown when they had no other guardian, the question by whom and in what manner the prerogative should be exercised would not seem open to much controversy. Partaking as it does more of the nature of a judicial administration of rights and duties in foro conscientiæ than of a strict executive authority, it would naturally follow, *ea ratione*, that it should be exercised in the Court of Chancery as

¹ See *Beverley's Case*, 4 Co. R. 123, 124; *Bract. Lib. 3, cap. 9*; *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 118, 123. See also 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 262, 263.

² *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 118, 123; *Butler v. Freeman*, *Ambler*, R. 302; *Hughes v. Science*, 2 Eq. Abridg. 756; *De Manneville v. De Manneville*, 10 Ves. 63, 64; *Morgan v. Dillon*, 9 Mod. 139, 140; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 262.

³ 3 Black. Comm. 427; *Fitz. Nat. Brev. 27*; 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a)*; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 262, 263. In *Butler v. Freeman*, *Ambler*, R. 302, Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said, with reference to this subject: 'This court does not act on the footing of guardianship or wardship. The latter is totally taken away by the Statute of Car. II. And, without claiming the former and disclaiming the latter, it has a general right, delegated by the Crown as *pater patriæ*, to interfere in particular cases for the benefit of such who are incapable to protect themselves.' In the case of *Hughes v. Science*, cited in *Ambler*, R. 302, Mr. Blunt's note (2), the same learned judge said: 'The law of the country has taken great care of infants, both their persons and estates, and particularly to prevent marriages to their disparagement. For that purpose it had assigned them guardians, and if a stranger married without the guardian's consent, it was considered a ravishment of ward, and the party was deemed punishable by fine and imprisonment; and so it was if the guardian himself married the infant to another to its disparagement. And the court has originally exercised a superintendent jurisdiction over guardians in behalf of infants, to prevent abuses either in their persons or estates as well as in behalf of the Crown, and inferior lords, who had formerly a great interest in the wardship of infants. Afterwards indeed the Court of Wards being created took the jurisdiction out of chancery for a time. But as soon as that court came to be dissolved, the jurisdiction devolved again upon the court, and infants have ever since been considered as under the immediate care of chancery. Whenever a suit is commenced here on their behalf, and even without suit, the court every day appoints guardians on petition; and the marriage of an infant to his guardian or any other without the consent of the court, where a suit is depending here in behalf of their infant, has been always treated and punished as a contempt. See *Serj. Hill's MSS., Vol. VI. p. 8.*' *s. c.* cited at large in *Macpherson on Infants*, Appendix I. See also Lord Eldon's remarks in *De Manneville v. De Manneville*, 10 Ves. 63, 64.

a branch of the general jurisdiction originally confided to it. Accordingly the doctrine now commonly maintained is, that the general superintendence and protective jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over the persons and property of infants is a delegation of the rights and duty of the Crown; that it belonged to that court and was exercised by it from its first establishment; and that this general jurisdiction was not even suspended by the Statute of Henry VIII., erecting the Court of Wards and Liveries.¹

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a); *Morgan v. Dillon*, 9 Mod. 139, 140; *De Manneville v. De Manneville*, 10 Ves. 63, 64; *Ex parte Phillips*, 19 Ves. 122; *Cary v. Bertie*, 2 Vern. R. 342; *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, 2 Russ. R. 20, 21; *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Bligh, R. n. s. 129, 136; *Id.* 142. Lord Eldon, in the celebrated case of *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort* (2 Russ. 20), speaking on the subject of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over infants, and especially of its interfering between parent and child, said: 'I do apprehend that notwithstanding all the doubts that may exist as to the origin of this jurisdiction, it will be found to be absolutely necessary that such a jurisdiction should exist, subject to correction by appeal, and subject to the most scrupulous and conscientious conviction of the judge, that he is to look most strictly into the merits of every case of this kind, and with the utmost anxiety to be right. It has been questioned whether this jurisdiction was given to this court upon the destruction of the Court of Wards (which however it is impossible to say could have been the case when we recollect the nature of the jurisdiction), or whether it is to be referred to circumstances and principles of a different nature; more especially whether it belongs to the King as *parens patriæ*, having the care of those who are not able to take care of themselves, and is founded on the obvious necessity that the law should place somewhere the care of individuals who cannot take care of themselves, particularly in cases where it is clear that some care should be thrown round them. With respect to the doctrine that this authority belongs to the King, as *parens patriæ*, exercising a jurisdiction by this court, it has been observed at the bar that the court had not exercised that jurisdiction unless where there was property belonging to the infant to be taken care of in this court. Now whether that be an accurate view of the law or not, whether it is founded on what Lord Hardwicke says in the case of *Butler v. Freeman*, "that there must be a suit depending relative to the infant or his estate" (applying however the latter words rather to what the court is to do with respect to the maintenance of infants); or whether it arises out of a necessity of another kind, namely, that the court must have property in order to exercise this jurisdiction, — that is a question to which perhaps sufficient consideration has not been given. If any one will turn his mind attentively to the subject, he must see that this court has not the means of acting, except where it has property to act upon.' The same case was afterwards carried to the House of Lords upon appeal, and Lord Redesdale in delivering his opinion in the House of Lords on that occasion, in affirmation of the decree below, said: 'We find that now for a hundred and fifty years the Court of Chancery has assumed an authority with respect to the care of infants, and it has assumed

1335. The jurisdiction over idiots and lunatics is distinguishable from that over infants in several respects. The former is a

that authority to the extent in which it was assumed for this reason. As long as the feudal tenures remained, generally speaking infants who had lost their parents were under the protection of the law which then existed with respect to the treatment and the care of the children. When that was at an end, it was thought fit, by a particular statute, to enable the father to make an appointment of a guardian for his children, giving to him the power which that statute gave to select proper persons for that purpose. As I observed before, if he makes an improper selection, if the person whom he has so selected misconduct himself, it is perfectly clear that a power has been assumed to control that conduct. Now upon what does Lord Somers, upon what does Lord Nottingham, upon what does Lord Hardwicke, upon what ground does every chancellor who has been sitting on the bench in the Court of Chancery since that time, place the jurisdiction? They all say that it is a right which devolves to the Crown, as *parens patriæ*, and that it is the duty of the Crown to see that the child is properly taken care of. We all know that many jurisdictions are given to the Crown, many powers are given to the Crown, but those powers are all to be exercised by responsible ministers. It is not the King who takes on himself to determine who is to be a proper guardian of the children; but he is to delegate to different ministers the different kinds of powers which belong to him, that there may be, according to the language of our law, persons responsible to the King and the people for their good conduct in the administration of their trust. I therefore have no doubt in the world that it must be taken to be a jurisdiction rightly assumed, for a hundred and fifty years past unquestionably assumed, by the chancellors sitting in the Court of Chancery. Lord Somers resembled the jurisdiction over infants to the care which the court takes with respect to lunatics, and supposed that the jurisdiction devolved on the Crown in the same way. There is no particular law upon the subject. The law merely declares that the King has the care of the persons who are of insane mind, and that he is to take care of their property. If they are absolute idiots, the property devolves to him during their lives, and he is to provide only for their maintenance. If they are not idiots, but persons who have lucid intervals, then the King is to take care of their property, to take care of their persons, to take care of their maintenance. And whatever property may be accumulated in the mean time he is a trustee of it for the benefit of those who may be entitled at their death, or to them if they should ever recover. With respect to the case of infants, can there be a stronger proof that it was conceived to be reserved to the Crown than this: that the City of London claim, as an immemorial right, and a right which must have been derived to them from the Crown, the care of orphans, and that they have most extraordinary powers for that purpose, extending to enable the Court of Orphans to commit to Newgate a person who disobeys their order? That has been allowed in a Court of Common Law; and it is founded upon usage which must have been founded originally upon a grant from the Crown of such powers to the Corporation of London. I think there can be no doubt therefore that the law of this country has reserved to the King the prerogative for the protection of infants, to be executed in such a manner as the constitution requires him to execute all his prerogatives.' *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Blyth, R. N. S. 129 to 135. In pages 134 to 136 the subject is further examined and illustrated by his Lordship. See also *Id.* pp. 141, 142, Lord Manner's opinion.

personal trust in the Lord Chancellor, and especially delegated to him under the sign manual of the King; and from his decree no appeal lies except to the King in council.¹ On the other hand the latter belongs to the Court of Chancery, and it may be exercised as well by the Master of the Rolls as by the Lord Chancellor; and therefore an appeal does lie from the decision of the Court of Chancery in cases of infants to the House of Lords.²

1336. It may be asked why, if no particular warrant be necessary to enable the Court of Chancery to exercise its protective power and care over infants, a separate commission under the sign manual should be necessary to confer on the chancellor the jurisdiction over idiots and lunatics, since that also has been referred to the protecting prerogative of the Crown as *parens patriæ*. The answer which has been given (and perhaps it is a true one) is, that in point of fact the custody of the persons and property of idiots and lunatics, or at least of those who held lands, was not anciently in the Crown but in the lord of the fee. The Statute (*De Prerogativa Regis*) of the 7th of Edward II., ch. 9 (or, as Lord Coke and others suppose, some earlier statute³) gave to the King the custody of idiots and also vested in him the profits of the idiot's lands during his life.⁴ By this means the Crown acquired a beneficial interest in the lands; and as a special warrant from the Crown is in all cases necessary to

¹ *Sheldon v. Fortescue Aland*, 3 P. Will. 104, 107, Mr. Cox's note (A); *Rochfort v. Earl of Ely*, 6 Bro. Parl. Cas. 329; *Sherwood v. Sanderson*, 19 Ves. 285; *Ex parte Phillips*, 19 Ves. 122, 123.

² 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a); *Oxenden v. Compton*, 2 Ves. jr. 71, 72.

³ *Ibid.* See 2 Co. Inst. 14; 2 Reeves's Hist. ch. 12, pp. 307, 308; 1 Black. Comm. 302, 303; Fitz. N. Brev. 232.

⁴ Lord Coke, in 2 Inst. 14, speaking of the provision in Magna Charta, ch. 4, says: 'At the making of this statute the King had not any prerogative in the custody of the lands of idiots during the life of the idiots; for if he had, this act would have provided against waste, &c., committed by the committee or assignee of the King, to be done in his possessions as well as in the possessions of wards. But at this time the guardianship of idiots, &c., was to the lords and others according to the course of the common law.' In *Beverley's Case* (4 Co. Rep. 126) it is expressly declared that the Statute of 17 Edward II. ch. 9, is but an affirmance or declaration of the common law. So Mr. Justice Blackstone, in his Commentaries (1 Black. Comm. 303), treats it. Lord Coke thinks that this prerogative was given to the Crown by some statute not now extant in the reign of Edward I., after Bracton wrote his work, and before that of Britton. 2 Inst. 14. See also Lord Northington's opinion in *Ex parte Grimstone, Ambler*, R. 707.

any grant of its interest, the separate commission which gives the Lord Chancellor jurisdiction over the persons and property of idiots may be referred to this consideration.¹ With respect to lunatics the Statute of 17 Edward II. ch. 10, enacted that the King should provide that their lands and tenements should be kept without waste. It conferred merely a power which could not be considered as included within the general jurisdiction antecedently conferred on the Court of Chancery; and therefore a separate and special commission became necessary for the delegation of this new power.² There is, under the statute, a differ-

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a); *De Manneville v. De Manneville*, 10 Ves. 63, 64; 1 Black. Comm. 303, 304.

² *Ibid.* Lord Loughborough, in *Oxenden v. Lord Compton* (2 Ves. jr. 71, 72; s. c. 4 Bro. Ch. R. 231), considered the Statute of 17 Edw. II. ch. 10, as merely in affirmance of the antecedent rights of the Crown. His language on that occasion was: 'That leads to the principle upon which the administration of the estates of lunatics stands; and how it is committed, not to the Court of Chancery, but to a certain great officer of the Crown. The statute (17 Edward II. ch. 10) is not introductive of any new right of the Crown. The better opinion inclines that way, and the words of the statute put it past all doubt. The object was to regulate and define the prerogative, and to restrain the abuse of treating the estates of lunatics as the estates of idiots.' Again: 'The course upon the statute has been that the Crown has committed to a certain great officer of the Crown, not of necessity the person who has the custody of the Great Seal (namely, the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper), though it usually attends him by a warrant from the Crown which confers no jurisdiction, but only a power of administration. If that power is abused, if anything wrong is done, or error committed, the appeal is immediately to the King, and not in the ordinary course attending the established jurisdiction of the kingdom. The orders that are made by persons charged with the custody of lunatics are appealable to the King in Council.' Lord Apsley, in *Ex parte Grimstone* (Ambler, R. 707; s. c. 4 Bro. Ch. R. 235, note), said: 'It (the right of the Crown over idiots and lunatics) certainly existed before the Statute *De Prerogativa Regis*. 17 Edw. II. ch. 9, 10. The writ does not go of course, but must be sued for. After the return to the commission the Great seal, by virtue of the King's sign manual, grants the custody merely to save the application to the King in person. After the custody is granted, the Great Seal acts in matters relative to the lunatic, not under the sign manual, but by virtue of its general power as keeper of the King's conscience. It is usual to take bonds from the committees to account and submit to orders, but I do not apprehend it is absolutely necessary. The court makes many orders, and enforces them by attachments, which orders, and the manner of enforcing them, are not warranted by the sign manual, but by the general powers of the court.' In the Corporation of *Burford v. Lenthall* (2 Atk. 553) Lord Hardwicke said: 'Before the Courts of Wardship were erected the jurisdiction was in this court both as to lunatics and idiots, therefore all these commissions were taken out in this court and returned here; and, after the Court of Wards was

ence between the case of an idiot and that of a lunatic in this respect. In the case of a lunatic the King is a mere trustee; in the case of an idiot he has a beneficial interest.¹

taken away by act of Parliament, it reverted back to the Court of Chancery; and the sign manual of the King is a standing warrant to the Lord Chancellor to grant the custody of the lunatics, and is a beneficial thing in case of idiocy, because the King could not only give the custody of idiots, but the rents and profits of idiots' lands, to persons.' Again, in *Re Heli* (3 Atk. 635) he said: 'One part of the chancellor's power in relation to idiots and lunatics is by virtue of a sign manual of the King upon his coming to the Great Seal, and countersigned by the two secretaries of State, empowering him to take care of such persons in the right of the Crown, and to make grants from time to time of the idiots' or lunatics' estates.' If one might venture to make a suggestion in a case where there seems no small diversity of opinion, it would be that upon general principles the King, as *parens patriæ*, has an original prerogative to take care of persons and property of infants, of idiots, and of lunatics in all cases where no other guardianship exists. So long as any special guardianship exists by law or custom in other persons the prerogative of the Crown is inactive, but not suspended. The jurisdiction generally belongs to the Court of Chancery as delegate of the Crown, except where it is specially or personally delegated or restricted by statute. The Statute *De Prerog. Regis*, ch. 9, 10, has rendered special commissions for certain purposes necessary to be granted under the sign manual; and the jurisdiction being in fact committed to the same person has in practice become mixed. If this view of the subject be admitted to be correct, it will clear away some of the difficulties now encumbering the subject.

¹ In *Re Fitzgerald*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 436. The difference is fully expounded by Lord Redesdale in *Re Fitzgerald* (2 Sch. & Lefr. 436). 'There is a difference,' said he, 'in the case of an idiot and a lunatic in this respect. In the case of a lunatic the King is a mere trustee; in the case of an idiot he has a beneficial interest. In point of form in the terms of the grant to the committee the grant of a lunatic's estate is a grant liable to account, and the other is a grant to a certain degree without account; that is, the King is not bound to do more than provide for the maintenance of the idiot, and is entitled by his prerogative to the surplus of his estate. The words of the statutes (which are said in *Beverley's Case*, 4 Co. 126, 127, to be only declaratory of the common law) differ as to the provisions for the care of the property of an idiot and a lunatic. In the one case the King, having an interest, is said "to have the custody of an idiot, his lands," &c. But with respect to the other the words of the statute, and the language of those who have written on the subject, are that "the King shall provide, when any happen to fail of his wit, that their lands and tenements shall be safely kept without waste, and that they and their household shall be maintained with the profit, and that the residue shall be kept to their use, to be delivered to them when they come to right mind." So that the meaning simply is that in the one case the King shall have a personal benefit, but that in the other he is only to act as *parens patriæ*, as the person to take care of those who are incompetent to take care of themselves. And the statute with respect to lunatics expressly provides, "*nec rex aliquid de exitibus recipiat ad opus suum.*" These are direct negative words, that the King cannot take the profits for his own use; but as to

1337. But whatever may be the true origin of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over the persons and property of infants, it is now conceded on all sides to be firmly established, and beyond the reach of controversy. (a) Indeed it is a settled maxim that the King is the universal guardian to infants, and ought, in the Court of Chancery, to take care of their fortunes.¹ We shall now proceed to the consideration of some of the more important functions connected with this authority, — in the appointment and removal of guardians; in the maintenance of infants; in the management and disposition of the property of infants; and lastly in the marriage of infants.

1338. In the first place in regard to the appointment and removal of guardians. The Court of Chancery will appoint a suitable guardian to an infant where there is none other, or none other who will or can act, at least where the infant has property; for if the infant has no property, the court will perhaps not interfere. It is not however from any want of jurisdiction that it will not interfere in such a case, but from the want of means to exercise its jurisdiction with effect; because the court cannot take upon itself the maintenance of all the children in the king-

what is not in itself profitable, as the presentation to a church, the King takes. Then the statute proceeds to direct that if the party shall die in this condition, the residue shall be distributed for the benefit of his soul according to the superstition of the times in which the statute was made, which is certainly now to be taken as a direction to preserve the residue for those entitled to the personal estate of the lunatic on his death independent of that statute.' Again in *Lysaght v. Royse* (2 Sch. & Lefr. 153), the same learned chancellor said: 'Some doubt occurs to me as to the validity of the grant of the estate of the idiot. Under warrant of the King's sign manual, countersigned by the Lords of the Treasury, the chancellor has the ordering and disposition of the persons and estates of idiots and lunatics. This authority is given to him (as stated in the warrant) in consideration of its being his duty as chancellor to issue the commissions on which the inquiry as to the fact of idiocy or lunacy is to be made. The warrant certainly gives to the chancellor the right of providing for the maintenance of idiots and lunatics, and for the care of their persons and estates. For lunatics the Crown is merely a trustee. But in the case of an idiot the Crown is absolutely entitled to the profits, subject to the maintenance of the idiot. And I doubt whether the warrant thus given to the chancellor is a warrant for passing letters patent granting to any person for his own benefit the surplus profits of the estate of the idiot.'

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1; *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, 2 Russ. R. 19; *Duke of Beaufort v. Berty*, 1 P. Will. 702, 706.

(a) See *In re Jackson*, 21 Ch. D. 419; *nin v. Lessors*, 35 Md. 474; *Lee v. 786*; *Lynch v. Rotan*, 39 Ill. 14; *Dow- Lee*, 55 Ala. 590.

dom. It can exercise this part of its jurisdiction usefully and practically only where it has the means of doing so; that is to say, by its having the means of applying property for the use and maintenance of the infant.¹ Guardians appointed by the court are treated as officers of the court, and are held responsible accordingly to it.²

1338 *a*. The question of who are to be appointed guardians is generally one of discretion merely; and the court ordinarily refers it to a master, especially if the guardianship be contested between two or more parties to appoint guardians, leaving the person in whose custody the infant actually is to retain that custody until the coming in of the master's report. But if there are testamentary guardians, the court has no jurisdiction to interfere. (*a*) If the testamentary appointment however be one that contemplates the residence of the child in the country of its birth, as in Scotland for example, and the child be removed to a residence in England, it seems that the Court of Chancery in England will appoint guardians there; and the testamentary appointment will be looked at only as an expression of the parent's preferences, to which the court will give great influence. (*b*) But at the same time the court will look at all the circumstances, and not appoint the persons for whom the parent has expressed a preference, if they are resident in Scotland, unless the

¹ Lord Eldon, in *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, 2 Russ. R. 21. The court will appoint a guardian upon petition without a bill being filed; and it is done upon the petition of the infant himself or of some person in his behalf. See *Da Costa v. Mellish*, 2 Atk. 14; s. c. 2 Swanst. R. 533, where it is better reported; and in *West's Rep.* 299; *Ex parte Mountfort*, 15 Ves. 445; *Ex parte Salter*, 2 Dick. R. 769; *Wilcox v. Drake*, 2 Dick. R. 631; s. c. cited *Jacob's R.* 251, note (*c*); *Curtis v. Rippon*, 4 Madd. R. 462; *Ex parte Myerscough*, 1 Jack. & Walk. 151; *Ex parte Richards*, 3 Atk. 518; *Ex parte Birchell*, 3 Atk. 813; *Ex parte Woolcombe*, 1 Madd. R. 213; *Ex parte Wheeler*, 16 V. 266; In *Re Jones*, 1 Russ. R. 478; *Bradshaw v. Bradshaw*, 1 Russ. R. 528; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 167, 268.

² *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, 2 Russ. R. 1, 20, 21; post, § 1351.

(*a*) See *Wardwell v. Wardwell*, 9 jurisdiction of equity. *Lee v. Lee*, 55 Ala. 590.

removal of guardians is largely regulated by statute in this country. But conferring jurisdiction in the matter upon another court does not take away the

(*b*) See *Miller v. Harris*, 14 Sim. 540; In *re Johnstone*, 2 Jones & L. 222.

court is satisfied that it was his intention to appoint them guardians generally, and not guardians for Scotland merely.¹ (a)

1339. In the next place as to the removal of guardians. (b) The Court of Chancery will not only remove guardians appointed by its own authority, but it will also remove guardians at the common law, and even testamentary or statute guardians, whenever sufficient cause can be shown for such a purpose.² In all such cases the guardianship is treated as a delegated trust for the benefit of the infant, and if it is abused, or in danger of abuse, the Court of Chancery will interpose not only by way of remedial justice but of preventive justice.³ Where the conduct of

¹ *Beattie v. Johnson*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 17; s. c. in House of Lords, 10 Clark & Fin. 42.

² In *Foster v. Denny*, 2 Ch. Cas. 238, the Lord Chancellor said: 'Where there is a guardianship by the common law this court will intermeddle and order; but being here a guardian by act of Parliament I cannot remove him or her.' But this doctrine seems to have been denied by Lord Macclesfield, in the *Duke of Beaufort v. Berty* (1 P. Will. 703), who asserted the jurisdiction of the court to be the same over statute guardians as over common-law guardians. Lord Hardwicke held the same opinion in *Butler v. Freeman*, Ambler, R. 302, and *Roach v. Garvan*, 1 Ves. 160. Lord Eldon, in *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort* (2 Russ. R. 1, 21, 22), fully recognized the same doctrine, as did also Lord Redesdale and Lord Manners in their opinions in *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Bligh, R. (n. s.) 128 to 130, 145, 146. In the *Duke of Beaufort v. Berty* (1 P. Will. 705), Lord Macclesfield said: 'If the guardian chose to make use of methods that might turn to the prejudice of the infant, the court will interfere and order the contrary, and that this was granted upon the general power and jurisdiction which it had over all trusts; and a guardianship was most plainly a trust.' Mr. Fonblanque, 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a), and § 2, note (h) seems to have thought that a testamentary guardian cannot be removed; although his conduct may be regulated by the court and he may be restricted from doing any acts to the prejudice of the infant. But it appears to me that he is not warranted in this opinion by the authorities. See *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 107; 1 Wooddes. Lect. 17, p. 461; *Morgan v. Dillon*, 9 Mod. 139 to 141; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 O. 4, 5; *Spencer v. Earl of Chesterfield*, Ambler, R. 146; *Okeefe v. Casey*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 106; *Tombes v. Elers*, 1 Dick. 88; *Smith v. Bate*, 2 Dick. 631; *Ex parte Crumb*, 2 John. Ch. R. 439. But in *Ingham v. Bickerdike* (6 Madd. 276) the Vice-Chancellor seems to have thought that the Court cannot remove a testamentary guardian, though it might appoint some other person to superintend the maintenance and education of the infant.

³ *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, 2 Russel, R. 1, 20, 21; *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Bligh, R. n. s. 128 to 130; *Id.* 141, 142, 145, 146; *Duke of Beaufort v. Berty*, 1 P. Will. 704, 705; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 O. 4, 5.

(a) See *Albert v. Perry*, 1 McCart. Mass. 501; *West v. Forsythe*, 34 Ind. 540.

(b) See *Perkins v. Finnegan*, 105 497.

the guardian is less reprehensible, and does not require so strong a measure as a removal, the court will, upon special application, interfere, and regulate and direct the conduct of the guardian in regard to the custody and education and maintenance of the infant; and if necessary it will inhibit him from carrying the infant out of the country, and it will even appoint the school where he shall be educated.¹ In like manner it will in proper cases require security to be given by the guardian if there is any danger of abuse or injury to his person or to his property.² (a)

1340. The Court of Chancery will not only interfere to remove guardians for improper conduct, but it will also assist guardians in compelling their wards to go to the school selected by the guardian, as well as in obtaining the custody of the persons of their wards when they are detained from them. This may not only be done by the chancellor acting as any other judge, by a writ of habeas corpus, but it may also be done on a petition without any bill being filed in the court.³

1341. The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery extends to the care of the person of the infant so far as is necessary for his protection and education, and to the care of the property of the infant for its due management and preservation and proper application for his maintenance.⁴ (b) It is upon the former ground principally, that is to say, for the due protection and education of the infant, that the court interferes with the ordinary rights of parents as guardians by nature or by nurture, in regard to the

¹ *Duke of Beaufort v. Berty*, 1 P. Will. 703, 704; *De Manneville v. De Manneville*, 10 Ves. 65; *Lyons v. Blenkin*, Jacob's R. 245; *Skinner v. Warner*, 2 Dick. R. 779; *Tombes v. Elers*, 1 Dick. 88; *Talbot v. Earl Shrewsbury*, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 672.

² 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a); *Foster v. Denny*, 2 Ch. Cas. 237; *Hanbury v. Walker*, 3 Ch. R. 58; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 263, 264, 268, 269.

³ *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 103, 118, 120; *Goodall v. Harris*, 2 P. Will. 561, 562; *Ex parte Hopkins*, 3 P. Will. 152, and Mr. Cox's note; *Hall v. Hall*, 3 Atk. 721; *Da Costa v. Mellish*, West's R. 300; s. c. 2 Swanst. 533, 537, note; *Reynolds v. Teynham*, 9 Mod. R. 40; *Wright v. Naylor*, 5 Madd. R. 77.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Clark v. Clark*, 8 Paige, R. 152; *In re Spence*, 2 Phillips Ch. R. 247.

(a) *Lee v. Lee*, 55 Ala. 590; *Monell Hancock*, L. R. 6 Ch. 850; *Mostyn v. Monell*, 5 Johns. Ch. 297; *Lemon Brooke*, L. R. 4 H. L. 304; s. c. 2 *v. Hansbarger*, 6 Gratt. 301. *DeG. J. & S.* 353; *Frith v. Cameron*, L. R. 12 Eq. 169.

(b) For illustrations see *Nunn v. L. R. 12 Eq. 169.*

custody and care of their children.¹ For although in general parents are intrusted with the custody of the persons and the education of their children, yet this is done upon the natural presumption that the children will be properly taken care of, and will be brought up with a due education in literature and morals and religion, and that they will be treated with kindness and affection. But whenever this presumption is removed, whenever (for example) it is found that a father is guilty of gross ill treatment or cruelty towards his infant children; or that he is in constant habits of drunkenness and blasphemy, or low and gross debauchery; or that he professes atheistical or irreligious principles; or that his domestic associations are such as tend to the corruption and contamination of his children; or that he otherwise acts in a manner injurious to the morals or interests of his children, — in every such case the Court of Chancery will interfere and deprive him of the custody of his children, and appoint a suitable person to act as guardian and to take care of them and to superintend their education.² (a) As between hus-

¹ Mr. Hargrave, in his learned note, 66, §§ 12, 13, to Co. Litt. 88 *b*, has brought together the general principles and doctrine applicable to guardianship by nature, guardianship by socage, and guardianship by nurture, the first and last of which are often confounded and used in a loose and indeterminate sense. At the common law, guardianship by nature is of the heir apparent only (and not of all the children), and belongs to the father and mother and other ancestor standing in that predicament to the infant. It lasts until twenty-one years of age, and extends no further than the custody of the infant's person. Guardianship by socage arises wholly out of tenure, and exists only when the infant is seized of lands or other hereditaments lying in tenure and in socage. It extends to the person and all the estates (including the socage estates) of the infant, and lasts until the infant arrives at the age of fourteen. It belongs to such of the infant's next of blood as cannot have by descent the socage estate, in respect to which the guardianship arises by descent without any distinction between the whole blood and the half blood. Guardianship by nature occurs only when the infant is without any other guardian; and none can have it except the father or mother. It lasts until the age of fourteen years, and extends only over the person. See 1 Black. Comm. 461, 462; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2, note (*h*).

² The cases on this subject are numerous. *Duke of Beaufort v. Berty*, 1 P. Will. 703; *Whitfield v. Hales*, 12 Ves. 492; *De Manneville v. De Manneville*, 10 Ves. 59, 60, 62, 63; *Shelley v. Westbroke*, Jacob's R. 266; *Lyons v. Blenkin*, Jacob's R. 245; *Roach v. Garvan*, 1 Dick. R. 88; *Lord Shipbrook v. Lord Hinchinbrook*, 2 Dick. 547; *Creuse v. Orby Hunter*, 2 Cox, R. 242; *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, 2 Russ. R. 1, 20, 21; s. c. 2 Bligh n. s. pp. 128 to 130,

(a) See *In re Pulbrook*, 11 Jur. 185; *Curtis v. Curtis*, 5 Jur. n. s. 1147; post, § 1347, and note (*b*).

band and wife, the custody of the children generally belongs to the husband; (*a*) and the latter cannot by an agreement with his wife (*b*) alienate to her the right to the custody and care of the children.¹

1841 *a*. Considerations of another nature may often operate in deciding who, as between the parents themselves, shall have the custody of the children of the marriage in cases where the parents do not live together. Ordinarily indeed the father will be entitled to the custody of his infant children. Thus for example if the infant be a daughter and of very tender years, and the mother under all the circumstances be the most suitable to take care of her person and education, a Court of Chancery will confer the custody on the mother; when, if the infant were of riper years and more discretion, and especially if a son, he would be intrusted for his education and superintendence to the custody and care of his father, if no real objection to his character or conduct existed.² (*c*)

141, 142; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 O. 4, 5; *Ball v. Ball*, 2 Simons, R. 35; *Ex parte Mountfort*, 15 Ves. 445. The language 'to act as guardian' is here used with reference to the remark of Lord Eldon in *Ex parte Mountfort* (15 Ves. 446), where his Lordship said: 'In certain cases the court will upon petition, without a bill, appoint, not a guardian, which cannot be during the father's life, but a person to act as guardian.'

¹ *The People v. Mercein*, 3 Hill, R. 399.

² *Ex parte Wollstonecraft*, 4 John. Ch. R. 80; *Ex parte Waldron*, 13 John. R. 419; *The People v. Mercein*, 8 Paige R. 47, 55, 56. In this last case Mr. Chancellor Walworth said: 'The decision of the case so far as respects the infant daughter of the relator depends upon different principles, as from her tender years she is wholly incapable at this time of exercising any volition whatever in regard to her future residence. The court therefore must for the present decide that question for her, with reference not only to her own immediate safety, but also with a due regard for her future welfare. In such a case as this it is not material perhaps to inquire whether the chancellor in allowing the writ of habeas corpus acts as a mere commissioner under the statute, or as a court proceeding by virtue of an inherent power derived from the common law, but regulated in the exercise of that power by the special provisions of the Revised Statutes on the subject. Were it necessary however, I

(*a*) See *Agar-Ellis v. Lascelles*, 24 Ch. D. 317; *In re Elderton*, 25 Ch. D. 220; *In re Taylor*, 4 Ch. D. 157; *In re North*, 11 Jur. 7; *Commonwealth v. Briggs*, 16 Pick. 203. And it is said that a Court of Law has no power to take children from the father. *In re Hake-will*, 12 C. B. 223. See further *Ex parte Skinner*, 9 Moore, 278; *King v. Greenhill*, 6 Nev. & M. 244; *Rex v. Morely*,

5 East, 224, note; *Rex v. Hopkins*, 7 East, 579; *infra*, p. 680, note (*b*).

(*b*) Or with others. *Regina v. Smith*, 17 Jur. 24; s. c. 16 Eng. L. & E. 221; *Mayne v. Bredwin*, 1 Halst. Ch. 454.

(*c*) *Ex parte Schumpert*, 6 Rich. 314; *Ex parte Woodward*, 17 Eng. L. & E. 77; *Baird v. Torrey*, 6 C. E. Green, 384, reversing 3 C. E. Green, 195.

1342. The jurisdiction thus asserted, to remove infant children from the custody of their parents and to superintend their education and maintenance, is admitted to be of extreme delicacy, and of no inconsiderable embarrassment and responsibility. But it is nevertheless a jurisdiction which seems indispensable to the sound morals, the good order, and the just protection of a civilized society. On a recent occasion, after it had been acted upon in chancery for one hundred and fifty years, it was attempted to be brought into question, and was resisted, as unfounded in the true principles of English Jurisprudence. It was however confirmed by the House of Lords with entire unanimity; and on that occasion was sustained by a weight of authority and reasoning rarely equalled.¹ (a)

think there would be no difficulty in showing that the power of the chancellor to issue a habeas corpus is not derived solely from the statute, but is also an inherent power in the court derived from the common law; although the authority of this court, as well as of the Supreme Court, to award the writ and to proceed thereon is to be exercised in conformity to the several provisions of the Revised Statutes. 2 R. S. 573, § 73. A writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum however is not, either by the common law or under the provisions of the Revised Statutes, the proper mode of instituting a proceeding to try the legal right of a party to the guardianship of an infant. This court therefore upon such a writ will exercise its discretion in disposing of the custody of the infant, upon the same principles which regulate the exercise of a similar discretion by other courts and officers who are authorized to allow the writ in similar cases. And such was the decision of Chancellor Kent in the case of Wollstonecraft (4 John. Ch. Rep. 80), referred to by the counsel on the argument. In the exercise of such a discretion however the natural rights of parents to the custody of their infant children are not wholly to be lost sight of by the court or officer before whom the writ is returnable. And where, as in this case, it unfortunately happens that the parents are living separate from each other, either with or without a legal decree authorizing a suspension of matrimonial cohabitation, a summary inquiry as to the relative merits and demerits of each may frequently become necessary to enable the court to make a proper disposition of their infant children who are brought up on habeas corpus. For this reason it was that the relator and the defendant in the present case were permitted to occupy the court for so many days in the investigation of the causes which have led to the separation between the relator and his wife; which causes the defendant insists are sufficient to justify the wife in her refusal to return to matrimonial cohabitation, and to authorize him by the laws of this State to give to her and to her infant daughter shelter and protection.' *U. States v. Green*, 3 Mason, R. 482, 485; *The King v. De Manneville*, 5 East, R. 221; *De Manneville v. De Manneville*, 10 Ves. 52.

¹ *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Bligh, N. S. 124, 128 to 145; s. c. 2 Russ. R. 1, 20, 21.

(a) Jurisdiction in England has been changed by the Judicature Act of 1873; the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice being given concurrent authority. See *In re Goldsworthy*, 2 Q. B. D. 75.

1343. It may not be without use to glance at some of the leading considerations suggested on that occasion.¹ The opposition to the jurisdiction was founded upon the right of the father to have the care and custody of his children. That right in a general sense is not to be disputed. (a) But the true question is whether the father, having that right, is to be at liberty to abuse it. Why is the parent by law ordinarily intrusted with the care of his children? Simply because it is generally supposed that he will best execute the trust reposed in him; for that it is a trust, and of all trusts the most sacred, no one can well doubt.

1344. In the case of ordinary guardians there is no question as to the authority of the court. Even in the case of a guardian appointed under the statute which enables the father to appoint a guardian to his children, it is clear that as a case of delegated trust, — a trust which the law has enabled the father when he ceases to live to give to others for the benefit of his children, — the authority of the court to interfere and to control the conduct of such a guardian in case of any abuse scarcely admits of dispute. What ground then is there to deny the like authority in the case of a parent?

1345. Why is not the conduct of a father to be considered as a trust, as well as the conduct of a person appointed as guardian? It is true that the law compels the father to maintain his infant children; but it does no more than compel a bare maintenance. He cannot be compelled, whatever his property may be, to allow to his children what might be deemed a liberal allowance for their maintenance and education, but only so much as is a bare maintenance. But if the children have property of their own, there exists a right to apply that property which belongs to the children most beneficially for their support and education.

1346. Upon what ground is the court in any case required to maintain children out of their own property and not at the expense of their father? It is because the father either has not the means or is an improper person to have the care of his children. (b) When it is proposed to take the maintenance and

¹ The reasoning in the text is extracted from the very able opinion of Lord Redesdale in *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Bligh, R. (N. S.) 128 to 141.

(a) The custody of an illegitimate child belongs to the mother. In re *C. E. Green*, 303. Casey, 10 Q. B. D. 454. (b) See *Tompkins v. Tompkins*, 3

education of children out of his control, he may refuse to supply them with more than a bare maintenance; and yet it may be indispensable for their character, their morals, their interest, and their station in society that they should receive a good education. It is for that reason that the court takes upon itself to apply a part of their property for their suitable maintenance and education, instead of accumulating the income of it for their benefit until they are capable of taking possession of it themselves. (*a*) This jurisdiction of the court as to maintenance is unquestionable. It is a jurisdiction with respect to the income of the property of the children to apply it for their benefit, and it stands upon the same general principles as other interferences of the court in cases of property.

1347. It is impossible to say that the father has any such absolute right to the care and custody of his children as the objection supposes. What are the grounds on which the custody of the children is given to the father? First protection, then care, then education. (*b*) Is it not clear, if the father does not give that protection, if he does not maintain the children, that the law interferes for the purpose of compelling the maintenance of the children? (*c*) Is it not clear, if the father cruelly treats the children in any manner, that a Court of Criminal Jurisdiction will interfere for the purpose of preventing that ill treatment? Upon what ground then can it be said that there is no jurisdiction whatsoever in the country which can control the conduct of the father in the education of his children? If such a defect could exist in our jurisprudence, it would strike all civilized countries with astonishment.

1348. It is said that there is nothing from which this jurisdiction can be inferred as belonging to the Court of Chancery, except the dicta in the books and the actual exercise of it in that court for one hundred and fifty years. The very circumstance of such an actual exercise of the authority for such a period is conclusive in favor of its rightful origin; for in many cases under the cou-

(*a*) See *In re Howarth*, L. R. 8 Ch. 415; *Brophy v. Bellamy*, *Ib.* 798.

(*b*) As to religious training see *In re Newbury*, L. R. 1 Ch. 263; s. c. 1 Eq. 431; *Hawksworth v. Hawksworth*, L. R. 6 Ch. 539; *In re Skinner*, L. R. 3 P. C. 451; *Andrews v. Salt*, L. R. 8

Ch. 622; *Agar-Ellis v. Lascelles*, 10 Ch. D. 49; s. c. 24 Ch. D. 17; *Andrews v. Salt*, L. R. 8 Ch. 622; *In re Besant*, 11 Ch. D. 508; *In re Clarke*, 21 Ch. D. 817.

(*c*) See *ante*, § 1341.

stitution of England no other ground except the actual exercise of authority can be assigned for its legitimacy. The origin cannot be ascertained. How came there to be a House of Lords and a House of Commons? No one has been able to ascertain the exact origin of either. Much of the jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench and of the Court of Exchequer is beyond the reach of any man to trace to its source or to say when and how it originated.

1349. The truth is that in the constitution of the government of England all powers in the administration of justice which are necessary in themselves are vested in the Crown, and are so vested to be exercised by those ministers of the Crown to whom the jurisdiction has usually been delegated. The present jurisdiction must be taken to be delegated to the Court of Chancery whenever there is a suit respecting property in that court. If there was a suit respecting property in the Court of Exchequer as a Court of Equity to take care of property belonging to an infant, the Court of Exchequer would exercise that jurisdiction as an incident; that is to say, it would take care that the property which was to be administered under its direction should be properly administered. Such is the general course of reasoning by which the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery has been maintained and established in the highest appellate court of England.¹

1350. It would be a subject of curious inquiry to ascertain the nature and extent of the parental power in the Roman law, and also the nature and extent of the powers and duties of guardians in the same law, and the manner of their appointment; but it would lead us too far from the immediate object of these Commentaries. It is highly probable that the common law as well as the Equity Jurisprudence of England has borrowed many of its doctrines on this subject from this source. Guardians (who were appointed on the death of the father) were in the Roman law of two sorts: (1) tutors, who were guardians of males until their age of fourteen years, and of females until their age of twelve years; and (2) curators, who were then appointed their guardians, and continued such until the minors respectively arrived at the age of twenty-five years, which was the full majority of the Roman law. Guardians were usually selected from the nearest relations,

¹ See *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Blyth, n. s. 128 to 141.

and might be nominated by the father or mother during their lifetime. But they were required to be appointed and confirmed by the proper judge or magistrate of the place where the minor resided; and they were removable for personal misconduct, or for ill treatment of the minor, or for bad management of his estate. But while any one remained guardian he was bound to take care of the person of the minor, to provide suitable maintenance out of his estate, to superintend his morals and education, and to exercise a prudent management over his estate.¹ In many respects indeed the Court of Chancery in the exercise of its authority over infants implicitly follows the very dictates of the Roman code.

1351. It might seem upon principle that this jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery ought not to be confined to cases where a suit is depending for property in that court, although it might well be so confined, as to other Courts of Equity in England.² It would seem to belong to the Court of Chancery as the general delegate of the Crown acting as *parens patriæ*, for the protection of the persons and property of those who are unable to take care of themselves and yet possess the means of maintenance and are without any other suitable guardian;³ and upon that ground that it ought to reach all cases where the person or the property of the infant required the protection of the court, without any inquiry whether there was a ground for actual litigation or not. (a) But in practice it seems to be limited to cases where a suit is actually pending in chancery upon a bill filed, even when the whole gravamen of the bill is a mere fiction.⁴

¹ See 1 Domat, B. 2, tit. 1, §§ 1 to 7; Dig. Lib. 26, tit. 1 to 10; Inst. Lib. 1, tit. 20 to 26, and Vinn. Comm. Ibid.; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3.

² Ante, § 1349.

³ Ante, § 1333; *Duke of Beaufort v. Wellesley*, 2 Russ. R. 20, 22; *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Bligh, n. s. 135 to 137; *Butler v. Freeman*, Ambler, R. 302; *Smith's Prac. in Chan.* 3d edition.

⁴ It often occurs that a bill is filed for the sole purpose of making an infant a ward of chancery; but in such a case the bill always states, however untruly, that the infant has property within the jurisdiction, and the bill is brought against the person in whose supposed custody or power the property is. *Johnstone v. Beattie*, 10 Clark & Fin. 42. Why such a mere fiction should be resorted to has never, as it seems to me, been satisfactorily explained; and why the Lord Chancellor, exercising the prerogative of the Crown as *parens*

1352. We are next led to the consideration of what constitutes an infant a ward of chancery, in respect to whom the court interferes in a great variety of cases when it would not if the infant did not stand in that predicament in relation to the court. Properly speaking, a ward of chancery is a person who is under a guardian appointed by the Court of Chancery.¹ But wherever a suit is instituted in the Court of Chancery relative to the person or property of an infant, although he is not under any general guardian appointed by the court, he is treated as a ward of the court and as being under its especial cognizance and protection.² (a)

1352 a. The power of the Court of Chancery to appoint a guardian and make an infant a ward of the court is not, it seems, limited to cases where the infant is domiciled in the country and actually has property there, but reaches cases where the infant is but temporarily in the country and all the property is in a foreign country. Thus an infant domiciled in Scotland and having a guardian or tutor there, and being in England solely for purposes of education, has been held liable to be made a ward in chancery upon a bill filed in England, although the whole property is in fact in Scotland and under the power of the guardian or tutor there.³

1353. In all cases where an infant is a ward of chancery no act can be done affecting the person or property or state of the minor, unless under the express or implied direction of the court itself.⁴ (b) Every act done without such a direction is treated as

patria, might not in his discretion appoint a guardian to an infant having no other guardian, without any bill being filed, seems difficult to understand upon principle. But the practice seems founded upon narrower ground.

¹ See *Goodall v. Harris*, 2 P. Will. 560, 562; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (b); see *Hughes v. Science*, Ambler, R. 302, note.

² *Butler v. Freeman*, Ambler, R. 301; *Hughes v. Science*, Ambler, R. 302, in note; *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 112; *Wright v. Naylor*, 5 Madd. R. 77; *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Bligh, n. s. 137.

³ *Johnstone v. Beattie*, 10 Clark & Fin. 42.

⁴ See *Goodall v. Harris*, 2 P. Will. 560, 562; *Butler v. Freeman*, Ambler, R. 302, 303; *Hughes v. Science*, Ambler, R. 302, note; *Johnstone v. Beattie*,

(a) See *Rivers v. Durr*, 46 Ala. 418; *Brown v. Collins*, 25 Ch. D. 56. the right of a guardian to avoid his infant ward's deed see *Chandler v.*

(b) But see *Wallace v. Holmes*, 9 Blatchf. C. C. 65; and compare *Atkinson v. Atkinson*, 8 Allen, 15. As to *Simmons*, 97 Mass. 508. And to bind the ward's estate by contract, *Hicks v. Chapman*, 10 Allen, 463.

a violation of the authority of the court; and the offending party will be arrested upon proper process for the contempt and compelled to submit to such orders and such punishment by imprisonment as are applied to other cases of contempt. Thus for example it is a contempt of the court to conceal or withdraw the person of the infant from the proper custody, (a) to disobey the orders of the court in relation to the maintenance or education of the infant, or to marry the infant without the proper consent or approbation of the court.¹ Of the latter more will be presently stated.² Indeed when once the Court of Chancery has thus directly or indirectly assumed authority over the person or property of an infant as its ward, it acts throughout with all the anxious care and vigilance of a parent; and it allows neither the guardian nor any other person to do any act injurious to the rights or interests of the infant. (b)

1354. In the next place in regard to the maintenance of infants. Whenever the infant is a ward of chancery and a suit is

10 Clark & Fin. 42, 84, 85. In this case Lord Lyndhurst said: 'It is proper that I should state that, according to the uniform course of the Court of Chancery, which I understand to be the law of that court, which has always been the law of that court upon the institution of a suit of this description, the plaintiff, the infant, became a ward of the court, — became such ward by the very fact of the institution of the suit; and being a ward of the court it was the duty of the court to provide for the care and protection of the infant, and as the court cannot itself personally superintend the infant, it appoints a guardian, who is an officer of the court, for the purpose of doing that on behalf of the court, and as the representative of the court, which the court cannot do itself personally. If there be a parent living within the jurisdiction of the court, or if there be a testamentary guardian within the jurisdiction of the court, the court in that case does not interfere for the purpose of appointing a person to discharge the duty, which is imposed upon the court itself, of taking care of the person of the infant; but the parent or the testamentary guardian is subject to the orders and control of the court precisely in the same way as an officer appointed by the authority of the court for the purpose of discharging the duties to which I have referred. I apprehend that is clearly the law of the Court of Chancery; and it has always been so as far as I have been able to understand and comprehend.'

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, and notes (b), (c); Hughes v. Science, Ambler, R. 302, note (2); s. c. Macpherson on Infants, Appendix I.

² Post, § 1358.

(a) The solicitor of a person suspected of concealing the ward may be compelled to give information. *Ramsbotham v. Senior*, L. R. 8 Eq. 575.

(b) See *Lee v. Lee*, 55 Ala. 590, 599.

depending in the court, the court will of course upon petition direct a suitable maintenance for the infant, having a due regard to the rank, the future expectations, the intended profession or employment, and the property of the latter.¹ (α) But where there is already a guardian in existence not deriving his authority from the Court of Chancery, and where there is no suit in the court touching the infant or his property (thus making the infant quasi a ward of the court), there formerly existed much difficulty on the part of the court in interfering upon the petition, either of the guardian or of the infant, to direct a suitable maintenance of the latter. The effect of this doubt was to allow the guardian to exercise his discretion at his own peril, and thus to leave much to his sense of duty, and much more to his habits of bold or of timid action in assuming responsibility. At present a different course is pursued; and in ordinary cases, at least where the property is small, the court will upon petition, without requiring the more formal proceedings by bill, settle a due maintenance upon the infant.² Lord Hardwicke, in vindication of this latter course, said: 'There may be a great convenience in applications of this kind, because it may be a sort of check upon infants with regard to their behavior; and it may be an inducement to persons of worth to accept of the guardianship, when they have the sanction of this court for anything they do on account of maintenance, and likewise of use in saving the expense of a suit to an infant's estate.'³ These are considerations which certainly ought never to be lost sight of in regulating the practice of the court; for it seems not to be a question as to the jurisdiction of the court.

1354 *a*. But in regard to the maintenance of infants out of their own property, we are not to understand that it is to be allowed

¹ See *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 2 Bligh, n. s. 135 to 137.

² 2 Fonbl. Eq. B 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, and note (*d*); *Ex parte Whitfield*, 2 Atk. 315; *Ex parte Thomas*, Ambler, R. 146; *Ex parte Kent*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 88; *Ex parte Salter*, 2 Dick. R. 769; s. c. 3 Bro. Ch. 500; *Ex parte Mountfort*, 15 Ves. 445; *Ex parte Myerscough*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 152; *Corbet v. Tottenham*, 1 B. & Beatt. 59, 60; *Ex parte Green*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 253; *Ex parte Starkie*, 3 Sim. R. 339; *Ex parte Lakin*, 4 Russ. R. 307; *Ex parte Molesworth*, 4 Russ. R. 308, note; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 267, 268, 272; *Clay v. Pennington*, 8 Sim. R. 359; *Bridge v. Brown*, 2 Younge & Coll. New R. 181.

³ *Ex parte Whitfield*, 2 Atk. 316.

(α) See *In re Howarth*, L. R. 8 Ch. 415; *Brophy v. Bellamy*, *Ib.* 798; *De Witte v. Palin*, L. R. 14 Eq. 251.

as a matter of course, by a Court of Equity, either out of the income or the principal thereof. On the contrary the court will examine into the circumstances of the case, and if the father is of ability to maintain the infant out of his own property, the court will ordinarily withhold all allowance from the property or income of the infant for the maintenance of the latter.¹ (a).

¹ *Thompson v. Griffin*, 1 *Craig & Phillips*, 317, 320. On this occasion Lord Cottenham said: 'If the property of the children had been derived from the bounty of a stranger, there could be no doubt but that the father, being of ability to maintain his children, could not be entitled to any allowance out of the income of their property for that purpose; but the claim of the father rests upon the distinction which has been taken between the cases in which the property of the children is derived from the bounty of a stranger, and those in which they are entitled to it under the marriage settlement of their parents, such as *Mundy v. Lord Howe*, *Stocken v. Stocken*, and *Meacher v. Young*. It appears to me that the distinction between those two classes of cases has been carried quite as far as can be justified upon principle. In some of them it has been said that in the case of marriage settlements the father is a purchaser, and therefore entitled to an allowance for the maintenance of his children, and thereby to be relieved from the burden which the law throws upon him of maintaining them himself. No doubt he is so, if the contract contained in the settlement gives him such a benefit; but before he can be entitled to it he must show that such was his contract. So in the case of a legacy from a stranger, if the intention to be found in the construction of the will appears to have been that the father should have such a benefit, the court is bound to give it to him. In both cases the question is one of construction and intention. In all the cases referred to there were distinct and positive trusts to apply the income to the maintenance of the children applicable, according to the construction put upon the whole of the provision, to the case of a surviving father. If in these cases the construction was correct, the order for maintenance must have been so; for if the settlement had expressed in terms what the court thought it sufficiently expressed upon the construction of the whole of the provisions, there could be no doubt but that such a trust would be carried into effect. In the present case I find no such trust; I find indeed a power, and in the case of the freehold property which is vested in the infant a mere power, at the discretion of the trustees, to apply part of that income which would otherwise belong to the infants for the purposes of their maintenance and education. If they do not exercise that power, the whole income belongs to the children. The father contends that he by the authority of this court can compel them to exercise that power for the purpose of giving the whole or part of this income to him. This would be going far beyond any

(a) See *Stephens v. Howard*, 32 *N. J. Eq.* 244; *Tompkins v. Tompkins*, 3 *C. E. Green*, 303; *Carmichael v. Hughes*, 6 *Eng. L. & E.* 71; *Ransome v. Burgess*, *L. R.* 3 *Eq.* 773; *Stopford v. Canterbury*, 11 *Sim.* 82; *Bruin v. Knott*, 1 *Phill.* 572; *Sparhawk v. Buell*, 9 *Vt.* 41; *McKnight v. Walsh*, 8 *C. E. Green*, 136; *Beasley v. Watson*, 41 *Ala.* 234; *Mulhern v. McDavitt*, 16 *Gray*, 404; *Welch v. Burris*, 29 *Iowa*, 186; *Griffith v. Bird*, 22 *Gratt.* 73.

1354 *b*. The court also is not limited in its authority in regard to maintenance to cases where the infant is resident within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the maintenance is to be applied there. But in suitable cases and under suitable circumstances it will order maintenance for an infant out of the jurisdiction, taking care to impose such conditions and restrictions on the party applying for it as will secure a proper application of the money.¹

1355. In allowing maintenance the Court of Chancery will have a liberal regard to the circumstances and state of the family to which the infant belongs; as for example if the infant be an elder son and the younger children have no provision made for them, an ample allowance will be allowed to the infant so that the younger children may be maintained.² Similar considerations will apply to a father or mother of the infant who is in distress or narrow circumstances.³ (*a*) On the other hand in allowing maintenance the court usually confines itself within the limits of the income of the property. But where the property is small, and more means are necessary for the due maintenance of the infant, the court will sometimes allow the capital to be broken in upon.⁴ But without the express sanction of the

of the other cases. I cannot upon this settlement find any trust for the benefit of the father, or any contract that he should be relieved, out of the settled property, from the burden of supporting his children.' See *Stocken v. Stocken*, 4 Sim. R. 152; s. c. 4 Mylne & Craig, 95; *Mundy v. Lord Howe*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 223; *Meacher v. Young*, 2 Mylne & Keen, R. 490; *Bruin v. Knott*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 572.

¹ *Stephens v. James*, 1 Mylne & Keen, 627; *Logan v. Farlie*, Jacob, R. 193; *Jackson v. Hankey*, Jacob, R. 265; cited also in 1 Mylne & Keen, 627.

² 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (*d*); *Harvey v. Harvey*, 2 P. Will. 21, 22; *Lanoy v. Duke of Athol*, 2 Atk. 447; *Petre v. Petre*, 3 Atk. 511; *Burnet v. Burnet*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 179, and Mr. Belt's note.

³ *Roach v. Garvan*, 1 Ves. 160; *Bradshaw v. Bradshaw*, 1 Jac. & W. 647; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 275, 276; *Heysham v. Heysham*, 1 Cox, R. 179; *Allen v. Coster*, 1 Beav. R. 201.

⁴ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (*d*); *Barlow v. Grant*, 1 Vern. 255; *Harvey v. Harvey*, 2 P. Will. 22, 23; *Ex parte Green*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 253; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 276; *Walker v. Wetherell*, 6 Ves. 474; *In re England*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 499; *Ex parte Swift*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 575; *Clay v. Pennington*, 8 Simons, R. 359.

(*a*) See *McKnight v. Walsh*, 8 C. E. Green, 136, 142, 143.

court a trustee or guardian will not be permitted of his own accord to break in upon the capital.¹ (a)

1356. In the next place in regard to the management and disposal of the property of infants. (b) And here the Court of Chancery will exercise a vigilant care over guardians in their management of the property of the infant. It will carry its aid and protection in favor of infants so far as to reach other persons than those who are guardians strictly appointed. For if a man intrudes upon the estate of an infant and takes the profits thereof, he will be treated as a guardian and held responsible therefor to the infant in a suit in equity.²

1357. Guardians will not ordinarily be permitted to change the personal property of the infant into real property, or the real property into personalty, since it may not only affect the rights of the infant himself, but also of his representatives if he should die under age.³ (c) But guardians may under particular circumstances, where it is manifestly for the benefit of the infant, change the nature of the estate; and the court will support their conduct if the act be such as the court itself would have done under the like circumstances by its own order. The act of the guardian in such a case must not be wantonly done, but it must be for the manifest interest and convenience of the infant.⁴ It is true that

¹ Walker v. Wetherell, 6 Ves. 474.

² 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, and note (f); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 3, note (k); ante, § 511.

³ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 269, 270; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 5, note (b); Inwood v. Twyne, Ambler, R. 417; s. c. 2 Eden, R. 148, and Mr. Eden's note.

⁴ Inwood v. Twyne, Ambler, R. 418, and Mr. Blunt's note; s. c. 2 Eden, R. 148, and Mr. Eden's note; 1 Madd. Ch. R. 269; Mason v. Day, Prec. Ch.

(a) See *In re Coe*, 4 Kay & J. 199; *Caffey v. McMichael*, 64 N. Car. 507; *Johnston v. Haynes*, 68 N. Car. 514; *Calhoun v. Calhoun*, 41 Ala. 369; *Wiggle v. Owen*, 45 Miss. 691; *Jarret v. Andrews*, 7 Bush, 311.

(b) Equity may order the sale of an infant's real estate if that will be for the benefit of his estate. *Crawford v. Creswell*, 55 Ala. 497; *Ex parte Jewett*, 16 Ala. 409. Equity has jurisdiction also to direct the raising of money by means of mortgage upon the estate of an infant for

the purpose of paying the cost of repairs absolutely necessary, in a case where the infant is absolutely entitled to the estate subject to trusts, the legal estate being in trustees. *In re Jackson*, 21 Ch. D. 786.

(c) *Camden v. Murray*, 16 Ch. D. 161; *In re Jackson*, 21 Ch. D. 786; *Attridge v. Billings*, 57 Ill. 489; *Mathews v. Heyward*, 2 S. Car. 239; *Horton v. McCoy*, 47 N. Y. 21. But see *Kann's Estate*, 69 Penn. St. 219; *Paul v. York*, 1 Tenn. Ch. 547.

it has been said that there is no equity in such a case between the representatives of the infant. But nevertheless the court has an obvious regard to the circumstance that these representatives may be affected thereby,¹ and it is always inclined to keep a strict hand over guardians, in order to prevent partiality and misconduct.² For the purpose of preventing any such acts of the guardian, in case of the death of the infant before he arrives of age, from changing improperly the rights of the parties who as heirs or distributees would otherwise be entitled to the fund, it is the constant rule of Courts of Equity to hold lands purchased by the guardian with the infant's personal estate, or with the rents and profits of his real estate, to be personalty and distributable as such; and on the other hand to treat real property (as for example timber cut down on a fee simple estate of the infant), turned into money, as still for the same purpose real estate.³ (a) On these accounts, and also from the manifest hazard which guardians must otherwise run, it is common for them to ask the positive sanction of the court to any acts of this sort. And when the court directs any such change of property, it directs the new investment to be in trust for the benefit of those who would be entitled to it if it had remained in its original state.⁴ (b)

319; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 5, note (f); *Tullit v. Tullit*, Ambler, R. 370; *Ex parte Grimstone*, Ambler, R. 708; *Pierson v. Shore*, 1 Atk. 480.

¹ *Inwood v. Twyne*, Ambler, R. 418, and Mr. Blunt's note; s. c. 2 Eden, R. 147, 152, and Mr. Eden's note. See also *Oxenden v. Lord Compton*, 2 Ves. jr. 69, 70; *Ware v. Polhill*, 11 Ves. 278; *Pierson v. Shore*, 1 Atk. 480; *Ex parte Grimstone*, Ambler, R. 707; s. c. 2 Ves. jr. 235, note.

² *Ibid.*

³ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 269, 270; *Gibson v. Scudamore*, 1 Dick. R. 45; s. c. *Select Cas. in Ch.* 63, and *Moseley*, R. 6; *Earl of Winchelsea v. Norcliffe*, 1 Vern. 434, and Mr. Raithby's note (3); *Tullit v. Tullit*, Ambler, R. 370; *Witter v. Witter*, 3 P. Will. 101, and Mr. Cox's note (1); *Rook v. Worth*, 1 Ves. 461; *Pierson v. Shore*, 1 Atk. 480, 481; *Mason v. Day*, Prec. Ch. 319; *Ex parte Grimstone*, cited 4 Bro. Ch. R. 235, note; *Ware v. Polhill*, 11 Ves. 278.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Ashburton v. Ashburton*, 6 Ves. 6; *Sergeson v. Sealy*, 2 Atk. 413; *Webb v. Lord Shaftsbury*, 6 Madd. 100; *Ex parte Phillips*, 19 Ves. 122, 123; *Tullit v. Tullit*, Ambler, R. 370; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 5, note (f). In this respect the Court of Chancery acts differently in cases of infancy from what it does in lunacy. Lord Eldon, in *Ex parte Phillips*, 19 Ves. 122, 123,

(a) See *Kann's Estate*, 69 Penn. St. 219; *Horton v. McCoy*, 47 N. Y. 21; *Clay v. Brittingham*, 34 Md. 675. (b) As to the power of a guardian to bind his ward's estate see *Wood v. Truax*, 39 Mich. 628.

1358. In the next place in regard to the marriage of infants. This is a most important and delicate duty of the Court of Chancery, which it exercises with great caution in relation to all persons who are wards of the court. No person is permitted to marry a ward of the court without the express sanction of the court, even with the consent of the guardian. If a man should

explained the difference and the reasons of it as follows: 'In the case of the infant the Lord Chancellor is acting as the Court of Chancery; not so in lunacy, but under a special, separate commission from the Crown, authorizing him to take care of the property, and for the benefit of the lunatic. In the case of the infant it is settled that as a trustee out of court cannot change the nature of the property, so the court, which is only a trustee, must act as the trustee out of court; and finding that a change will be for the benefit of the infant, must so deal with it as not to affect the powers of the infant over his property even during his infancy, when he has powers over one species of property, not over the other. It may be for the benefit of an infant, in many cases, that money should be laid out in land if he should live to become adult; but if not, it is a great prejudice to him, taking away his dominion by the power of disposition he has over personal property, so long before he has it over real estate. The court therefore with reference to his situation, even during infancy, as to his powers over property, works the change, not to all intents and purposes, but with this qualification: that if he lives he may take it as real estate, but without prejudice to his right over it during infancy as personal property. A lunatic stands on quite a different footing. At the instant of a lucid interval he has precisely the same power of disposition over one species of property as over the other, in different modes and forms, I admit. The Lord Chancellor, acting under a special commission from the Crown, does what is for his benefit, taking the advice and assistance of the presumptive next of kin and heir as to the management of the property that may or may not be their own. A case has occurred of a lunatic, seised *ex parte paterna* of estate A, and *ex parte materna* of estate B, the latter being subject to a mortgage, and timber cut upon A, having been applied in discharge of the mortgage upon B; it was, on a question between the heirs, held that A was not to be recouped. Upon these grounds, had the application been to sell a part of the real estate for the payment of debts, the court finding that the maintenance of the lunatic would be better provided for and his advantage promoted by disposing of a real estate, inconvenient, ill-conditioned, &c., that it would be for his benefit so to pay the debts, and keep together the personal estate, would have no difficulty in making such an application; and so in cutting down timber upon the estate, augmenting the personal property, it goes as personal property, and the different form of disposition is not regarded when a lucid interval arrives. Upon these principles this sort of distinction, whether solid or not, is settled, and I think there is sufficient to maintain it; but if settled, I have no inclination to disturb it.' See also *Oxenden v. Lord Compton*, 2 Ves. jr. 69, 70 to 78; *Ex parte Grimstone, Ambler*, R. 707; *Ex parte Degge*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 235, note. Some statute provisions have been made in England on the subject of the estate of infants, and the rights of guardians relative thereto, which may be found succinctly stated in *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 5, § 3, pp. 232, 233.

marry a female ward without the consent and approbation of the court, he and all others concerned in aiding and abetting the act will be treated as guilty of a contempt of the court;¹ and the husband himself, even though he were ignorant that she was a ward of the court, will still be deemed guilty of a contempt.²

1359. In all cases where the Court of Chancery appoints a guardian, or committee in the nature of a guardian, to have the care of an infant, it is accustomed to require the party to give a recognizance that the infant shall not marry without the leave of the court; which form is rarely altered, and only upon special circumstances. So that if an infant should marry, though without the privity or knowledge or neglect of the guardian or committee, yet the recognizance would in strictness be forfeited, whatever favor the court might upon an application think fit to extend to the party when he should appear to have been in no fault.³

1360. With a view also to prevent the improper marriages of its wards, the court will, where there is reason to suspect an intended and improper marriage without its sanction, by an injunction not only interdict the marriage, but also interdict communications between the ward and the admirer; and if the guardian is suspected of any connivance, it will remove the infant from his care and custody and place the infant under the care and custody of a committee.⁴ Lord Hardwicke has justly remarked that this jurisdiction is highly important in its exercise under both of these aspects: in the first place when it is exercised by way of punishment of such as have done any act to the prejudice of the ward; in the next place by the still more salutary and useful exercise by way of prevention, when it re-

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (b); *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 111, 112, 115; *Butler v. Freeman*, Ambl. R. 302; *Edes v. Brereton*, West, R. 348; *More v. More*, 2 Atk. 157; *Herbert's Case*, 3 P. Will. 116; *Hughes v. Science*, Ambl. R. 302, note; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 277, 278; *Nicholson v. Squire*, 16 Ves. 259.

² *Ibid.* Some auxiliary provisions to secure due marriages and protection to infants have been made by the Marriage Act of 4 Geo. IV. ch. 76, which however it is here unnecessary to enumerate. They are stated in *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 1, ch. 5, § 3, pp. 225, 226.

³ *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 112; *Dr. Davis's Case*, 1 P. Will. 698.

⁴ *Smith v. Smith*, 3 Atk. 304; *Pearce v. Crutchfield*, 14 Ves. 206; *Beard v. Travers*, 1 Ves. 313; *Shipbrook v. Hinchinbrook*, 2 Dick. 547, 548; *Roach v. Garven*, 1 Dick. 88.

strains persons from doing any act to disparage the ward before the act has been completed.¹

1361. In case of an offer of marriage of a ward the court will refer it to a master to ascertain and report whether the match is a suitable one, and also what settlement ought to be made.² And where a marriage has been actually celebrated without the sanction of the court, the court will not discharge the husband who has been committed for the contempt, until he has actually made such a settlement upon the female ward as upon a reference to a master shall under all the circumstances be deemed equitable and proper.³ It will not make any difference in the case that the ward has since arrived of age, or is ready to waive her right to a settlement; for the court will protect her against her own indiscretion and the undue influence of her husband.⁴(a)

¹ *Smith v. Smith*, 3 Atk. 305.

² *Ibid.*

³ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (b); *Stevens v. Savage*, 1 Ves. jr. 154; *Winch v. James*, 4 Ves. 386; *Bathurst v. Murray*, 8 Ves. 74, 78; *Ball v. Coutts*, 1 V. & Beam. 300, 301, 303; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 279 to 281.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Stackpole v. Beaumont*, 3 Ves. 98. What the settlement should be must necessarily vary with the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case. On this point Mr. Jeremy has well summed up the general result of the authorities. *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 5, § 3, pp. 230, 231.*

(a) How far Courts of Equity in this country would interfere in matters treated by the author in the last four sections, query? See *Kenny v. Udall*, 5 Johns. Ch. 464, 473; s. c. 3 Cowen, 591; *Van Epps v. Van Deusen*, 4 Paige, 64; *Van Duzer v. Van Duzer*, 6 Paige, 366; *Chambers v. Perry*, 17 Ala. 726.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

IDIOTS AND LUNATICS.

1362. WITH this brief exposition of the jurisdiction and doctrines of the Court of Chancery in regard to infants, we may dismiss the subject and proceed to the consideration of the jurisdiction in relation to *IDIOTS AND LUNATICS*. The remarks which have been already made to distinguish the jurisdiction of the court in this class of cases from that exercised in cases of infants have in a great measure anticipated and brought under discussion the explanations proper for this place.¹ If the preceding views of this subject are correct, the Court of Chancery may be properly deemed to have had originally, as the general delegate of the authority of the Crown as *parens patriæ*, the right not only to have the custody and protection of infants, but also of idiots and lunatics, when they have no other guardian.² (a)

¹ Ante, §§ 1334 to 1336, and notes.

² Ante, §§ 1335, 1336; *Beverley's Case*, 4 Co. R. 126; 1 Black. Comm. 303; *Ex parte Grimstone*, Ambler, R. 707; s. c. cited 2 Ves. jr. 235, note; *Ex parte Degge*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 235, note; *Oxenden v. Lord Compton*, 2 Ves. jr. 71; *Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Will. 118, 119; *Cary v. Bertie*, 2 Vern. 342, 343; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, note (a).

(a) Equity accordingly has original jurisdiction to give directions as to the guardianship and maintenance of persons of unsound mind not so found. *Vane v. Vane*, 2 Ch. D. 124; *In re Brandon*, 13 Ch. D. 773. See however *In re Bligh*, 12 Ch. D. 364. And see an article on the English Lunacy Laws in the April No., 1885, of the Law Quarterly Review.

But the Court of Chancery is not

the curator either of the person or of the estate of an insane person whom it cannot make its ward. It is not by reason of the incompetency, but notwithstanding the incompetency, that chancery entertains jurisdiction. *Jones v. Lloyd*, L. R. 18 Eq. 265; *Wilder v. Pigott*, 22 Ch. D. 263, 268. The court has jurisdiction to order a sale of land for a lunatic's support, or to pay for money expended by his guardian.

1363. But the Statutes of 17 Edw. II. ch. 9, 10, introduced some new rights, powers, and duties of the Crown; and since that period the jurisdiction has become somewhat mixed in practice; but it is principally in modern times exerted under these statutes. The jurisdiction therefore is now usually treated as a special jurisdiction for many purposes (certainly not for all) derived from the special authority of the Crown, under its sign manual, to the chancellor personally, and not as belonging to him as chancellor, or as sitting in the Court of Chancery. So that (it has been said) the sign manual does not confer on him any jurisdiction, but only a power of administration.¹ From this circumstance (as we have seen) the practice under the two branches of the jurisdiction is not the same, nor are the doctrines of the judge the same in all respects.² Still for the most part they agree in substance; and in a work like the present there would be little utility in a more minute and comprehensive enumeration of the distinctions and differences between them. (a)

1364. But whatever may be the true origin of the authority of the Crown as to idiots and lunatics, it is clear that the chancellor does not in all cases act under the special warrant by the sign manual. The warrant gives to the chancellor the right of providing for the maintenance of idiots and lunatics, and for the care of their persons and estates, and no more.³ When a person is ascertained to be an idiot or lunatic, the chancellor proceeds under his special warrant to commit the custody of the person and estate of the idiot or lunatic, sometimes to the same person and sometimes to different persons, according to circum-

¹ Ex parte Phillips, 19 Ves. 122; *Oxenden v. Lord Compton*, 2 Ves. jr. 72.

² Ante, § 1336, and notes.

³ *Lysaght v. Roysse*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 153. In order that the chancellor should deal with the property of a lunatic at all it is necessary that a commission should be taken out, or that the lunatic should be a party in a cause; otherwise the court has no jurisdiction. *Gilbee v. Gilbee*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 121.

Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338. See *Warfield v. Fisk*, 136 Mass. 219.

In managing the estates of lunatics equity has regard to their maintenance and comfort more than to the claims of creditors. In re Pink, 23 Ch. D. 577. Concerning allowances in favor

of one who has voluntarily maintained a lunatic see In re Weaver, 21 Ch. D. 615.

(a) As to the present jurisdiction in England under the Judicature Act of 1873 see In re Lamotte, 4 Ch. D. 325; In re Watson, 19 Ch. D. 384.

stances, and to direct for him a suitable maintenance.¹ After the custody is so granted and maintenance is assigned, the chancellor acts in other matters, relative to lunatics at least,² not under the warrant by the sign manual, but in virtue of his general power as holding the Great Seal, and keeper of the King's conscience. It is usual indeed to take bond from the committees to account and submit to the orders of the Court of Chancery, but it is not absolutely necessary so to do. The Court of Chancery is in the habit of making many orders and enforcing them by attachment; which orders and the manner of enforcing them are not warranted by the sign manual, but are warranted by the general power of the court.³

¹ *Dormer's Case*, 2 P. Will. 263; *Sheldon v. Fortescue Aland*, 3 P. Will. 110; *Lysaght v. Royse*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 153; *Ex parte Chumley*, 1 Ves. jr. 296; *Ex parte Baker*, 6 Ves. 8; *Ex parte Pickard*, 3 Ves. & B. 127. In the matter of *Webb*, 2 Phillips, Ch. R. 10.

² See *Lysaght v. Royse*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 153.

³ *Ante*, § 1335; *Ex parte Grimstone, Ambler*, R. 707; *Ex parte Degge*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 235, note; *Ex parte Fitzgerald*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 432, 438; *Oxenden v. Lord Compton*, 2 Ves. jr. 69; s. c. 4 Bro. Ch. R. 231; *Nelson v. Duncombe*, 9 Beav. R. 211. Lord Redesdale, in *Ex parte Fitzgerald* (2 Sch. & Lefr. 438), has gone at large into this subject. The following extract sufficiently illustrates the text: 'The issuing of the commission is under the direction of the Great Seal, and the care and custody of the person and estate is a matter which, after the abolition of the Court of Wards and Liveries, seems to have fallen back to the Crown, to be provided for upon a special application for the purpose. At the same time the duty thus thrown on the Crown was often difficult. It was to be performed by the Crown according to the advice upon which the King might constitutionally act, and it has therefore long been the practice from time to time to authorize by the King's sign manual the person holding the Great Seal to exercise the discretion of the Crown in providing for the care and custody of the persons and estates of lunatics, which has been usually done by grants to committees. But I apprehend that, though the discretion of the Crown has thus been delegated to the person holding the Great Seal, yet the superintendence of the conduct of the committee in the management both of the property and the person originates in the authority of the court itself as the court from which the commission inquiring of the lunacy issues, and into which the inquisition is returned, and which makes the grant founded on the inquisition; for which grant the sign manual (which is countersigned by the lords of the treasury) is a general warrant. The reason given in the warrant for delegating the power of appointing the committee to the person holding the Great Seal is because the jurisdiction of issuing the commission, and consequently of acting upon it, is by law in the Great Seal. And I conceive that the warrant itself implies no more, and that nothing is communicated by it but simply the selection of the person to whom the grant shall be made. But as the King is bound in conscience to execute the trust reposed in him by the statute, and cannot do it

1365. In regard to the manner of ascertaining whether a person is an idiot or lunatic or not a few words will suffice. Upon a proper petition addressed to the chancellor, not as such, but as the person acting under the special warrant of the Crown,¹ a commission issues out of Chancery on which the inquiry is to be made as to the asserted idiocy or lunacy of the party.² The inquiry is always had and the question tried by a jury, whose unimpeached verdict becomes conclusive upon the fact. (a) The commission is not confined to idiots or lunatics, strictly so called, but in modern times it is extended to all persons who, from age, (b) infirmity, or other misfortune, are incapable of managing their own affairs, (c) and therefore are properly deemed of unsound mind, or non compotes mentis.³

otherwise than by bailiff, the chancellor or person holding the Great Seal is the proper authority to direct and control the authority of the person so appointed bailiff. It is the duty therefore of the person holding the Great Seal to see that the committee does not use his office to the prejudice of the lunatic in his lifetime, or of those entitled to his property after his death, that being manifestly the duty of the Crown imposed by the law investing it with the care of persons in this situation.' There is some obscurity from the language used in the books as to the point whether the Lord Chancellor acts as administering the general powers of a Court of Equity, technically speaking, as to the orders and decrees which he makes in cases of lunacy, or only as keeper of the King's conscience and delegate of the Crown, or *virtute officii* as chancellor in cases beyond the special commission. The truth seems to be that he acts merely as delegate of the Crown, and exercising its personal prerogative as *parens patriæ* in Chancery, and not as a Court of Equity. Hence it is that from his orders and decrees in cases of lunacy an appeal lies to the King in council; whereas if he acted in such cases as a Court of Equity an appeal would lie from said orders and decrees to the House of Lords. See *Sheldon v. Fortescue Aland*, 3 P. Will. 107, and note; *Oxenden v. Lord Compton*, 2 Ves. jr. 69; s. c. 4 Bro. Ch. R. 235; *Sherwood v. Sanderson*, 19 Ves. 285. Yet the language used in *Ex parte Grimstone*, *Ambler*, R. 707, and in 2 Sch. & Lefr. 438, above cited, might lead to an opposite result.

¹ See *Sherwood v. Sanderson*, 19 Ves. 285.

² *Lysaght v. Royse*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 153; *Ex parte Fitzgerald*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 438. In the matter of *Webb*, 2 Phillips, Ch. R. 10; In the matter of *Joanna Gordon*, 2 *Ibid.* 242.

³ *Gibson v. Jeyes*, 6 Ves. 273; *Ridgway v. Darwin*, 8 Ves. 66; *Ex parte Cranmer*, 12 Ves. 446; *Sherwood v. Sanderson*, 19 Ves. 285. Some statutes have in modern times been passed in England relating to idiots, lunatics, and persons non compotes mentis authorizing certain acts to be done on their

(a) See *Rogers v. Walker*, 6 Barr, 253. See *Regina v. Shaw*, L. R. 1 371; In re *Lasher*, 2 Barb. Ch. 97; In C. C. 145.

re *Collins*, 3 C. E. Green, 253.

(c) See In re *Monaghan*, 3 Jones &

(b) In re *Collins*, 3 C. E. Green, L. 254.

1865 *a*. The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over lunatics is not confined to lunatics domiciled within the country; but a commission of lunacy may issue where the lunatic has lands or other property within the State, although he is domiciled abroad.¹ (*a*)

behalf by the committee under the direction of the Court of Chancery. They will be found summarily stated in Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 1, ch. 4, pp. 213, 214.

¹ Southcote's Case, 2 Ves. 402; Perkins's Case, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 121; Petit's Case, 2 Paige, R. 174; in the matter of Gause, 9 Paige, R. 416; in the matter of the Princess Bariantinski, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 375.

(*a*) See *In re Fowler*, 2 Barb. Ch. 305; *In re Garnier*, L. R. 13 Eq. 532.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

MARRIED WOMEN.

1366. WE may next proceed to the consideration of the peculiar jurisdiction exercised by Courts of Equity in regard to the persons and property of MARRIED WOMEN; and principally in regard to their property. It is not our design in these Commentaries to enter upon any consideration of the general doctrines relative to the rights, duties, powers, and interests of husband and wife, which are recognized at the common law. That would properly belong to a treatise of a very different nature. It will be sufficient for our present purpose, to examine those particulars only which are peculiar to Courts of Equity, or in which a remedial justice is applied by them beyond or unknown to the common law.

1367. It is well known that at the common law the husband and wife are treated for most purposes as one person; that is to say, the very being or legal existence of the woman as a distinct person is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated with that of her husband.¹ Upon this principle of the union of person in husband and wife depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities which either of them acquire by or during the marriage.² For this reason a man cannot grant anything to his wife or enter into a covenant with her; for the grant would be to suppose her to possess a distinct and separate

¹ 1 Black. Comm. 442. I have qualified Blackstone's text by adding the words 'for most purposes;' for in some respects even at law she is treated as a distinct person; as for example she may commit crimes separately from her husband; she may act as an attorney for him or for others; she may levy a fine; she may swear articles of peace against him.

² Ibid.

existence. And therefore it is also generally true that contracts made between husband and wife when single are avoided by the intermarriage.¹ Upon the same ground it is that if the wife be injured in her person or property during the marriage, she can bring no action for redress without the concurrence of her husband; neither can she be sued without making her husband also a party in the cause.² All this is very different in the civil law, where the husband and wife are considered as two distinct persons, and may have separate estates, contracts, debts, and injuries,³ and may also by agreement with each other have a community of interest in the nature of a partnership.

1367 *a*. It is also a settled rule of the common law, founded in like principles, that in virtue of the marriage the husband becomes entitled to all the personal estate, including the choses in action of the wife, and may appropriate the whole to his own use. Hence if a promissory note or bond be given to a woman before marriage by a third person to secure an annuity to her upon her subsequent marriage, her husband may release the note or bond, and by the release of the security the annuity itself is gone.⁴ It would be otherwise if the annuity were secured on land, for then the husband could not release it without the concurrence of his wife; and in order to extinguish the security she must join with him in levying a fine of the land.⁵

1368. Now in Courts of Equity, although the principles of law in regard to husband and wife are fully recognized and enforced in proper cases, yet they are not exclusively considered. On the contrary Courts of Equity for many purposes treat the husband and wife as the civil law treats them, as distinct persons, capable (in a limited sense) of contracting with each other, of suing each other, and of having separate estates, debts, and interests.⁶ A wife may in a Court of Equity sue her husband and be sued by him.⁷ And in cases respecting her separate estate, she may also be sued without him,⁸ although he is ordinarily

¹ *Ibid*.² 1 Black. Comm. 443.³ *Ibid*. 444; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, and note (*h*).⁴ *Hare v. Becher*, 12 Simons, R. 465, 467.⁵ *Ibid*.⁶ *Arundell v. Phipps*, 10 Ves. 144, 149; *Livingston v. Livingston*, 2 John. Ch. R. 539.⁷ *Cannel v. Buckle*, 2 P. Will, 243, 244.⁸ *Dubois v. Hole*, 2 Vern. 613, and Mr. Raithby's note (1). See Travers

required to be joined, for the sake of conformity to the rule of law, as a nominal party whenever he is within the jurisdiction of the court and can be made a party.¹

1369. In the further illustration of this subject we shall consider: first, the cases in which contracts between husband and wife will be recognized and enforced in equity; secondly, the manner in which a wife may acquire a separate estate, and her powers and interest therein; thirdly, the equity of the wife to a settlement out of her own property not reduced into the possession of her husband; and fourthly, her claim in equity for maintenance and alimony.

1370. And first in regard to contracts between husband and wife. By the general rules of law, as has been already stated, the contracts made between husband and wife before marriage become by their matrimonial union utterly extinguished.² Thus for example if a man should give a bond to his wife or a wife to her husband before marriage, the contract created thereby would at law be discharged by the intermarriage.³ (a) Courts of Equity, although they generally follow the same doctrine, will, in special cases in furtherance of the manifest intentions and objects of the parties, carry into effect such a contract made before marriage between husband and wife, although it would be avoided at law.⁴ An agreement therefore entered into by husband and wife before marriage for the mutual settlement of their estates, or of the estate of either upon the other upon the marriage, even without the intervention of trustees, will be enforced in equity although void at law; for equity will not suffer the intention of the parties to be defeated by the very act which is designed to give effect to such a contract.⁵ On this ground, where a wife before marriage

v. Bulkeley, 1 Ves. 383; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, notes (k) and (p); *Brooks v. Brooks*, Prec. Ch. 24; *Kirk v. Clark*, Prec. Ch. 275; *Lampert v. Lampert*, 1 Ves. jr. 21; *Griffith v. Hood*, 2 Ves. 452.

¹ See *Lilia v. Airey*, 1 Ves. jr. 278; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (p).

² Co. Litt. 112 a, 187 b; Com. Dig. Baron & Feme, D. 1; ante, § 1367.

³ Com. Dig. Baron & Feme, D. 1; Cro. Car. 551; Co. Litt. 264 b.

⁴ *Rippon v. Dawding*, Ambler, R. 566, and Mr. Blunt's note.

⁵ *Moore v. Ellis*, Bunb. R. 205; *Fursor v. Penton*, 1 Vern. 408; *Cotton v. Cotton*, Prec. Ch. 41; s. c. 2 Vern. 290, and Mr. Raithby's note; *Bradish v.*

(a) And would not be revived by *v. Kellogg*, 102 Mass. 246; *Smiley v. the death of the husband. Abbott v. Smiley*, 18 Ohio St. 543. *Winchester*, 105 Mass. 115; *Chapman*

gave a bond to her intended husband that in case the marriage took effect she would convey her estate to him in fee, the bond was after the marriage carried into effect in equity, although it was discharged at law; upon that occasion the Lord Chancellor said: 'It is unreasonable that the intermarriage, upon which alone the bond was to take effect, should itself be a destruction of the bond. And the foundation of that notion is that at law the husband and wife being one person, the husband cannot sue the wife on this agreement; whereas in equity it is constant experience that the husband may sue the wife or the wife the husband; and the husband might sue the wife upon this very agreement.'¹ (a)

1371. Even at law a bond given by a husband to his intended wife, upon a condition not to be performed in his lifetime (as for instance to leave her at his death £1,000), would not be extinguished by the intermarriage; for marriage extinguishes such contracts only as are for debts, or things which are due in præsentia or in futuro, or upon a contingency which may occur during the coverture. But where the debt or thing cannot be due until after the coverture is dissolved, the contract is only suspended, and not extinguished during the coverture.² (b) A fortiori such an agreement would be specifically decreed in a Court of Equity.³ Therefore where a husband covenanted before marriage with his intended wife that she should have power to dispose of £300 of her estate, he was afterwards held bound specifically to perform

Gibbs, 3 John. Ch. R. 523, 540 to 547; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, notes (n) and (o).

¹ Cannel v. Buckle, 2 P. W. 243, 244; s. c. 2 Eden, R. 252 to 254.

² Gage v. Acton, Com. Rep. 67, 68; s. c. 1 Lord Raym. 516; s. c. 1 Salk. 325; Milbourn v. Ewart, 5 T. Rep. 381; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n).

³ Acton v. Acton, Prec. Ch. 237; s. c. 2 Vern. 480; Watkyns v. Watkyns, 2 Atk. 96; Prebble v. Boghurst, 1 Swanst. R. 318, 319; Lampert v. Lampert, 1 Ves. jr. 21; Com. Dig. Baron & Feme, D. 1; Id. Chancery, 2 M. 11; Newland on Contr. ch. 6, pp. 111, 112; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n); Rippon v. Dawding, Ambler, R. 566, and Mr. Blunt's note. There are some early cases the other way, but they are now overruled. Darcey v. Chute, 1 Ch. Cas. 21; Pridgeon v. Executors of Pridgeon, 1 Ch. Cas. 117, 118.

(a) Moore v. Moore, 47 N. Y. 467; Walter v. Walter, 48 Mo. 140. Under the statutes in regard to separate property see Minnier v. Minnier, 4 Lans. 421; Adams v. Curtis, Ib. 164.

(b) A covenant to pay an annuity revives on the death of the husband. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, L. R. 2 P. C. 83.

it.¹ The wife may even execute a power to dispose of property so reserved to her in favor of her husband.²

1372. In regard to contracts made between husband and wife after marriage a fortiori the principles of the common law apply to pronounce them a mere nullity; for there is deemed to be a positive incapacity in each to contract with the other. But here again, although Courts of Equity follow the law, they will under particular circumstances give full effect and validity to post-nuptial contracts.³ (a) Thus for example if a wife having a separate estate should bona fide enter into a contract with her husband to make him a certain allowance out of the income of such separate estate for a reasonable consideration, the contract, although void at law, would be held obligatory, and would be enforced in equity.⁴ (b) So if the husband should after marriage for good reasons contract with his wife that she should separately possess and enjoy property bequeathed to her, the contract would

¹ *Fursor v. Penton*, 1 Vern. 408, and Mr. Raithby's note; *Wright v. Cadogan*, 2 Eden, R. 252; Com. Dig. Baron & Feme, D. 1; *Id.* Chancery, 2 M. 31; *Bradish v. Gibbs*, 3 John. Ch. R. 540, 544.

² *Bradish v. Gibbs*, 3 John. Ch. R. 523, 536. But see *Milnes v. Busk*, 2 Ves. jr. 498.

³ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n).

⁴ *Moore v. Freeman*, Bunb. R. 205.

(a) As in regard to money loaned by the wife to the husband out of her separate or individual property. *Medsker v. Bonebrake*, 108 U. S. 66; *Atlantic Bank v. Tavener*, 130 Mass. 407; *Thoms v. Thoms*, 45 Miss. 263; *Simmons v. Thomas*, 34 Mo. 31; *Hoxie v. Price*, 31 Wis. 82. And as to the converse case of money loaned by the husband to the wife see *Butler v. Butler*, 14 Q. B. D. 831. But a promissory note made to a married woman by a firm of which her husband is a member is considered in Massachusetts absolutely void, though made for full value, and is not enforceable even in equity against the partner not her husband. *Fowle v. Torrey*, 135 Mass. 87, two judges dissenting. And this too though the consideration of the note was money loaned by the married woman out of

her separate estate, so long as no fraud was practised upon her and no agreement made that the property was to be held or kept as her separate property. *Ib.* Sed qu. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field for the authorities bearing upon the question.

(b) It is laid down that if the wife consents to her husband's receiving the income of her separate estate from the trustee thereof, the husband and wife having lived together, she will not be entitled to an account for arrears against either the trustee or her husband. *Dixon v. Dixon*, 9 Ch. D. 587. See *Caton v. Rideout*, 1 Mac. & G. 599; *Payne v. Little*, 26 Beav. 1; *Darkin v. Darkin*, 17 Beav. 578, 581. If she has not consented, she may recover the arrears. *Ib.*; *Parker v. Brooke*, 9 Ves. 583.

be upheld in equity.¹ So if husband and wife for a bona fide and valuable consideration should agree that he should purchase land and build a house thereon for her, and she should pay him therefor out of the proceeds of her own real estate, if he should perform the contract on his side she also would be compelled to perform it on her side.² Nay, if an estate should be devised to a husband for the separate use of his wife, it would be considered as a trust for the wife, and he would be compelled to perform it.³

1373. It is upon similar grounds that a wife may become a creditor of her husband by acts and contracts during marriage, and her rights as such will be enforced against him and his representatives. Thus for example if a wife should unite with her husband to pledge her estate, or otherwise to raise a sum of money out of it to pay his debts or to answer his necessities, whatever might be the mode adopted to carry that purpose into effect, the transaction would in equity be treated according to the true intent of the parties. She would be deemed a creditor or a surety for him (if so originally understood between them) for the sum so paid; and she would be entitled to reimbursement out of his estate, and to the like privileges as belong to other creditors.⁴

1374. In respect also to gifts or grants of property by a husband to his wife after marriage they are ordinarily (but not universally) void at law. But Courts of Equity will uphold them in many cases where they would be held void at law, although in other cases the rule of law will be recognized and enforced. Thus for example if a husband should by deed grant all his estate or property to his wife, the deed would be held inoperative in

¹ *Harvey v. Harvey*, 1 P. Will. 125, 126; s. c. 2 Vern. R. 659, 760, and Mr. Raithby's note; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2 M. 11, 12, 14; *Bradish v. Gibbs*, 3 John. Ch. R. 523, 540.

² *Livingston v. Livingston*, 2 John. Ch. R. 537, 539. See also *Townshend v. Windham*, 2 Ves. 7.

³ *Darley v. Darley*, 3 Atk. 399; *Rich v. Cockell*, 9 Ves. 375; post, §§ 1377 a, 1380.

⁴ *Tate v. Austin*, 1 P. Will. 264, and Mr. Cox's note; s. c. 2 Vern. 689, and Mr. Raithby's note; *Neimcewicz v. Gahn*, 3 Paige, R. 614; *Pawlet v. Delaval*, 2 Ves. 663, 669; *Clinton v. Hooper*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 201; *Innes v. Jackson*, 16 Ves. 356, 367; s. c. 1 Bligh, R. 104, 114, 115 to 127; 1 Eq. Abridg. 62; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n); 1 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 4, § 1, pp. 143 to 162.

equity as it would be in law; for it could in no just sense be deemed a reasonable provision for her (which is all that Courts of Equity hold the wife entitled to), and in giving her the whole he would surrender all his own interests.¹ (a)

1375. But on the other hand if the nature and circumstances of the gift or grant, whether it be express or implied, are such that there is no ground to suspect fraud, but it amounts only to a reasonable provision for the wife, it will, even though made after coverture, be sustained in equity.² (b) Thus for example gifts made by the husband to the wife during the coverture, to purchase clothes or personal ornaments, or for her separate expenditures (commonly called pin-money), and personal savings and profits made by her in her domestic management which the husband allows her to apply to her own separate use,³ will be held to vest in her as against her husband (but not as against his creditors) an unimpeachable right of property therein, so that they may be treated as her exclusive and separate estate.⁴ It is true that Courts of Equity will require clear and incontrovertible evidence to establish such gifts as a matter of intention and fact; but when that is established, full effect will be given to them.⁵ A fortiori such allowances provided for by marriage articles, or by a settlement before marriage even without the intervention of trustees, will be deemed valid in equity to all intents and purposes, not only against the husband but also against his creditors. And if such allowances are invested in jewels or other ornaments, or property, the latter will be entitled to the same protection against the husband and his creditors.⁶

¹ Beard v. Beard, 3 Atk. 72.

² Walter v. Hodge, 2 Swanst. R. 106, 107; Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270, 271.

³ Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Will. 337.

⁴ 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 17, § 1, pp. 132, 137 to 139; Wilson v. Pack, Prec. Ch. 295, 297; Sir Paul Neal's case, cited in Prec. Ch. 44; Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270; Walter v. Hodge, 2 Swanst. 106, 107; Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atk. 393 to 395.

⁵ McLean v. Longlands, 5 Ves. 78, 79; Walter v. Hodge, 2 Swanst. R. 103 to 107.

⁶ Ibid.; 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 18, § 4, pp. 165, 166; 1 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 8, §§ 1, 2, pp. 288 to 327; Offley v. Offley, Prec. Ch. 26, 27.

(a) Warlick v. White, 86 N. Car. J. Ch. 241. So of a contract on good consideration and partially executed.

(b) See Schreiber v. Dinkel, 54 L. Kesner v. Trigg, 98 U. S. 50.

1375 *a*. Pin-money is a very peculiar sort of gift for a particular purpose and object, and whether it is secured by a settlement or otherwise, it is still required to be applied to those purposes and objects.¹ It is not deemed to be an absolute gift, or, as it is sometimes said, out and out, by the husband to the wife. It is not considered like money set apart for the sole and separate use of the wife during coverture, excluding the *jus mariti*; but it is a sum set apart for a specific purpose, due or given to the wife in virtue of a particular arrangement, payable and paid by the husband in virtue of that arrangement and for that specific purpose. Pin-money is a sum paid in respect to the personal expense of the wife for her dress and pocket-money; and hence, as the very name seems to import, it has a connection with her person, and is to deck and attire it. The husband therefore, as well as the wife, may be said to have an interest in it; for the wife is to dress (it has been said) according to his rank and not her own. It is upon this ground that Courts of Equity refuse to go back to call upon the husband to pay beyond the arrears of a year, although stipulated for by a marriage settlement; for the money is meant to dress the wife during the year so as to keep up the dignity of the husband, and not for the accumulation of the fund. This provides a check and control to the husband. It prevents the wife from misspending the money. It secures the appropriation of the money to its natural and original purpose. It is with this view quite as much as on account of the presumed satisfaction by acquiescence, that Courts of Equity have established the principle above stated, not to allow the wife to claim pin-money beyond the year. On the same ground it is that the personal representatives of the wife are not allowed to make any claim for the arrears of pin-money, not even for arrears of a year; for the allowance has a sole regard to the personal dress and expenses of the wife herself during that period. And hence also it is that if the wife becomes insane and remains so until her death, if the husband has maintained her and taken suitable care of her according to her rank and condition, Courts of Equity will not allow her personal representatives to make any claim for any arrearages of pin-money even secured by a marriage settlement.²

¹ *Jodrell v. Jodrell*, 9 Beav. R. 45.

² *Howard v. Digby*, 8 Bligh, R. 224, 246 to 250; *Id.* 252, 257, 261, 262, 266, 267, 269, 271. The whole of this section is abstracted from the elaborate

1376. Under the like consideration in a great measure falls the right of the wife to her paraphernalia; a term originally of

and able opinion of the Lord Chancellor in this case. In one part of his opinion the noble Lord said: 'It is wonderful indeed how little there is to be found upon the subject of pin-money, notwithstanding its occurring almost every time that a marriage takes place among persons of large fortune. You cannot even get a definition from the books upon which you can rely; you cannot trace the line which divides it from the separate property of the wife with any distinctness, or in a way on which you can depend. And as to authority, either of decisions or dicta or text-writers or obiter dicta of judges, there is nothing that furnishes a clear and steady light on the subject; the cases running from pin-money into separate estate and from separate estate into pin-money in such a way that when a text-writer quotes a case, *Brodie v. Barry* (2 Ves. & B. 36) for instance, in support of a doctrine touching pin-money, you look at the book and find it has nothing to do with pin-money, and does not support the proposition for which it is cited.' Again, 'It is a very material fact in a case where authority is so little to be had, that the general opinion of all those who give pin-money either to their own wives or to the wives of their sons upon marriage should be entirely coincident with the view to which the argument had led; namely, that it is a sum allowed to save the trouble of a constant recurrence by the wife to the husband upon every occasion of a milliner's bill, upon every occasion of a jeweller's account coming in. I mean not the jeweller's account for the jewels, because that is a very different question; but I mean for the repair and the wear and tear of trinkets, and for pocket-money, and things of that sort. I do not of course mean the carriage and the house and the gardens, but the ordinary personal expenses. It is in order to avoid the necessity of a perpetual recurrence by the wife to the husband that a sum of money is settled at the marriage which is to be set apart to the use of the wife for the purpose of bearing those personal expenses.' Again, 'It is meant for the wife's expenditure on her person: it is to meet her personal expenses and to deck her person suitably to her husband's dignity, that is, suitably to the rank and station of his wife. It is a fund which she may be made to spend during the coverture by the intercession and advice and at the instance of her husband. I will not go so far as to say, because it is not necessary for the purpose of this argument, that he might hold back her pin-money if she did not attire herself in a becoming way. I should not be afraid however of stretching the proposition to that extent. But I am not bound here to do so, because if during her coverture a claim were made by her (and this is one distinction between the claim of the wife and the claim of her personal representatives after her death), the absurd and incredible state of things that I have put as the consequence of their argument—the case of her attiring herself in an unbecoming manner—never could happen if the pin-money is only to be claimed by herself; for in that case the Duke would of course say, "If you do not dress as you ought to do, what occasion have you for pin-money?" He need not refuse, but he remonstrates; he uses that influence which the law supposes him legitimately to have over his wife, and sees that the fund is duly expended for its proper purpose. Now the purpose is not the purpose of the wife alone: it is for the establishment; it is for the joint concern; it is for the maintenance of the common dignity; it is for the support of that family whose brightest

Greek derivation (where it means something reserved over and above dower, or a dotal portion) and afterwards imported into the civil law, and from thence adopted into the language of the common law,¹ in which it includes all the personal apparel and ornaments of the wife which she possesses, and which are suitable to her rank and condition in life.² At law the husband in his lifetime may dispose of her paraphernalia, excepting indeed her necessary apparel; and they are liable to the claims of creditors, with the like exception.³ But the wife is, even at law, entitled to her paraphernalia against his representatives; for the husband cannot by will dispose of them or leave them to his representatives.⁴ Courts of Equity fully recognize this right of the husband and his creditors; although in case of the latter, if there are any other personal assets of the husband, they will after his death be marshalled against his representatives in favor of the widow.⁵

ornament very probably is the wife; whose support and strength is the husband, but whose ornament is the wife. It is to support the dignity and splendor of the joint establishment, consisting of husband and wife, that part of the whole expenditure is for the support of the wife herself. Then does it not follow from thence that the husband has a direct interest in the expenditure of the pin-money? He has a right to have the pleasure of it, to have the credit of it, to be spared the eyesore of a wife appearing as misbecomes his station. That is the destination and the object of pin-money.' Post, §§ 1396, 1425, note. See *Jodrell v. Jodrell*, 9 Beav. R. 45.

¹ 'Si res dentur in ea quæ Græci *παράφερνα* dicunt quæ Galli peculium appellant.' Dig. Lib. 23, tit. 3, l. 9, § 3. As to these the Code declared: 'Ut vir in his rebus quas extra dotem mulier habet quas Græci *παράφερνα* dicunt, nullam uxore prohibente habeat communionem, nec aliquam ei necessitatem imponat, &c. Nullo modo (ut dictum est) muliere prohibente, virum in parapheruis se volumus immiscere.' Cod. Lib. 5, tit. 14, l. 8; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 9, § 4, pp. 180 to 182.

² 2 Black Comm. 435.

³ 2 Black. Comm. 435, 436; *Graham v. Londonderry*, 3 Atk. 393; *Townshend v. Windham*, 2 Ves. 7; *Burton v. Pierpont*, 2 P. Will. 79; *Parker v. Harvey*, 4 Bro. Parl. R. 609, by Tomlins; s. c. 3 Bro. Parl. Cas. 187.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Tipping v. Tipping*, 1 P. Will. 729, 730; *Seymore v. Tresilian*, 3 Atk. 358, 359; *Ridout v. Earl of Plymouth*, 2 Atk. 105; *Northey v. Northey*, 2 Atk. 77; s. c. 9 Mod. R. 270.

⁵ Ante, § 568; *Townshend v. Windham*, 2 Ves. 7; *Tipping v. Tipping*, 1 P. Will. 729; *Burton v. Pierpont*, 2 P. Will. 79, 80; *Tynt v. Tynt*, 2 P. Will. 542, 544, and Mr. Cox's note (1); *Probert v. Clifford*, Ambler, R. 6, and Mr. Blunt's note; *Inclendon v. Northcote*, 3 Atk. 438; *Snelson v. Corbett*, 3 Atk. 369; *Aldrich v. Cooper*, 8 Ves. 397; *Boynton v. Parkhurst*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 576; s. c. 1 Cox, 106; *Aguilar v. Aguilar*, 5 Madd. R. 414; 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 17, § 3, pp. 144, 145, and note.

1377. There is however a distinction upon this subject of paraphernalia which is entitled to consideration. Where the husband either before or after marriage gives to his wife articles of paraphernal nature, they are not treated as absolute gifts to her as her own separate property; for if they were, she might dispose of them at any time, and he could not appropriate them to his own use. But they are deemed as technically paraphernalia, to be worn by the wife as ornaments of her person, and so to be deemed gifts *sub modo* only.¹ But if the like articles were bestowed upon her by a father, or by a relative, or even by a stranger, before or after marriage, they would be deemed absolute gifts to her separate use; and then, if received with the consent of the husband, he could not, nor could his creditors, dispose of them any more than they could of any other property received and held to her separate use.²

1377 *a*. And although (as we have seen³) post-nuptial contracts for a settlement entered into by husband and wife, or husband and wife and children, will not, if they are purely voluntary, be enforced against the husband or his heirs or personal representatives, yet this doctrine is to be received with this qualification, that it is done in pursuance of a duty on the part of the husband which a Court of Equity would enforce. For if a husband should voluntarily enter into a contract to make a settlement, or should actually make a settlement upon his wife and children in consideration of personal property coming by distribution or bequest to her from her relatives, to no greater extent than what a Court of Equity would upon a suitable application by bill direct him to make, in such a case the post-nuptial contract or settlement will not only be held valid and obligatory upon him and his representatives, but equally so against his creditors.⁴ (*a*)

1378. In the next place as to the manner in which a married

¹ *Graham v. Londonderry*, 3 Atk. R. 393 to 395; *Ridout v. Earl of Plymouth*, 2 Atk. 104.

² *Graham v. Londonderry*, 3 Atk. 393 to 395; 2 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 17, § 3, p. 143.

³ *Ante*, §§ 95, 169, 433, 706 *a*, 789, 793, 973, 987, 1040 *b*.

⁴ *Wickes v. Clarke*, 8 Paige, R. 161; *Seward v. Jackson*, 8 Cowen, R. 406; *ante*, §§ 372, 1372, 1373; *post*, § 1415.

(*a*) See *Bridgford v. Riddell*, 55 Ill. 261; *Kesner v. Trigg*, 98 U. S. 50.

woman may acquire a separate estate and as to her powers and interests therein. It is well known that the strict rules of the old common law would not permit the wife to take or enjoy any real or personal estate separate from or independent of her husband. And although these rules have been in some degree relaxed and modified in modern times, yet they have still a very comprehensive influence and operation in Courts of Law.¹ On the other hand Courts of Equity have for a great length of time admitted the doctrine that a married woman is capable of taking real and personal estate to her own separate and exclusive use, and that she has also an incidental power to dispose of it.² (a)

1379. The power to hold real and personal property to her own separate and exclusive use may be and often is reserved to her by marriage articles or by an actual settlement made before marriage; and in that case the agreement becomes completely obligatory between the parties after marriage, and regulates their future rights, interests, and duties. In like manner real and personal property may be secured for the separate and exclusive use of a married woman after marriage, and thus the arrangement may acquire a complete obligation between the parties.³

1380. It was formerly supposed that the interposition of trustees was in all arrangements of this sort, whether made before or after marriage, indispensable for the protection of the wife's rights and interests. In other words it was deemed absolutely necessary that the property of which the wife was to have the separate and exclusive use should be vested in trustees for her benefit; and that the agreement of the husband should be made with such trustees, or at least with persons capable of contracting with him for her benefit.⁴ But although in strict propriety that should always be done and it usually is done in regular and well-considered settlements, yet it has for more than a century been established in Courts of Equity that the intervention of trustees

¹ See *Coomes v. Elling*, 3 Atk. 679; 2 Roper on *Husb. and Wife*, ch. 18, p. 151. See *Agar v. Blethyn*, 1 Tyrw. & Grang. 160.

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n); 2 Roper on *Husb. and Wife*, ch. 18, pp. 151 to 266.

³ *Ibid.*; ante, § 372; post, § 1415; *Wickes v. Clarke*, 8 Paige, R. 161.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Harvey v. Harvey*, 1 P. Will. 125; *Burton v. Pierpont*, 2 P. Will. 79; *Peacock v. Monk*, 2 Ves. 190.

(a) As to statutory separate estates see *Kelly v. Turner*, 74 Ala. 513.

is not indispensable; and that whenever real or personal property is given or devised or settled upon a married woman either before or after marriage for her separate and exclusive use without the intervention of trustees, the intention of the parties shall be effectuated in equity, and the wife's interest protected against the marital rights and claims of her husband and of his creditors also.¹ In all such cases the husband will be held a mere trustee for her; (a) and although the agreement is made between him and her alone, the trust will attach upon him and be enforced in the same manner and under the same circumstances that it would be if he were a mere stranger.² It will make no difference whether the separate estate be derived from her husband himself or from a mere stranger; for as to such separate estate when obtained in either way her husband will be treated as a mere trustee and prohibited from disposing of it to her prejudice.

1381. Under what circumstances property given, secured, or bequeathed to the wife will be deemed a trust for her separate and exclusive use is a matter which upon the authorities involves some nice distinctions. There is no doubt that when, from the terms of the gift, settlement, or bequest, the property is expressly or by just implication designed to be for her separate and exclusive use (for technical words are not necessary), the intention will be fully acted upon; and the rights and interests of the wife sedulously protected in equity.³ But the question which most frequently arises is, what words are sufficiently expressive of such a purpose; for the purpose must clearly appear beyond any

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n); 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 18, pp. 151 to 157; Parker v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583; 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 21, § 5, p. 370; Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Will. 316, decided in 1725; Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270; Pawlet v. Delavel, 2 Ves. 666, 667; Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Will. 337 to 339; Rollfe v. Budder, Bumb. R. 187; Darley v. Darley, 3 Atk. 399; Rich v. Cockell, 9 Ves. 375; Davison v. Atkinson, 5 T. Rep. 434; Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 John. Ch. R. 540; Shirley v. Shirley, 9 Paige, 363; Lee v. Prieaux, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 383; Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 197; Major v. Lansley, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 355.

² Ibid.; ante, § 1732.

³ Darley v. Darley, 3 Atk. R. 399; Tyrrell v. Hope, 2 Atk. 561; Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 175; Newlands v. Paynter, 10 Sim. R. 377; s. c. 4 Mylne & Craig, 408; post, § 1384.

(a) See Porter v. Bank of Rutland, Barb. 352; Ellis v. Woods, 9 Rich. 19 Vt. 410; Blanchard v. Blood, 2 Eq. 19.

reasonable doubt, otherwise the husband will retain his ordinary, legal, and marital rights over it.¹ (a)

1382. On the one hand if the language of a marriage settlement made before marriage, or of a gift or bequest to a married woman after marriage, be that she is to have the property 'to her sole use or disposal;' or 'to her separate use or disposal;'² or 'to her sole use and benefit;'³ or 'for her own use and at her own disposal;'⁴ or 'to her own use during her life independent of her husband;'⁵ or 'that she shall enjoy and receive the issues and profits;'⁶ or that it is an allowance as or for pin-money (eo nomine);⁷ in all these cases the marital rights of her husband will be excluded and the property will be for her exclusive use. So a bequest to a married woman, 'her receipt to the executors to be a sufficient discharge to the executors,' is equivalent to saying to her sole and separate use.⁸ So money paid to the husband 'for the livelihood of the wife,' and money given to a married woman for her own use 'independent of her husband,' and money or stock given to such a married woman 'not to be disposed of by her husband without her consent,' will be construed to give her the property to her sole and separate use.⁹ So a bequest to

¹ *Lumb v. Milnes*, 5 Ves. 517; *Brown v. Clark*, 3 Ves. 166; *Ex parte Ray*, 1 Madd. R. 199; *Rich v. Cockell*, 9 Ves. 370, 377; *Wills v. Sayers*, 4 Madd. R. 409; *Massey v. Parker*, 2 Mylne & K. 174.

² *Ibid.*; *Adamson v. Armitage*, Cooper, Eq. R. 283; s. c. 19 Ves. 416; *Wills v. Sayers*, 4 Madd. R. 409; 2 Roper on Legacies, by White, ch. 21, § 5, pp. 370, 371.

³ — *v. Lyne*, 1 Younge, R. 562.

⁴ *Prichard v. Ames*, 1 Turn. & Russell, 222; *Stanton v. Hall*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 175.

⁵ *Wagstaff v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 520. See *Dixon v. Olmius*, 2 Cox, R. 414.

⁶ *Tyrrell v. Hope*, 2 Atk. 561.

⁷ *Herbert v. Herbert*, Prec. Ch. 44; *Milles v. Wikes*, 1 Eq. Abridg. 66; 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 17, § 1, p. 132.

⁸ *Lee v. Prieaux*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 381; *Lumb v. Milnes*, 6 Ves. 517; *Tyler v. Lake*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 183; — *v. Lyne*, 1 Younge, R. 562; *Stanton v. Hall*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 180; *Blacklow v. Laws*, 2 Hare, R. 40, 49.

⁹ *Darley v. Darley*, 3 Atk. 399; *Wagstaff v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 520, 524; *Johnes v. Lockhart*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 383, note; *Tyler v. Lake*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 183.

(a) See *Stuart v. Kissam*, 2 Barb. 493; *Taylor v. Stone*, 13 Smedes & M. 653; *Logan v. Thrift*, 20 Ohio St. 62; *Boal v. Morgner*, 46 Mo. 48; *Mer-*
rill v. Bullock, 105 Mass. 486; *Hathaway v. Seaman*, 8 Bush, 391; *Charles v. Coker*, 2 S. Car. 122.

a married woman and her infant daughter to be equally divided between them, share and share alike, 'for their own use and benefit independent of any other person,' will be construed to mean to their sole and separate use.¹ So a bequest to a married woman 'for her benefit independent of the control of her husband,' will receive the like construction.² In all these cases the words manifest an unequivocal intent to exclude the power and marital rights of the husband.

1382 *a*. But even her own power over her separate property may be qualified. Thus where there was a bequest of money and leaseholds to a feme sole 'for her own absolute use without liberty to sell or assign during her life,' it was held that she took the property absolutely, but without any power to dispose of it during her life; or in other words with a restriction against alienation during her life.³ (*a*) And other qualifications may, as we shall presently see, be annexed to her power of disposal or enjoyment thereof.⁴

1383. On the other hand a gift or bequest after marriage to a married woman, 'for her own use and benefit,'⁵ or 'to pay the same into her own proper hands to and for her own use and benefit,'⁶ or to pay an annuity 'into her proper hands for her own proper use and benefit,'⁷ have been held not to amount to a sufficient expression of an intention to exclude the marital rights of the husband; for although the money is to be paid into her own hands or to her own use, yet there is nothing in that inconsistent with its being subject to his marital rights.⁸ So an

¹ *Margetts v. Barringer*, 7 Sim. R. 482; *Simons v. Horwood*, 1 Keen, R. 7.

² *Simons v. Horwood*, 1 Keen, R. 7.

³ *Baker v. Newton*, 2 Beav. R. 112.

⁴ Post, § 1384.

⁵ *Kensington v. Dollond*, 2 Mylne & K. 184; *Wills v. Sayers*, 4 Madd. R. 409; *Roberts v. Spicer*, 5 Madd. R. 491; 2 *Roper on Legacies*, by White, ch. 21, § 5, pp. 371, 372.

⁶ *Tyler v. Lake*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 183.

⁷ *Blacklow v. Laws*, 2 Hare, R. 49.

⁸ This doctrine is maintained expressly in the authorities; but there are certainly antecedent dicta or opinions the other way. See *Lumb v. Milnes*, 5 Ves. 520; *Hartley v. Hurle*, 5 Ves. 545; *Adamson v. Armitage*, Cooper, Eq. R. 283; s. c. 19 Ves. 416; *Ex parte Ray*, 1 Madd. R. 199. But these opinions seem to have proceeded in a good measure upon a misunderstanding of

(*a*) See *Shonk v. Brown*, 61 Penn. St. 320.

annuity given in trust for a married woman for life 'to pay the same to her and her assigns,' will not exclude the marital rights of the husband.¹ (a)

1384. A distinction was formerly taken between the case of a gift or bequest to a married woman and the case of a gift or bequest to an unmarried woman generally, and not in the contemplation of an immediate marriage or as a provision for that event. For it was said that if a gift or bequest should be made to an unmarried woman to be at her own disposal or for her sole and separate use or independent of her husband, the title would vest absolutely in her as owner; and the property would not upon her subsequent marriage be held by her in any other manner than her other absolute property, but it would be subject to the marital rights of her husband.² (b) This distinction has however

the case of *Johnes v. Lockhart*, now correctly reported in 3 Bro. Ch. R. 383, Mr. Belt's note, where the doctrine of the text is explicitly supported. The case of *Brown v. Clark* (3 Ves. 166) shows how nicely language is sometimes interpreted to sustain the marital rights of the husband.

¹ *Dakins v. Berisford*, 1 Ch. Cas. 194. See also *Lumb v. Milnes*, 5 Ves. 517; *Stanton v. Hall*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 175.

² *Massey v. Parker*, 2 Mylne & K. 174; *Kensington v. Dollond*, 2 Mylne & K. 184; *Brown v. Pocock*, 2 Mylne & K. 189; *Newton v. Reid*, 4 Sim. R. 141; *Woodmeston v. Walker*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 197; *Benson v. Benson*, 6 Sim. R. 126; *Knight v. Knight*, 6 Sim. 121; *Jacobs v. Amyatt*, 1 Madd. R. 376, note; *Stiffe v. Everitt*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 37. This question has been much discussed in the English courts, and no small diversity of opinion has been expressed on it by the learned judges in equity. The doctrine stated in the text is supported by the cases above cited. But the Vice-Chancellor (Sir Lancelot Shadwell), in *Davies v. Thornycroft*, 6 Sim. R. 420, held that there was no difference whether the bequest or trust was for the separate use of a married woman or an unmarried woman; for in each case it would be a trust for her separate use, and good as such against a present or future husband. See also *Maber v. Hobbs*, 2 Younge & Coll. 317. The same doctrine was held by Sir John Leach in *Anderson v. Anderson*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 427. In *Bradley v. Hughes*, 8 Sim. R. 149, the Vice-Chancellor admitted that it was now settled that if property be given for the separate use of a woman during a particular coverture, she may after that coverture is gone alienate it, even though it is intended for her separate use. In *Scarborough v. Borman*, decided in November, 1838, 17 Law Jour. pp. 10 to 24, the Master of the

(a) A bequest to the wife's sole and separate use will not exclude the husband from taking under the Statute of Distributions, where there is no issue. *Cooney v. Woodburn*, 33 Md. 320. Nor will a devise to the same effect prevent the husband's taking by the curtesy. *Appleton v. Rowley*, L. R. 8 Eq. 139.

(b) See *Massy v. Rowen*, L. R. 4 H. L. 288. Compare *In re Tarsey*, L. R. 1 Eq. 561.

been since qualified if not entirely overruled, and the doctrine seems now well established that property may be secured to an unmarried woman or a married woman with a clause against anticipation; and in such a case it will be good against the marital rights of any future husband.¹ (a) And the same doctrine seems applicable to every case where property is given to the separate use of a woman, whether married or unmarried at the time, without any such clause; for in such a case, if no other agreement is made between the parties, the future husband upon his marriage is deemed to adopt the property in the state in which he finds it as her separate property, and he is bound in equity not to disturb it.² (b)

1385. Cases also may occur of a separate estate, and even of a separate liability of a wife, of a more enlarged nature. Thus by the custom of London a married woman may carry on trade within the city as a sole trader, and be liable as such.³ (c) And

Rolls (Lord Langdale) held that a gift to the sole and separate use of an unmarried woman was good against an after-taken husband. In the very recent case of *Nedby v. Nedby*, before the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cottenham) in January, 1839 (4 Mylne & Craig, 367), the point was directly made; but the Lord Chancellor refused to decide it on an interlocutory motion, at the same time admitting the authorities to be in conflict. In the subsequent cases of *Tullett v. Armstrong*, and *Scarborough v. Borman*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 377 to 407, the subject was most elaborately discussed, and all the authorities were reviewed by Lord Cottenham, and he held that a gift to the sole and separate use of a woman, married or unmarried, with a clause against anticipation, was good against an after-taken husband. And in *Newlands v. Paynter* (4 Mylne & Craig, 408), he held it to be equally good against such husband without any such clause against anticipation. See the *English Law Magazine* for May, 1842, pp. 285 to 301. See what is a proper clause against anticipation, *Barrymore v. Ellis*, 8 Simons, R. 1; *Brown v. Bamford*, before Sir L. Shadwell, V. Ch. in May, 1842.

¹ *Tullett v. Armstrong*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 377, 390; *Scarborough v. Borman*, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 379; *Baggott v. Meux*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 627.

² *Newlands v. Paynter*, 4 Mylne & Craig, R. 408, 417, 418. See the *English Law Magazine* for May, 1842, pp. 285 to 301. *Barrymore v. Ellis*, 8 Simons, R. 1; *Brown v. Bamford*, before Sir L. Shadwell, V. Chanc. in May, 1842; (d) *Ashton v. McDougall*, 5 Beav. R. 56.

³ Roper on *Husb. and Wife*, ch. 16, p. 125.

(a) In some States the trust, to be sustained, must be in contemplation of an immediate marriage. *Wells v. McCall*, 64 Penn. St. 207; *Ogden's Appeal*, 70 Penn. St. 501. See 2 *Perry, Trusts*, § 652, and note.

(b) See *Schafroth v. Ambs*, 46 Mo. 114.

(c) See *Wortman v. Price*, 47 Ill. 22.

(d) 11 Sim. 127; s. c. 12 Sim. 615; 1 Phill. 620.

the right to carry on trade on her sole account may, independently of any such custom, be established by an agreement between the husband and wife before or after marriage. When such an agreement is entered into before marriage, it stands upon a valuable consideration; and therefore if there is the interposition of trustees, it will be maintained against the husband and his creditors as well at law as in equity. In such a case the trustees of the wife will be entitled to the property assigned and to the increase and profits thereof, for her sole and separate use and benefit. The wife will even at law be considered as the mere agent of her trustees, and her possession as their possession. Even if no trustees are interposed, the property will in the like case be protected in equity against the claims of the husband and his creditors, and excepted out of the general rules which govern in cases of husband and wife.¹

1386. Where the agreement for a separate trade by the wife occurs after marriage and it is founded upon a valuable consideration, the like protection will be given at law if the property is vested in trustees; and the property and the income and profits thereof will be held secure for the wife against the husband and his creditors.² A fortiori the doctrine will be enforced in equity. But if it is a voluntary agreement, it will be good against the husband only, and not against his creditors.³ Care however must be taken in all these cases that the negotiations are not carried on in the name of the wife, as by taking notes or other securities in her name; for then they will at law be held to belong to the husband, although in equity it will be otherwise.⁴

1387. We here perceive that the law will give effect to such agreements only when those forms have been observed which will vest the property in parties capable of enforcing the proper rights of the wife in legal tribunals; as is the case where the property is vested in trustees for her sole use and benefit in order to enable her to carry on trade. But Courts of Equity will go further; and if there is any such agreement before mar-

¹ 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 18, § 4, pp. 165, 186; *Jarman v. Woolton*, 3 T. R. 618; *Haselinton v. Gill*, 3 T. R. 620, note.

² *Ibid.*, and 1 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 8, § 2, pp. 303 to 331.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 18, § 4, pp. 169, 170; *Barlow v. Bishop*, 1 East, R. 432.

riage resting in articles and without trustees, by which she is to be permitted to carry on business on her sole and separate account, or if without any such ante-nuptial agreement the husband should permit her after marriage to carry on business on her sole and separate account, all that she earns in trade will be deemed to be her separate property and disposable by her as such, subject however to the claims of third persons properly affecting it.¹ In the former case the earnings will, in equity, be supported for her separate use against her husband and his creditors; in the latter against him only, unless the permission after marriage arises from a valuable consideration.² So if a husband should desert his wife, and she should be enabled by the aid of her friends to carry on a separate trade (as that of a milliner), her earnings in such trade will be enforced in equity against the claims of her husband.³

1388. It remains to say a few words on the subject of the wife's power to dispose of her separate property, and of its liability for her contracts and debts. Wherever a trust is created or a power is reserved by a settlement to enable the wife after marriage to dispose of her separate property either real or personal, it may be executed by her in the very manner provided for, whether it be by deed or other writing, or by a will or appointment. (a) And Courts of Equity will in all cases enforce

¹ 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 18, § 4, pp. 171 to 176.

² 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 17, § 4, pp. 171, 172; *Gore v. Knight*, 2 Vern. 535; *Sir Paul Neal's Case*, cited in *Herbert v. Herbert*, Prec. Ch. 44; *Slanning v. Style*, 3 P. Will. 337; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (m).

³ *Cecil v. Juxon*, 1 Atk. 278; *Lamphir v. Creed*, 8 Ves. 599; s. c. better reported in 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 18, § 4, p. 173; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2 M. 11. Where the wife carries on trade under an agreement made before marriage and the property is vested in trustees, the husband would not be liable to the payment of the debts relative to such trade, even at law. But if no trustees intervened, and the agreement was after marriage, then the husband would be liable for the debts at law. At least he would be liable unless a credit was exclusively given to the wife in relation to the trade, or the trade had been carried on without his sanction or permission. If however he should be liable at law, a Court of Equity would relieve him, at least to the extent of making the funds in the trade applicable to the payment of the debts. See 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 18, § 4, pp. 174, 175.

(a) Or in any other way known to the law, in the absence of negative words in the instrument giving the power. *Green v. Sutton*, 50 Mo. 186. But see contra *McClintic v. Ochiltree*, 4 W. Va. 249. And see *Young v. Young*, 7 Cold. 461; *Dunn v. Dunn*, 1 S. Car. 350.

against heirs, devisees, and trustees, as well as against the husband and his representatives, the rights of the donee or appointee of the wife.¹ (a) But where no such settlement, trust, or power is created before marriage, but it rests in a mere agreement between the husband and wife, it was formerly a matter of doubt whether the wife could dispose of her separate real estate so as effectually to bind it, although it was admitted that she had a full power to dispose of her personal estate.

1389. The distinction and the reasons for it are very clearly stated by Lord Hardwicke. 'Agreements,' said he, 'for settling estates to the separate use of the wife on marriage are very frequent, relating both to real and personal estate. As to personal, undoubtedly where there is an agreement between husband and wife before marriage, that the wife shall have to her separate use either the whole or particular parts, she may dispose of it by an act in her life or will. She may do it by either, though nothing is said of the manner of disposing of it. But there is a much stronger ground in that case than there can be in the case of real estate, because that is to take effect during the life of the husband; for if the husband survives he is entitled to the whole, and none can come into a share with the husband on the Statute of Distributions. Then such an agreement binds and bars the husband, and consequently bars everybody. But it is very different as to real estate; for her real estate will descend to her heir at law, and that more or less beneficially; for the husband may be tenant by the curtesy if they have issue, otherwise not. But still it descends to her heir at law. Undoubtedly on her marriage a woman may take such a method that she may dispose of that real estate from going to her heir at law; that is, she may do it without a fine. But I doubt whether it can be done but by way of trust or of power over an use.'²

1390. But this doubt, however powerfully urged upon technical principles, has been overcome; and the doctrine is now firmly

¹ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (g); *Peacock v. Monk*, 2 Ves. 191; *Doe v. Staples*, 2 Term. Rep. 695; *Wright v. Englefield*, Ambl. R. 468; s. c. 2 Eden, R. 239; *Oke v. Heath*, 1 Ves. 135; *Marlborough v. Godolphin*, 2 Ves. 75; *Southby v. Stonehouse*, 2 Ves. 610, 612; *Pybus v. Smith*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 339; *Dowell v. Dew*, 1 Younge & Coll. New R. 345.

² *Peacock v. Monk*, 2 Ves. 191.

(a) See *Wood v. Wood*, L. R. 10 Eq. 220.

established by the highest authority, that in such a case Courts of Equity will compel the heir of the wife to make a conveyance to the party in whose favor she has made a disposition of the real estate; in other words he will be treated as a trustee of the donee or appointee of the wife.¹ So that it may now be laid down as a general rule that all ante-nuptial agreements for securing to a wife separate property will, unless the contrary is stipulated or implied, give her in equity the full power of disposing of the same, whether real or personal, by any suitable act or instrument in her lifetime, or by her last will, in the same manner and to the same extent as if she were a feme sole.² And in all cases where a power for this purpose is reserved to her by means of a trust which is created for the purpose, she may execute the power without joining her trustees, unless it is made necessary by the instrument of trust.³

¹ *Wright v. Cadogan*, 6 Bro. Parl. Cas. 156; s. c. *Ambler*, R. 468; 2 Eden, R. 239; *Doe v. Staple*, 2 Term Rep. 695; *Cannel v. Buckle*, 2 P. Will. 243; *Rippon v. Dawding*, *Ambler*, R. 565, and *Mr. Blunt's note*; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 2, § 6, note (q); *Bradish v. Gibbs*, 3 John. Ch. R. 539, 540, 551.

² *Ibid.*; *Roper ou Husb. and Wife*, ch. 19, § 1, pp. 177 to 198; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (q); *Hulme v. Tenant*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 20; *Wagstaff v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 520; *Parkes v. White*, 11 Ves. 220; *Grigby v. Cox*, 1 Ves. 517; *Cotter v. Laver*, 2 P. Will. 623; *Bradish v. Gibbs*, 3 John. Ch. R. 540 to 551.

³ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (q); *Grigby v. Cox*, 1 Ves. 517; *Essex v. Atkins*, 14 Ves. 547; *Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church*, 17 John. R. 548; s. c. 3 John. Ch. R. 86 to 114; 2 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 20, § 2, p. 215. This doctrine is necessary to be limited to cases where there is no restraint upon the wife by the instrument giving her the separate property, as to her power of disposing of it. What terms in the instrument will create either an express or virtual restraint upon her power of disposing of such separate property has been a matter often discussed, and upon the authorities there is some nicety of construction. See on this subject *Wagstaff v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 520; *Parkes v. White*, 11 Ves. 220; *Fettiplace v. Gorges*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 8; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 46; *Glyn v. Baster*, 1 *Younge & Jerv.* 329; *Acton v. White*, 1 *Sim. & Stu.* 429; *Lee v. Muggerridge*, 1 Ves. & B. 118; *Sturgis v. Corp.* 13 Ves. 190; *Mores v. Huish*, 5 Ves. 692; *Sockett v. Wray*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 483; *Sugden on Powers*, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 113 to 119 (3d edit.). See also the case of the *Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jaques*, 3 John. Ch. R. 86 to 114, where the authorities are elaborately examined by *Mr. Chancellor Kent*; and the same case on appeal, 17 John. R. 548. See also 2 *Roper on Husb. and Wife*, ch. 19, §§ 1, 2, pp. 177, 181; *Ibid.* ch. 20, § 1, pp. 199 to 206, *Ibid.* ch. 21, § 1, pp. 229 to 235. When a married woman has an absolute power to dispose of property she may execute it in any manner capable of transferring it. When she has a power only over it, she must dispose of it in the manner prescribed by the power. And this distinction is very important; for in many

1391. In regard to the power of the wife to dispose of her separate property where no trust is interposed, but it rests merely upon a post-nuptial agreement of the husband, there is a material distinction, whether it be personal estate or whether it be real estate. In the former case her power to dispose of it can affect her husband's rights only, and therefore his assent is conclusive upon him.¹ But it is very different in respect to her real estate; for here her own heirs are or may be deeply affected in their interests by descent. Now by the general principles of law a married woman is during her coverture disabled from entering into any contract respecting her real property, either to bind herself or to bind her heirs. And this disability can be overcome only by adopting the precise means allowed by law to dispose of her real estate; as in England by a fine, and in America by a solemn conveyance.² It is true that the husband by his own post-nuptial agreement with his wife may bind his own interest in her real estate and convert himself into a trustee for her. But he cannot trench upon the rights of her heir who is no party to such an agreement. And under such circumstances the latter will take her real estate by descent, unaffected by any of the trusts springing from the agreement.³ (a)

1392. The remarks which have been made apply to the case of the real estate of the wife already vested in her, as affected by her own ante-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement with her husband. But the question may arise as to her rights and power over real estate which is given by a third person to her during her coverture for her separate use, with a power to dispose of the same, where no trustees are interposed to protect the exercise

cases Courts of Equity will not interpose to aid the defective execution of powers in favor of volunteers, whatever it may do in favor of purchasers. See ante, §§ 169 to 178; 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 20, §§ 1, 2, pp. 199 to 220.

¹ *Wright v. Englefield*, Ambler, R. 468; *Dillon v. Grace*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 463; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (q); *Peacock v. Monk*, 2 Ves. 191; *Major v. Lansley*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 355.

² *Dillon v. Grace*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 456, 462 to 464; *Wright v. Cadogan*, 2 Eden, R. 257 to 259.

³ *Ibid.*; 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 19, § 1, pp. 179 to 181.

(a) The wife may by post-nuptial agreement acquire the right to will away her real estate as if sole. *Pride v. Bubb*, L. R. 7 Ch. 64.

of the power.¹ As to this the received doctrine seems to be, that if an estate is during coverture given to a married woman and her heirs for her separate use without more, she cannot in equity dispose of the fee from her heirs; but she must dispose of it, if at all, in the manner prescribed by law, as by a fine.² But if in such a case a clause is expressly superadded that she shall have power to dispose of the estate so given to her during her coverture, there Courts of Equity will treat such a power as enabling her effectually to dispose of the estate, notwithstanding no trustees are interposed.³ The reason of the distinction is, that the term 'for her separate use' is not supposed to indicate any intention to give her more than the sole use and power of disposal of the profits of the real estate during the life of her husband; and more expressive words are indispensable to demonstrate the more enlarged intention of conferring an absolute power to dispose of the whole fee. Unless such an absolute power to dispose of the whole fee is conferred on the wife, she takes the estate in fee subject to the ordinary disabilities resulting from her coverture. As her separate estate her husband cannot intermeddle with it; but her heir will take it by descent, as he would any other property vested in her in fee.⁴

1393. As to personal property and the income of real property, we have already seen that if they are given for the separate use of a married woman, she has in equity a full power to dispose of them at her pleasure.⁵ But qualifications may be attached to the gift which will control this absolute power; and on the other hand this absolute power may exist, notwithstanding words ac-

¹ There is no doubt that a gift of personal estate or of the rents and profits of real estate to a married woman for her separate use during her life would give her a complete power to dispose of the same. See 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 19, § 2, p. 182; *Hulme v. Tenant*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 16, 19 to 21; *Fettiplace v. Gorges*, 1 Ves. jr. 46; s. c. 3 Bro. Ch. R. 8, and Mr. Belt's note; *Peacock v. Monk*, 2 Ves. 191; *Roach v. Haynes*, 8 Ves. 589; *Parkes v. White*, 11 Ves. 220, 221; *Rich v. Cockell*, 9 Ves. 369, 375; *Wagstaff v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 520; *Brandon v. Robinson*, 18 Ves. 435, 436; ante, § 1391.

² 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 19, § 2, p. 182.

³ See 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 16, § 2, pp. 102 to 104; *Ibid.* ch. 19, § 2, p. 181; *Maundrell v. Maundrell*, 10 Ves. 254, 255; *Clancy on Marr. Women*, ch. 5, pp. 282, 287; *Peacock v. Monk*, 2 Ves. 190; *Downs v. Timperon*, 4 Russ. R. 334.

⁴ 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 19, § 2, p. 182.

⁵ Ante, §§ 1389, 1390, note; *Major v. Lansley*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 355.

company the gift which may seem *prima facie* intended to confer the power *sub modo* only. Thus for example if there be an express limitation to a married woman *for life* with a power to dispose of the same property by will, there her interest will be deemed a partial interest, and equivalent to a life estate only; and she cannot dispose of the property absolutely, except in the manner prescribed by the power.¹

1394. On the other hand if the property is expressly given to a married woman 'to her for her sole and separate use,' without saying *for life*, and she is further authorized to dispose of the same by will, in such a case the gift will be construed to confer on her the absolute property, and consequently she may dispose of it otherwise than by will; for the absolute property being given, the power becomes nugatory and is construed to be nothing more than an anxious expression of the donor that she may have an uncontrolled power of disposing of the property.² So if a

¹ Reid *v.* Shergold, 10 Ves. 370, 379; 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 20, §§ 1, 2, pp. 200 to 211.

² Elton *v.* Shephard, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 532, and Mr. Belt's note; 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 20, § 1, pp. 200, 201; Barford *v.* Street, 16 Ves. 135; Irwin *v.* Farrer, 19 Ves. 86; ante, § 974 *a.* Some very nice distinctions exist in the cases on this subject. Thus in Bradley *v.* Westcott, 13 Ves. 445, 451, where A bequeathed to his wife B all his personal estate for life, to be at her absolute disposal during that period, and after her death he gave such of his wife's jewels, &c., household furniture and plate which she should be possessed of at the time of her death, together with £500, to such persons as she should appoint by her will, and in default of such appointment the same to fall into the residuum of his personal estate, which he afterwards bequeathed to other persons, Sir William Grant held that the wife took an estate for life only in the whole, with a power of appointment. On that occasion he said: 'The distinction is perhaps slight which exists between a gift for life with a power of disposition superadded, and a gift to a person indefinitely with a superadded power to dispose by deed or will. But that distinction is perfectly established, that in the latter case the property vests. A gift to A and to such persons as he shall appoint is absolute property in A without any appointment. But if it is to him for life, and after his death to such person as he shall appoint by will, he must make an appointment in order to entitle that person to anything.' In Barford *v.* Street (16 Ves. 135), where there was a gift for life to A, with a power of appointment by deed or writing or will, and some special limitations, it was held that A had an estate for life, with an unqualified power of appointing the inheritance; and that comprehended everything. So that A was held to be entitled as absolute owner. The case of Irwin *v.* Farrer, 19 Ves. 86, is still stronger. See also the case of Smith *v.* Bell, 6 Peters, R. 68; Acton *v.* White, 1 Sim. & Stu. 429; Randall *v.* Russell, 3 Meriv. R. 190; Phillips *v.* Chamberlain, 4 Ves. 53, 54, 58; Hales *v.* Marge-

limitation be to a married woman for life for her sole and separate use, with a particular power of appointment of the property, and in default of any appointment the property is limited to her personal representatives, she will, or at least may, under such circumstances be deemed the absolute owner; and as such she will have an unqualified power to dispose of the property generally without any exercise of the power of appointment.¹

rum, 3 Ves. 299; *Heatley v. Thomas*, 15 Ves. 597; s. c. 2 Roper on *Husb. and Wife*, ch. 20, § 1, p. 204, and note; *Langham v. Nenny*, 3 Ves. 469, 470; *Lee v. Muggeridge*, 1 Ves. & B. 118, 123; *Pybus v. Smith*, 1 Ves. jr. 189; *Witts v. Dawkins*, 12 Ves. 501; *Browne v. Like*, 14 Ves. 302; 2 Roper on *Husb. and Wife*, ch. 20, §§ 1, 2, p. 199; *Sockett v. Wray*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 483, and Mr. Belt's note; ante, § 1073. Mr. Chancellor Kent has critically reviewed the authorities in his learned opinion in the case of the *Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jaques*, 3 John. Ch. R. 86 to 114.

¹ See 2 Roper on *Husb. and Wife*, ch. 20, § 1, p. 200, note (a); *Ibid.* pp. 211 to 213; *Anderson v. Dawson*, 15 Ves. 532, 536; *Richards v. Chambers*, 10 Ves. 584; *Sanders v. Franks*, 2 Madd. R. 147, 155; *Clancy on Marr. Women*, ch. 6, pp. 294 to 308; ante, § 974 a. See also *Proudley v. Fielder*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 57; *Barrymore v. Ellis*, 8 Sim. R. 1; *Owens v. Dickinson*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 45. The doctrine stated in the text, that where there is a bequest to a married woman for life for her sole and separate use, with a power of appointment, and in default of such appointment to her personal representatives, she may under such circumstances take the absolute interest, is fully supported by the language of Sir William Grant in *Anderson v. Dawson* (15 Ves. 533, 536), and is distinguished by him from the case where in default of the appointment the property is to go 'to her next of kin.' 'There is,' said he, 'a great difference between a limitation to the executors and administrators and a limitation to the next of kin. The former is as to personal property the same as a limitation to the right heirs as to real estate. But a limitation to the next of kin is like a limitation to heirs of a particular description; which would not give the ancestor having a particular estate the whole property in the land. Mr. Roper (2 Roper on *Husb. and Wife*, ch. 20, § 2, pp. 211 to 213) however thinks the doctrine ill-founded. His remarks are as follows: 'The reader's attention is requested to the circumstance that in the cases before stated upon the present subject, with the exception of *Sockett v. Wray*, the ultimate limitation of the property in default of the wife's appointment was not to herself, but to a stranger or to her next of kin. Because it has been intimated in some of those cases that although an express estate be given to the wife's separate use for life, with a power to dispose of the principal, yet if in default of appointment such principal be limited to her executors or administrators and not to her next of kin, the absolute interest in the fund will vest in her, and be disposable with her husband's concurrence, without resort to the particular power given her for the purpose. The principle of the distinction is this: that in the first case the wife is to be considered complete mistress or owner of the property, the effect of such limitation being compared to that of a limitation to her right heirs, which in the instance of real estates vests the absolute inheritance. But that in the second case the limitation to

1395. A married woman having this general power of disposing of her separate property, the question naturally arises, whether she may bestow it by appointment or otherwise upon her husband, or whether the legal disability attaches to such a transaction. Upon this subject the doctrine is now firmly established in equity, that she may bestow her separate property by appointment or otherwise upon her husband as well as upon a stranger. But

the wife's next of kin, being the same in effect as that to particular heirs, which if the subject were lands would not pass the fee to a donee or devisee, will not therefore vest the absolute interest in personal estate in the wife; and consequently that in order to dispose of the capital the wife must have resort to her special power. It is however submitted that this analogy between real and personal estates is not applicable to the subject now under consideration. But that when the limitation in default of appointment is to the wife's executors or administrators, it will be required that she should execute her power in order to dispose of the fund during her marriage. The reasons are these: admitting the limitation to impart to the wife the absolute interest in the fund, yet she being a married woman the effect of such a limitation to her is quite different from a similar one to a man or to a single woman. For in the instance of such a limitation to a married woman who is under a legal incapacity to dispose of property during coverture, there is no repugnancy nor inconsistency between a limitation to her of the absolute interest and a particular power of disposition over it during the marriage; as appears in a former part of this work relating to powers, and also under the title *Curtsey*, where it is shown that an equitable interest for the wife's separate use for life in real estate and the ultimate limitation to her of the fee simple do not unite in such a manner as to merge the particular estate and extinguish the special limitation to her separate use for life. The analogy therefore mentioned in the commencement of these observations is inapplicable to limitations to married women; and it does not authorize the conclusion that when the wife has an estate to her separate use for life in personal property, with a power of appointment, and the absolute interest is limited to her, if she do not execute the power she has, in analogy to similar limitations of real estates at law, such an absolute estate as of necessity enables her to dispose of the property without regard to her special authority to do so. This necessity therefore not existing, and when the settler's intention in giving such a power is considered, as also the anxiety of a Court of Equity to protect the wife's property against improvident dispositions of it from restraint, &c., during the marriage, it seems but reasonable that when an express estate for life in personality is limited to her for her separate use, with a power of appointment, and in default of its execution to her, her executors or administrators, the same appointment should be considered necessary, as has been decided to be so when the ultimate limitation in default of appointment is to her next of kin.' There are also some nice distinctions in *Richards v. Chambers*, 10 Ves. 584; *Ellis v. Atkinson*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 565, and Mr. Belt's note, which, unless they proceed upon the peculiar ground that there was a contingent interest by survivorship in the wife, would seem to favor Mr. Roper's opinion. See also *Field v. Sowle*, 4 Russ. R. 112; *Clancy on Married Women*, ch. 6, pp. 294 to 308.

at the same time Courts of Equity examine every such transaction between husband and wife with an anxious watchfulness and caution and dread of undue influence; and if they are required to give sanction or effect to it, they will examine the wife in court and adopt other precautions to ascertain her unbiassed will and wishes.¹

1396. Courts of Equity will not only sanction such a disposition of the wife's separate property in favor of her husband when already made, but they will also in proper cases, upon her application and consent given in court, decree such property to be passed to her husband, whether it be in possession or reversion, in such manner as she shall prescribe.² In the same way her separate estate may be charged with and made liable for his debts.³ But Courts of Equity have no authority, even with the consent of the wife, to transfer to the husband any property secured to her sole and separate use for life where no power of disposition is reserved to her over the property or beyond the power reserved to her.⁴ And therefore if the husband should receive such property, he will ordinarily be compelled to account therefor. The same rule will apply where the husband has by a settlement contracted to allow a specific annual sum (not money) for her sole and separate use, as for example £100 or £1,000 a year; for in such cases if he does not pay it, he will be held liable for the arrears.⁵

¹ 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 20, § 2, pp. 216, 217, 222 to 224; Pybus v. Smith, 1 Ves. jr. 189, 194; Parkes v. White, 11 Ves. 209, 222, &c.; and Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jaques, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 86 to 114; Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 523, where the authorities are elaborately examined. See also Milnes v. Busk, 2 Ves. jr. 498, 500; Pickard v. Roberts, 3 Madd. R. 386; Essex v. Atkins, 14 Ves. 542.

² See 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 20, § 2, pp. 224 to 226; Pickard v. Roberts, 3 Madd. R. 386; Sturgis v. Corp, 13 Ves. 190; Headen v. Rosher, 1 McClel. & Younge, 89; Allen v. Papworth, 1 Ves. 163; s. c. Belt's Supplement, 88; Sperling v. Rochfort, 8 Ves. 164, 175; Clark v. Pistor, cited 3 Bro. Ch. R. 346, note; Id. 567; Chesslyn v. Smith, 8 Ves. 183.

³ Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 144; Field v. Sowle, 4 Russ. R. 112.

⁴ Richards v. Chambers, 10 Ves. 580. There is a distinction between reversionary property given for the separate use of the wife and reversionary property which is given for her use generally. The former she may dispose of to her husband, but not the latter. Post, § 1413. See Sturgis v. Corp, 13 Ves. 190, and Pickard v. Roberts, 3 Madd. R. 386; 1 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 6, § 2, pp. 246 to 248; 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 19, § 2, p. 184.

⁵ Howard v. Digby, 8 Bligh, R. 224, 257, 258.

Where indeed the husband with the consent of his wife is in the habit of receiving the income, profits, and dividends of her separate estate, Courts of Equity regard the transaction as showing her voluntary choice thus to dispose of it for the use and benefit of the family; and they will not ordinarily require him to account therefor beyond the income, profits, and dividends received during the then last year,¹ any more than they will to account for arrears of the wife's pin-money beyond the year.² But a distinction would probably be taken between the year's arrears of pin-money and the year's arrears of the wife's other separate personal estate, so that her personal representatives might claim the latter but not the former.³

1397. In the next place let us examine how far the separate property of the married woman is liable for any contracts, debts, or other charges created by her during her coverture. At law she is during the coverture generally incapable of entering into any valid contract to bind either her person or her estate.⁴ In equity also it is now clearly established that she cannot by contract bind her person or her property generally. The only remedy allowed will be against her separate property.⁵ (a) The reason of this

¹ *Square v. Dean*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 326; *Powell v. Hankey*, 2 P. Will. 82, 83; *Thomas v. Bennett*, 2 P. Will. 341; *Fowler v. Fowler*, 3 P. Will. 353; *Smith v. Camelford*, 2 Ves. jr. 698; *Brodie v. Barry*, 2 Ves. & B. 36; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n); *Parkes v. White*, 11 Ves. 225; *Townshend v. Windham*, 2 Ves. 7; *Milnes v. Busk*, 2 Ves. jr. 488; 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 20, § 2, pp. 220 to 222; *Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jacques*, 3 John. Ch. R. 90 to 92; *Howard v. Digby*, 8 Bligh, R. N. s. 224; s. c. 4 Sim. R. 588; 5 Sim. R. 330; post, § 1495, note 1.

² *Howard v. Digby*, 8 Bligh, R. N. s. 224; reversing the decision of the Vice-Chancellor (Sir L. Shadwell) in the same case, 4 Sim. R. 588; s. c. 5 Sim. R. 330; post, § 1495, note 1; ante, § 1375 a.

³ *Howard v. Digby*, 8 Bligh, R. N. s. 224, 257, 258.

⁴ *Marshall v. Rutton*, 8 Term Rep. 545; 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 21, § 2, pp. 235, 236.

⁵ See Mr. Belt's note (3) to *Hulme v. Tenant*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 20; *Sockett v. Wray*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 485; *Nantes v. Corrook*, 9 Ves. 189; *Jones v. Harris*, 9 Ves. 496, 497; *Stewart v. Lord Kirkwall*, 3 Madd. 387; *Gardner v. Gardner*, 22 Wend. R. 526; *Owens v. Dickenson*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 48; *Francis v. Wigzell*, 1 Madd. R. 258. In this last case the principal authorities are collected and commented on by Sir Thomas Plumer, and the doctrine in the text maintained. In *Aylett v. Ashton*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 105, 111, the Master of the Rolls (now Lord Cottenham) said: 'The doctrine as to how far the court will execute a contract entered into by a feme covert as to her separate estate was very fully discussed,

(a) See *Davis v. Smith*, 75 Mo. 219.

distinction between her separate property and her other property is that as to the former she is treated as a feme sole having the general power of disposing of it; but as to the latter all the legal disabilities of a feme covert attach upon her.¹

and all the cases were cited by Sir Thomas Plumer in the case of *Francis v. Wigzell* (1 Madd. 258). It was there decided, and clearly in conformity with all previous decisions, that the court has no power against a feme covert in personam, but that if she has separate property the court has control over that separate property. In all cases however the court must proceed in rem against the property. A feme covert is not competent to enter into contracts so as to give a personal remedy against her. Although she may become entitled to property for her separate use, she is no more capable of contracting than before. A personal contract would be within the incapacity under which a feme covert labors. Sir T. Plumer says: "There is no case in which this court has made a personal decree against a feme covert. She may pledge her separate property, and make it answerable for her engagements; but where her trustees are not made parties to a bill, and no particular fund is sought to be charged, but only a personal decree against her, the bill cannot be sustained." Sir T. Plumer there refers to *Hulme v. Tenant* (1 Bro. C. C. 16) before Lord Thurlow, and to *Nantes v. Corrock* (9 Ves. 182), where Lord Eldon, following the case before Lord Thurlow, lays down the rule in precisely the same terms. The present bill does not seek to affect the separate property except through Mrs. Ashton personally. If it had sought to affect the property upon the ground that the contract had given the plaintiff a right against the property, the suit would have been brought against the trustees; for there must be some trustees of that part of the property which is settled to Mrs. Ashton's separate use, although their names do not appear. Although a feme covert has power, and the court has jurisdiction, over the rents and profits of her separate property, no case has given effect to her contracts against the corpus of her separate estate.' See also *Milnes v. Busk*, 2 Ves. jr. 498, 499, where Lord Rosslyn comments upon the then prevailing doctrines at law, and doubts them.

¹ See *Stuart v. Lord Kirkwall*, 3 Madd. R. 387; *Gardner v. Gardner*, 22 Wend. R. 526; *Owens v. Dickinson*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 48. In this last case Lord Cottenham said: 'This married woman, as it appears by the settlement, had a separate estate, subject to her appointment by will or deed, or other instrument in writing attested by one witness. Having by her mark put her signature to the document which recognized the £210 as a debt, which in certain circumstances she was to be liable to pay to the plaintiff, she makes her will, and by her will charges all her debts upon property which she had power to dispose of. Now that document alone within the authority of cases which have been decided would have been operative upon her separate estate, but not by way of the execution of a power, although that has been an expression sometimes used, and as I apprehend very inaccurately used, in cases where the court has enforced the contracts of married women against their separate estate. It cannot be an execution of the power, because it neither refers to the power nor to the subject-matter of the power; nor indeed in many of the cases has there been any power existing at all. Besides, as it was argued in the case of *Murray v. Barlee*, if a married woman enters into several agreements of this sort, and all the parties come to have satisfaction out of her

1398. The doctrines maintained by Courts of Equity as to the nature and extent of the liability of the separate estate of a married woman for her debts and other charges created during her coverture are somewhat artificial in their texture, and therefore require to be carefully distinguished from each other, as they cannot all be resolved into the general proposition that she is as to such property to be deemed a feme sole. In the first place her separate property is not in equity liable for the payment of her general debts or of her general personal engagements. (a)

separate estate, they are paid *pari passu*; whereas if the instruments took effect as appointments under a power, they would rank according to the priorities of their dates. It is quite clear therefore that there is nothing in such a transaction which has any resemblance to the execution of a power. What it is, it is not easy to define. It has sometimes been treated as a disposing of the particular estate; but the contract is silent as to the separate estate, for a promissory note is merely a contract to pay, not saying out of what it is to be paid or by what means it is to be paid; and it is not correct according to legal principles to say that a contract to pay is to be construed into a contract to pay out of a particular property so as to constitute a lien on that property. Equity lays hold of the separate property, but not by virtue of anything expressed in the contract; and it is not very consistent with correct principles to add to the contract that which the party has not thought fit to introduce into it. The view taken of the matter by Lord Thurlow, in *Hulme v. Tenant*, is more correct. According to that view the separate property of a married woman being a creature of equity, it follows that if she has a power to deal with it she has the other power incident to property in general; namely, the power of contracting debts to be paid out of it; and inasmuch as her creditors have not the means at law of compelling payment of those debts, a Court of Equity takes upon itself to give effect to them, not as personal liabilities, but by laying hold of the separate property as the only means by which they can be satisfied. Now these considerations are important, because it was part of the argument that a married woman, although she can enter into a species of contract, and bind herself by a promissory note (for that was the case put), yet that she cannot be considered as having creditors; and therefore when she makes her will, and directs that her debts are to be paid, that part of the will cannot be carried into effect. But all the cases suppose she can have creditors. The holder of her promissory note has her contract, which equity considers her capable of entering into; and it would be a very strong proposition to say that when she has by an instrument under her hand acknowledged her debt and promised to pay it, she is not to be considered as creating an obligation which binds her. There is however no ground for supporting such a proposition, and it would be interfering very much with the rights which this court considers are attached to the property of a married woman to put such a construction on her contract.' Post, § 1401.

(a) But her separate estate is held liable in equity for her debts contracted before marriage, where her husband has become bankrupt. Chubb

v. Stretch, L. R. 9 Eq. 555. Contra, *Vanderheyden v. Mallory*, 1 Const. 452.

So far Courts of Equity follow the analogies of the common law. If therefore a married woman should during her coverture contract debts generally without doing any act indicating an intention to charge her separate estate with the payment of them, Courts of Equity will not entertain any jurisdiction to enforce payment thereof out of such separate estate during her life.¹ (a)

1399. But in the second place her separate estate will in equity be held liable for all the debts, charges, incumbrances, and other engagements which she does expressly or by implication charge thereon; for, having the absolute power of disposing of the whole, she may a fortiori dispose of a part thereof.² Her agreement however creating the charge is not (it has been said), properly speaking, an obligatory contract, for as a feme covert she is incapable of contracting, but is rather an appointment out of her separate estate. The power of appointment is incident to the power of enjoyment of her separate property, and every security thereon executed by her is to be deemed an appointment pro tanto of the separate estate.³

¹ 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 21, § 2, pp. 235 to 238; *Id.* 241, and note; *Duke of Bolton v. Williams*, 2 Ves. 138, 150, 156; s. c. 4 Bro. Ch. R. 297; *Jones v. Harris*, 9 Ves. 498; *Stewart v. Kirkwall*, 3 Madd. R. 387; *Greatley v. Noble*, 3 Madd. R. 94; *Aguilar v. Aguilar*, 5 Madd. R. 418. The qualification 'during her life' is important; for it has been said that after her death such general creditors will be entitled to satisfaction out of her assets. But then, though they may be creditors by bond, they will not be entitled to any preference, but must come in *pari passu* with her simple contract creditors. 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 21, § 3, pp. 238, 245, note, citing *Anon.* 18 Ves. 258; *Gregory v. Lockyer*, 6 Madd. R. 90. The circumstances of these cases however do not appear; and the wife may have charged her separate estate (for aught that appears) with the payment of all her debts. But in *Norton v. Turvill* (2 P. Will. 144) it was held that all the separate estate of a married woman was after her death a trust for the payment of her debts; and upon that ground a bond debt contracted by her generally after marriage was enforced against it. See *Court v. Jeffery*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 105, and Mr. Roper's note, *supra*.

² *Hulme v. Tenant*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 16, 20; s. c. 2 Dick. 560; *Brown v. Like*, 14 Ves. 302; 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 21, § 3, pp. 240, 241, 247, 248; *Peacock v. Monk*, 2 Ves. 190; *Grigby v. Cox*, 1 Ves. 517; *Greatley v. Noble*, 3 Madd. R. 94.

³ *Stuart v. Lord Kirkwall*, 3 Madd. 387; *Greatley v. Noble*, 3 Madd. R. 94; *Field v. Sowle*, 4 Russ. R. 112. The language of the last case may be presumed to apply to the express power of appointment therein given. But the language of the other cases seems intentionally general. See also *Aguilar*

(a) *Vanderheyden v. Mallory*, 1 Const. 452.

1399 *a*. Upon the ground of interest as well as power, where freeholds are conveyed by release to trustees, to the use of a feme covert, for her separate use for life, or to the use of such person as she should by writing sealed, &c., appoint, and in default of such appointment in trust to pay the rents to her for her separate use, and the husband and wife by writing not under seal for valuable consideration undertook to execute a mortgage of the property when required, and her husband died before any mortgage was executed, it was held that the agreement was binding upon the surviving wife.¹ (*a*)

1400. The great difficulty however is to ascertain what circumstances in the absence of any positive expression of an intention to charge her separate estate shall be deemed sufficient to create such a charge, and what sufficient to demonstrate an intention to create only a general debt. It is agreed that there must be an intention to charge her separate estate, otherwise the debt will not affect it. (*b*) The fact that the debt has been contracted during the coverture either as a principal or as a

v. Aguilar, 5 Madd. 418. But see *Owens v. Dickenson*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 48, 52 to 54.

¹ *Stead v. Nelson*, 2 Beav. R. 245, 248. On this occasion Lord Langdale said: 'This estate was vested in Mrs. Waterworth for her life for her separate use. Now supposing a legal estate to have been vested in her, a Court of Law would take no notice of the words "for her separate use," but in this court those words would give her, during coverture, the same right over the estate as she would have had if she had been a feme sole. Having that right, she enters into a contract whereby, in consideration of a sum of £120, she agrees to execute a mortgage of this estate. That which was vested in her, and over which her power extended, was her life estate. It is true that her life might be prolonged beyond the life of her husband; if so, the consequence would be that she would then have, both in equity as well as at law, an absolute power of disposition over that life estate, and I cannot say that I think that the analogy of a reversionary interest in a chose in action in any way applies to this case. It appears to me that she had a power to enter into this agreement which must be specifically performed with costs, and it must be declared that the plaintiff's mortgage is entitled to priority over that of Mr. Tolson.'

(*a*) But compare *Harris v. Mott*, 14 Beav. 169; s. c. 7 Eng. L. & E. 245. Further see *Pemberton v. Johnson*, 46 Mo. 342; *Carpenter v. Mitchell*, 50 Ill. 470; *Pollen v. James*, 45 Miss. 129; *Ross v. Armstrong*, 5 C. E. Green, 109; *Fiske v. McIntosh*, 101 Mass. 66.

(*b*) Where the consideration of an undertaking entered into by a married woman goes to the benefit of her separate estate, equity will decree that her debt created thereby shall be paid from such estate to the extent to which her power of disposal may go. *Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Abbott*, 127 Mass. 558; *Willard v. Eastham*, 15 Gray, 328; *Heburn v. Warner*, 112 Mass. 271.

surety for herself, or for her husband, or jointly with him, seems ordinarily to be held *prima facie* evidence to charge her separate estate without any proof of a positive agreement or intention so to do.¹ (a) It has been remarked that this rule of holding that a general security executed by a married woman, purporting only to create a personal demand and not referring to her separate property, shall be intended as *prima facie* an appointment or charge upon her separate property, is a strong case of constructive implication by Courts of Equity founded more upon a desire to do justice than upon any satisfactory reasoning. The main argument in favor of it seems to be, that the security must be supposed to have been executed with the intention that it

¹ *Hulme v. Tenant*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 16; s. c. 2 Dick. 560; *Heatley v. Thomas*, 15 Ves. 596; *Bullpin v. Clarke*, 17 Tes. 365; *Stuart v. Lord Kirkwall*, 3 Madd. R. 387. See *Gardner v. Gardner*, 22 Wend. 526; *Owens v. Dickenson*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 48, 52 to 54; ante, § 1397, note; *Crosby v. Church*, 3 Beav. R. 489. In this last case Lord Langdale said: 'If a married woman could not dispose of her separate estate without making a direct reference to it, or without showing an express intention to charge it, there would be an end of the question; but I apprehend there are many ways in which a married woman may render her separate property liable to a charge, without having in the transaction made any direct charge on, or made any reference to, the property settled to her separate use.' In *Tullett v. Armstrong* (4 Beav. R. 319, 323) the same learned judge used language still more comprehensive: 'It is perfectly clear that when a woman has property settled to her separate use she may bind that property without distinctly stating that she intends to do so. She may enter into a bond, bill, promissory note, or other obligation, which, considering her state as married woman, could only be satisfied by means of her separate estate; and therefore the inference is conclusive that there was an intention, and a clear one, on her part, that her separate estate, which would be the only means of satisfying the obligation into which she entered, should be bound. Again I apprehend it to be clear that where a married woman having separate estate, but not knowing perfectly the nature of her interest, executes an instrument by which she plainly shows an intention to bind the interest which belongs to her, then, though she may make a mistake as to the extent of the estate vested in her, the law will say that such estate as she may have shall be bound by her own act. But in a case where she enters into no bond, contract, covenant, or obligation, and in no way contracts to do any act on her part, where the instrument which she executes does not purport to bind or to pass anything whatever that belongs to her, and where it must consequently be left to mere inference whether she intended to affect her estate in any manner or way whatever, the case is entirely different either from the case where she executes a bond, promissory note, or other instrument, or where she enters into a covenant or obligation by which she, being a married woman, can be considered as binding her separate estate.'

(a) *Williams v. Urmston*, 35 Ohio St. 296.

shall operate in some way, and that it can have no operation except as against her separate estate. If this reasoning be correct, it will equally apply to all her general pecuniary engagements; for she has no other means of satisfying them except out of her separate estate.¹ To this extent the doctrine has not as yet been established, although the tendency of the more recent decisions is certainly in that direction. Indeed it does seem difficult to make any sound or satisfactory distinction on the subject as to any particular class of debts, since the natural implication is, that if a married woman contracts a debt she means to pay it; and if she means to pay it, and she has a separate estate, that seems to be the natural fund which both parties contemplate as furnishing the means of payment.²

¹ 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 21, § 3, pp. 243, 244, note.

² This subject was a good deal discussed in *Murray v. Barlee*, 4 Sim. R. 82, by the Vice-Chancellor, and on appeal of that case, by Lord Chancellor Brougham, in 3 Mylne & Keen, 209, in which he affirmed the Vice-Chancellor's decision, and acted upon the ground stated in the text. On that occasion his Lordship said: 'That at law a feme covert cannot in any way be sued even for necessaries is certain. Bind herself or her husband by specialty she cannot; and although living with him and not allowed necessaries, or apart from him, whether on an insufficient allowance or an unpaid allowance, she may so far bind him that those who furnish her with articles of subsistence may sue him, yet even in respect of these she herself is free from all suit. This is her position of disability or immunity at law; and this is now clearly settled. Her separate existence is not contemplated; it is merged by the coverture in that of her husband; and she is not more recognized than is the cestui que trust or the mortgagor, the legal estate, which is the only interest the law recognizes, being in others. But though this is now settled law, we know that it was not always so; or at least that an exception was admitted to what all men allow to be the general rule. When *Corbett v. Poelnitz* was decided, Lord Mansfield said that as times alter, new customs and manners arise; and he held, with the concurrence of all his learned brothers, that where the wife has a separate maintenance, and lives apart from her husband, receiving credit upon the possession of that estate, she ought to be bound; and the action was accordingly held to lie. That this great and accomplished judge imported his views on the subject from those Courts of Equity which he had once adorned as an advocate, I have no doubt; but it is certain that the decision never received the assent of Westminster Hall. That those who pronounced it very strongly adhered to it there can be no question. Mr. Justice Buller, sitting in this court a few years after, recites it among other clear points, and plainly refers to it more emphatically than to the rest in these words: "All these things have been determined, and I know no reason why these decisions should not be as religiously and as sacredly observed as any judgment, in any time, by any set of men. I believe they are founded in good sense and are adapted to the transactions, the understanding, the welfare of mankind." *Compton v. Collinson*. He adds that the reasons on which these decisions were founded

1401. In the earlier cases indeed the doctrine was put upon the intelligible ground that a married woman is, as to her sepa-

were so satisfactory both to the parties interested and to the profession that no writ of error had ever been brought. It happened however that this was a very groundless panegyric. The profession were always much divided upon the point, and latterly the general opinion was against it. A case for the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas was directed by Mr. J. Buller in *Compton v. Collinson*; and though the certificate of the judges, when that case came to be argued, was in conformity with the law as then laid down by Lord Mansfield, yet Lord Loughborough in delivering the judgment of the court observed, after an elaborate review of the cases, that it could not be considered as a settled point that an action might be maintained against a married woman separated from her husband by consent, and enjoying a separate maintenance. A few years afterwards that judgment which had been pronounced to be as worthy of religious and sacred observance as any judgment ever delivered was overruled on the fullest consideration, and after two arguments, by the unanimous determination of all the judges. *Marshall v. Rutton*. The doors of the Courts of Common Law were thus shut against an admission of the equitable principle, and the law was fixed that in those courts the wife could in no way be sued by reason of her having separate property and living apart from her husband. But in equity the case is wholly different. Her separate existence, both as regards her liabilities and her rights, are here abundantly acknowledged; not indeed that her person can be made liable, but her property may, and it may be reached through a suit instituted against herself and her trustees. It may be added that the current of decisions has generally run in favor of such recognition. The principle has been supposed to be carried further in *Hulme v. Tenant* than it had ever been before, because there a bond, in which the husband and wife joined, and which indeed so far as the obligation of the wife was concerned was absolutely void at law, was allowed to charge the wife's estate, vested in trustees to her separate use, though such estate could be only reached by implication, and though till then the better opinion seemed to be that the wife could only bind her separate estate by a direct charge upon it. Lord Eldon repeatedly expressed his doubts as to this case; but it has been constantly acted upon by other judges, and never in decision departed from by himself. It is enough to mention *Heatley v. Thomas* and *Bullpin v. Clarke*, both before Sir William Grant, who in the latter case held the wife's separate estate to be charged by a promissory note for money lent to her; which at law could never have charged the husband in any way, directly or indirectly. The same was held as to a bill of exchange, accepted by a feme covert in *Stuart v. Lord Kirkwall*, and an agreement by the wife as to her separate estate, in *Master v. Fuller*. In all these cases I take the foundation of the doctrine to be this: the wife has a separate estate subject to her own control, and exempt from all other interference or authority. If she cannot affect it no one can; and the very object of the settlement which vests it in her exclusively is to enable her to deal with it as if she were discovert. The power to affect it being unquestionable, the only doubt that can arise is whether or not she has validly incumbered it. At first the court seems to have supposed that nothing could touch it but some real charge, as a mortgage, or an instrument amounting to an execution of a power where that view was supported by the nature of the settlement. But afterwards her intention was more

rate property, to be deemed a feme sole; and therefore that her general engagements, although they would not bind her person,

regarded, and the court only required to be satisfied that she intended to deal with her separate property. When she appeared to have done so, the court held her to have charged it, and made the trustees answer the demand thus created against it. A good deal of the nicety that attends the doctrine of powers thus came to be imported into this consideration of the subject. If the wife did any act directly charging the separate estate, no doubt could exist; just as an instrument expressing to be in execution of a power was always of course considered as made in execution of it. But so if by any reference to the estate it could be gathered that such was her intent, the same conclusion followed. Thus if she only executed a bond, or made a note, or accepted a bill, because those acts would have been nugatory if done by a feme covert without any reference to her separate estate, it was held, in the cases I have above cited, that she must be intended to have designed a charge on that estate, since in no other way could the instruments thus made by her have any validity or operation; in the same manner as an instrument which can mean nothing if it means not to execute a power, has been held to be made in execution of that power, although no direct reference is made to the power. Such is the principle, and it goes the full length of the present case. But doubts have been in one or two instances expressed as to the effect of any dealing whereby a general engagement only is raised, that is, where she becomes indebted without executing any written instrument at all. This point was discussed in *Greatley v. Noble*; and the present Master of the Rolls appears, in the subsequent case of *Stuart v. Lord Kirkwall*, to have been of opinion that the wife's separate estate was not liable without a charge, and to have supposed that he had before stated that opinion in *Greatley v. Noble*, although he by no means expressed himself so strongly in disposing of that case, and distinctly abstained from deciding the point. I own I can conceive no reason for drawing any such distinction. If in respect of her separate estate the wife is in equity taken as a feme sole, and can charge it by instruments absolutely void at law, can there be any reason for holding that her liability, or more properly her power of affecting the separate estate, shall only be exercised by a written instrument? Are we entitled to invent a rule, to add a new chapter to the Statute of Frauds, and to require writing where that act requires none? Is there any equity reaching written dealings with the property which extends not also to dealing in other ways; as by sale and delivery of goods? Shall necessary supplies for her maintenance not touch the estate, and yet money furnished to squander away at play be a charge on it if fortified by a scrap of writing? No such distinction can be taken upon any conceivable principle. But one of the earlier cases, *Kenge v. Delavall*, makes no mention of such a distinction, for there, being indebted generally is all that is stated as grounding the claim; and in *Lilia v. Airey*, the party who had furnished necessary supplies to the wife was held entitled to recover to the extent of her separate maintenance. She had, it is true, given a bond, but only for £60; the court however held the creditor entitled to a larger sum, the separate maintenance exceeding the amount of the bond. But the present is by no means a case of mere general charge. If it were, I have no doubt that the claim would well lie; but there are written promises. I hold a retainer in writing to imply a promise to pay, whatever shall be reasonably and lawfully

should bind her separate property.¹ This however (as we have seen) is not the modern doctrine; for by that it seems to turn upon the intention of the married woman to create a charge on her separate estate, either as an appointment or as a disposition of it by a contract in the nature of an appointment.² (a) The

demanded by the solicitor or attorney acting under that retainer. So if there be no formal retainer, but only a written acknowledgment or adoption of the professional conduct, or instructions in writing to proceed further, the party who gives such written instructions in effect promises to pay whatever may lawfully become due to one acting in obedience to them; that is, to pay the costs which shall be taxed. The present case is in almost the whole if not the whole of it covered by such written authority, although such written authority was not necessary to bind Mrs. Barlee's separate estate. I am of opinion therefore that the decree of his Honor ordering the solicitor's bill to be taxed is well founded. Nothing could more effectually defeat the very purpose of such settlements than denying power to the wife thus to charge her estate. She is meant to be protected by the separate provisions from all oppression and circumvention, and to be made independent of her husband as well as of all others. If she cannot obtain professional aid, and that with the facility which other parties find in obtaining it, she is not on equal terms with them. If the husband or the trustees can hold her at arm's length, and refuse her the proceeds of the fund held by them for her use, and if they can by a verbal retainer engage a solicitor while she can only obtain such help by executing a mortgage or by granting bonds or notes, she is not on the same footing with them. I hold therefore that so far from a solicitor's or attorney's bill being less entitled to favor in Courts of Equity when sued upon, as against the separate estate of a married woman, the argument is all the other way.' See also the learned note of Mr. Roper, in his *Treatise on Husband and Wife* (ch. 21, § 3, pp. 241 to 247), which contains a very elaborate review of the leading authorities, and in a great measure exhausts the subject. From that note the materials in the text have been partly drawn. See also Clancy on Married Women, ch. 9, pp. 331 to 346. In *Vandergucht v. De Blaquiére* (8 Sim. R. 315), the Vice-Chancellor held that where a married woman divorced from her husband, and entitled to alimony under a decree of the Ecclesiastical Court, accepted a bill of exchange for articles of dress supplied to her by the drawer of the bill, and made it payable at her banker's, to whom the alimony was paid, she did not thereby charge her alimony.

¹ *Hulme v. Tenant*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 16, and Mr. Belt's note; *Peacock v. Monk*, 2 Ves. 193; *Norton v. Turvill*, 2 P. Will. 144; *Lilia v. Airey*, 1 Ves. jr. 277, 278; Mansfield, C. J. in *Nurse v. Craig*, 5 Bos. & Pull. 162, 163; *Angell v. Hadden*, 2 Meriv. R. 163.

² Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 21, § 3, p. 243, note: *Sperling v. Rochfort*, 8 Ves. 175 to 178; *Jones v. Harris*, 9 Ves. 497, 498; *Whistler v. Newman*, 4

(a) Something more is required than the mere existence of such facts as would create a debt against a single woman. *Johnson v. Gallagher*, 7 Jur. n. s. 273; s. c. 3 DeG. F. & J. 494; *Oakley v. Pound*, 1 McCart. 178. See further *Butler v. Cumpston*, L. R. 7 Eq. 16; *Matthewman's Case*, L. R. 3 Eq. 781; *Rogers v. Ward*, 8 Allen, 387; *White v. McNett*, 33 N. Y. 371.

difficulty then is to distinguish upon any clear reasoning what ground of general presumption exists to infer an intention not expressed, to charge any particular debt upon her separate estate which would not ordinarily apply to all her general debts. If she gives a promissory note, or an acceptance, or a bond, to pay her own debt, (*a*) or if she joins in a bond with her husband to pay his debts, the decisions have gone the length of charging it on her separate estate, either as a contract or as an appointment, without any distinct circumstance establishing her intention.¹ (*b*) Where indeed she lives apart from her husband and has a separate estate and maintenance secured to her, there may be good ground to hold that all her debts, contracted for such maintenance, and in the course of her dealings with tradesmen, are understood by both parties to be upon the credit of her separate funds for maintenance.² (*c*)

1402. In the next place let us proceed to the consideration of what is commonly called the equity of a wife to a settlement out of her own property. It is well known that at the common law marriage amounts to an absolute gift to the husband of all the goods, personal chattels, and other personal estate of which the wife is actually or beneficially possessed at that time in her own right, and of such other goods, personal chattels, and personal

Ves. jr. 129; *Stuart v. Kirkwall*, 3 Madd. R. 387; *Field v. Sowle*, 4 Russ. 112; *Mansfield, C. J. in Nurse v. Craig*, 5 Bos. & Pull. 162, 163. But see *Owens v. Dickenson, Craig & Phillips*, 48, 52 to 54; ante, § 1397, note.

¹ *Stanford v. Marshall*, 2 Atk. 68; *Hulne v. Tenant*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 16; s. c. 2 Dick. 560; *Master v. Fuller*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 19; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 513; *Stuart v. Kirkwall*, 3 Madd. R. 387; *Field v. Sowle*, 4 Russ. R. 112; *Bullpin v. Clarke*, 17 Ves. 365; *Heatley v. Thomas*, 15 Ves. 595; *Power v. Bailey*, 1 B. & Beatt. 49; *Wagstaff v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 520; *Clerk v. Miller*, 2 Atk. 379; *Clancy on Married Women*, ch. 9, pp. 331 to 346.

² 2 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 21, § 3, pp. 244, 245, note; *Ibid.* ch. 22, § 4, pp. 305 to 307; *Lilia v. Airey*, 1 Ves. jr. 277; *Mansfield, C. J., in Nurse v. Craig*, 5 Bos. & Pull. 162, 163.

(*a*) *Rogers v. Ward*, 8 Allen, 387; *Dederer*, 18 N.Y. 265; *Kelso v. Tabor*, 52 Barb. 125.

See *Davis v. Smith*, 75 Mo. 219; *Johnson v. Gallagher*, 7 Jur. n. s. 273; s. c. 3 DeG. F. & J. 494; *London Bank v. Lamprière*, L. R. 4 P. C. 572; *Picard v. Hine*, L. R. 5 Ch. 274.

(*b*) But compare *Willard v. Eastham*, 15 Gray, 328. And see *Yale v.*

(*c*) See *Johnson v. Gallagher*, 7 Jur. n. s. 273; s. c. 3 DeG. F. & J. 494; *London Bank v. Lamprière*, L. R. 4 P. C. 572, 591; *McHenry v. Davies*, L. R. 10 Eq. 88; *Johnson v. Cummins*, 1 C. E. Green, 97.

estate as come to her during the marriage.¹ But to her choses in action, such as debts due by obligation or by contract or otherwise, the husband is not absolutely entitled unless they are reduced into possession during her life.² In regard to chattels real of which the wife is or may be possessed during the coverture the husband has a qualified title. He has an interest therein in her right; and he may by his alienation during the coverture absolutely deprive her of her right therein. But if he does not aliene them, she will be entitled to them if she survives him; and if he survives her, he will be entitled to them in virtue of his marital rights.³

1403. These general explanations of the state of the common law as to the respective rights of husband and wife in regard to her personal property are sufficient to enable us to understand the origin, nature, and character of the wife's equity to a settlement. We have already seen the protective power which Courts of Equity exert to preserve the control and disposition of married women over property secured or given to their separate use, and also to preserve the rights and interests of wards of the court. Whenever the husband has reduced the personal estate of his wife, of whatever original nature it may be, whether legal or equitable, into possession, he becomes thereby the absolute owner of it and may dispose of it at his pleasure.⁴ And this be-

¹ 1 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 5, § 2, p. 169; Co. Litt. 300, 351 *a*, and Butler's note (1); Com. Dig. Baron & Feme, E. 3; Clancy on Marr. Women, B. 1, ch. 1, pp. 1 to 3.

² Co. Litt. 351 *a*, and Mr. Butler's note (1); 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 5, § 4, pp. 204, 205; Clancy on Married Women, B. 1, ch. 1, pp. 3 to 9; *Perdew v. Jackson*, 1 Russ. R. 66.

³ 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 5, § 2, pp. 173 to 187; *Ibid.* Addenda, No. 3, p. 221; Clancy on Marr. Women, B. 1, ch. 1, pp. 9 to 11. Co. Litt. 46 *b*; *Ibid.* 251 *b*, and Butler's note (1); *Doe v. Polgrean*, 1 H. Black. 535; Com. Dig. Baron & Feme, E. 2, F. 1; *Pale v. Mitchell*, 2 Eq. Abr. 138, pl. 4; *Donne v. Hart*, 2 Russ & Mylne, 360; post, §§ 1410, 1413. But see *Bisset on Estates for Life*, 187, 188, 192, 193, 195.

⁴ Clancy on Marr. Women, B. 5, ch. 1, pp. 442 to 444; *Jewson v. Moulson*, 2 Atk. 420; *Murray v. Elibank*, 10 Ves. 90. See as to what will be a reduction into possession by the husband of the wife's choses in action or not, *Searing v. Searing*, 9 Paige, R. 283. (*a*)

(*a*) *Mardree v. Mardree*, 9 Ired. Young's Estate, 65 Penn. St. 101; 295; *McCaa v. Woolf*, 42 Ala. 389; *Aitchison v. Dixon*, L. R. 10 Eq. 589; *Latourette v. Williams*, 1 Barb. 9; *Fleet v. Perrins*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 500. *Dunn v. Sargent*, 101 Mass. 336;

ing the just exercise of his legal marital rights, Courts of Equity will not interfere to restrain or limit it.¹ Wherever also he is pursuing the common remedies at law for the purpose of reducing such personal property into possession, Courts of Equity for the same reason are, or at least (it is said) ought to be, ordinarily passive.² We say ordinarily; because it is not perhaps quite certain that Courts of Equity will not interfere by way of injunction to suits at law for the wife's personal property against the husband under special circumstances. In one class of cases, that of legacies to the wife, when they are sued for by the husband in the Ecclesiastical Courts, it is certain that an injunction will be allowed for the purpose of enforcing the wife's equity to a settlement.³

1404. The principal if not the sole cases in which Courts of

¹ Ibid.

² 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (*k*); *Vaughan v. Buck*, 13 Simons, R. 404; s. c. 1 Phillips, R. 75.

³ Ante, §§ 591, 592, 598, 599, 898; Anon. 1 West, R. 581; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 1, pp. 443, 463, 464; *Jewson v. Moulson*, 2 Atk. 419, 420; *Harrison v. Buckle*, 1 Str. 238; *Gardner v. Walker*, 1 Str. 503. There are instances in which bills in equity have been entertained to restrain the husband from enforcing his legal remedies to reduce his wife's choses in action into possession, for the purpose of enforcing her equity to a settlement. *Winch v. Page*, Bunb. R. 86; *Mason v. Masters*, cited in 1 Eden, R. 506. See also *Jewson v. Moulson*, 2 Atk. 420; *Ellis v. Ellis*, 1 Viner, Abrid. Suppt. 476; *Clancy on Marr. Women*, B. 5, ch. 2, pp. 463, 464; *Id.* 466 to 470; 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 257, 258; *Id.* 274. Mr. Clancy insists that there is no just ground upon which the Courts of Equity should decline to interfere in cases where the husband is seeking at law to recover the wife's legal choses in action. His reasoning is entitled to great consideration from its intrinsic force; and there are certainly authorities in its favor, although he admits that the prevalent spirit of the cases is against it. *Clancy on Marr. Women*, B. 5, ch. 2, pp. 466 to 470. Mr. Jacob, in his late edition of *Roper on Husband and Wife* (Vol. I. 271; 272), expressly denies that there is any sound principle for making a distinction between a trust term and any other equitable chose in action of the wife. It were to be wished that the principle could, as a matter of general justice, be maintained in equity. In *Pierce v. Thornely* (2 Sim. R. 167) the Vice-Chancellor held a doctrine which seems to cover the very case. 'At law,' said he, 'where judgment had been recovered by the husband and wife, the husband alone could levy execution. But a Court of Equity will not, unless the wife consents, permit the husband to recover the whole of his wife's choses in action, but will require a settlement to be made upon her.' See also *Kenny v. Udall*, 5 John. Ch. R. 477; and *Van Epps v. Van Deusen*, 4 Paige, R. 74. In the latter case Mr. Chancellor Walworth was of opinion that an injunction ought to go to a proceeding at law in order to enforce the wife's equity to a settlement.

Equity now interpose to secure to the wife her equity to a settlement are, first, where the husband seeks aid or relief in a Court of Equity in regard to her property; secondly, where he makes an assignment of her equitable interests; thirdly, where she seeks the like relief as plaintiff against her husband or his assignees in regard to her equitable interests.¹ (a) In the first case the court lays hold of the occasion upon the ground of the maxim, that he who seeks equity must do equity, to require the husband to make a suitable settlement upon the wife (if not already made) out of that property, or some other property, for her due maintenance and support in case of her survivorship, according to the rank and condition and circumstances of the parties.² In the second case the same principle is applied to other persons claiming under the husband as to himself. In the third case the doctrine may seem more artificial; but it is in truth enforcing against the husband her admitted equity to prevent an irreparable injustice.³

1405. The general theory of this branch of Equity Jurisprudence may be thus succinctly stated: By marriage the husband clearly acquires an absolute property in all the personal estate of his wife capable of immediate and tangible possession. But if it is such as cannot be reduced into possession except by an action at law or by a suit in equity, he has only a qualified interest therein, such as will enable him to make it an absolute interest by reducing it into possession. If it is a chose in action properly so called, that is, a right which may be asserted by an action at law, he will be entitled to it if he has actually reduced it into possession (for a judgment is not sufficient) in his lifetime. But if it is a right which must be asserted by a suit in equity, as where it

¹ Clancy on Marr. Women, B. 5, ch. 1, pp. 441, 445; *Id.* ch. 2, p. 456; post, § 1414.

² Clancy on Marr. Women, B. 5, ch. 1, pp. 441, 442; *Beresford v. Hobson*, 1 Madd. 363; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (*k*).

³ Clancy on Marr. Women, B. 5, ch. 2, pp. 470 to 475. In *Eedes v. Eedes*, 11 Simons, R. 569, 570, the Vice-Chancellor (Sir L. Shadwell) said: 'where a wife is entitled to a chose in action which consists of a principal sum and not merely income, she may file a bill against her husband and the trustees for a settlement.'

(a) The wife has no equity to a marriage. *Carrick v. Ford*, L. R. 4 settlement except in the surplus after Ch. 247. payment of her debts contracted before

is vested in trustees who have the legal property, he has still less interest. He cannot reach it without application to a Court of Equity, in which he cannot sue without joining her with him; although perhaps a Court of Law might permit him to do so, or at least to use her name without her consent. If the aid of a Court of Equity is asked by him in such a case, it will make him provide for her unless she consents to give such equitable property to him.¹

1406. It is called the wife's equity. But in truth it is never limited to the wife; for in all cases where a settlement is decreed, it is the invariable practice to include a provision for the issue of the marriage through the instrumentality of the equity of the wife.² (a) This equity will not only be administered at the instance of the wife and her trustees, but also where the husband sues in equity for her property at the instance of her debtor.³ We shall presently see in what manner the wife may waive the right to such a settlement, and what will be the effect of her waiver, and what other circumstances will deprive her and her issue of the right.⁴

1407. It is not easy to ascertain the precise origin of this right of the wife, or the precise grounds upon which it was first established. It has been said that it is an equity grounded upon natural justice; that it is that kind of parental care which a Court of Equity exercises for the benefit of orphans, and that as a father would not have married his daughter without insisting upon some provision, so a Court of Equity, which stands in loco parentis, will insist on it.⁵ This is not so much a statement of

¹ Langham v. Nenny, 3 Ves. jr. 469; Bond v. Simmons, 3 Atk. 20, 21.

² Ibid.; Murray v. Lord Elbank, 13 Ves. 6; Steinmetz v. Halthin, 1 Glyn. & Jam. R. 64; s. c. cited in Pierce v. Thornely, 2 Sim. R. 167; Wilson v. Wilson, 1 Jac. & Walk. 459, 460. In the matter of Anne Walker, 1 Lloyd & Goold's Rep. 299, 323.

³ Clancy on Marr. Women, B. 5, ch. 1, p. 465; Davy v. Pollard, Finch, Ch. R. 377; s. c. 1 Eq. Abridg. 64, pl. 2.

⁴ See post, § 1416. In the matter of Anne Walker, 1 Lloyd & Goold's Rep. 299.

⁵ Jewson v. Moulson, 2 Atk. 419; Kenny v. Udall, 5 John. Ch. R. 474.

(a) See Mercier v. West Kansas City Land Co., 72 Mo. 473, where however the form of the conveyance was such as to give the wife an absolute estate in equity. A power of appointment should be reserved to the settler in default of issue. James v. Couchman, 33 Week. R. 452.

the origin as it is of the effect and value of the jurisdiction. The truth seems to be that its origin cannot be traced to any distinct source. It is the creature of a Court of Equity, and stands upon its own peculiar doctrine and practice. It is in vain to attempt by general reasoning to ascertain the nature or extent of the doctrine, and therefore we must look entirely to the practice of the court for its proper foundation and extent.¹

1408. And in the first place a settlement will be decreed to the wife whenever the husband seeks the aid or relief of a Court of Equity to procure the possession of any portion of his wife's fortune.² In such a case it is of no consequence whether the fortune accrues before or during the marriage, whether the property consists of funds in the possession of trustees or of third persons, or whether it is in the possession of the court or under its administration or not; for under all these circumstances the equity of the wife will equally attach to it.³ This equity of the wife was for a long time supposed to be confined to the absolute personal property of the wife. It was afterwards extended to the rents and profits of the real estate in which she has a life interest,⁴ although it was not then generally extended as against the husband personally to equitable interests in which she had a life-estate only.⁵ It seems now to have acquired a wider range,

¹ *Murray v. Elibank*, 10 Ves. 90; s. c. 13 Ves. 6.

² *Jewson v. Moulson*, 2 Atk. 419, 420; *Sleech v. Thorington*, 2 Ves. 561; *Attorney-Gen. v. Whorwood*, 1 Ves. 538, 539; *Bosvil v. Brander*, 1 P. Will. 459, Mr. Cox's note; *Howard v. Moffat*, 2 John. Ch. R. 206, 208; *Fabre v. Colden*, 1 Paige, R. 166; *Smith v. Kane*, 2 Paige, R. 303; *Clancy on Marr. Women*, B. 5, ch. 2, pp. 456 to 475; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (k); *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 97, 101 to 104; *Hanson v. Keating*, *The Jurist*, 1844, Vol. 8, p. 949.

³ 2 Roper on *Husb. and Wife*, ch. 7, § 1, p. 259.

⁴ *Clancy on Marr. Women*, B. 5, ch. 1, p. 445; *Burdon v. Dean*, 2 Ves. jr. 607; *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 97, 101 to 103.

⁵ *Elliott v. Cordell*, 5 Madd. R. 155, 156. In this case a legacy was given to a married woman of the dividends of £9,000 three per cents during her life, with a bequest over. The husband and wife joined in a sale of her life-estate, and he became bankrupt. The wife afterwards filed a bill for a provision against the purchaser, but it was refused. The Vice-Chancellor (Sir John Leach), on that occasion said: 'I find no authority for the equity claimed by the wife as against the particular assignee in the case of an interest given to the wife for her life; and it does not follow as a corollary or consequence from any established doctrine of the court. Where an absolute equitable interest is given to the wife, the court will not permit the husband to possess it without making a provision for the wife or her express consent, and all who claim

and is at present applied to all cases of the real estate of the wife, whether legal or equitable, where the husband or his assignee is

under the husband must take his interest subject to the same equity. But where an equitable interest is given to the wife for her life only, this court does permit the husband to enjoy it without the consent of the wife, and without making any provision for her. It is true that if the husband desert his wife, and fail to perform the obligation of maintaining her, which is the condition upon which the law gives him her property, this court will apply any equitable interest which he retains for the life of the wife, either wholly or in part, for the maintenance of the wife. And if the husband becomes bankrupt, or takes the benefit of an insolvent debtor's act, this court will fasten the same obligation of maintaining the wife out of the property of this description, which devolves by act of law upon the general assignee; for when the title of such assignee vests, the incapacity of the husband to maintain the wife has already raised this equity for the wife. But the same principle does not necessarily apply to a particular assignee for a valuable consideration, who purchased this interest when the husband was maintaining the wife, and before circumstances had raised any present equity in this property for the wife, whatever may be the force of general reasoning upon it. If however I considered it to be useful that the same rule should be applied to the particular assignee as to the general assignee, which may be doubted, by declaring this rule in the absence of all direct authority, and of all authority leading necessarily to the same conclusion, I fear that I should not be administering the actual law of this court, but I should be making a new law, and I cannot venture to assume such a jurisdiction.' In *Stanton v. Hall*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 175, a devise was in trust to A, the husband, for life, of certain rents and profits; if he attempted to assign the same, or became bankrupt or insolvent, then upon trust to pay his wife an annuity of £100 during his life, and after his death an annuity to his widow of £30. It was held that the annuity was not the separate estate of the wife, but passed to the husband's assignee for value, and that against that assignee the wife had no equity for a settlement out of the annuity. On that occasion the Lord Chancellor (Brougham) said: 'The case involves the question how far a married woman to whom an annuity for life was bequeathed in terms which have been adjudged not to vest it in her as her separate estate, is entitled to claim a settlement out of it, against one who was a purchaser for valuable consideration from her husband, the husband having afterwards become insolvent. And as *Elliott v. Cordell*, (a) if it should be held to be law, decides the question, I have looked with some attention into that case, and also into the former authorities; and I find no warrant for supposing that *Elliott v. Cordell* introduced any new doctrine upon the subject. The same doctrine in principle was recognized long before by Sir W. Grant, although undoubtedly neither in *Mitford v. Mitford* (9 Ves. 87), nor in *Wright v. Morley* (11 Ves. 12), was the point raised and disposed of formally. It was however repeatedly referred to in those cases, and it is perfectly plain from the language there used that the opinion of Sir W. Grant would have excluded the wife's claim as against particular assignees. If the question were now for the first time raised whether Courts of Equity had not gone further than principle warranted in allowing the claim against particular as-

(a) 5 Madd. 149.

obliged to come into a Court of Equity to enforce his rights against the property.¹

1409. There are some exceptions to the general doctrine however which deserve notice. In the first place if both the husband and wife are subjects of and residents in a foreign country where he would be entitled to his wife's fortune without making any settlement upon her, in such a case Courts of Equity sitting in another jurisdiction will as to personal property of the wife within their jurisdiction follow the local law and do what the local tribunals would ordain under similar circumstances; for the rights of the husband and wife are properly subject to the local law of their own sovereign.²

1409 *a.* It has however been said, and with great apparent force, that the equity which a Court of Equity 'administers in securing a provision and maintenance for the wife is founded upon the well-known rule of compelling a party who seeks equity to do equity; and it is not possible to conceive a case more strongly calling for the application of that rule. The common law gives to the husband the enjoyment of the life-estate of the wife upon the ground that he is liable to maintain her, and makes no provision for the event of his failing or becoming unable to perform that duty. If the life-estate be attainable by the husband or his assignee at law, the severity of this law must prevail; but if it cannot be reached otherwise than by the interposition of this court, equity, though it follows the law and therefore gives to the husband or his assignee the life-estate of the wife, yet it withholds its assistance for that purpose until it has secured for the wife the means of subsistence; it refuses to hand over to the assignee of the husband, to the exclusion of the wife, the income of the property which the law intended for the maintenance of both.'³ But, as we shall presently see, the doctrine is even applied to cases where the wife actively seeks to assert her equity

signees in cases where a capital sum is at stake, some doubt might perhaps be entertained. But in a case like *Elliott v. Cordell*, where the question related to a mere life-interest, and where, prior to the assignment, there was no failure on the part of the husband to maintain his wife, the Vice-Chancellor would have gone a great step further had he listened to the argument in favor of the wife's equity.' Post, § 1417.

¹ *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 97, 105 to 107; *Hanson v. Keating*, *The Jurist*, 1844, Vol. 8, p. 949; *Ibid.* 465, 466; post, § 1410.

² *Sawer v. Shute*, 1 *Anst. R.* 63.

³ *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Cr. 105.

as plaintiff,¹ so that the maxim scarcely seems to meet the exigencies of such a case.²

1410. Another exception seems to be where the wife's property is a leasehold estate or a term for years held in trust for her. In such a case it has been said that the husband may assign the term for a valuable consideration and thereby dispose of it without the wife having any claim against his assignee; and if he does not dispose of it, there is some doubt whether the wife has any equity against him.³ It is extremely difficult to perceive the exact grounds upon which this exception rests. It constitutes a seeming anomaly resting more upon authority than principle; and as such it has been several times doubted,⁴ and perhaps ought now to be deemed overruled.⁵ (a) But however questionable it may be in its origin, and however it may seem to be at variance with the received doctrine in other analogous cases of assignment by the husband, it has had no inconsiderable weight of judicial authority in its favor. It has even been carried to this extent, that the husband may by his assignment of the reversionary interest in a term of years held in trust for the wife bind that interest so as to deprive her of her equity therein, although he could not in the same way dispose of her reversionary interest in any choses in action or personal chattels.⁶ The sole ground

¹ *Ibid.*

² See *Hanson v. Keating*, *The Jurist*, 1844, Vol. 8, p. 949.

³ *Turner's Case*, 1 Vern. 7; *Pitt v. Hunt*, 1 Vern. 18; s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. 58, pl. 2, 3; *Jewson v. Moulson*, 2 Atk. 420, 421; Co. Litt. 351 a; *Butler's note* (1); *Newland on Contr.* ch. 7, pp. 124 to 127; *Atherley on Marr. Sett.* ch. 23, pp. 345 to 348; *Bosvil v. Brander*, 1 P. Will. 459, and *Mr. Cox's note* (1); *Tudor v. Samyne*, 2 Vern. 270; *Packer v. Wyndham*, *Prec. in Ch.* 418, 419; *Walter v. Saunders*, 1 Eq. Abr. 58; *Bates v. Dandy*, 2 Atk. 208; s. c. 3 Russ. R. 72, note; *Id.* 76; ante, § 1402.

⁴ See *Mr. Raithby's note* to *Turner's case*, 1 Vern. 7; *Jewson v. Moulson*, 2 Atk. R. 417, 420; *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Cr. 97, 106, 107; *Hanson v. Keating*, *The Jurist*, 1844, Vol. 8, p. 949; *Macaulay v. Philips*, 4 Ves. 19; *Franco v. Franco*, 4 Ves. 528; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 4, pp. 507, 508; *Mr. Cox's note* (1) to *Bosvil v. Brander*, 1 P. Will. 459; *Doyly v. Perfull*, 1 Ch. Cas. 225; *Atherley on Marr. Set.* ch. 23, pp. 345 to 348; 1 *Roper on Husb. and Wife*, ch. 5, § 2, p. 177, and note; *Id.* 178; post, § 1413; *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Cr. 97 to 103.

⁵ *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 97, 104 to 107; *Hanson v. Keating*, *The Jurist*, 1844, Vol. 8, p. 949; *Id.* 466; ante, § 1408.

⁶ *Donne v. Hart*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 360; *Honner v. Morton*, 3 Russ. R. 65;

of the doctrine seems to have been that the husband may dispose of the wife's contingent, reversionary, legal interest in a term for years, and that there is no difference in equity between the legal interests in and the trusts of a term for years.¹ Perhaps these latter cases would now be deemed to be subject to the same doubts and difficulties which affected and overcame the authority of that which has just been considered.²

1411. Secondly, in regard to the wife's equity to a settlement in cases where the husband has made an assignment of her choses in action or other equitable interests. It has been long settled that the assignees in bankruptcy or insolvency of the husband, and also his assignees for the payment of debts due to his creditors generally, are bound to make a settlement upon the wife out of her choses in action and equitable interest assigned to them, whether they are absolute interests or life interests only in her, in the same way, and to the same extent, and under the same circumstances, as he would be bound to make one; for it is a general principle that such assignees take the property subject to all the equities which affect the bankrupt or insolvent or general assignor.³ Such assignees also take the property subject to the wife's right of survivorship in case the husband dies before the assignees have reduced her choses in action and equitable interests into possession.⁴

Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. R. 1; post, § 1413. But see *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Cr. 97; *Hanson v. Keating*, *The Jurist*, 1844, Vol. 8, p. 949.

¹ *Donne v. Hart*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, R. 361, 364.

² *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Cr. 97; *Hanson v. Keating*, *The Jurist*, 1844, Vol. 8, p. 949.

³ 1 *Roper on Husb. and Wife*, ch. 7, § 1, p. 268; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 3, pp. 476 to 493; *Id.* ch. 4, p. 494; 1 *Madd. Ch. Pr.* 385, 386; *Jewson v. Moulson*, 2 *Atk.* 420; *Jacobson v. Williams*, 1 *P. Will.* 382; *Bosvil v. Brander*, 1 *P. Will.* 458, and *Mr. Cox's note*; *Newland on Contr.* ch. 7, pp. 122 to 129; *Burdon v. Dean*, 2 *Ves. jr.* 607, 608; *Pryor v. Hill*, 4 *Bro. Ch. R.* 139, and *Mr. Belt's notes*; *Oswell v. Probert*, 2 *Ves. jr.* 680; *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 *Ves.* 87, 97, 100; *Elliot v. Cordell*, 5 *Madd. R.* 149; *Mumford v. Murray*, 1 *Paige*, R. 620; *Smith v. Kane*, 2 *Paige*, R. 303; *Van Epps v. Van Deusen*, 4 *Paige*, R. 64; ante, §§ 1038, 1229, 1404, and notes; *Eedes v. Eedes*, 11 *Simous*, R. 569, 570; *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 *Mylne & Craig*, 97, 103, 104.

⁴ *Pierce v. Thornely*, 2 *Sim. R.* 167; *Honner v. Morton*, 3 *Russ. R.* 64, 68, 69; *Gayer v. Wilkinson*, 1 *Bro. Ch. R.* 49, and note; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 1, ch. 8, pp. 124 to 132; *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 *Ves.* 87, 97, 99; *Van Epps v. Van Deusen*, 4 *Paige*, R. 64, 72; *Purdew v. Jackson*, 1 *Russ. R.* 64.

1412. The principal controversy which has arisen is whether a special assignee or purchaser from the husband, for a valuable consideration, of her choses in action, or equitable interests, is bound to make such a settlement. It is now firmly established that he is bound to make such a settlement;¹ but (it has been said) that, subject to such provision, he will be entitled to the choses in action, and equitable interests so assigned, discharged from the title of the wife by survivorship, if she should survive him.² Here again a distinction has been insisted upon between such a special assignee, or purchaser, and a general assignee in

¹ 1 Roper on Husb. and Wife, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 268 to 273; *Ibid.* ch. 6, § 2, pp. 227 to 246; 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, Addenda, No. 3, pp. 509 to 522; Clancy on Married Women, B. 1, ch. 8, pp. 110 to 136; *Ibid.* B. 5, ch. 4, pp. 494 to 510; *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 Ves. 87, 97, 99; *Elliot v. Cordell*, 5 Madd. R. 149; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 386; *Macaulay v. Philips*, 4 Ves. 19; *Like v. Beresford*, 3 Ves. 506; *Pryor v. Hill*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 139; *Purdeu v. Jackson*, 1 Russ. R. 1, 70; *Honner v. Morton*, 3 Russ. R. 64, 68; *Pope v. Crashaw*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 326; *Kenny v. Udall*, 5 John. Ch. R. 473 to 479; s. c. 3 Cowen, R. 590; *Harwood v. Fisher*, 1 Younge & Coll. 112; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 472, 479. In this respect the case of general assignees differs from that of a special assignee for a valuable consideration, if the doctrine be correct that the latter will take against the right of the wife by survivorship. In the former case the assignees take subject to the wife's right by survivorship. *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 Ves. 87, 97, 99, 100; ante, § 1411. The ground of the distinction, if it exists (which is doubtful), is not perhaps at first sight very obvious. But in the case of a special assignee it is said that equity considers the assignment of the husband as amounting to an agreement that he will reduce the property into possession. It likewise considers that which a party agrees to do as actually done. And therefore when the husband has the present power of reducing the property into possession, his assignment of the choses in action of the wife will be regarded as a reduction of it into possession. *Honner v. Morton*, 3 Russ. R. 68, 69. But why may not the same principle be applied to the case of a general assignment by the husband for the benefit of his creditors? And as to the rule in equity, it is a rule applicable properly to the husband himself and to his rights. Why should it affect the right of survivorship of the wife when there is no actual reduction into possession? See the Lord Chancellor's observations in *Druce v. Denison*, 6 Ves. 394; 2 Roper on Husb. and Wife, Addenda, No. 3, pp. 509 to 522. Sir Thomas Plumer, in his able judgment in *Purdeu v. Jackson* (1 Russ. R. 63, 64), said: 'An opinion has certainly prevailed that a distinction subsists between an assignment by operation of law and an assignment for a valuable consideration to an individual by contract; that the former is no bar to the right of the surviving wife, but that the latter is. And I think both kinds of assignment ought to have the same effect, and that it would be a manifest inconsistency to decide the contrary.' See also *Ibid.* p. 53, and *Pierce v. Thornely*, 2 Sim. R. 167. But in the cases of *Elliot v. Cordell*, 5 Madd. R. 149, and *Stanton v. Hall*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 355, cited ante, § 1408, the distinction is insisted on.

² *Ibid.*

bankruptcy or otherwise; for in the latter case the wife is admitted to have an equity for a settlement out of her equitable interest for her life, whereas in the former case it has been said she has no such equity for a settlement, as indeed ordinarily she would not have against her husband.¹ But there is great reason to doubt the soundness of this distinction, and the doctrine seems now firmly established by the recent authorities, that no assignment made by the husband of the wife's choses in action for a valuable consideration, which choses in action are capable of being immediately reduced into possession, will convey any right to the assignee or purchaser against the wife if she survives her husband, and neither her husband nor the assignee or purchaser has reduced them into possession during the husband's lifetime;² and that in cases of choses in action capable of being so reduced, the property belongs absolutely to the wife by right of survivorship, in the same manner as it does in case of reversionary choses in action.³

1413. In respect to reversionary choses in action, (a) and other reversionary equitable interests of the wife, in personal chattels (although not, as we have seen, to her immediate and present equitable interests⁴ in chattels real), the doctrine has been for a long time well settled, and in a manner most favorable

¹ Clancy on Married Women, B. 5, ch. 4, p. 494; *Elliott v. Cordell*, 5 Madd. R. 149; ante, § 1408; *Stanton v. Hall*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 355; *Purdew v. Jackson*, 1 Russ. 1; *Ibid.* 53. See also *Major v. Lansley*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 359; post, § 1414, note (1).

² Note, supra.

³ *Elwyn v. Williams*, the English Jurist, April 24, 1843, pp. 337, 338; *Ellison v. Elwyn*, 13 Simons, R. 309; *Honner v. Morton*, 3 Russell, R. 65; *Purdew v. Jackson*, 1 Russ. R. 70. In this last case Sir Thomas Plumer said: 'After this repeated consideration of the subject I still continue of opinion that all assignments made by the husband of the wife's outstanding personal chattels, which is not or cannot be then reduced into possession, whether the assignment be in bankruptcy or under the insolvent acts, or to trustees for the payment of debts, or to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, pass only the interest which the husband has subject to the wife's legal right by survivorship;' and this doctrine was fully recognized and affirmed in *Ellison v. Elwyn*, 13 Simons, 309, 317.

⁴ Ante, § 1410.

(a) It has been decided that a wife's equity to a settlement does not extend to a reversionary interest in stock. *Osborn v. Morgan*, 8 Eng. L. & E. 192; s. c. 16 Jur. 52.

to her rights.¹ For no assignment by the husband, even with her consent, and joining in the assignment, will exclude her right of survivorship in such cases. The assignment is not, and cannot from the nature of the thing amount to a reduction into possession of such reversionary interests; and her consent, during the coverture, to the assignment, is not an act obligatory upon her.² Nay, in such a case the wife's consent in court to the

¹ It has been recently held that the husband may assign his wife's contingent reversionary interest in a term of years held in trust for her, and oust her of her equity. On that occasion the Master of the Rolls (Sir John Leach) said: 'It is clear that the wife's contingent legal interest in a term may be sold by her husband; and there is no difference in equity between the legal interest in, and the trust of, a term.' *Donne v. Hart*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, R. 360; ante, § 1410. See *Major v. Lansley*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 355; post, § 1413, note 3; *Purdew v. Jackson*, 1 Russ. R. 1; *Ibid.* 50.

² *Hornsby v. Lee*, 2 Madd. R. 16; *Purdew v. Jackson*, 1 Russ. 1, 62, 67, 69, 70; *Morley v. Wright*, 11 Ves. 17; *Elliot v. Cordell*, 5 Madd. R. 149; *Honner v. Morton*, 3 Russ. R. 65, 88; *Stamper v. Barker*, 5 Madd. R. 157; *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 Ves. 87; *Stanton v. Hall*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, R. 175; *Stiffe v. Everitt*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 37, 41. This last case first came on before Sir C. C. Pepsys when Master of the Rolls. It was a case where a testator had given his residuary estate to trustees for the separate use of his daughter, then unmarried, for life without power of anticipation. She afterwards married, and joined with her husband in a petition to have the fund transferred to him absolutely. The court refused it. The Master of the Rolls then said: 'That the doubt he felt was one which the authorities cited left quite untouched, namely, how far, where an annuity or life-interest in a fund was given to a married woman and not settled to her separate use, the husband, with her concurrence, was capable of effectually disposing of her entire life-estate, seeing that she might outlive her husband, and then as to such part of it as would be enjoyed by her after the coverture determined her interest would be reversionary only. He should be glad to be furnished with any cases which would relieve him from this difficulty; but unless some authority for it was produced, he must decline to make the order.' Afterwards, when he became Lord Chancellor, he reheard the cause, and said: 'When this petition came on to be heard it was assumed that the only question was the authority of some late decisions with respect to property left to the separate use of a woman not married at the time. But I suggested another difficulty, namely, with respect to the power of the husband to dispose of his wife's life-interest when not settled to her separate use; and the petition stood over for the purpose of enabling the petitioners' counsel to produce cases in favor of such right. I have since been informed that no such cases are to be found. It is, I believe, certain that there are none; and the question is whether, consistently with the doctrine established in *Purdew v. Jackson* (1 Russ. 1) and *Honner v. Morton* (3 Russ. 65), any such power can exist. This very point is just alluded to in a note to *Purdew v. Jackson* (1 Russ. 71, note), but there is no decision upon it. I do not see how, consistently with the cases of *Purdew v. Jackson* and *Honner v. Morton*, the husband can make a title to such of the dividends of the fund as may accrue

transfer of such reversionary interest to or by her husband will not be allowed. That consent is not acted upon by the court, except where she is to part with her equity to a settlement, or with her own present and immediate separate property; and is never acted on for the purpose of parting with her reversionary property or with her right of survivorship.¹ If the assignment could be deemed on the part of the husband to be an agreement to reduce such reversionary interest into possession, yet, being incapable of being performed, it could not be treated upon any principle of equity as if it had been performed.² It is this supposed ability of the husband to reduce it into possession which constitutes the sole ground (if indeed that is sufficient) of giving effect to his assignment of an immediate and present equitable interest of the wife against her right of survivorship in favor of a purchaser for a valuable consideration.³

after his own death and during the life of his wife surviving him.' The case of *Major v. Lansley* (2 Russ. & Mylne, 359) may seem at first view to contradict or to qualify the generality of the doctrine stated in the text. But there were several circumstances in that case materially distinguishing it from the cases referred to in the text. One circumstance was that in that case the annuity (which was assigned by the husband and wife), although a reversionary interest, was devised to the separate use of the wife; and of course she had the same complete power to dispose of it as she had of any other equitable property vested in her for her separate use; and she joined in the assignment of her husband. Another was that there were no trustees interposed, and the legal interest of the annuity therefore devolved upon her husband for the joint lives of himself and the wife, and she had only an equitable interest therein, and the assignment could operate upon that equitable interest. Another was that the reversionary interest fell into possession before the death of the husband, and he had by the assignment covenanted that he and his wife would levy a fine of the annuity; which however was not done at the time of his death. The court thought that under these circumstances the legal estate in the annuity coming to the wife by the death of the husband did not defeat the title of the assignee to the equitable interest therein under the assignment as a bona fide purchase for a valuable consideration.

¹ *Richards v. Chambers*, 10 Ves. 580, 686; *Pickard v. Roberts*, 3 Madd. R. 386; *Macaulay v. Philips*, 4 Ves. 18; 1 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 6, § 2, pp. 246 to 248; 2 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 19, § 2, p. 184; *Id.* ch. 20, § 2, p. 222; *Woollands v. Crowcher*, 12 Ves. 174, 177; *Sturgis v. Corp.*, 13 Ves. 191, 192; *Honner v. Morton*, 3 Russ. R. 64, 86, 87; *Major v. Lansley*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 359. See also *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 8, pp. 344 to 346; ante, § 1396, and note.

² This was until lately a matter of controversy which was acutely and severely debated in the profession. But it is put finally at rest by the decisions in *Purdew v. Jackson*, 1 Russ. R. 1, and *Honner v. Morton*, 3 Russ. R. 65.

³ Ante, §§ 1402, 1410. In *Honner v. Morton* (3 Russ. 75) Lord Chan-

1414. Thirdly, the equity of a wife to a settlement will not only be enforced in regard to her choses in action and equitable interests under the circumstances above mentioned, against the husband and his assignees, where he or they are plaintiffs seeking aid and relief in equity, but it will also be enforced where she or her trustee brings a suit in equity for the purpose of asserting it.¹ This was formerly matter of no inconsiderable doubt, as it was (not unnaturally) supposed that the jurisdiction rested solely upon the ground that parties seeking relief in equity should do equity; and if they were not seeking any relief, then that the court remained passive. But the doctrine is now firmly established that whenever the wife is entitled to this equity for a settlement out of her equitable interests against her husband or his assignees, she may assert it in a suit, as plaintiff, by bringing a bill in the name of her next friend.² And certainly there is much good sense in disallowing any distinction founded upon

cellor Lyndhurst said: 'This fund was a chose in action of the wife; it was her reversionary chose in action. Whether the husband has the power of assigning his wife's reversionary interest in a chose in action is a question which has been repeatedly agitated, and has excited considerable interest both at law and in equity. At law the choses in action of the wife belong to the husband if he reduces them into possession; if he does not reduce them into possession, and dies before his wife, they survive to her. When the husband assigns the chose in action of his wife, one would suppose on the first impression that the assignee would not be in a better situation than the assignor, and that he too must take some steps to reduce the subject into possession in order to make his title good against the wife surviving. But equity considers the assignment by the husband as amounting to an agreement that he will reduce the property into possession. It likewise considers what a party agrees to do as actually done; and therefore where the husband has the power of reducing the property into possession, his assignment of the chose in action of the wife will be regarded as a reduction of it into possession. On the other hand I should also infer that where the husband has not the power of reducing the chose in action into possession, his assignment does not transfer the property till by subsequent events he comes into the situation of being able to reduce the property into possession; and then his previous assignment will operate on his actual situation, and the property will be transferred.'

¹ *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 99 to 107; *Hanson v. Keating*, *The Jurist*, 1844, vol. 8, p. 949; *Gilchrist v. Cator*, 1 De Gex & S. R. 188.

² *Ante*, § 1404; *Bosvil v. Brander*, 1 P. Will. 458, and Mr. Cox's note (1); *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 2, pp. 471 to 475; 1 *Roper on Husb. and Wife*, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 260 to 263; *Elibank v. Montelieu*, 5 Ves. 737; *Ellis v. Ellis*, 1 Viner, Suppt. 475; *Gardner v. Walker*, 1 Str. 503; *Harrison v. Buckle*, 1 Str. R. 238; *Roberts v. Roberts*, 2 Cox, R. 422; *Tanfield v. Davenport*, *Tothill*, R. 119; *Carr v. Taylor*, 10 Ves. 574; *Van Duzer v. Van Duzer*, 6 Paige, R. 366; *Sturgis v. Champneys*, 5 Mylne & Craig, 97, 103, 104.

the mere consideration who is plaintiff on the record; for her equity is precisely the same whether she is plaintiff or whether she is defendant. If it is a substantial right, it ought to be enforced in her favor whenever it is withheld from her.¹

1415. We have seen that when the husband comes into a Court of Equity for relief as to any property which he claims in her right, *jure mariti*, he will be obliged to submit to the terms of the court, and make a settlement or provision for her; otherwise the court will not render him any assistance. If he does not choose to make any such settlement or provision, the court will not ordinarily take from him the income and interest of his wife's fortune so long as he is willing to live with her and maintain her, and there is no reason for their living apart. The most the court will do under such circumstances is to secure the fund, allowing him, whenever it is deemed proper under its order, to receive the income and interest.² The effect of this proceeding is, that the wife will have the chance of taking it by survivorship.³ But where the husband refuses her a maintenance, or deserts her, the rule, as we shall presently see, is different.⁴ The like doctrine, subject to the like exceptions and limitations, is applied to assignees in bankruptcy, and to other general assignees, claiming title under the husband.⁵ We have already seen that a voluntary post-nuptial settlement, made by a husband upon his wife in consideration of personal property having come to her as distributee or legatee, will be upheld in equity, even against creditors, if it be a reasonable settlement, and such as a Court of Equity would have enforced upon a bill brought for the purpose in favor of the wife.⁶

1416. Let us pass in the next place to the consideration of the circumstances under which this equity to a settlement may

¹ See *Gardner v. Walker*, 1 Str. R. 503, 504; *Van Duzer v. Van Duzer*, 6 Paige, R. 366.

² *Sleech v. Thorington*, 2 Ves. 562; *Watkyns v. Watkyns*, 2 Atk. 96, 98; *Bond v. Simmons*, 3 Atk. 20; *Packer v. Wyndham*, Prec. Ch. 412; *Macaulay v. Philips*, 4 Ves. 15; *Murray v. Elibank*, 10 Ves. 90; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 472; 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 7, § 2, pp. 276, 277.

³ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (*k*); 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 7, § 2, pp. 277, 278.

⁴ Post, §§ 1422 to 1424, 1426.

⁵ 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 7, § 2, p. 277. See *Corsbie v. Free*, Craig & Phillips, 64; post, §§ 1421, 1421 *a*.

⁶ *Wickes v. Clarke*, 8 Paige, R. 161; ante, §§ 372, 1377 *a*.

be waived or lost. And here it need scarcely be said that if the wife is already amply provided for under a prior settlement, the very motive and ground for the interference of a Court of Equity in her favor is removed.¹ (a) But she will not ordinarily be barred by an inadequate settlement, unless it be by an express contract made before marriage.²

1417. The wife's equity for a settlement is generally understood to be strictly personal to her; and it does not extend to her issue unless it has been asserted and perfected by her in her lifetime. If therefore she should die entitled to any equitable interest and leave a husband, and her children are unprovided for by any settlement, still her husband will be enabled to file a bill to recover the same without making any provision for the children.³ In truth the equity of the children is not an equity to which in their own right they are entitled. It cannot therefore be asserted against the wishes of the wife or in opposition to her rights. The court in making a settlement of the wife's property always attends to the interests of the children; because it is supposed that in so doing it is carrying into effect her own desires to provide for her offspring. But if she dissents, the court withholds all rights from the children.⁴ But the right of

¹ Clancy on Married Women, B. 5, ch. 1, p. 441; Id. ch. 5, pp. 510 to 522.

² Ibid.

³ 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 7, § 1, p. 263; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (k); Clancy on Married Women, B. 5, ch. 7, pp. 532 to 536; Scriven v. Tapley, Ambler, R. 509; s. c. 2 Eden, R. 337; Macaulay v. Philips, 4 Ves. 18; Lloyd v. Williams, 1 Madd. R. 467; Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Jac. & Walk. 479; Harper v. Ravenhill, 1 Tamlyn, R. 144; Murray v. Elibank, 10 Ves. 84, 88, 89; s. c. 13 Ves. 1, 8.

⁴ Hodgens v. Hodgens, 11 Bligh, R. 104 to 106. On this occasion Lord Cottenham said: 'The equity of the children is not an equity to which they are in their own right entitled. In making the settlement of the wife's property the interests of the children are always attended to, because it must be supposed to be the object, and it is the duty of the court, in carrying that object into effect, to provide for those whom the mother of the children would be anxious to provide for; but as between the mother and the children I know of no authority for saying that the court has jurisdiction to take from the mother that which the court has given to the mother as against the right of the husband, for the purpose of creating a benefit to the children. That the children have no equity of their own, that it is only the equity that they obtain through the means of the consent of the mother, is sufficiently clear when I call to your Lordships' recollection the fact that if the mother, having attained

(a) Martin v. Martin, 1 Comst. 473; Giacometti v. Proegers, L. R. 14 Eq. 253; s. c. 8 Ch. 338.

the children to the benefit of a settlement attaches upon the wife's filing a bill for that purpose; and if she should die pending the proceedings without waiving the right to a settlement, the children may by a supplemental bill enforce their claim.¹ (a)

1418. It is competent however for the wife at any time pending the proceedings, and before a settlement under the decree is completed, or at least before proposals are made under that decree by her consent given in open court or under a commission, to waive a settlement, and to agree that the equitable fund shall be wholly and absolutely paid over to her husband.² (b) In such an event both she and her children will be deprived of all right whatsoever in and over the fund.³ But a female ward of the

the age of twenty-one, comes into court and consents that the property shall be paid over to the husband, the court will permit it to be paid over without reference to the interests of the children. But in no instance are the children permitted to assert an independent equity of their own, and in no instance has that right ever been permitted against the mother. It is against the father that the court exercises jurisdiction to exclude him from those rights which the law would otherwise give him; and then the court deals with those rights as between the mother whose property it is, and as between the children of the marriage, in such a way as may be thought for the interests of the family. But the question is, whether the children have any right of their own against their mother to deprive her of that income which is given to her by a settlement, though not actually executed, yet in the hands of the master at the time when the party thought proper to submit to the jurisdiction of the court.'

¹ *Rowe v. Jackson*, 2 Dick. R. 604; *Murray v. Elibank*, 13 Ves. 1, 8, 9; *Steinmitz v. Halthin*, 1 Glyn. & Jam. 64; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 6, pp. 527 to 529; *Id.* ch. 8, pp. 537 to 544; *Groves v. Perkins*, 6 Sim. R. 576, 584; *Groves v. Clarke*, 1 Keen, R. 138, 139; *In re Walker*, 1 Lloyd & Goold, R. 324, 325; *De La Garde v. Lempriere*, 6 Beav. R. 344.

² There are many cases in this point. But it was directly recognized by Lord Chancellor Cottenham, in *Hodgens v. Hodgens*, 11 Bligh, R. 103 to 105, in the House of Lords. As to the mode of her examination when she does not appear in open court, but it is under a commission, see *Minet v. Hyde*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 663, and Mr. Belt's note; *Bourdillon v. Adair*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 237; *Campbell v. French*, 3 Ves. 321; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 8, pp. 539 to 542. *In re Walker*, 1 Lloyd & Goold, R. 324, 325; *De La Garde v. Lempriere*, 6 Beav. R. 344.

³ *Murray v. Elibank*, 10 Ves. 88, 90; s. c. 13 Ves. 1, 5, 6, 8; *Macaulay v.*

(a) As to the form of the settlement see *Spirett v. Willows*, L. R. 4 Ch. 407; *Croxton v. May*, L. R. 9 Eq. 404; *Walsh v. Wason*, L. R. 8 Ch. 482; *In re Suggitt*, L. R. 3 Ch. 215; *James v. Couchman*, 33 Week. R. 452;

Mercier v. West Kansas City Land Co., 72 Mo. 473.

(b) She may withdraw her consent before the transfer is completed. *Penfold v. Mould*, L. R. 4 Eq. 562.

Court of Chancery who has been married without its authority and in contempt of it will not be allowed by the court to dispend with a settlement out of her property.¹ On the contrary the court will insist upon such a settlement's being made by the husband, notwithstanding her consent to the contrary. And the court will often by way of punishment in gross cases do what it is not accustomed to do on common occasions, require a settlement of the whole of the wife's property to be made on her and her children.²

1419. The equity of the wife to a settlement may not only be waived by her, but it may also be lost or suspended by her own misconduct. (a) Thus if the wife should be living in adultery apart from her husband, a Court of Equity will not interfere upon her own application to direct a settlement out of her choses in action or other equitable interests; for by such misconduct she has rendered herself unworthy of the protection and favor of the court.³ On the other hand a Court of Equity will not in

Philips, 4 Ves. 18, 19; Fenner *v.* Taylor, 1 Sim. R. 169; s. c. 2 Russ. & Mylne, 190; Lloyd *v.* Williams, 1 Madd. R. 450, 466; 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 264 to 266; Hodgens *v.* Hodgens, 11 Bligh, R. 103 to 105. But see Clancy on Married Women, B. 5, ch. 6, pp. 524 to 527; Id. 531; where the author is of opinion that the wife, after proposals for a settlement made by the husband under a decretal order, cannot waive a settlement so as to take away the rights of her children, though she may before. See also *Ex parte Gardner*, 2 Ves. 672, and Mr. Belt's note and his *Suppl.* p. 438.

¹ 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 7, § 1, pp. 267, 268; Clancy on Married Women, B. 5, ch. 6, p. 525; Id. ch. 11, pp. 579, 580. Upon this point Lord Cottenham, in Hodgens *v.* Hodgens, 11 Bligh, R. 103, said: 'In cases either where the husband has been guilty of contempt in marrying a ward or where he has not been guilty of such contempt, if a Court of Equity has jurisdiction over the property of the ward, it undoubtedly in making settlements constantly and almost uniformly, I may say, provides for the interests of the children. The case we have now to consider is, where the husband has been guilty of a gross contempt, and where the settlement to be made and the objects to be provided for by that settlement are to be considered with reference to the situation in which he, the husband, stands as respects himself and the property of the ward, with regard to whom he has been guilty of an offence by marrying without the consent of the court.'

² *Ibid.*; Like *v.* Beresford, 3 Ves. 506; Stackpole *v.* Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89, 98; Ball *v.* Coutts, 1 Ves. & Beam. 303; Clancy on Married Women, B. 5, ch. 1, pp. 450 to 454.

³ 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 7, § 1, p. 275; Carr *v.* Estabrooke, 4 Ves. 146; Ball *v.* Montgomery, 2 Ves. jr. 197, 199; Sidney *v.* Sidney, 3 P. Will.

(a) See *In re Lush*, L. R. 4 Ch. 591; Sharpe *v.* Foy, *Ib.* 35; fraud on creditors.

such a case upon the application of the husband decree such equitable property of the wife to be paid over to him; for he is at no charge for her maintenance, and it is only in respect to his duty to maintain her that the law gives him her fortune.¹

1419 *a*. Where indeed the wife has entitled herself to a settlement and it has been decreed by a Court of Equity, there the court will not withhold or vary her right in consequence of any misconduct on her part, even although the decree has not been carried into execution. Nor will the court in such a case, at the instance of the husband who has misconducted himself, entertain a suit for a settlement against the wife or her children, and thereby relieve him from his ordinary duty of maintaining them.²

1420. But we must be careful to distinguish between an application made for a settlement on the wife which is addressed to the equity of the court, and which is administered by it sua sponte upon the merits of the parties, and is not founded in any antecedent vested rights, and other applications where the parties stand upon their own positive vested rights under a settlement, or under a valid contract for a settlement made before marriage. In the latter cases Courts of Equity cannot refuse to protect or support those vested rights on account of any misconduct in the wife; and it will be no answer to a suit brought by her for a settlement in such cases that she has been guilty of adultery.³ (*a*)

1421. Let us in the next place consider under what circum-

269. But if the wife be a ward of the Court of Chancery and married without its consent, there, although she is living in adultery, the court will insist on a settlement for a contempt of its authority. *Ball v. Coutts*, 1 Ves. & Beam. 302, 304; 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 7, § 2, p. 276; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 11, pp. 586 to 588. And in case of a jointure, or articles for a jointure before marriage, the right to the settlement is not forfeited by the adultery of the wife. *Sidney v. Sidney*, 3 P. Will. 269.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Hodgens v. Hodgens*, 11 Bligh, R. 62, pp. 104 to 110.

³ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (*k*); *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 11, p. 588; *Sidney v. Sidney*, 3 P. Will. 269, 276, and Mr. Cox's note (2). In re Walker, 1 Lloyd & Goold, R. 326, 327.

(*a*) But it seems that a covenant is void; as it may be an inducement before marriage, that in case of any separation taking place between the husband and wife, the husband shall make a certain provision for his wife, to the wife to be guilty of the worst conduct. *Cocksedge v. Cocksedge*, 14 Sim. 244.

stances Courts of Equity will allow alimony to a married woman. The wife's equity already mentioned, as it is ordinarily administered against her husband or against his particular assignee for a valuable consideration, is by decreeing a settlement which secures to her a provision for her maintenance commencing from the death of her husband.¹ When the same equity is administered upon a general assignment of his property in bankruptcy or otherwise, the settlement secures a present and immediate provision for the maintenance of the wife, because the general assignment of his property renders him incapable of giving her a suitable support.² In each case the equity is administered out of the equitable funds which are brought under the control of the court, and are subject to its order. The object of the court in each case is to secure to her a maintenance out of such equitable funds whenever she stands in need of it.

1421 *a*. So if it is apparent from the state of the case that the husband must remain in future without funds to maintain his wife, and there is an equitable fund belonging to her within the reach of a Court of Equity, it will decree the income of the whole fund to be applied primarily to the maintenance of the wife during her lifetime, and after her death the principal to be divided among her children. Thus if the husband has become insolvent and has taken advantage of an Insolvent Act, which discharges his person but not his future effects, there a Court of Equity will secure the whole fund in the manner above mentioned, for the benefit of the wife and children; for it is apparent that there is no certainty that he can ever have any means of supporting his wife and children. In this respect the case differs from that of a discharge under the Bankrupt Laws; for in the latter case the future effects of the bankrupt are not liable to his creditors. It is upon this difference that Courts of Equity will not give the whole fund to the wife and children in cases of bankruptcy as they will in cases of insolvency.³ (*a*)

¹ Clancy on Married Women, B. 5, ch. 9, p. 549.

² *Ibid.*

³ See *Brett v. Greenwell*, 3 Younge & Coll. 230 to 232; *Beresford v. Hobson*, 1 Madd. R. 362. In *Foden v. Finney*, 4 Russ. R. 428, the whole fund in the court being less than £200 (which is the lowest sum for which the court

(*a*) But that was done in *Gardner v. Marshall*, 14 Sim. 575, although the husband was a bankrupt.

1422. But it is obvious that cases may arise calling for relief in favor of the wife under very different circumstances from those above stated. Thus a woman may be totally abandoned and deserted by her husband, or she may be driven from his home and compelled by his ill-treatment and cruelty to seek an asylum elsewhere. The question therefore may arise, whether under such circumstances Courts of Equity have a general authority to decree alimony to the wife when she is left without any other adequate means of maintenance. To this question, propounded in its general form, it can scarcely be said that according to the result of the authorities an answer in the affirmative can be given in positive terms. Although it is clearly the duty of the husband to provide a suitable maintenance for his wife if it is within his power, yet according to the course of the English authorities it seems not to be an obligation or duty of which Courts of Equity will decree the specific performance by directing in such a case a separate maintenance.¹ (a) The proper remedy is by an action in a Court of Common Law to be brought against the husband by any person who shall under such circumstances supply the wife with necessaries according to her rank and condition; for by compelling the wife thus to leave him, the husband sends her abroad with a general credit for her maintenance.² (b) Or if this reliance should be precarious, the wife may make an application to the proper Ecclesiastical Court for a decree *a mensa et thoro*, or for a restitution of conjugal rights; and as incident thereto (but not, as it seems, as an exercise of

gives the wife the benefit of her equity), the court ordered the whole to be paid over to the husband, notwithstanding he had deserted her, and left her without support for ten years. This case seems difficult to be maintained on principle. (c)

¹ *Ball v. Montgomery*, 2 Ves. 195, 196; *Head v. Head*, 3 Atk. 550; *Legard v. Johnson*, 3 Ves. 359 to 361; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 9, pp. 549, 550. See also *Foden v. Finney*, 4 Russ. 428, and ante, § 1422 *a*, note; post, § 1472, 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n).

² *Guy v. Pearkes*, 18 Ves. 196, 197; *Harris v. Morris*, 4 Esp. R. 41; *Hodges v. Hodges*, 1 Esp. R. 441; *Bolton v. Prentice*, 2 Str. R. 1214; *Hindley v. Marquis of Westmeath*, 6 B. & Cres. 200, 213.

(a) But see *Galland v. Galland*, 38 Cal. 265.

(b) See *Eames v. Sweetser*, 101 Mass. 78. As to money furnished for

support see *Deare v. Soutten*, L. R. 9 Eq. 151.

(c) It was disapproved in *In re Cutler*, 15 Jur. 911; s. c. 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 97.

original jurisdiction) the latter court may pronounce a decree for a suitable alimony.¹

1423. It has indeed been said that upon a writ of supplicavit in chancery by the wife for security of the peace against her husband the court may, as an incident to the exercise of that jurisdiction, decree a separate maintenance to her.² But it has been also said that there is no modern instance of any such exercise of authority.³ (a)

1423 a. In America a broader jurisdiction in cases of alimony has been asserted in some of our Courts of Equity; and it has been held that if a husband abandons his wife and separates himself from her without any reasonable support, a Court of Equity may in all cases decree her a suitable maintenance and support out of his estate, upon the very ground that there is no adequate or sufficient remedy at law in such a case. And there is so much good sense and reason in this doctrine, that it might be wished it were generally adopted.⁴ (b)

1424. But although Courts of Equity do not assert any general jurisdiction to decree a suitable maintenance for the wife out of her husband's property because he has deserted her or ill treated her,⁵ yet on the other hand they do not abstain altogether from

¹ *Ball v. Montgomery*, 2 Ves. 195; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 9, pp. 549, 550; 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 1*, ch. 2, § 6, note (n. 2).

² *Ball v. Montgomery*, 2 Ves. 195; *Duncan v. Duncan*, 19 Ves. 394; *Lambert v. Lambert*, 2 Bro. Parl. R. 18, by Tomlins; but counsel, arguendo, p. 283. See, for the form of a supplicavit, *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 1, p. 454; *Fitz. Nat. Brev.* 238, 239; *Gilb. Forum Roman.* ch. 11, p. 202. In re *Ann Walker*, 1 *Lloyd & Goold*, R. 326, 327.

³ 2 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 22, § 4, p. 309, note; *Id.* § 5, pp. 317 to 320; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 5, ch. 1, pp. 453 to 455.

⁴ *Purcell v. Purcell*, 4 *Hen. & Munf.* 597.

⁵ During the time of the Commonwealth in England there was a suspension of all ecclesiastical tribunals, and their powers were conferred on the Commissioners of the Great Seal, who then exercised the authority to decree alimony according to the doctrines of the ecclesiastical law. See *Russell v. Bodvil*, 1 *Ch. Rep.* 186; *Whorewood v. Whorewood*, 1 *Ch. Cas.* 250; *Finch, Ch. R.* 153; 1 *Ch. Rep.* 223. See also *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 6, ch. 9, p. 550; 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 1*, ch. 2, § 6, note (n); *Head v. Head*, 3 *Atk.* 295; *Legard v. Johnson*, 3 *Ves.* 359, 360.

(a) *Adams v. Adams*. 100 *Mass. Halst. Ch.* 389. A claim for alimony ceases with the death of the husband. 365.

(b) See *Patterson v. Patterson*, 1 *Gaines v. Gaines*, 9 *B. Mon.* 295.

interference in her favor.¹ Whenever the wife has any equitable property within the reach of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity they will lay hold of it; and in the case of the desertion or ill treatment of the wife by the husband, as well as in the case of his inability or refusal to maintain her, they will decree her a suitable maintenance out of such equitable funds.² (a) The general ground on which this jurisdiction is asserted is, that the law, when it gives the property of the wife to the husband, imposes upon him the correspondent obligation of maintaining her; and that obligation will fasten itself upon such equitable property in the nature of a lien or trust, which Courts of Equity when necessary will, in pursuance of their duty, enforce. If the equitable property has been fraudulently transferred into the possession of the husband, or of a third person for his use, the same equity will be enforced against it in their hands; and if it has passed into the possession of a bona fide purchaser without notice, the other property of the husband will be held liable as a substitute.³

1425. Courts of Equity will also for the like reasons interfere and decree a suitable maintenance to the wife under the like circumstances, whenever "there is a positive agreement between the parties for the purpose, or whenever there has been a decree for alimony upon proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Courts.⁴ In the former case no more is done than in other cases of contract

¹ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6. note (n); Clancy on Married Women, B. 6, ch. 9, pp. 549 to 567; *Head v. Head*, 3 Atk. 295, 548.

² *Nicholls v. Danvers*, 2 Vern. 671, and Mr. Raithby's notes; *Oxenden v. Oxenden*, 2 Vern. 493; s. c. Prec. in Ch. 239; *Williams v. Callow*, 2 Vern. 752; *Lambert v. Lambert*, 2 Bro. Parl. R. 18, by Tomlins; *Wright v. Morley*, 11 Ves. 20, 21, 23; *Bullock v. Menzies*, 4 Ves. 798, 799; *Duncan v. Duncan*, 19 Ves. 394, 396, 397; *Sleech v. Thorington*, 2 Ves. 561; 1 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 7, § 2, pp. 276 to 287; *Burdon v. Dean*, 2 Ves. jr. 607; *Atherton v. Nowell*, 1 Cox, R. 229; Clancy on Marr. Women, B. 5, ch. 9, pp. 549 to 567; *Elliott v. Cordell*, 5 Madd. 156; *Peters v. Grote*, 7 Sim. R. 238.

³ *Colmer v. Colmer*, Mosel. R. 113; *Watkyns v. Watkyns*, 2 Atk. 96; Clancy on Marr. Women, B. 5, ch. 9, pp. 562 to 566.

⁴ 1 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 7, § 2, p. 278, note (a); *Angier v. Angier*, Prec. Ch. 497, 498; post, § 1472; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n).

(a) *Gilchrist v. Cator*, 1 DeG. & S. 188; *Edwards v. Abrey*, 2 Phill. 37. In the latter case the surplus income of the wife's separate property, after providing for her maintenance, was paid to the husband; but the court refused to apply any part of the principal fund to reimburse the husband what he had actually paid for her past maintenance.

between parties to enforce their mutual obligations by a specific performance.¹ In the latter case it would seem to be but the ordinary equity of carrying into effect the decree of a competent court against the property of a party who seeks by fraud or otherwise to evade it.² (a) However it has been recently held in England that no bill ought to be maintained in equity to enforce any decree for alimony in the Ecclesiastical Court after the death of the wife. (b) The reason is suggested to be that alimony is the proper and exclusive subject for discussion in the Ecclesiastical Court, whose province it is to determine what ought to be the amount, for how long it is to be granted, and what operates to discharge it.³

¹ 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6; note (n. 2); *Angier v. Angier*, Prec. Ch. 496; *Lasbrook v. Tyler*, 1 Ch. R. 44; *Head v. Head*, 3 Atk. 547, 548; *Watkyns v. Watkyns*, 2 Atk. 96; *Oxenden v. Oxenden*, 2 Vern. 493; s. c. Prec. Ch. 239; *Fletcher v. Fletcher*, 2 Cox, R. 99, 102, 104; *Legard v. Johnson*, 3 Ves. 359 to 361.

² See *Mildmay v. Mildmay*, 1 Vern. 53, 54; *Whorewood v. Whorewood*, 1 Ch. Cas. 250; *Fletcher v. Fletcher*, 2 Cox, R. 107; *Colmer v. Colmer*, Mosel. R. 121; 1 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 7, § 2, p. 278, note (a); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n. 2); *Head v. Head*, 3 Atk. 295; *Denton v. Denton*, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 364; *Read v. Read*, 1 Ch. Cas. 115; *Ex parte Whitmore*, 1 Dick. R. 143. The question arose in *Stones v. Cooke*, 7 Sim. R. 22, whether a bill is maintainable in equity by the executors of the wife against her husband for an account and arrears of alimony decreed by an Ecclesiastical Court, which remained unpaid at the time of her death. The point was left undecided by the Vice-Chancellor. It was suggested that the Ecclesiastical Court might enforce the payment in such a case; and if so, that would show that the Courts of Equity need not interfere. But this was thought by the court doubtful, and therefore the bill was retained for a hearing. But the Lord Chancellor (Lord Lyndhurst) reversed the decree and dismissed the bill. *Stones v. Cooke*, 8 Sim. R. 321, note. In *Earl Digby v. Howard* (4 Sim. R. 588) it was held by the Vice-Chancellor, where the Duchess of Norfolk was entitled to pin-money, and became lunatic and remained so until her death, and the Duke received all the rents and maintained her during her life, that the Duke was liable in equity for all the arrears, as she was incapable of consent. But this decision was reversed in the House of Lords. *Howard v. Digby*, 8 Bligh, R. 224, n. s.; s. c. 5 Sim. R. 330; ante, §§ 1375 a, 1396.

³ *Stones v. Cooke*, 8 Sim. 321, note. On this occasion Lord Lyndhurst is reported to have said: 'Alimony is the proper and exclusive subject for dis-

(a) See *Wilson v. Wilson*, 14 Sim. R. 405, reviewing the cases in which articles of separation have been decreed to be specifically performed. *Chase v. Chase*, 105 Mass. 385; *Allen v. Allen*, 100 Mass. 373.

(b) So after the death of the husband. *Gaines v. Gaines*, 9 B. Mon. 295.

A decree for alimony makes the wife a creditor, and she may impeach a

1426. This equity of a wife to a maintenance out of her own equitable estate is generally confined to cases of the nature above mentioned; that is to say, where the husband abandons or deserts her, or where he refuses to maintain her, or where by reason of his insolvency he is incapable of affording a suitable maintenance for her. Unless some one of these ingredients exists, Courts of Equity will decline to interfere. If therefore the separation of the wife from her husband is voluntary on her part, and is caused by no cruelty or ill treatment; or if he is bona fide ready and willing and able to maintain her, and she without good cause chooses to remain separate from him; or if she already has a competent maintenance, — in all such cases Courts of Equity will afford her no aid whatever in accomplishing a purpose which is deemed subversive of the true policy of the matrimonial law and destructive of the best interests of society.¹

cussion in the Ecclesiastical Court. It is the province of that court to determine what ought to be its amount, for how long it is to be granted, and what operates to discharge it. There is no instance in modern times of such a bill as the present being filed. During the Rebellion bills were filed for alimony, but they were filed in consequence of the abolition of the Ecclesiastical Courts. The decisions during that period do not apply, as they proceed upon the peculiar state of circumstances then existing. Other cases where maintenance has been allowed to the wife were cited, but neither do they apply, as they were cases arising out of the fraudulent conduct of the husband, or they were cases of trust. The simple question is, whether, where the alimony has been suffered to run in arrear, a bill can be maintained by the executors of a wife against the husband. It was said that in analogy to the cases in which this court grants the writ of *ne exeat regno*, and on principle, the bill might be sustained; but it is impossible to look into those cases without seeing how very reluctantly the court has acted in giving relief. See *Shaftoe v. Shaftoe* and *Dawson v. Dawson*. Then it was said that the party will be without remedy, because executors cannot maintain a suit in the Ecclesiastical Court. That argument operates, I think, the other way; for executors may maintain suits in the Ecclesiastical Court, but not for arrears of alimony. It should seem therefore that the claim must cease with the death of the wife. That is probably the principle, but it does not follow that therefore this court has jurisdiction. There is no instance of such a bill as the present being filed against a husband by the executors of the wife, and I should be very averse to establish a precedent. The authorities do not warrant it. The cases in which the court has granted the writ of *ne exeat regno* do not warrant it, nor from the circumstance of the Ecclesiastical Court not interfering can I found any jurisdiction in this court.' See also *Vandergucht v. De Blaquiére*, 8 Sim. R. 315, 322; post, § 1472.

¹ Clancy on Marr. Women, B. 5, ch. 9, pp. 560, 561; Id. ch. 10, pp. 572, 573; 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 22, § 5, pp. 313 to 322; 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 7, § 2, pp. 281 to 283; *Duncan v. Duncan*, 19 Ves.

A fortiori where the wife has eloped, and is living in a state of adultery, they will withhold all countenance to such grossly immoral conduct; and they will leave the wife to bear as she may the ordinary results of her own infamous abandonment of duty.¹

1427. So earnest indeed are Courts of Equity to promote the reconciliation of parties living in a state of separation, that they will on no occasion whatever enforce articles of separation by decreeing a continuance of the separation.² (a) It has indeed been often questioned whether deeds of separation between husband and wife through the intervention of trustees ought not to be held utterly void to all intents and purposes, as against the policy of the law not only in their direct provisions for the separation, but also in respect to all collateral and accessorial provisions, such as a stipulation for a separate maintenance.³ But the

394; s. c. *Cooper*, Eq. R. 224; *Bullock v. Menzies*, 4 Ves. 798; *Macaulay v. Phillips*, 4 Ves. 19, 20; *Watkins v. Watkins*, 2 Atk. 97.

¹ *Watkins v. Watkins*, 2 Atk. 96; *Ball v. Montgomery*, 2 Ves. jr. 191, 198, 199; *Carr v. Estabrooke*, 4 Ves. 146; *Clancy on Marr. Women*, B. 5, ch. 10, pp. 568, 569.

² *Wilkes v. Wilkes*, 2 Dick. R. 791; *Worrall v. Jacob*, 3 Meriv. 267; *Westmeath v. Westmeath*, Jac. R. 126; s. c. 1 Dow, R. 519, n. s.; *St. John v. St. John*, 11 Ves. 529; *The People v. Mercein*, 8 Paige, R. 47, 57; *Frampton v. Frampton*, 4 Beav. 287, 293.

³ See *Westmeath v. Salisbury*, 5 Bligh, R. n. s. 356; s. c. 1 Dow & Clarke, R. 519; *Evans v. Evans*, 1 Hagg. Consist. R. 36. On this occasion Lord Stowell said: 'The law has said that married persons shall not be *legally* separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit together. The disinclination must be founded upon reasons which the law approves; and it is my duty to see whether those reasons exist in the present case. To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge; but if it were, it would not be difficult to show that the law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity, with that true wisdom and that real humanity that regards the general interests of mankind. For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individuals, yet it must be carefully remembered that the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that they *must* live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and good wives from the necessity of remaining

(a) Contra now, at least in England. *Besant v. Wood*, 12 Ch. D. 605, 620, where Jessel, M. R. calls attention forcibly to the change of view of the judges in regard to public policy on this subject. See also *Wilson v. Wilson*, 1 H. L. Cas. 538; *Rowley v. Rowley*, L. R. 1 H. L. Scotch, 63; *Hart v. Hart*, 18 Ch. D. 670; *Clark v. Clark*, 10 P. D. 188.

authorities on this subject have perhaps gone too far to enable Courts of Equity to adopt this broad principle, even if it were as unquestionable and salutary in morals and policy as it has been thought to be.¹

1428. The principal distinctions on this subject as they are

husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes. If it were once understood that upon mutual disgust married persons might be legally separated, many couples, who now pass through the world with mutual comfort, with attention to their common offspring, and to the moral order of civil society, might have been at this moment living in a state of mutual unkindness, in a state of estrangement from their common offspring, and in a state of the most licentious and unreserved immorality. In this case as in many others the happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general good.'

¹ *St. John v. St. John*, 11 Ves. 529; *Westmeath v. Westmeath*, Jacob, R. 134 to 143; *Newl. on Contr.* ch. 6, pp. 115 to 121; *Worrall v. Jacob*, 3 Meriv. 267; *Id.* 259, note (g). See 2 *Roper on Husb. and Wife*, ch. 22, § 1, p. 270, note (b); *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 4, ch. 4, pp. 397 to 421; *Westmeath v. Salisbury*, 5 Bligh, R. n. s. 339, 354; *Jodrell v. Jodrell*, 9 Beav. R. 45. Mr. Roper in his learned note (2 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 22, § 1, pp. 270 to 277) has summed up the general reasoning on each side of this point with great ability and clearness. I have drawn the distinctions in the text principally from his labors and those of Mr. Clancy. *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 4, ch. 4, pp. 397 to 421. See also *Westmeath v. Salisbury*, 5 Bligh, R. n. s. 339, where this subject is elaborately discussed. Lord Eldon, in delivering his opinion in this case, expressed his disapprobation of the doctrine in the following terms (pp. 398, 399): 'According to the law of this country marriage is an indissoluble contract. It can only be dissolved a vinculo matrimonii by the legislature, and that contract once entered into imposes upon the husband and wife, both with respect to themselves and with respect to their offspring, most important and most sacred duties; so important and so sacred that it does seem a little astonishing that it ever should have happened that it should be thought that they could, by a mutual agreement between themselves, destroy all the duties they owed to each other and all the duties they owed to their offspring. I do not go through what has been stated in a great variety of cases upon the subject, nor do I refer to them for any other purpose than that of stating that which I think can admit of no contradiction, that it is impossible for any person to read the judgments I have had the honor to pronounce upon the subject without seeing that I never could originally have been a party to any such doctrine. But when decision followed decision, when men whose professional knowledge, whose talents, and whose abilities I was bound not only to respect but to revere, had so often in Courts of Law stated doctrines to which I could not agree, it seemed to me a most improper thing that I should take upon myself to say that those doctrines were wrong, without putting the matter into the most solemn course of inquiry; and I believe it will be found, if your Lordships look at the judgments to which I am referring, that I was always exceedingly anxious that a case of this important nature should be brought before the House of Lords.' See also *The People v. Mercein*, 8 Paige, R. 47, 67; s. c. 3 Hill, R. 399.

now established seem to be as follows: In the first place a deed of separation does not relieve the wife from any of the ordinary disabilities of coverture.¹ In the next place a deed of separation entered into by the husband and wife alone, without the intervention of trustees, is utterly void.² In the next place a deed for an immediate separation, with the intervention of trustees, will not be enforced so far as it regards any covenant for separation, but only so far as maintenance is covenanted for by the husband, and the trustees covenant to exonerate him from any debts contracted therefor.³ In the next place if a deed of separation contains a covenant purporting to preclude the parties from any future suit for the restitution of conjugal rights, the covenant will be utterly void.⁴ In the next place a deed containing a covenant with trustees for a future separation of the husband and wife, and for her maintenance, consequent thereon, will be utterly void.⁵ In the next place, even in case of a deed

¹ *Marshall v. Rutton*, 8 T. R. 545.

² *Legard v. Johnson*, 3 Ves. 352, 359, 361; *Westmeath v. Salisbury*, 5 Bligh, N. S. 375.

³ *Legard v. Johnson*, 3 Ves. 359, 360; 2 *Roper on Husband and Wife*, ch. 22, § 2, p. 270, and note; *Id.* 287; *Westmeath v. Westmeath, Jacob*, R. 126; *Worrall v. Jacob*, 3 Meriv. 267; *Jee v. Thurlow*, 2 B. & Cressw. 547; *Elworthy v. Bird*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 372; *Rodney v. Chambers*, 2 East, R. 283; *Westmeath v. Salisbury*, 5 Bligh, R. N. S. 339, 375. A covenant on the part of the trustees to indemnify the husband against the maintenance of the wife will be a legal foundation for a covenant on his part to furnish a specific maintenance for her when there is a general trust-deed between the parties. *Westmeath v. Salisbury*, 5 Bligh, R. N. S. 375; *Id.* 356. The subject of the legality of deeds of separation between husband and wife was much discussed in the very recent case of *Jones v. Waite*, 5 Bing. New Cas. 341, in the Exchequer Chamber, where it was held by three judges against two that a deed of separation having been drawn up between husband and wife, a promise by a third person to pay certain debts and expenses for which the husband was solely liable, if he could execute the deed of separation, was held to be a valid promise; Lords Abinger and Denman being against the decision, and Patterson, Alderson, and Littledale, justices, being in favor of it. Lord Denman on this occasion said: 'If I could venture to lay down any principle which alone seems safely deducible for all these cases (which he cited), it is this: that when a husband has, by his deed, acknowledged his wife to have a just cause of separation from him, and has covenanted with her natural friends to allow her a maintenance during separation, on being relieved from liability for her debts, he shall not be allowed to impeach the validity of that covenant.' The whole case deserves deliberate examination, and it was argued with great ability and learning. See also *Hindley v. The Marquis of Westmeath*, 6 Barn. & Cressw. 200.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Durant v. Titley*, 7 Price, R. 577; *Hindley v. Westmeath*, 6 B. & Cressw.

for an immediate separation, if the parties come together again there is an end to it with respect to any future as well as to the past separation.¹ (a)

1429. Such are some of the more important instances of the exercise of jurisdiction by Courts of Equity in regard to married women for their protection, support, and relief; in some of which they are merely auxiliary to the common law, and in others again they proceed upon principles wholly independent if not in contravention of that system. Upon a just survey of the doctrines of Courts of Equity upon this subject it is difficult to resist the impression that their interposition is founded in wisdom, in sound morals, and in a delicate adaptation to the exigencies of a polished and advancing state of society. And here, as well as in the exercise of the jurisdiction in regard to infants and lunatics, we cannot fail to observe the parental solicitude with which Courts of Equity administer to the wants, and guard the interests, and succor the weakness of those who are left without any other protectors in a manner which the common law was too rigid to consider or too indifferent to provide for.

200; *Westmeath v. Salisbury*, 5 Bligh, R. N. s. 339, 367, 373, 375, 393, 395, 396, 400, 415 to 417; *St. John v. St. John*, 11 Ves. 526.

¹ *Fletcher v. Fletcher*, 2 Cox, R. 99; 3 Bro. Ch. R. 619; *Bateman v. Countess of Ross*, 1 Dow, R. 235; *Westmeath v. Salisbury*, 5 Bligh, R. N. s. 375, 395; *St. John v. St. John*, 11 Ves. 537; 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 22, § 1; p. 273, note; *Id.* § 5, p. 316; *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 4, ch. 4, pp. 405, 413 to 417; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n. 2). Whether a covenant for a separate maintenance would now be enforced against the husband in case of an immediate separation, after the husband was willing to receive his wife again and cohabit with her, and there was no reason to suppose it to be otherwise than a bona fide effort at reconciliation, is perhaps questionable. See on this point the authorities collected and commented on by Mr. Clancy. *Clancy on Married Women*, B. 4, ch. 4, pp. 405 to 420. Mr. Clancy thinks that where the separation is intended to be temporary it would not be enforced; where it is intended to be permanent it would. See also 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, ch. 22, § 5, pp. 313 to 316; *Id.* 320 to 322. But see the judgment in *Westmeath v. Salisbury*, 5 Bligh, R. N. s. 339 to 421.

(a) In this country equity has, it has been said, no control, apart from statute, of husband and wife except in regard to property; it cannot compel cohabitation or a restoration of conjugal rights. *Cruger v. Douglas*, 4 Edw. 433; *Coverdill v. Coverdill*, 3 Har. (Del.) 13; 1 Bishop, Mar. & Div. § 31. Query as to the rule in England. See *Connelly v. Connelly*, 2 Eng. L. & E. 570; s. c. 14 Jur. 437; *Besant v. Wood*, 12 Ch. D. 605; *Clark v. Clark*, 10 P. D. 188, opinion of Baggallay, L. J.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

SET-OFF.

1430. IT remains for us to take notice of a few other matters, over which Courts of Equity exercise a jurisdiction, either in its own nature exclusive, or at least exclusive for particular objects and under particular circumstances. Upon these however our commentaries will necessarily be brief, as they either are not of very frequent occurrence, or they are in a great measure embraced under the heads which have been already discussed.

1431. And in the first place let us consider the subject of SET-OFF as an original source of equity jurisdiction.¹ It is not easy to ascertain the true nature and extent of this jurisdiction, since it has been materially affected in its practical application in England by the Statutes of 2 Geo. II. ch. 22, and 8 Geo. II. ch. 24 in regard to set-off at law in cases of mutual unconnected debts,² and by the more enlarged operation of the bankrupt laws, in regard to set-off both at law and in equity, in cases of mutual debts and mutual credits.³

1432. It was said by a late learned Chancellor, that before the statutes of set-off at law, and the statutes of mutual debts and credits in bankruptcy, 'this court [that is, the Court of Chancery as a Court of Equity] was in possession of it [i. e. the doctrine of set-off], as grounded upon principles of equity, long before the law interfered. It is true where the court does not find a natural equity going beyond the statute [of set-off], the construction is the same in equity as at law. But that does not

¹ Set-off was formerly called Stoppage. See *Downam v. Matthews*, Prec. Ch. 582; *Jefferies v. Wood*, 2 P. Will. 128, 129.

² See Bac. Abr. by Guillim, Title Set-off, A, B, C.

³ See Stat. 4 & 5 Anne, ch. 17; 5 Geo. I. ch. 11; 5 Geo. II. ch. 30; 46 Geo. III. ch. 135; 6 Geo. IV. ch. 16; *Babbington on Set-off*, ch. 5, p. 116, &c.

affect the general doctrine upon natural equity. So as to mutual debts and credits Courts of Equity must make the same construction as the law. But both in law and in equity that statute, enabling a party to prove the balance of the account upon mutual credit, has gone much further than the party could have gone before, either in law or in equity, as to set-off.¹ This is not a very instructive account of the doctrine, for it leaves in utter obscurity what were the particular cases in which Courts of Equity did interpose upon principles of natural equity.²

1433. Lord Mansfield has expressed his views of the subject of set-off in equity in the following language: 'Natural equity says that cross demands should compensate each other by deducting the less sum from the greater, and that the difference is the only sum which can be justly due. But positive law, for the sake of the forms of proceeding and convenience of trial, has said that each must sue and recover separately in separate actions. It may give light to this case and the authorities cited if I trace the law relative to the doing complete justice in the same suit, or turning the defendant round to another suit, which under various circumstances may be of no avail. Where the nature of the employment, transaction, or dealings necessarily constitutes an account consisting of receipts and payments, debts and credits, it is certain that only the balance can be the debt; and by the proper forms of proceeding in Courts of Law or Equity the balance only can be recovered. After a judgment or decree "to account," both parties are equally actors. Where there were mutual debts unconnected, the law said they should not be set off, but each must sue. And Courts of Equity followed the same rule, because it was the law; for had they done otherwise, they would have stopped the course of law in all cases where there was a mutual demand. The natural sense of mankind was first shocked at this in the case of bankrupts; and it was provided for by 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 11, and 5 Geo. II. ch. 30, § 28. This clause must have everywhere the same construction and effect, whether the question arises upon a summary petition, or a formal bill, or an action at law. There can be but one right construc-

¹ Lord Eldon in *Ex parte Stephens*, 11 Ves. 27; *Greene v. Darling*, 5 Mason, R. 207, 208; *Ex parte Blagden*, 19 Ves. 467.

² The general principles of the English Law as to set-off are well summed up in Mr. Evans's edition of Pothier on Obligations, Vol. 2, p. 112, No. 13.

tion ; and therefore if courts differ, one must be wrong. Where there was no bankruptcy, the injustice of not setting off (especially after the death of either party) was so glaring, that Parliament interposed by 2 Geo. II. ch. 22, and 8 Geo. II. ch. 24, § 5. But the provision does not go to goods, or other specific things wrongfully detained. And therefore neither Courts of Law nor Equity can make the plaintiff, who sues for such goods, pay first what is due to the defendant, except so far as the goods can be construed a pledge ; and then the right of the plaintiff is only to redeem.¹

1434. If this be a true account of the matter, then it would seem that Courts of Equity did not, antecedently to the statutes of set-off, exercise any jurisdiction as to set-off, unless some peculiar equity intervened independently of the mere fact of mutual unconnected accounts. (a) As to connected accounts of debt and credit, it is certain that both at law and in equity, and without any reference to the statutes, or the tribunal in which the cause was depending, the same general principle prevailed, that the balance of the accounts only was recoverable ; which was therefore a virtual adjustment and set-off between the parties.² But there is some reason to doubt whether Lord Mansfield's statement of the jurisdiction of equity in cases of set-off is to be understood in its general latitude, and without some qualifications. It is true that equity generally follows the law as to set-off ; but it is with limitations and restrictions.³ If there is no connection between the demands, then the rule is as it is at law. (b) But if there is a connection between the demands, equity acts upon it, and allows a set-off under particular circumstances.⁴ (c)

¹ Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2220, 2221.

² Dale v. Sollet, 4 Burr. 2133.

³ See Duncan v. Lyon, 3 John. Ch. R. 358, 359; Dale v. Cooke, 4 John. Ch. R. 11; Howe v. Sheppard, 2 Sumner, R. 109, and cases there cited; Green v. Darling, 5 Mason, R. 207; Peters v. Soame, 2 Vern. R. 428; Gordon v. Lewis, 2 Sumner, Rep. 628.

⁴ Whitaker v. Rush, Ambler, R. 407, 408, and Mr. Blunt's note (4); Hurl-

(a) See Walker v. Brooks, 125 Mass. 220; Martin v. Mohr, 56 Ala. 221, Mass. 241; Wolcott v. Jones, 4 Allen, 223.

(b) Spaulding v. Backus, 122 Mass. 367; Spaulding v. Backus, 122 Mass. 553; Tate v. Evans, 54 Ala. 16; Simmons v. Williams, 27 Ala. 507; Tus-

(c) Though equity, it is said, at first assumed jurisdiction on the

1435. In the first place it would seem that independently of the statutes of set-off Courts of Equity in virtue of their general jurisdiction are accustomed to grant relief in all cases where, although there are mutual and independent debts, yet there is a mutual credit between the parties founded at the time upon the existence of some debt due by the crediting party to the other. By mutual credit, in the sense in which the terms are here used, we are to understand a knowledge on both sides of an existing debt due to one party, and a credit by the other party, founded on and trusting to such debt as a means of discharging it.¹ (a) Thus for example if A should be indebted to B in the sum of

bert v. Pacific Insur. Co., 2 Sumner, R. 471; *Rawson v. Samuel*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 161, 172, 173; *Clark v. Cost*, 1 Craig & Phillips, 54.

¹ See *Ex parte Prescott*, 1 Atk. 331. In *Hankey v. Smith* (3 T. R. 507, note), it seems to have been thought by the court that to constitute mutual credit within the Bankrupt Acts it is not necessary that the parties mean particularly to trust to each other in each transaction. Therefore where a bill of exchange accepted by A got into the hands of B, and B bought sugars of A, intending to cover the bill, it was held to be a case of mutual credit, although A did not know that the bill was in B's hands. Lord Kenyon said the mutual credit was constituted by taking the bill on the one hand and selling the sugars on the other hand; to which Buller, J., assented. The distinction between a mutual debt and a mutual credit is in this view extremely nice. In *Trench v. Fenn* (Coke, Bank. Laws, 569, 4th edit.; 554, 5th edit.; s. c. 3 Doug. R. 257), Mr. Justice Buller said, wherever there is a trust between two men on each side, that makes a mutual credit. In *Olive v. Smith* (5 Taunt. R. 60), Mr. Justice Gibbs said that Lord Mansfield, in *Trench v. Fenn*, adopted it as a principle, that wherever there is a mutual trust, that is, wherever one party being indebted to another intrusts that other with goods, it is a case of mutual credit. See also *Atkinson v. Elliot* (7 T. R. 376); *Olive v. Smith* (5 Taunt. R. 67, 68). In *Key v. Flint* (8 Taunt. R. 23), Mr. Justice Dallas said that mutual credit meant something different from mutual debts. Mutual credit must mean mutual trust. In *Rose v. Hart* (8 Taunt. R. 499, 506) the court narrowed the extent of former decisions, and held that in order to constitute a mutual credit the demands must be of such a nature as must terminate in cross debts. See *Easum v. Cato*, 5 B. & Ald. 861.

ground that one demand in justice should compensate a counter-demand, and that it was unjust to attempt at law to enforce payment of more than the balance, — now the court exercises it only (1) when a legal demand is interposed to an equitable suit, (2) when an equitable demand cannot be enforced at law, and the other party is suing there, or (3) where both the demands are partly legal, and the party

seeking the benefit of the set-off can show some equitable ground of protection. *Tuscumbia R. Co. v. Rhodes*, 8 Ala. 206, 220; *Martin v. Mohr*, 56 Ala. 221, 223.

Mere unliquidated damages from a tort will not be set off in equity. *Chambers v. Wright*, 52 Ala. 444.

(a) See *Astley v. Gurney*, L. R. 4 C. P. 714.

£10,000 on bond, and B should borrow of A £2,000 on his own bond, the bonds being payable at different times, the nature of the transaction would lead to the presumption that there was a mutual credit between the parties as to the £2,000 as an ultimate set-off pro tanto from the debt of £10,000. But if the bonds were both payable at the same time, the presumption of such a mutual credit would be converted almost into an absolute certainty. Now in such a case a Court of Law could not set off these independent debts against each other. But a Court of Equity would not hesitate to do so upon the ground either of the presumed intention of the parties or of what is called a natural equity.¹ If in such a case there should be an express agreement to set off the debts against each other pro tanto, there could be no doubt that a Court of Equity would enforce a specific performance of the agreement, although at the common law the party might be remediless.² (a)

¹ Lord Lanesborough *v.* Jones, 1 P. Will. 326; *Ex parte Flint*, 1 Swanst. 33, 34; *Downam v. Matthews*, Prec. Ch. 580, 582. See also a decision of Lord Hale, cited in *Chapman v. Derby*, 1 Vern. R. 117; *Jeffer v. Wood*, 2 P. Will. 128, 129; *Meliorucchi v. Royal Exchange Ass. Co.*, 1 Eq. Abr. 8, pl. 8; s. c. *Ambler*, R. 408, note by Mr. Blunt; *James v. Kynnier*, 5 Ves. 110; *Hawkins v. Freeman*, 2 Eq. Abr. 10, pl. 10. In the case of *Lord Lanesborough v. Jones* (1 P. Will. 326), Lord Chancellor Cowper said, that it was natural justice and equity that in all cases of mutual credit only the balance should be paid. In that case there was a mortgage by A to B for £1,500, and a debt due by B to A on notes for £1,400 upon different transactions. In *Jeffer v. Wood* (2 P. Will. 129), the Master of the Rolls said: 'But it may be a doubt whether an insolvent person may in equity recover against his debtor to whom he at the same time owes a greater sum, although I own it is against conscience that A should be demanding a debt against B, to whom he is indebted in a larger sum and would avoid paying it. However it seems that the least evidence of an agreement for a stoppage will do. And in these cases equity will take hold of a very slight thing to do both parties right.' In *Green v. Darling*, 5 Mason, R. 207 to 213, the principal cases in respect to set-off in equity are collected.

² *Jeffer v. Wood*, 2 P. Will. 128, 129; *Whitaker v. Rush*, *Ambler*, R. 408; *Hawkins v. Freeman*, 2 Eq. Abr. 10, pl. 10.

(a) In winding up the affairs of an insolvent corporation or stock company in England debts cannot be set off against calls. *Black's Case*, L. R. 8 Ch. 254. But a shareholder in an unlimited company which is being wound up may be allowed to set off a debt due to him from the company on an independent contract, against calls made on his shares under the winding-up. *Gibbs's Case*, L. R. 10 Eq. 312. Secus of a shareholder in a limited company. *Ib.* at p. 327; *Grissell's Case*, L. R. 1 Ch. 528. The case of *Brighton Arcade Co. v. Dowling*, L. R. 3 C. P. 175, seems in conflict with *Grissell's Case*. See *Gibbs's Case*, at p. 330.

1436. In the next place as to equitable debts, or a legal debt on one side and an equitable debt on the other, there is great reason to believe that whenever there is a mutual credit between the parties touching such debts, a set-off is, upon that ground alone, maintainable in equity; although the mere existence of mutual debts without such a mutual credit, might not, even in a case of insolvency, sustain it.¹ (a) But the mere exist-

¹ See *Lord Lanesborough v. Jones*, 1 P. Will. 326; *Curson v. African Company*, 1 Vern. 122, Mr. Raithby's note; *Jeffer v. Wood*, 2 P. Will. 128, 129; *Ryall v. Rowles*, 1 Ves. 375, 376; s. c. 1 Atk. 185; *James v. Kynnier*, 5 Ves. 110; *Gale v. Luttrell*, 1 Y. & Jerv. 180; *Cheetham v. Crook*, 1 McClell. & Y. 307; *Piggott v. Williams*, 6 Madd. 95; *Taylor v. Okey*, 13 Ves. 180. In *Ex parte Prescott* (1 Atk. R. 231), Lord Hardwicke said, that in cases of bankruptcy, before the making of the Act of 5 Geo. II. ch. 30, if a person was a creditor he was obliged to prove his debt under the commission, and receive perhaps a dividend only of 2s. 6d. in the pound from the bankrupt's estate, and at the same time pay the whole to the assignee of what he owed to the bankrupt. So that it seems that insolvency alone would not constitute a sufficient equity. See *Lord Lanesborough v. Jones* (1 P. Will. 325); *James v. Kynnier* (5 Ves. 110). In *Simson v. Hart* (14 Johns. R. 63, 76) it seems to have been thought that the fact of insolvency created an equity, or at least fortified it. See also *Sewall v. Sparrow*, 16 Mass. R. 24; *Lyman v. Estes*, 1 Greenl. R. 182; *Peters v. Soame*, 2 Vern. R. 428. In *Green v. Darling* (5 Mason, R. 212) the court, after citing the principal decisions, summed up the result in the following language: 'The conclusion which seems deducible from the general current of the English decisions (although most of them have arisen in bankruptcy), is that Courts of Equity will set off distinct debts where there has been a mutual credit upon the principles of natural justice to avoid circuity of suits following the doctrine of compensation of the civil law to a limited extent. That law went further than ours, deeming each debt suo jure

(a) *Riddick v. Moore*, 65 N. Car. 382; *Condon v. Shehan*, 46 Miss. 710; *Spaulding v. Backus*, 122 Mass. 553. But see *Smith v. Felton*, 43 N. Y. 419; *Chicago R. Co. v. Field*, 86 Ill. 270; *Brewer v. Norcross*, 2 C. E. Green, 219; *Fulkerson v. Davenport*, 70 Mo. 541; *Reppy v. Reppy*, 46 Mo. 571; *Field v. Oliver*, 43 Mo. 200; *Hamilton v. Van Hook*, 26 Texas, 302. Clearly a party whose debt is not due has no equitable claim to have it set off against a debt of his own already due in the hands of an insolvent person. *Spaulding v. Backus*, supra; *Bradley v. Angel*, 3 Comst. 475; *Reppy v. Reppy*, supra.

However it is held that the contin-

gent liability of a surety not being available as a set-off at law (because no action could be brought upon it while contingent) may be ground of interference in equity in a proper case. A surety e. g. upon an administrator's bond, being indebted to the administrator by promissory note on which a judgment at law has been rendered in favor of an assignee, may enjoin the judgment and establish an equitable set-off to it for money which he has been compelled to pay since the judgment, upon showing that the administrator is insolvent, and that the note was transferred in fraud of creditors. *Wood v. Steele*, 65 Ala. 436.

ence of cross demands will not be sufficient to justify a set-off in equity.¹ (a) Indeed a set-off is ordinarily allowed in equity only

set off or extinguished pro tanto; whereas our law gives the party an election to set off if he chooses to exercise it. But if he does not, the debt is left in full force, to be recovered in an adversary suit. Since the statutes of set-off of mutual debts and credits Courts of Equity have generally followed the course adopted in the construction of the statutes by Courts of Law, and have applied the doctrine to equitable debts. They have rarely if ever broken in upon the decisions at law, unless some other equity intervened which justified them in granting relief beyond the rules of law, such as has been already alluded to. And on the other hand Courts of Law sometimes set off equitable against legal debts, as in *Bottomley v. Brooke* (cited 1 T. R. 619). The American courts have generally adopted the same principles as far as the statutes of set-off of the respective States have enabled them to act.' The court adhered to the same doctrine in *Howe v. Sheppard*, 2 Sumner, R. 409, 414, 416; and *Gordon v. Lewis*, 2 Sumner, R. 628, 633, 634.

¹ *Rawson v. Samuel, Craig & Phillips*, 161, 178, 179; *Whyte v. O'Brien*, 1 Simons & Stu. 551. In the case of *Rawson v. Samuel*, Lord Cottenham said: 'We speak familiarly of equitable set-off as distinguished from the set-off at law; but it will be found that this equitable set-off exists in cases where the party seeking the benefit of it can show some equitable ground for being protected against his adversary's demand. The mere existence of cross demands is not sufficient; *Whyte v. O'Brien* (1 S. & S. 551); although it is difficult to find any other ground for the order in *Williams v. Davies* (2 Sim. 461) as reported. In the present case there are not even cross demands, as it cannot be assumed that the balance of the account will be found to be in favor of the defendants at law. Is there then any equity in preventing a party who has recovered damages at law from receiving them because he may be found to be indebted upon the balance of an unsettled account to the party against whom the damages have been recovered? Suppose the balance should be found to be due to the plaintiff at law, what compensation can be made to him for the injury he must have sustained by the delay? The jury assess the damages as the compensation due at the time of their verdict. Their verdict may be no compensation for the additional injury which the delay in payment may occasion. What equity have the plaintiffs in the suit for an account to be protected against the damages awarded against them? If they have no such equity, then there can be no good ground for the injunction. Several cases were cited in support of the injunction; but in every one of them except *Williams v. Davies* it will be found that the equity of the bill impeached the title to the legal demand. In *Beasley v. Arcy* (2 Sch. & Lefr. 403, n.) the tenant was entitled to redeem his lease upon payment of the rent due; and in ascertaining the amount of such rent a sum was deducted which was due to the tenant from the landlord for damage done in cutting timber. Both were ascertained sums, and the equity against the landlord was, that he ought not

(a) As costs in a suit in equity and an indemnity bond as to title, the costs in a suit at law, though relating amount due on the bond being liquidated. *Stone v. Fargo*, 55 Ill. 71. *See Detroit R. Co. v. Gregg*, 12 Mich. 45. to the same subject. *Throckmorton v. Crowley*, L. R. 3 Eq. 196. But set-off has been allowed in equity between notes for purchase-money and

when the party, seeking the benefit of it, can show some equitable ground for being protected against his adversary's demand; the mere existence of cross demands is not sufficient. A fortiori a Court of Equity will not interfere, on the ground of an equitable set-off, to prevent the party from recovering a sum awarded to him for damages for a breach of contract merely because there is an unsettled account between him and the other party in respect to dealings arising out of the same contract.¹ (a)

1436 a. However where there are cross demands between the parties of such a nature that if both were recoverable at law they would be the subject of a set-off, then and in such a case if either of the demands be a matter of equitable jurisdiction the set-off will be enforced in equity.² As for example if a legal debt is due to the defendant by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is the assignee of a legal debt due to a third person from the plaintiff which has been duly assigned to himself, a Court of Equity will set off the one against the other, if both debts could properly be the subject of a set-off at law.³ (b)

to recover possession of the farm for non-payment of rent whilst he owed the tenant a sum for damage to that same farm. In *O'Connor v. Spaight* (1 Sch. & Lefr. 305) the rent paid formed part of a complicated account; and it was impossible without taking the account to ascertain what sum the tenant was to pay to redeem his lease. In *Ex parte Stephens* (11 Ves. 24) the term equitable set-off is used; but the note having been given under a misrepresentation, and a concealment of the fact that the party to whom it was given was at the time largely indebted to the party who gave it, the note was ordered to be delivered up as paid. In *Piggott v. Williams* (6 Madd. R. 95) the complaint against the solicitor for negligence went directly to impeach the demand he was attempting to enforce. In *Lord Cawdor v. Lewis* (1 Y. & Coll. 427) the proposition is too largely stated in the marginal note; for in the case the action for mesne profits was brought against the plaintiff, who was held, as against the defendant, to be in equity entitled to the land. None of these cases furnish any grounds for the injunction in the case before me.'

¹ *Rawson v. Samuel, Craig & Phil.* 172, 177 to 180.

² *Clarke v. Cost, 1 Craig & Phillips, R.* 154, 160.

³ *Clarke v. Cost, 1 Craig & Phillips, R.* 154, 160; *Williams v. Davies, 2 Simons, R.* 461.

(a) There is no equity to retain a sum due because cross demands to a larger amount are about falling due. *Jeffries v. Agra Bank, L. R. 2 Eq.* 674; *Smith's Case, L. R. 1 Ch.* 538.

(b) Notice of assignment of an equitable chose in action cuts off the right

of set-off as to a debt falling due there-after though arising on a contract made before the notice, where the contract does not appear to have been made with special reference to a right of set-off. *Watson v. Mid-Wales Ry. Co., L. R. 2 C. P.* 593. Nor can an

1437. In the next place Courts of Equity, following the law, will not allow a set-off of a joint debt against a separate debt, or conversely of a separate debt against a joint debt; or, to state the proposition more generally, they will not allow a set-off of debts accruing in different rights. But special circumstances may occur creating an equity which will justify even such an interposition.¹ (a) Thus for example if a joint creditor fraudulently conducts himself in relation to the separate property of one of the debtors, and misapplies it so that the latter is drawn in to act differently from what he would if he knew the facts, that will constitute in a case of bankruptcy a sufficient equity for a set-off of the separate debt created by such misapplication against the joint debt.² So if one of the joint debtors is only a surety for the other, he may in equity set off the separate debt due to his principal from the creditor; for in such a case the joint debt

¹ *Ex parte Twogood*, 11 Ves. 517; *Addis v. Knight*, 2 Meriv. R. 121; *Duncan v. Lyon*, 3 John. Ch. R. 351, 352; *Dale v. Cooke*, 4 John. Ch. R. 13 to 15; *Harvey v. Wood*, 5 Madd. R. 460; *Tucker v. Oxley*, 5 Cranch, R. 35; *Vulliamy v. Noble*, 3 Meriv. R. 617; *Whitaker v. Rush*, Ambler, R. 407; *Bishop v. Church*, 3 Atk. 691; *Jackson v. Robinson*, 3 Mason, R. 144, 145; *Murray v. Toland*, 3 John. Ch. R. 573; *Medlicot v. Bowes*, 1 Ves. 208; *Leeds v. The Marine Insur. Company*, 6 Wheat. R. 565, 571. In *Tucker v. Oxley* (5 Cranch, 34) the Supreme Court of the United States held that under the bankrupt laws of the United States, where a suit was brought by the assignee of one partner (who had become a bankrupt) for a separate debt due to him by the defendant, who was a creditor of the partnership, the joint debt due by the partners might be set off by the creditor against the separate debt due by him to the partner who had become bankrupt. There were however special circumstances in the case. The partnership had been dissolved, and the separate debt was contracted afterwards with the bankrupt partner, who had agreed on the dissolution of the partnership to pay the joint debts, and who testified that he intended that the separate debt should, when contracted, be a credit for the joint debt. This might well constitute a case of mutual credit. But the court relied on the provisions of the bankrupt laws, which in fact on this point did not differ from those of the English bankrupt laws.

² *Ex parte Stephens*, 11 Ves. 24; *Ex parte Blagden*, 19 Ves. 466, 467; *Ex parte Hanson*, 12 Ves. 348; *Vulliamy v. Noble*, 3 Meriv. R. 621.

obligor set off against his obligation a claim against a mesne assignee of the same who has assigned to the present holder. *Downey v. Thorp*, 63 Penn. St. 322.

(a) *Blake v. Langdon*, 19 Vt. 485; *Fulkerson v. Davenport*, 70 Mo. 541; *Stammers v. Elliott*, L. R. 4 Eq. 675;

s. c. 3 Ch. 195; *Spurr v. Snyder*, 35 Conn. 172; *Upham v. Wyman*, 7 Allen, 499. Where a partner has allowed his separate debt to be offset against the firm's debt, equity will give relief. *Pierce v. Fynney*, L. R. 12 Eq. 69.

is nothing more than a security for the separate debt of the principal; and upon equitable considerations a creditor who has a joint security for a separate debt cannot resort to that security without allowing what he has received on the separate account for which the other was a security.¹ Indeed it may be generally stated that a joint debt may in equity be set off against a separate debt where there is a clear series of transactions establishing that there was a joint credit given on account of the separate debt.²

1437 *a*. It has been already suggested that Courts of Equity will extend the doctrine of set-off and claims in the nature of set-off beyond the law in all cases where peculiar equities intervene between the parties. These are so very various as to admit of no comprehensive enumeration. Some cases however illustrative of the doctrine may readily be put. Thus if an agent having a title to an estate should allow his principal to expend money upon the estate without any notice of that title, he will not be permitted after a recovery at law in ejectment to maintain an action at law against the principal for mesne profits; but Courts of Equity will require that to the extent of the improvements there shall be a set-off or compensation allowed to the principal against the mesne profits.³ So if an agent in his own name should procure a policy of insurance to be underwritten for his principal, he will be personally liable for the premium of insurance to the underwriters; and if he has also in his own name procured another policy to be underwritten for the same principal, and a loss occurs under the latter policy on which he sues the underwriters, they may in equity, if not at law, set off the premiums due on the first policy against such loss.⁴ (*a*)

1438. We may conclude this very brief review of the doctrine of set-off as recognized in Courts of Equity, a doctrine which is

¹ *Ex parte Hanson*, 12 Ves. 346; s. c. 18 Ves. 232; *Dale v. Cooke*, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 15; *Cheetham v. Crook*, 1 McClell. & Y. 307.

² *Vulliamy v. Noble*, 3 Meriv. 521, 593, 617, 618; *Tucker v. Oxley*, 5 Cranch, 34.

³ *Lord Cawdor v. Lewis*, 1 Younge & Coll. 427, 433. See *Money Penny v. Bristow*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 117.

⁴ *Leeds v. The Marine Insurance Company*, 6 Wheat. R. 565.

(*a*) As to set-off against factors who sell in their own name see *Ex parte Dixon*, 4 Ch. D. 133.

practically of rare occurrence in cases not within the statutes of set-off, either at law generally or in bankruptcy, by a few remarks upon the same subject as it is found recognized in the civil law. In the latter the doctrine was well known under the title of Compensation, which may be defined to be the reciprocal acquittal of debts between two persons who are indebted the one to the other;¹ or, as it is perhaps better stated by Pothier, ‘compensation is the extinction of debts of which two persons are reciprocally debtors to one another by the credits of which they are reciprocally creditors to one another.’² The civil law itself expressed it in a still more concise form. ‘Compensatio est debiti et crediti inter se contributio.’³

1439. The civil law treated compensation as founded upon a natural equity, and upon the mutual interest of each party to have the benefit of the set-off rather than to pay what he owed, and then to have an action for what was due to himself. ‘Ideo compensatio necessaria est quia interest nostra potius non solvere quam solutum repetere.’⁴ Baldus adds another and very just reason, that it avoids circuitry of action. ‘Quod potest brevis per unum actum expediri compensando, incassum protraheretur per plures solutiones et repetitiones.’⁵

1440. It has been truly said that the English doctrine of set-off has been borrowed from the Roman Jurisprudence. But there are several important differences between compensation in the civil law and set-off in our law.⁶ In the first place in our

¹ 1 Domat, Civ. Law, B. 4, tit. 2, § 1, art. 1.

² Pothier on Oblig. by Evans, n. 587 (n. 622 of French editions). Pothier has examined the whole subject with great ability, and given a full exposition of the doctrines of the civil law in his Treatise on Obligations, Pt. 3, ch. 4, n. 587 to 605 (n. 622 to 640 of French editions).

³ Dig. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 1; Pothier Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 1.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 3. See also Inst. Lib. 4, tit. 6, § 30.

⁵ Cited by Pothier on Oblig. n. 587 (n. 623 of French editions).

⁶ Mr. Chancellor Kent, in *Duncan v. Lyon* (3 John. Ch. R. 359) used the following language: ‘The doctrine of set-off was borrowed from the doctrine of compensation in the civil law. Sir Thomas Clarke shows the analogy in many respects on this point between the two systems; and the general rules in the allowance of compensation or set-off by the civil law as well as by the law of those countries in which that system is followed are the same as the English law. To authorize a set-off the debts must be between the parties in their own right, and must be of the same kind or quality, and be clearly ascertained or liquidated. They must be certain and determinate debts. Dig. 16, tit. 2, de Compensationibus, Code Lib. 4, tit. 31, l. 14, and Code Lib. 5, tit. 21, l. 1; Ersk. Inst. vol. 2, 525, 527; Pothier, Trait. des Oblig. No. 587 to 605;

law if the party has a right of set-off, he is not bound to exercise it; and if he does not exercise it, he is at liberty to commence an action afterwards for his own debt.¹ But in the civil law it was otherwise; for the cross debt to the same amount was by mere operation of law, and independent of the acts of the parties extinguished.² In support of this there are many texts of the civil law. ‘Posteaquam placuit inter omnes, id quod invicem debetur, *ipso jure* compensari.’³ ‘Unusquisque creditorem suum, eundemque debitorem, petentem summovet, si paratus est compensare.’⁴ ‘Si totum petas, plus petendo causa cadis.’⁵ ‘Si quis igitur compensare potens, solverit, condicere poterit, quasi indebito soluto.’⁶

1441. In the next place in our law the right of compensation or set-off is confined to debts properly so called, or to claims strictly terminating in such debts. In the civil law the right was more extensive; for not only might debts of a pecuniary nature be set off against each other, but debts or claims for specific articles of the same nature (as for corn, wine, or cotton) might also be set off against each other. All that was necessary was that the debt or claim to be compensated should be certain and determinate and actually due, and in the same right and of the same kind as that on the other side.⁷ The general rule was: ‘Aliud pro alio, invito creditori, solvi non potest.’⁸ ‘Ejus quod non ei debetur qui convenitur, sed alii, compensatio fieri non potest.’⁹ ‘Quod in diem debetur non compensabitur, antequam dies venit, quanquam dari oporteat.’¹⁰ ‘Compensatio debiti ex pari specie, et causa dispari, admittitur; velut si pecuniam tibi

Ferriere sur. Inst. tom. 6, 110, 113.’ See also *Whitaker v. Rush*, Ambler, R. 407 and 408.

¹ 2 Pothier, by Evans, App. 112, No. 13; *Baskerville v. Brown*, 2 Burr. 1229.

² Pothier on Oblig. n. 599 [635]; 1 Domat, B. 4, tit. 2, § 1, art. 4.

³ Dig. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 21; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. n. 3.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 1.

⁵ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 3.

⁶ Ibid. n. 5; Dig. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 10, § 1.

⁷ 1 Domat, Civ. Law, B. 4, tit. 2, § 2, art. 1 to 9; Pothier on Oblig. n. 588, 590 (n. 623, 626 of the French editions); Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 11 to 24; Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 31, l. 141.

⁸ Pothier on Oblig. (n. 588 n. 623 of the French editions); Dig. Lib. 12, tit. 1, l. 2, § 1.

⁹ Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 31, l. 9; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 15.

¹⁰ Dig. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 7; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 12.

debeam, et tu mihi pecuniam debeas, aut frumentum, aut cætera, hujusmodi, licet ex diverso contractu, compensare vel deducere debes.¹ The only exception to the rule was in case of deposits; for it was said, 'In causa depositi compensationi locus non est; sed res ipsa reddenda est.'²

1442. In another provision of the civil law we may distinctly trace an acknowledged principle of Equity Jurisprudence upon the same subject.³ The rule that compensation should be allowed of such debts only as were due to the party himself and in the same right had an exception in the case of sureties. A person who was surety for a debt might not only oppose as a compensation what was due from the creditor to himself, but also what was due to the principal debtor. 'Si quid a fidejussore petatur, æquissimum est eligere fidejussorem quod ipsi, an quod reo debetur, compensare malit; sed et, si utrumque velit compensare, audiendus est.'⁴

1443. There was another exception in the civil law which has not received the same favor in ours. It was generally true that a debt due from the creditor to a third person could not be insisted on by the debtor as a compensation even with the assent of such third person: 'Creditor compensare non cogitur quod alii quam debitori suo, debet; quamvis creditor ejus pro eo qui convenitur ob debitum proprium velit compensare.'⁵ Yet where the debtor had procured a cession or assignment of the debt of such third person, he might after notice to the creditor insist upon it by way of compensation. 'In rem suam procurator datus, post litis contestationem, si vice mutua conveniatur, æquitate compensationis utetur.'⁶

1444. These may suffice as illustrations of the civil law on the subject of compensation or set-off. The general equity and reasonableness of the principles upon which the Roman superstruc-

¹ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 22.

² Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 8; Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 31, l. 11; 1 Domat, Civ. Law, B. 4, tit. 2, § 2, art. 6.

³ Ante, § 1347.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 5; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 16; Pothier on Oblig. n. 595 [631].

⁵ Dig. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 18; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 16; Pothier on Oblig. n. 594 [629].

⁶ Dig. Lib. 16, tit. 2, l. 18; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 16, tit. 2, n. 15; Pothier on Oblig. n. 594 (n. 629, of the French editions).

ture is founded make it a matter of regret that they have not been transferred to their full extent into our system of Equity Jurisprudence. Why indeed in all cases of mutual debts independently of any notion of mutual credit Courts of Equity should not have at once supported and enforced the doctrine of the universal right of set-off as a matter of conscience and natural equity it is not easy to say. Having affirmed the natural equity, it seems difficult to account for the ground upon which they have refused the proper relief founded upon it. The very defect of the remedy at law furnishes an almost irresistible reason for such equitable relief. The doctrine of compensation has indeed been felicitously said to be among those things 'quæ jure aperto nituntur.'¹ The universality of its adoption in all the systems of jurisprudence which have derived their origin from Roman fountains demonstrates its persuasive justice and sound policy.² The common law in rejecting it from its bosom seems to have reposed upon its own sturdy independence or its own stern indifference. But the marvel is that Courts of Equity should have hesitated to foster it when their own principles of decision seem to demand the most comprehensive and liberal action on the subject.

¹ See Mr. Blunt's note to *Whitaker v. Rush*, Ambler, R. 408; note (6).

² See Pothier on Oblig. Pt. 3, ch. 4, n. 587 to 605 (n. 622 to 640 of the French editions); 1 Stair's Inst. B. 1, ch. 18, § 6; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 4, §§ 11 to 20; Heinecc. Elem. Juris. Germ. Lib. 2, tit. 17, § 475.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

ESTABLISHING WILLS.

1445. It has been already stated in another part of these Commentaries that the proper jurisdiction as to the validity of last wills and testaments belongs to other tribunals. Where a will respects personal estate it belongs to the Ecclesiastical Courts; and where it respects real estate it belongs to the Courts of Common Law.¹ (a) But although this is regularly true, and Courts of Equity will not in an adversary suit entertain jurisdiction to determine the validity of a will, yet whenever a will comes before them as an incident in a cause they necessarily entertain jurisdiction to some extent over the subject; and if the validity of the will is admitted by the parties, or if it is otherwise established by the proper modes of proof, they act upon it to the fullest extent.² If either of the parties should afterwards bring a new suit to contest the determination of the validity of the will so proved, the Court of Equity which has so determined it would certainly grant a perpetual injunction.³

1446. The usual manner in which Courts of Equity proceed in such cases is this: If the parties admit the due execution and

¹ Ante, §§ 184, 238; *Sheffield v. Duchess of Buckinghamshire*, 1 Atk. 629, 630; *Pemberton v. Pemberton*, 13 Ves. 297; *Jones v. Jones*, 3 Meriv. R. 161, 170. See *Barker v. Ray*, 2 Russ. R. 63.

² See *Morrison v. Arnold*, 19 Ves. 670, 671.

³ *Sheffield v. Duchess of Buckinghamshire*, 1 Atk. R. 630; 3 Wooddes. Lect. 59, p. 477.

(a) See *Allen v. McPherson*, 1 H. L. Cas. 191; *Meluish v. Milton*, 3 Ch. D. 27; *Broderick's Will*, 21 Wall. 503; *Ellis v. Davis*, 109 U. S. 485, 494; *Smith v. Harrison*, 2 Heisk. 230; *Townsend v. Townsend*, 4 Cold. 70. In the last case equity set up a lost will; and in *Smith v. Harrison* the court took jurisdiction to reinstate the probate on the ground that a verdict against the will on an issue of *devisavit vel non* had been obtained by fraud.

validity of the will it is deemed *ipso facto* sufficiently proved. If the will is of personal estate and a probate thereof is produced from the proper Ecclesiastical Court, that is ordinarily deemed sufficient. But if the parties are dissatisfied with the probate and contest the validity of the will, the Court of Equity in which the controversy is depending will suspend the determination of the cause in order to enable the parties to try its validity before the proper ecclesiastical tribunal, and will then govern itself by the result.¹ If the will is of real estate and its validity is contested in the cause, the court will in like manner direct its validity to be ascertained either by directing an issue to be tried or an action of ejectment to be brought at law, (a) and will govern its own judgment by the final result.² If the will is established in either case, a perpetual injunction may be decreed.³ (b)

1447. But it is often the primary although not the sole object of a suit in equity brought by devisees and others in interest to establish the validity of a will of real estate; and thereupon to obtain a perpetual injunction against the heir at law and others to restrain them from contesting its validity in future.⁴ (c) In such cases the jurisdiction exercised by Courts of Equity is somewhat analogous to that exercised in cases of bills of peace; and it is founded upon the like considerations, in order to suppress interminable litigation and to give security and repose to titles.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*; *Attorney-Gen. v. Turner*, Ambler, R. 587.

³ *Leighton v. Leighton*, 1 P. Will. 671.

⁴ *Bootle v. Blundell*, 19 Ves. 494, 509; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 297, 298; *Id.* ch. 4, § 5, p. 489; *Leighton v. Leighton*, 1 P. Will. 671; *Colton v. Wilson*, 3 P. Will. 192; *Devonsher v. Newenham*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 199; *Harris v. Cotterell*, 3 Meriv. 678, 679; *Morrison v. Arnold*, 19 Ves. 670, 671.

⁵ *Ante*, §§ 853, 859. The heir at law cannot come into equity for the pur-

(a) The heir may at his option have the issue *devisavit vel non* or an ejectment. *Grove v. Young*, 6 Eng. L. & E. 28; s. c. 15 Jur. 810; *infra*, note 5 to § 1447.

(b) *Boyse v. Rossborough*, Kay, 71; s. c. 3 DeG. M. & G. 817; 6 H. L. Cas. 1.

(c) See *Grove v. Bastard*, 2 Phill. 619; *Boyse v. Rossborough*, Kay, 71; s. c. 3 DeG. M. & G. 817; 6 H. L.

Cas. 1. But a purchaser of land the title to which is derived under a will is not entitled to have the will established, or to have a conveyance by the heir to him, unless some reasonable ground exists for doubting the validity of the will. *McCulloch v. Gregory*, 3 Kay & J. 12. How far the rule of establishing a will, in an action by a devisee or a purchaser, obtains in this country is not clear.

In every case of this sort Courts of Equity will, unless the heir waives it, direct an issue of *devisavit vel non* (as it is technically although according to Mr. Wooddeson barbarously expressed¹) to ascertain the validity of the will.² But it will not feel itself

pose of having an issue to try the validity of the will at law, unless it is by consent; for he may bring an ejectment. But if there are any impediments to the proper trial of the merits on such an ejectment, he may come into equity to have them removed. *Jones v. Jones*, 3 Meriv. R. 161, 170; *Bates v. Graves*, 2 Ves. jr. 288; 1 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, ch. 15, p. 628, note (1). Courts of Equity do not seem to have any direct or original authority to establish the validity of a will of real estate per se, but only as incidental to some other object, as carrying into effect trusts, marshalling assets, &c. For if no obstacles intervene, the devisee, if he has a legal estate, may sue at law. If after repeated trials at law in such a case the will is established by a satisfactory verdict and judgment, Courts of Equity will then interfere and grant a perpetual injunction against the heir to prevent endless litigation, as it does in other cases. *Bootle v. Blundell*, 19 Ves. 502.

¹ 2 Wooddes. Lect. 59, p. 478; *Bates v. Graves*, 2 Ves. jr. 287.

² *Pemberton v. Pemberton*, 11 Ves. 53; s. c. 13 Ves. 290; *Dawson v. Chater*, 9 Mod. 90; *Levy v. Levy*, 3 Madd. R. 245; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 3, § 7, note (t); *Bootle v. Blundell*, 19 Ves. 501, 502. The following extract from the report of the Chancery Commissioners to Parliament, in March, 1826, and the explanatory paper of Mr. Beames (p. 84), shows very distinctly the practice of the Courts of Equity in establishing wills: 'In a suit for establishing a will the heir at law is, by the long-established practice of the court, entitled to an issue *devisavit vel non*. But he cannot be compelled to decide whether he will or not require such issue until the hearing of the cause, when he will have had an opportunity of considering the evidence taken in the cause, and of satisfying his mind, so far as that evidence extends, whether he should or not have the matter investigated by the *viva voce* examination of the witnesses on the trial of an issue. If he should elect to have such an issue, as all the expense incurred in examining witnesses would, in the event of their being in existence at the time of the issue being tried, be wholly useless, and the evidence they had given in equity might possibly be made an improper use of by the heir when he came to try the issue, and at all events that evidence might not improbably in some measure affect that testimony which the witnesses might give on such trial, it seems expedient to provide that in all such suits for the establishment of wills neither party shall, before the hearing, enter into any evidence either to support or question the will, except that the plaintiff shall examine the attesting witnesses upon the usual interrogatories, and which apply only to the formal execution of the will, and the heir may cross-examine such witnesses.' See also *White v. Wilson*, 13 Ves. 87, 91, 92; *Bootle v. Blundell*, 19 Ves. 494, 505, 509; *Tatham v. Wright*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 1. In *Whitaker v. Newman*, 2 Hare, R. 299, on a bill to establish a will the heir admitted by his answer the execution of the will, but alleged that it was revoked by a subsequent will, by which the estate was devised to the heir, which subsequent will was unintentionally destroyed, and submitted that the subsequent will ought to be established, or that there was an intestacy; the court refused

bound by a single verdict either way if it is not entirely satisfactory; but it will direct new trials until there is no longer any reasonable ground for doubt.¹ (a) The general rule established in Courts of Equity is that upon every such issue and trial at law all the witnesses to the will should be examined if practicable, unless the heir should waive the proof.² But the rule is not absolutely inflexible, but it will yield to peculiar circumstances.³

an issue devisavit vel non, and no evidence having been given of the alleged revocation, established the original will.

¹ 3 Wooddeson, Lect. 59, p. 478, note (c); Attorney-Gen. v. Turner, Ambler, R. 587; Pemberton v. Pemberton, 11 Ves. 50, 52; s. c. 13 Ves. 290; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 499 to 501; Fowkes v. Chadd, 2 Dick. 576.

² Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 297, 298; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 499, 502, 505, 509; Ogle v. Cooke, 1 Ves. 177; Tatham v. Wright, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 1.

³ The doctrine was much considered in Tatham v. Wright (2 Russ. & Mylne, 1), which was first heard before the Master of the Rolls (Sir John Leach), who in speaking on this point, said: 'The effect of establishing a will in this court is to conclude all future questions respecting its validity; and the caution of this court requires therefore, before a will be established upon evidence here, that all the attesting witnesses shall be examined. If this court requires the aid of a court of law and the intervention of a jury to determine the validity of a will, it does not necessarily follow that a court of law must in such a case depart from its own rules and adopt those of a Court of Equity. When all the witnesses are not examined in the Court of Law and the cause comes on for further directions in a Court of Equity, there may be cases in which a Court of Equity, referring to its own principles, may not have its conscience fully satisfied by the verdict of the jury; as for instance where the general competence of the testator being admitted the question depends on the competency at the particular time of executing the will. There the attesting witnesses being the persons who can give the best testimony as to the special fact, it may be reasonable in the Court of Equity to send the case back in order that all the witnesses may be examined. But when, as in the present case, the question depends not upon the particular state of the testator's mind at the making of the will but upon his general competency throughout a long life, the attesting witnesses to the will may not be persons capable of speaking to the fact of general competency, and not therefore the most material witnesses in the consideration of a Court of Equity. It is further to be observed that the bill filed in this case is not by the devisees, to establish the testamentary instrument, but it is a bill by the heir at law, claiming against these instruments to have a legal estate put out of his way, in order that he may try the validity of these instruments by ejectment; and no decree in this cause would be conclusive upon the question of the validity of the will. The plaintiff might, by redeeming the mortgage, get in the outstanding legal estate by an

(a) As to when a new trial will be granted see *Waters v. Waters*, 2 DeG. & S. 591; *McGregor v. Topham*, 3 H. L. Cas. 132; *Hitch v. Wells*, 10 Beav. 84.

When by these means upon a verdict the validity of the will is fully established, the court will by its decree declare it to be well

assignment of the mortgage, or even upon the hearing, upon further directions, he might still contend that he ought not to be concluded by the trial of the issues, and that the Court of Equity should still permit him to proceed by restraining the defendants from opposing to him the legal estates. It is not however for the present purpose necessary to advert to these distinctions. The complaint that the two other witnesses were not examined is made by the heir to whom they were tendered, who had full opportunity of examining them, but thought fit to decline that examination. He declined it because he wished to have the technical advantage which, by the rules of law, results from considering those persons witnesses of his opponent. Can he therefore with effect say that it must be inferred that the witnesses, if examined, could have given evidence in his favor when it was his own choice that such evidence should not be laid before the court?' The cause was reheard before Lord Chancellor Brougham, with the assistance of Lord Chief Justice Tindal and Lord Chief Baron Lyndhurst. Lord Chief Justice Tindal, in delivering the opinion of himself and the Lord Chief Baron, said: 'It may be taken to be generally true that in cases where the devisee files a bill to set up and establish the will, and an issue is directed by the court upon the question *devisavit vel non*, this court will not decree the establishment of the will, unless the devisee has called all the subscribing witnesses to the will or accounted for their absence. And there is good reason for such a general rule. For as a decree in support of the will is final and conclusive against the heir, against whom an injunction would be granted if he should proceed to disturb the possession after the decree, it is but reasonable that he should have the opportunity of cross-examining all the witnesses to the will before his right of trying the title of the devisee is taken from him. In that case it is the devisee who asks for the interference of this court, and he ought not to obtain it until he has given every opportunity to the heir at law to dispute the validity of the will. This is the ground upon which the practice is put in the cases of *Ogle v. Cooke* (1 Ves. sen. 177) and *Townsend v. Ives* (1 Wils. 216). But it appears clearly, from the whole of the reasoning of the Lord Chancellor in the case of *Bootle v. Blundell* (1 Mer. 193, Cooper, 136), that this rule, as a general rule, applies only to the case of a bill filed to establish the will (an establishing bill, as Lord Eldon calls it in one part of his judgment), and an issue directed by the court upon that bill. And even in cases to which the rule generally applies, this court, it would seem, under particular circumstances, may dispense with the necessity of the three witnesses being called by the plaintiff in the issue. For, in *Lowe v. Jolliffe* (1 W. Black. 365), where the bill was filed by the devisees under the will, and an issue *devisavit vel non* was tried at bar, it appears, from the report of the case, that the subscribing witnesses to the will and codicil, who swore that the testator was utterly incapable of making a will, were called by the defendant in the issue, and not by the plaintiff; for the Reporter says, "to encounter this evidence, the plaintiff's counsel examined the friends of the testator, who strongly deposed to his sanity;" and again the Chief Justice expressed his opinion to be that all the defendant's witnesses were grossly and corruptly perjured. And after the trial of this issue the will was established. In such a case to have compelled the devisee to call these witnesses would have been to smother the investigation of the truth. Now in the present case the applica-

proved and that it ought to be established, and will grant a perpetual injunction.¹ (a)

1448. If however the devisees have no further present object than merely to establish the will by perpetuating the testimony of the witnesses thereto, this may be done (as we shall presently see) by a proper bill for the purpose; and the latter is indeed what is usually meant by proving a will in chancery.² (b)

1449. It may be proper also to take notice in this place (allusion to this court is not by the devisee seeking to establish the will, but by the heir at law calling upon this court to declare the will void, and to have the same delivered up. The heir at law does not seek to try his title by an ejectment, and apply to this court to direct that no mortgage or outstanding terms shall be set up against him to prevent his title from being tried at law; but seeks to have a decree in his favor in substance and effect to set aside the will. This case therefore stands upon a ground directly opposed to that upon which the cases above referred to rests. So far from the heir at law being bound by a decree which the devisee seeks to obtain, it is he who seeks to bind the devisee; and such is the form of his application that if he fails upon this issue he would not be bound himself. For the only result of a verdict in favor of the will would be that the heir at law would obtain no decree, and his bill would be dismissed, still leaving him open to his remedies at law. No decided case has been cited in which the rule has been held to apply to such a proceeding, and certainly neither reason nor good sense demands that this court should establish such a precedent under the circumstances of this case. If the object of the court in directing an issue is to inform its own conscience by sifting the truth to the bottom, that course should be adopted with respect to the witnesses which by experience is found best adapted to the investigation of the truth. And that is not attained by any arbitrary rule that such witnesses must be called by one, and such by the other party; but by subjecting the witnesses to the examination in chief of that party whose interest it is to call him from the known or expected bearing of his testimony, and to compel him to undergo the cross-examination of the adverse party against whom his evidence is expected to make.' Lord Brougham expressed his own opinion in the following language: 'There is a broad line of distinction between cases where the moving party seeks to set the will aside, and cases where the moving party is a devisee seeking to establish it; the rule which makes it imperative to call all the witnesses to a will must be considered as applicable to the latter only.'

¹ Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 297, 298, and cases before cited.

² 3 Black. Comm. 450.

(a) See *Boyse v. Rossborough, Kay*, 71. If the heir does not dispute the will, but acts under it, merely denying that certain lands pass under the language of the will, equity has full jurisdiction to determine this question without granting an issue of devisavit

vel non, or it may grant such issue at its discretion. *Ricketts v. Turquand*, 1 H. L. Cas. 472.

(b) *Boyse v. Rossborough, Kay*, 71; s. c. 3 DeG. M. & G. 817; 6 H. L. Cas. 1.

though it more frequently arises in the exercise of the auxiliary or assistant jurisdiction) that Courts of Equity in cases of this sort, where the original will is lodged in the custody of the register of the Ecclesiastical Court, and it may be necessary to be produced before witnesses resident abroad whose testimony is to be taken under a commission to prove its due execution, will direct the original will to be delivered out by such officer to a fit person to be named by the party in interest, such party first giving security, to be approved by the judge of the Ecclesiastical Court, to return the same within a specified time. If there is any dispute about the security for the safe custody and return of the will, it will be referred to a master to settle and adjust the same.¹ If the commission is to be executed within the realm and the witnesses are therein, the Court will direct the original will to be brought into its own registry to lie there until the court has done with it,² or to be delivered out on giving security.³ (a)

¹ *Frederick v. Aynscompe*, 1 Atk. R. 627, 628.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Morse v. Roach*, 2 Str. 961.

(a) See *Eyres v. Broderick*, 15 Jur. 865; s. c. 5 Eng. L. & E. 599.

CHAPTER XL.

AWARDS.

1450. COURTS of Equity also formerly exercised a large jurisdiction in matters of AWARDS. But by means of statutes which have been passed both in England and America the jurisdiction has become in a practical sense, although not in a theoretical view, greatly narrowed and is now of rare occurrence. It may not however be without use to refer to some of the more ordinary cases in which that jurisdiction was originally exerted, and still may be exerted in cases where no statute of the States interferes with the due exercise thereof. And it is constantly to be borne in mind that the subsequent remarks, even when not so expressly qualified, are to be understood with this limitation, that there are no statutable provisions which vary or control the general jurisdiction of equity in matters of award.¹

¹ Com. Dig. Chancery, 2 K. 1 to 6; Stat. 9 & 10 Will. III. ch. 15; Bac. Abr. Arbitration and Award, B. The Statute of 9 & 10 Will. III. ch. 15, in England, authorizing submissions to arbitrations to be made a rule of the Court of King's Bench or other court of record, has very materially changed the jurisdiction of the English Courts of Equity over awards made under submissions made in pursuance of the statute. In *Nichols v. Roe*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 431, the subject, how far an award made upon a submission pursuant to the statute ousted the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity was much discussed. Lord Chancellor Brougham decided against the jurisdiction, and said: 'It is necessary to observe that this was a submission, not in a cause depending either here or at law, but by agreement with the usual power for either party to make the submission a rule of the Court of King's Bench or other court of record. It was therefore altogether under and within the Statute of 9 & 10 W. III. ch. 15, and consequently the proceedings must be governed by that statute, and so must all the rights and equities of the parties. As there was the accustomed clause in the agreement that no action or suit in equity should be brought by either party to impeach the award, I shall say a word upon that in order to dismiss the point. It has frequently been denied that any such agreement can ever oust the jurisdiction of this court;

1451. In cases of fraud, mistake, or accident Courts of Equity may, in virtue of their general jurisdiction, interfere to set aside

and in *Nichols v. Chalie* (14 Ves. 265), Lord Eldon said the point had never been determined. I need not now determine it; the party against whom the bill to set aside the award is filed, might, had he thought fit, have availed himself of it by plea; but it is quite unnecessary towards the decision of the present question that anything should be said upon the matter. When we examine the elaborate remarks of Lord Eldon in *Nichols v. Chalie*, and what he afterwards says in the subsequent case of *Gwinett v. Bannister* (14 Ves. 530), and compare those passages with Lord Loughborough's judgment in *Lord Lonsdale v. Littledale* (2 Ves. jr. 451), and look into the arguments at the bar, — in all the three cases it is matter of surprise that any doubt should ever have been entertained on the subject. For the statute is undoubtedly repealed in its most express provision, if the jurisdiction continues to reside in this court after the parties have resorted elsewhere under the act. There can be no more plain or distinct terms used than those of the latter part of the first section of the act. After directing process of contempt to issue for enforcing performance of the award, it proceeds thus: "Which process shall not be stopped or delayed in its execution by any order, rule, command, or process of any other court, either of law or equity, unless it shall be made to appear on oath to such court that the arbitrators or umpire misbehaved themselves, and that such award, arbitration, or umpirage was procured by corruption or other undue means." I may stop here to observe that the courts have long extended this exception to cases of mistake in law. *Kent v. Elstob* (3 East, 13). Now this prohibition is plainly made to preclude all review of the award, either at law or in equity, excepting on those special grounds. But it is also to be intended as giving to that court only in which the submission is made a rule, the power of reviewing the award; for if the literal meaning of the words were adopted, namely, that in the excepted cases either party might go to a Court of Equity and make it appear on oath that there were grounds for impeaching the award, — first, this would prove too much, for it would enable the same party to go to some other Court of Law; and who ever heard of the Court of Common Pleas setting aside an award made a rule of court in the King's Bench, or who ever made such an attempt? Indeed the second section expressly confines the application to the court in which the submission was made a rule; for it says that "any arbitration or umpirage, procured by corruption or undue practices, shall be judged and esteemed void and of none effect, and accordingly be set aside by any Court of Law or Equity, so as complaint of such corruption or undue practice be made in the court where the rule is made for submission to such arbitration or umpirage, before the last day of the next term after such arbitration or umpirage made and published to the parties." Secondly, the words used in the exception to the prohibition of the first section that the ground of impeachment must be made to appear on oath to such court, are the words always used to describe proceedings by affidavit; and the Courts of Law and Equity are here — and they are throughout the statute mentioned in the same manner, so that the proceeding is to be alike in all — not a submission made a rule of the Court of Law, and then a bill filed in equity to set it aside, but the submission to be made a rule, either of a Court of Law or a Court of Equity, and application made to the same court by affidavit on the behalf of those seeking to impeach the award. It must be further observed that the second section

awards upon the same principles and for the same reasons which justify their interference in regard to other matters where there

affixes a period of limitation, — a time within which the application must be made, where there are grounds to bring the case within the exception. It shall be “before the last day of the next term after such arbitration or umpirage made and published to the parties.” This is very material; for the provision would be rendered wholly nugatory by allowing the party to come here and file his bill and move for his injunction, which I presume he may do within the usual period, — that is, at any time within twenty years. Such being my clear opinion on the construction of the statute and its bearing upon this question, I have only to observe on the cases that the older ones are not in similar circumstances to the present, though as far as they go they bear out the doctrine I contend for, and tend to exclude the jurisdiction. In this view reference may be had to *Kampshire v. Young* (2 Atk. 155); *Chicot v. Lequesne* (2 Ves. sen. 315), and *Spettigue v. Carpenter* (3 P. Wms. 361). But the parallel cases are the more recent ones in the time of Lord Loughborough and Lord Eldon which I have already mentioned, — *Lord Lonsdale v. Littledale*, *Nichols v. Chalie*, and *Gwinett v. Bannister*. The first of these cases was the one in which the court sustained its jurisdiction; and Lord Eldon, in *Nichols v. Chalie*, makes some strong observations upon Lord Loughborough’s argument in its favor, and plainly doubts, if he does not quite deny, the authority of the case. But what prevents its application to the question now before the court is, that Lord Lonsdale *v. Littledale* did not arise at all under the Statute of 9 & 10 W. III. In that case a verdict had been taken at the trial of a cause for nominal damages, subject to a reference, and the award was made a rule of court. This is explicitly allowed by Lord Loughborough not to be a case within or under the statute. It is true that his Lordship goes on to state his opinion that even if the case were one of a reference under the statute he should still hold the equitable jurisdiction not to be excluded. But this is merely an extra-judicial dictum from which, for the reasons above assigned, I take leave to dissent. Lord Eldon in *Nichols v. Chalie* nearly overruled it, and in *Gwinett v. Bannister* he did so altogether. These two cases, and the last especially, appear to close the question; and Lord Eldon in commenting upon the statute adopts the same construction which I have put upon it. It was a case precisely the same with the present in every particular save one, — that here the bill was filed before the submission was made a rule of court, and in that case the bill was filed after the submission was made a rule of court. But I do not think that this makes any material difference. In — *v. Mills* (17 Ves. 419) a similar distinction was taken; but Lord Eldon disposed of the application on another ground, and said nothing of this. But surely the mere filing of a bill cannot be held to destroy the force of the statutory provision, more especially as the party filing the bill might any moment have applied to the Court of King’s Bench. He says his adversary had not made it a rule of court, and so he could not move. There never was a greater mistake; he might himself have made it a rule and then moved. If not, any one possessed of an award in this form could defeat his adversary’s right of moving to set aside the award by not making the submission a rule of court till the period had elapsed within which the statute allows the motion to be made impeaching it. The constant practice is the other way.’ See also *Nichols v. Chalie*, 14 Ves. 264.

is no adequate remedy at law.¹ (a) And if there be no statute to the contrary, an agreement by the party on entering into an arbitration not to bring any action or suit in equity to impeach the award made under it will be held not obligatory if there be in fact from fraud, or mistake, or accident, or otherwise, a good ground to impeach it or to require it to be set aside.²

1452. It is well known that when a suit is brought at the common law upon an award, no extrinsic circumstances or matter of fact dehors the award can be pleaded or given in evidence to defeat it. Thus for example fraud, partiality, misconduct, (b) or mistake of the arbitrators is not admissible to defeat it.³ (c) But

¹ See *Duncan v. Lyon*, 3 John. Ch. R. 356; *Champion v. Wenham*, Ambler, R. 245; *Knox v. Symmonds*, 1 Ves. jr. 369; *South Sea Company v. Bumstead*, 2 Eq. Abr. 80, pl. 8; *Gartside v. Gartside*, 3 Anst. 735; *Earl v. Stocker*, 2 Vern. 251; *Ives v. Metcalfe*, 1 Atk. 64; *Emery v. Wase*, 5 Ves. 846, 847; *Attorney-Gen. v. Jackson*, 5 Hare, R. 366.

² See *Nichols v. Chalie*, 14 Ves. 264, 269; *Nichols v. Rowe*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 431; *Street v. Rigby*, 6 Ves. 815; *Chesslyn v. Dalby*, 2 Younge & Coll. 170.

³ *Wills v. Maccarmic*, 2 Wils. R. 148; *Bac. Abr. Arbitrament and Award*, K.; *Braddick v. Thompson*, 8 East, 344; *Underhill v. Van Cortlandt*, 2 John. Ch. R. 336, 367; s. c. 17 John. R. 405; *Kyd on Awards*, ch. 7, p. 327.

(a) That an award is unconscionable and oppressive towards one of the parties may be good cause for setting it aside in equity, if the plaintiff is free from fault. *Brewer v. Bain*, 60 Ala. 153.

(b) Contra generally, it seems, in this country. *Bean v. Farnham*, 6 Pick. 269; *Boston Water Co. v. Gray*, 6 Met. 131; *Strong v. Strong*, 9 Cush. 560; *Conrad v. Massasoit Ins. Co.*, 4 Allen, 20; *Mickles v. Thayer*, 14 Allen, 114; *Ferson v. Drew*, 19 Wis. 225. See also *Gaylord v. Norton*, 130 Mass. 74; *Hoosac Tunnel Co. v. O'Brien*, 137 Mass. 424. Indeed fraud may be a ground for collaterally impeaching even a judgment. See *Bigelow, Estoppel*, 157-165, 195, 241-245, 3d ed.

(c) That mistake of law or of fact is no ground of objection to an award, unless it is manifest on the face of the record, or unless it is obvious or very gross, or unless it is produced by the fraud or misconduct of the opposite party, is clear. *Infra*, note 3 to § 1454; *Withington v. Warren*, 10 Met. 431;

Boston Water Co. v. Gray, 6 Met. 131, 169, 170 (where the court speak of obvious mistake); *Strong v. Strong*, 9 Cush. 560, 569; *Cutting v. Carter*, 29 Vt. 72; *Matthews v. Matthews*, 1 Heisk. 669. So in equity. *Davis v. Henry*, 121 Mass. 150. In this last case the court say: 'When it is sought to set aside an award upon the ground of a mistake committed by arbitrators, it is not sufficient to show that they came to a conclusion of fact erroneously, however clearly it may be demonstrated that the inference drawn by them was wrong. It must be shown that, by some error, they were so misled or deceived that they did not apply the rules which they intended to apply to the decision of the case, so that upon their own theory a mistake was made which has caused the result to be something different from that which they had reached by their reason and judgment. *Boston Water Co. v. Gray*, 6 Met. 131, 169; *Carter v. Carter*, 109 Mass. 306; *Spoor v. Tyzzer*, 115 Mass.

Courts of Equity will in all such cases, grant relief, and upon due proofs will set aside the award.¹ (a)

1453. In regard to a mistake of the arbitrators it may be in a matter of fact or in a matter of law. If upon the face of the award there is a plain mistake of law or of fact material to the decision, which misled the judgment of the arbitrators, there can be little or no reason to doubt that Courts of Equity will grant relief.² But the difficulty is whether the mistake of fact or of

¹ Lord Harris *v.* Mitchell, 2 Vern. 485; Chicot *v.* Lequesne, 2 Ves. 315; Brown *v.* Brown, 1 Vern. 159, Mr. Raithby's note (1); Lingwood *v.* Eade, 2 Atk. 501; Morgan *v.* Mather, 2 Ves. jr. 15. The Statute of 9 & 10 Will. III. ch. 15, has in England made great alterations in the exercise of this general jurisdiction; for it seems that an award under that statute is not generally remediable in equity on account of fraud or misconduct of the arbitrators; but only in the court of which the submission is made a rule and within the time therein prescribed. See Auriol *v.* Smith, 1 Turn. & Russ. 121, 126, 127, 134 to 136; ante, § 1450, note 1. (b)

² Corneforth *v.* Greer, 2 Vern. 705; Ridout *v.* Payne, 1 Ves. 11; s. c. 3 Atk. 494.

40.' This appears to be the 'obvious' mistake considered by Shaw, C. J. See 6 Met. 169, 170, where examples are stated; and these are repeated in Vanderwerker *v.* Vermont Cent. R. Co., 27 Vt. 130.

An injunction may be granted against proceeding with an arbitration, where a party has been guilty of fraud or other serious misconduct, or an arbitrator of corruption. Pickering *v.* Cape Town Ry. Co., L. R. 1 Eq. 84; Beddow *v.* Beddow, 9 Ch. D. 89. So where, in Cutting *v.* Carter, 29 Vt. 72, one of the parties to an arbitration procured an allowance in his own favor by withholding his books and papers from inspection, when he was conscious that his claim was unfounded, and that a free inspection would disclose the fact, equity set aside the award. And wherever a party before arbitrators procures the allowance of a claim which he knows to be fictitious, doing this upon fictitious or fabricated testimony, equity will set aside the award, and enjoin the party from suing thereon. *Ib.*; Emerson *v.* Udall, 13 Vt. 477. Probably such

facts would also avail to impeach a mere award collaterally, as in a suit upon it. It will help to an understanding of the case to bear in mind that an award not entered as a judgment of court is not properly speaking *res judicata*, but the result of an agreement of parties in the ordinary way. Hence the question appears simply to be, what that agreement in any respect fairly implies. See e. g. Nickels *v.* Hancock, 7 DeG. M. & G. 300, an award in excess of the authority. A judgment of that sort could not well happen if the court had jurisdiction. But see as to an award by statutory commissioners, alleged to be *ultra vires*, Baleman *v.* Boynton, L. R. 1 Ch. 359.

(a) Malmsbury Ry. Co. *v.* Budd, 2 Ch. D. 113; Wolff *v.* Shelton, 51 Ala. 425.

(b) The jurisdiction over awards in pais remains. Hamilton *v.* Rankin, 3 DeG. & S. 782. In this country see Sisk *v.* Garry, 27 Md. 401; Fletcher *v.* Hubbard, 43 N. H. 58; Elkins *v.* Page, 45 N. H. 310; Pulliam *v.* Pensoneau, 33 Ill. 375.

law is to be made out by extrinsic evidence, and whether a mistake of law upon a general submission, involving the decision both of law and fact, constitutes a valid objection. Upon these points the decisions of Courts of Law and Courts of Equity are not reconcilable with each other; and it is not easy to lay down any doctrine which may not be met by some authority.¹

1454. Perhaps the following will be found to be the doctrines most reconcilable with the leading authorities: Arbitrators being the chosen judges of the parties are in general to be deemed judges of the law as well as of the facts applicable to the case upon them. (a) If no reservation is made in the submission, the parties are presumed to agree that every question both as to law and fact necessary for the decision is to be included in the arbitration. Under a general submission therefore the arbitrators have rightfully a power to decide on the law and on the fact. (b) And under such a submission they are not bound to award on mere dry principles of law, but they make their award according to the principles of equity and good conscience.² Subject therefore to the qualifications hereafter mentioned, a general award cannot be impeached collaterally, or by evidence aliunde, for any mistake of law or of fact, unless there be some fraud or misbehavior in the arbitrators.³ (c) These qualifications will now be stated.

¹ In *Chace v. Westmore* (13 East, R. 358), Lord Ellenborough said: 'I fear it is impossible to lay down any general rule upon this subject in what cases the court will suffer an award to be opened. It must be subject to some degree of uncertainty, depending upon the circumstances of each case.'

² *Knox v. Symmonds*, 1 Ves. jr. 369; *South Sea Company v. Bunstead*, 6 Eq. Abr. 80, pl. 8; *Shepard v. Merrill*, 2 John. Ch. R. 276; *Delver v. Barnes*, 1 Taunt. R. 48, 51.

³ *Morgan v. Mather*, 2 Ves. jr. 15 to 17, 22; *Knox v. Symmonds*, 1 Ves. jr. 369; *Chace v. Westmore*, 13 East, 357, 358; *Todd v. Barlow*, 2 John. Ch. R. 551; *Herrick v. Blair*, 1 John. Ch. R. 101; *Underhill v. Van Cortlandt*, 2 John. Ch. R. 339, 361; *Greenhill v. Church*, 3 Ch. R. 49 [88]; *Cavendish v. —*, 1 Ch. Cas. 279; *Brown v. Brown*, 1 Vern. 157; *Emery v. Wase*, 5 Ves.

(a) *Hoosac Tunnel Co. v. O'Brien*, 137 Mass. 424.

(b) See *Boston Water Co. v. Gray*, 6 Met. 131; *Fairchild v. Adams*, 11 Cush. 549.

(c) See *Moseley v. Simpson*, L. R. 16 Eq. 226, 739; *Cleland v. Hedly*, 5 R. I. 163; *Speer v. Bidwell*, 44 Penn.

St. 23. But an action cannot be maintained against an arbitrator under a rule of court, for misconduct. *Hoosac Tunnel Co. v. O'Brien*, 137 Mass. 424. Secus of an attorney in the cause, for conspiring successfully with an arbitrator to obtain an unjust award. *Ib.*

1455. First, in regard to matters of law. If arbitrators refer any point of law to judicial inquiry by spreading it on the face of their award, and they mistake the law in a palpable and material point, their award will be set aside.¹ (a) If they admit the law but decide contrary thereto upon principles of equity and good conscience, although such intent appear upon the face of the award, it will constitute no objection to it. If they mean to decide strictly according to law and they mistake it, although the mistake is made out by extrinsic evidence, that will be sufficient to set it aside.² (b) But their decision upon a doubtful point of

846; *Ives v. Medcalfe*, 1 Atk. 64; *Tittenson v. Peat*, 3 Atk. 529; *Champion v. Wenham*, Ambler, R. 245; *Boutillier v. Tick*, 1 Dowl. & Ryl. 366; *Wood v. Griffith*, 1 Swanst. 43; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2 K. 6. In *Knox v. Symmonds* (1 Ves. jr. 369), Lord Thurlow said: 'A party to an award cannot come to have it set aside upon the simple ground of erroneous judgment in the arbitrator; for to his judgment they refer their disputes, and that would be a ground for setting aside every award. In order to induce the court to interfere there must be something more; as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake, either apparent upon the face of the award or to be made out by evidence. But in case of mistake it must be made out to the satisfaction of the arbitrator, and the party must convince him that his judgment was influenced by that mistake, and that if it had not happened he should have made a different award. But this relates only to a general reference to arbitration of all matters in dispute between the parties. But upon a reference to an arbitrator to inquire into facts, &c., the reference is to him in the character of a master, and the court is to draw the conclusion; and if the arbitrator has taken upon himself to do so, the court will see that he has drawn a right conclusion. Upon a general reference to arbitration of all matters in dispute between the parties the arbitrator has a greater latitude than the court in order to do complete justice between the parties; for instance he may relieve against a right which bears hard upon one party, but which having been acquired legally and without fraud could not be resisted in a court of justice.' See *Nichols v. Roe*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 438, 439.

¹ *Knox v. Symmonds*, 1 Ves. jr. 369; *Ridout v. Payne*, 3 Atk. 494; *Kent v. Elstop*, 3 East, R. 18.

² *Kleine v. Catara*, 2 Gallis. R. 70, 71; *Young v. Walter*, 9 Ves. 364, 366;

(a) *White v. White*, 21 Vt. 250; *Jones v. Boston Mill Corp.* 6 Pick. 148, 154; *Estes v. Mansfield*, 6 Allen, 69; *Speer v. Bidwell*, 44 Penn. St. 23; *Brewer v. Bain*, 60 Ala. 153.

(b) *White v. White*, 21 Vt. 250; *West Jersey R. Co. v. Thomas*, 6 C. E. Green, 205; *Ruckman v. Ransom*, 23 N. J. Eq. 118. And equity will hear the testimony of the arbitrators on this subject, and if it appear that

a mistake of law or of fact was made, but for which a different result would have been reached, the award will, it is held in England, be set aside or referred back. In *re Dare Valley Ry. Co.*, L. R. 6 Eq. 429. See *Bucclench v. Metropolitan Board of Works*, L. R. 5 H. L. 418. This in terms is wider than the Massachusetts rule, *supra*, note (c) to § 1452, but perhaps no more is meant.

law, or in a case where the question of law itself is designedly left to their judgment and decision, will generally be held conclusive.¹ (a)

1456. Secondly, in regard to matters of fact the judgment of the arbitrators is ordinarily deemed conclusive.² (b) If however there is a mistake of material fact apparent upon the face of the award, or if the arbitrators are themselves satisfied of the mistake and state it (although it is not apparent on the face of the award), and if in their own view it is material to the award, then, although made out by extrinsic evidence, Courts of Equity will grant relief.³ (c)

1457. Courts of Equity will not enforce the specific performance of an agreement to refer any matter in controversy between adverse parties, deeming it against public policy to exclude from

Blennerhassett v. Day, 2 Ball & Beatt. 120; *Ainslee, Goff, Kyd on Awards*, ch. 7, pp. 351 to 354 (2d edit.); s. c. cited in *Delver v. Barnes*, 1 Taunt. R. 48, 53, note (a); *Richardson v. Nourse*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 237.

¹ *Ching v. Ching*, 6 Ves. 282; *Young v. Walter*, 9 Ves. 364; *Chace v. Westmore*, 13 East, R. 357; *Campbell v. Twemlow*, 1 Price, R. 81; *Steff v. Andrews*, 2 Madd. R. 6, 9; *Wood v. Griffith*, 1 Swanst. 55; *Underhill v. Van Cortlandt*, 2 John. Ch. 339; *Roosevelt v. Thurman*, 1 John. Ch. R. 220, 226; *Richardson v. Nourse*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 237; *Sharman v. Bell*, 5 Maule & Selwyn, 504. Even at law, in *Chace v. Westmore* (13 East, R. 358), Lord Ellenborough said: 'But it is enough to say in the present case, where the merits in law and fact were referred to a person competent to decide upon oath, we will not open the award, unless it could be shown to be so notoriously against justice and his duty as an arbitrator that we could infer misconduct on his part.'

² See *Price v. Williams*, 1 Ves. jr. 365; s. c. 3 Bro. Ch. R. 163; *Morgan v. Mather*, 2 Ves. jr. 15 to 18, 20, 22; *Dick v. Milligan*, 2 Ves. jr. 23; *Goodman v. Sayers*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 249, 259.

³ *Knox v. Symmonds*, 1 Ves. jr. 369. See *Rogers v. Dallimore*, 6 Taunt. R. 111. These distinctions are principally drawn from the case of *Kleine v. Catara* (2 Gallis. R. 71), where the principal authorities are collected. See also *Bac. Abr. Arbitrament and Award*, K.; *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 2 K. 1 to 6; *Kyd on Awards*, ch. 7, pp. 327 to 380 (2d edit.); *Watson on Arbitration*, ch. 9, § 4, pp. 161 to 178; *Attorney-Gen. v. Jackson*, 5 Hare, R. 366.

(a) See *Jones v. Boston Mill Corp.*, 6 Pick. 148, 155, 156.

(b) That is, where the arbitrators have drawn inferences from actual facts or, it seems, from what may be deemed a probable state of facts. See *Boston Water Co. v. Gray*, 6 Met. 131, 169. A mere error of judgment is no ground for interference, since the

judgment of a chancellor on facts is as fallible as that of an arbitrator. *Vanderwerker v. Vermont Cent. R. Co.*, 27 Vt. 130. See *Jones v. Boston Mill Corp.*, 6 Pick. 148.

(c) See *Boston Water Co. v. Gray*, 6 Met. 131, 169; *In re Dare Valley Ry. Co.*, L. R. 6 Eq. 429; *Bissell v. Morgan*, 56 Barb. 369.

the appropriate judicial tribunals of the State any persons who in the ordinary course of things have a right to sue there.¹ Neither will they for the same reason compel arbitrators to make an award;² nor when they have made an award will they compel them to disclose the grounds of their judgment.³ (a) The latter doctrine stands upon the same ground of public policy as the others; that is to say, in the first instance, not to compel a resort to these domestic tribunals, and on the other hand not to disturb their decisions when made, except upon very cogent reasons. (b)

1458. When an award has actually been made, and it is unimpeached and unimpeachable, it constitutes a bar to any suit for the same subject-matter both at law and in equity. (c) And

¹ *Kill v. Hollister*, 1 Wils. R. 129; *Mitchell v. Harris*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 312, 315; s. c. 2 Ves. jr. 131; *Street v. Rigby*, 6 Ves. 815, 818; *Crawshay v. Collins*, 1 Swanst. R. 40; *Agar v. Macklew*, 2 Sim. & Stn. 418; *Gourlay v. Somerset*, 19 Ves. 431; *Tobey v. The County of Bristol*, 3 Story, R. 800.

² *Kyd on Awards*, ch. 4, p. 100 (2d London edit.). In this respect our law differs from the Roman law; for by the latter arbitrators would, unless under special circumstances, be compelled to make an award when they had taken the office upon themselves. Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 8, l. 3, §§ 1, 3; *Kyd on Awards*, ch. 4, pp. 98, 99, and note (2d Lond. ed.); post, § 1496.

³ *Anon.* 3 Atk. 644; *Story on Eq. Plead.* § 825, note 1.

(a) See *Willisford v. Watson*, L. R. 14 Eq. 572; *Law v. Garret*, 8 Ch. D. 26.

(b) An agreement to arbitrate which ousts the jurisdiction of the courts is void as against public policy, and is so treated in equity as well as at law. *Pearl v. Harris*, 121 Mass. 390; *Wood v. Humphrey*, 114 Mass. 185; *Tobey v. Bristol*, 3 Story, 800. But on the other hand there may be a valid condition precedent to arbitrate before suing in the courts. *Scott v. Avery*, 8 Ex. 487; s. c. 5 H. L. Cas. 811; *Wood v. Humphrey*, supra; *Rowe v. Williams*, 97 Mass. 163; *Cobb v. New England Ins. Co.*, 6 Gray, 192, 204; *Scott v. Liverpool*, 3 DeG. & J. 334; *Jones v. St. Johns College*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 115; *Elliott v. Royal Assur. Co.*, L. R. 2 Ex. 237; *Sharpe v. San Paulo Ry. Co.*, L. R. 8 Ch. 597; *Gray v. Wilson*, 4 Watts, 39; *Herrick v.*

Belknap, 27 Vt. 673; *Hill v. More*, 40 Maine, 515. For such a condition admits the right of the parties to go to the courts, but only prescribes a necessary preliminary step. *Wood v. Humphrey*, supra. A fortiori will any general agreement to arbitrate be good which does not profess to prevent the parties from resorting to the courts at any time. *Scott v. Avery*, supra; *Rowe v. Williams*, supra; *Smith v. Lloyd*, 26 Beav. 507. E. g. a rule or by-law of a society that all disputes among the members shall be settled by arbitration. *Smith v. Lloyd*, supra. Nor does it matter that the agreement is that the 'award shall be final.' *Rowe v. Williams*, supra. Further see *Vickers v. Vickers*, L. R. 4 Eq. 529; *Dinham v. Bradford*, L. R. 5 Ch. 519; *Richardson v. Smith*, Ib. 648; *Kimberly v. Dick*, L. R. 13 Eq. 1.

(c) After the award is made the

Courts of Equity will in proper cases enforce a specific performance of an award which is unexceptionable, and which has been acquiesced in by the parties, if it is for the performance of any acts by the parties in specie, such as a conveyance of lands; and such a specific performance will be decreed almost as if it were a matter of contract instead of an award.¹ (a)

1459. But as the specific performance of awards as well as of contracts rests in the sound discretion of the court, if, upon the face of the award or otherwise it appears that there are just objections to enforcing it, Courts of Equity will not interfere.² On the other hand where an award has been long acquiesced in or acted upon by both parties, even although objections might have been originally urged against it, an application to set it aside will not be entertained.³

1460. It is curious to remark the coincidences between the civil law and our law in regard to arbitrations and awards. Whether we are to attribute this to the origin of the latter in the established jurisprudence of the former, or to the same good sense, prevailing in different nations and establishing the like equitable principles on the same subject, founded on public policy and private convenience, it is not necessary to discuss. But it is

¹ *Hall v. Hardy*, 3 P. Will. 187; *Thompson v. Noel*, 1 Atk. 62; *Norton v. Mascall*, 2 Ch. Rep. 304; s. c. 2 Vern. 24; *Wood v. Griffith*, 1 Swanst. 54; *Bouck v. Wilber*, 4 John. Ch. R. 405; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2 K. Lord Hardwicke, in *Thompson v. Noel* (1 Atk. 62), said: 'A bill to carry an award into execution, where there is no acquiescence in it by the parties to the submission or agreement by them afterwards to have it executed, would certainly not lie; but the remedy to enforce performance of the award must be taken at law.' See also *Bishop v. Webster*, 1 Eq. Abr. 51; s. c. 2 Vern. 444.

² *Auriol v. Smith*, 1 Turn. & Russ. R. 187, 189, 190; *Eyre v. Good*, 2 Ch. Rep. 19 [34]; *Wood v. Griffith*, 1 Swanst. 54; *Emery v. Wase*, 5 Ves. 846; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2, K. 2.

³ *Jones v. Bennett*, 1 Bro. Parl. R. 411, 428.

arbitrator is *functus officio*, and cannot rectify even a clerical error. *Mordue v. Palmer*, L. R. 6 Ch. 22.

(a) *Jones v. Boston Mill Corp.*, 6 Pick. 148; *Caldwell v. Dickinson*, 13 Gray, 365; *Shelton v. Alcox*, 11 Conn. 240; *Burke v. Parke*, 5 W. Va. 122; *Akely v. Akely*, 16 Vt. 450. In the last of these cases a party having obtained an award for the conveyance

of certain real estate, a question was raised, based on certain dicta of early cases, whether it was not necessary that the award should have been confirmed by the party against whom it was made; and the question was, on a review of the authorities, decided in the negative. See *Sears v. Vincent*, 8 Allen, 507; *supra*, note 1, Lord Hardwicke's rule.

certain that the Roman law has much to commend it in the reasonableness of its doctrines.

1461. Arbitration, called compromise (*compromissum*), was a mode of terminating controversies much favored in the civil law, and was usually entered into by reciprocal covenants or obligations, with a penalty or with some other certain or implied loss,¹ and the award was deemed to partake of the character of a judicial proceeding.² ‘*Compromissum ad similitudinem judiciorum redigitur, et ad finiendas lites pertinet.*’³ ‘*Ex compromisso placet exceptionem non nasci, sed pœnæ petitionem.*’⁴ The general conclusiveness of awards when made within the legitimate powers of the arbitrators was firmly established upon the same principles which ought universally to prevail to suppress litigation. ‘*Stari autem debet sententiæ arbitri, quam de re dixerit, sive æqua, sive iniqua sit; et sibi imputet qui compromisit.*’⁵

1462. The leading though not the only exception to the conclusiveness of awards, when regularly made, was the fraud or corruption of the parties or of the arbitrators. ‘*Posse eum uti doli mali exceptione.*’ Again: ‘*Etiam si appellari non potest, doli mali exceptionem in pœnæ petitione obstaturam.*’⁶ Another exception was, that the arbitrators had, in their award, exceeded their authority; for if they had, it was void. ‘*De officio arbitri tractantibus sciendum est, omnem tractatum ex ipso compromisso sumendum. Nec enim aliud illi licebit quam quod ibi, ut efficere posset, cautum est. Non ergo quodlibet statuere arbiter poterit,*

¹ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 8, n. 13, 14; Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 8, l. 11, § 2, 3; Ibid. l. 13, § 1; Ibid. l. 27, § 6.

² If there was a simple agreement to stand by the award without any penalty or equivalent, it seems that in the civil law there was originally no remedy to enforce it. Justinian in some cases, but not adequately (as it should seem), provided for this defect. See Kyd on Awards, ch. 1, pp. 8, 9 (2d Lond. edit.), which cites Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 8, l. 27, §§ 6, 7, where it is said: ‘*Et si quis presens arbitrum sententiam dicere prohibuit, pœna committetur. (§ 6.) Sed si pœna non fuisset adjecta compromisso, sed simpliciter, sententiæ stari quis promiserit, incerti adversus eum foret actio.*’ § 7. See also Cod. Lib. 2, tit. 56, l. 4, 5.

³ 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 14, § 1, art. 2; Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 8, l. 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 8, n. 1.

⁴ 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 14, § 1, art. 3; Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 8, l. 2.

⁵ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 8, l. 27, § 2; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 8, n. 39, 40.

⁶ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 8, l. 32, § 14; Ibid. l. 31; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 8, n. 40, 47, 48.

nec in re qualibet ; nisi de qua re compromissum est, et quatenus compromissum est.’¹

1463. Subject to exceptions of this nature, it has been justly remarked by an eminent judge that the prætor at Rome would not interfere with the decisions of these domestic tribunals for the very reasons which have been adopted in modern times ; because they put an end to suits, and the arbitrators were judges of the parties’ own choice.² ‘Tametsi neminem prætor cogit arbitrium recipere (quoniam hæc res libera et soluta est, et extra necessitatem jurisdictionis posita) ; attamen ubi semel quis in se receperit arbitrium, ad curam et sollicitudinem suam hanc rem pertinere prætor putat ; non tantum quod studeret lites finiri, verum quoniam non deberent decipi qui eum, quasi virum bonum, disceptatorem inter se elegerunt.’³ Indeed when once arbitrators had taken upon themselves that office, they were compellable by the prætor to make an award. ‘Quisquamne potest negare æquissimum fore prætorem interponere se debuisse, ut officium, quod in se recepit, impleret. Et quidem arbitrum cujuscunque dignitatis coget officio quod susceperit, perfungi.’⁴ In this respect there is a marked distinction between our law and the civil law.⁵

¹ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 8, l. 32, § 15 ; 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 4, § 2, art. 6 ; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 8, n. 41, 42.

² Mr. Chancellor Kent, in *Underhill v. Van Cortlandt*, 2 John. Ch. R. 368.

³ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 8, l. 3, § 1 ; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 4, tit. 8, n. 22.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 4, tit. 8, l. 3, §§ 1, 3 ; Kyd on Awards, 98, 99, and note (2d Lond. edit.).

⁵ Ante, § 1457.

CHAPTER XLI.

WRITS OF NE EXEAT REGNO AND SUPPLICAVIT.

1464. HAVING thus reviewed most of the branches of the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of Equity which arise from or are dependent upon the subject-matter of the controversy, we are next led to the consideration of those branches of exclusive jurisdiction which arise from, or are dependent upon, the nature of the remedy to be administered. The peculiar remedies in equity in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, have already been fully discussed; and much therefore which would otherwise be appropriate for remark in this place has been already anticipated. The peculiar remedies connected with the exclusive jurisdiction in equity seem to be principally the process of Bill of Discovery, properly so called; the process of Bill for Perpetuating Evidence; and the processes called the writ of NE EXEAT REGNO and the writ of SUPPLICAVIT.¹ The two former are properly embraced in what is called the auxiliary or assistant jurisdiction of Courts of Equity, and will therefore be reserved for examination thereafter. The two latter will be discussed in the present chapter.

1465. The writ of Ne Exeat Regno, or, as it is sometimes termed, Ne Exeat Regnum, is a prerogative writ, which is issued, as its name imports, to prevent a person from leaving the realm.²

¹ The authority to award an issue to be tried by a jury, though a peculiar remedy, is an incident both to the concurrent and the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of Equity. The granting or refusing of such an issue is in all cases except in questions of the validity of wills (*ante*, §§ 184, 1446) a matter of discretion, and is designed merely to assist the conscience of the court in deciding upon some matter of fact. It seems rather therefore to belong to the practice of the court than to constitute a part of its peculiar jurisdiction. See on this subject *O'Connor v. Cook*, 8 Ves. 536; *Short v. Lee*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 496, 497; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd.* B. 3, ch. 1, § 2, pp. 295 to 299; 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 6, ch. 3, § 7, and notes (*t*), (*u*); *Matthews v. Warner*, 4 Ves. R. 206; *Lancashire v. Lancashire*, 9 Beav. R. 259.

² *Beames on Ne Exeat*, p. 1; 1 *Black. Comm.* 137, 266. Most of the mate-

It is said that it is a process unknown to the ancient common law, which in the freedom of its spirit allowed every man to depart the realm at his pleasure.¹ Its origin is certainly obscure. But it may be traced up to a very early period, although some have thought that its date is later than the reign of King John; since by the great charter, granted by him, the unlimited freedom to go from and return to the kingdom at their pleasure was granted to all subjects. ‘Liceat unicuique de cætero exire de regno nostro, et redire salvo et secure per terram et per aquam, salva fide nostra, nisi tempore guerræ, per aliquod breve tempus, propter communem utilitatem regni.’² The period between the reign of King John and that of Edward I. has been accordingly assigned by some writers as the probable time of its introduction. A proceeding somewhat similar in its nature and objects; though not in the precise form of the modern writ, is distinctly mentioned by Fleta and Britton;³ and the Statute of 5 Rich. II. (ch. 2, §§ 6, 7) prohibited all persons whatsoever from going abroad, excepting lords and great men and merchants and soldiers.⁴ (a)

1466. In Fitzherbert’s *Natura Brevium* two forms of writs are given against subjects leaving the realm without license, the one applicable to clergymen and the other to laymen.⁵ And it is there remarked by Fitzherbert that by the common law every man may go out of the realm at his pleasure, without the King’s leave; yet because every man is bound to defend the King and his realm, therefore the King, at his pleasure, by his writ, may command a man that he go not beyond the seas or out of the realm without license; and if he do the contrary, he shall be punished for disobeying the King’s command.⁶ From this language it may be inferred, as his opinion, that the right of the King was a part of the common law, not at all incompatible

rials which are contained in this chapter have been drawn from the concise but perspicuous treatise of Mr. Beames, entitled ‘A Brief View of the Writ of Ne Exeat Regno, London, 1812.’ I have not omitted however to compare the observations of the author with the original authorities.

¹ Beames on Ne Exeat, p. 1.

² Beames on Ne Exeat, p. 3.

³ Fleta, 383, §§ 1, 2; Britton, ch. 122, cited in Beames on Ne Exeat, pp. 4, 5.

⁴ Beames on Ne Exeat, p. 6.

⁵ Fitz. Nat. Brev. 85.

⁶ Fitz. Nat. Brev. 85.

(a) See *Placita Anglo-Normannica*, the Conqueror and his subject Odo, 291, for a great case between William Bishop of Bayeux, anno 1082.

with the ordinary right of the subject to leave the realm; but a restriction upon that right, which might be imposed by the Crown for great political purposes. This is manifestly the view of the matter taken by Lord Coke, who deems it a part of the prerogative of the Crown at the common law, and not dependent upon any statute 'pro bono publico regis et regni.'¹

1467. Be the origin of this writ however as it may, it was originally applied only to great political objects and purposes of State for the safety or benefit of the realm.² The time when it was first applied to mere civil purposes in aid of the administration of justice is not exactly known, and seems involved in the like obscurity as its primitive existence. It seems however to have been so applied as early as the reign of Queen Elizabeth.³ In the reign of King James I. it seems to have been so firmly established as a remedial civil process grantable in chancery that it was made the subject of one of Lord Bacon's Ordinances. It is there declared that 'Writs of Ne Exeat Regnum are properly to be granted according to the suggestion of the writ in respect of attempts prejudicial to the King and State; in which case the Lord Chancellor will grant them upon prayer of any of the principal secretaries, without cause showing, or upon such information as his Lordship shall think of weight. But otherwise also they may be according to the practice of *long time used*, in case of interlopers in trade, great bankrupts in whose estates many subjects are interested, or other cases that concern multitudes of the King's subjects; also in case of duels and divers others.'⁴

¹ 2 Co. Inst. 54; 3 Co. Inst. ch. 84, pp. 178, 179; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 B.

² Ex parte Bruncker, 3 P. Will. 312; Anon. 1 Atk. 521; Flack v. Holm, 1 Jac. & Walk. 405, 413, 414.

³ Tothill, in his Transactions (p. 136), mentions three cases, one in the 32d of Elizabeth and two in the 19th of James I. See also Beames, Ord. of Chanc. p. 40, note (148); Beames on Ne Exeat, p. 16. Lord Chancellor Talbot, in Ex parte Bruncker (3 P. Will. 312), said: 'In all my experience I never knew this writ of Ne Exeat Regno granted or taken out without a bill in equity first filed. It is true it was originally a State writ, but for some time (though not very long) it has been made use of in aid of the subjects for the helping them to justice. But still as custom has allowed this latter use to be made of it, it ought to go no further than can be warranted by usage, which always has been to have a bill first filed.' A copy of the modern writ will be found in Beames on Ne Exeat, pp. 19, 20, and Hinde's Practice, p. 613.

⁴ Beames, Ord. in Chanc. pp. 39, 40, Ord. 89; Beames on Ne Exeat, pp. 16, 17.

1468. The ground then upon which it is applied to civil cases being, as is here stated, custom or usage, it has been in practice uniformly confined to cases within the usage, and therefore it is perhaps impossible to expound its true use or limitation upon principle.¹ It has been strongly said that it is applied to cases of private right with great caution and jealousy.²

1469. The writ of the *Ne Exeat Regno* is also in use in America, where it is treated not as a prerogative writ but as a writ of right in the cases in which it is properly grantable. (a) But generally the same limitations which are imposed as to the remedy in England exists in our present practice. In short the writ and its attributes are almost entirely derived from the English authorities and practices.³

1470. In general it may be stated that the writ of *Ne Exeat Regno* will not be granted unless in cases of equitable debts and claims; for in regard to civil rights it is treated as in the nature of equitable bail.⁴ If therefore the debt be such as that it is

¹ *Ex parte Bruncker*, 3 P. Will. 313; *Etches v. Lance*, 7 Ves. 417; *De Carriere v. De Calonne*, 4 Ves. 590.

² *Tomlinson v. Harrison*, 8 Ves. 32; *Whitehouse v. Partridge*, 3 Swanst. 379.

³ By the Act of Congress of 2d March, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, it is provided that 'Writs of *Ne Exeat* may be granted by any judge of the Supreme Court of the United States in cases where they may be granted by the Supreme or a Circuit Court. But no writ of *Ne Exeat* shall be granted unless a suit in equity be commenced, and satisfactory proof shall be made to the court or judge granting the same, that the defendant designs quickly to depart from the United States.'

⁴ *Beames on Ne Exeat*, p. 30; *Seymour v. Hazard*, 1 John. Ch. R. 1; *Ex parte Bruncker*, 3 P. Will. 312; *Atkinson v. Leonard*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 218; *Jackson v. Petrie*, 10 Ves. 163, 165; *Whitehouse v. Partridge*, 3 Swanst. R. 377 to 379; *Dawson v. Dawson*, 7 Ves. 173; *Haffey v. Haffey*, 14 Ves. 261; *Stewart v. Graham*, 19 Ves. 313, 314; *Hyde v. Whitfield*, 19 Ves. 344; *Flack v. Holm*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 405, 413, 414; *Jenkins v. Parkinson*, 2 Mylne & Keen, 5. In *Wyatt's Practical Register*, p. 289, it is said: 'It is now mostly used where a suit is commenced in this court against a man, and he, designing to defeat the other of his just demand, or to avoid the justice and equity of this court, is about to go beyond sea, or however that the duty will be endangered if he goes.' The usual affidavit on which the writ is granted states both of these facts. *Beames on Ne Exeat*, pp. 26 to 28.

(a) See *Samuel v. Wiley*, 50 N. H. 353; *Breck v. Smith*, 54 Barb. 212; *Dean v. Smith*, 23 Wis. 433; *Ex parte Harker*, 49 Cal. 465; *Malcolm v. Andrews*, 68 Ill. 101; *Myer v. Myer*, 25 N. J. Eq. 28; *Bonesteel v. Bonesteel*, 28 Wis. 245. It is said that it cannot issue against a woman. *Adams v. Whitcomb*, 46 Vt. 708.

demandable in a suit at law, the writ will be refused; for in such a case the remedy at law is open to the party.¹ If bail may be required, it can be insisted on in the action at law; if not required at law, that furnishes no ground for the interference of a Court of Equity to do what in effect as to legal demands the law inhibits.²

1471. It has been said in the preceding remarks that in general the writ of *Ne Exeat Regno* lies only upon equitable debts and claims. There are to this general statement two recognized exceptions, and two only. The one is a case of alimony decreed to a wife which will be enforced against her husband by a writ of *Ne Exeat Regno* if he is about to quit the realm;³ the other is the case of an account on which a balance is admitted by the defendant, but a larger claim is insisted on by the creditor.⁴

1472. In regard to alimony it has been said that it arose from compassion, and because the Ecclesiastical Courts could not take bail.⁵ Whether this be the real origin of the jurisdiction in equity may admit of some doubt. The truer ground perhaps for equitable interference would seem to be, that although alimony is a fixed sum and not strictly an equitable debt, yet the Ecclesiastical Courts are unable to furnish a complete remedy to enforce the due payment thereof; and therefore Courts of Equity ought to interfere to prevent the decree from being defeated by fraud.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*; *Dawson v. Dawson*, 7 Ves. 173; *Russell v. Ashby*, 5 Ves. 96; *Blaydes v. Calvert*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 211, 213; *Smedberg v. Mark*, 6 John. Ch. R. 138.

² *Porter v. Spencer*, 2 John. Ch. R. 169, 170; *Crosley v. Marriot*, 2 Dick. R. 609; *Gardner v. —*, 15 Ves. 444.

³ *Read v. Read*, 1 Ch. Cas. 115; *Shaftoe v. Shaftoe*, 7 Ves. 71; *Dawson v. Dawson*, 7 Ves. 173; *Anon.* 2 Atk. 210; ante, § 1425, note 2.

⁴ *Beames on Ne Exeat*, pp. 30 to 34; *Id.* p. 38; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 182 to 187; *Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3*, pp. 149, 150.

⁵ *Beames on Ne Exeat*, 30; *Anon.* 2 Atk. 210; *Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere*, 8 Sim. R. 315. The Vice-Chancellor (Sir L. Shadwell) in this case said: 'The cases that have been cited in the course of the argument do not furnish any authority to show that this court has ever exercised any jurisdiction with respect to alimony except in granting the writ of *Ne Exeat Regno*. The interference of the court in granting that writ has arisen from the peculiar circumstances that the Ecclesiastical Court cannot compel the husband to find bail. And if the husband makes it appear that he does not intend to leave the kingdom, the court will not grant the writ, although he may not intend to pay what is due from him.' See also *Stones v. Cooke*, 8 Sim. R. 321, note (q); ante, § 1425, note 2.

⁶ See *Cooper, Eq. Pl. Intro. p. 34*. In *Read v. Read*, 1 Ch. Cas. 115; *Ex*

It does not seem however that in modern times Courts of Equity have assumed or acted upon the jurisdiction to this extent.¹ In cases of alimony it is said that Courts of Equity will not interfere unless alimony has been already decreed, and then only to the extent of what is due.² But if there is an appeal from the decree pronouncing alimony, and a fortiori if no alimony has been decreed, and the case is a *lis pendens*, Courts of Equity will abstain from granting the writ.³

1473. In regard to a bill for an account where there is an admitted balance due by the defendant to the plaintiff, but a larger sum is claimed by the latter, there is not any real deviation from the appropriate jurisdiction of Courts of Equity;⁴ for matters of account are properly cognizable therein. The writ of *Ne Exeat Regno* may therefore well be supported as a process in aid of the concurrent jurisdiction of Courts of Equity; and accordingly it is now put upon this intelligible and satisfactory ground.⁵

1474. As to the nature of the equitable demand for which a *Ne Exeat Regno* will be issued, it must be certain in its nature, and actually payable and not contingent.⁶ It should also be for some debt or pecuniary demand. It will not lie therefore in a case where the demand is of a general unliquidated nature or is

parte *Whitmore*, 1 Dick. R. 143, *Shaftoe v. Shaftoe*, 7 Ves. 171, and *Dawson v. Dawson*, 7 Ves. 173, no such ground as compassion is suggested. In New York, where the jurisdiction as to divorce and alimony is vested in the Court of Chancery, the Chancellor will, *pendente lite*, grant a writ of *Ne Exeat Republica* against the husband. *Denton v. Denton*, 1 John. Ch. R. 364, 441; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2.

¹ *Stones v. Cooke*, 8 Sim. R. 321, note (q); ante, § 1425, and note.

² *Shaftoe v. Shaftoe*, 7 Ves. 171; *Dawson v. Dawson*, 7 Ves. 173; *Haffey v. Haffey*, 14 Ves. 261. See *Angier v. Angier*, Prec. Ch. 497; *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, pp. 149, 150; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2, § 6, note (n); ante, § 1422.

³ *Coglar v. Coglar*, 1 Ves. jr. 94; *Haffey v. Haffey*, 14 Ves. 261; *Street v. Street*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 322.

⁴ *Jones v. Sampson*, 8 Ves. 593; *Russell v. Ashby*, 5 Ves. 96; *Amsinck v. Barklay*, 8 Ves. 597; *Dick v. Swinton*, 1 Ves. & Beam. 371; *Stewart v. Graham*, 19 Ves. 313; *Flack v. Holm*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 405, 413; *Porter v. Spencer*, 2 John. Ch. R. 169 to 171; *Mitchell v. Bunch*, 2 Paige, R. 606, 617 to 619.

⁵ *Jones v. Alephsin*, 16 Ves. 471; *Howden v. Rogers*, 1 Ves. & Beam. 132 to 134; *Atkinson v. Leonard*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 218; *Blaydes v. Calvert*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 213.

⁶ *Anon.* 1 Atk. 521; *Rico v. Gualtier*, 3 Atk. 500; *Shearman v. Shearman*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 370; *Whitehouse v. Partridge*, 3 Swanst. 377, 378; *Morris v. McNeil*, 2 Russ. R. 604; *Porter v. Spencer*, 2 John. Ch. R. 169.

in the nature of damages.¹ The equitable debt need not however be directly created between the parties. It will be sufficient if it is fixed and certain. Thus the cestui que trust or assignee of a bond may have a writ of *Ne Exeat Regno* against the obligor.²

1475. We may conclude what is thus briefly said upon this subject by stating that the writ will not be granted on a bill for an account in favor of a plaintiff who is foreigner out of the realm because he cannot be compelled to appear and account. And on the other hand it may be granted against a foreigner transiently within the country, although the subject-matter originated abroad, at least to the extent of requiring security from him to perform the decree made on the bill filed.³

1476. The other process to which we have alluded as belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of chancery is the Writ of *Supplicavit*. It is in the nature of the process at the common law to find sureties of the peace upon articles filed by a party for that purpose.⁴ It is however rarely now used, as the remedy at the

¹ See *Etches v. Lance*, 7 Ves. 417; *Cock v. Ravie*, 6 Ves. 283. See also *Bridge v. Hindall*, Rep. temp. Finch, 257; *Beames on Ne Exeat*, 36, 37, 53 to 55; *Whitehouse v. Partridge*, 3 Swanst. 377, 378; *Blaydes v. Calvert*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 212; *Graves v. Griffith*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 646; *Flack v. Holm*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 405, 407; *Smedberg v. Mark*, 6 John. Ch. R. 138; *Mattocks v. Tremain*, 3 John. Ch. R. 75; *De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti*, 4 Paige, R. 264.

² *Grant v. Grant*, 3 Russ. R. 598; *Leake v. Leake*, 1 Jac. & Walk. 605.

³ *Hyde v. Whitefield*, 19 Ves. 343, 344. See *Done's case*, 1 P. Will. 263. It seems a matter still subject to some little doubt, whether the writ is grantable against a foreigner who happens to be within the country, although the objection may not prevail where he is a subject domiciled in a foreign country or in a colony. See *Beames on Ne Exeat*, pp. 44 to 48; *Grant v. Grant*, 3 Russ. R. 598. The case of *Flack v. Holm* (1 Jac. & Walk. 405, 411, 414, 415) affirms the jurisdiction against a foreigner domiciled abroad and transiently within the realm, in the case of a balance of account on which he might have been sued at law and held to bail. This seems to have been the main ground of the decision. 'It is,' said Lord Eldon in that case, 'but a civil process to hold a person to bail for an equitable debt under the same circumstances as those in which, if it were a legal debt, he might be held to bail at law.' See also *Howden v. Rogers*, 1 Ves. & Beam. 129. In *Woodward v. Schatzell* (3 John. Ch. R. 412), Mr. Chancellor Kent affirmed the jurisdiction in relation to foreigners and citizens of other States transiently within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of New York, stating however that the writ would be discharged upon giving security to abide the decree. See also the same point ruled in *Mitchell v. Bunch*, 2 Paige, R. 606, 617 to 620.

⁴ See *Baynum v. Baynum*, *Ambler*, R. 63, 64. In Lord Bacon's Ordinances there is one regulating the issuing of this writ. Ord. 87, in *Beames's Ord.*

common law is in general adequate; although (as we have seen¹) it is sometimes resorted to by a wife against her husband, and in that case it is said that the Court of Chancery as an incident may grant maintenance or alimony to the wife if she is compelled to live apart from her husband.² (a)

1477. Lord Chief Baron Gilbert has given a full description of the nature and objects of this writ; and it will be sufficient for all the purposes of our present inquiry to state them in his words: 'It is granted upon complaint and oath made of the party where any suitor of the court is abused and stands in danger of his life, or is threatened with death by another suitor. The contemnor is taken into custody and must give bail to the sheriff; and if he moves to discharge the writ of supplicavit, the court hears both parties on affidavit and continues or discharges it as the case appears before them. If they order the contemnor to give security for his good behavior (for this writ is in the nature of a

Chau. p. 39. On this Mr. Beames has remarked in his note (144): 'This writ as now issuing is founded on the Statute 21 Jac. I. ch. 8, which must have passed about five years after the making of the present Ordinances, if they really were published on the 29th Jan. 1618, as asserted in the Judicial Authority of the Master of the Rolls, p. 100. In addition to the authorities cited in the notes subjoined to Heyn's Case, the reader may be referred to Stoell v. Botelar, 2 Ch. Rep. 68; Ex parte Gumbleton, 9 Mod. 232; s. c. 2 Atk. 70; Hilton v. Biron, 3 Salk. 248; Ex parte Lewis, Mosel. 191; Ex parte Gibson, Ib. 198; Gilb. For. Rom. 202; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 R. and Forcible Entry, D. 16, 17. The Collec. Jurid. 193 carries supplicavits so high as the reigns of Henry VII. and Henry VIII., when both parties, plaintiff and defendant, were bound over to their good behavior.'

¹ Ante, § 1423; Clavering's Case, 2 P. Will. 202; Snelling v. Flatman, 1 Dick. 6; Stoell v. Botelar, 2 Ch. R. 68; Baynum v. Baynum, Ambler, R. 63, 64.

² Ibid.; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. jr. 195; Duncan v. Duncan, 19 Ves. 396; Tunnicliff's Case, 1 Jac. & Walk. 348; Dobbyn's Case, 3 Ves. & Beam. 133; Heyn's case, 2 Ves. & Beam. 182; King v. King, 2 Ves. 578; s. c. Ambl. R. 240, 333; Baynum v. Baynum, Ambler, R. 63, 64. An application of this sort was made by a married women in Codd v. Codd (2 John. Ch. R. 141), and Mr. Chancellor Kent seems on that occasion to have doubted whether the writ ought now to be granted in chancery, as the remedy at law was complete. But it is difficult, upon the authorities, to maintain this doubt. See Beames's Orders in Chancery, p. 39, note (144).

(a) The jurisdiction to grant such a writ, in a case in which the conduct of the husband was such as to justify a divorce, was refused in Adams v. Adams, 100 Mass. 365, though the wife had religious and conscientious scruples against applying for a divorce.

Lord Chief Justice's warrant to apprehend a man for a breach of the peace), he must do it by recognizance to be taken before one of the masters of the court, who must be in the commission of the peace. He is to find sureties to be of his good behavior. If he beats or assaults the party a second time, the court will order the recognizance to be put in suit and permit the party to recover the penalty; for the recognizance is never to be sued but by leave of the court. But this proceeding very rarely or never happens. So if any suitor of the court is arrested either in the face of the court or out of the court as he is going and coming to attend and follow his cause (for so far the court does and will protect every man), upon complaint made thereof, sitting the court, they will send out the tipstaff and bring in the bailiffs and prisoner into court instantly, sitting the court, and they will order them forthwith to discharge him or lay them by the heels, and the plaintiff in the action upon complaint and oath made thereof will certainly stand committed. He shall lie in prison till he petitions, submits, and begs pardon, and pays the costs to the other party.¹

1478. We may close this head of exclusive processes by advertising to certain proceedings which, although not unknown to the Courts of Common Law, seem, as a matter of right and authority independent of the consent of parties, to belong exclusively to Courts of Equity. We refer to the practice, in doubtful matters of fact, of directing an issue to be tried at law to ascertain the same, and in matters of law, of sending the point for the opinion of a Court of Law, and then acting upon the final result in either case in the Court of Equity directing the issue or opinion. We have already seen the application of the former proceeding to the issue of *devisavit vel non* in bills for the establishment of wills.²

1479. The nature and objects of these proceedings cannot be

¹ Gilbert's *Forum Rom.* pp. 202, 203; 2 Harrison's *Ch. Pr.* by Newland, ch. 79, p. 563. *Clavering's Case* (2 P. Will. 202) and *Stoell v. Botelar* (2 Ch. Rep. 68) are instances of the actual granting of the writ under circumstances like those stated by Gilbert in his *Forum Roman.* pp. 202, 203. It is usual to discharge persons committed for want of surety on articles of peace, and on a *supplicavit*, after a year, if nothing new happens and the threat or danger does not continue. *Baynum v. Baynum*, *Ambler*, R. 63; *Ex parte Grosvenor*, 3 P. Will. 103.

² Ante, §§ 1447, 1464, note 1.

better stated than they are by Mr. Justice Blackstone. 'The Chancellor's decree,' says he, 'is either interlocutory or final. It very seldom happens that the first decree can be final or conclude the cause; for if any matter of fact is strongly controverted, this court is so sensible of the deficiency of trial by written depositions that it will not bind the parties thereby, but usually directs the matter to be tried by jury, especially such important facts as the validity of a will, or whether A is the heir at law to B, or the existence of a *modus decimandi*, or real and immemorial composition for tithes. But as no jury can be summoned to attend this court, the fact is usually directed to be tried at the bar of the Court of King's Bench or at the Assizes upon a feigned issue. For (in order to bring it there and have the point in dispute and that only put in issue) an action is feigned to be brought wherein the pretended plaintiff declares that he laid a wager of £5 with the defendant that A was heir at law to B, and then avers that he is so, and brings his action for the £5. The defendant allows the wager, but avers that A is not the heir to B; and thereupon that issue is joined which is directed out of chancery to be tried, and thus the verdict of the jurors at law determines the fact in the Court of Equity. These feigned issues seem borrowed from the *sponsio judicialis* of the Romans, and are also frequently used in the Courts of Law by consent of the parties to determine some disputed right without the formality of pleading, and thereby to save much time and expense in the decision of a cause. So likewise if a question of mere law arises in the course of a cause, as whether by the words of a will an estate for life or in tail is created, or whether a future interest devised by a testator shall operate as a remainder or an executory devise, it is the practice of this court to refer it to the opinion of the judges of the Court of King's Bench or Common Pleas, upon a case stated for that purpose, wherein all the material facts are admitted and the point of law is submitted to their decision; who thereupon hear it solemnly argued by counsel on both sides and certify their opinion to the Chancellor. And upon such certificates the decree is usually founded.'¹

1479 *a*. When the court orders an issue of fact, and a verdict is founded upon the issue in favor of either party, it is not neces-

¹ 3 Black. Comm. 452, 453.

sarily conclusive upon either party; and, notwithstanding the verdict, the party against whom it is given has a right to proceed in the cause and to go into evidence in support of his case, notwithstanding the court upon a motion for a new trial (which the court is at full liberty to entertain) refuses to disturb the verdict. Generally speaking such a verdict is treated as conclusive between the parties; for persons who have had an ample opportunity of bringing before a jury such evidence as they think proper and material to the case are generally satisfied with the result, at least if the result of the investigation be such as not to lead to an order for a new trial. Still in point of practice and in point of law (as has been suggested) the verdict is not conclusive. But from the inconvenience of the practice of proceeding after the verdict and in opposition thereto to a hearing of the cause, the court will as a matter in its discretion refuse an issue unless upon an understanding by both parties to abide the result, unless the court should disturb the verdict.¹

¹ *Ansdell v. Ansdell*, 4 Mylne & Craig, 449, 454. On this occasion Lord Cottenham said: 'Now that the verdict founded on the interlocutory application is not conclusive, — conclusive in point of law it cannot be, — but conclusive, I mean, according to the practice of this court, I apprehend is free from all doubt. It is a matter of extreme importance undoubtedly in any subsequent investigation; but it is merely that which it would be at law, namely, a matter of evidence, but not conclusive evidence, between the parties. Of necessity therefore the defendants here were at liberty to go into the case which they had made, and if possible to raise sufficient doubt in the mind of the court as to whether the result of the former investigation had been so satisfactory as to justify the court in acting upon that finding and that result without additional and further investigation. It is obvious that this course of proceeding is open to very grave objection and to very great danger, and it will deserve the consideration of those before whom similar causes may come in future, — certainly if any such cause should come before me I shall give it my most serious consideration before directing any issue on an interlocutory application, — whether such an issue should be directed without putting the parties to an undertaking to abide by the result. The mere circumstance of an issue being necessary to enable the court to deal with the interlocutory application is of itself sufficient to support an order for an injunction until the parties shall be in a situation to try the facts. A plaintiff can very seldom if ever — indeed I know not that he can ever — be in a situation to render it necessary for him to ask for such an issue. The doubt which directs and is the ground of such an issue assumes that it would be sufficient for his purpose. On the other hand the defendant may be very deeply interested in having what he asserts to be his rights not interfered with, without the opportunity at the earliest possible moment of having those rights put into a course of investigation and trial; and the defendant therefore can never complain that the option

is tendered to him of submitting to have his rights, if they do exist, suspended by an injunction or of proceeding to an immediate trial, undertaking that the result of that trial, subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to any application for a new trial, shall be conclusive upon the rights of the parties. As at present advised, and according to the opinion I at present entertain, it will be very difficult to induce me, after the experience I have had in this cause, to direct any issue on interlocutory application without calling on the defendant to treat the result as conclusive of the case on the matter of fact.'

CHAPTER XLII.

BILLS OF DISCOVERY, AND BILLS TO PRESERVE AND PERPETUATE EVIDENCE.

1480. WE shall now proceed to the third and last head of equity jurisdiction proposed to be examined in these Commentaries; that is to say, the auxiliary or assistant jurisdiction which indeed is exclusive in its own nature, but being applied in aid of the remedial justice of other courts may well admit of a distinct consideration.

1481. In a general sense Courts of Equity may be said to be assistant to other courts in a variety of cases, in which the administration of justice could not otherwise be usefully or successfully attained. Thus for example they become assistant to Courts of Law by removing legal impediments to the fair decision of a question depending thereon; by preventing a trustee, lessee, or mortgagee from setting up an outstanding term to defeat an ejectment brought to try a title to land, or by suppressing a deed or devise fraudulently obtained and set up for the same purpose.¹ They are in like manner assistant to other courts by rendering their judgments effectual; as by setting aside fraudulent conveyances which interfere with them; by providing for the safety of property pending litigation; and by suppressing multiplicity of suits and oppressive actions.² But these topics have already been sufficiently, although incidentally, considered in the preceding pages.³

1482. What we propose particularly to consider in the subse-

¹ Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, note (*f*); Cooper, Eq. Pl. Introd. pp. 33, 34; Id. ch. 3, p. 143; *Harrison v. Southcote*, 1 Atk. 540; Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 4, 5, 111, 134, 135, 143 to 145; Id. 281.

² *Ibid.*; Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, pp. 146 to 149, 157; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 3, § 1.

³ Ante, §§ 437 to 439, 825, 829, 852, 859, 861, 903, &c.

quent discussions is the remedial process of Bills of Discovery, Bills to perpetuate Testimony, and Bills to take Testimony *de bene esse* pending a suit; all of which are most important instruments to be employed as adminicular to the remedial justice of other courts.¹

1483. In the first place as to bills of discovery. It has been already remarked that every bill in equity may properly be deemed a bill of discovery, since it seeks a disclosure from the defendant on his oath of the truth of the circumstances constituting the plaintiff's case as propounded in his bill.² But that which is emphatically called in equity proceedings a bill of discovery is a bill which asks no relief, but which simply seeks the discovery of facts resting in the knowledge of the defendant, or the discovery of deeds, or writings, or other things in the possession or power of the defendant, in order to maintain the right or title of the party asking it in some suit or proceeding in another court.³ The sole object of such a bill then being a particular discovery, when that discovery is obtained by the answer, there can be no further proceedings thereon.⁴ To maintain a bill of

¹ Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 148, 149, 185, 186.

² Ante, § 689; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 53; Id. 183 to 185. Story on Eq. Pl. § 311.

³ Ante, § 689; Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 4, p. 58; Id. 60; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, pp. 8, 53, 148, 306, 307; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 160. It was said by Lord Hardwicke in *Montague v. Dudman* (2 Ves. 398) that 'A bill of discovery lies here in aid of some proceedings in this court in order to deliver the party from the necessity of procuring evidence, or to aid in the proceeding in some suit relating to a civil right in a Court of Common Law, as an action.' On the subject of discovery I beg leave to refer the reader to the very able work of Mr. Wigram on Points of Discovery, and of Mr. Hare on Discovery. In these two works the subject seems completely exhausted. See also Story on Eq. Plead. § 34, &c.

⁴ Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 16; *Lady Shaftsbury v. Arrowsmith*, 4 Ves. 71. Mr. Fonblaque has made some remarks upon the nature and dangers of this branch of equity jurisdiction, which are certainly entitled to serious consideration. 'There is,' says he, 'no branch of equitable jurisdiction of more extensive application than that which enforces discovery; and where kept within its due limits there is none more conducive to the claims of justice. To compel a defendant to discover that which may enable the plaintiff to substantiate a just or to repel an unjust demand, is merely assisting a right or preventing a wrong. But as the most valuable institutions are not exempt from abuse, this power, which ought to be the instrument of justice, may be rendered the instrument of oppression. A plaintiff by his bill may without the least foundation impute to the defendant the foulest frauds, or seek a discovery of transactions in which he has no real concern; and when the defend-

discovery it is not necessary that the party should otherwise be without any proof of his case; for he may maintain such a bill, either because he has no proof or because he wants it in aid of other proof.¹ (a) But in general it seems necessary, in order to maintain a bill of discovery, that an action should be already commenced in another court to which it should be auxiliary. There are exceptions to this rule, as where the object of discovery is to ascertain who is the proper party against whom the suit should be brought. But these are of rare occurrence.²

1484. One of the defects in the administration of justice in the Courts of Common Law arises from their want of power to compel a complete discovery of the material facts in controversy by the oaths of the parties in the suit.³ And hence (as we have seen) one of the most important and extensive sources of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity is their power to compel the parties upon proper proceedings to make every such discovery.⁴

1485. Another defect of a similar nature is the want of a power in the Courts of Common Law to compel the production of deeds, books, writings, and other things which are in the custody or power of one of the parties, and are material to the right, title, or defence of the other.⁵ (b) This defect is also

ant has put in his answer denying the frauds or disclosing transactions (the disclosure of which may materially prejudice his interest), the plaintiff may dismiss his bill with costs, satisfied with the mischief he may have occasioned by the publicity of his charge, or with the advantage which he may have obtained by an extorted disclosure. The rule which requires the signature of counsel to every bill affords every security against such an abuse which forensic experience and integrity can supply; but it cannot wholly prevent it. The court alone can counteract it; and in vindication of its process must feel the strongest inclination to interpose its authority.' 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 3, § 1, note (a).

¹ *Finch v. Finch*, 2 Ves. 492; *Montague v. Dudman*, 2 Ves. 398; *March v. Davidson*, 9 Paige, 580; *Many v. Beekman Iron Company*, 9 Paige, 188. It would be otherwise if the bill were for relief as well as discovery. *Ibid.*

² *Moodaly v. Moreton*, 2 Dick. R. 652; *Angell v. Angell*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 83; *Mendes v. Barnard*, 1 Dick. 65; *City of London v. Levy*, 8 Ves. 404.

³ 3 Black. Comm. 381, 382; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 3, § 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ 2 Black. Comm. 382; *Com. Dig. Chancery*, 3 B.

(a) So if the court can suppose that the discovery may in any way be material in support or defence of a suit. *Peck v. Ashley*, 12 Met. 478.

(b) The defect referred to in this and in the preceding section has been removed by statute very generally.

remediable in Courts of Equity, which will compel the production of such books, deeds, writings, and other things.¹

1486. The Roman law provided similar means by the oath of the parties and by a bill of discovery to obtain due proofs of the material facts in controversy between the parties. There seem originally to have been three modes adopted for this purpose. One was upon a due act of summons to require the party without oath to make a statement or confession generally relative to a matter in controversy. Another was to require him to answer before the proper judge to certain interrogatories propounded in the form of distinct articles which the judge might in his discretion order him to answer upon oath. The third was to require the adverse party to answer upon oath as to the fact in controversy, the party applying for the answer consenting to take the answer so given upon oath as truth. On this account it was called the decisive or decisory oath, and it admitted of no countervailing and contradictory evidence. In the two former cases other proofs were admissible.² ‘Ubi cunque judicem æquitas moverit, æque oportere fieri interrogationem, dubium non est.’³ ‘Voluit prætor adstringere eum qui convenitur, ex sua in judicio responsione, ut vel confitendo, vel mentiendo, sese oneret.’⁴

1487. In the Roman law bills of discovery were called *Actiones ad exhibendum* when they related to the production of things, or deeds, or documents, in which another person had an interest.⁵ When they required the answer of the party on oath to interrogatories, they were called *Actiones interrogatoriæ*.⁶ It seems that originally interrogatory actions might be propounded at any time before suit brought by any party having any interest. But we are informed in the Digest that in the time of Justinian they had become obsolete, and interrogatories were propounded only in cases in litigation. ‘Interrogatoriis autem actionibus hodie non utimur quia nemo cogitur ante judicium de suo jure aliquod respondere. Ideoque minus frequentantur, et in desuetudinem abierunt. Sed tantummodo, ad probationes litigatoribus sufficient

¹ *Ibid.*

² 1 Domat, B. 1, tit. 6, § 5, pp. 458, 459; *Id.* § 5, art. 4, 5.

³ Dig. Lib. 11, tit. 1, l. 21.

⁴ Dig. Lib. 11, tit. 1, l. 4.

⁵ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 10, tit. 4, n. 1 to 7; *Id.* n. 8 to 30.

⁶ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 11, tit. 1, n. 1 to 24, and note (2).

ea quæ ab adversa parte expressa fuerint apud iudices, vel in hereditatibus, vel in aliis rebus quæ in causis vertuntur.¹ The Roman law also required that the party seeking a discovery of facts should have a legal capacity to sustain himself in court, and that the discovery should respect some right of action.² It does not seem important further to trace out the analogies of the Roman law on this subject; and with these brief hints, showing the probable origin of the like proceeding in our Courts of Equity, we may return to the subject of bills of discovery.

1488. As the object of this jurisdiction in cases of bills of discovery is to assist and promote the administration of public justice in other courts, they are greatly favored in equity, and will be sustained in all cases where some well-founded objection does not exist against the exercise of the jurisdiction.³ We shall therefore proceed to the consideration of some of the circumstances which may constitute an objection to such bills, leaving the reader silently to draw the conclusion that if none of these nor any of the like nature intervene, the jurisdiction to compel the discovery sought will be strictly enforced.

1489. The principal grounds upon which a bill of discovery may be resisted have been enumerated by a learned writer as follows: (1) That the subject is not cognizable in any municipal court of justice. (2) That the court will not lend its aid to obtain a discovery for the particular court for which it is wanted. (3) That the plaintiff is not entitled to the discovery by reason of some personal disability. (4) That the plaintiff has no title to the character in which he sues. (5) That the value of the suit is beneath the dignity of the court. (6) That the plaintiff has no interest in the subject-matter, or title to the discovery required, or that an action will not lie for which it is wanted. (7) That the defendant is not answerable to the plaintiff, but that some other person has a right to call for the discovery. (8) That the policy of the law exempts the defendant from the discovery. (9) That the defendant is not bound to discover his own title. (10) That the discovery is not material in the suit. (11) That the defendant is a mere witness.

¹ Pothier, Pand. Lib. 11, n. 24; Dig. Lib. 11, tit. 1, l. 1, § 1.

² Pothier, Pand. Lib. 11, tit. 1, n. 13, 15.

³ 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 160 to 178; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2, ch. 1, pp. 257 to 262.

(12) That the discovery called for would criminate the defendant.¹ Some of these grounds of objection are equally applicable to bills asking for relief; and others are so obvious upon the mere statement of them as to require no further exposition. It may however be proper to unfold the principles with more particularity by which a few of them are governed.

1490. In the first place it must clearly appear upon the face of the bill that the plaintiff has a title to the discovery which he seeks; or in other words that he has interest in the subject-matter to which the discovery is attached, capable and proper to be vindicated in some judicial tribunal.² A mere stranger cannot maintain a bill for the discovery of the title of another person. Hence an heir at law cannot during the life of his ancestor maintain a bill for a discovery of facts or deeds material to the ancestor's estate; for he has no present title whatsoever, but only the possibility of a future title.³ Nor has a party a right to any

¹ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3, pp. 189, 190. See also Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 185 to 200; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 B. 2; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2, ch. 1, § 3, pp. 268, 269; Story on Eq. Plead. §§ 549 to 604.

² *Brown v. Dudbridge*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 321, 322; Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, pp. 166, 167, 171, 194, 195; *Brownsword v. Edwards*, 2 Ves. 243, 247; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 154, 156, 157, 187; Story on Eq. Plead. §§ 503 to 508.

³ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 4, p. 58; *Ibid.* ch. 3, p. 197; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 189 to 191; *Buden v. Dore*, 2 Ves. 445. But see *Metcalf v. Hervey*, 1 Ves. 248; *Ivy v. Kekewick*, 2 Ves. jr. 679; *Glegg v. Legh*, 4 Madd. R. 193, 208; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2, ch. 1, pp. 262, 263.* Yet it has been held that if the discovery sought is of a matter which would show the defendant incapable of having any interest or title, as for example whether the defendant, claiming real estate under a devise, is an alien and consequently incapable of holding it, a bill of discovery will lie. *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, p. 197; Attorney-Gen. v. Duplessis, Parker, R. 144, 155 to 162.* The ground of the decision seemed to be that the disability of alienage is neither a penalty nor a forfeiture. *Ibid.* 163, 164. And this decision was affirmed in the House of Lords. 5 Bro. Parl. R. 91; s. c. 2 Ves. 286. Lord Hardwicke however held a different doctrine in the case of *Duplessis*, and insisted that she was not bound to discover whether she was an alien. *Finch v. Finch*, 2 Ves. 494. Mr. Wigram in his recent *Treatise on the Law of Discovery* (which did not reach my hands until after the text had been prepared for the press) lays down the following as fundamental propositions on this subject. (1) It is the right, as a general rule, of the plaintiff in equity to examine the defendant upon oath as to all matters of fact which being well pleaded in the bill are material to the proof of the plaintiff's case, and which the defendant does not by his form of pleading admit. (2) Courts of Equity as a general rule oblige a defendant to pledge his oath to the truth of his defence. With this (if a) qualification the right of a plaintiff in equity to the benefit of the defendant's oath is limited to a discovery of such material facts as relate to the plain-

discovery, except of facts and deeds and writings necessary to his own title or under which he claims; for he is not at liberty to pry into the title of the adverse party.¹ (a)

1491. Even an heir at law has not a right to the inspection of deeds in the possession of a devisee unless he is an heir in tail; in which latter case he is entitled to see the deeds creating the estate tail, but no further.² On the other hand a devisee is entitled against the heir at law to a discovery of deeds relating to the estate devised.³

1492. The reason of this distinction may not at first view be apparent; but the ground upon which it is asserted is this: The title of an heir at law is a plain legal title. All the family deeds together would not make his title better or worse. If he cannot set aside the will, he has nothing to do with the deeds. He must make out his title at law, unless there are incumbrances standing in his way, which indeed a Court of Equity would remove in order to enable him to assert his legal title. But in

tiff's case; and it does not extend to the discovery of the manner in which or of the evidence by means of which the defendant's case is to be established, or to any discovery of the defendant's evidence. Wigram, *Points in Law of Discovery*, pp. 21, 22; Story on Eq. Plead. §§ 572 to 574.

¹ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, pp. 171, 173, 194; *Sackville v. Ayleworth*, 1 Vern. R. 105; *Dursley v. Fitzhardinge*, 6 Ves. 260; *Allan v. Allan*, 15 Ves. 131.

² Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 4, pp. 58, 59; *Ibid.* ch. 3, § 3, pp. 197, 198; *Shaftsbury v. Arrowsmith*, 4 Ves. 71. In *Shaftsbury v. Arrowsmith* (4 Ves. 71), Lord Rosslyn explained the ground of the doctrine in favor of the heir in tail, that it was removing an impediment which prevented the trial of a legal right. He afterwards added: 'Permitting a general sweeping survey into all the deeds of the family would be attended with very great danger and mischief; and where the person claims as heir of the body it has been very properly stated that it may show a title in another person if the entail is not well barred.'

³ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 4, p. 59; *Ibid.* ch. 3, § 3, pp. 197, 198; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 3, § 2.

(a) See ante, § 704; *Haskell v. Haskell*, 3 Cush. 540; *Kettlewell v. Barstow*, L. R. 7 Ch. 686; *Commissioners v. Glasse*, L. R. 15 Eq. 302; *Girdlestone v. North British Assur. Co.*, L. R. 11 Eq. 197; *Roberts v. Oppenheim*, 26 Ch. D. 724. The defendant cannot refuse to produce private letters from a stranger. *Hopkinson v. Burghley*, L. R. 2 Ch. 447. But he cannot be required to produce

documents concerning the compromise of a dispute between himself and a stranger. *Warrick v. Queen's College*, L. R. 4 Eq. 254. Further as to inspection of documents see *Dent v. Dent*, L. R. 1 Eq. 186; *Patch v. Ward*, Ib. 436; *Piffard v. Beeby*, Ib. 623; *Clinch v. Financial Corp.*, L. R. 2 Ch. 271; *Swansea Ry. Co. v. Budd*, Ib. 274.

the case of an heir in tail a will is no answer to him; although a will established is an answer to an heir at law. An heir in tail has beyond the general right such an interest in the deed creating the entail that he has a right to the production of it. But an heir at law has no interest in the title-deeds of an estate unless it has descended to him.¹

1493. On the other hand a devisee claiming an estate under a will cannot without a discovery of the title-deeds maintain any suit at law. The heir at law might not only defeat his suit by withholding the means to trace out his legal title, but might also defend himself at law by setting up prior outstanding incumbrances; and thus he might prevent the devisee from having the power of trying the validity of the will at law.² Whether this distinction is well founded may perhaps be thought to admit of some question. That the devisee should in such a case be entitled to a discovery seems plain enough. That the heir at law is not equally well entitled to a discovery of the deeds under which the estate is claimed in order to ascertain the extent to which he is disinherited may not appear quite so plain.³

1493 *a*. In the next place the party must not only show that he has an interest in the subject-matter of the bill to which the

¹ *Shaftsbury v. Arrowsmith*, 4 Ves. 67, 70, 71; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 3, § 2, and notes (*g*), (*h*).

² *Duchess of Newcastle v. Lord Pelham*, 8 Viner, Abrid. Discovery, M. pl. 12; 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 392; Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 4, p. 59.

³ It is obvious that the distinction is not satisfactory to Mr. Fonblanque. In 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 3, § 2, note (*g*), he says: 'And an heir at law, although not entitled to come into equity upon an ejectment bill for possession, yet he is entitled to come into equity to remove terms out of the way which would otherwise prevent his recovering possession at law, and also has a right to another relief before he has established his title at law, namely, that the deed and will may be produced and lodged in proper hands for his inspection; for any heir at law has a right to discover by what means and under what deed he is disinherited.' For this he relies upon *Harrison v. Southcote* (1 Atk. 539, 540), where Lord Hardwicke asserts the proposition in the same language; and *Floyer v. Sydenham* (Select Cas. in Ch. 2), which is directly in point. If it were clear that if the will were established, the title of the heir would be gone, the objection to a bill of discovery by him might not be unreasonable; for then he would have no title to the estate, and of course no title to a discovery of the deeds of it. But it may depend upon the very terms of the instrument as a settlement, or the boundaries stated in different deeds where the purchase has been of different parcels at different times, whether he is disinherited or not. In such a case an inspection may be very important to him. See Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3, p. 198; *Aston v. Lord Exeter*, 6 Ves. 288; *Hylton v. Morgan*, 6 Ves. 294.

required discovery relates, but he must also state a case which will, if he is the plaintiff at law, constitute a good ground of action, or, if he is the defendant at law, show a good ground of defence in aid of which the discovery is sought. (a) If it is clear that the action or the defence is unmaintainable at law, Courts of Equity will not entertain a bill for any discovery in support of it, since the discovery could not be material, but must be useless.¹ This however is so delicate a function that Courts of Equity will not undertake to refuse a discovery upon such grounds unless the case is entirely free from doubt. If the point be fairly open to doubt or controversy, Courts of Equity will grant the discovery and leave it to Courts of Law to adjudicate upon the legal rights of the party seeking the discovery.² (b)

1494. In the next place Courts of Equity will not entertain a bill for a discovery to aid the promotion or defence of any suit which is not purely of a civil nature. Thus for example they will not compel a discovery in aid of a criminal prosecution, or of a penal action, or of a suit in its nature partaking of such a character, or in a case involving moral turpitude; for it is against the genius of the common law to compel a party to

¹ *Debigge v. Lord Howe*, cited *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 187, and cited also in 3 *Bro. Ch. R.* 155; *Wallis v. Duke of Portland*, 3 *Ves. jr.* 494; *Lord Kensington v. Mansell*, 13 *Ves.* 240; *Story on Equity Pleading*, §§ 319, 556 to 559; *Macaulay v. Shackell*, 1 *Bligh, R. n. s.* 120; *Thomas v. Tyler*, 3 *Younge & Coll.* 255; *Hare on Discovery*, 43 to 46.

² *Thomas v. Tyler*, 3 *Younge & Coll.* 255, 261, 262; *Hare on Discovery*, 43 to 46; *Story on Equity Pleading*, §§ 560 to 568. If the bill filed by a defendant at law suggests specific defects in the title of his adversary, the discovery will be granted, although the case made by the bill is not the assertion of an affirmative title in the party bringing the bill. *Smith v. Duke of Beaufort*, 1 *Phillips, Ch. R.* 209.

(a) See *Primmer v. Patten*, 32 *Ill.* 528.

(b) See *Thompson v. Dunn*, *L. R.* 5 *Ch.* 573.

A creditor who has exhausted his remedy at law may maintain a bill in equity against his debtor for discovery of assets and for relief. *Treadwell v. Brown*, 44 *N. H.* 551. But after judgment at law against a party he cannot maintain a bill in equity for

discovery of matters of purely legal nature unless he can show proper excuse for not availing himself of them at law. *McCullum v. Prewitt*, 37 *Ala.* 573.

It is no objection to discovery that it anticipates what is sought by the decree, if the facts are needed for proof. *Chichester v. Donegal*, *L. R.* 4 *Ch.* 416. Compare *Kettlewell v. Barstow*, *L. R.* 7 *Ch.* 686.

accuse himself; and it is against the general principles of equity to aid in the enforcement of penalties or forfeitures.¹

¹ Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 186, 193 to 198; Wigram on Discovery, 2d edit. p. 81, §§ 130, 131 to 134; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 173, 174; Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3, pp. 191, 192, 202, 203, 205, 206; *Montague v. Dudman*, 2 Ves. 398; *Thorpe v. Macauley*, 5 Madd. R. 229, 230; *Shackell v. Macaulay*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 79; s. c. 1 Bligh, R. n. s. 96; *Claridge v. Hoare*, 14 Ves. 64, 65; *U. States v. Bank of Virginia*, 1 Peters, R. 100, 104; *Wallis v. Duke of Portland*, 3 Ves. 494; *Franco v. Bolton*, 3 Ves. 368; *Earl of Suffolk v. Green*, 1 Atk. 450; *King v. Burr*, 3 Meriv. R. 693; *Finch v. Finch*, 2 Ves. 492; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2*, ch. 1, pp. 265 to 267; *Greenleaf v. Queen*, 1 Peters, R. 138; *Horsburg v. Baker*, 1 Peters, R. 232 to 236; *Hare on Discovery*, pp. 131 to 135; *Ibid.* 140 to 144; *Story on Eq. Plead.* §§ 521, and note, 522 to 526, 553, 575 to 588, 591 to 594, 824, 825, note (1). Lord Hardwicke, in *Montague v. Dudman* (2 Ves. 398), held that a discovery did not lie to aid a mandamus. In the cases of *Thorpe v. Macauley*, 5 Madd. R. 229, 230, and *Shackell v. Macaulay*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 79; s. c. 2 Russ. R. 550, note, bills of discovery to aid a suit for a libel were dismissed as improper, as they partake of criminal nature. The case of *Shackell v. Macaulay* was carried to the House of Lords, where the decision was affirmed so far as it authorized a commission to take testimony abroad. 1 Bligh, Rep. n. s. 96, 133, 134. In *Wilmot v. Maccabe* (4 Sim. R. 263) the Vice-Chancellor seems to have thought that the decision in the House of Lords, in *Shackell v. Macaulay*, justified the court in requiring a discovery in cases of a civil action for libel. Mr. Hare maintains the same doctrine. *Hare on Discovery*, 116, 117. But it does not seem to me that the decision justifies any such conclusion. See also *Southall v. —*, 1 Younge, R. 308. The case of *Glynn v. Houston* (1 Keen, R. 329), is directly in point to establish that a discovery cannot in a civil action be compelled of facts which would subject the party to penal consequences. See also *Story on Eq. Plead.* §§ 553, note (3), 575 to 588; *Ibid.* §§ 597, 598. Where the suit involves penalties, if the plaintiff is competent to waive them, and does waive them in his bill of discovery, it is maintainable. Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 195 to 197, 205, 206; *Story on Eq. Plead.* § 598. (a) And there are other exceptions; as where the party expressly by contract has agreed to discover. *Ibid.*; *Hare on Discovery*, 137 to 139. There is another exception in regard to forfeitures deserving notice in this place. It is that a bill of discovery will lie for a disclosure of money lost at play and of the securities given for it. But this stands, at least in modern times, upon the provisions of the Statute of 9 Anne, ch. 14, giving a bill of discovery. *Rawden v. Shadwell*, *Ambler*, R. 268, and *Mr. Blunt's note* (3); *Newman v. Franco*, 2 Anst. R. 519; *Andrews v. Berry*, 3 Anst. R. 634, 635. There are however said to be older cases which support it upon general principles. 14 *Viner*, Abr. Gaming, D. pl. 3, citing *Suckling v. Morley*, *Tothill*, 84 (this is probably a mistake of the true page in the edition of 1649; the case will be found at p. 23). See ante, § 302; 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B. 1*, ch. 4, § 6, note (c). In *Green v. Weaver*, 1 Sim. R. 404, it was held that a London broker was compellable to make a discovery in aid of an action brought against him by his employer for misconduct, although it subjected him to the penalty of his bond given for his faithful discharge of his official

(a) See *United States v. McRae*, L. R. 4 Eq. 327; s. c. 3 Ch. 79.

1495. In the next place Courts of Equity will not entertain a bill for a discovery to assist a suit in another court if the latter is of itself competent to grant the same relief; for in such a case the proper exercise of the jurisdiction should be left to the functionaries of the court where the suit is depending.¹ (a) Neither will Courts of Equity entertain such bills in aid of a controversy pending before arbitrators; for they are not the regular tribunals authorized to administer justice, and being

duties. Another exception (if indeed properly considered it is an exception) is where the bill seeks a discovery of a fraud or of fraudulent acts of the defendant; if they do not subject him to criminal proceedings, he is bound to make the discovery. *Janson v. Solarte*, 2 Younge & Coll. 132, 136; *Hare on Discovery*, 140, 142; *Green v. Weaver*, 1 Sim. R. 404, 427, 432. See also *Story on Eq. Plead.* § 589, and note (3); *Ibid.* §§ 595, 596. (b)

¹ *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 186; *Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3*, pp. 191, 192; *Dunn v. Coates*, 1 Atk. 288; *Anon.* 2 Ves. 451; *Gelston v. Hoyt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 547; *Story on Equity Plead.* § 555. Mr. Chancellor Kent, in *Gelston v. Hoyt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 547, 548, used this expressive language on this point: 'If a bill seeks discovery in aid of the jurisdiction of a Court of Law, it ought to appear that such aid is required. If a Court of Law can compel the discovery, a Court of Equity will not interfere. And facts which depend upon the testimony of witnesses can be procured or proved at law, because Courts of Law can compel the attendance of witnesses. It is not denied in this case but that every fact material to the defence at law can be proved by ordinary means at law without resorting to the aid of this court. The plaintiffs did not come here for any such aid, and it ought not to be afforded unless they call for it and show it to be necessary. I should presume from the bill itself that every material fact relative to the ownership of the vessel could be commanded without resorting to this court; and such trials at law are not to be delayed and discoveries required when the necessity of such delay and discovery is not made to appear. This would be perverting and abusing the powers of this court. Unless therefore the bill states affirmatively that the discovery is really wanted for the defence at law, and also shows that the discovery might be material to that defence, it does not appear to be reasonable and just that the suit at law should be delayed. The bill is therefore defective and insufficient in this point of view.' But see *March v. Davidson*, 9 Paige, R. 580; *Story on Eq. Plead.* § 319, where it appears that the doctrine is not correct as to mere bills for discovery, but at most applies only where the bill is for discovery and relief.

(a) *Heath v. Erie R. Co.*, 9 Blatchf. C. C. 316. But see *ante*, vol. 1, pp. 30, 78, in notes; *Shotwell v. Smith*, 5 C. E. Green, 79.

(b) See *Robinson v. Robinson*, 35 Eng. L. & E. 558; *Currier v. Railroad*, 48 N. H. 321; *Lindsley v. James*, 3 Cold. 477. Nor is it an excuse for

not producing documents that they may subject the party to a penalty in a foreign country, though that may be his own country. *King of Sicilies v. Wilcox*, 15 Jur. 214; s. c. 2 Eng. L. & E. 122. Compare *United States v. McRae*, L. R. 4 Eq. 327; s. c. 3 Ch. 79.

judges of the parties' own choice, they must submit to the inconveniences incidental thereto.¹ But it constitutes no objection to a bill of discovery that it is to assist proceedings in a court which sits in a foreign country, if in amity with that where the bill is filed; for it is but a just exercise of that comity which the mutual necessities and mutual convenience of all nations prescribe in their intercourse with each other.² Neither does it constitute any objection to a bill of discovery that the suit which it is to aid has not yet been commenced; for it may be indispensable to enable the party rightly to frame his action and declaration.³

1496. In the next place no discovery will be compelled where it is against the policy of the law from the particular relation of the parties. Thus for instance if a bill of discovery is filed against a married woman, to compel her to disclose facts which may charge her husband, it will be dismissed; for a married woman is not permitted to be a witness for or against her husband in controversies with third persons.⁴ Upon the same ground a person standing in the relation of professional confidence to another, as his counsel or attorney, will not be compelled to disclose the secrets of his client.⁵ (a)

¹ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3, p. 192; *Street v. Rigby*, 6 Ves. 821; Story on Eq. Plead. §§ 554, 555.

² Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3, p. 191; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 186, note (g); *Daubigny v. Davallen*, 2 Anst. R. 467, 468; *Mitchell v. Smith*, 1 Paige, R. 287.

³ *Moodaly v. Moreton*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 469, 571; s. c. 2 Dick. 652; Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3, p. 192; ante, § 1483; Story on Eq. Plead. §§ 321, 560.

⁴ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 5, § 3, p. 196; *Le Texier v. Margrave of Anspach*, 5 Ves. 322; s. c. 15 Ves. 159; *Baron v. Grillard*, 3 V. & Beam. 165; *Cartwright v. Green*, 8 Ves. 405, 408; Story on Eq. Plead. §§ 519, 556, 557.

⁵ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 5, pp. 295, 300; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 284, 288; *Bulstrode v. Letchmere*, 2 Freem. 5; s. c. 1 Ch. Cas. 277; *Parkhurst v. Lowten*, 2 Swanst. 194, 216; *Sandford v. Remington*, 2 Ves. jr. 189. Lord Redesdale (Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 288) says: 'If a bill seeks a discovery of a fact from one whose knowledge of the fact was derived from the confidence reposed in him as counsel, attorney, or arbitrator, he may plead in bar of the discovery

(a) *Wilson v. Northampton Ry. Co.*, L. R. 14 Eq. 477; *MacFarlan v. Rolt*, Ib. 580; *Minet v. Morgan*, L. R. 8 Ch. 361 (communications with predecessors in title); *Bustros v. White*, 1 Q. B. D. 423; *Wheeler v. Le Marchant*, 17 Ch. D. 609; *Friend v. London Ry. Co.*, 2 Ex. D. 437; *Bristol v. Cox*, 26 Ch. D. 678. But see of letters passing between counsel and client *before* suit *In re Mason*, 22 Ch. D. 609. Communications between co-defendants after suit are not ordinarily privileged. *Hamilton v. Knott*, L. R. 16 Eq. 112.

1497. In the next place no discovery will be compelled, except of facts material to the case stated by the plaintiff;¹ (a) for otherwise he might file a bill, and insist upon a knowledge of facts wholly impertinent to his case, and thus compel disclosures in which he had no interest, to gratify his malice or his curiosity or his spirit of oppression. In such a case his bill would most aptly be denominated a mere fishing bill. But cases of immateriality may be put far short of such unworthy objects. Thus if a mortgagor should seek by a bill of discovery to ascertain whether the mortgagee was a trustee or not, that would ordinarily be deemed an improper inquiry, since, unless special circumstances were shown, it could not be material to the plaintiff whether any trust were reposed in the mortgagee or not.² (b)

1498. In general arbitrators are not compellable by a bill of discovery to disclose the grounds on which they made their award; for (it has been said) it would be a great inconvenience to compel them to set forth the particular reasons of their decision; and it would be a discouragement of suitable persons to take upon themselves such an office.³ Perhaps a stronger ground

that his knowledge of the fact was so obtained.' Mr. Cooper (Eq. Pl. ch. 5, p. 300) adopts similar language. In the cases referred to by Lord Redesdale I do not find arbitrators mentioned; nor do I find that arbitrators are exempted from disclosing facts which have been stated before them, but only from stating the grounds of their award. See *Gregory v. Howard*, 3 Esp. R. 113; *Habershon v. Troby*, 3 Esp. R. 38; *Slack v. Buchannan*, Peake, R. 5; *Brown v. Brown*, 1 Vern. 158, 159; *Story on Eq. Plead.* §§ 231, 599 to 603; *Adams v. Barry*, 2 Y. & Coll. N. R. 107.

¹ See *Finch v. Finch*, 2 Ves. 492; *Gelston v. Hoyt*, 1 John. Ch. R. 548, 549; *Story on Eq. Plead.* §§ 319, 565.

² *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 8, pp. 198 to 200; *Montague v. Dudman*, 2 Ves. 399; *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 191, 192; *Harvey v. Morris*, Rep. temp. Finch, 214; *Story on Eq. Plead.* § 565.

³ *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3, p. 201; *Steward v. East India Company*, 2 Vern. 380; *Anon.* 3 Atk. 644; ante, §§ 1457, 1596, note; *Story on Eq. Plead.* §§ 519, 599, 825, note (1).

(a) See *Lindsley v. James*, 3 Cold. 15 Eq. 115; *Benbow v. Low*, 16 Ch. 477; *Whyte v. Ahrens*, 26 Ch. D. 717; *D. 93.*

Wier v. Tucker, L. R. 14 Eq. 25; (b) When documents are material
Minet v. Morgan, L. R. 8 Ch. 361. see *Compagnie du Pacifique v. Peruvian Gnano Co.*, 11 Q. B. D. 55. A person cannot be required to produce a muniment of title which he swears does not impeach his present title or aid the opposite party. *Minet v. Morgan*, L. R. 8 Ch. 361.

In trade-mark cases the names of the defendant's customers need not be disclosed. *Carver v. Pinto Leite*, L. R. 7 Ch. 90; *Moore v. Craven*, *Ib.* 94, note. See *Murray v. Clayton*, L. R.

against it is, that the arbitrators are not obliged by law to give any reason for their award; and if they act with good faith, being the judges chosen by the parties, their decision ought ordinarily to be conclusive.¹ But if they are charged with corruption, fraud, or partiality, they must answer to that.²

1499. In the next place it is ordinarily a good objection to a bill of discovery that it seeks the discovery from a defendant who is a mere witness and has no interest in the suit; for as he may be examined in the suit as a witness, there is no ground to make him a party to a bill of discovery, since his answer would not be evidence against any other person in the suit.³

1500. There are some exceptions to this rule as to witnesses; but they are all founded upon special circumstances, and in general they do not seem applicable to mere bills of discovery, but only to bills for discovery and relief. Thus if arbitrators are made parties to a bill to set aside an award, it is a good ground of objection on their part that they are mere witnesses.⁴ But if the bill charges them with corruption, fraud, or other gross misconduct, then they are compellable to make the discovery and to answer the bill. For they shall never be permitted to deprive the injured party of their evidence by their own fraud or gross misconduct; and if the case is maintained, they will be held liable for costs.⁵ So an attorney or solicitor who assists his client in obtaining a fraudulent deed, although a mere witness, may be made a party and compelled to make a discovery.⁶

1501. Another exception is the case of making the secretaries, book-keepers, and other officers of a corporation, and under certain circumstances even other members of the corporation, parties to bills of discovery and relief, also to bills for discovery,

¹ *Tittenson v. Peat*, 3 Atk. 529; ante, §§ 1454 to 1456.

² *Ibid.*; *Ives v. Medcalfe*, 1 Atk. 63.

³ *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3, pp. 200, 201; *Fenton v. Hughes*, 7 Ves. 287; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 188; *Neuman v. Godfrey*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 332 to 334; *Cookson v. Ellison*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 252; *Story on Eq. Plead.* §§ 234, 262, 323, 519, 570.

⁴ *Story on Eq. Plead.* §§ 235, 323, 519.

⁵ *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3, p. 202; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 161, 188, 189; *Chicot v. Lequesne*, 2 Ves. 315, 318; *Lingood v. Croucher*, 2 Atk. 395; *Lonsdale v. Littledale*, 2 Ves. jr. 451; *Dummer v. Corporation of Chippenham*, 14 Ves. 252; *Story on Eq. Plead.* §§ 235, 323, 519, 570.

⁶ *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 3, § 3, p. 201; *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 189; *Bennet v. Wade*, 2 Atk. 324; *Bowles v. Stewart*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 227.

merely against the corporation. The ground upon which this exception has been maintained is, that a corporation, being an artificial person, cannot be compelled to make any discovery on oath, but only under its common seal; and therefore it cannot make any satisfactory answer, nor be liable for perjury for any false answer. By making the secretary or other officer of the corporation a party, an answer under oath may be obtained from those persons as to the facts within their knowledge. Besides, their answer may enable the plaintiff to arrive at the means of obtaining better information.¹ Some dissatisfaction has been expressed with this mode of reasoning. The first of the grounds is extremely questionable; and if it were now to be considered for the first time, it would hardly be deemed correct. The latter ground is very singular; for it assigns as the ground of making a person who is a witness a defendant, that it is in order to enable the plaintiff to deal better, and with more success, with the other parties upon the record, — a ground wholly repugnant to the general principles of Courts of Equity on the subject of parties.² The doctrine however is now so firmly established that it is (practically speaking) impossible to overturn it.³

¹ *Wych v. Meal*, 3 P. Will. 311, 312; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 188, 189; Anon. 1 Vern. 117; Story on Eq. Plead. § 235.

² *Fenton v. Hughes*, 7 Ves. 288 to 291; *Dummer v. Corporation of Chippenham*, 14 Ves. 252. Lord Eldon has commented strongly on the doctrine of this exception in *Fenton v. Hughes* (7 Ves. 289), and the statement in the text is drawn from his judgment in that case.

³ *Ibid.* In the late case of *Glasscott v. Copper Miners' Company*, 11 Simons, R. 305, which was a bill for a discovery by a defendant in aid of an action at law, Sir L. Shadwell said: 'Then the question is, whether such a bill can be sustained. In my opinion there is abundance of authority for sustaining such a bill. It is very remarkable that the second edition of Lord Redesdale's Treatise, which was published in the year 1787, contains word for word the same passage as we find in the fourth edition, which was published in his lifetime and with his sanction, and which therefore does clearly show that his Lordship did after the lapse of forty years entertain the opinion which he published in the year 1787. Lord Redesdale was a great observer of what took place in this court; and we can hardly suppose that he forgot the cases in which he himself had been engaged as counsel, as he was in *Moodaly v. Moreton*, which was heard in 1785. Now though it may be perfectly true that the observation made by Sir John Leach in the case of *Angell v. Angell* may have contained very good reasons why the demurrer should have been allowed so far as it was a bill for a commission, still his honor's opinion, supposing it to be right, would be no authority against the proposition which is involved in the decision of that case, namely, that a bill for discovery only may be filed

1502. In the next place a defendant may object to a bill of discovery that he is a bona fide purchaser of the property for a valuable consideration, without notice of the plaintiff's claim. We have already had occasion to take notice of this protection which Courts of Equity throw round innocent purchasers, and that it applies not only to bills of relief but to bills of discovery.¹ To entitle himself to this protection however the purchaser must not only be bona fide, and without notice, and for a valuable consideration, but he must have paid the purchase-money.² So

against a corporation and its officers. And it appears to me that any observations which were made upon the collateral point concerning the commission have nothing at all to do with the question whether a bill of discovery only may be filed against a company and its officers. Then the language of Lord Redesdale in both the editions to which I have referred is in the most general form: "It has been usual," says his Lordship, "where a discovery of entries in the books of the corporation or of any act done by the corporation has been necessary, to make their secretary or book-keeper or other officer a party." And if you make any other officer than a secretary or a book-keeper a party, which this language plainly imports, it seems to follow that you may make not only the secretary but the governor and the deputy-governor, &c., and any other person a party, with respect to whom there is an averment that he has or that he and others have in their custody books and papers which relate to the matters in the bill mentioned, and whereby the truth of those matters would appear. And I cannot but think, notwithstanding all that has been said on this subject, that I am actually bound by the authority which I find, which I must take to have been considered as the law for the length of time from 1787 to 1827, and which I myself have always understood to be the law of the court.' (a)

¹ Ante, §§ 64 c, 108 a, 119, 381, 409, 434, 630, 631; *McNeil v. Magee*, 5 Mason, R. 269, 270; *Jeremy on Eq. Juris. B. 2*, ch. 1, pp. 263, 264; *Cooper Eq. Pl. ch. 5*, p. 300; *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 274, 275. Mr. Butler's note to *Co. Litt. 290 b*, note 1, § 13; *Stanhope v. Earl Varney*, 2 Eden, R. 81.

² *Wood v. Mann*, 1 Sumner, R. 506; *Flagg v. Mann*, 2 Sumner, R. 487; ante, § 64 c; Mr. Butler's note to *Co. Litt. 290 b*, note (1), § 13; *Stanhope v. Earl Varney*, 2 Eden, R. 81; *Willoughby v. Willoughby*, 1 Term, R. 763, 767. In this last case Lord Hardwicke said: 'In the first place he must be a purchaser for a price paid or for a valuable consideration. He must be a purchaser bona fide, not affected with any fraud or collusion. He must be a purchaser without notice of the prior conveyance or of the prior charge or incumbrance; for notice makes him come in fraudulently. And here when I speak of a purchaser for a valuable consideration I include a mortgagee, for he is a purchaser pro tanto. If he has no notice and happens to take a defective conveyance of the inheritance, defective either by reason of some prior conveyance or of

(a) The official liquidator in a defendant to a bill of discovery. *Ex winding up is in a position as to duty parte Contract Corp.*, L. R. 2 Ch. to answer interrogatories similar to 350. Compare *Gooch's Case*, L. R. that of an officer of a corporation made 7 Ch. 207.

he must have purchased the legal title, and not be a mere purchaser without a semblance of title; for even the purchaser of an equity is bound to take notice of and is bound by a prior equity;¹ and between equities the established rule is that he who has the prior equity in point of time is entitled to the like priority in point of right.²(a) But it is not indispensable to protect himself against a bill of discovery that he should be the purchaser of a legal title. For the rule in equity is, that if a defendant has in conscience a right equal to that claimed by the person filing a bill against him, although he is not clothed with a perfect legal title, this circumstance, in his situation as defendant, renders it improper for a Court of Equity to compel him to make any discovery which may hazard his title.³ It seems that a judgment-creditor, proceeding in invitum, does not, in the view of a Court of Equity, stand in that position in which he requires or receives the same favor as a purchaser whose right is enforced through the conscience of the other party.⁴

1503. In short Courts of Equity will not take the least step imaginable against an innocent purchaser in such a predicament; and will on the other hand allow him to take every advantage

some prior charge or incumbrance, and if he also take an assignment of the term to a trustee for him or to himself where he takes the conveyance of the inheritance to his trustee, in both these cases he shall have the benefit of the term to protect him; that is, he may make use of the legal estate of the term to defend his possession, or if he has lost his possession, to recover it at common law, notwithstanding that his adversary may at law have the strict title to the inheritance.' *Maundrell v. Maundrell*, 10 Ves. 246, 259, 260, 270; *Jones v. Bowles*, 3 Mylne & Keen, 581, 596, 597, 598.

¹ *Vattier v. Hinde*, 7 Peters, 252, 271. But see *Payne v. Compton*, 2 Younge & Coll. 457; *Story on Eq. Pl.* §§ 604 to 805.

² *Fitzsimmons v. Ogden*, 7 Cranch, 2; ante, § 57 a; *Boone v. Chiles*, 10 Peters, R. 177; *Payne v. Compton*, 2 Younge & Coll. 457; see ante, §§ 64 c, 410, 434, 630, 631.

³ *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 199; *Story on Eq. Pl.* §§ 603, 604, 604 a, 805; ante, § 64 c, and note.

⁴ *Langton v. Horton*, 1 Hare, R. 547, 563; *Doe, dem. Coleman v. Britain*, 2 B. & Ald. 93; *Skeeles v. Shearly*, 8 Sim. R. 153; s. c. 3 Mylne & Craig, 112; *Story on Eq. Pl.* § 807 a.

(a) The rule of purchaser for value without notice does not apply, between equitable interests, where the circumstances are such as to require equity to determine the priorities. An equitable conveyance passes no more than the grantor has; and in determining the priority of securities the maxim applies 'qui prior est in tempore potior in jure.' *Phillips v. Phillips*, 4 DeG. F. & J. 208; *Cave v. Cave*, 15 Ch. D. 639, 646.

which the law gives him; for there is nothing which can attach itself upon his conscience in such a case in favor of an adverse claim.¹ Where Courts of Equity are called upon to administer justice upon grounds of equity against a legal title they allow a superior strength to the legal title when the rights of the parties are in conscience equal. And where a legal title may be enforced in a court of ordinary jurisdiction, to the prejudice of an equitable title, Courts of Equity will refuse assistance to the legal title against the equitable title when the rights are in conscience equal.² On the other hand if a plaintiff comes into equity seeking relief upon a legal title against a bona fide purchaser of an equitable title, if he is entitled to relief in such a case (which is perhaps doubtful), still he must obtain it upon the strength of his own case and his own evidence; and he is not entitled to extract from the conscience of the innocent defendant any proofs to support it.³

1503 *a.* And not only is a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice protected in equity against a plaintiff seeking to overturn that title, but a purchaser with notice under such a bona fide purchaser without notice is entitled to the like protection. For otherwise it would happen that the title of such a bona fide purchaser would become unmarketable

¹ *Jerrard v. Saunders*, 2 Ves. jr. 458; *Wood v. Mann*, 1 Sumner, R. 507 to 509.

² *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 199, 200; *Wortley v. Birkhead*, 2 Ves. 573, 574; ante, § 415. See on this point, ante, § 64 *c*, and note 2, § 410, note 2, §§ 436, 630, 631, note 2. The only recognized exceptions are in favor of a plaintiff against a judgment creditor holding the estate on his judgment, and in favor of a dowress against an innocent purchaser. *Ibid.* See *Wood v. Mann*, 1 Sumner, R. 507 to 509.

³ See *Senhouse v. Earl*, 2 Ves. 450. Lord Loughborough, in *Jerrard v. Saunders* (2 Ves. jr. 458), said: 'I believe it is decided that you cannot even have a bill to perpetuate testimony against him' (a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice). The case of *Seybourne v. Clifton*, cited 2 Vern. 159, s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. 354, certainly favors that doctrine. But the case was not decided on any such point. And Lord Eldon, in *Dursley v. Fitzhardinge*, 6 Ves. 263, has manifestly doubted it. Mr. Cooper however asserts the doctrine on the authority of the other cases. *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 3, pp. 56, 57; *Id.* ch. 5, pp. 283, 287. See also *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 279, 280; *Bechinall v. Arnold*, 1 Vern. R. 354, and Mr. Raithby's note. Lord Abinger, in *Payne v. Compton*, 2 Younge & Coll. 457, 461, held that a plea of bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice was a good defence in equity to a bill by a plaintiff who was the owner of the legal estate. See also *Wood v. Mann*, 1 Sumner, R. 507 to 509.

in his hands, and consequently he might be subjected to great losses if not utter ruin.¹

1503 *b*. The question sometimes arises as to who is to be treated as a bona fide purchaser in the sense of the rule; and it has been held that a judgment creditor by *elegit* is not entitled to be deemed such, but he takes only such rights in the premises as the judgment debtor rightfully possessed. Thus for example a judgment creditor cannot hold an estate subject to an equitable mortgage by an *elegit* executed on the estate of the debtor mortgagor except subject to such equitable mortgage, although he had no notice of the mortgage at the time of the *elegit*.² (*a*)

¹ Ante, §§ 57 *a*, 108, 381, 434; *Varick v. Briggs*, 6 Paige, R. 323, 329; *Bennett v. Walker*, 1 West. R. 130; *Jackson v. McChesney*, 7 Cowen, R. 360.

² *Whitworth v. Guagain*, *The Jurist*, May 4, 1844, p. 374; s. c. 3 Hare, R. 416. 'The defendants, between whom and the plaintiffs the contest in the cause exists, are judgment creditors of George Cooke, whose judgments were entered up after the mortgage to the plaintiffs, and who have since by means of *elegits* obtained actual possession of the lands comprised in the mortgage; and the question between them is, which of the two is in equity to be preferred to the other? In considering that question I shall here repeat what I have on more than one occasion already said respecting Lord Cottenham's judgment when this cause was before him upon motion, namely, that I am satisfied he did not intend by what he said finally to decide the point now before me. However strong the leaning of his mind may have been in favor of the judgment creditor, he not only did not intend to decide, but intended that it should be reserved. And I therefore consider myself not only at liberty but bound to decide the cause according to my own understanding of the law. Now if the question be not decided by that judgment, I have certainly a very strong opinion upon it. The more I consider the case the more satisfied I feel that I stated the general principle correctly in *Langton v. Horton*, when I said that a creditor might under his judgment take in execution all that belonged to his debtor and nothing more. He stands in the place of his debtor. He only takes the property of his debtor, subject to every liability under which the debtor himself held it. First, take the case of an ordinary trust. It could not for a moment be contended that this court would not protect the interest of the *cestui que trust* against the judgment creditor of the trustee. The judgment of Lord Cottenham in *Newlands v. Paynter* (4 Mylne & Cr. 408) is decisive upon that point, and the other cases cited at the bar prove the same thing. Secondly, take the case of a purchaser for value before conveyance. *Lodge v. Lysely* (4 Sim. 70) is an authority, if authority could be wanting, to show that the equitable interest of such a party will be preferred in equity to the claim of the judgment creditor of the vendor. Again take the case of an equitable

(*a*) So of a creditor deriving title under levy of execution. *Hart v. Farmers' Bank*, 33 Vt. 252. See *Farmers' Bank v. Teeters*, 31 Ohio St. 36; *Kinyon v. Young*, 44 Mich. 339; *Abell v. Howe*, 43 Vt. 403. But see *Danbury v. Robinson*, 1 McCart. 213.

1504. Upon the same principle a jointress is entitled to protect herself against the discovery of her jointure deed if the

charge to pay debts, or legacies, or any other equitable interest except that of an equitable mortgagee, and I apprehend the right of the equitable incumbrancer to be preferred to the judgment creditor of the debtor in whom the legal estate in the property charged might be, will be, as indeed it properly was, admitted. And if such equitable interests are thus protected, upon what principle is the equitable mortgagee to be excluded from the like protection? Unless I misunderstand the report of the case of *Williams v. Craddock* (4 Sim. 316), the counsel as well as the court were of opinion that an interest by way of equitable mortgage was entitled in this court to the same protection against judgments as other equitable claimants. In the argument of this case both parties referred to and drew conclusions from the proposition that in a Court of Equity a purchaser for value who obtains a conveyance of the legal interest, without notice of an equity affecting the specific subject of his purchase, will in equity as at law have a better title to that subject than the mere equitable claimant. The proposition thus admitted and necessarily admitted by both parties is pregnant with consequences which go a great way towards deciding the question now before me. If the tenant by elegit is (as was argued) to be considered as a purchaser for value without notice under a conveyance, all trusts and all equitable interests of every description must be subject to the judgments against the trustee. For a purchaser for value without notice from a fraudulent trustee having got the legal estate will unquestionably be preferred in equity to the cestui que trust; and it appears to me to be impossible, except by a merely arbitrary decision, to distinguish the case of an ordinary trust or other equitable interest from the present, in considering merely the effect of a judgment upon it, unless it can be shown that the interest of the equitable mortgagee is for the present purpose distinguishable from that of an ordinary cestui que trust. Again it follows conversely that if the equitable interest of an ordinary cestui que trust or any other equitable interest is not subject to judgments against the trustee, though executed, then those judgments, though executed, are not analogous to purchases for value. In other words the judgment creditor of a trustee is not a purchaser for value in the contemplation of a Court of Equity. The proposition that a judgment creditor is a purchaser for value would prove too much for the defendant's purpose. It would affect all equitable interests alike. But it was said that the interest of an equitable mortgagee was distinguishable from that of an ordinary cestui que trust and other equitable interests (charges for example to pay debts and legacies paramount to the title of the debtor), which it was admitted would be preferred in equity—that the interest of the equitable mortgagee was imperfect, that of the cestui que trust perfect. In what respect is the interest of the equitable mortgagee imperfect? As between the mortgagor and mortgagee it is absolute and complete. In what respect is it imperfect as between the mortgagee and those who claim under the mortgagee as his creditors by judgment? The interest of the equitable mortgagee is liable to be defeated by a fraudulent dealing with the legal estate, and in that respect no doubt it is imperfect. But that is an infirmity to which all equitable interests are subject; and if other equitable interests are to be protected against judgments obtained against the trustee or other party in whom the legal estate may be, why is the interest of the equitable mortgagee to be unprotected? The debt

party seeking the discovery is not capable of confirming the jointure, or if being capable he does not offer by his bill to confirm it.¹ If he is capable and offers to confirm it, the discovery will be granted as soon as the confirmation is made, but not before. For otherwise it might happen that after the discovery his offer might become ineffectual by the intervention of other interests.²

1505. Let us now pass to the consideration of bills to preserve and perpetuate testimony. The object of all bills of this sort is to preserve and perpetuate testimony when it is in danger of being lost before the matter to which it relates can be made the subject of judicial investigation.³ Bills of this sort are obviously indispensable for the purposes of public justice, as it may be utterly impossible for a party to bring his rights presently to a judicial decision; and unless in the intermediate time he may perpetuate the proofs of those rights, they may be lost without any default on his side. The civil law adopted similar means of preserving testimony which was in danger of being otherwise lost.⁴

1506. This sort of bill (as has been remarked by Mr. Justice Blackstone) 'is most frequent when lands are devised by will away from the heir at law, and the devisee in order to perpetuate the testimony of the witnesses to such will exhibits a bill in chancery against the heir, and sets forth the will verbatim therein, suggesting that the heir is inclined to dispute its validity; and then, the defendant having answered, they proceed to issue as in other cases, and examine the witnesses to the will, after which the cause is at an end without proceeding to any decree, no relief being prayed by the bill; but the heir is entitled

was no more contracted upon the view of the land (if that were material, which I think it is not) in the one case than in the other.'

¹ Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 199; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 197, 208, 284; Portsmouth v. Effingham, 1 Ves. 30; Id. 430; Chamberlain v. Knapp, 1 Atk. 52; Senhouse v. Earl, 2 Ves. 450; Leech v. Trollop, 2 Ves. 662; Ford v. Peering, 1 Ves. jr. 76.

² Leech v. Trollop, 2 Ves. 662.

³ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 3, p. 52; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 148, 149; Com. Dig. Chancery, R.

⁴ 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 6, § 3; Dig. Lib. 9, tit. 2, l. 40; Gilb. For. Roman. ch. 7, pp. 118, 119; Mason v. Goodburne, Rep. temp. Finch, 391.

to his costs, even though he contests the will. This is what is usually meant by proving a will in chancery.¹

1507. The jurisdiction which Courts of Equity exercise to perpetuate testimony has been thought to be open to great objections, although it seems indispensable for the purposes of public justice. First, it leads to a trial on written depositions which is deemed (at least in Courts of Common Law) to be much less favorable to the cause of truth than the viva voce examination of witnesses. But what is still more important, inasmuch as those depositions can never be used until after the death of the witnesses, and are not indeed published until after their death, it follows that whatever may have been the perjury committed in those depositions, it must necessarily go unpunished. The testimony therefore has this infirmity, that it is not given under the sanction of those penalties which the general policy of the law imposes upon the crime of perjury. It is for these reasons that Courts of Equity do not generally entertain bills to perpetuate testimony for the purpose of being used upon a future occasion, unless where it is absolutely necessary to prevent a failure of justice.²

1508. If therefore it be possible that the matter in controversy can be made the subject of immediate judicial investigation by the party who seeks to perpetuate testimony, Courts of Equity will not entertain any bill for the purpose. For the party under such circumstances has it fully in his power to terminate the controversy by commencing the proper action; and therefore there is no reasonable ground to give the advantage of deferring his proceedings to a future time, and to substitute thereby written depositions for viva voce evidence. But on the other hand if the party who files the bill can by no means bring the matter in controversy into immediate judicial investigation, which may happen when his title is in remainder, or when he himself is in actual possession of the property, or when he is in the present possession of the rights which he seeks to perpetuate by proofs, — in every such case Courts of Equity will entertain a suit to secure such proofs. For otherwise the only evidence which could sup-

¹ 2 Black. Comm. 450.

² Angell v. Angell, 1 Sim. & Stu. 83; Duke of Dorset v. Girdler, Prec. Ch. 531, 532; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 152, 153; Cann v. Cann, 1 P. Will. 567 to 569.

port his title, possession, or rights might be lost by the death of his witnesses, and the adverse party might purposely delay any suit to vindicate his claims with a view to that very event.¹

1509. As to the right to maintain a bill to perpetuate testimony there is no distinction whether it respects a title or claim to real estate, or to personal estate, or to mere personal demands; or whether it is to be used as matter of proof in support of the plaintiff's action, or as matter of defence to repel it.² (a) But there is this difference between a bill of discovery and a bill to perpetuate

¹ *Angell v. Angell*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 83; *Duke of Dorset v. Girdler*, Prec. Ch. 531; *Dew v. Clarke*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 114; *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 3, pp. 53 to 55; Com. Dig. Chancery, R. These grounds are fully expounded in the case of *Angell v. Angell* (1 Sim. & Stu. 83), as indeed they had been before expounded in the case of the *Duke of Dorset v. Girdler*, Prec. Ch. 531. From the opinion of the court in the latter case the following extract is made, as it exhibits the pith of the whole doctrine. 'If one is out of possession, having only right to fishery or common rent-charge, he who brings such bill ought never to be allowed to do so, but a demurrer to it will be good, because he may and ought first to enter his action and establish his title at law; otherwise publication not being to pass till after the death of the witness (as in those cases it never does without special order of the court), they may be guilty of the grossest perjury, and yet go unpunished. Besides that, the party having a remedy at law, the other side ought not to be deprived of the opportunity of confronting the witnesses and examining them publicly, which has always been found the most effectual method for discovering of the truth. But if a man is in actual possession, and is only threatened with disturbances by another who pretends a right, he has no other way in the world to perpetuate the testimony of his witnesses but by such a bill as this is, for not being actually interrupted or disturbed he can bring no action at law. And in such a case if their demurrer should be allowed, there is an end of all bills to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses to wills and such like, wherein the parties pray no relief, nor ought to do, but only a commission for the examination of their witnesses. And yet even in these cases, if the plaintiff should afterwards be evicted or disturbed, these depositions cannot be made use of, so long as the witnesses are living, and may be had to be examined before a jury.' It is said by Mr. Cooper (*Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 3, p. 52) that Lord Nottingham in *Mason v. Goodburne* (Rep. temp. Finch, 391) decided the first and leading case on this subject. The marginal note in that case is far more full than the report of the judgment. Bills to perpetuate the testimony of the subscribing witnesses to a will are often brought where the devisee is in possession, and the heir may afterwards choose to contest its due execution. See *Harris v. Cotterell*, 3 Meriv. 678.

² *Earl of Suffolk v. Green*, 1 Atk. 450.

(a) A bill to perpetuate testimony defendant in a pending suit. *Spencer v. Peek*, L. R. 3 Eq. 415.

testimony, that the latter may be brought in many cases where the former cannot be. Thus in cases which involve a penalty or forfeiture of a public nature a bill of discovery will not lie at all. And in cases which involve only a penalty or forfeiture of a private nature it will not lie unless the party entitled to the benefit of the penalty or forfeiture waives it.¹ But no such objection exists in regard to a bill to perpetuate testimony; for the latter will lie not only in cases of a private penalty or forfeiture without waiving it where it may be waived, as in cases of waste or of the forfeiture of a lease, but also in cases of public penalties, such as for the forgery of a deed or for a fraudulent loss at sea.²

1510. There is also perhaps another difference between the case of a bill of discovery and that of a bill to perpetuate testimony, in regard to a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice. We have seen that the former bill is not maintainable against him.³ But as the latter asks for no discovery, and only seeks to perpetuate testimony which might be used at the time if the circumstances called for it and an action were brought it does not seem open to the same objection. And there is this reason for the distinction, that otherwise the plaintiff might lose his legal rights by the mere defect of testimony, which if he could maintain a suit he would clearly be entitled to.⁴

1511. It follows from the very nature and objects of such bills that the plaintiff who is desirous of perpetuating evidence must by his bill show that he has some interest in the subject-matter, and that it may be endangered if the testimony in support of it is lost.⁵ Courts of Equity will not however perpetuate testimony in support of the right of a plaintiff which may be immediately barred by the defendant.⁶ But if the interest be a present vested one not liable to such an objection, it is perfectly immaterial how

¹ Ante, §§ 1319, 1320, 1494; Story on Eq. Plead. §§ 521 to 526, 553, 824.

² Earl of Suffolk v. Green, 1 Atk. 450; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2, § 1, pp. 266, 267, ch. 2, § 2, pp. 277, 278; ante, § 1494.

³ Ante, § 1502.

⁴ Dursley v. Fitzhardinge, 6 Ves. 263, 264; ante, § 1508, and note; Gordon v. Close, 2 Bro. Parl. Cas. 473, 477, 479.

⁵ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 3, p. 52; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 57; Mason v. Goodburne, Rep. temp. Finch, 391; Dursley v. Fitzhardinge, 6 Ves. 261, 262; Earl of Belfast v. Chichester, 2 Jac. & Walk. 449, 451.

⁶ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 3, pp. 53, 54; Dursley v. Fitzhardinge, 6 Ves. 260 to 262; Earl of Belfast v. Chichester, 2 Jac. & Walk. 451, 452.

minute that interest may be, or how distant the possibility of its coming into actual possession and enjoyment may be. A present interest, the enjoyment of which may depend upon the most remote and improbable contingency, is nevertheless a present estate, although with reference to chances it may be worth little or nothing.¹ On the other hand, although the contingency may be ever so proximate and valuable, yet if the party has not by virtue of that an estate (as in the case of the heir of a lunatic), Courts of Equity will not interfere to perpetuate evidence touching it.² (a)

1512. If the bill is sustained and the testimony is taken, the suit terminates with the examination, and of course is not brought to a hearing.³ But the decretal order of the court granting the commission directs that the depositions when taken shall remain to perpetuate the memory thereof, and to be used in case of the death of the witnesses or their inability to travel, as there shall be occasion.⁴

1513. There is another species of bills having a close analogy to that to perpetuate testimony and often confounded with it, but which in reality stands upon distinct considerations. We allude to bills to take testimony *de bene esse*, and bills to take the testimony of persons resident abroad to be used in suits actually pending in the country where the bills are filed.⁵ There is this broad distinction between bills of this sort and bills to perpetuate testimony, that the latter are and can be brought by

¹ *Ibid.*; *Allan v. Allan*, 15 Ves. 136; *Earl of Belfast v. Chichester*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 451, 452.

² *Ibid.*; *Sackvill v. Ayleworth*, 1 Vern. 105, 106.

³ *Cooper*, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 3, p. 52; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, p. 51, and note (u); *Hall v. Hoddesdon*, 2 P. Will. 162; *Anon.* 2 Ves. 497; *Anon. Ambler*, R. 237; *Vaughan v. Fitzgerald*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 316; 3 Black. Comm. 450; ante, § 1506.

⁴ *Rep. temp. Finch*, 391, 392.

⁵ 3 Black. Comm. 438; *Gilb. Forum Roman.* 140. When depositions which are taken in a suit to perpetuate testimony are required to be used in a trial at law not under the control of the court, the order is that the depositions be published, and that the officer attend with and produce to the court of law the record of the whole proceedings, and that the parties may make such use of them as by law they can. *Attorney-Gen. v. Ray*, 2 Hare, R. 518.

(a) But in *In re Tayleur*, L. R. 6 Ch. 416, the court, without deciding whether the bill would lie, passed an order allowing the committee to pay the expenses of any bill which might be brought with the approval of a master to perpetuate testimony as to two wills made before lunacy.

persons only who are in possession under their title, and who cannot sue at law and thereby have an opportunity to examine their witnesses in such suit. But bills to take testimony de bene esse may be brought not only by persons in possession, but by persons who are out of possession, in aid of the trial at law.¹ There is also another distinction between them, which is, that bills de bene esse can be brought only when an action is then depending and not before.²

1514. By the common law it is well known that the Courts of Law have no authority to issue commissions to take the testimony of witnesses de bene esse in any case.³ But Courts of

¹ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 3, p. 57; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 153; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2, ch. 2, § 2, pp. 277, 278.

² *Angell v. Angell*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 83. The case of *Phillips v. Carew* (1 P. Will. 117) seems to decide that a bill of this sort might be brought although no action was pending, and merely in contemplation of an action where the plaintiff's witnesses were aged or infirm. But in *Angell v. Angell*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 83, 93, the Vice-Chancellor (Sir John Leach) held an opposite doctrine, that which is stated in the text. On that occasion he said, referring to the case in 1 P. Will. 117: 'The principle of that case, supposing it to be correctly reported, is not however very satisfactory. Written depositions, on account of the infirmity which I have before referred to, are never to be received where, with reasonable diligence, viva voce testimony may be had; and the circumstance that the witnesses are aged and infirm should be rather a reason for the action being immediately brought to give the better chance of their living till the trial than a reason for permitting the action to be indefinitely delayed at the pleasure of the plaintiff. Whenever such a case occurs again the principle of *Phillips v. Carew*, 1 P. Will. 117, will come to be reconsidered.' In the same case he added: 'If a bill for a commission to examine witnesses abroad to be used on a trial at law were entertained before an action actually commenced, then, inasmuch as it is not pretended that there is any time limited within which the future action is to be brought, this consequence might follow, that the plaintiff in the bill having obtained this written testimony, not given under the sanction of the penalties of perjury, might delay his action until after the deaths of those witnesses for the adverse party resident in this country and subject to viva voce examination, whose evidence might be in opposition to this written testimony, and thus the justice of the case might be defeated. On the other hand no reason of justice or even of convenience to the party plaintiff in such a bill requires that he should be permitted to file it before he has actually commenced his action. The necessary effect of such a bill is to suspend the trial until the commission is returned, and to secure to him the benefit of his foreign evidence; and all further delay of trial is injustice to the other party. I am therefore of opinion, both upon authority and upon principle, that a bill for a commission to examine witnesses abroad in aid of a trial at law where a present action may be brought is demurrable, if it do not aver that an action is pending.'

³ *Mitford*, Eq. Pl. by *Jeremy*, 149; 3 *Black. Comm.* 383; *Macaulay v. Shackell*,

Equity have been constantly in the habit of exercising such jurisdiction in aid of trials at law, where the subject-matter admits of present judicial investigation and a suit is actually pending in some court.¹ They will for example, upon a proper bill, grant

1 Bligh, R. N. s. 119, 130. This defect has long since been cured in America, and indeed the authority given to our Courts of Common Law to take the depositions of witnesses, both at home and abroad, has been carried to an extent far beyond what has been exercised by Courts of Equity. A recent statute in England has conferred authority upon the Courts of Common Law to take the depositions of witnesses abroad. See Stat. 13 George III. ch. 63, §§ 40, 44, and Stat. 1 Will. IV. ch. 22; 1 Starkie, Evid. 275, 276 (2d Lond. edit. 1833).

¹ In *Macaulay v. Shackell*, 1 Bligh, R. N. s. 119, Lord Eldon said: 'The original jurisdiction of granting commissions was under the Great Seal, because no commission at one time could be granted in Common-Law Courts.' Lord Eldon in the same case (pp. 130, 131) cited an extract from the reasons of appeal, in the case of *Davie v. Verelst* in the House of Lords, which contains a full exposition of the grounds of the jurisdiction. It is as follows: 'The order appealed from proceeds upon a fundamental maxim in the administration of justice, namely, that both sides are to be heard, and the parties are to be heard by their evidence and witnesses to matters of fact. The end of the order in question, which was for a commission, is to give the respondents an opportunity of bringing over their evidence from a foreign country to maintain the truth of the justification which they have pleaded. The Courts of Law pay an attention to *Audi alteram partem* as far as the powers of a Court of Law can go, and therefore will put off trials upon an affidavit made by the defendant showing that he has material witnesses abroad who are expected home in a reasonable time, it not being the fault but the misfortune of the party that his witnesses are not within the reach of the process of the court whereby their attendance on the trial may be compelled. This reasoning goes only to the putting off the trial where there are witnesses abroad who are expected to be here in a reasonable time, and not when the witnesses were not expected to be here, and their testimony was to be sought by sending a commission to them, instead of waiting for their coming home here to be examined. But where witnesses reside abroad, and cannot or will not personally attend in England, the power of the Courts of Law is at an end, as they have no means of examining witnesses abroad. But the Court of Chancery having an authority to issue commissions under the Great Seal for various purposes, and amongst others for examining witnesses in causes in that court, the suitors, defendants at law, have availed themselves of the power of the Court of Chancery to come in and supply the failure of justice by preferring their bills there, containing a state of their case and of the proceedings at law with the defendants' misfortune, that their witnesses being resident abroad and not compellable to appear at the trial, they cannot have the benefit of their testimony, and therefore praying that the court will relieve them against this accident and grant them a commission for the examination of their witnesses, to the end that their depositions may be read at law; and, as it would be nugatory to try the causes without evidence, praying also that the plaintiff at law may be restrained by injunction from proceeding in the mean time till the return of the commission.

a commission to examine witnesses who are abroad and who are material witnesses to the merits of the cause, whether the adverse party will consent thereto or not.¹ They will also entertain a bill to preserve the testimony of aged and infirm witnesses resident at home, and of witnesses about to depart from the country, to be used in a trial at law in a suit then pending, if they are likely to die before the time of trial may arrive.² They will even entertain such a bill to preserve the testimony of a witness who is neither aged nor infirm, if he is a single witness to a material fact in the cause.³ This latter case stands upon the same general ground as the other; that is to say, the extreme danger to the party of an irreparable loss of all the evidence on which he may rely in support of his right in the trial at law; for that which depends upon a single life must be practically treated as being very uncertain in its duration.⁴

1515. In regard to commissions to take the testimony of witnesses abroad, although they are grantable in civil actions only,

Both the Courts of Chancery and of Exchequer, as Courts of Equity, have always entertained these bills as belonging to one of their great sources of jurisdiction, the relief against such accidents as are beyond the power of Courts of Law to aid.'

¹ *Moodalay v. Morton*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 469; *Thorpe v. Macaulay*, 5 Madd. R. 218, 231; *Mendizabel v. Machado*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 483; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 152; *Angell v. Angell*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 83, 93; *Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 149; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2*, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 271, 272; *Cock v. Donovan*, 3 Ves. & Beam. 76; *Hinde's Pract.* 305; *Devis v. Turnbull*, 6 Madd. 232.

² *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 51, 52, and note (y); *Id.* 149, 150; *Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1*, § 3, p. 57; *Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2*, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 270, 271. If a witness is seventy years old he is deemed aged within the rule, and the commission goes of course. *Fitzhugh v. Lee*, *Ambler*, R. 65; *Rowe v. —*, 13 Ves. 261, 262; *Prichard v. Gee*, 5 Madd. R. 364.

³ *Angell v. Angell*, 83, 92, 93; *Shirley v. Earl Ferrers*, 3 P. Will. 77, 78; *Pearson v. Ward*, 1 Cox, R. 177; *Hankin v. Middleditch*, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 641, and Mr. Belt's note; *Cholmondeley v. Oxford*, 4 Bro. Ch. 157; 1 Foulb. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, note (f). In *Cholmondeley v. Oxford*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 157, a commission was granted to take the depositions of the witnesses who were sworn to be the only persons who had knowledge of the material facts, without stating their age. When the commission is granted to take the examination of a single witness, the affidavit to obtain it must state that the particular witness knows the fact and is the only person that knows it. The belief of the person making the affidavit is not sufficient. *Rowe v. —*, 13 Ves. 261. In all other cases an affidavit is required, as for example that the witness is seventy years of age, or is in a dangerous state. *Bellamy v. Jones*, 8 Ves. 31; *Barton*, Suit in Eq. 53, 54, note.

⁴ *Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy*, 150; *Shirley v. Earl Ferrers*, 3 P. Will. 77.

yet they are not confined to cases purely *ex contractu*, or touching rights of property; but they are grantable in cases of suits for civil torts, although such torts may also be indictable. Thus for example a commission will be granted to take the testimony of witnesses abroad, in order to establish a justification in a civil suit for a libel, although the justification involves a criminal charge against the plaintiff and the libel may be the subject of an indictment.¹

1516. Some confusion exists in the authorities as to the publication of the testimony in the three distinct classes of cases before mentioned; first, on examinations of witnesses *de bene esse* pending a cause; secondly, on examinations of witnesses in a bill merely to prove a will *per testes*, as it is called, that is, by the subscribing witnesses; and thirdly, on examinations of witnesses on common bills to perpetuate testimony, as for example to perpetuate the testimony respecting a will, or a deed, or a modus, or the legitimacy of a marriage.² The true rule as to the publication of the testimony in these several classes of cases is as follows: As to the first, the examinations are not published but by the consent of the parties or on a strong case made to the court.³ As to the second, they stand on a distinct ground, because none but subscribing witnesses are examined; and they are examined to the question of the sanity of the testator merely, as incidental, and their publication is of course.⁴ As to the third, publication is not ordinarily allowed during the lifetime of the witnesses, because of the dangers incident thereto, there being no limits as to the points to which the witnesses are examined.⁵ But the publication is a matter resting in the sound

¹ *Macaulay v. Shackell*, 1 Bligh, R. N. S. 96, 126, 127, 129.

² *Harris v. Cotterell*, 3 Meriv. 680; ante, § 1506.

³ *Ibid.*; *Gilb. For. Roman.* 140. As for example upon proof that the witness is since dead, or is unable to attend the trial at law. *Webster v. Pawson*, 2 Dick. 540; *Price v. Bridgman*, 1 Dick. 144; *Bradley v. Crackenthorp*, 1 Dick. R. 182; *Gason v. Wordsworth*, 2 Ves. 336, 337; *Dew v. Clark*, 1 Sim. & Sta. 108; *Gilb. Forum Roman.* 140. If the witness is alive at the time of the trial and capable of attending, and within the jurisdiction, his deposition cannot be used. If the case be a bill in equity and the testimony is taken *de bene esse*, and the witness is living and within the jurisdiction when the examinations are to be taken in chief, he must be examined over again, as other witnesses. *Gilb. Forum Roman.* 140, 141. See also *Harrison's Pract. by Newland*, pp. 275 to 280, edit. 1808.

⁴ *Harris v. Cotterell*, 3 Meriv. 678 to 680; ante, § 1506.

⁵ *Barnsdale v. Lowe*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 142.

discretion of the court, upon the special circumstances of the case, and it will be allowed or refused accordingly.¹ In this last class of cases (of bills to perpetuate testimony), when the examinations are taken the case is considered to be at an end; or at least as suspended until the anticipated action is brought; and then at a suitable period an order for the publication thereof may be obtained from the court upon a proper case made, such as the death or absence of the witnesses, or their inability to attend the trial.²

¹ *Harris v. Cotterell*, 3 Meriv. R. 678 to 680. However, it is said that there are very few cases in which a publication has ever been ordered during the lifetime of the witnesses. *Barnsdale v. Lowe*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 142. As to some in which it has been ordered doubts have been expressed. *Ibid.*; *Wyatt*, Pract. Reg. 73.

² *Abergavenny v. Powell*, 1 Meriv. R. 433; *Teale v. Teale*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 385; *Morrison v. Arnold*, 19 Ves. 671. In the case of *Morrison v. Arnold* (19 Ves. 672), Lord Eldon used the following language: 'The question, upon the motion to publish these depositions, the witnesses being still living, is, What is the practice where witnesses have been examined, not de bene esse, but upon a different principle, to have their testimony recorded in perpetuam rei memoriam; the course being in a suit for that purpose, that after the examination of the witnesses there is an end of the cause. It is laid down in the text-books that ordinarily the depositions cannot be published during the lives of the witnesses; and that doctrine appears to be as old as the time of Lord Egerton, who regretted that such was the practice upon the inconvenience that if the facts stated by the witness are false, that cannot be established against him in any species of prosecution, as that fact can only be established by the production of the deposition, which cannot be produced until the witness is dead. That word, *ordinarily*, which is found in most of the books of practice on this subject, struck me as large enough to admit the exercise of a sound discretion by the court, and it seems to be capable of another construction, as there are cases where the depositions may be published, although the witness is not dead, if for instance he is too infirm to travel. The general rule, I am persuaded, is not to permit the deposition to be read during the life of the witness; and I think it will appear that such orders as are to be found proceed upon affidavit that the witness is dead; and some, after the declaration that the deposition of the particular witness shall be read, add, with a considerable degree of caution, that the depositions of the other witnesses shall not be read, affording both affirmative and negative evidence of the practice.' He afterwards added: 'After considerable research there is not a single instance, except of a person sick, incapable of travelling, or prevented by accident; all the orders, but in those excepted cases, stating that the witness is dead. And though struck with the circumstance that he swears with considerable security, as the depositions are not to be opened until after his death, I am afraid to make a precedent contrary to all the authorities; and further, looking at the first will, and what the trustees under it are about, I doubt whether a bill to perpetuate testimony is in this particular case exactly the bill that should have been filed.'

CHAPTER XLIII.

PECULIAR DEFENCES AND PROOFS IN EQUITY.

1517. WE have thus reviewed the principal topics of Equity Jurisprudence as connected with the three great divisions of its jurisdiction; namely, its Concurrent Jurisdiction, its Exclusive Jurisdiction, and its Auxiliary Jurisdiction. Imperfect as this exposition of it necessarily has been from the vast mass and variety of the materials, as well as from the intrinsic difficulty of ascertaining in many cases the exact limits and boundaries of its operations, enough has been shown to enable the attentive reader to ascertain the general outlines and proportions of the system, and its beautiful adaptation to the general concerns and actual business of human life. He cannot fail to have observed to what an immeasurable extent beyond the prescribed bounds of the common law its remedial justice reaches; with what wonderful flexibility it applies itself to all the changing circumstances which require the relief to be modified and adjusted, with a nice regard to the rights and interests and even to the compassionate claims of the adverse parties; and by what a curious though artificial machinery it sifts the consciences of the parties and detects the latent springs of action and draws as it were from the secret recesses of the heart its hidden purposes and its yet questionable designs. He cannot fail to have observed with what deep solicitude and promptitude it interferes in cases of fraud, accident, and mistake; how eager it is to succor the distressed, to assist the infirm, to protect the weak, to guard the credulous against the arts of the cunning and profligate, and to save the rash and inexperienced from the natural effects of their own acts of folly and their own misguided and violated confidence. He cannot fail to have approved its bold and sometimes even stern denunciations against

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vice and craftiness, its uncompromising support of the purest morality, and its unflinching resistance to oppression and meditated wrong. Above all he cannot fail to have been struck with that admirable invention of judicial policy which interposes preventive guards against impending dangers and mischiefs, and which does not, like the slow and reluctant arm of the common law, wait until the destructive blow has been dealt and then content itself with an attempt to remedy in damages what may be in a just sense incapable of compensation. If here and there he shall have seen an artificial doctrine reared up which it is now difficult to vindicate upon sound reasoning or public convenience, let him consider that it occupies but a narrow space in the general system; that it is the necessary result of the different modes of thought in different ages; and that if it has the touch of human infirmity in its structure, its very failings lean to virtue's side, and serve in some degree to fence in as well as to embarrass the interests of those who stand in constant need of the guardianship of the law. Let him also remember the profound remark of Lord Bacon, that there are in nature certain fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived but as streams; yet that like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the very soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions or governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains.¹ If he should perceive that even Equity Jurisprudence has its blemishes and imperfections in its inability to reach some cases of gross injustice or of violated right and duty, and he should be tempted to utter the lamentation of an eminent jurist of antiquity, that we do not seek to cherish the solid and expressive form of true law and genuine justice, but that we content ourselves with the mere shadow and semblance of it, nay that even these we do not follow, as it is desirable we should do, since they are drawn from the best examples of nature and truth,² let him also ponder on the consoling truth so beautifully expressed by the same master mind, that

¹ Lord Bacon's Works, Advancement of Learning, p. 219 (London edit. 1803).

² 'Sed nos veri juris, germanæque justitiæ, solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus; umbra et imaginibus utimur; eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! Feruntur enim ex optimis naturæ et veritatis exemplis.' Cic. De Offic. Lib. 3, § 17.

the wisdom of laws in stooping to the concerns of human life must necessarily stop far short of the wisdom of philosophy.¹

1518. We shall close the present work by adverting to a few peculiarities of equity jurisdiction for which a more appropriate place has not been found, or which if noticed before seem fit to be brought again into view before they are finally dismissed.

1519. There are some defences which are peculiar to Courts of Equity and are unknown to Courts of Common Law. So also there are some peculiarities in relation to evidence unknown to the practice of the latter courts which yet lie at the very foundation of the practice of the former. Upon each of these subjects we shall say a few words by way of illustration, leaving the full exposition of them to works more appropriate for that purpose.

1520. In the first place as to defences peculiar to Courts of Equity; for of those which are equally available at law we do not here propose to speak.² The Statutes of Limitations when they are addressed to Courts of Equity as well as to courts of law, as they seem to be in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction at law and in equity (as for example in matters of account), to which they directly apply, seem equally obligatory in each court. It has been very justly observed that in such cases Courts of Equity do not act so much in analogy to the statutes as in obedience to them.³ (a) In a great variety of other cases Courts of Equity

¹ 'Sed aliter leges, aliter philosophi, tollunt astutias. Leges quatenus manu tenere possunt; philosophi quatenus ratione et intelligentia.' Ibid.

² Ante, §§ 55, 529, 975.

³ *Hovenden v. Lord Annesley*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 607, 629, 630. In *Hovenden v. Lord Annesley*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 630, Lord Redesdale said: 'But it is said that Courts of Equity are not within the Statutes of Limitations. This is true in one respect. They are not within the words of the statutes, because the words apply to particular legal remedies; but they are within the spirit

(a) See *Smith v. Davidson*, 40 Mich. 632; *Bickel's Appeal*, 86 Penn. St. 204; *Kelly v. Hurt*, 74 Mo. 561; *Dodge v. Essex Ins. Co.*, 12 Gray, 65; *Wilhelm v. Caylor*, 32 Md. 151; *Ayer v. Stewart*, 14 Minn. 97; *In re Cornwall*, 9 Blatchf. C. C. 114. It is laid down that when an injunction is sought in aid of a legal right, the court is bound to grant it if the legal right is established. And lapse of time will not

bar the granting of it if it will not bar the legal right. *Fullwood v. Fullwood*, 9 Ch. D. 176, Fry, J.

There is no rule in equity any more than at law that mere non-suing by a specialty creditor for any period within the statutory limit is such neglect as to deprive him of the right to require payment of the specialty debt. *In re Baker*, 20 Ch. D. 230.

act upon the analogy of the limitations at law. Thus for example if a legal title would in ejectment be barred by twenty years' adverse (*a*) possession, Courts of Equity will act upon the like limitation and apply it to all cases of relief sought upon equitable titles or claims touching real estate.¹ (*b*) Thus for example if the mortgagee has been in possession of the mortgaged estate for twenty years without acknowledging the existence of the mortgage, it will be presumed that the mortgage is foreclosed and that he holds by an absolute title. (*c*) If the mortgagor has been in possession of the mortgaged estate for the like space of time

and meaning of the statutes, and have been always so considered. I think it is a mistake in point of language to say that Courts of Equity act merely by analogy to the statutes; they act in obedience to them. The Statute of Limitations, applying itself to certain legal remedies for recovering the possession of lands, for recovering of debts, &c., equity, which in all cases follows the law, acts on legal titles and legal demands, according to matters of conscience which arise, and which do not admit of the ordinary legal remedies. Nevertheless in thus administering justice according to the means afforded by a Court of Equity it follows the law. The true jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in such cases is to carry into execution the principles of law where the modes of remedy afforded by Courts of Law are not adequate to the purposes of justice, to supply a defect in the remedies afforded by Courts of Law. The law has appointed certain simple modes of proceeding which are adapted to a great variety of cases. But there are cases under peculiar circumstances and qualifications to which, though the law gives the right, those modes of proceeding do not apply. I do not mean to say that in the exercise of this jurisdiction Courts of Equity may not in some instances have gone too far, though they have been generally more strict in modern times. So Courts of Law, fancying that they had the means of administering full relief, have sometimes proceeded in cases which were formerly left to Courts of Equity, and at one period this also seems to have been carried too far. I think therefore Courts of Equity are bound to yield obedience to the Statute of Limitations upon all legal titles and legal demands, and cannot act contrary to the spirit of its provisions. I think the statute must be taken virtually to include Courts of Equity; for when the legislature, by statute, limited the proceedings in equity, it must be taken to have contemplated that equity followed the law, and therefore it must be taken to have virtually enacted in the same cases a limitation for Courts of Equity also.' Ante, §§ 1028 *a*, 1028 *b*. But see *McKnight v. Taylor*, 17 Peters, R. 197; *s. c.* 1 Howard, Sup. C. R. 151; *Tatam v. Williams*, 3 Hare, R. 347, 357, 358, 359; *Folly v. Hill*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 399.

¹ *Ibid.*; *Miller v. McIntyre*, 6 Peters, 61; *Coulson v. Walton*, 9 Peters, R. 62; *Peyton v. Stith*, 5 Peters, R. 485; *Piatt v. Vattier*, 9 Peters, R. 405, 416, 417, and the other cases cited in note (3) to p. 736; *Boone v. Chiles*, 10 Peters, R. 177; *White v. Parnter*, 1 Knapp, R. 228, 229.

(*a*) *Shorter v. Smith*, 56 Ala. 208.

(*b*) *Smith v. Davidson*, 40 Mich. 632.

(*c*) Ante, §§ 1028 *a*, 1028 *b*.

without acknowledging the mortgage debt, it will be presumed to be paid. If the judgment creditor has lain by for twenty years without any effort to enforce his judgment, and it has not been acknowledged by the debtor within that time, it will be presumed to be satisfied.¹ (a) And in all these cases Courts of Equity will act upon these facts as a positive bar to relief in equity.² But a defence peculiar to Courts of Equity is that founded upon the mere lapse of time and the staleness of the claim in cases where no statute of limitations directly governs the case. In such cases Courts of Equity act sometimes by analogy to the law, and sometimes act upon their own inherent doctrine of discouraging for the peace of society antiquated demands by refusing to interfere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights, or long and unreasonable acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights.³ (b)

¹ *White v. Parnter*, 1 Knapp, R. 228, 229; *Grenfell v. Girdlestone*, 2 Younge & Coll. 662, 680; *Dexter v. Arnold*, 3 Sumner, R. 152.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Mitf. Eq. Pl.* by Jeremy, 269 to 274; 1 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 1, ch. 4, § 27, and note (7). It does not seem necessary at this time to cite at large the authorities which establish this doctrine. They are as full and conclusive upon the subject as they can well be both in England and America. The leading cases on this subject of the English courts are *Smith v. Clay*, *Ambler*, R. 645; *Bond v. Hopkins*, 1 *Sch. & Lefr.* 413, 428; *Hovenden v. Lord Annesley*, 2 *Sch. & Lefr.* 607, 630 to 640; *Stackhouse v. Barnston*, 10 *Ves.* 466, 467; *Ex parte Dewdney*, 15 *Ves.* 496; *Beckford v. Wade*, 17 *Ves.* 96; *Cholmondeley v. Clinton*, 2 *Jac. & Walk.* 1, 138 to 152; *Portlock v. Gardner*, 1 *Hare*, R. 594; *Vigors v. Pike*, 8 *Clarke & Fin.* 650. In America the subject has been largely discussed, and the same doctrine sanctioned in many cases. See *Kane v. Bloodgood*, 7 *John. Ch. R.* 93; *Dexter v. Arnold*, 3 *Sumner*, 152; *Decouche v. Savetier*, 3 *John. Ch. R.* 190; *Murray v. Coster*, 20 *John. R.* 576, 582; *Prevost v. Gratz*, 6 *Wheat. R.* 481; *Hughes v. Edwards*, 9 *Wheat. R.* 489; *Elmendorf*

(a) *Ante*, § 1028 *b*; *Cheever v. Perley*, 11 *Allen*, 584.

(b) See *Burrow v. Debo*, 47 *Mich.* 242; *Zoellner v. Zoellner*, 46 *Mich.* 511 (nine years); *Sable v. Maloney*, 48 *Wis.* 331 (nearly fifteen years); *Oakley v. Hurlbut*, 100 *Ill.* 204 (fourteen years); *Nudd v. Powers*, 136 *Mass.* 273 (three years' delay to enforce a charge on land not fatal); *Morse v. Hill*, *Ib.* 60; *Bliss v. Prichard*, 67 *Mo.* 181 (nine years); *Brown v. Buena Vista*, 95 *U. S.* 157. Equity acts upon

the circumstances of each particular case in determining upon the effect of lapse of time. *Sullivan v. Portland R. Co.*, 94 *U. S.* 806, 811. It often treats lapse of time for a shorter period than that of the Statute of Limitations as a presumptive bar. *Godden v. Kimmell*, 99 *U. S.* 201; *Stearns v. Page*, 7 *How.* 819; *Badger v. Badger*, 2 *Cliff.* 154. It is not laches to wait until one is in a legal condition to sue. *Gamble v. Folsom*, 49 *Mich.* 141.

1520 *a*. It is often suggested that lapse of time constitutes no bar in cases of trust. (*a*) But this proposition must be received

v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 168; *Willison v. Watkins*, 3 Peters, R. 44; *Miller v. McIntire*, 6 Peters, R. 61, 66; *Piatt v. Vattier*, 9 Peters, 405, 416, 417; *Sherwood v. Sutton*, 5 Mason, R. 143, 145, 146; *McKnight v. Taylor*, 17 Peters, R. 197; s. c. 1 Howard, S. C. R. 151; *Bowman v. Wathen*, 17 Peters, R. 235; s. c. 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 189; *Gould v. Gould*, 1 Story, R. 537; *Story on Eq. Pleading*, §§ 813, 814. In *Smith v. Clay*, *Ambler*, R. 645, Lord Camden said: 'A Court of Equity, which is never active in relief against conscience or public convenience, has always refused its aid to stale demands where the party has slept upon his right, and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. Where these are wanting, the court is passive and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced; and therefore from the beginning of this jurisdiction there was always a limitation to suits in this court. Therefore in *Fitter v. Lord Macclesfield*, Lord North said rightly that though there was no limitation to a bill of review, yet after twenty-two years he would not reverse a decree but upon very apparent error. "Expediit reipublicæ ut sit finis litium," is a maxim that has prevailed in this court in all times without the help of an act of Parliament. But as the court has no legislative authority, it could not properly define the time of bar by a positive rule to an hour, a minute, or a year. It was governed by circumstances. But as often as Parliament had limited the time of actions and remedies to a certain period in legal proceedings, the Court of Chancery adopted that rule, and applied it to similar cases in equity. For when the legislature had fixed the time at law, it would have been preposterous for equity (which by its own proper authority always maintained a limitation) to countenance laches beyond the period that law had been confined to by Parliament. And therefore in all cases where the legal right has been barred by Parliament the equitable right to the same thing has been concluded by the same bar.' In *Bond v. Hopkins* (1 Sch. & Lefr. 429) Lord Redesdale said: 'Nothing is better established in Courts of Equity (and it was established long before this act) than that where a title exists at law and in conscience, and the effectual assertion of it at law is unconscientiously obstructed, relief should be given in equity; and that where title exists in conscience, although there be none at law, relief should also, although in a different mode, be given in equity. Both these cases are considered by Courts of Equity as affected by the Statute of Limitations; that is, if the equitable title be not sued upon within the time within which a legal title of the same nature ought to be sued upon to prevent the bar created by the statute, the court, acting by analogy to the statute, will not relieve. If the party be guilty of such laches in prosecuting his equitable title as would bar him if his title were solely at law, he shall be barred in equity. But that is all the operation this statute has or ought to have on proceedings in equity.' In *Cholmondeley v. Clinton*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 141, Sir Thomas Plumer said: 'In the Courts of Equity of this country the principle has been always, as I shall hereafter show, strongly enforced. They have refused relief to stale demands even in cases where no statutable limitation existed; and whenever

(*a*) An executor cannot rely on breach of trust by his testator. *Brittle-lapse of time in defence of a claim for bank v. Goodwin*, L. R. 5 Eq. 545.

with its appropriate qualifications. As long as the relation of trustee and cestui que trust is acknowledged to exist between

any statute has fixed the periods of limitations by which the claim if it had been made in a Court of Law would have been barred, the claim has been by analogy confined to the same period in a Court of Equity.' Again he added (p. 151), after citing the cases: 'These cases show, first that Courts of Equity have at all times upon general principles of their own, even where there was no analogous statutory bar, refused relief to stale demands where the party has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time; and secondly, that whenever a bar has been fixed by statutes to the legal remedy in a Court of Law, the remedy in a Court of Equity has in the analogous cases been confined to the same period. I should not have thought it necessary to cite authorities upon points so long and so clearly established, had not the present decision tended, as it appears to me it does, to call them in question; and had it not been of such transcendent importance that no doubt should exist upon questions so materially affecting the titles to real property.' The judgment of Mr. Baron Alderson in *Grenfell v. Girdlestone*, 2 Younge & Coll. 662, 678 to 681, is very full and able to the same point of the effect in equity of lapse of time. So is that of Lord Wynford in *White v. Parnter*, 1 Knapp, R. 226, 228, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in *Boone v. Chiles*, 10 Peters, R. 177. See also *McKnight v. Taylor*, 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 161; *Tatam v. Williams*, 3 Hare, R. 347, 357, 358. In this last case Mr. Vice-Chancellor Wigram said: 'In this court there is direct and very high authority for the proposition that a Court of Equity will not after six years' acquiescence, unexplained by circumstances or countervailed by acknowledgment, decree an account between a surviving partner and the estate of a deceased partner. *Barber v. Barber*, 18 Ves. 286; *Ault v. Goodrich*, 4 Russ. 430; *Bridges v. Mitchell*, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 224; *Bunb. 217*; 15 Vin. Ab. Tit. Limitation, E. 2, pl. 7, p. 110 (a case spoken of by Lord Eldon in *Foster v. Hodgson*, 19 Ves. 185, as a case of authority), to which may be added also the case of *Martin v. Heathcote*, 2 Eden, 169, and Lord Henley's note upon that case. *Ibid.* The authority of the case of *Barber v. Barber*, and consequently the authority of the other cases, is without doubt much shaken by the observations of Lord Brougham in moving the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of *Robinson v. Alexander*, 8 Bligh, n. s. 352; 3 Cl. & Fin. 717. For, notwithstanding Lord Cottenham's remark in *Mirehouse v. Scaife*, 2 Myl. & Cr. 704, to the effect that the judgment of the House of Lords in any given case does not involve an approbation of all the reasons which each peer may have given for his vote, so as to make those reasons binding upon courts of inferior jurisdiction, it is impossible not to defer to the opinion to which I have adverted, and perhaps difficult to explain the judgment of the House of Lords upon any other reasons, notwithstanding the special circumstances of that case. But Lord Brougham in that case acknowledged in the clearest manner that, whether by analogy to the statute or for any reason six years was or was not a bar in that case, it was the duty of a Court of Equity to consider whether under circumstances of delay a decree should be made. In this case it is unnecessary that I should rely upon the cases which have decided that this court will not give relief after six years of delay wholly unaccounted for, inasmuch as in this case it was not six years, but a clear period of thir-

the parties, and the trust is continued, lapse of time can constitute no bar to an account or other proper relief for the cestui que trust. (a) But where this relation is no longer admitted to exist, or time and long acquiescence have obscured the nature and character of the trust or the acts of the parties, or other circumstances give rise to presumptions unfavorable to its continuance, — in all such cases a Court of Equity will refuse relief upon the ground of lapse of time and its inability to do complete justice. This doctrine will apply even to cases of express trust, and a fortiori it will apply with increased strength to cases of implied or constructive trusts.¹ (b)

teen years, which elapsed between the death of Foster and the filing of the bill and no excuse is given for that delay.' Ante, §§ 1028 a, 1028 b, 1520.

¹ *Prevost v. Gratz*, 6 Wheat. 481; *Portlock v. Gardner*, 1 Hare, R. 594, 603, 604; *Attorney-Gen. v. Fishmonger's Company*, 5 Mylne & Cr. 16, 17. In

(a) See *Stone v. Stone*, L. R. 5 Ch. 74; *Burdick v. Garrick*, Ib. 233; *Woodhouse v. Woodhouse*, L. R. 8 Eq. 514; *Carpenter v. Cushman*, 105 Mass. 417; *McCandless's Estate*, 61 Penn. St. 9; *Albretch v. Wolf*, 58 Ill. 186; *Howe v. Rogers*, 32 Texas, 218. A cestui que trust not under disability may however be barred of his equity by a possession adverse to the trustee and himself. *Merriam v. Hassam*, 14 Allen, 516. Indeed if there be a competent trustee, the adverse possession may be good though the cestui que trust is under disability. *Mason v. Mason*, 43 Ga. 435; *Crook v. Glenn*, 30 Md. 55; 2 *Perry, Trusts*, §§ 864 et seq.

(b) See *Knight v. Bowyer*, 2 DeG. & J. 421; *Bridgman v. Gill*, 24 Beav. 302; *Bright v. Legerton*, 7 Jur. n. s. 559; *Vyvyan v. Vyvyan*, 30 Beav. 65; *Needles v. Martin*, 33 Md. 609; *Shuman v. Wilson*, L. R. 13 Eq. 36. That the statute may be pleaded to a suit to enforce an implied trust see *McClane v. Shepherd*, 6 C. E. Green, 76; *Ashurst's Appeal*, 60 Penn. St. 290; *Board of Supervisors v. Herrington*, 50 Ill. 232.

But a distinction must be observed between the case of property held for

another, and property held in one's own right subject to a trust in favor of another. Thus where lands are devised to trustees, and an express trust is created for the payment of legacies, the claim of the legatees is not barred by the Statute of Limitations, and no presumption of payment arises from the lapse of twenty years. But where land is devised subject to the payment of a legacy, and the devisee holds the land for twenty years without recognizing the legacy, a presumption of payment arises. The devisee holds in his own right; the trustee holds in right of the legatee. *Watson v. Saul*, 5 Jur. n. s. 404; s. c. 1 *Giffard*, 188. The latter case is the 'derivative' possession of text-writers. See *Markby, Elements of Law*, § 583 (3d ed.).

However if property is given to executors 'in trust' to pay legacies, the statute will run; nothing beyond the ordinary duty of an executor being imposed, there is no express trust. *Cadbury v. Smith*, L. R. 9 Eq. 37.

Indeed it is held by very high authority that lapse of time and enjoyment by an executor of the testator's assets in a manner inconsistent with the trusts of the will, coupled with

1521. Courts of Equity not only act in obedience and in analogy to the Statutes of Limitations in proper cases, but they also interfere in many cases to prevent the bar of the statutes where it would be inequitable or unjust. (a) Thus for example if a party has perpetrated a fraud which has not been discovered until the statutory bar may apply to it at law, Courts of Equity will interpose and remove the bar out of the way of the other injured party.¹ A fortiori they will not allow such a bar to pre-

this last case Lord Cottenham said: 'It was argued, upon the principle that this court recognizes no limitation of time in cases of trust, that no regard was to be paid in this case to the lapse of four hundred years which have passed away since the title of the company appears to have accrued. Such a doctrine would be most dangerous, and might if acted upon prove destructive of many of the best titles in the kingdom. If there be no doubt as to the origin and existence of a trust, the principles of justice and the interests of mankind require that the lapse of time should not enable those who are mere trustees to appropriate to themselves that which is the property of others; but in questions of doubt whether any trust exists, and whether those in possession are not entitled to the property for their own benefit, the principles of justice and the interests of mankind require that the utmost regard should be paid to the length of time during which there has been enjoyment inconsistent with the existence of the supposed trust. One of the principal reasons for admitting limitations of suits is the difficulty of ascertaining the facts necessary to make it safe to exercise the judicial power. Upon this principle this court has in many instances limited the period within which it will exercise its power; and it would indeed be strange if in cases in which it has not done so it were altogether to disregard the lapse of time as applicable to the evidence upon which it is called upon to act.' *Wedderburn v. Wedderburn*, 4 Mylne & Cr. 41. But see *Michard v. Girod*, 4 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 561.

¹ *Booth v. Lord Warrington*, 4 Bro. Parl. Cas. 163, by Tomlins; s. c. 1 Bro.

consent of the beneficiaries, may raise an inference of a gift by them to the executor; though of course when the possession and time are in accordance with the trusts of the will, no such inference can arise. *Pillgrim v. Pillgrim*, 18 Ch. D. 93 (C. A.), distinguishing *Ray v. Ray*, G. Coop. 261. See also *Fenwick v. Laycock*, 2 Q. B. 108.

A parol gift of land of which the donee takes possession is not held as a trust in right of the donor; it is held in right of the donee, and the donee may acquire a good title under the Statute of Limitations. *Graham v. Craig*, 81* Penn. St. 459.

Equity will not interfere to establish a partnership, settle its dealings, and declare one of the partners a trustee for the other after the lapse of more than twenty years since the plaintiff's right accrued, when during the whole period the defendant denied and disregarded the alleged rights of the plaintiff. *Phillippi v. Phillippi*, 61 Ala. 41.

(a) *Ecclesiastical Com. v. Northern Ry. Co.*, 4 Ch. D. 845, 859; *Brooksbank v. Smith*, 2 Younge & C. Ex. 58; *Bond v. Hopkins*, 1 Sch. & L. 429; *Barnett v. Nichols*, 56 Miss. 622; *Sturgis v. Morse*, 3 DeG. & J. 1; s. c. 24 Beav. 541. *81* Penn. St. 459*

vail by mere analogy to suits in equity, where it would be in furtherance of a manifest injustice.¹ (a) Thus if a party should

Parl. Cas. 445; *Hovenden v. Lord Annesley*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 634; *South Sea Comp. v. Wymondsell*, 3 P. Will. 143; *Deloraine v. Browne*, 3 Bro. Ch. R. 633, 646, and Mr. Belt's note; *Story on Eq. Plead.* § 751.

¹ *Bond v. Hopkins*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 413, 431; *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 1, ch. 4, § 27, note (q); *Hovenden v. Lord Annesley*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 630, 640. In *Bond v. Hopkins*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 430 to 435, Lord Redesdale made an elaborate exposition of this doctrine. From his opinion on that occasion the following extract is made. 'But it is said that the bar arising from lapse of time ought not to be removed. Why not as well as a satisfied term, if used against conscience? But it is contended that the bar arising from the Statute of Limitations ought not to be removed, because the enactment of the statute is positive. The answer is, the positive enactment has nothing to do with the case. The question is not whether it shall operate in a case provided for by the positive enactment of the statute; but whether it shall operate in a case not provided for by the words of the act, and to which the act can apply only so far as it governs decisions in Courts of Equity; that is, whether it shall prevent a Court of Equity doing justice according to good conscience, where the equitable title is not barred by lapse of time, although the legal title is so barred. It is admitted that in a case where this court may decree possession (supposing the suit instituted in time) it will not be prevented by the Statute of Limitations from doing justice by a direct decree, although before the time of making that decree the lapse of time would bar proceedings on a legal title. But it is said it cannot do justice indirectly; that is, it cannot do justice where it thinks fit to put the question of title in a train of discussion at law, by directing a trial at law to ascertain facts and the law arising on those facts; which is only one mean of doing justice used by Courts of Equity, and a mean used because the court will not break in on legal proceedings more than is necessary for the purposes of justice, but will suffer the course of the law to proceed as far as with justice it can. It is admitted, even in that indirect mode of administering relief, if a term for years or any other temporary bar be an impeding to justice, it may be put out of the way. There is no difficulty made upon that part of the case. It is admitted also that where the court is to act directly and by itself, it is not bound by the words of the statute, or by the spirit of it, provided the suit in equity is instituted in due time. It should seem to follow (though there were no case) that when it acts indirectly it should be no more barred by the statute than when it acts directly. *Barnesly v. Powell*, 1 Ves. 285, is an authority to show that if the court could not from the nature of the case do justice indirectly by putting the title in a course of trial in another court, it ought to act upon the matter itself, and give direct relief. But it is clear that Courts of Equity have, under the correction of the court of dernier resort, and with the acquiescence of the legislature, decided on the principles on which the Master of the Rolls' decree is founded. *M'Kenzie v. Powis*, 4 Bro. Ch. 328; *Pincke v. Thornycroft*, 1 Bro. Ch. 289; s. c. *Dom. Proc.* 1784, reported in *Cruise on Fines*, 366; and many other cases. In the first of these cases the appeal was on the single ground

(a) As to mistake in the execution of a contract see *McCormack v. McCormack*, 1 L. R. Ir. 119.

apply to a Court of Equity and carry on an unfounded litigation, protracted under circumstances and for a length of time which should deprive his adversary of his right to proceed at law on account of the Statute of Limitations having in the intermediate time run against it, Courts of Equity would themselves supply and administer within their own jurisdiction a substitute for that original legal right of which the party had been thus deprived, and by their decree give him the fullest benefit of it.¹

1521 *a*. The question often arises, in cases of fraud and mistake and acknowledgments of debts, and of trusts and charges on lands for payment of debts, under what circumstances, and at what time, the bar of the Statute of Limitations begins to run. In general it may be said that the rule of Courts of Equity is, that the cause of action or suit arises when and as soon as the party has a right to apply to a Court of Equity for relief.² In cases of fraud or mistake it will begin to run from the time of the discovery of such fraud or mistake, and not before.³ (*a*) And

that the Court of Equity had not set the Statute of Limitations out of the way. It is evident that Courts of Equity had been then in the habit of removing the statute out of the way for so much time as had run pending the cause in equity. The court of dernier resort thought that from the circumstances of that case it should be wholly put out of the way.⁷

¹ *Pulteney v. Warren*, 6 Ves. 73; *The East India Company v. Champion*, 11 Bligh, R. 158, 186, 187. Upon this last occasion Lord Chancellor Cottenham said: 'The case of *Pulteney v. Warren*, which was urged at the bar on behalf of the respondent, and which I had occasion lately to consider together with several others, established only this principle, that where a party applies to a Court of Equity, and carries on an unfounded litigation protracted under circumstances, and for a length of time which deprives his adversary of his legal rights, the Court of Equity considers that it should itself supply and administer within its own jurisdiction a substitute for that legal right of which the party so prosecuting an unfounded claim has deprived his adversary. It was upon that principle that Lord Eldon made the order in *Pulteney v. Warren*. because there a party had by litigation improperly deprived his opponent of his legal remedy. It is for such reason that a Court of Equity will give a party interest out of the penalty of a bond where by unfounded litigation the obligor has prevented the obligee from prosecuting his claim at the time when his legal remedy was available. Upon that principle it is that when a party by unfounded litigation has prevented an annuitant from receiving his annuity, the court will in some cases give interest upon the annuity. All those cases depend upon the same principle of equity.' Ante, § 1316 *a*.

² *Whalley v. Whalley*, 3 Bligh, R. 1.

³ *Brooksbank v. Smith*, 2 Younge & Coll. 58. In this case Mr. Baron

(*a*) See *Godden v. Kimmell*, 99 U. S. 201; *Ecclesiastical Com. v. North-ern Ry. Co.*, 4 Ch. D. 845; *Parham v. McCrary*, 6 Rich. Eq. 140 (that

an acknowledgment of a debt or judgment, to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations, or bar by lapse of time, must be made, not to a mere stranger but to the creditor or some one acting for him, and upon which the creditor is to act or confide.¹ (a) A general direction in a will of personal estate to pay debts will not stop the running of the Statute of Limitations, or, if the bar has already attached, remove it.² The same rule is

Alderson said: 'Then is the Statute of Limitations a bar to the remedy sought by this bill? It seems to me that it is not so. The statute does not absolutely bind Courts of Equity; but they adopt it as a rule to assist their discretion. In cases of fraud however they hold that the statute runs from the discovery, because the laches of the plaintiff commences from that date on his acquaintance with all the circumstances. In this Courts of Equity differ from Courts of Law, which are absolutely bound by the words of the statute. Mistake is, I think, within the same rule as fraud. Here therefore the statute was not applicable, for the mistake was first discovered within six years before the filing of the bill. I think therefore that the decree should be for the plaintiffs, but without costs; and as they have offered to take the £1,000, which is the whole of the stock that remains, I think they should be bound by that offer.' See also *Blair v. Browley*, 5 Hare, R. 542; s. c. 2 Phillips, Ch. R. 354; *Hough v. Richardson*, 3 Story, R. 659.

¹ *Grenfell v. Girdlestone*, 2 Younge & Coll. 662.

² *Freake v. Cranefeldt*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 499.

ignorance of the evidence to establish the fraud will not prevent the running of the statute); *Meader v. Norton*, 11 Wall. 442; *Evans v. Bacon*, 99 Mass. 213; *Foot v. Farrington*, 41 N. Y. 164; *Henry v. Winnebago*, 52 Ill. 299. The right of a party injured to rescind a fraudulent transaction remains only for a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud. *Royal Bank v. Grand Junction R. Co.*, 125 Mass. 490, 494; *Evans v. Bacon*, 99 Mass. 213; *Learned v. Foster*, 117 Mass. 365; *Boston & M. R. Co. v. Bartlett*, 10 Gray, 384; *In re Pinto Silver Mining Co.*, 8 Ch. D. 273, 284; *Allen v. Allen*, 47 Mich. 74.

The question of time is one for the sound discretion of the court. *Royal Bank v. Grand Junc. R. Co.*, supra; *Brown v. Buena Vista Co.*, 95 U. S. 157, 160.

The more exact rule appears to be that the statute begins to run not from the time when knowledge of the fraud

was obtained, but from the time when, under the circumstances, knowledge ought by reasonable diligence to have been obtained. *Vane v. Vane*, L. R. 8 Ch. 383; *Chatham v. Hoare*, L. R. 9 Eq. 571. . And mere dulness of perception will not, it seems, be taken into account to prevent the bar of the statute. *Manby v. Bewicke*, 3 Kay & J. 342. See also *Bridgman v. Gill*, 24 Beav. 302; *Smith v. Acton*, 26 Beav. 210; *Cox v. Dolman*, 2 DeG. M. & G. 592; *Oldham v. Oldham*, 5 Jones, Eq. 89; *Franklin v. Redenhous*, Ib. 420.

(a) When a title has been extinguished by the Statute of Limitations, no mere acknowledgment by the person who has acquired under the statute a title, as good as if a conveyance had been made to him, can restore the old title. *Sanders v. Sanders*, 19 Ch. D. 373; *In re Alison*, 11 Ch. D. 284, overruling *Stansfield v. Hobson*, 3 DeG. M. & G. 620.

equally applicable to the case of a devise or charge upon real estate for the payment of debts. In no case will it take the debt out of the operation of the Statute of Limitations and prevent the running of the statute.¹ But a direction to pay certain scheduled debts out of a particular fund of personal estate will take these debts, to the extent of the fund, out of the Statute of Limitations, and prevent its running.² And the like doctrine would probably be applied to cases of trust, or charges upon real estate for the payment of scheduled debts. If the statute has begun to run in the lifetime of the testator, it will continue to run after his death, and will not cease to run during the period which may elapse between his death and the time at which a personal representative is constituted.³

1521 *b*. It has been held at law that where there is a joint contract, which is severed by the death of one of the contractors, nothing can be done by the personal representative of the deceased party, by acknowledgment of the debt or otherwise, to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations against the survivor.⁴ How far the principle upon which this doctrine has been held can be applied to the right which a creditor has in equity, against the estate of a deceased party, and how far the equitable right which the creditor of joint and several debtors may have to avail himself of the equities subsisting between the debtors may be affected by agreements among the debtors themselves, do not

¹ *Freake v. Cranefeldt*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 499, 502; *Burke v. Jones*, 2 Ves. & B. 275; *Scott v. Jones*, 4 Clark & Fin. 382; *Fergus v. Gore*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 107; *Hargreaves v. Michell*, 6 Madd. R. 326; *Hughes v. Wynne*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 307; *Rendell v. Carpenter*, 2 Younge & Jerv. 484. But see *Crallan v. Oulton*, 3 Beav. R. 1, 6, 7.

² *Williamson v. Naylor*, 3 Younge & Coll. 208, 210, note.

³ *Freake v. Cranefeldt*, 3 Mylne & Craig, 499; *Scott v. Jones*, 4 Clark & Finnelly, R. 382. It seems that in England it is in the discretion of the executor or administrator, under ordinary circumstances, to plead the Statute of Limitations to a debt due by his testator or intestate or not; and if he acts bona fide and reasonably in not pleading it and pays the debt, the payment will be good. *Norton v. Frecker*, 1 Atk. 526; *Castleton v. Fanshaw*, Prec. Ch. 100; *Ex parte Dewdney*, 15 Ves. 498; *Shewen v. Vanderhorst*, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 349; s. c. 2 Russ. & Mylne, 75; 2 *William's Law of Executors*, pp. 1282, 1283 (2d edit.). A different rule prevails in some of the American States; and the executor or administrator is not allowed to pay debts barred by the statute.

⁴ *Atkins v. Tredgold*, 2 Barn. & Cressw. 23; *Slater v. Lawson*, 1 Barn. & Adolph. 396.

appear to be points clearly settled, and therefore will deserve consideration whenever they shall arise.¹

1522. Upon similar grounds of fraud, although the Statute of Frauds is ordinarily a good bar both at law and in equity to a suit on a parol contract respecting lands, yet if there has been any act of part performance, that will in equity avoid the operation of the statute; for otherwise it would become an instrument of fraud for designing parties.² The like principle applies to cases of judgments and decrees which have been procured by fraud and are set up to defeat the rights of innocent persons.³(a)

1523. A former decree in a suit in equity between the same parties, and for the same subject-matter, is also a good defence in equity, even although it be a decree merely dismissing the bill, if the dismissal is not expressed to be without prejudice.⁴ Here Courts of Equity act in analogy to the law in some respects but not in all; for the dismissal of a suit at law, or even a judgment at law, is not in all cases a good bar to another action.

1524. An account stated constitutes also a good bar to a bill in equity to account, although it will constitute no bar to an action at law for the same subject-matter.⁵ But then (as we have seen), equitable circumstances may be shown which will remove the whole effect of the bar.⁶

1525. The plea of a purchase for a valuable consideration without notice is also a defence peculiarly belonging to Courts of Equity, and is utterly unknown to the common law. But upon this sufficient has already been said in the antecedent portions of these Commentaries.⁷

1526. The want of proper parties to a bill is also a good de-

¹ Crallan v. Oulton, 3 Beav. R. 1, 7.

² Ante, §§ 759, 760.

³ Cooper on Eq. Pl. ch. 5, pp. 266, 267, 271; Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 265 to 268.

⁴ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 5, pp. 269 to 271; Mitford, Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, pp. 237 to 239.

⁵ Ante, § 523; Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 5, p. 277; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 259, 260.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ante, § 64 c, and §§ 108, 139, 165, 381, 409, 434, 436, 1502, 1503.

(a) Acquiescence in a void sale will not, it is said, be fatal within the period of limitation; secus of a sale merely voidable. Sloan v. Frothingham, 65 Ala. 593.

fence in equity, at least until the new parties are made, or a good reason shown why they are not made. At law a plea of the like nature is sometimes a good defence in bar, and is sometimes only a matter in abatement. But the plea in equity is of a far more extensive nature than at law; and it often applies where the objection would not at law have the slightest foundation. The direct and immediate parties having a legal interest are those only who can be required to be made parties in a suit at law. But Courts of Equity frequently require all persons who have remote and future interests, or equitable interests only, or who are directly affected by the decree, to be made parties; and they will not, if they are within the jurisdiction, and capable of being made parties, proceed to decide the cause without them. Hence it is that in Courts of Equity persons having very different and even opposite interests are often made parties defendant. It is the great object of Courts of Equity to put an end to litigation, and to settle if possible in a single suit, the rights of all parties interested or affected by the subject-matter in controversy.¹ Hence the general rule in equity is, that all persons are to be made parties who are either legally or equitably interested in the subject-matter and result of the suit, however numerous they may be, if they are within the jurisdiction, and it is, in a general sense, practicable so to do. There are exceptions to the rule, and modifications of it, which form a very important part of the practical doctrines of Courts of Equity on the subject of pleading. But they properly belong to a distinct treatise on that particular subject.²

1527. In the next place in relation to evidence peculiar to Courts of Equity. In general it may be stated that the rules of evidence are the same in equity as they are at law,³ and that questions of the competency or incompetency of witnesses and of other proofs are also the same in both courts. Without advert- ing to minor differences and distinctions, there are however two respects in which Courts of Equity differ from Courts of Law in the modes of obtaining and acting upon evidence. In the first

¹ Cooper, Eq. Pl. ch. 1, p. 34; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 163, 164.

² See Cooper on Eq. Pl. ch. 1, § 2, pp. 21 to 42; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 163 to 181; West v. Randall, 2 Mason, R. 190 to 196; Story on Eq. Plead. §§ 72 to 238.

³ Manning v. Lechmere, 1 Atk. 453; Glynn v. Bank of England, 2 Ves. 41; Gilbert's Forum Roman. 147.

place Courts of Law, unless under very special circumstances, do not allow of the evidence of witnesses by written depositions, but require it to be given *viva voce*. On the other hand almost all testimony is positively required by Courts of Equity to be by written deposition; the admission of *viva voce* evidence at the hearing being limited to a very few cases, such as proving a deed or a voucher referred to in the case.¹

1528. But a more important difference in the next place is, that in Courts of Law the testimony of the parties themselves in civil suits is ordinarily if not universally excluded. But in Courts of Equity the parties, plaintiffs as well as defendants, may reciprocally require and use the testimony of each other upon a bill and cross bill for the purpose. And in every case the answer of the defendant to a bill filed against him upon any matter stated in the bill and responsive to it is evidence in his own favor.² Nay, the doctrine of equity goes further; for not only is such an answer proof in favor of the defendant as to the matters of fact of which the bill seeks a disclosure from him, but it is conclusive in his favor unless it is overcome by the satisfactory testimony of two opposing witnesses, or of one witness corroborated by other circumstances and facts which give to it a greater weight than the answer, or which are equivalent in weight to a second witness.³ Or, to express the doctrine in

¹ 2 Madd. Ch. Pract. 330, 331; *Higgins v. Mills*, 5 Russ. R. 287; 2 Daniel, Chan. Pract. 441 to 446.

² In like manner Courts of Equity admit the testimony of certain persons to facts which perhaps they would not be or might not be competent to prove in a Court of Law. Thus an accounting party may in equity discharge himself by his own oath of small sums under forty shillings, provided that they do not in the whole exceed the sum of one hundred pounds. 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 1, § 1, and note (c); *Remsen v. Remsen*, 2 John. Ch. R. 501. See also *Holstcomb v. Rivers*, 1 Ch. Cas. 127, 128; *Peyton v. Green*, 1 Ch. Rep. 78 [146]; *Anon.* 1 Vern. R. 283; *Marshfield v. Weston*, 2 Vern. 176; s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. 11, pl. 14; *Whicherly v. Whicherly*, 1 Vern. 470; *Morely v. Bonge*, Mosel. R. 252. But he will not be allowed as plaintiff to charge another person in the same way upon his own oath. *Everard v. Warren*, 2 Ch. Cas. 249; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 1, § 1; *Marshfield v. Weston*, 2 Vern. 176; s. c. 1 Eq. Abr. 11, pl. 14. I have said that perhaps the same evidence might not be allowed at law. Mr. Fonblanque (*ubi supra*) intimates that it would not be. But Lord Hardwicke, in *Robinson v. Cumming* (2 Atk. 410), suggested the contrary.

³ *Pember v. Mathers*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 52; *Walton v. Hobbs*, 2 Atk. 19; *Janson v. Rany*, 2 Atk. 140; *Arnot v. Biscoe*, 1 Ves. 97; *Cooth v. Jackson*, 6 Ves. 40; *East India Company v. Donald*, 9 Ves. 275, 283; *Pilling v. Armit-*

another form, it is an invariable rule in equity that where the defendant in express terms negatives the allegations of the bill, and the evidence is only of one person affirming as a witness what has been so negatived, the court will neither make a decree nor send the case to be tried at law, but will simply dismiss the bill.¹ The reason upon which the rule stands is this: The plaintiff calls upon the defendant to answer an allegation of fact which he makes, and thereby he admits the answer to be evidence of that fact. If it is testimony, it is equal to the testimony of any other witness; and as the plaintiff cannot prevail unless the balance of proof is in his favor, he must either have two witnesses, or some circumstances in addition to a single witness, in order to turn the balance. We say a second witness or circumstances; for certainly there may be circumstances entirely equivalent to the testimony of any single witness.²

1529. We are however carefully to distinguish between cases of this sort, where the answer contains positive allegations as to facts responsive to the bill, and cases where the answer admitting or denying the facts in the bill sets up other facts in defence or avoidance. In the latter cases the defendant's answer is no proof whatsoever of the facts so stated, but they must be proved by independent testimony.³

1530. In the civil law (as we have seen) the parties to a suit might be interrogated upon articles propounded to them under the direction of the judge as to the facts in controversy. '*Ubi cunque judicem æquitas moverit, æque oportere fieri interrogationem, dubium non est.*'⁴ And by the rules of law two witnesses were generally required for the establishment of all the material facts not made out in writing, or by the solemn admission of the parties in court. '*Ubi numerus testium non adjicitur, etiam duo*

age, 12 Ves. 78; *Cooke v. Clayworth*, 18 Ves. 12; *Savage v. Brocksopp*, 18 Ves. 335; *Clark's Executors v. Van Reimsdyk*, 9 Cranch, 160; *Smith v. Brush*, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 459, 462; *Flagg v. Mann*, 2 Sumner, R. 489.

¹ 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 6, ch. 2, § 3, note (g); *Pember v. Mathers*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 52; *Mortimer v. Orchard*, 2 Ves. jr. R. 243.

² *Clark's Executors v. Van Reimsdyk*, 9 Cranch, 160; *Gresley on Evidence*, 4.

³ *Gilbert's For. Roman.* 51, 52; *Hart v. Ten Eyck*, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 88 to 90.

⁴ *Ante*, §§ 1486, 1487; *Dig. Lib.* 11, tit. 1, l. 21; 1 *Domat*, B. 3, tit. 6, § 5, art. 4; *Id.* § 6, art. 3, 4, 6, 9.

sufficient. *Pluralis enim elocutio duorum numero contenta est.*¹ ‘*Sanximus ut unius testimonium nemo iudicum in quacumque causa facile patiatnr admitti. Et nunc manifeste sancimus ut unius omnino testis responsio non audiatur, etiamsi præclaræ curiæ honore præfulgeat.*’² These coincidences between the civil law and Equity Jurisprudence, if they do not demonstrate a common origin of the doctrines on this subject, serve at least to show that they have a firm foundation in natural justice. The canon law has followed the rule of the civil law.³

1531. In the next place the same general rule prevails in equity as at law, that parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, qualify, extend, or vary written instruments; and that the interpretation of them must depend upon their own terms. But in cases of accident, mistake, or fraud Courts of Equity are constantly in the habit of admitting parol evidence to qualify and correct, and even to defeat the terms of written instruments.⁴

¹ Dig. Lib. 22, tit. 5, l. 12; 1 Domat, B. 3, tit. 6, § 3, art. 13.

² Cod. Lib. 4, tit. 20, l. 9, § 1; Pothier, Pand. Lib. 22, tit. 5, n. 19. Mr. Justice Blackstone, in his Commentaries (3d vol. 370), comments somewhat severely and perhaps not very justly on this rule of the civil law. ‘One witness,’ says he, ‘(if credible) is sufficient evidence to a jury of any single fact, although undoubtedly the concurrence of two or more corroborates the proof. Yet our law considers that there are many transactions to which only one person is privy, and therefore does not always demand the testimony of two, as the civil law universally requires. “Unius responsio testis omnino non audiatur.” To extricate itself out of which absurdity the modern practice of the Civil Law Courts has plunged itself into another. For as they do not allow a less number than two witnesses to be *plena probatio*, they call the testimony of one, although never so clear and positive, *semi plena probatio* only, on which no sentence can be founded. To make up therefore the necessary complement of witnesses when they have one only to a single fact, they admit the party himself (plaintiff or defendant) to be examined in his own behalf, and administer to him what is called the suppletory oath; and if his evidence happens to be in his own favor this immediately converts the half proof into a whole one, by this ingenious device satisfying at once the forms of the Roman law and acknowledging the superior reasonableness of the law of England, which permits one witness to be sufficient where no more are to be had, and, to avoid all temptations of perjury, lays it down as an invariable rule that “*nemo testis esse debet in propria causa.*”’

³ Evans v. Evans, The Jurist, 1844, vol. 8, p. 1055.

⁴ 2 Starkie, Evid. title, Parol Evidence, pp. 544 to 577 (2d Lond. edit.); 1 Phillips on Evid. ch. 10, §§ 1 to 3; Id. Pt. 2, ch. 5, §§ 1, 2 (8th edit. 1838); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 11, and note (o); 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 2, § 6, and note (e); Id. B. 2, ch. 5, § 3, and note (l); ante, §§ 152 to 168, 179, 767 to 770; Croome v. Lediard, 2 Mylne & Keen, R. 260, 261.

So they will allow parol evidence to rebut a presumption, or an equity arising out of written instruments. But in these latter cases they do not interfere with or repel the proper construction of the instrument itself, but only the artificial rules of presumption or of equity, which they themselves have created or applied to cases perfectly indeterminate in their nature, and admitting of either construction according to the real intent of the party.¹

1532. With these few remarks we may dismiss these supplementary topics as to peculiarities of defence and of evidence in Courts of Equity. And here these Commentaries are regularly brought to their close according to their original design. Let not however the ingenuous youth imagine that he also may here close his own preparatory studies of Equity Jurisprudence, or content himself for the ordinary purposes of practice with the general survey which has thus been presented to his view. What has been here offered to his attention is designed only to open the paths for his future inquiries; to stimulate his diligence to wider and deeper and more comprehensive examinations; to awaken his ambition to the pursuit of the loftiest objects of his profession; and to impress him with a profound sense of the ample instruction and glorious rewards which await his future enterprise and patient devotion in the study of the first of human sciences, the Law. He has as yet been conducted only to the vestibule of the magnificent temple reared by the genius and labors of many successive ages to Equity Jurisprudence. He has seen the outlines and the proportions, the substructions and the elevations, of this wonderful edifice. He has glanced at some of its more prominent parts, and observed the solid materials of which it is composed, as well as the exquisite skill with which it is fashioned and finished. He has been admitted to a hasty examination of its interior compartments and secret recesses. But the minute details, the subtle contrivances, and the various arrangements which are adapted to the general exigencies and conveniences of a polished society, remain to invite his curiosity and gratify his love of refined justice. The grandeur of the entire plan cannot be fully comprehended but by the persevering

¹ *Ibid.* Mr. Phillips, in his *Treatise on Evid.* Pt. 2, ch. 10, § 3, *Id.* Pt. 2, ch. 5, §§ 1, 2 (8th edit. 1838), has fully collected the cases on this subject. See also on the same subject 2 *Starkie on Evid.* pp. 568 to 570 (2d London edit. 1833); 2 *Fonbl. Eq. B.* 2, ch. 5, § 3, note (l); ante, §§ 1102, 1202, 1203.

researches of many years. The masterpieces of ancient and modern art still continue to be the study and admiration of all those who aspire to a kindred excellence ; and new and beautiful lights are perpetually reflected from them which have been unseen or unfelt before. Let the youthful jurist who seeks to enlighten his own age or to instruct posterity be admonished that it is by the same means alone that he can hope to reach the same end. Let it be his encouragement and consolation that by the same means the same end can be reached. It is but for him to give his days and nights with a sincere and constant vigor to the labors of the great masters of his own profession, and although he may now be but a humble worshipper at the entrance of the porch, he may hereafter entitle himself to a high place in the ministrations at the altars of the sanctuary of justice.

[The three following chapters, subject to some slight changes, were added to the work by the late Chief Justice Redfield. A few later cases are cited in the notes.]

CHAPTER XLIV.

ESTOPPELS IN EQUITY.

1533. THE subject of equitable estoppels, or estoppels in fact, although not formally discussed in any of the preceding chapters and not named in terms, is nevertheless incidentally alluded to in connection with constructive fraud, the Statute of Limitations, and laches,¹ and has become one of great practical importance; and it seems necessary to a full understanding of the present state of equity law in regard to it that we should give it more than a passing notice. It forms a very essential element in that fair dealing and rebuke of all fraudulent misrepresentation which it is the effort of Courts of Equity constantly to check.

1534. It applies to all cases where rights once valid are lost by delay, and the implied acquiescence resulting from such delay. In a late case² in the Court of Appeal in Chancery before the Lords Justices it was held that where the plaintiff had the right to prevent a party from erecting buildings upon his own land in consequence of the covenants of his grantor with the grantor of the plaintiff, and he gave notice of such right and of an intention to enforce it before any expense was incurred, and followed such notice by a bill for an injunction, although not filed till four months afterward, he was not estopped by his delay, it appearing that the plaintiff could not sooner establish his right to enforce the prohibition.

1535. So too in another case before the same court it was held that where the party had acquiesced in the violation of a covenant to a certain extent, this afforded sufficient objection to the granting of an interlocutory injunction against a greater violation of it.³

1536. So also where a married woman entitled to the income of a legacy for her separate use continued for fifteen years, with full notice of the circumstances affecting her rights, to receive the income on the footing that the legacy was liable to contribute in favor of the residuary legatees to a loss occurring on the reinvestment of part of the estate, and it was afterwards decided that the legacy was not liable so to contribute, but must be paid in full, it was held that she could not recover from the residuary legatees the sums which she had before acquiesced in allowing to be paid to them,⁴ and which they had expended as their own in faith of such acquiescence. Such acquiescence constituted an equitable estoppel upon any such claim, since it had been acted upon in good faith by the other party.

¹ Ante, §§ 64 a, 384 et seq., 1520 to 1522. Eq. 541; *Western v. MacDermott*, L. R. 1 Eq. 499; 2 Ch. 72.

² *Coles v. Sims*, 5 DeG. M. & G. 1.

⁴ *Stafford v. Stafford*, 1 DeG. & J.

³ *Child v. Douglas*, 5 DeG. M. & G. 739. See *Mitchell v. Steward*, L. R. 1 G. 338.

193. See *Bate v. Hooper*, 5 DeG. M. &

1537. The equitable rule however as to the effect of a person's lying by and allowing another to expend money on his property does not apply where the money is expended with knowledge of the real state of the title.¹ But in a late case² it was decided that where a landlord stands by and sees a tenant lay out money on the faith of a promised lease, this, though not strictly part-performance, may raise an equity analogous to that which is raised when one stands by and sees another expend money on his land believing he has good title. And this principle affects corporations and other joint-stock companies the same as it does individuals.³ However where a partner in a joint-stock company after his shares were declared forfeit lay by for seven years while the affairs of the concern were greatly depressed, until they began to be more prosperous, and then filed his bill to be let in to a share of the profits, it was held that he must be considered as having acquiesced in the action of the directors in declaring his shares forfeited, and that he was not entitled to the relief sought.⁴ But the principle of this case was held not to apply where the surviving partner had refused to give the representatives of a deceased partner all the information as to the state of the concern which was necessary to enable them to exercise a sound discretion as to whether they should claim an interest and take a share in the risks of the concern.⁵

1538. Where a party by misrepresentation draws another into a contract, he may be compelled to make good the representation if that be possible; but if not, the other party may avoid the contract. And the same principle applies although the party making the representation believed it to be true, if in the due discharge of his duty he ought to have known the fact.⁶ Third parties who by false representations induce others to enter into contracts are estopped from afterwards falsifying their statements, and if necessary may be compelled to make them good. But where a contract is entered into upon the false statement of one not a party, it is no ground of avoiding the contract. Misrepresentation may be either by the suppression of truth or the suggestion of falsehood; but to be the ground for avoiding the contract, it must be such that it is reasonable to infer that in its absence the party deceived would not have entered into the contract.⁷

¹ *Rennie v. Young*, 2 DeG. & J. 136.

² *Nunn v. Fabian*, L. R. 1 Ch. 35; *Tbornton v. Ramsden*, 4 Giff. 519; *Crook v. Corporation of Seaford*, L. R. 10 Eq. 678; 6 Ch. 551.

³ *Strand v. Music Hall Co.*, 14 W. R. 6; *Hill v. South Staffordshire Ry. Co.*, 2 DeG. J. & S. 230; *Wilson v. West Hartlepool Ry. Co.*, Ib. 475; *Steevens Hospital v. Dyas*, 15 Ir. Ch. 405. See as to equitable estoppel from standing by and allowing building *Davies v. Sear*, L. R. 7 Eq. 427; *Bankart v. Tennant*, L. R. 10 Eq. 141; *Raritan Water Co. v. Veghte*, 6 C. E. Green, 463; *Millingar v. Sorg*, 61 Penn. St. 471; *Evansville v. Pfisterer*, 34 Ind. 36; *Donovan v. Firemen's Ins. Co.*, 30 Md. 155; *Brooks v. Curtis*, 4 Lans. 283.

⁴ *Prendergast v. Turton*, 1 Younge & C. 98; ante, § 1325.

⁵ *Lord Cranworth*, in *Clements v. Hall*, 2 DeG. & J. 173.

⁶ *Pulsford v. Richards*, 17 Beav. 87. It is here held that persons who take shares in the formation of a railway company, and the directors who form it, are mutually contracting parties, and the prospectus is a representation forming the basis of the contract for the sale of such shares. So one allowing his name to appear as shareholder to induce others to take stock is estopped to deny his being such. *Bridger's Case*, L. R. 9 Eq. 74. So an infant allowing his name to remain for two years after coming of age, with full knowledge of facts. *Mitchell's Case*, L. R. 9 Eq. 363. And see *Ebbett's Case*, L. R. 5 Ch. 302.

⁷ *Ibid.*

1539. This principle has often been applied to the proceedings of joint-stock companies not strictly in accordance with the requirements of their charter. Thus where power was given by the deed of settlement at a meeting of two-thirds in number and value of the shareholders, to borrow money on debentures, and the directors borrowed money on debentures upon the resolution of a meeting at which the requisite number did not attend, and the debentures were issued to persons present at the meeting, and the money applied in payment of the debts of the company, and interest paid on the loans for two years, it was held that the original issue of debentures was invalid, but that it was cured by the subsequent acquiescence of the company.¹

1540. In a recent case before the Master of the Rolls, Lord Romilly,² it is declared that lapse of time and acquiescence on the side of the party whose interests are alleged to have been injuriously affected by irregular proceedings will be a complete bar unless the transaction is tainted with fraud, meaning thereby an act involving grave moral guilt. Upon this ground an agreement between the shareholders and directors of a joint-stock company was upheld, although admitted to have been originally *ultra vires*, and that the books of the company accessible to the shareholders did not show the real nature of the transaction. And in cases of actual fraud the Courts of Equity feel great reluctance to interfere where the party complaining does not apply for redress at the earliest convenient moment after the fraudulent character of the transaction comes to his knowledge. The party upon whose rights or interests a fraud is attempted should not be allowed, after the fact comes to his knowledge, to speculate upon the possible advantages to himself of confirming or repudiating the transaction. He must repudiate it at once and surrender his securities.³

1541. Upon similar grounds courts refuse to disturb settlements long acquiesced in, although between parties holding confidential relations to each other, and of such a nature as to give one great advantage over the other in making such settlements;⁴ as for instance between trustee and *cestui que trust*.⁵ And the acknowledgment of money received in the account of the trustee on behalf of the *cestui que trust* is evidence against the latter.

1542. This subject is extensively discussed and the cases reviewed in an important cause before the House of Lords in the early part of 1858.⁶ The

¹ The *Magdalena Steam Nav. Co.* in re, 6 Jur. n. s. 975. See the cases reviewed in regard to acquiescence in equity in 2 *Redfield on Railw* 353-355, § 220; ante, § 345 a, 518 a. See also *Laird v. Birkenhead Railw. Co.*, 6 Jur. n. s. 140; *Bankart v. Houghton*, 27 Beav. 425.

² *Smallcomb's Case*, L. R. 3 Eq. 769. This case was affirmed in the House of Lords, L. R. 3 H. L. 249. See also *Brotherhood's Case*, 31 Beav. 365, which was professedly followed in the preceding case.

³ *Parks v. Evansville Railw.*, 23 Ind. 567. See as to the laches which will prevent an allottee from throwing up his shares for alleged non-fulfilment of con-

dition of application *Perrett's Case*, L. R. 15 Eq. 250. After winding-up order it is too late to seek to repudiate subscription for fraud in the prospectus. *Oakes v. Turquand*, L. R. 2 H. L. 325; *Kent v. Freehold, &c. Co.*, L. R. 3 Ch. 493. And see as to laches which will disentitle the party deceived to relief as against the directors individually *Peek v. Gurney*, L. R. 13 Eq. 79; s. c. L. R. 6 H. L. 377. It seems if the original allottee would be stopped to complain of the fraud, his transferee is in no better position. *Ibid.*

⁴ *Bright v. Legerton*, 6 Jur. n. s. 1179.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Clarke v. Hart*, 6 H. L. Cas. 633.

Lord Chancellor Chelmsford maintained an essential difference between executory and executed interests in regard to the effect of laches in asserting the claim. In regard to the former, and where it is requisite to resort to a Court of Equity to be put in possession of them, 'It is,' says the learned judge, 'an invariable principle of the court that the party must come promptly, — that there must be no unreasonable delay; and if there is anything on his part which amounts to laches, Courts of Equity have always said, "We will refuse you relief." With regard to interests which are executed, the consideration is entirely different. There mere laches will not disentitle the party to relief by a Court of Equity, but a party may by standing by, as it has been metaphorically called, waive or abandon any right which he may possess. . . . I apprehend where there is a vested right or interest in any party, the principle of law as now firmly established is, that he cannot waive or abandon that right except by acts which are equivalent to an agreement or to a license.'¹

1543. But where upon the occasion of a transaction money is, with the privity and in the presence of any person, paid upon the faith of a representation which that person understands (and knows is about to be thus acted upon, and that his not disputing will be regarded as confirmation of it, and he remains silent), he is bound to fulfil the purpose for which it was made.² This was the case of one tenant in common contracting for the sale of the entire estate; other tenants being present when a portion of the purchase-money was paid to the mortgagee, and making no objection, were held bound by the agreement.

1544. This doctrine of estoppels in pais in ordinary cases grows out of a fraudulent purpose and a fraudulent result. If indeed the element of deception is wanting, there is no estoppel; as if both parties were equally conusant of the facts, and the declaration or silence of one party produced no change in the conduct of the other, he acting solely upon his own judgment.³ There must be deception and change of conduct in consequence, in order to estop the party from showing the truth.⁴

1545. An estoppel may occur in regard to the dedication of land to public use from the circumstances under which it is done and the acts which it induces in others.⁵ As where one sells house-lots adjoining a space held out as an open street or public square, and valuable erections and improvements are

¹ The learned judge here quotes the language of Lord Denman, in *Pickard v. Sears*, 6 Ad. & Ellis, 469; and that of Parke, B., in *Freeman v. Cooke*, 2 Exch. 654.

² *Davies v. Davies*, 6 Jur. n. s. 1320. See also *Martin v. Righter*, 2 Stockton, Ch. 510. The rule is defined in *Eldred v. Hazlett*, 33 Penn. St. 307; *Blackwood v. Jones*, 4 Jones, Eq. 54.

³ *Eldred v. Hazlett*, 33 Penn. St. 307; *Bigelow, Estoppel*, 519 et seq., 3d ed. That equity does not favor estoppels against the truth, see *Rhodes v. Childs*, 64 Penn. St. 18.

⁴ *White v. Langdon*, 30 Vt. 599. So a recital in a deed contrary to the fact, but made by mistake, will not create an

estoppel. *Brooke v. Haymes*, L. R. 6 Eq. 25; *Empson's Case*, L. R. 9 Eq. 597. One who is privy to the execution of a deed cannot claim that it is an act of bankruptcy. *Ex parte Stray*, L. R. 2 Ch. 384. As to whether devisees and those claiming under them are bound by estoppel where testator undertook to create a term for the raising of an annuity the legal estate not being in him but in mortgagees, and the devisees paid the mortgage and got in the legal estate and sold to a purchaser without notice of the annuity, see *Clemow v. Geach*, L. R. 6 Ch. 147.

⁵ See *Holdane v. Coldspring*, 21 N. Y. 474; *Baker v. Johnston*, 21 Mich. 319; *Gilbert v. Manchester*, 55 N. H. 298.

made in faith of such professions, there arises forthwith an irrevocable dedication of such property to public use in the form indicated.¹

1546. In a late case where a married woman executed a deed *inter partes*, whereby she attempted to make her husband's debt a charge upon her separate estate, the court held the deed itself inoperative; but inasmuch as the woman, after she became discoverd, did not repudiate the deed, but for some years continued to recognize it as a valuable security, it was considered that she thereby confirmed it. So that her adoption and confirmation should have the same effect as if the deed had been executed by her *de novo*.²

1547. In a late case³ before the House of Lords, on appeal from the Court of Session in Scotland, the Lord Chancellor discusses this question of estoppel in fact, or acquiescence in adversary claims of right, somewhat in detail. He is reported thus: ⁴ 'It is a universal law that if a man, either by words or by conduct, has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done, and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent, and he thereby induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned, to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words, or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct.' And again: 'If a party has an interest to prevent an act being done, and acquiesces in it so as to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it, and the position of others is altered by their giving credit to his sincerity, he has no more right to challenge the act to their prejudice than he would have, had it been done by his previous license.'

1548. So also in a very late case,⁵ where the subject of the sale of shares in a joint-stock company through the instrumentality of a prospectus issued by the directors of the company came in question, it was held that where the representations contained in the prospectus are believed by the company to be correct at the time the prospectus issued, and a person agrees to accept shares upon the faith of them, and without making inquiries, the company cannot enforce the agreement after the representations have been discovered to be false. The company were bound to know they were true before making them; and, having made them, are now bound to make them good to those who have acted upon the faith of them, or else relinquish all advantage gained by them.

1549. It is sometimes attempted to be maintained that Courts of Equity require a more perfect good faith and visit a severer condemnation upon parties for any departure from its strict observance than Courts of Law. It may be true that they are sometimes enabled by means of their different modes of procedure to effect more perfect justice between parties, and thus seemingly to redress some departures from honesty and fair dealing in a more exemplary manner than can be done in Courts of Law. But it is well settled that there is no equitable construction of a contract or a duty different from its legal one. The same is true in the construction of statutes.⁶

¹ *Rives v. Dudley*, 3 Jones, Eq. 126. But a mere permission to build on one's land a toll-bridge does not amount to a dedication of the land to public use. *Ibid.*

² *Skottowe v. Williams*, 3 DeG. F. & J. 535. The English doctrine seems to be that a married woman may be estopped by her recital in a deed as though sole.

See *In re Fiddey*, L. R. 7 Ch. 773. So by her acquiescence. See *Jones v. Higgins*, L. R. 2 Eq. 538.

³ *Cairncross v. Lorimer*, 7 Jur. n. s. 149.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *New Brunswick Ry. Co. v. Mugeridge*, 7 Jur. n. s. 132.

⁶ *Scott v. Liverpool*, 3 DeG. & J. 834.

1550. There are many other cases of equitable estoppel which we can only present as illustrations of the principle. Courts of Equity will interfere by injunction to restrain land-owners from maintaining ejectment against a canal company who have been permitted by such owner to occupy the land sued for during forty years by paying an agreed rent; and also from erecting a bridge upon the land on the ground of acquiescence in the company's use of the land, they undertaking to put in force their statutory powers to acquire the land.¹

1551. So also where the successive owners of freehold lands with which the parish lands were mixed, being also tenants from year to year of the parish lands, and having for a long time paid a certain rent to the parish, and taken receipts from the collectors expressed 'for rent of parish lands,' it was held that the present owners could not be allowed to prove that the very land belonging to the parish was not in their possession, and that the rent had been paid by them and their immediate predecessors by virtue of a contract of indemnity between them and the occupiers of the parish land, their conduct being equivalent to a representation that they had parish land in their possession in which the parish had been induced to trust and to act accordingly. And it was also held that a purchaser of land, from an owner who had thus been paying rent to the parish, must be regarded as having notice that part of the land purchased belonged to the parish.²

1552. And in cases of alleged fraud in the sale of real estate (and the rule is the same in other cases of sales), where the vendee seeks to defend against the securities at law, or to have them set aside by a Court of Equity on the ground of fraud, it is incumbent upon him to interpose the objection at the earliest possible moment; and if after he discovers the existence of the facts which are claimed to constitute fraud he continues to act under the contract except for the mere purpose of preserving the property for the party ultimately entitled, he will be held to have affirmed the contract with full knowledge of all the facts.³ And where the defendant in a bill to redeem expressly waives all objection to such redemption upon the payment of the sum due in equity, and so states in his answer, he cannot afterwards be allowed to insist that the mortgage was foreclosed before the commencement of the suit.⁴ So also where the mortgagor executes a bond and mortgage to secure the debt of a third party to the mortgagee, he will not be at liberty to defend against it upon the ground of any equities between himself and the original debtor. As a general rule the assignee of a mortgage takes the mortgage subject to all the equities subsisting against it in the hands of the mortgagee. But if the mortgagor when applied to for information misleads the assignee as to the amount due, or conceals his equitable defence, or stands silently by and permits the assignee in good faith to pay his money and take an assignment for its full nominal value, he cannot afterwards set up his equitable defence against the claim of the assignee for full payment.⁵

¹ *Somersetshire Coal Canal Co. v. Harcourt*, 2 DeG. & J. 596. See also *Duke of Beaufort v. Patrick*, 17 Beav. 60; *Mold v. Wheatcroft*, 27 Beav. 510. See also *Cumberland Valley Railw. v. McLanahan*, 59 Penn. St. 23, where it is declared that valuable improvements having been made by a railway company on the faith of a license, it is not within the Statute of Frauds; and subsequent ratification

by parol is equivalent to precedent authority.

² *Attorney-Gen. v. Stephens*, 1 Kay & J. 724.

³ *Jennings v. Broughton*, 5 De G. M. & G. 126; *Downer v. Smith*, 32 Vt. 22; *Farebrother v. Gibson*, 1 De G. & J. 602; *Gatling v. Newell*, 9 Ind. 572.

⁴ *Strong v. Blanchard*, 4 Allen, 538.

⁵ *Lee v. Kirkpatrick*, 1 McCarter, 264.

1553. In a somewhat remarkable case¹ which came before the Master of the Rolls in 1856, the decision is placed upon the ground of delay in instituting proceedings. The facts upon which the claim rested were briefly these: In 1818 the plaintiffs, who carried on business at Emsden, in Hanover, consigned a cargo of wheat to defendant's testator, doing business in London. The wheat was kept in warehouse unsold until 1825, and then sold for less than the expense already incurred in storage. In 1832 proceedings were instituted in the Hanoverian courts to recover the balance of the expense above the price; and after going by appeal throughout all the tribunals of the kingdom, resulted in a judgment for the defendant for a balance of £1,350, being the value of his wheat probably. This judgment was accompanied with reasons stating that the contract was to be governed by the law of Hanover, and was rendered in 1842. The debtor died in England four years after, and his executors were appointed in due course, and the bill was brought in 1855 to compel payment out of his assets. As no excuse for the delay was given, the learned judge said: 'I have thought that a due regard to justice and the necessity of compelling parties to enforce their demands with diligence requires me to dismiss this bill.'

1554. The late English cases with regard to questions of nuisance seem to assume the ground that in the case of extensive public works, or even those of a more private character, which are liable to cause serious damage to the adjoining land-owners by obstructing the flow of water or otherwise, it is the duty of the party complaining to take proceedings while the works are in progress, or at the earliest convenient period after the full extent of the damage is fairly ascertainable; and if this be not done, a Court of Equity will not interfere, but leave the parties to their legal remedies.²

1555. In the case of *Lowell v. Daniels*³ the question how far a married woman who executes a deed of land in her maiden name and antedated at a period before the marriage, with the fraudulent purpose of imposing upon some one to be affected by it, and without disclosing the fact of her marriage, is estopped thereby, or estops her heirs from setting up her title, is extensively discussed by court and counsel, and the conclusion reached that it will have no effect in regard to her title, either upon herself or her heirs, in estopping her from setting up her title, either as against her grantee, or his grantee without notice. But this view would not, it seems, be generally accepted.⁴

1556. A party setting up an equitable estoppel is himself bound to the exercise of good faith and due diligence to ascertain the truth.⁵

¹ *Reimers v. Druce*, 23 Beav. 145. See also *Ware v. Regent's Canal Co.*, 3 DeG. & J. 212.

² *Hicks v. Hunt, Johnson*, 372. So also in *Chapman v. Railway Co.*, 6 Ohio, n. s. 119.

³ 2 Gray, 161.

⁴ See *Frazier v. Gelston*, 35 Md. 298;

Bigelow v. Foss, 59 Me. 162; *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, 10 C. E. Green, 194; *Patterson v. Lawrence*, 90 Ill. 174; *Connolly v. Branstler*, 3 Bush, 702; *Drake v. Glover*, 30 Ala. 382; In re *Lush*, L. R. 4 Ch. 591; *Bigelow, Estoppel*, 513, 3d ed.

⁵ *Moore v. Bowman*, 47 N. H. 494.

CHAPTER XLV.

RAILWAYS AND OTHER COMPANIES.

1557. We can give here little more than the outline of equity jurisdiction connected with railways and other joint-stock companies. The subject is discussed in detail in a work devoted exclusively to the subject of railways,¹ and we have ventured to refer to this work as containing our own views, since it would be little less than affectation to appear here to have drawn our present suggestions from any other source.

1558. In regard to injunctions affecting railway companies Courts of Equity have declined to assume the control of railway construction.² But such companies may be restrained from taking land after their statutory powers have ceased, and from doing other acts exceeding their powers.³

1559. It has also been held that a joint-stock company cannot use the joint property except within the legitimate scope of their charter; that the shareholders are bound by such modifications of their charter as are not fundamental but merely auxiliary to the main design; and that if a majority of the company obtain an alteration of their charter which is fundamental, as to enable them to build an extension of their road, any shareholder who has not assented to the act may restrain the company by injunction from applying the funds of the original organization to the extension.⁴ So too a company will be restrained by injunction from surrendering their charter with a view to obtain another for a different purpose.⁵

1560. Upon the question how far the directors of a railway or other similar company can apply the funds of the company to objects fundamentally different from those specified in their charter, there is no difference of opinion in regard to the principle, but infinite diversity in the application of the rule.⁶ This may be shown by a statement of some of the cases.

1561. It seems to be settled that a fundamental alteration of the objects of the charter, as by allowing a railway to purchase steamboats, will release subscribers who had taken stock.⁷ And the fact that the project will tend to improve the value of the original stock will not excuse the departure from the fundamental purpose of the original charter.⁸ But such acts of the directors

¹ Redfield on Railways, §§ 205 to 224.

² *Webb v. Manchester & Leeds Railway Co.*, 4 My. & Cr. 116. But where two railroads have rights in same tunnel, though equity will not appoint a receiver or permanently supersede the managers of the road, it will, in case of disagreement, regulate their use of the common property. *Delaware R. Co. v. Erie R. Co.*, 6 C. E. Green, 298.

³ Redfield on Railways, § 205, pl. 2, 6.

⁴ *Stevens v. Rut. & Bur. Railway Co.*, 1 Law Register, 154; Redfield on Railways, 194, where the substance of this

very elaborate and satisfactory opinion of Chancellor Bennett will be found. See also *Natusch v. Irving*, 2 Cooper, Ch. Cas. 358. See *Wilson v. Wills Valley R. R. Co.*, 33 Ga. 466; *Durfee v. Old Colony, &c. R. Co.*, 5 Allen, 230; *Blatchford v. Ross*, 54 Barb. 42; *Stewart v. E. & W. Trans. Co.*, 17 Minn. 372.

⁵ *Ward v. Society of Attorneys*, 1 Colly. 370.

⁶ See Redfield on Railways, chap. ix. sec. x.; § 56, pp. 91 to 96.

⁷ *Hartford & N. H. Railway v. Crosswell*, 5 Hill, 383.

⁸ *Macedon Pl. Road Co. v. Lapham*,

as come within the general powers conferred by the charter will not exonerate subscribers.¹ And it has sometimes been held that an act of the directors which violated the terms of a subscription, but which did not affect the interest of the subscriber, will not release the contract.² Courts of Equity often compel corporations to act within the requirements of their charter where they attempt a departure which would be likely to cause irreparable mischief to any one.³

1562. Injunctions are issued with great caution by the English Courts of Equity where their effect would be to cause serious loss to these extensive companies, and whose business materially interests the public.⁴ An injunction will not be granted for the purpose of trying the constitutionality of the company's act. For all preliminary purposes, and until the hearing upon the merits, that will be assumed to be constitutional.⁵ Injunctions will be granted to restrain railway companies from seeking a certain rate of profit, and securing the capital of a steam-packet company to act in connection with the railway with a view thereby to enhance its profits.⁶ So too a railway company will be restrained from purchasing shares in another railway company or applying their funds in its support;⁷ or from giving up the management of its line to another company;⁸ or from building part of their line and abandoning the remainder;⁹ or from procuring an illegal amalgamation.¹⁰

1563. The directors of a life-insurance company, not being authorized thereto by their deed of settlement, cannot by a transfer of the business and the liabilities of another life-insurance company to their own company fetter their shareholders with such liabilities.¹¹ It is proper to enjoin a corporation at the suit of one stockholder from employing their powers or funds for the accomplishment of purposes not within their charter.¹²

18 Barb. 312. But see *Granville Railway v. Coleman*, 5 Rich. 118.

¹ *Faulkner v. Hebard*, 26 Vt. 452; *Redfield on Railways*, 95, and notes.

² *Banet v. Alton Ry.*, 13 Illinois, 504; *Danbury Ry. v. Wilson*, 22 Conn. 435.

³ *Redfield on Railways*, chap. ix. sec. x.; § 214, pp. 500 to 503. The injury resulting to a gas company from competition by another corporation acting outside the territory to which it was alleged to be limited, is held not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief. *Pudsey Coal Gas Co. v. Bradford*, L. R. 15 Eq. 167. And see as to restraint of acts ultra vires, and to injury of plaintiff, *Erie R. Co. v. Delaware R. Co.*, 6 C. E. Green, 283; *Cumberland Valley R. Co.'s Appeal*, 62 Penn. St. 218; *Rogers Works v. Erie R. Co.*, 5 C. E. Green, 379.

⁴ *Redfield on Railways*, § 206 b, and cases cited in notes.

⁵ *Deering v. The York Ry. Co.*, 31 Me. 172.

⁶ *Colman v. Eastern Ry. Co.*, 10 Beav. 1; *Bagshaw v. Eastern Ry. Co.*, 7 Hare, 114; s. c. affirmed, 2 M. & G. 389.

⁷ *Solomon v. Lsing*, 12 Beav. 339; *Great Western Ry. v. Rushout*, 5 De G. & Sm. 290; *Balt. & O. Railway Co. v. Wheeling*, 13 Gratt. 40; *Central R. Co. v. Collins*, 40 Ga. 582. And see *Goodin v. Cincinnati R. Co.*, 18 Ohio, n. s. 169; *Davis v. Old Colony R. Co.*, 181 Mass. 258, and cases there reviewed.

⁸ *Beman v. Rufford*, 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 106; *Winch v. Rich. Ry. Co.*, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 506; *Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co.*, 12 Eng. L. & Eq. 224.

⁹ *Cohen v. Wilkinson*, 12 Beav. 125, 138; s. c. affirmed, 1 M. & G. 481. But see this question more fully discussed, and the cases cited, in *Redfield on Railways*, 488, 489, § 210.

¹⁰ *Parker v. Dun. Nav. Co.*, 1 DeG. & Sm. 192. See the cases also upon this point in *Redfield on Railways*, 623, § 254.

¹¹ *In re The Era Ins. Co.*, 6 Jur. n. s. 1334. See *Clinch v. Financial Co.*, L. R. 4 Ch. 117.

¹² *Gifford v. New Jersey Ry. Co.*, 2 Stockton, Ch. 171.

1564. Courts of Equity have assumed to exercise control in some cases and within certain limits in regard to railway and other joint-stock companies, petitioning the legislature for a change of their corporate powers. But the exercise of such control is now reduced within narrow limits, and scarcely extends beyond the application of their existing funds to enterprises fundamentally different from those which they were pledged to support and carry forward.¹ In a late case it is held that applications to the legislature on public grounds cannot be restrained by Courts of Equity; but that those of a private nature may be, in the discretion of the courts.²

1565. The subject of the interference of Courts of Equity in regard to the conduct and management of railway and other similar corporations is thus discussed by an eminent equity judge, Lord Langdale, M. R.:³ 'The class of cases in which this court has often been called upon to interfere are those which arise out of a combination of acts which are in themselves illegal and considered as breaches of contract, with the public acts which are breaches of contract express or implied with the subscribers to the undertaking, and acts erroneous or breaches of contract incapable of being rectified by the shareholders themselves in the exercise of their own powers.' The conclusion to which the English courts have come in regard to this question is, that whenever the acts complained of are capable of being rectified by the shareholders themselves in the exercise of their corporate powers, equity will not interfere, but leave questions of internal management and regulation to be settled by the shareholders in corporate meeting.⁴ But where the charter of the company prescribes a particular course to be pursued by the directors and agents of the company, and they are acting in violation of the requirement and to the injury of shareholders, a Court of Equity will interfere by way of injunction.⁵ Equity will interfere by injunction in many other cases where the officers of corporations are acting in violation of duty either general or specific.⁶

1566. Equity in obvious cases will interfere and control the action of railway companies in regard to the construction of their works, directing the mode of crossing highways at the instance of the trustees having the charge of the maintenance of such highways.⁷ It is considered that railway companies perform important public functions, in regard to many of which they are under the control of a board of supervision created by the supreme legis-

¹ Redfield on Railways, § 212.

² Lancaster Ry. Co. v. N. W. Ry. Co., 2 K. & J. 293. See also Merritt v. Shrewsbury Ry. Co., 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 144; Durfee v. Old Colony R. Co., 5 Allen, 230.

³ Brown v. Monmouthshire Ry. Co., 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 113; s. c. 13 Beav. 32.

⁴ Redfield on Railw., 490, § 211.

⁵ Allen v. Talbot, 30 Law Times, 316.

⁶ Redfield on Railw. chap. xxviii. sec. vii. § 211, pp. 489, 496, where the cases are fully discussed. See Hilles v. Parrish, 1 McCarter, 380, where the learned chancellor adopts the rule laid down by Chief-Justice Taney, in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 519, 588; namely, 'A corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the

sovereignty by which it is created. . . . It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.' The same rule is reaffirmed by Mr. Justice Thompson in Runyan v. Coster, 14 Peters, 122, 129. See also Miller v. Ewer, 27 Me. 509. That equity has no jurisdiction to restrain an officer of a corporation from performance of his usual duties, but may restrain any particular wrong or injury by him, and may, on notice and cause shown on hearing remove him, but not by injunction without notice or hearing, see People v. Albany R. Co., 55 Barb. 344.

⁷ Redfield on Railw., §§ 207, 208, pp. 282-286, and cases cited; Springfield v. Conn. River Ry., 4 Cush. 63.

lative authority, denominated railway commissioners; and Courts of Equity regard the decisions and orders of this board within the sphere of their proper jurisdiction as conclusive, unless reversed in some mode prescribed by law. They will therefore carry such orders into effect without inquiring into the reasons which induced the commissioners to make the order.¹

1567. So too Courts of Equity will require the officers of joint-stock companies to account for moneys received in trust for the company. The directors of a company on the transfer of its business to another company received from the latter a large sum for compensation, the particulars of which they withheld from the members; and it was held that they were trustees of the money for the members, and they were ordered, on application for an interlocutory injunction, to pay it into court.²

1568. But the acts of corporate officers will receive a favorable construction, and will be upheld when not in violation of the spirit of their charter. The directors of a company were prohibited by their charter from giving bills of exchange, but they had power to borrow on mortgage. They however gave bills to secure an existing debt, and a mortgage was at the same time executed under the seal of the company, which was made subject to redemption on payment of the bills. It was held that the mortgage was given to secure the debt, and not the payment of the bills, and therefore was not invalid on that account; and that upon a bill of foreclosure the deed of the company must be treated as valid until set aside by an independent proceeding.³

1569. Courts of Equity often interfere by way of decreeing specific performance of contracts of railways with each other and with natural persons; such as contracts by one company to permit another to run upon its track, contracts in regard to farm accommodations, and contracts with land-owners, and many others.⁴ The discussion of this subject in its full extension would occupy more space than could be reasonably devoted to it in a chapter of this general character.

1570. Where a railway company agreed with a land-owner through whose estate the railway was to pass, to construct and maintain a 'siding' connected with their railway at a particular point, together with all necessary approaches thereto for public use, for the reception and delivery of goods, it was held that specific performance of the agreement to construct might be decreed without making any decree in regard to maintaining them when constructed.⁵ Upon this point the learned Vice-Chancellor said: 'I think that it is no objection to specific performance,' that there is a clause in the agreement that the party making it shall keep it in repair when made.' 'I may order that the work shall be done; and the question of repairs will be a matter of inquiry when a breach of that part of the agreement occurs.'

1571. In this case an inquiry arose in regard to the extent of the term 'siding,' and there occurred the usual contradiction in the testimony of the experts. On the part of the plaintiff it was deposed by numerous witnesses that it imported nothing less than all the appliances of a furnished station for the receipt and discharge of freight, with a servant of the company in constant

¹ *Hodges on Railways*, 671; *Newry Ry.*, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 11; *Redfield on Ry. v. Ulster Ry.*, 39 Eng. L. & Eq. 553; *Railways*, § 218, pp. 498-500; id. 54-56; *Redfield on Railways*, 488.

² *Gaskell v. Chambers*, 26 Beav. 360.

³ *Scott v. Colburn*, 26 Beav. 276.

⁴ *Great Northern Ry. v. Manchester*

⁵ *Lytton v. Great Northern Ry. Co.*,

2 Kay & J. 394. See also *Sanderson v.*

C. & W. Ry. Co., 11 Beav. 497.

attendance to accommodate the public; and on the part of the defendant that nothing more was intended by the term than a side-track where cars could be set aside for the discharge and receipt of freight, the responsibility of lading and unlading resting with the owners chiefly. The learned judge said: 'I cannot give much credit to the witnesses who say that a siding, according to their interpretation of the word, means numerous other things, which may no doubt be very convenient, but which are not covered by the true signification of the word. According to that construction the words should be equivalent to a siding with all proper conveniences connected therewith; but nothing of that kind is specified in the agreement.' And again: 'If he' (the plaintiff) 'had wished to have a station made, it would have been easy to have said so; the meaning of that word is familiar to every one.'

1572. Equity interferes also to restrain one railway company from interfering with the exclusive franchises of another which have been secured to them by legislative grant. But this question involves such an extensive inquiry into important and difficult constitutional questions that we can do little more than refer to some of the leading cases upon the subject.¹

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS AT LAW. — FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.

1573. As Courts of Law constitute a jurisdiction altogether independent of and foreign to that of Courts of Equity, the control which Courts of Equity assume to exercise over the judgments of such courts is very much the same which it exercises over the judgments of courts altogether foreign to the forum where the Court of Equity exists. It may be important therefore to obtain clear views of the grounds and the mode of this interference, that we may be the better able to comprehend the true limits of the jurisdiction, and thus to define with accuracy and precision where any excess is liable to occur, and especially where it may be proper to invoke the interference of Courts of Equity in regard to judgments at law.

1574. Equity never attempts to act upon the Court of Law itself, and does not claim any supervisory power over such courts or the proceedings therein.² It acts solely upon the party, and will enjoin him in a proper case from pursuing any claim in a Court of Law over which the Courts of Equity have a concurrent jurisdiction and a more perfect means of doing complete justice. This it never attempts to accomplish after judgment, in a matter where the Court of Law had concurrent jurisdiction by declaring the judgment void or setting it aside, but only by enjoining the party from proceeding to enforce it.³

1575. And this it will never do upon the ground of mistake or error in the judgment of the Court of Law, or that the Court of Equity in deciding the

¹ Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 field on Railways, § 214, pp. 500-503; Wheaton, 518; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters, 514; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 420; Red-

id. § 231, pp. 537-562.

² Ante, § 875, and cases cited.

³ Gairity v. Russell, 40 Conn. 450.

same questions decided by the Court of Law would have come to a different conclusion; but only upon the ground that the party had some defence against the claim, which has occurred or first come to his knowledge since the trial in the Court of Law, whereby it would be a virtual fraud in the party recovering at law now to insist upon enforcing his judgment.¹ But where the fact existed before the trial at law, upon which the relief in equity is claimed, and is also known to the party suing in equity, or might have been discovered by the exercise of diligence, and is as much a defence at law as in equity, no redress can ordinarily be obtained in equity.²

1576. In matters where the jurisdiction of the Courts of Law and Equity is entirely concurrent, the adjudication of the Court of Law is conclusive upon Courts of Equity. And a Court of Equity will not interfere to relieve a party from such adjudication, except upon the ground of newly discovered matter since the trial, of fraud in obtaining the judgment, or of some inevitable accident or mistake. But where the party has equitable rights not cognizable in a Court of Law, which would in a Court of Equity have prevented such an adjudication as was made in the Court of Law, the judgment will interpose no obstacle to redress in equity, since the Court of Law had no proper jurisdiction of the subject-matter forming the basis of redress in equity.³

1577. And although some of the earlier decisions look almost like granting new trials in equity in regard to all matters adjudicated at law where there has been surprise at the trial or newly discovered evidence,⁴ the more recent

¹ *Paddock v. Palmer*, 19 Vt. 581; ante, § 257 b.

² Ante, §§ 894, 895; *Gibbons v. Bressler*, 61 Ill. 110; *Smith v. Allen*, 63 Ill. 474. Equity will not aid a defendant to avail himself of a discharge under the bankrupt law. *Foote v. Perry*, 40 Ind. 40. If there is fraud or collusion in prosecuting actions at law, or if a judgment so obtained is used to oppress or defraud, equity may interfere and enjoin or correct the wrong, if there is no adequate remedy at law. *Hablitzel v. Latham*, 35 Ia. 550; *Jennings v. Whittemore*, 2 Thomp. & C. 397; *Busen v. Foster*, 6 Heisk. 333. If a party has lost his remedy against an erroneous or irregular judgment, without his own fault equity may interfere. *Connery v. Swift*, 9 Nev. 39; *Dalton v. Lemburth*, 9 Nev. 192. See also *Loss v. Obrey*, 7 C. E. Green, 52; *Wingate v. Haywood*, 40 N. H. 437; *Currier v. Esty*, 110 Mass. 543. But if a defendant elects his remedy in a suit against him, equity will not relieve him from the effect of his choice. *Penn v. Reynolds*, 23 Gratt. 518. And if a party has the means of correcting the erroneous judgment by appeal or writ of error or otherwise, equity cannot interfere. *Lyme*

v. Allen, 51 N. H. 442. See ante, §§ 897, 898.

³ *Dunham v. Downer*, 31 Vt. 249; *Lansing v. Eddy*, 1 Johns. Ch. 49; *Simpson v. Hort*, 1 Johns. Ch. 98; s. c. on appeal, 14 Johns. 63; ante, §§ 894, 895, 895 a; *Clifton v. Livor*, 24 Ga. 91. It is no objection to the conclusiveness of the finding of a Court of Equity that the party had in fact full remedy at law, so that in truth the Court of Equity never had any proper jurisdiction of the case. And it makes no difference in this respect whether such want of jurisdiction appear upon the face of the bill, but, not being insisted upon, is disregarded by the Court of Equity, and a decree passes upon the merits, or such defect of jurisdiction is shown by the proofs in support of the answer; and the case is dismissed upon that ground upon the final hearing. *Munson v. Munson*, 30 Conn. 425. As to the conclusiveness of judgments in ejectment in the American practice see *Miles v. Caldwell*, 2 Wall. 36.

⁴ *Gainsborough v. Gifford*, 2 P. Wms. 424. In a late case, where the question is examined, the law is thus stated: 'The early English cases which have been

and better considered cases will justify no such proposition.¹ The new trial is never granted in terms. There can be in no such case anything like another trial in the Court of Law. The case is effectually ended there. But where there was a distinct fraud in the proceedings by which the judgment at law was obtained, as by giving no notice of the suit or one calculated to mislead the defendant and thus deprive him of an opportunity to be heard in the trial at law; or in any similar mode making the trial at law fictitious or fallacious; and also where the defendant at law through accident or mistake, and without default in the proper degree of watchfulness and care required of careful men in their own concerns of equal importance fails to present his defence fully, Courts of Equity will in their discretion grant relief by re-examining the case upon its merits, and either enjoining the party from pursuing the judgment at law, or, where some portion of the claim is due, granting such an injunction as to a portion of it; or upon condition that the plaintiff shall pay into court whatever sum is due upon the judgment, with reasonable costs.²

1578. But a creditor is not in a condition to claim the interference of a Court of Equity in removing conveyances made by his debtor of the property which it is claimed should go in payment of debts, until he has perfected his own title against such debtor by judgment and levy.³ Nor will a Court of Equity set aside the levy of an execution upon real estate on the ground of alleged defects and irregularities in the same. The proper remedy in such case will be by application to the court rendering the judgment, and where the levy remains of record.⁴

1579. It seems to be conclusively settled that a judgment can only be impeached in a Court of Equity for fraud in its concoction.⁵ It is said there is no case in which equity has ever undertaken to question a judgment for irregularity. The power of a Court of Law is always exercised in such cases in sound discretion, and the relief is frequently granted on terms. This court cannot impose any such terms or take any such cognizance of the case.⁶ If

brought to our notice, and which we have before had occasion to examine, and some of the American cases, and especially *Colyer v. Langford*, 1 A. K. Marshall, 237, seem to go upon the ground that a bill will be entertained for a new trial in an action determined at law upon very much the same grounds that new trials are granted at law, where the Courts of Law have no means of granting a new trial in the case [or for any reason decline to interfere]. But the numerous cases in this State, from *Essex v. Berry*, 2 Vt. 161, to *Warner v. Conant*, 24 Vt. 351, have established the rule upon a very much narrower basis. The rule of the best considered and more recent cases upon the subject is, that the party must have failed in obtaining redress in the suit at law by the fraud of the opposite party, or inevitable accident or mistake, without any default either of the party or his counsel. That is the rule laid down in

Emerson v. Udall, 13 Vt. 477, and *Pettes v. Bank of Whitehall*, 17 Vt. 435. The rule in Connecticut, *Carrington v. Hollabaird*, 17 Conn. 530; s. c. 19 id. 84, is laid down in almost the same terms, — stress being laid upon the fact that the plaintiff's failure to obtain justice at law has been "without fault on his part." *Burton v. Wiley*, 26 Vt. 430, 432.

¹ But see ante, § 896, note.

² *Emerson v. Udall*, 13 Vt. 477; *Cutting v. Carter*, 29 Vt. 72; *Stone v. Seaver*, 5 Vt. 549.

³ *Castle v. Bader*, 23 Cal. 75.

⁴ *Boles v. Johnston*, 23 Cal. 226. See also *Hurlbut v. Mayo*, 1 D. Chip. Vt. 387. But see *Ramsden v. O'Keefe*, 9 Min. 74.

⁵ See *Flower v. Lloyd*, 10 Ch. D. 327; *Patch v. Ward*, L. R. 3 Ch. 203; *Bigelow, Estoppel*, 164, 165, 3d ed.

⁶ Chancellor Kent in *Shottenkirk v. Wheeler*, 3 Johns. Ch. 275, 280. This

then the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction can only be enjoined in a Court of Equity upon the ground of fraud (and this fraud must have been practised in the very act of obtaining the judgment or else it will be concluded by the judgment at law, where fraud is equally a defence as in equity), it remains to inquire how far foreign judgments, whether in Courts of Law or Equity, will come under a similar rule.

1580. Notwithstanding the occasional vacillation of the English courts, and especially the Courts of Equity, in regard to the conclusive character of the contract resulting from the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in a country foreign to the forum where its validity and fairness is attempted to be brought in question, the general tendency of all the decisions is certainly in that direction. In some of the earlier English cases¹ there seems to be manifested a disposition to treat foreign judgments as only *prima facie* evidence of indebtedness, and examinable in the forum where they were attempted to be enforced. But this rule was subsequently qualified to some extent, and they were regarded as not examinable unless in regard to the jurisdiction of the foreign court over the subject-matter and the parties.² A very learned and able opinion is given by the Vice-Chancellor in *Martin v. Nicolls*³ as late as 1830, in which the learned judge, Sir Lancelot Shadwell, after an elaborate review of all the former cases in England, maintains that it does appear most distinctly that the old law is in favor of the proposition that a foreign judgment is not examinable in the courts of Westminster Hall. And a demurrer is here allowed to a bill which asked for a commission to examine witnesses abroad in aid of the plaintiff's defence to a suit upon a foreign judgment, and for a discovery of the ground upon which the judgments were rendered. This rule has been acquiesced in in England for the most part until the present time.

1581. As Courts of Equity are frequently called to determine upon the validity of foreign judgments,⁴ it will not be out of place here to state briefly the results of the latest decisions upon the subject. The question is considered very much at length in *Riemers v. Druce*,⁵ and the following propositions declared: A foreign judgment sought to be enforced in this country is impeachable for error, upon the very fact of it, sufficient to show that it ought

decision is based upon *Baker v. Morgan*, 2 Dow, 526 (1814). The learned chancellor adds: 'The doctrine, coming from such masters of equity as Lord Redesdale and Lord Eldon, is undoubtedly to be considered as correctly declared. If there had been any case warranting the interference of chancery with an irregular judgment, they would have known it.' The same principle is reaffirmed by the same learned judge in *De Riemer v. De Cantillon*, 4 Johns. Ch. 85; *French v. Shotwell*, 6 Johns. Ch. 235; s. c. 5 Johns. Ch. 555; and in 20 Johns. 668. See also *Elliott v. Balcom*, 11 Gray, 286, where the general subject of relief in Courts of Equity against final judgments in courts of general jurisdiction is considerably discussed. In *Hubbard v. Eastman*, 47 N. H.

507, it is said that any fact which proves it to be against good conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could not have availed himself in the court rendering the judgment as a defence against the action, or where he was prevented from so doing by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence on his part, will justify the interference of a Court of Equity.

¹ *Sinclair v. Fraser*, 1 Doug. 5; *Phillips v. Hunter*, 2 H. Bl. 402; 410; *Walker v. Witter*, 1 Doug. 1.

² *Tarleton v. Tarleton*, 4 M. & S. 21; *Buchanan v. Rucker*, 9 East, 192.

³ 3 Simons, 458.

⁴ Ante, § 1294.

⁵ 23 Beav. 145.

not to have been rendered. The reasons attached to a foreign judgment are part of the record, and to be treated as an integral part of the judgment. In the case of *The Bank of Australia v. Nias*¹ it is decided upon full consideration that an act of the colonial legislature, by which actions in favor of or against corporations are allowed to be maintained in the name of their chairman, and shall have the same effect to bind the property of the corporators as if they were made parties to the suit by service of process personally, is a valid law, and not repugnant to the law of England or to natural justice; and that a judgment recovered in such an action after service upon the chairman had the same effect beyond the territory of the colony which it would have had if the defendant had been personally served with process; that although a foreign or colonial judgment is impeachable to some extent, as for the purpose of showing want of jurisdiction, e. g. that the party was not served with process, or that the judgment was fraudulently obtained, yet the judgment is not examinable upon the merits, as that the contract sued upon was not made or was obtained by fraud, or that the judgment was erroneous. In this latter proposition we apprehend this case is rather to be relied upon than that of *Riemers v. Druce*.

1582. For it will be found extremely difficult, we apprehend, to fix upon any limitation to the rule of holding a foreign judgment revisable for error apparent upon its face, unless it be error of that gross character which shows the judgment to have been given upon grounds repugnant to natural justice or else to the universally recognized laws of morality and decency in all Christian States. This proposition is not countenanced in any of the late English cases to the extent claimed in *Riemers v. Druce*. And in the elaborate judgment of the House of Lords in *Ricardi v. Garcias*,² the conclusiveness of such judgments as a merger of the original cause of action is fully recognized, and its freedom from impeachment except upon the grounds recognized by the Queen's Bench in the *Bank of Australia v. Nias*.³

1583. Accounts recorded in the Court of Chancery in Jamaica in a suit instituted against executors who had proved the testator's will in that island were ordered, in a suit against them in England, to be taken as prima facie evidence of the truth of the matters therein contained, with liberty to the plaintiffs to surcharge and falsify.⁴

1584. The question how far courts of last resort are bound by their own declarations of the law is one of considerable difficulty. Lord Chancellor Campbell, in an important case before the House of Lords,⁵ pronounces the rule to be clearly recognized that such declarations as to the existing state of the law are as much binding upon the court of last resort as upon inferior

¹ 16 Q. B. 717.

² 12 Clark & Fin. 368.

³ It seems mistake of English law as to an English contract, apparent on the face of the proceedings, is not ground of defence to a foreign judgment. *Godard v. Gray*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 139. A judgment of a foreign court on default, the defendant not being a subject of nor resident in the country, cannot be enforced. *Schibshy v. Westenholz*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 155. See *Bishoff v. Wethered*, 9 Wall. 812. A de-

crec of divorce rendered in a State of the Union where the wife is actually resident, though not the State of her husband's domicile, is binding in other States. *Cheever v. Wilson*, 9 Wall. 108. Whether it is conclusive on the question of the wife's being actually resident, quære. *Ib.*

⁴ *Sleight v. Dawson*, 3 Kay & J. 292. But see *Simpson v. Fogo*, 6 Jur. n. a. 949.

⁵ *Attorney-Gen. v. Windsor*, 6 Jur. n. s. 833; s. c. 8 H. L. Cas. 369.

tribunals, and can only be altered by act of Parliament, notwithstanding every member of the court become convinced that they are in fact erroneous; but that observations of different members beyond the ratio decidendi, which is propounded and acted upon in giving judgment, are of no force beyond their intrinsic weight.

1585. One point incidentally alluded to, both in the original text of the learned author¹ and in the present chapter,² has not been brought out with such distinctness as its importance in connection with the subject of Equity Jurisprudence obviously deserves. We allude to the question of fraud in foreign judgments. If the opinion be well founded that domestic and foreign judgments as to the conclusiveness of the contract resulting from the adjudication stand upon equal footing, which is certainly the inclination of the English decisions upon the question, then it is clear that a Court of Equity cannot enjoin such judgment upon the ground of any fraud in the original transaction out of which the judgment arose, since that might have been considered in the court rendering the judgment as ground of defence, and is therefore concluded by the judgment.

1586. The only question of fraud which is open to examination in a Court of Equity as a ground for enjoining the judgment of any court having jurisdiction of the case, whether domestic or foreign, is such as intervened in the proceedings by which the judgment was obtained.³ All questions prior to the proceedings by which the judgment was obtained are necessarily concluded by it. And indeed many irregularities in these latter, such as defects in process or in service, are also concluded where there is an appearance.⁴

1587. It was accordingly held in a recent case⁵ that the decree of a foreign court proceeding in rem could not be so far disregarded as to allow an action at law, as for a conspiracy in assigning the claim by the real owner to a foreigner to enable him to enforce it in the foreign court against property there, which could only be done on behalf of citizens of that country, when in fact the transfer as alleged in the declaration was merely colorable, and to enable the assignee to carry forward the proceedings in his own name for the benefit of the assignor, but which could not have been maintained if the fact of the real interest being still remaining in him had been known.

¹ Ante, § 1294.

² Ante, § 1575.

³ *Sample v. Barnes*, 14 How. 70; *Emerson v. Udall*, 13 Vt. 477; *Atkinsons v. Allen*, 12 Vt. 619.

⁴ *Walker v. Robbins*, 14 How. U. S. 584. The following may be referred to as leading cases upon the subject in the American courts: *Truly v. Warner*, 5

How. U. S. 142; *Humphreys v. Leggett*, 9 How. 297; *Snidam v. Beals*, 4 McLean, 12; *Hendrickson v. Hinckley*, 17 How. 443. See also *Adams's Eq.*, note of the Am. editor, 197, and cases cited.

⁵ *Castrique v. Behrens*, 7 Jur. n. s. 1028. See *Castrique v. Imrie*, L. R. 4 H. L. 414.

INDEX.

A.

	PAGE
ABATEMENT,	
of the shares of creditors in assets	i. 567
of legatees	i. 568
ACCELERATION OF PAYMENT OF DEBTS,	
when allowed in equity	ii. 556-559
in cases of elegits	ii. 557
in cases of reversion	ii. 557
in cases of liens	ii. 558, 559
ACCIDENT,	
not exclusively cognizable in equity	i. 58, 61, 62, 75, 82, 83
concurrent jurisdiction in cases of	i. 83
what is meant by	i. 84
negligence and accident	i. 84, note.
Mr. Jeremy's definition inaccurate	i. 87, note.
an old head of equity	i. 88
necessary circumstances to sustain the jurisdiction	i. 88-90, 107
when remedied at law	i. 88, 89
relief in cases of lost bonds and instruments	i. 89-96
the grounds thereof	i. 89-96
finding instrument after suit will not defeat jurisdiction	i. 95, note.
on condition of the party's giving indemnity	i. 90, 93
where relief is sought, affidavit of the loss required	i. 90, 91, 95, 96
otherwise where discovery only is sought	i. 91
three cases for discovery and relief on lost instruments, stated by Lord Hardwicke	i. 91, note.
relief in cases of lost notes, and the grounds thereof	i. 94
jurisdiction over lost notes not sustained, upon the mere fact of loss	i. 94
where the lost note is not negotiable	i. 94
the loss, if not admitted, must be established by proofs	i. 95
relief against penalties, and the grounds thereof	i. 96
of executors and administrators in respect of assets in case of	i. 97, 98
of an unpaid legatee against other legatees	i. 99
apportionment of premium on account of	i. 100
a revolution treated as an accident	i. 100, note.
so where stock is reduced by an act of Parliament	i. 100
where there is a defective execution of a power by accident	i. 100-102, 181-190

(See POWER.)

ACCIDENT — *continued.*

	PAGE
where trusts in favor of particular persons fail in being executed	i. 102, 103
where a will is cancelled, supposing a later one executed	i. 103
confusion of boundaries by	i. 103
omission of indorsement by	i. 103
cases of, in which no relief will be granted	i. 104-108
where there is a positive contract	i. 104
where premises are destroyed by fire or lightning	i. 104, 105
where express covenant to pay rent	i. 105
where parties stand equally innocent	i. 105
where the accident arose from gross negligence or fault	i. 106
where both parties stand upon equal equities	i. 106, 107
where a party has not a clear vested right	i. 106
in case of a bona fide purchaser without notice	i. 107
grounds of equitable jurisdiction in cases of	i. 107
whether accounts are cognizable on account of	i. 166

(See MISTAKE.)

ACCOUNT,

concurrent jurisdiction of equity in matters of	i. 443, 444
origin and nature of the jurisdiction	i. 443-450
inadequacy of remedy at law	i. 443-449
when founded on obligations purely legal	i. 443
assumpsit will lie for a balance of	i. 444, note.
difficulties in the action of at common law	i. 443-449, 451, 452, 529
suggestions of the Parliamentary Commissioners with reference to	i. 444, note.
use of the old action of	i. 444, note.
in what cases it lay	i. 446, 447, 448
confined to bailiffs, receivers, and guardians in socage and merchants	i. 446, 447, 448
did not lie against wrong-doers	i. 446
who were bailiffs and receivers in	i. 446, 447
modes of proceeding in this action	i. 447, 448, 449
auditors could not administer an oath	i. 448
issues, being certified by the auditors, would be tried by the court and jury	i. 448
in many actions of account, defendant might wage his law	i. 449
proceedings of Courts of Equity in suits for	i. 450, 451
reference to, and report of, a master	i. 450
all parties may be brought before the court	i. 450
foundation of the jurisdiction of equity over	i. 450-452
because the remedy is more complete in equity than law	i. 450-452, 453, note, 455
in order to obtain a discovery	i. 453, 454, 456, 457, 535
whether on the ground of accident, mistake, or fraud, it lies	i. 452, 533
incidents to matters of account, of which concurrent jurisdiction is taken	i. 452, 455
difficult to ascertain the boundaries of jurisdiction over	i. 453-455
Lord Erskine's opinion upon jurisdiction in	i. 455, note.
whether, where the court has jurisdiction for discovery, it will give relief	i. 453-457, note.

ACCOUNT — *continued.*

	PAGE
jurisdiction, three grounds of	i. 458, note.
over cases of mutual accounts	i. 455-458
where the accounts are on one side, and no discovery is sought	i. 455-458
where mere complication	i. 456, note.
when not founded in privity of contract	i. 466
jurisdiction to require executor or administrator to account	i. 549, note.
in cases of agency	i. 467-477
(See AGENCY.)	
to prevent multiplicity of suits	i. 467-470
where no preliminary objection is taken to	i. 470
between trustees and cestui que trust	i. 470-473, 533, 534
between tenants in common and joint tenants	i. 473
between part-owners of ships	i. 473
between partners	i. 473
(See PARTNERS)	
in cases of tort	i. 475, 476, 532-534
in cases of adverse title	i. 532, 533
jurisdiction in cases of apportionment	i. 477-502
(See APPORTIONMENT.)	
jurisdiction in cases of general average	i. 502
(See AVERAGE.)	
jurisdiction in cases of contribution	i. 504-530
(See CONTRIBUTION.)	
liens	i. 530, 531
(See LIENS.)	
pledges	i. 531
rents and profits	i. 531-535
(See RENTS AND PROFITS.)	
waste	i. 535-540
(See WASTE.)	
tithes and moduses	i. 539, 540
(See TITHES AND MODUSES.)	
in bills of account both parties are actors	i. 540
defendant is entitled to orders in the cause	i. 540
may entitle himself to a decree	i. 540
may revive a suit	i. 540
account stated is a good plea	i. 541
where a Court of Equity will open a settled account	i. 541, 542, 543
where it is between client and attorney	i. 542, note.
where liberty is given to surcharge and falsify	i. 543, 544
meaning of "to surcharge and falsify"	i. 543, 544
what is a stated account	i. 544; ii. 853
where the clause "errors excepted" occurs	i. 544
it need not be signed by the parties	i. 544
its acceptance may be implied	i. 544
between merchants at home and merchants in different coun- tries	i. 544
when a settled account is conclusive between the parties or not	i. 544-547

	PAGE
ACCOUNT — <i>continued.</i>	
in legal demands equity follows the Statute of Limitations	i. 546
within what time equity will interpose in cases of equitable de-	
mauds	i. 546
appropriation of payments upon	i. 460, note.
decreed to wind up partnership affairs	i. 677, note, 678, 679, 680
ACCOUNT BOOKS , specific delivery of	ii. 25
ACCOUNT STATED , when a bar in equity	ii. 853
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT ,	
what is sufficient to avoid Statute of Limitations	ii. 851, 852
when a charge of debts on lands avoids statute or not	ii. 852
ACTIONS , distinctions between, in the Roman law	i. 33
ACTORS , both parties are in bills of account	i. 540
ACTUAL FRAUD. (<i>See FRAUD, ACTUAL.</i>)	
ADEMPTION , how established	ii. 449, note.
ADMINISTRATION ,	
concurrent jurisdiction in cases of	i. 548, 549
what are assets	i. 548, 564, 565
grounds of jurisdiction over	i. 548, 589
whether cognizable as a trust	i. 548, 549
cognizable in ecclesiastical and common-law courts	i. 550-552, 553
necessity of interposition of equity	i. 550-552
defect of remedy at law	i. 550-552
in the ecclesiastical courts	i. 550-552
in the case of creditors	i. 551, 552
of legatees	i. 552, 553
of distribution of the residue of an estate	i. 553, 554
origin of the jurisdiction of equity	i. 554, 555
where relief is sought by executors or administrators	i. 555
bills of conformity, what they are	i. 555
whether these are maintainable against all the creditors	i. 556
where relief is sought by creditors	i. 556-562
when the bill is by a single creditor for his own debt only	i. 556
creditors' bills, what they are	i. 558
how these destroy preferences	i. 560
assets, usual decree upon them	i. 558
what follows the decree	i. 560
abuse of them, how prevented	i. 561
where the jurisdiction of equity is indispensable	i. 564
what are legal assets	i. 548, 564, note.
when payment of these is enforced in equity	i. 565, note.
what are equitable assets	i. 564, 565, 566
why so called	i. 565
of two kinds	i. 565
where land is charged with the payment of debts	i. 566
equity follows same rules, as to legal assets, as Courts of Law	i. 567
recognizes liens, charges, &c., according to their priority	i. 567
follows different rules, as to equitable assets, from Courts of	
Law	i. 567

ADMINISTRATION — *continued.*

	PAGE
equitable assets distributed among creditors equally and <i>pari passu</i>	i. 567
abatment of the shares of creditors, where the funds fall short	i. 567
three orders of creditors in the civil law	i. 567, note.
legatees of equitable assets take <i>pari passu</i>	i. 568
abatment of their share	i. 568
creditors have a preference over	i. 568-570
how a creditor partly paid out of legal assets is postponed as to the	
equitable	i. 569
decree in cases of this sort	i. 570
marshalling assets	i. 570-588
what is marshalling of assets	i. 570
where a creditor has two funds	i. 570
where one mortgage covers two estates	i. 571, 573, 574
assets marshalled only in favor of common creditors of a common	
debtor	i. 572, 573
a creditor of A and B not compellable to proceed against B alone	i. 572, 573
whether the assets of one alive may be marshalled	i. 572
every claimant upon assets to be satisfied	i. 572
when simple contract creditors shall stand in the place of the spe-	
cialty creditors	i. 573
where specialty creditors may resort to two funds	i. 573, 574
where mortgagee exhausts the personal estate	i. 574
how assets are marshalled in favor of legatees	i. 575-579
when they may stand in the place of specialty creditors and	
mortgagees	i. 575, 577
where real estate not mortgaged is devised	i. 575, 576, 577
what passes by devise of land mortgaged	i. 575, 577
preference between the legatee and devisees	i. 576, note.
distinction between the heir and devisee	i. 576, note.
where lands are subjected to the payment of debts	i. 577
where some legacies are charged on real estate and some not	i. 576, 577
doctrine of substitution adopted from the civil law	i. 578
how assets are marshalled in favor of widow	i. 578
her necessary apparel not liable for husband's debts	i. 578
how creditors will be turned from her paraphernalia	i. 578
no marshalling where legacies are for charitable uses	i. 578
when an heir or devisee will be substituted for a specialty creditor	i. 579
personal estate the primary fund for payment of debts	i. 579-588
rule for application of funds to payment of debts	i. 580, note.
order of preferences among persons in interest	i. 579, 580, 581, 582
where unincumbered and mortgaged lands are specifically	
devised	i. 581
where the equities of the legatees and devisees are equal	i. 581
where a specialty debt or mortgage is paid by an heir or	
devisee	i. 581
where lands are devised for the payment of debts	i. 582
what is proof of intended exemption of personal estate	i. 582
intention of the testator followed	i. 582, 583

ADMINISTRATION—*continued.*

PAGE

- where the real estate is or becomes the primary fund i. 583-587
- as of a jointure or portion to be raised out of lands by the execution of a power i. 583, 584
- as of a mortgage by an ancestor, and the mortgaged estate descending upon his heir i. 584, note.
- as of land descended to the wife, mortgaged by her father, and for a personal covenant by the husband i. 585
- as upon descent cast of a mortgaged estate purchased by an ancestor i. 587
- summary as to marshalling assets i. 587, 588
- where there is waste by the personal representative i. 588
- executor treated as debtor at law i. 588-591
- retainer of an executor i. 589, note.
- assets treated as debtor of trust fund in equity i. 589
- when assets may be followed, where there is a misapplication of them by executor i. 590-592
- distinction between sale or pledge of assets for a present advance or for an antecedent debt i. 591
- relief in case of waste by the husband of a feme covert executrix . . i. 592
- where assets are collected under an ancillary or foreign administration i. 592-597
- probate and administration granted as to assets within the jurisdiction of the court i. 593
- where there are different administrations in different countries . . i. 593-597
- different regulations in different countries i. 593-597
- by what law the assets are to be governed i. 595-597
- effect of the law of domicil of deceased i. 596, 597
- final distribution of the residue, after discharge of the claims in the country of the ancillary administration i. 596, 597
- fraud in dealing with executors and administrators . . i. 426-428, 588-591
- assent of executor to legacies required before a suit at law . . i. 598, 599
- (See LEGACIES.)

ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS. (See ADMINISTRATION.)

- frauds by i. 426-428, 588-591
- waste by i. 588-591
- collusive sales by i. 422-428, 588-591
- collusion with debtors to estate i. 422-428, 588-591

ADVANCEMENT, purchase in name of a son, when an ii. 538-542

in name of a wife ii. 541

ADVERSE TITLE, purchase with notice, effect of i. 399-417

(See NOTICE.)

AFFIDAVIT, of loss of bond, when required i. 90, 91, 95

AGENCY, misrepresentation by an agent i. 211, note.

accounts arising from jurisdiction over i. 467-476

definition of i. 467

when bill will lie between principal and agent . . i. 456, note, 467, note, 468, note.

agents must keep accounts and preserve vouchers i. 468, 476

AGENCY — *continued.*

	PAGE
are responsible for profits	i. 468, 469
difficulty of settling their accounts without a discovery	i. 469, 470
where there is an election of remedy	i. 469
where there is a single consignment	i. 469
jurisdiction to prevent multiplicity of suits	i. 469
action of money had and received	i. 469, 470
when equity considers the agent as trustee	i. 469
where no preliminary objection is taken to the jurisdiction	i. 469, 470
accounts between trustees and cestui que trust	i. 470
an agent cannot purchase for himself unless under special circumstances	i. 322, 323
accounts between tenants in common and joint tenants	i. 473
between part-owners	i. 473
between partners	i. 473
torts of agents will be charged by equity upon their estate	i. 476, note.
where a tenant tortiously digs ore during his life	i. 476, note.
where an agent does not keep regular accounts	i. 476
where an agent mixes his principal's property with his own	i. 476
(See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.)	
AGREEMENTS , mistake in written; when relieved or not	i. 166-181
to secure influence over another person	i. 266, 267, 269, 270
fraudulent, respecting marriage	i. 266-292
among heirs, to share equally	i. 269
(See FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE.)	
within Statute of Frauds	i. 338
parol evidence, to correct errors in	i. 166-179
ALIMONY , when allowed by Courts of Equity	ii. 755, 756, 802
when arrears of, recoverable or not	ii. 803
ANCILLARY, FOREIGN ADMINISTRATION , what it is	i. 592-597
(See ADMINISTRATION.)	
effect of	i. 592-597
ANNUITIES , during widowhood are valid	i. 288
apportionment of	i. 488
ANSWER IN EQUITY , when evidence or not	ii. 825-857
APPLICATION OF PURCHASE-MONEY ,	
when purchaser bound to see to or not	ii. 466-476
APPOINTMENT , power of, when a trust	ii. 384
defective execution of powers of, when relieved	i. 97-103, 181-190
when not	i. 123
(See POWERS.)	
illusory, relief in cases of	i. 260, 263
APPORTIONMENT , of a premium on account of accident	i. 100
of arrears of a dividend due to tenants for life	i. 100
of annuities	i. 488
concurrent jurisdiction in cases of	i. 477-502

APPORTIONMENT — *continued.*

	PAGE
discovery required for	i. 477
whether founded on contract	i. 477, note, 478, 479
in the case of an old party wall rebuilt	i. 477, note.
contracts not generally apportioned at common law	i. 478
where a collector of rents died at the end of three quarters of a year	i. 479
where a mate engaged for a voyage, and died during the voyage	i. 479
when allowed in cases of apprentice fees	i. 480, 481
of apprentice fees, when the master becomes bankrupt	i. 99, 100, 480
on account of misconduct of his master	i. 481
where certain acts were left undone by the death	
of the master	i. 481
on the dissolution of the apprenticeship at his re-	
quest	i. 481
in the case of an attorney's clerk	i. 481
etymology and meaning of the word	i. 477
in cases of rent, or common, or other charge	i. 481-492
of rent	i. 492, note.
where one purchases a part of the land, out of which a rent charge	
issues	i. 482
where part of the land comes by operation of law to a party	i. 482, 483
rent service apportionable	i. 483
where a lessor grants part of a reversion to a stranger	i. 483
in case of eviction of part of the land	i. 483
where one parcener, or co-feeoffee, is distrained for a rent service	i. 483
where one of several alienees satisfies a judgment	i. 485
where writ of contribution will lie for	i. 486, 487
superiority of remedy in equity	i. 487
in cases where no remedy exists at law	i. 487
where a right of common is recovered of a lessee of divers	
lands	i. 487
where rent is payable in lieu of tithes, and the lands came	
to several grantees	i. 487
where interest of a mortgage is apportioned between the heir	
and administrator	i. 487
where a daughter's maintenance will be apportioned	i. 488
denied by equity in certain cases	i. 488
in case of South Sea Annuities	i. 488
in case of government securities	i. 489
where tenant for life leases for years, rendering rent half	
yearly, and dies in the middle of the half year	i. 490
between the executors of a tenant in tail and remainder-man	i. 491,
	492, note.
tithes leased, apportioned on the death of the parson	i. 491, note.
in cases where fines and other charges on real estate are paid off	i. 493-497
where different parcels in the same mortgage are sold to dif-	
ferent persons	i. 497
generally, where there are different interests under a mort-	
gage	i. 497, 498
importance of the assistance of equity in these cases	i. 498-502
where there are different interests in the inheritance	i. 498, 499

APPORTIONMENT — *continued.*

	PAGE
between tenant in tail and remainder-man	i. 499
where an incumbrance is paid off by tenant in tail	i. 499
by tenant in tail in remainder	i. 499
by tenant for life	i. 499, 500
between tenant for life and reversioneer or remainder-man	i. 499, 500
of surplus, where the estate is sold to discharge incumbrances	i. 500
of the interest on mortgages, &c.	i. 500, 501
where a mortgage is devised and paid by the mortgagor	i. 500, note.
where tenant in tail is an infant, guardian shall keep down the interest	i. 501, note.
in cases of general average	i. 502-504
(See AVERAGE; CONTRIBUTION.)	
APPRENTICE BONDS, when apportioned or not	i. 99, 100, 480, 481
APPROPRIATION, of payments	i. 458-466
ARBITRATION (See AWARD.)	
agreement for, when void, or not	ii. 794, note.
Roman law of	ii. 796, 797
ARBITRATORS, agreement to refer disputes to by partners, whether enforceable in equity	i. 676
equity will not enforce agreement to refer to	ii. 793
not bound to discover the grounds of their award	ii. 794, 822
conspiring with attorney, renders attorney liable	ii. 791, note.
cannot rectify award when made	ii. 794, note.
not to be made parties	ii. 822, 823
except in cases of fraud	ii. 823
ARRANGEMENTS, FAMILY. (See COMPROMISES.)	
ASSETS, what are legal	i. 548, 564
what are equitable	i. 564-566
marshalling of	i. 564, 587, 588
(See ADMINISTRATION.)	
ASSIGNEES in bankruptcy can purchase debts only for benefit of estate, and not of themselves	i. 330
may set aside fraudulent conveyance of bankrupt	ii. 343, note.
the right to all equities	ii. 347, 575, 576, 744
ASSIGNMENT, of equitable property or debts. Notice of necessary to trustee to perfect title	i. 425, note.
of an officer's half pay, void	i. 297
of the fees of keeping a house of correction	i. 297
of uncollected call on stockholders	ii. 349, note.
of emoluments of fellow of a college	ii. 356, note.
of dower, jurisdiction in equity	i. 627-636
(See DOWER.)	
by debtors giving preferences to creditors, when valid or not	i. 377, 378, 380, 385, 386
of property and general and special trusts	ii. 343-381
general, for payment of debts	ii. 343-345
relief in equity on	ii. 343-365, 379
by or to the King of choses in action valid	ii. 347

- ASSIGNMENT** — *continued.*
- | | PAGE |
|---|---------------------------|
| special assignment | ii. 347-359 |
| of choses in action | ii. 347-359 |
| of debts | ii. 347-381 |
| of contingent interests and expectancies | ii. 352, 378 |
| no remedy on assignment of choses in action at law | ii. 347, 372, 378 |
| but full remedy in equity | ii. 347-381 |
| when implied | ii. 361, 529 |
| of choses in action of wife by husband when and how far valid | ii. 747 |
| remittance, when it amounts to an assignment | ii. 362-365 |
| what valid or not | ii. 362-365 |
| by second assignee without notice of prior assignment when, by giving notice to the legal holder of the interest, he may acquire priority over the first assignee | ii. 338-340, 367, 379 |
| what interests are not assignable | ii. 354 |
| pensions | ii. 356 |
| half-pay | ii. 355 |
| when valid by parol | ii. 366 |
| when revocable or not | ii. 272, and note. |
| voluntary is revocable | ii. 364-367 |
| what may be assigned or not | ii. 350-354 |
| what is champerty and maintenance or not | ii. 368-377 |
| of freight in futuro, valid | ii. 378 |
| ASSUMPSIT , when it will lie on an account | i. 444, note. |
| for tolls | i. 453, note. |
| ATTORNEY. (<i>See CLIENT AND ATTORNEY.</i>) | |
| AUCTIONS , engagements not to bid against each other | i. 295 |
| joint purchasers at, may authorize one to bid | i. 295, note. |
| where underbidders or puffers are employed | i. 295 |
| sales of post obit bonds at | i. 352 |
| purchase at auction by trustee | i. 329 |
| AUDITORS , duty in the action of account | i. 448 |
| (<i>See ACCOUNT.</i>) | |
| AULA REGIS , administration of justice in England originally confined to | i. 35 |
| other courts derived out of | i. 35 |
| AVERAGE, GENERAL , jurisdiction in cases of | i. 502-504 |
| definition of | i. 502 |
| on what principle founded | i. 502-504 |
| derived from the Roman law | i. 502 |
| confined to sacrifices of property | i. 503 |
| difficulty of adjusting it at law | i. 503 |
| where there are different interests embarked | i. 504 |
| AWARDS , fraudulent | i. 260 |
| jurisdiction in equity, as to | ii. 786-797 |
| unconscionable, set aside | ii. 789, note. |
| in cases of fraud and accident | ii. 787-791 |
| in cases of mistake of law | ii. 789, note, 792, note. |
| in cases of mistake of fact | ii. 793, note. |

AWARDS — *continued.*

	PAGE
when made, cannot be rectified by arbitrator	ii. 794, note.
when specific performance of, decreed or not	ii. 793-795
agreement to refer, not decreed	ii. 793
arbitrators not decreed to make an	ii. 794
arbitrators not compelled to discover grounds of award	ii. 794, 822
except in cases of fraud	ii. 794, 823
no action against arbitrator for misconduct	ii. 791, note.
Roman law of arbitration	ii. 796, 797
bill of discovery of grounds of award, when it lies or not	ii. 794, 822
when arbitrators should be parties or not to a bill of discovery	ii. 794, 822, 823

B.

BACON, LORD, his character as chancellor	i. 49
value of his ordinances	i. 49
BAILIFFS AND RECEIVERS,	
had the benefit of action of account at common law	i. 446, 447
who they were at common law	i. 446, 447
BAILMENTS, though trusts, are cognizable at law	i. 470, 549
treated in equity as trusts	i. 360-364
BANKRUPTCY, ASSIGNEES IN,	
take subject to all equities	ii. 347, 575, 576, 744
BARGAINS, catching	i. 202, 341
unconscionable	i. 254-259, 339
with expectant heirs, reversioners, &c.	i. 341-355
BARS, PECULIAR IN EQUITY	ii. 840-854
Statute of Limitations	ii. 842-853
lapse of time	ii. 842-853
atches	ii. 848-853
Statute of Frauds	ii. 853
former decree	ii. 853
account stated	ii. 853
purchase bona fide without notice	ii. 825-829, 853
want of proper parties	ii. 853
BENEFICIARY, who is (<i>cestui que trust</i>)	i. 327, note.
(See TRUSTEE.)	
BIDDINGS, at auction, when fraudulent	i. 295
BILLS OF PEACE. (See PEACE, BILL OF.)	
BILLS QUIA TIMET. (See QUIA TIMET.)	
BILLS TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY	ii. 830-834
(See PERPETUATING TESTIMONY.)	
BILLS TO TAKE TESTIMONY DE BENE ESSE	ii. 834-839
(See TESTIMONY; BILLS FOR DE BENE ESSE.)	
BILLS FOR AN ACCOUNT. (See ACCOUNT.)	

	PAGE
BILLS OF CONFORMITY, what they are, and when maintainable	i. 555
(See ADMINISTRATION.)	
BILLS OF CREDITORS. (See CREDITORS' BILLS.)	
BILLS OF DISCOVERY, their importance	i. 23; ii. 810-830
(See DISCOVERY.)	
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, protection of	i. 63, 64, note, 107, 387, 415, 417, 421, 436, 438
(See PURCHASER.)	
BONDS, lost, relief in cases of, and the grounds thereof	i. 89-97
on condition of the party's giving indemnity	i. 90, 94
when affidavit of the loss is required	i. 90, 91, 95
three cases for discovery and relief stated by Lord Hardwicke	i. 91, note.
relief against penalties and the grounds thereof	i. 96
(See ACCIDENT.)	
of apprenticeship, when apportioned	i. 100, 481
(See APPOINTMENT.)	
reform of mistake in	i. 166-180
joint, when deemed joint and several	i. 176-178
obtained by attorneys of their clients	i. 319-321
for assisting in an elopement void	i. 268
for giving consent to marriage void	i. 269, 270
(See MARRIAGE.)	
fraudulent, upon an intended marriage	i. 269-272
not a lien upon lands in England	i. 383
post obit bonds, relief in cases of	i. 349, 350, 354
relief of sureties on bonds and contribution	i. 511-524
debts by, cannot be tacked except against heir	i. 422, note.
BOOKS OF ACCOUNT, specific delivery of	ii. 25
BOUNDARIES, CONFUSION OF. (See CONFUSION OF BOUNDARIES.)	
BROKAGE CONTRACTS. (See MARRIAGE.)	i. 266-268

C.

CANCELLATION OF DEEDS AND INSTRUMENTS,

when decreed	i. 28-31, note; ii. 4-17
for want of authority of agent who made	ii. 5, note.
when deeds void and voidable	ii. 7, 9-19
when not decreed	ii. 14-16
when deeds illegal on their face	ii. 14, 15
who may require	ii. 5
in cases of fraud	ii. 5-7, 28, note.
negotiable note	i. 28, note; ii. 10, note.
against public policy	ii. 5-9
against conscience	ii. 5-9
when satisfied	ii. 19-22
other cases	ii. 16-19
upon what terms	ii. 2-9, 23

	PAGE
CANCELLATION of wills by accident	i. 103
of deeds by mistake	i. 180
CANON LAW, its authority in England	i. 233, note.
CATCHING BARGAINS, relief against	i. 202, 341
CAVEAT EMPTOR, rules of the common law	i. 233
CESSION, doctrine of the Roman law as to	i, 507, 645
CESTUI QUE TRUST. (<i>See</i> TRUSTEE.)	
CHAMPERTY, contracts of	i. 298, 301
what is or not	ii. 368-378
CHANCELLOR,	
this officer known to the Roman Emperors	i. 36
common among the modern kingdoms of Europe	i. 37
question as to the origin of the word	i. 37, note.
authority and dignity of	i. 37, 38, note.
anciently, petitions to the king were referred to	i. 39, 41
when his powers were first delegated to commissioners	i. 48, note.
character of Cardinal Wolsey as chancellor	i. 48
Sir Thomas More	i. 48
Lord Bacon	i. 48
Lord Nottingham	i. 49
Lord Hardwicke	i. 50
his jurisdiction over idiots, &c.	i. 241, note.
CHANCERY, the grand Officina Justitiæ	i. 39
(<i>See</i> EQUITY.)	
CHARGE ON LANDS FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS,	
what words create	ii. 565-591
CHARITABLE USES, legacies for, no marshalling of assets in favor of	i. 578
CHARITIES, history of equity jurisdiction in cases of	ii. 477-500
what are now deemed charities	ii. 491-500
what are within Statute of Elizabeth	ii. 500, 501
how construed	ii. 501-517, 524
how favored	ii. 501-509
how carried into effect	ii. 501-509
doctrine of <i>Cy près</i>	ii. 503-505, 510
uncertainty of objects of	ii. 492, note, 503, 510, 513
defects in conveyances to	ii. 506-509
no marshalling of assets in cases of	ii. 513
surplus in charities how applied	ii. 514
what charities void	ii. 514-517
for foreign objects, when enforced	ii. 514-519
jurisdiction over, when in the Court of Chancery	ii. 519-523
when personal in the chancellor, as delegate of the crown	ii. 521-523
when to be administered by the crown	ii. 521-523
when by trustees	ii. 523-525
effect of change of name or location of donee	ii. 503, note.

CHARITIES — *continued.*

PAGE

- change of membership in society benefited ii. 525, note.
 interpretation of bequests for ii. 524
 misuse of charity ii. 524, and note.
 rewards to discover charities ii. 525
 Statute of Limitations not applied to charities ii. 526
 effect of modern statutes, as to charities ii. 526, 527

CHATTELS, specific delivery of. (*See DELIVERY UP OF CHATTELS.*)

- when decreed ii. 23-26, 213, 214
 antiques ii. 25
 heirlooms ii. 25
 paintings ii. 25
 books of accounts ii. 25
 farm stock ii. 26
 injunctions for ii. 213-215

CHILDREN are favorites of equity i. 182

(*See PARENT AND CHILD.*)

CHOSSES IN ACTION, ASSIGNMENT OF,

- remedy in equity ii. 347-363, 365-379
 effect of notice ii. 772, note.
 the king may assign or take an assignment of ii. 347

CLIENT AND ATTORNEY,

- relief in cases of concealment by an attorney from his client . . . i. 236
 plea of ignorance by attorneys i. 236
 their peculiar fiduciary relation i. 313-321
 latter shall not be benefited by the negotiations for the former . . . i. 313-321
 onus upon the latter to show perfect fairness in his dealings . . . i. 317-321
 distinction between this relation and that of cestui que trust . . . i. 313-321
 a bond obtained by an attorney from a poor client i. 319
 a bond obtained by an attorney from a client for a specific sum . . . i. 320
 judgment against a client for security for costs i. 320
 gift to an attorney pendente lite i. 320, note.
 when the relation is dissolved i. 321
 account between i. 542, note.
 cloud upon title ii. 11, note.

COKE, LORD, his opinion as to the origin of equity jurisdiction . . . i. 38

- his hostility to Courts of Equity i. 38

COLLUSION BY EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,

- with debtors of the estate i. 426-428, 589-591
 in sales of personal assets i. 426-428, 590

COMPANIES, railway and other ii. 867-870

- injunctions against ii. 867
 funds of, how to be applied ii. 867, 868
 restraint of application to legislature ii. 869

COMPENSATION, when decreed for improvements on an estate in

- equity i. 663
 in cases of partition for owelty i. 665, 666

COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN EQUITY,

- when decreed ii. 36, 42-44, 122-133

COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES — *continued.*

	PAGE
when not	ii. 122-133
when as incident to other relief	ii. 122-133
COMPENSATION IN CIVIL LAW, what	ii. 775-778
when allowed to trustees or not	ii. 612-614

(See SET-OFF.)

COMPOSITIONS, secret by creditors, when valid i. 384-387

COMPROMISES, in ignorance of a rule of law i. 116, note, 130-141

when valid i. 139-142

of doubtful rights i. 139, 140

family, by a person in drink i. 143, 245

supported on principles of policy i. 139-142

CONCEALMENT, what it is, and relief in cases of i. 227-237

in fraud of marriage i. 270-274

in cases of sales i. 233

in cases of sureties i. 234

in cases of insurance i. 235

in cases of fiduciary relations i. 236, 310-337

of crimes, agreements for, void i. 297

of title, with design to mislead i. 389-399

of material facts, in cases of guaranty and advances i. 388

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION. (See JURISDICTION.)

CONDITIONS, (See PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.)

in restraint of marriage i. 275-292

(See MARRIAGE.)

how viewed at law ii. 637-641

possible and impossible ii. 638-641, 643

precedent and subsequent. ii. 638-641

illegal and repugnant ii. 638-641

when relieved against in equity ii. 643-650

CONFIRMATION, marriage brokage contracts incapable of i. 268

what contracts are capable of or not i. 268, 309, 353, note.

CONFORMITY, BILLS OF, what they are, and when maintainable

i. 555, 556

when not i. 555, note.

(See ADMINISTRATION.)

CONFUSION OF BOUNDARIES,

concurrent jurisdiction in cases of i. 103, 618-626

origin and history of the jurisdiction i. 618, 619

two writs in the register concerning boundaries i. 618

rule of the civil law as to i. 620

grounds for the exercise of the jurisdiction i. 622, 623

that the boundaries are in controversy is not sufficient i. 621-623

to suppress multiplicity of suits i. 622-625

where a special equity is set up i. 620-622, 624, 625

where the confusion arises from fraud i. 623, 624

from the peculiar relations of the parties i. 624

	PAGE
CONFUSION OF BOUNDARIES — <i>continued.</i>	
when the matter is cognizable at law	i. 621-623
where a bill is brought to fix the boundaries of two parishes	i. 622
where a bill is brought by a rector for tithes and to fix boundaries	i. 623
commission to ascertain boundaries, what	i: 623, 624, note.
when the remedy by distress, from confusion, is impracticable	i. 103, 625, 693
by accident	i. 103
CONFUSION OF PROPERTY , when relief for	i. 625, 626
where an agent confounds his own property with his principal's	i. 476, 625, 626
CONJUGAL RIGHTS , restoration of	ii. 764, note.
CONSENT , necessary in contracts	i. 237-239
has three elements, according to Grotius	i. 238
fraud in withholding consent to marriage	i. 264
CONSIDERATION , good and valuable, what	i. 360
(See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.)	
valuable to support contract	ii. 21, 22, 109, 115-121, 273, 289, 290
when meritorious is sufficient	ii. 109, 119, 273, 290
inadequacy of does not per se avoid a bargain	i. 254, 255
relief granted, where there is fraud	i. 256
opinions of the civilians and Pothier as to	i. 256-258
where the parties cannot be placed in statu quo	i. 258, 259
CONSOLIDATION OF MORTGAGES	i. 417, note; ii. 327, note.
CONTINGENT INTERESTS AND RIGHTS ,	
assignable in equity	ii. 352, 353, 378
CONTRACTS , apportionment of	i. 99, 100, 477-481
(See APPORTIONMENT.)	
by persons in drink	i. 243
(See DRUNKARDS.)	
illegal, what are	i. 275-309
in restraint of marriage	i. 275-292
(See MARRIAGE.)	
in restraint of trade	i. 293-295
fraudulent concealment of crimes	i. 297
against public policy	i. 296, and notes, 297
(See FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE.)	
of wager and champerty	i. 297, 298
arising from turpitude	i. 299-307
for sale of offices	i. 298, 299
(See FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE.)	
affecting public elections	i. 300, 301
usurious	i. 305-307
gaming	i. 307, 308
what capable of confirmation or not	i. 268, 309, 353, note.
when avoided or not	i. 295-306
when relief on illegal or not	i. 293-306
unreasonable, when relieved at law	i. 339, note.

CONTRACTS — *continued.*

	PAGE
by a party under duress or imprisonment	i. 250, 251
in a state of necessity	i. 251
consent, necessary in	i. 237-239
of lunatics	i. 238-243
of marriage brokage	i. 266-268

(See MARRIAGE.)

voluntary, not enforced	i. 433-435
respecting land how treated in equity	ii. 111-115
when, as if specifically performed	ii. 111-115
voluntary, when enforced or not	ii. 21, 22, 109, 115-121, 273, 289, 290
specific performance of, when decreed or not	ii. 27-121

(See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.)

CONTRIBUTION , jurisdiction in cases of	i. 502-530
between feoffors, &c. to discharge incumbrances	i. 485, 486, 493-497
between sureties	i. 504-530

(See SURETIES.)

by legatees in case of deficiency of assets	i. 528
by partners	i. 528, 529
by joint tenants, tenants in common, and by part-owners	i. 529
flexible powers of Courts of Equity in cases of	i. 529, 530

(See APPORTIONMENT; AVERAGE.)

among purchasers, to discharge a lien or incumbrance on land, when and how priorities established	i. 485, 486, 493-497; ii. 579, 580
--	------------------------------------

CONVENIENCE , when the ground of an account in equity	i. 531, 532
--	-------------

CONVERSION OF PROPERTY, EQUITABLE,

from real to personal, or e contra	i. 573-579
when land deemed money	ii. 111-115, 550-553
when money deemed land	ii. 111-115, 550-553
election of party	ii. 111-115
lien in cases of	ii. 554-576

(See LIEN.)

CONVEYANCE, WHEN A TRUST. (See PURCHASE.)

when made without consideration	ii. 529-532
when purchase in name of another	ii. 534-544

CONVEYANCES, FRAUDULENT. (See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.)

COPIES OF DEEDS , when decreed to be given to persons claiming in privity of title	ii. 18-21
--	-----------

COPYHOLD , mortgage of, and tacking	i. 422, note.
--	---------------

COPYRIGHT , remedy in equity for infringements of	ii. 236-248
--	-------------

(See INJUNCTION.)

in what cases granted	ii. 238-248
in what not	ii. 238-248

CORPORATION,

its capital stock a trust for payment of its debts	ii. 602, 603
creditor's bill against stockholder in	i. 557, note.

(See REVOCATION.)

COURTS OF COMMON LAW,

	PAGE
distinction between these and Courts of Equity	i. 19, 20
remedies in, often defective	i. 20, 21, 438, 439
existence of remedies in	i. 25, note.
confined to the parties in litigation before them	i. 20, 21
mistaken notions with regard to	i. 26-32
have jurisdiction over fraud, accident, and confidence	i. 82, 83
will now entertain jurisdiction in certain cases of lost bonds	i. 89, 90
why they did not originally entertain it	i. 91-93
entertain defences in favor of idiots, &c.	i. 241, 242
their forms of proceeding and judgments more restrained than those of equity	i. 19-21, 438, 439
defective remedy in, where a deed is fraudulently obtained without consideration	i. 438, 439

(See COURTS OF EQUITY.)

COURTS, ECCLESIASTICAL,

rules adopted there with respect to restraints of marriage	i. 282, 283
their jurisdiction over matters of administration	i. 550-554
(See ADMINISTRATION.)	
originally exclusive over legacies	i. 598, 599
trusts cannot be enforced in	i. 601, 602
cases of injunction and prohibition upon	i. 601-603

COURTS OF EQUITY,

do not abate the rigor of the common law	i. 11, 12
are governed by the same rules of interpretation as Courts of Law	i. 12, 13
distinction between these and Courts of Law	i. 19, 20
different natures of the rights and remedies regarded in these courts and Courts of Law	i. 20-23
their forms of proceeding flexible	i. 21
their remedies and decrees may be adjusted to meet the exigencies of a case	i. 20-22
may bring before them all parties interested in the subject mat- ter	i. 20-22, 487, 498
may administer remedies for rights not recognized at law	i. 20-22
have cognizance of trusts	i. 22
other subjects of which they have cognizance	i. 22
will interfere by injunction to prevent wrongs	i. 22
will compel a specific performance of a contract	i. 22
their modes of trial different from those at law	i. 22, 23
try causes without a jury	i. 22
resort to different evidence from Courts of Law	i. 22, 23
require the defendant to answer on oath	i. 22, 23
Mr. Justice Blackstone's outline of the powers of	i. 23
Lord Redesdale's sketch of the jurisdiction of	i. 23, 24
have jurisdiction, where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy can- not be had at law	i. 24, 25, 46
their jurisdiction is concurrent, exclusive, and auxiliary to that of Courts of Law	i. 25
separation of, from Courts of Law	i. 26-34
question as to the expediency of this separation	i. 32, 33

COURTS OF EQUITY — *continued.*

	PAGE
this separation approved by Lords Bacon and Hardwicke	i. 32
how this separation arose	i. 39, 40
origin of, in England, involved in obscurity	i. 35, 36
derived out of the Aula Regis	i. 35
of very high antiquity	i. 35-37
jurisdiction of, difficult to ascertain its origin	i. 37, 38
opinion of Lambard and Lord Coke as to origin of	i. 38
opinion of Lord Hale	i. 39

(See JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF EQUITY.)

contest between Lord Coke and Lord Ellesmere as to the power of injunction	i. 48, note.
their practice improved by the Ordinances of Lord Bacon	i. 48, 49
how they differ from Courts of Law	i. 57
for what purposes established, according to Blackstone	i. 57, 58
cases not relievable by	i. 58, 59
will not interfere in favor of a borrower on usurious interest, except on terms	i. 65
their powers not enlarged or restrained by Courts of Law	i. 69, 70
remedy in, more perfect than at law	i. 438
remedy, where a deed is fraudulently obtained without consideration i. 439	
will aid defective securities and relieve against certain instruments i. 439	
flexible character of their decrees	i. 439, 440
summary of the adaptation of their decrees	i. 440
jurisdiction in cases of accident, mistake, and fraud	i. 440, 441

(See ACCIDENT, MISTAKE, AND FRAUD.)

COVENANTS, when specific performance of, decreed or not ii. 39-56

CREDITOR ON ELEGIT,

when entitled to sale of the property ii. 557

CREDITORS, favored in equity in cases of defective execution of

powers	i. 182-184
marshalling of assets in favor of	i. 555-559, 570-588

(See ADMINISTRATION.)

constructive fraud in cases of	i. 356-387
secret preference of, in case of assignment, when fraudulent	i. 378, 384-386

(See FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.)

marshalling of securities in favor of i. 637-653

(See MARSHALLING OF SECURITIES.)

lien of, on a charge for payment of debts	ii. 589-595
of partners, lien of	ii. 603, 604
whether put to election or not	ii. 432
entitled to lien, when sale decreed to satisfy it	ii. 554-561
rights of, when enforced against equitable property	ii. 554-561

CREDITORS' BILLS, what they are i. 556-559

against stockholder i. 557, note.

mortgagee may file i. 558

(See ADMINISTRATION.)

proceedings on i. 556-562

	PAGE
CREDITOR'S SUIT, what is the meaning of	ii. 199
CROWN, its jurisdiction over lunatics	i. 241, note, 242
CUMULATIVE LEGACIES.	ii. 463-465
CY PRÈS, application to charities	ii. 503-508, 510
compliance with conditions	i. 292

D.

DAMAGES AND COMPENSATION,	
when decreed in equity	ii. 122-133
DAMAGES LIQUIDATED, what are	ii. 650
no relief in equity against	ii. 650
DEBTS, charge on estate for payment of	ii. 382, 589-595
who, on such charge, have authority to sell the estate	ii. 383
DECEIT. (<i>See</i> FRAUD; MISREPRESENTATION.)	
DECREE, FORMER, in equity, when a bar or not	ii. 853
not in cases of fraud	ii. 853
DECREES of Courts of Equity may be adjusted to meet the exigencies	
of a case	i. 21, 438, 439
in bills for an account, defendant may entitle himself to	i. 540
in cases of creditors' bill	i. 558
frauds in, are remediable in equity	i. 261
of equal dignity with a judgment at law	i. 558
DEED, suppression and destruction of, and relief against	i. 261
when fraudulently obtained without consideration	i. 439
of insane person void or voidable	i. 238, note.
DEFENCES, peculiar in equity	ii. 840
lapse of time	ii. 842-847
laches	ii. 842-847
former decree	ii. 853
account stated	ii. 853
purchase bona fide without notice	ii. 825-830, 853
want of proper parties	ii. 853, 854
DELAY, where surety is discharged thereby	i. 335, 336
DELIVERY OF POSSESSION, injunction for	ii. 261-263
DELIVERY UP OF DEEDS and other instruments	ii. 4-26, 213, 214
when decreed	ii. 4-26
in cases of fraud	ii. 5-9
in cases where deeds, &c. against public policy	ii. 6-16
or against conscience	ii. 9-13
in other cases	ii. 4-26
in favor of persons entitled thereto	ii. 17-23
for failure to perform covenant to maintain	ii. 19, note.
whether volunteers may file bill for	ii. 21-23

DELIVERY UP OF DEEDS — *continued.*

	PAGE
delivery, upon what terms	ii. 6-9, 23
whether any distinction between void and voidable	ii. 9-17
in cases where withheld from proper owner	ii. 17-23
in cases where instruments satisfied	ii. 21-23
DELIVERY UP OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS	ii. 23-26, 213, 214
of heirlooms	ii. 25
of antiques	ii. 24, 25
of paintings	ii. 25
of books of account	ii. 25
of farm stock	ii. 26
DEPOSIT OF TITLE-DEEDS,	
an equitable mortgage	ii. 322-324
DEPOSITIONS, to perpetuate testimony	ii. 830-834
(See TESTIMONY, BILL TO PERPETUATE.)	
de bene esse, when bill to take	ii. 834-838
(See TESTIMONY, DE BENE ESSE.)	
when to be published	ii. 838, 839
DERIVATIVE POSSESSION	ii. 847, note.
DESCENT, and devise of estates, marshalling of assets in cases of	ii. 575-577, 579-588
(See ADMINISTRATION.)	
DEVASTAVIT, what it is	ii. 590, 591
DEVISAVIT VEL NON, when heir entitled to issue of	ii. 780, note, 784, note.
DISCLOSURE OF SECRETS OF TRADE,	
injunction to prevent	ii. 256-258
DISCOVERY, bill of	i. 23
jurisdiction for	i. 78, note.
every bill is a bill of discovery	ii. 1, 811
bill of discovery and relief, when maintainable, or not	ii. 1-4
when the right to discovery carries the right to relief	ii, 3, note.
in Roman law	ii. 813, 814
when it lies generally	ii. 811-830
when for devisee against heir	ii. 815-817
when for heir against devisee or not	ii. 816
when it lies not generally	ii. 814-817
it lies not for plaintiff having no present title	ii. 815, 816, note.
it lies not in aid of any criminal or penal suit	ii. 652, 653, 818, 819, 833
it lies not in cases of penalties and forfeitures	ii. 652, 653, 818, 819, 833
it lies not in aid of a court of competent jurisdiction	ii. 820
it lies not in aid of arbitration	ii. 820
it lies not against arbitrators to discover grounds of award	ii. 794, 822, 823
it lies not for heir against devisee generally	ii. 816
except for heir in tail	ii. 816
it lies not, where suit or defence is not maintainable at law	ii. 818

DISCOVERY — *continued.*

	PAGE
it lies not against bona fide purchaser	ii. 825-830
it lies not against jointress	ii. 829, 830
nor to compel discovery of professional confidence	ii. 821
it lies not against witnesses generally	ii. 823
when it lies in special cases	ii. 823, 824
when by creditor against debtor	ii. 818, note.
in trade-mark cases	ii. 822, note.
when against officers and members of corporations	ii. 823, 824
when against arbitrators in cases of fraud	ii. 823
when against attorneys in cases of fraud	ii. 823
when defendant must disclose documents or not	ii. 820, note, 821, note, 822 note.
when a party, having a title to this, may go on for further relief	i. 70-81
English cases leave the principle of this rule unsettled	i. 453-457, 456, note.
clearer principle in the American cases	i. 75-77
propositions on this subject deduced from the cases	i. 70-81
what must be alleged in the bill to maintain the jurisdiction	i. 77, 78
in cases of account	i. 70-72
in cases of agency	i. 467-470
in cases of apportionment	i. 477-502
in cases of partition	i. 654-668
in cases of tithes	i. 539
important in cases between partners	i. 669, 670
DISCUSSION, process of, in the Roman law	i. 506, 507
DISSOLUTION, of partnership, when decreed in equity	i. 680-682
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS. (<i>See ADMINISTRATION.</i>)	
DIVISION, benefit of, in the Roman law	i. 506, 507
DOMICIL, of deceased, in distribution of assets	i. 595-597
DONATIONS MORTIS CAUSA, what they are	i. 607-617
what is necessary to give them effect	i. 607-617
special cases of	i. 609, notes.
symbolical delivery	i. 610, note.
derived from the Roman law	i. 608, 609
DOUBLE LEGACIES	ii. 463-465
DOUBLE PORTIONS	ii. 448, note.
(<i>See SATISFACTION.</i>)	
DOWER, concurrent jurisdiction in the assignment of	i. 627-636
a legal right	i. 627-636
grounds of the jurisdiction in cases of	i. 627-631
embarrassment of widow from the writ of dower	i. 630, note, 631, note.
Lord Alvanley's vindication of	i. 630
when title is disputed, it must be established at law	i. 627, 628
when an account of rents and profits will be decreed	i. 533, 534, 630; 631
favored in equity	i. 632-635
bill for discovery and relief maintained against a bona fide purchaser	i. 631, note, 634, 635

DOWER — *continued.*

	PAGE
controversy about this point	i. 634, 635
whether a plea of a bona fide purchaser is good against a legal title	i. 634, note.
instances in America of application to a Court of Equity for	i. 636
DOWRESS , lien on estate in favor of	ii. 598-601
(See JOINTRESS .)	
DRAMATIC PERFORMANCES ,	
injunction to prevent piracy of	ii. 253, 254
DRUNKARDS , Lord Coke's fourth class of <i>nou compotes</i>	i. 243-246
their offences against the laws not extenuated	i. 243-246
their acts relievable in equity, where there is fraud	i. 243-245
where their contracts will be set aside	i. 244, notes.
validity of a deed given in extreme intoxication	i. 244, note.
where relief refused to	i. 245
family compromises by	i. 245
how regarded by Heineccius, Puffendorf, Pothier, and the Scottish law	i. 245, 246
DURESS , relief in cases of	i. 250, 251

E.**ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS.** (See **COURTS**, **ECCLESIASTICAL**)

ELECTION , jurisdiction of equity in cases of	ii. 415-438
as to land being deemed money or money land	ii. 114
of remedy, when party compelled to	ii. 198
doctrine of, derived from Roman law	ii. 417, 418
to what instruments applied	ii. 418-426
in cases of inconsistent claims	ii. 415-438
in cases of alternate legacies	ii. 416, 417
in cases of wills	ii. 420-423
when it may create a trust	ii. 423
when an absolute forfeiture of devised estate or not	ii. 424-432
what words raise a case of election, or not	ii. 427-435, 436, note.
creditors not put to an election	ii. 432
what act amounts to election	ii. 436, 437, note.
when it must be made	ii. 437, 438
by persons under disability	ii. 437, note.

(See **SATISFACTION**.)

ELEGIT , bill for an account in cases of	i. 532, 533
creditor on, when entitled to sale	ii. 557-559
acceleration of payments on	ii. 557-559

ELOPEMENT , bonds for assisting in	i. 268
---	--------

ENCYCLOPÆDIA AMERICANA,

article on equity contained therein approved by Professor Park i. 21, note.

EQUITABLE ASSETS , what they are	i. 565, 566
---	-------------

(See **ADMINISTRATION**.)

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. (*See* ESTOPPEL, EQUITABLE)

- EQUITY, its nature and character i. 1-34
- imperfect notion generally entertained as to i. 1
- its meaning in natural law i. 1-4
- double sense in which it is used by Cicero i. 2-3
- definition by Grotius i. 3, 4, 9
- Aristotle i. 3
- its meaning in the Roman law i. 2-5
- applied in the interpretation of positive laws i. 6-9, 12, 13
- in the Roman law different actions grounded on the express words
and the equity of a law i. 4
- misapprehension of Mr. Butler as to its meaning in English law i. 7, note.
- also of St. German, Francis, Lord Bacon, Mr. Ballow, &c. i. 8, 10, 11
- misapprehensions pointed out by Mr. Justice Blackstone i. 11, 12, 13, 15
- its object is not to abate the rigor of the common law i. 11, 12
- does not supply defects of positive legislation i. 12, 13
- no criminal jurisdiction i. 19, note.
- error of Lord Kaimes as to its meaning i. 10, note, 13, 14
- language of Sir John Trevor as to i. 14
- governed by established rules and precedents i. 14-19
- (*See* PRECEDENTS.)
- loose language of Lord Hardwicke as to general rules in equity i. 15, note.
- Selden's definition of i. 16
- De Lolme's view of, commended i. 17, note.
- also Professor Park's lecture i. 19, note.
- in early times quite unlimited i. 18, 19
- built up by materials from the Roman law i. 18, 19
- its meaning in the jurisprudence of England and America i. 19-32
- is that portion of remedial justice exclusively administered by a Court
of Equity, &c. i. 19, 20
- (*See* COURTS OF EQUITY.)
- definition of, in Encyclopædia Americana, approved by Professor Park
i. 21, note.
- Sir James Mackintosh's definition of, commented on i. 25, note.
- administered in distinct courts, in countries governed by the common
law i. 26-34, 419
- otherwise under the civil law i. 33, 34
- question as to the expediency of a separation of, from the Courts of Law
i. 26-34
- approved by Lords Bacon and Hardwicke i. 32
- how it arose i. 36-47
- origin and history of, in England i. 36-51
- in United States i. 52-56
- Dane's chapters on the system and practice of, commended i. 60, note.
- cannot disobey or dispense with what the law enjoins i. 60, 61
- cannot disregard the canons of descent i. 61
- will control the legal title of an heir, even when deemed absolute at
law i. 61
- treats money to be laid out in land, as real estate in i. 69
- (*See* MAXIMS IN EQUITY; JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF EQUITY.)

	PAGE
EQUITY OF WIFE TO A SETTLEMENT	ii. 735-755
(See HUSBAND AND WIFE.)	
"ERRORS EXCEPTED," effect of, in accounts	i. 544, 545
ESCHEAT, not declared where grantor and cestui que trust deceased without heirs	ii. 529, note.
ESTOPPEL, EQUITABLE	i. 389, note; ii. 860-866
for fraudulent silence	ii. 861, 863, 865, 866
for misrepresentation	i. 389, note; ii. 861-864, 865
for lapse of time and acquiescence	ii. 862-864
for dedication of land to public use	ii. 863
upon married women	ii. 860, 864, 866
EVIDENCE, certain rules in Courts of Equity different from those in Courts of Law	i. 22, 23, 202, 203
in cases of fraud	i. 202, 203
general rules of, the same in equity as at law	ii. 854-859
answer in equity, when evidence or not	ii. 855, 856
parol evidence, when admissible or not, in cases of written instruments	ii. 857, 858
to rebut presumptions	ii. 440, 537, 544, 858
when two witnesses required in opposition to answer	ii. 855-857
(See PAROL EVIDENCE.)	
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR,	
payment of legacies by ignorance of outstanding debts	i. 97, 98
when a trustee for next of kin, &c.	ii. 545-549
when a trustee for legatees	ii. 403
power given to, when a trust	ii. 384-395
when it survives	ii. 386, 387
when it is personal	ii. 386, 387
joint, when accountable for each other's acts	ii. 622-628
when ordered to pay money into court	ii. 164-166
how, being creditor, may retain assets	i. 589, note.
frauds by	i. 548-597
cannot purchase debts for themselves	i. 327, 328
collusion with debtors	i. 426-428, 588-591
waste by	i. 588-591
purchasers of the debts due by the estate	i. 329-331
(See ADMINISTRATION)	
EXPECTANTS, relief of	i. 340-355
(See HEIRS.)	

F.

FACTS, IGNORANCE OF, when relief given	i. 149-166
(See MISTAKE.)	
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS, when relieved against	i. 203-227
FAMILY COMPROMISES, invalid through concealment of material facts	i. 235

FAMILY COMPROMISES — *continued.*

	PAGE
by persons in drink	i. 243-248
supported upon principles of policy	i. 123, note, 137-142
FEMES COVERT , defective execution of powers in favor of aided	i. 101
grounds of the disability of	i. 253, 254
may dispose of property in equity	i. 253, 254
bound by fraudulent representations	i. 392
legacies to, a subject of equity jurisdiction	i. 552, 553, 602
estoppels upon	ii. 860, 864, 866
FERRY	ii. 857, note, 927
FIDE-COMMISSARY , what	i. 327, note.
FIDUCIARY RELATIONS , fraud in cases of	i. 235, 236, 310-337
(See FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE.)	
FINE , defective, not relieved against	i. 189, 190
by lunatics when rescinded,	i. 242, 243
FIRE , when premises are destroyed by, no relief against rent	i. 104, 105
FOREIGN ADMINISTRATIONS ,	i. 592-597
how assets distributed under	i. 592-597
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS. (See JUDGMENTS.)	
FORFEITURES. (See PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.)	
when relieved against	ii. 644-650
when not	ii. 650-661
not in cases of liquidated damages	ii. 650, 651
what are liquidated damages	ii. 650
re-entry for non-payment of rent, when relieved,	ii. 644-646
never enforced in equity	ii. 652, 653
bill of discovery does not lie in cases of	ii. 653, 818, 833
relief against, and the grounds thereof	i. 96, 97
(See ACCIDENT ; BOND.)	
FRAUD , when Statute of Limitations avoided by	ii. 842-853
when statute of begins to run in cases of	ii. 850-852
FRAUD, ACTUAL OR POSITIVE ,	
cognizable at law and in equity	i. 58
cases of, not relievable at law or equity	i. 58
concurrent jurisdiction in cases of	i. 194-264
in obtaining wills	i. 194, note, 250, 441, 442
in cases of wills	i. 194, note.
cases of, where equity does not relieve	i. 194, note.
origin of jurisdiction over	i. 199, 200
definition of, by Pothier and the civilians	i. 200, 201
definition of, in equity	i. 200-202
five cases of, stated by Lord Hardwicke	i. 201, 202
instances of relief difficult to enumerate	i. 201, 202
proofs of, different in Courts of Equity and Courts of Law	i. 202, 203
not presumed in either court	i. 202, 203, note.
in cases of misrepresentation (<i>suggestio falsi</i>)	i. 203-231
the misrepresentation must be of something material	i. 205-221
may be by acts as well as by words	i. 208
must be where one party places a known trust	
in the other	i. 221-223
in affirming what one does not know to be true	i. 216, note.

FRAUD, ACTUAL OR POSITIVE — *continued.*

	PAGE
cases of misrepresentation	i. 220, 221
in mere matters of opinion	i. 221-223, and notes.
conduct of buyer and seller	i. 222, note.
where one party is wrong in relying on the representations of the other	i. 221-223, 226
opinion of Lord Ellenborough on this point	i. 224
common language of puffing commodities	i. 226, 227
party must be misled by the misrepresentation	i. 226
it must be to his injury	i. 227
in cases of concealment (<i>suppressio veri</i>)	i. 227-236
definition of concealment by Cicero	i. 228, 229
by Paley	i. 228, note.
in equity	i. 230, 231
in the sale of land with an unknown mine	i. 229, 230, note.
where one has knowledge of an event from private sources	i. 230-232
where extrinsic circumstances are concealed	i. 230-235
where a vendor sells an estate, knowing that he has no title	i. 231
or a house, knowing it to be burnt	i. 232
where intrinsic circumstances are concealed	i. 232-235
intrinsic and extrinsic circumstances, what are	i. 232, 233
doctrines of the Roman law as to these	i. 232, 233
rule of caveat emptor at common law	i. 233
money recovered back on the ground of concealment	i. 233, note.
where facts are concealed from a surety	i. 234
what facts must be communicated to insurers	i. 235
where a release is obtained without disclosing material facts	i. 235
by the devisee of the heir's title	i. 235
concealment in family compromises	i. 235
in fiduciary relations	i. 236
by an attorney from his client	i. 236
by a trustee to the prejudice of his cestui que trust	i. 237
by one partner	i. 237
in cases of idiots and lunatics	i. 237-243, 246
(See LUNATICS.)	
drunkards	i. 243-250
(See DRUNKARDS.)	
mental imbecility	i. 246-250
(See IMBECILITY.)	
of undue influence, as duress	i. 250, 251
of contracts by a party under imprisonment	i. 250, 251
of infants	i. 252, 253
(See INFANTS.)	
in cases of <i>femes covert</i>	i. 253, 254
(See FEMES COVERT.)	
of unconscionable bargains	i. 254, 255
of inadequacy of consideration	i. 255-259
(See CONSIDERATION.)	
of surprise	i. 259, 260
(See SURPRISE.)	
of the suppression and destruction of deeds, &c.	i. 261, 262
of illusory appointments	i. 260, 263

FRAUD, ACTUAL OR POSITIVE— <i>continued.</i>	PAGE
of the prevention of acts to be done for the benefit of third persons	i. 263, 264
where a recovery is prevented	i. 263
of the prevention of legacies	i. 264
of withholding consent to marriage	i. 264
in equity, whether accounts were first cognizable on account of	i. 452
FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE	i. 265-442
concurrent jurisdiction in cases of	i. 265-442
definition of	i. 265
three classes of	i. 265, 266
1st. When against public policy	i. 266-309
what is against public policy	i. 266, note.
in marriage brokerage contracts	i. 266-268
(See MARRIAGE.)	
where a bond is given as remuneration for assisting in an elope- ment	i. 268-270
agreements for influence over another person	i. 268-270
where heirs agree to share equally	i. 269
contracts for benefit in promoting marriages	i. 269, 270
where a father took a bond from his son on his marriage	i. 269, 270
where a father took a bond for giving consent to his daughter's mar- riage	i. 269, 270
where there is an underhand agreement to defeat a settlement	i. 269-274
fraud on marital rights of husband	i. 272, 344, note, 388 note.
contracts and conditions in restraint of marriage, when void	i. 275-292
(See MARRIAGE.)	
contracts in general restraint of trade, void	i. 293-295
contracts in special restraint of trade, not void	i. 293
where parties engage not to bid against each other at auctions	i. 295
where underbidders or puffers are employed	i. 226, 295
contracts in fraud of public rights and duties	i. 296
an assignment of an officer's half-pay void	i. 297
an assignment of the fees of keeping a house of correction, void	i. 297
agreements to suppress criminal prosecutions, void	i. 297
under assignments intended for illegal purpose not effected, property recoverable	i. 303, note.
wager and champerty contracts, when void	i. 297
contracts for sale of offices, void	i. 298
contracts of moral turpitude, void	i. 299
devise in evasion of the Statute of Mortmain, void	i. 300
contracts affecting public elections, void	i. 300
relief, where parties are participes criminis :	i. 301-309
fluctuation of the cases on this subject	i. 301, note.
where the immoral agreement is repudiated, and relief asked	i. 302, 305, note.
when money will be ordered to be paid back	i. 301, note.
distinctions of the Roman Law on this subject	i. 304, note.
usurious contracts not enforced	i. 305-307
when equity will interfere for the borrower	i. 306
borrower can compel return of collateral	i. 307, note.

FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE — *continued.*

	PAGE
where borrower has paid upon a usurious contract	i. 305-307
gaming securities when delivered up	i. 307, 308
whether equity will assist a loser in gaming	i. 307, 308
doctrine of the Roman law on this subject	i. 308
when contracts are capable of confirmation	i. 308, 309, 354, 355
2d. Arising from peculiar fiduciary relations	i. 309-337
between parent and child	i. 311, 312
between other relations	i. 311, note.
between client and attorney	i. 313-321
(See CLIENT AND ATTORNEY.)	
between medical adviser and patient	i. 321
between principal and agent	i. 322-324
(See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.)	
between guardian and ward	i. 324-327
(See GUARDIAN AND WARD.)	
between trustee and cestui que trust	i. 327-331
between mortgagor and mortgagee	i. 332, note.
between corporation and directors	i. 332, note.
(See TRUSTEE AND CESTUI QUE TRUST.)	
between landlord and tenant	i. 331-333
between partners	i. 331-333
between principal and surety	i. 334-337
(See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.)	
between creditors and debtors	i. 335-337
3d. Upon the rights, &c. of third persons, or of the parties them- selves	i. 338-438
in cases under Statute of Frauds	i. 338, 381
case of unreasonable contract relieved at law	i. 339, note.
relief of mariners	i. 340
relief of heirs, reversioners, and expectants	i. 341-355
(See HEIRS AND EXPECTANTS.)	
against post obit bonds	i. 349-355
(See POST OBIT BONDS.)	
frauds on creditors	i. 356-387
fraudulent conveyances	i. 357-384, 386, 387
(See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.)	
fraudulent devises	i. 383
secret compositions among creditors	i. 384-386
agreement of insolvent debtor with his assignee	i. 386
where a father covenants, on the marriage of his daughter, to leave her certain tenements, &c.	i. 387, 388
private agreement where a friend has advanced money	i. 388
guaranty avoided by the suppression of material facts	i. 234, 388
where false impressions or affirmations are given	i. 388, 399
no difference between express and implied representations	i. 388-392
where one, having a title, stands by and encourages a sale, he is bound by it	i. 389-392
where evidence of lien is put in debtor's hands and credit obtained, lien postponed to credit	i. 396, note.
so, if he innocently misleads a purchaser	i. 393

FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE — <i>continued.</i>	PAGE
where money is spent upon another's estate, through mistake of title	i. 394
where one keeps his title secret, and suffers third persons to purchase parts of his premises	i. 395
a prior mortgage, which was concealed, postponed	i. 395
general grounds of these cases	i. 396
where trustee permits title-deeds to go out of his possession	i. 396
case of a bond upon an intended marriage	i. 396
circumstances of undue concealment	i. 396, 397
between mortgagor and mortgagee	i. 397
Roman law as to false affirmations	i. 398
when persons may be charged with notice of restrictions and the like	i. 404, note.
where persons purchase with notice of adverse title	i. 399-417
(See NOTICE.)	
notice by registration	i. 408-410
notice of <i>lis pendens</i>	i. 411-413
constructive notice, what amounts to	i. 413-417
tacking mortgages	i. 417-424
(See TACKING.)	
civil law does not allow tacking	i. 423
in dealings with executors and administrators	i. 426-428
where purchaser knows of an intended misapplication of assets	i. 426-428
who may question their doings	i. 428, note.
voluntary conveyances of real estate in regard to subsequent purchasers when avoided	i. 429-435
governed by Stat. 27th Eliz.	i. 429
(See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.)	
protection of bona fide purchasers	i. 63, 107, 148, 387, 417, 421, 431, note, 436, note, 438
flexibility of Courts of Equity in giving relief	i. 439
fraud in obtaining a will not cognizable in equity	i. 196, 250, 441
where the fraud only goes to some particular clause of a will, relief in equity	i. 442
where the consent of the next of kin to the probate is unduly obtained by fraud, void	i. 442
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF,	
cases affected by	i. 170, 338, 381
when allowed as a bar in equity, or not	ii. 853
not in cases of part performance	ii. 853
not in cases of fraud	ii. 853
(See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.)	
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES,	
relief of creditors against	i. 356, 429-438
relief of an executor or administrator of an insolvent estate	i. 359, note.
actual and constructive fraud, difficult to distinguish	i. 356
Roman law with regard to	i. 356, 357
English statutes with regard to	i. 357
how reached by the common law	i. 358
difference between Stat. 13th Eliz. and Stat. 27th Eliz.	i. 358, note.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES — *continued.*

	PAGE
effect of a voluntary gift in prejudice of creditors	i. 359, 361, 376, note.
nature and operation of Stat. 13th Eliz.	i. 359
under Stat. of 13th Eliz. conveyances must be upon good consideration and bona fide	i. 359, 360
considerations, good and valuable, what they are	i. 360
where one indebted conveys to his wife and children	i. 361-363, 379, note.
amount of the debts, how it affects the case	i. 362, note.
voluntary conveyance, when out of debt	i. 361-363
whether the indebtedment is per se evidence of fraud	i. 361-363, 370, note.
when subsequent creditors may avoid conveyance for fraud	i. 365, note.
of bankrupt may be set aside by his assignee in bankruptcy	ii. 343, note.
of husband, impeached by wife, having become creditor by decree for alimony	ii. 759, note.
when subsequent creditors are let in	i. 367, note.
doctrine of Supreme Court of United States	i. 367
of Connecticut	i. 370
of New York	i. 371
English cases	i. 370, note.
general conclusion, which is drawn from the authorities	i. 372
analogies of the Continental law	i. 373, note.
whether the Statute of 13th Eliz. applies to the transfer of property not applicable to the discharge of debts	i. 374, 375, note.
when made to defeat creditors, even on a valuable consideration, void	i. 359, 376
where one, to defeat a judgment, purchases the goods of a debtor	i. 376
assignments, giving preferences, when valid	i. 377, note.
though void as against creditors, they are valid between the parties	i. 378, 379, note.
post-nuptial settlements when valid or not	i. 366, 379-382, 435
post-nuptial settlements founded on parol agreement before marriage	i. 382, note.
what are badges of fraud	i. 369, note, 373, note, 381
object of Stat. 3d and 4th of William and Mary	i. 383
English adjudications under this statute	i. 383
in England a bond is not a lien on land of obligor	i. 383
where a party has fraudulently conveyed his estate in his lifetime	i. 383
doctrine in England on this point	i. 383
doctrine in America on this point	i. 383, 384
in the United States lands are assets	i. 384
grounds of jurisdiction of equity in these cases	i. 384
secret compositions by creditors are void at law and equity	i. 384, 385
money paid under these recoverable back	i. 385
agreement of insolvent debtor with his assignee held void	i. 386
protection of bona fide purchasers in cases of fraudulent conveyances	i. 148, 415-417, 421, 436-438
voluntary conveyances of real estate in regard to subsequent purchasers	i. 429-438
governed by Statute 27th Eliz.	i. 429
object of this statute	i. 429, 430
such conveyances are good between the parties	i. 429
this statute does not extend to personal property	i. 429, note.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES — <i>continued.</i>		PAGE
question as to the construction of the statute	i.	429
in England all voluntary conveyances avoided in favor of subsequent purchasers	i.	429
diversity of opinion in America	i.	430-433
doctrine of New York and Massachusetts courts	i.	430, 431
of Sup. Court of United States	i.	431-433
whether purchaser with notice should prevail against a voluntary conveyance	i.	430, note.
between voluntary conveyances the first prevails	i.	433
between volunteers equity will not interfere	i.	433-436
doctrine of the Roman law	i.	437
FREIGHT to be earned is assignable in equity	ii.	378

G.

GAMING SECURITIES,	ii.	7, note.
when decreed to be given up	i.	307
whether equity will assist a loser	i.	307-309
GENERAL AVERAGE. (<i>See AVERAGE.</i>)		
GIFTS, by a client to an attorney pendente lite	i.	321, note.
in prejudice of creditors void	i.	359
(<i>See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.</i>)		
GUARANTY, is avoided by suppression of material facts	i.	234, 388
GUARDIAN AND WARD,		
their peculiar fiduciary relation	i.	324-327
cannot deal with each other	i.	325
when equity will avoid transactions between, even after the minority of the ward	i.	324-327
when the relation has ceased	i.	327
when guardian shall keep down interest for infant	i.	501, note.
appointment and removal of	ii.	672-675
rights and powers and duties of	ii.	675-678, 688
aid to by chancery	ii.	675-678, 688
powers as to education	ii.	675-678
restraints on guardians	ii.	688-691
marriage of ward by	ii.	690-692
powers as to management of property	ii.	688, 689

H.

HARDWICKE, LORD, his character as Chancellor	i.	50
HEIRLOOMS, specific delivery of	ii.	25
injunction to prevent waste of	ii.	260
HEIRS AND EXPECTANTS,		
agreement of, to share equally when valid	i.	269
when relieved against fraud	i.	341-355
grounds of relief of	i.	341, 344-348

HEIRS AND EXPECTANTS—*continued.*

	PAGE
inadequacy of price will set aside contract with	i. 342
reversioners and remainder-men on same footing	i. 342
age does not prevent the protection of equity	i. 342
where the transactions with, are sanctioned by the person in loco parentis	i. 347
when necessitous and embarrassed	i. 348
doctrines of the Roman law as to	i. 349
their post obit bonds, when set aside	i. 349-355
their promises to pay money, which shall descend to them, when set aside	i. 350
opinion by Parsons, C. J. as to	i. 350, note.
subsequent confirmation of their contracts, when valid or not	i. 353, note
repudiation of their contracts	i. 354
sales of post obit bonds and reversions at auction	i. 354
relief against tradesmen's claims for goods sold	i. 355
marshalling of assets with respect to	i. 575, 579

HUSBAND AND WIFE,

fraudulent sales and transfers by husband	ii. 168, 259
rights and disabilities of, at law	ii. 698-700
rights and capacities of, in equity	ii. 698-700
in cases of contract generally	ii. 698-703
loans between	ii. 702, note.
post-nuptial contracts	ii. 702, 719, 720
in cases of gifts and grants	ii. 703, 704
in cases of paraphernalia	ii. 704-708
in cases of pin-money	ii. 705
in cases of separate property of wife	ii. 708-710
before or after marriage	ii. 708-710
how separate property acquired and held	ii. 708-710, 713, note.
trustees not necessary	ii. 708-710
what words create a separate property in wife	ii. 710-713
what not	ii. 712-713
when right to dispose of absolute, or not, in wife	ii. 719-725
separate debts and liability of wife	ii. 713-715, 727, note.
articles for separate trade of wife	ii. 715, 716
separate trade of wife, when deserted by husband	ii. 716
disposal of wife's separate property	ii. 716-725
of personal estate	ii. 716-722
of real estate	ii. 716-720
to whom she may dispose of her separate property	ii. 723-726
separate property, when and how chargeable with debts	ii. 725-735
equity of wife to a settlement	ii. 735-754
in what cases it exists	ii. 737-740
equity of wife to settlement, when the husband seeks relief	ii. 740-750
exceptions to the rule	ii. 742, 743
in cases of foreigners	ii. 742
in cases of leasehold estates of wife	ii. 743
when the assignees of the husband seek relief	ii. 744-749
when the husband has made an assignment of the wife's choses in action	ii. 745

HUSBAND AND WIFE — <i>continued.</i>		PAGE
when the wife is plaintiff		ii. 749, 754
in cases of reversionary interests		ii. 746
when waived or lost		ii. 750-754
when forfeited		ii. 753, 754
when not		ii. 753
a personal right, or for children		ii. 751
alimony, when decreed or not		ii. 754-761
out of what property	ii. 738, note, 746, note, 757-760	
separation of husband and wife		ii. 761-764
how far legal	ii. 761, note, 762, 763	
how far articles enforced		ii. 761-764
specific performance of articles		ii. 53, note.
conditions relating to		i. 292, note.
restoration of conjugal rights		ii. 764, note.
maintenance of wife, when decreed in equity		ii. 704, 754, 761
equity of a jointress		ii. 829
when not bound to discovery of title		ii. 829
(See MARRIAGE; MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS.)		

I.

IDIOTS. (See LUNATICS.)	
IGNORANCE OF LAW, relief in cases of	i. 103-148
(See MISTAKE.)	
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS	
what are	i. 296-309
(See CONTRACT.)	
when avoided or not	i. 296-309
INCUMBRANCES, payment of	i. 498
when the debt is extinguished by	i. 499
when it still remains charged on the estate	i. 499
by whom and in what proportions to be paid by parties	i. 499-501
when payments of by tenant for life is an extinguishment, and when not	i. 499
when payment by tenant in tail extinguishes	i. 499
ILLICIT INTERCOURSE, agreement for, void	i. 299
ILLUSORY APPOINTMENT, relief in cases of	i. 260, 263
IMBECILITY, MENTAL, relief in cases of	i. 246-250
immaterial from what cause it arises	i. 246
proof of fraud in cases of	i. 247
where there has been no fraud	i. 248-250
in cases of wills	i. 249, 250
where there is undue influence, or duress	i. 250, 251
doctrines of the Roman and Scottish law as to	i. 251, note.
IMMORAL CONTRACT, relief in cases of	i. 299-305
(See FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE.)	
IMPRISONMENT, contracts by a party under	i. 250

PAGE

IMPROVEMENTS , made on the lands of another, when to be allowed for	
or not	i. 394, 665; ii. 129, 580-586
lien for	ii. 580-586
INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION. (<i>See CONSIDERATION.</i>)	
INCUMBRANCES , concealment of	i. 395
how their various rights adjusted in equity	ii. 163, 164
priorities of satisfaction, how adjusted	ii. 579
INDEMNITY, COVENANT OF,	
specific performance of	ii. 170
INFANTS , jurisdiction in cases of	
cannot generally bind themselves	i. 252, 253
excepted cases	i. 252, 253
some of their acts are voidable and some void	i. 252
where a deed takes effect by delivery of their hand, voidable	i. 253
otherwise void	i. 253
fraudulent misrepresentations of	i. 392
not liable for fraudulent statement as to being of age	i. 252, note, 392, note.
legacies to	i. 603
when guardian or tenant in tail shall keep down interest	i. 501, note.
with regard to conveyances of upon partition by	i. 660
jurisdiction in equity over	ii. 662-697
origin and nature of	ii. 662-666
in the chancellor, as delegate of the crown	ii. 666, 672
appointment and removal of guardians	ii. 672-675
jurisdiction, as to persons of infants	ii. 675-677
against parental power	ii. 675-682
as to property of infants	ii. 675, 683-689
what constitutes a ward of chancery	ii. 683
protection of wards of chancery	ii. 683-684
maintenance of infants	ii. 684-688
education of infants	ii. 675-678
rights, powers, and duties of guardians of	ii. 675, 676, 683, note.
marriage of infants	ii. 690-692
INFLUENCE, UNDUE , relief in cases of contract	
in cases of marriage	i. 250
in cases of marriage	i. 268, 269
INFORMATIONS , in equity	
i. 20, note.	
INJUNCTION , contests between Coke and Ellesmere as to the exercise	
of this power	i. 48
anecdote of Sir Thomas More as to	i. 49, note.
to stay waste in favor of a tenant in common	i. 536, note.
cases of, to the Ecclesiastical Courts	i. 601, 602
against a sudden dissolution of a partnership	i. 674
to prevent a partner's doing injurious acts	i. 674, 675
(<i>See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.</i>)	
nature of	ii. 178-184, 186-188
as a primary remedy	ii. 178, note.
Roman law as to	ii. 184-187

INJUNCTION — *continued.*

	PAGE
the granting of, is discretionary	ii. 183, 262
to stay proceedings at law, when granted or not	ii. 189-213
in cases of sureties	ii. 194, 213
in cases of marshalling assets and administration	ii. 196, 199
before judgments ii. 197
after judgment	ii. 197, 198
to compel election of remedy ii. 198
to protect officers of the court ii. 200
common, what are ii. 201
special, what are ii. 201
when not granted, to stay proceedings at law	ii. 201-207
to stay issuance of process	ii. 190, note.
in cases of indictments ii. 201
where defence, available at law ii. 203
in cases of laches ii. 203, 205
in cases of mistake in pleading ii. 206
in cases of want of jurisdiction ii. 206
in cases of foreign suits ii. 207-211
to suppress vexatious suits ii. 211, 212
against misuse of legal process ii. 179, note.
to restrain acts of officers of public and private corporations	ii. 180 note, 227, note, 869, note.
against public officers ii. 260, note.
to remove improper impediments and defences at law ii. 212, 213
to restrain alienations of property	ii. 213, 214, 258-260
of personalty ii. 179, note.
to secure property ii. 213, 214, 260
to deliver up instruments ii. 213, 214
to prevent transfer of stocks ii. 214, 259
of negotiable instruments ii. 214, 259
of alienations pendente lite ii. 214, 260
to prevent conveyances pendente lite ii. 214
to prevent frauds ii. 215-223
to prevent waste ii. 215-223
to prevent removal of fixtures ii. 179, note.
in cases of nuisances ii. 223-230
public nuisances ii. 223-230
private nuisances ii. 228-236, 260-262
irreparable mischiefs and trespasses ii. 236, 237
infringements of copyright and inventions ii. 236-248
to suppress the publication of private MSS. and letters ii. 248-253
of official letters of public officers ii. 252, note.
to suppress publication of dramatic performances ii. 253, 254, note.
to suppress publication of magazines in a party's name ii. 254
to suppress sale of articles of trade in a party's name ii. 254, 255, note.
to prevent expulsion of member of company and the like ii. 263, note.
to prevent disclosure of secrets of trade ii. 256
to prevent writing for another theatre ii. 254
to prevent improper sales ii. 180, note, 258-260
to prevent transfer of negotiable securities ii. 213, 259

	PAGE
INJUNCTION — <i>continued.</i>	
to prevent husband from transferring his wife's property	ii. 259
to prevent transfer of heirlooms, pictures, statues, &c.	ii. 213, 259
to prevent ringing of bell contrary to contract	ii. 260
to prevent sailing of a ship before security given in admiralty	ii. 260
to restrain running of trains	ii. 264, note.
to deliver up and quiet possession	ii. 261
to undo what has been done	ii. 182, note.
INSANITY , proofs of	i. 243, note.
of a partner, effect of	i. 681
INSPECTION OF DEEDS AND INSTRUMENTS ,	
when decreed	ii. 18
when allowed to persons claiming in privity of title	ii. 18
INSTRUMENTS, LOST , jurisdiction in cases of i. 89-96	
(See ACCIDENT; BONDS.)	
INSURANCE , law of, chiefly created within fifty years i. 17	
mistake in policies of	i. 171
money lent on policy	ii. 324, note.
what facts must be communicated to underwriters	i. 235
INTEREST , on mortgages, apportionment of i. 487, 499, 500	
how kept down, when tenant in tail is an infant	i. 501, note.
INTERDICTS , in Roman Law ii. 184-186	
INTERPLEADER ,	
in what cases it lies at law	ii. 135, 136
in what cases in equity	ii. 136-150
in what not	ii. 147-153
affidavit in cases of	ii. 141
effect of	ii. 151-154
of stakeholder	ii. 140, note.
of attorney who has collected money on notes of a corporation	ii. 148, note.
of a sheriff	ii. 152, note.
bills in the nature of	ii. 153, note, 154
INTOXICATION. (See DRUNKARDS.)	
INVENTIONS, PATENT FOR ,	
violations of, when suppressed	ii. 236-239
(See INJUNCTION.)	
INVENTORY , when decreed to a legatee of specific articles in remainder i. 605	
ISSUES , of fact, when ordered in equity ii. 806	
of law, when ordered	ii. 806, 807
of devisavit vel non	ii. 779-785

J.

JETTISON , what it is	i. 502-504
JOINT CONTRACTS ,	
when in equity held joint and several	i. 176-179
in cases of partnership	i. 684-686

	PAGE
JOINT CONTRACTS — <i>continued.</i>	
when creditors of partnership are entitled to priority over separate creditors	i. 684-689
in cases of joint loans	i. 176-179
JOINT TENANTS , accounts between, cognizable in equity	i. 473
contribution between	i. 529
JOINTRESS , equity of	ii. 829
not bound to discover title	ii. 829
when covenant for, is a lien on lands of covenantor	ii. 601
JOINTURE , to be raised out of lands, marshalling of assets for	i. 583
JUDGMENT CREDITOR , not preferred to equitable mortgagee	ii. 828
JUDGMENTS , general and unqualified, rendered at law	i. 20, 21, 83
frauds in, make them void	i. 261
how enforced in equity	ii. 556, 557
when enforced on equitable estates	ii. 556, 557
when sale decreed in aid of	ii. 556, 557
how dealt with in equity	ii. 872-874
at law, effect of in equity	ii. 871-874
foreign	ii. 874-876
validity of, how determined in equity	ii. 874, 875
how securities are marshalled with respect to	i. 637-644
(See DECREES; INJUNCTION.)	
JULIAN LAW , as to marriage, what in the Roman law	i. 283
JURISDICTION ,	
in equity, vested in different tribunals	i. 26-34
difficult to ascertain its origin	i. 35-46
opinions of Lambard and Lord Coke as to its origin	i. 37, 38, notes.
Lord Hale	i. 39
Lord Hardwicke	i. 39
Mr. Cooper	i. 38, note.
deduced by Lord King from the prerogative of the king to administer justice, &c.	i. 40
how deduced by Mr. Reeves, Mr. Justice Blackstone, and Mr. Wooddeson	i. 43, note.
Mr. Jeremy's sketch of the origin of, commended	i. 43, note.
in full operation during the reign of Richard II.	i. 44
received an impulse from the invention of the writ of subpoena by John Waltham	i. 43
opposed unsuccessfully by the Commons	i. 44
light thrown on its origin by the Commissioners of Public Records	i. 44
mistake in supposing it arose from uses and trusts	i. 45, 82
grew out of assaults, trespasses, and outrages not cognizable at law	i. 45
none in criminal matters	i. 19, note.
established to remedy defects in common-law proceedings	i. 46
none over courts of law themselves	ii. 871
introduction of uses and trusts gave new activity to it	i. 46
resembled the equitable jurisdiction of the prætor at Rome in its growth	i. 47

JURISDICTION — *continued.*

	PAGE
in the reign of Henry VIII. quite extensive	i. 47, 48
importance of understanding its history	i. 51, 52
origin and history of, in the United States	i. 52-56
unknown till lately in the United States	i. 52
nature and extent of, in the different States	i. 52, note, 55
that of the United States conformable to that of England	i. 54
conferred by our constitution on the national judiciary	i. 54
in Massachusetts	i. 26, note.
in Pennsylvania administered through the forms of Courts of Com- mon Law	i. 55
article on Chancery Jurisdiction in American Jurist commended	i. 19, note, 55
general view of	i. 57-59
over three things, according to Coke	i. 57
general description of, unsatisfactory	i. 57-59
ascertained by a specific enumeration of its actual limits	i. 60
equity acts in personam	ii. 59-62
as to lands in foreign countries	ii. 59-62
is not lost by Courts of Law now entertaining suits which they for- merly rejected	i. 69, 89
is of a permanent and fixed character	i. 69, 70
where it has attached for one purpose, in what cases it will be re- tained for all purposes	i. 70-81, 453, 456, note.
sustained to prevent multiplicity of suits	i. 70-72
when it attaches for discovery, sustained in cases of fraud, account, accident, and mistake	i. 70-75
English cases on this point not reconcilable	i. 70-75
the American doctrine affirms the jurisdiction	i. 75
should be declined where a question for the jury arises	i. 76
general principles as to the entertainment of bills of discovery, seek- ing relief	i. 76, 77
over discovery not lost by change in law of evidence	i. 70, note.
over mortgage of expectancies not lost by repeal of usury laws	i. 350, note.
not sustained, where discovery is used as a mere pretence	i. 77, 78
what facts must be alleged in a bill of discovery	i. 77, 78, note.
divided into concurrent, exclusive, and auxiliary	i. 82
concurrent, embraces much of the original jurisdiction of the court	i. 82
origin of this	i. 82
to what cases it extends	i. 82-84; ii. 872
divided into two branches	i. 83
1st. founded on the subject-matter	i. 83
2d. founded on the peculiar remedies of equity	i. 83
that founded on the subject-matter first considered	i. 83
where it arises from accident	i. 84-107
(See ACCIDENT.)	
mistake	i. 108-193
(See MISTAKE.)	
actual fraud	i. 194-264
(See FRAUD.)	

JURISDICTION — <i>continued.</i>	PAGE
constructive fraud	i. 265-442
(See FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE.)	
where it arises from account	i. 443-547
(See ACCOUNT.)	
administration	i. 548-597
(See ADMINISTRATION.)	
legacies	i. 598-617
(See LEGACIES.)	
confusion of boundaries	i. 618-626
(See CONFUSION OF BOUNDARIES.)	
dower	i. 627-636
(See DOWER.)	
marshalling of securities	i. 637-653
(See MARSHALLING OF SECURITIES.)	
partition	i. 654-668
(See PARTITION.)	
partnership	i. 669-692
(See PARTNERSHIP.)	
rents	i. 692-698
(See RENTS.)	
JURY, causes tried without, in equity	i. 22
when question arises in equity, as to damages, trial should be by	i. 76

K.

KING, THE, OR GOVERNMENT, may, at common law, take or make an assignment of a chose in action	ii. 347
KING, LORD, his views on the origin of equity jurisdiction	i. 40
whether he wrote the treatise entitled, <i>The Legal Judicature in Chancery Stated</i>	i. 41, note.
KNOWLEDGE, of defendants in cases of representations	i. 209, note.
of plaintiffs	i. 215, note.

L.

LACHES, discountenanced in equity	i. 61
when a bar in equity	ii. 842-853
in cases of specific performance of contracts	ii. 94-106
in cases of fraud	i. 227, note.
(See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.)	
LAND, when deemed money or money land	ii. 111-114
charged with debts and legacies	i. 565-568, 603
marshalling securities on	i. 637-653
LANDLORD AND TENANT, constructive fraud in cases of	i. 331
LAPSE OF TIME, how it affects equitable demands	i. 61, 546
when a bar in equity	ii. 842-853
LAW, IGNORANCE OF, relief in cases of	i. 130-148
(See MISTAKE.)	

	PAGE
LEGACIES, fraud in the prevention of	i. 263
when legatees will be compelled to refund	i. 99, note.
rule for abatement of for debts	i. 580, note.
when revoked under mistake	i. 192
where a false reason is given for	i. 192
conditions annexed to, in respect to marriage	i. 287-292
when their payment will be enforced by the Ecclesiastical Courts	i. 282, 551
do not vest in legatee until the assent of the executor	i. 553, 593
executor held in equity as trustee or legatee	i. 553
marshalling of assets in favor of legatees	i. 575-579
when they may stand in place of specialty creditors and mort- gagees	i. 575
when real estate not mortgaged is devised	i. 575
preference between legatees and devisees	i. 576, note, 579-582
where lands are subjected to the payment of debts	i. 577, 582, 583
where some legacies are charged on real estate and some not	i. 577
where for charitable uses, no marshalling of assets	i. 578
concurrent jurisdiction in cases of	i. 598-617
jurisdiction over, originally in Ecclesiastical Courts	i. 598
no suit will lie for, at law, unless executor has assented to them	i. 598
action will lie for specific legacies after assent	i. 599
whether action will lie for pecuniary legacies after assent	i. 599, note.
grounds and origin of jurisdiction of equity	i. 599-601
cases where the jurisdiction is exclusive	i. 600-602
where they involve the execution of trust	i. 600, 601
when given to a married woman or to infants	i. 601, 602
when a discovery of assets is required	i. 603
when charged on land	i. 603
cases of injunction and prohibition upon Ecclesiastical Courts	i. 601-603
right of executor in the surplus of personal estate at common law, after payment of debts, a question of presumption on the face of will	i. 601, note.
requirement of security from legatees to refund on deficiency of assets	i. 602
from executors for the payment thereof	i. 604, note, 605
as to personal estate, equity follows the rules of the civil law	i. 603-617
as to those charged on land, equity follows the common law	i. 603, 617
distinction between contingent and absolute legacies	i. 604, note.
when an inventory will be decreed to a legatee of chattels in remainder	i. 605
denations mortis causa, what they are	i. 607-617
what is necessary to give them effect	i. 607, 608
special cases of	i. 609, note.
symbolical delivery	i. 610, note.
of commercial paper and the like	i. 610, note.
derived from the Roman law	i. 608
most important topics as to legacies, what they are	i. 617, note.
(See ADMINISTRATION.)	
construction of, in equity	ii. 403-414
(See ELECTION AND SATISFACTION.)	

LEGACIES — *continued.*

	PAGE
construction of words of limitation of	ii. 403
different construction in equity from that of law	ii. 403-406
limitations, when too remote	ii. 403-406
estate, tail in	ii. 403-406
words precatory or recommendatory, when construed to be legacies or not	ii. 405-413
election between	ii. 415
cumulative or not	ii. 463-465
satisfaction of, when	ii. 438
ademption of, when	ii. 449
when not	ii. 458, 459, 460

LEGATEES, (*See* LEGACIES.)

how and when they may be compelled to refund	i. 97-99
relieved in equity against frauds of executors and administrators i. 428, note.	
what words constitute a good description of	ii. 403-418

LETTERS, injunction to prevent publication of ii. 248-254

LIEN, (*See* TRUST.)

concurrent jurisdiction in cases of	i. 530
definition of	i. 530
in whose favor they exist	i. 530
sustained in equity, when unknown at law	i. 530
importance of a resort to equity	i. 530
how purchasers are bound to contribute to discharge a lien	i. 497
of vendor for purchase-money	ii. 559-579
vendor cannot have decree in personam for deficiency	ii. 560, note.
subrogation of such lien in behalf of a legatee	i. 575, note.
waiver of, or not	ii. 566-579
preferred to credit, obtained by placing evidence of lien in debtor's hands	i. 396, note.
taking a security, when a waiver	ii. 566-579
against whom it exists	ii. 570-576
against representatives	ii. 570-576
against purchasers with notice	ii. 577-579
against general assignees	ii. 576
against married woman	ii. 561, note.
when in favor of third persons	ii. 577, 578
when not	ii. 578
by deposit of title-deeds	ii. 576
by deposit of money for special objects	ii. 577
by covenant to appropriate funds to particular objects	ii. 302, 577
by covenant to settle lands	ii. 577, 595, 596
in favor of dowress for jointure	ii. 594-601
for repairs and improvements	ii. 580-586
for repairs of personal property	ii. 587
for repairs of ships	ii. 587, 588
for disbursements by master of a ship	ii. 587, 588
by part-owners	ii. 587
by partners	ii. 589
enforced by sale in equity	ii. 552-564

LIEN — *continued.*

	PAGE
sale of securities held by	ii. 367, note.
by judgment, when sale enforced in Equity	ii. 552, 557
of creditors by a charge, created by will	ii. 589-594
what words create a charge	ii. 589-601
when a primary charge on land or not	ii. 589-594
in favor of dowress	ii. 598
of joint creditors on partnership funds	ii. 603
in case of successive purchasers, how discharged	ii. 579

LIMITATION, STATUTES OF,

equity acts upon them by analogy	i. 61
and follows them as to legal demands	i. 546
their effect upon equitable demands	i. 546
operation of statute of, in cases of mortgages	ii. 333, 843
in cases of legal titles	ii. 333, 843
in case of grant by weak-minded person	i. 249, note.
in cases of equitable titles	ii. 333, 843
when it is not a bar in equity	ii. 848
when not in cases of fraud	ii. 848, 850, note.
when not in case of mistake	ii. 848-852
when it begins to run in equity	ii. 848-852
in case of trustees and cestui que trust	ii. 608, note.
in case of a devise charged with a legacy	ii. 847, note.
what is an acknowledgment of debt to avoid	ii. 850, 852, note.
charge of debts on lands, when it voids	ii. 852
when a bar in equity	ii. 843-852
in cases between partuers	ii. 848, note.
when the bar set aside	ii. 848-852
in cases of fraud	ii. 848-852

LIS PENDENS, is constructive notice to purchasers i. 411-414

LOST BONDS. (*See BONDS.*)

LOST INSTRUMENTS. (*See INSTRUMENTS.*)

LOST NOTES. (*See NOTES.*)

LUNATICS , consent necessary in contracts	i. 237-243
three elements of consent, according to Grotius	i. 238
ability to contract	i. 238
deeds or contracts of, void or voidable	i. 238, note, 242, note.
language of the civil law, of Grotius, and of Bracton as to	i. 238
maxim of the common law, that no man can stultify himself	i. 239-241
does not extend to the party's privies	i. 239
defence of, in Bacon's Abridgment	i. 239, note.
how far received in Courts of Equity	i. 239-241
how far adopted in America	i. 240, note.
what acts are voidable and what void	i. 241, note.
principles on which Chancery acts in setting aside contracts of	i. 241, note.
jurisdiction of the Crown over	i. 241, note.
contracts for necessaries and for their benefit upheld	i. 242
where a purchase has been made in good faith	i. 242
their solemn acts, as fines, &c., may be overthrown	i. 242

LUNATICS — *continued.*

	PAGE
proofs of insanity	i. 243, note.
Lord Coke's four classes of non compotes	i. 243
(See DRUNKARDS.)	
jurisdiction over, in Chancery	ii. 668-672, 693-697
chancellor acts as delegate of the crown	ii. 693-695
how idiocy and lunacy tried	ii. 693-697

M.

MACEDONIAN DECREE, what in the Roman law	i. 349
MADMEN. (See LUNATICS.)	
MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY,	
what is or not	ii. 368-381
MAINTENANCE OF INFANTS AND LUNATICS,	
jurisdiction for	ii. 684-695
MAINTENANCE OF WIFE, when decreed in equity	ii. 754-764
(See ALIMONY.)	
MANUSCRIPTS,	
injunction to prevent the publication of	ii. 248-255
MARINERS, relief of, in equity, against fraud	i. 340
their contracts for wages and prize-money watched	i. 340
where they sell their shares	i. 340, note.
viewed as favorably as young heirs	i. 340
MARITAL RIGHTS of husband, fraud on	i. 272
MARKS AND LABELS, FALSE IMITATIONS OF,	
injunction lies to prevent	ii. 255
MARRIAGE, conjugal rights consequent upon	ii. 764, note.
mistake in settlements of	i. 171, 172, note.
fraud in withholding consent to	i. 264
brokage contracts, void	i. 266-268
otherwise in the civil law	i. 266
reasons why void	i. 266-268
incapable of confirmation	i. 268
contracts for benefit in promoting	i. 269
conditions in restraint of	i. 276, note.
condition as to form of marriage	i. 292, note.
where a father took a bond from his son on his marriage	i. 269
where a bond was given to a father to obtain his consent to the marriage of his daughter	i. 270
where there is an underhand agreement to defeat a settlement	i. 270
cases of concealment and misrepresentation in fraud of	i. 270-272
where a secret settlement or conveyance is made by a woman in contemplation of	i. 272, 274, note.
by a man	i. 273, note.
contracts and conditions in restraint of	i. 275-291

MARRIAGE — *continued.*

PAGE

- reciprocal engagement between man and woman, good i. 275-281
 when deferred to a future period i. 275-281
 distinctions of the Roman law as to conditions in restraint of i. 281-283
 Lord Rosslyn's views as to the adoption of the Roman law in
 equity i. 282
 also Lord Thurlow's views i. 283, note.
 propriety of the doctrines of equity on i. 283-286
 where the conditions are reasonable, not void i. 285-292
 where rigid or in restraint of i. 285, 286, 289
 distinctions between precedent and subsequent conditions
 i. 283, note, 289-292
 where the condition requires the consent of third persons i. 288
 conditions as to widowhood i. 288, note.
 other cases of conditions i. 287
 conditions not favored in equity i. 289, note.
 where bequest over, in default of compliance with the condition i. 289
 distinction between conditions annexed to real and to personal
 estate i. 289-291
 where literal compliance with the condition becomes impossible i. 292
 case of a bond upon an intended marriage i. 269, 270
- MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS AND ARTICLES,** ii. 285-296
 how construed in equity ii. 285-290
 executory articles, how construed ii. 286-290
 marriage articles, in whose favor executed, or not ii. 289-291
 what may be settled ii. 292
 personal property ii. 292
 terms for years ii. 292
 estates per autre vie ii. 292
 trustees in, to preserve contingent remainders ii. 292-296
 rights and duties of such trustees ii. 292-295
 post-nuptial contracts, when valid or not. ii. 702
- MARRIED WOMEN, jurisdiction in equity** ii. 698-764
 (*See FEMES COVERT; HUSBAND AND WIFE.*)
- MARSHALLING OF ASSETS.** (*See ADMINISTRATION.*)
 no marshalling of assets in favor of charities i. 578
 in cases of liens ii. 570
 in cases of charities ii. 512
- MARSHALLING OF SECURITIES,**
 concurrent jurisdiction in cases of i. 637-653
 where one party has a lien on two funds i. 637, 650, 651
 must not prejudice the chief creditor i. 639, note.
 where there is a mortgage upon two estates for the same debt i. 637
 where one judgment creditor may go upon two funds i. 643
 where one creditor has judgment against A and B, and another
 against B only i. 644
 doctrine of substitution and cession in the Roman law i. 645, 649
 views of Lord Kaimes i. 646

- MARSHALLING OF SECURITIES** — *continued.* PAGE
- in favor of sureties i. 647
 - may be substituted to the collateral securities held by the creditor i. 647, 648
 - may by bill against creditor and debtor compel the payment of the debt i. 648
 - whether creditor may elect between the debtor and his collateral security i. 648
 - Roman law on this point i. 649
 - in favor of volunteers i. 638, note.
 - parties seeking aid must be creditors of a common debtor i. 639, note, 650
 - case of a joint debt due to one creditor by two persons, and a several debt due by one of them to another i. 650-653
 - whether a creditor of a firm may be compelled to resort to the separate estate of a deceased partner i. 652
 - among the creditors of joint debtors and partners i. 652
 - and rights of priority and liens in case of different purchasers ii. 579
- MASTER OF THE ROLLS,**
- when he first sat apart and heard cases i. 48, note.
- MAXIMS,**
- equity follows the law i. 60
 - various interpretations and illustrations of this maxim i. 61-68, 189, 254, 492, 567
 - equity acts by analogy to law i. 61
 - where there is equal equity, the law prevails i. 63
 - illustrations of this maxim i. 63-65
 - he who seeks equity must do equity i. 65
 - illustrations of this maxim i. 65, 300
 - equality is equity i. 67
 - illustrations of this maxim i. 67, 558, 568, 570
 - equity looks upon that as done which ought to be done i. 68
 - meaning and application of this maxim i. 68
- MELIORATIONS OF ESTATES,**
- when allowed for in equity ii. 129, 130, 580-586
 - lien for ii. 581-586
- (See IMPROVEMENTS.)
- MENTAL IMBECILITY.** (See IMBECILITY.)
- MERGER** i. 340, note; ii. 342, note.
- MINE,** when unknown to a seller, whether it avoids a purchase of the land i. 163, 230, note.
- bill against executor for opening mine i. 535, 536
- MINORS.** (See INFANTS.)
- MISREPRESENTATION,**
- what it is, and relief in cases of i. 203-227
- (See FRAUD, ACTUAL.)
- fraudulent in case of marriage i. 270-274

	PAGE
MISTAKE, concurrent jurisdiction in cases of	i. 108-193
what it is	i. 108
in matters of law	i. 108-148
ignorantia legis neminem excusat — grounds of this maxim	i. 109
principles of relief for mistake of law formulated	i. 108, note.
opinions of the civilians on this maxim	i. 110, note.
where there is a mere promise to pay in ignorance of law	i. 111, note.
in the release of one or two obligees in a bond	i. 123
where there is an overpayment	i. 123, note.
where power of appointment is executed absolutely	i. 123
agreements entered into under a mistake of law	i. 123
where parties act under wrong advice as to law	i. 123-126
where a letter of attorney is taken instead of a mortgage	i. 125, 126
of law, as a ground of reforming a deed	i. 123, 145, note.
where a compromise of right is made in ignorance of a rule of law	i. 128-142
or is made in a case of a doubtful question	i. 128-135, 138-143
distinction between mistake and ignorance of a principle of law	i. 130, note.
ignorance of title, when treated as a mistake of fact	i. 130, 131, note, 138
cases of mistake of the settled law, where relief has been given	i. 132-135
difficulty in reconciling these cases	i. 135, note.
case of <i>Lansdowne v. Lansdowne</i> doubted	i. 135, note.
payment of legacies by executor or administrator where they are	i. 97, 98
ignorant of outstanding debts	i. 97, 98
of a principle of law not plain to persons generally	i. 136
in the construction of a will	i. 137
of a plain rule of law, presumptive of imposition, surprise, &c.	i. 137
family compromises supported upon principles of policy	i. 141-148
where surprise is mixed up with mistake	i. 143
contracts made in mutual error, invalid	i. 143
where there is a peculiar trust and relation between the parties	i. 144
cases of defective execution of intent from ignorance of law	i. 145
summary of exceptions to the rule as to ignorance of law	i. 145-148
how considered in America	i. 146
loose statements of English elementary writers as to	i. 145, note.
where judgment is obtained on a contract, and afterwards the point	i. 148
of law is otherwise decided	i. 148
in acts done under statute, afterwards decided to be unconstitu-	i. 121, note.
tional	i. 121, note.
rules of the civil law as to error of law	i. 148, note.
where a bona fide purchaser, without notice, is concerned	i. 148, 179
by ignorance of material facts, relievable in equity	i. 149
distinction between ignorance of facts and mistake of facts	i. 149, note.
the facts must be material	i. 159
where the parties are innocent, and no presumption of fraud	i. 159, 160
where one innocently sells a message at the time destroyed	i. 159-161

MISTAKE — *continued.*

	PAGE
distinctions of the civil law as to such a sale	i. 160, note.
in the supposition of existing rights	i. 160, 161
mutual, as to the extent of the thing sold	i. 160, 161
in an instrument, so as to release rights of which the party is ignorant	i. 162
a party not relievable, unless he uses due diligence to ascertain the facts	i. 162
where facts are known to one party and not to another	i. 163
effect of, where rights of innocent third persons are affected	i. 151, note.
where there is no legal obligation to communicate the facts	i. 164
where the means of information are open to both parties	i. 164
or are equally unknown	i. 165
where a vendee has private knowledge of a declaration of war, &c.	i. 165
this topic ably discussed by Pothier	i. 165, note.
where the equity is equal between the parties	i. 165
summary of grounds, on which mistakes of facts are relievable	i. 166
in written agreements, when reformed	i. 166
shown by parol evidence	i. 167
Lord Thurlow's language as to the proofs commented on	i. 170, note.
in policies of insurance	i. 171
in preliminary contracts for conveyances, &c.	i. 171
where made out from other writings or memoranda	i. 172
in marriage settlements	i. 172, note.
where the final instrument and preliminary contract differ	i. 172
where a party seeks a specific performance of an agreement after it is reformed	i. 173
a distinction on this subject not easily reconcilable with the principles of equity	i. 174, note.
relief when mistake is only implied	i. 176
as, where joint loan of money, bond made joint and several	i. 176
reform of a joint bond against a surety	i. 178
equity interferes only between the original parties and privies to written instruments	i. 179
where parties have omitted acts necessary to the validity of written instruments	i. 179, 186, note, 190, note.
where bond not executed by all expected	i. 179, note.
where an instrument has been cancelled	i. 180
where the instrument is drawn untechnically	i. 181
instruments held to operate as covenants to stand seised	i. 181
in the execution of powers	i. 181
(See POWERS.)	
where defective fine or recovery	i. 189
mistakes in wills	i. 190, and note, 191, note.
must be clear and apparent on the face	i. 191
errors in legacies	i. 191
where a legacy is revoked under a mistake	i. 192
where a false reason is given for a legacy	i. 192
where money is spent upon another's estate through mistake of title	i. 394

MISTAKE — *continued.*

	PAGE
of law, upon the construction of a deed, &c.	i. 408
accounts are cognizable in equity on account of	i. 452
when Statute of Limitations no bar in case of	ii. 850
when statute begins to run in cases of	ii. 850

MODUSES. (*See TITHES.*)

MONEY , when deemed land or land money	ii. 111
when ordered to be paid into court	ii. 164

MORE, SIR THOMAS , his character as chancellor	i. 48
---	-------

MORTGAGES,

fraud in cases of	i. 396
on two estates for same debt, marshalling of securities	i. 637
definition and nature of tacking	i. 417

(*See TACKING.*)

origin and nature of	ii. 304
nature of, in Roman law	ii. 305
nature of, in equity	ii. 305
mortgage is a mere pledge in equity	ii. 310
effect of transfer of mortgage without note and vice versa	ii. 314, note.
equity of redemption, nature of	ii. 312-319, 321
estate of mortgagee in equity	ii. 318
rights of mortgagee	ii. 317
rights of mortgagor	ii. 319
varying effects of payment of amount of mortgage	ii. 340, note.
extinguishment of	ii. 318, note.
reduction of interest on punctual payment	ii. 319, note.
mortgagor in possession after maturity of debt	ii. 319, note.
mortgage distinguished from contract for repurchase	ii. 320, note.
equitable, by deposit of title-deeds	ii. 322
what constitutes a mortgage	ii. 320, 335, 336
what property may be mortgaged	ii. 325
of after-acquired property	ii. 325, note.
who may make a mortgage	ii. 326
who may redeem a mortgage	ii. 326
accounts between junior and senior mortgagee	ii. 327, note.
consolidation of	ii. 327, note.
right of foreclosure	ii. 329
relief against unjust foreclosure	ii. 329, note.
in what cases a sale decreed	ii. 330
sales under power in	ii. 331, note.
contribution to discharge of	i. 493
mortgages of personal property	ii. 334
difference between a mortgage and a pledge	ii. 334-336
equity of redemption in case of mortgage of personal property	ii. 335
tacking, in case of mortgage of personal property	ii. 337
marshalling of assets and securities with respect to	i. 571, 584, 637

(*See ADMINISTRATION.*)

apportionment of interest on	i. 487, 499, 500
--	------------------

(*See APPORTIONMENT.*)

a prior one, which was concealed, postponed	i. 395
---	--------

	PAGE
MORTMAIN, STATUTES OF, devise in evasion of, void	i. 300
MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS,	
prevention of, a ground of jurisdiction	i. 70
in cases of account	i. 455, 470
in cases of apportionment	i. 497
in cases of general average	i. 504
in cases of contribution	i. 509
in cases of sureties	i. 504, 510
in cases of confusion of boundaries	i. 624
in cases of rents and profits	i. 535
in cases of waste	i. 535, 537, 538
in cases of partnership	i. 690
MUTUAL ACCOUNTS,	
concurrent jurisdiction in cases of	i. 455
(See ACCOUNT.)	
N.	
NECESSARIES, contracts for by lunatics	i. 242
NE EXEAT REGNO, WRIT OF,	
origin and nature of	ii. 798
in what cases granted	ii. 801
for equitable debt	ii. 802-804
for alimony	ii. 802
in cases of foreigners	ii. 804
NEGLIGENCE, where accident arises from	i. 84, note, 105
NEXT OF KIN, who in a will are or may be deemed	ii. 397
NON COMPOTES MENTIS. (See LUNATICS.)	
NOTES, cancellation of overdue negotiable	i. 28, note.
NOTES LOST, relief in cases of, and the grounds thereof	i. 93
where they are not negotiable, loss of, is not admitted, must be estab-	
lished by proofs	i. 94
(See ACCIDENT; BOND.)	
NOTICE,	
of adverse title, purchase with	i. 399
of title of dowress, purchase with	i. 399, note, 416, note.
of deposit of title-deeds for security, purchase with	i. 399
in cases of, purchaser held trustee	i. 399
how purchaser may protect himself	i. 400
of contract to sell land or grant leases thereof, purchase with	i. 400
of prior unregistered conveyance, purchase with	i. 400
object and policy of the Registry Acts	i. 400, 401, 408
how broken in upon	i. 401
in case of subsequent purchasers	i. 402
actual and constructive, what they are	i. 402
where a party's deed recites another deed	i. 403

NOTICE—*continued.*

	PAGE
whatever puts a party on inquiry	i. 404
of a lease, what is notice of	i. 406
where an estate is purchased with knowledge that it is tenanted	i. 406
where mere rumor or suspicion is notice or not	i. 407
effect of registration under the Registry Acts	i. 409
in England registration not constructive notice	i. 409
otherwise in America	i. 410
registration of an equitable title	i. 410, note.
registration of deeds not required by law	i. 410
registration of deeds not in compliance with law	i. 410
of what passes in courts of justice	i. 411
purchaser of property pendente lite bound by the decree	i. 411
pendente lite nihil innovetur	i. 412
effect of lis pendens	i. 411, 412
effect of knowledge of a decree or judgment	i. 411
when priority of title may be acquired by, in equitable property	i. 424
where knowledge is brought home to an agent or attorney	i. 413
it must be notice in the present business	i. 414
effect of a bona fide purchase for valuable consideration	i. 415
where A purchases with notice and sells to B without notice, and B sells to C with notice	i. 415
by an equitable incumbrancer given to trustees, when it will give pri- ority over earlier incumbrancers	ii. 338, 339
NOTTINGHAM, LORD, his character as chancellor	i. 49
NUISANCES, remedy at law	ii. 223-230
remedy in equity	ii. 223-230
public	ii. 223-228
private	ii. 228-230
NUPTIAL CONVEYANCES,	
before marriage	i. 273-344, note.
after marriage	i. 273, note.

O.

OATH, of defendant required in equity	i. 23
OBLIGATIONS, distinction in Roman law between natural and civil	i. 2
OFFICES, contracts for the sale of, void	i. 298
OFFICERS OF COURTS,	
when Courts of Equity interfere to protect them	i. 29, note, ii. 159, 200
OVERPAYMENT, by mistake of law or fact	i. 123, note.
OWELTY OF PARTITION	i. 662, and note, 663, note.

P.

PARAPHERNALIA, what	ii. 706-708
marshalling of assets with respect to	i. 578
PARENT AND CHILD,	
constructive fraud arising from this relation	i. 311, 312

- PARENTAL POWER, as to infant children ii. 675
- PAROL CONTRACTS,
 when specifically enforced in equity ii. 66-95, 853
 (See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.)
- PAROL EVIDENCE,
 generally not admissible to vary a written agreement i. 166-181
 admissible to correct a mistake and to suppress imposition, fraud, &c.
 i. 166-181
 grounds of the rule i. 170
 when admissible in case of wills i. 190-192
 when admissible, or not, in cases of written instruments ii. 857
 (See EVIDENCE.)
- PAROL PROMISE,
 when discharged in law, yet supported in equity i. 61
 settlement founded on i. 381
- PARTICIPES CRIMINIS, relief where parties are i. 302-309, 427
 (See FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE.)
- PARTIES, want of proper, when a defence or bar in equity ii. 853, 854
- PARTITION, concurrent jurisdiction in cases of i. 654
 origin and history of this jurisdiction i. 654-658
 Mr. Hargrave's strictures upon it examined i. 654, 658
 did not lie at common law between joint tenants and tenants in
 common i. 657
 not decreed between partners upon dissolution i. 661, note.
 grounds of the jurisdiction in equity i. 656, 657
 defect of remedy at law i. 657
 discovery wanted i. 657
 principle of convenience, according to Lord Longborough
 i. 657
 title must be first established at law i. 659, note.
 title of both parties must be good i. 658, note.
 difference between partition at law and equity i. 660
 in equity conveyances are directed i. 660
 where infancy prevents the conveyances i. 660, and note.
 where contingent remainder is limited to a person not in
 existence i. 660, 665
 whether partition in equity is a matter of right i. 661, 664
 exigency of the writ at common law i. 663
 compensation decreed for improvements on the estate i. 663, 664
 owelty of partition i. 662, 663, note.
 tenant in common decreed to account for rents and profits i. 665, 666
 not decreed in one State, of lands in another State i. 665, note.
 where all parties in interest are not before the court i. 664
 where there are divers parcels of land, different estates will be allotted
 to each party i. 667
 the analogies of the law followed i. 668
 of personalty i. 654, note.
- PARTNERSHIP, lien of partners on partnership frauds ii. 589
 (See LIEN.)

PARTNERSHIP — *continued.*

	PAGE
lien of joint creditors of	ii. 603, 604
relief, where one partner conceals from the other the true state of the profits	i. 237
concurrent jurisdiction in cases of	i. 669
how formed	i. 669
controversy as to the existence of	i. 669
how governed after expiration of term of articles	i. 669, note.
where persons are acting together to get incorporated	i. 669, note.
of members of a mutual insurance company	i. 669, note.
remedies at law between partners	i. 670
by action of account	i. 670
for a contribution at law	i. 671
where a balance has been struck	i. 671, note.
on a covenant or promise to account	i. 670
(See ACCOUNT.)	
on an agreement to furnish a certain sum or stock for partnership purposes	i. 672
measure of damages in this case	i. 673
where a specific performance will be decreed of a contract to enter into	i. 673, note; ii. 34, 35, note.
so of other contracts	i. 674
covenants for, when specific performance of, decreed	ii. 40, 42
where there is a studied omission of a partner's name by the firm	i. 674
where one raises money on the credit of the firm, contrary to agreement	i. 674
where one engages in other business contrary to agreement	i. 674
in case of agreement, on dissolution, as to a partnership book	i. 674
where an injunction will be granted against a sudden dissolution	i. 675
doctrine of the Roman law on this point	i. 675
injunction to prevent a partner from doing injurious acts	i. 674
equity will not interfere in case of agreement to refer disputes to arbitrators	i. 676
when an account will be decreed so as to wind up the partnership affairs	i. 677, note.
receiver appointed to close the business	i. 678
no receiver, generally without dissolution	i. 680, note.
partners restrained from collecting debts	i. 679
when a dissolution will be granted	i. 681, note.
on account of the impracticability of the undertaking	i. 681
on account of the insanity or incapacity of one of the partners	i. 681, note.
when on account of gross misconduct	i. 681, 682, note.
the real estate of, is treated as personal estate	i. 682
lien of the partners upon the partnership funds, how enforced	i. 683, 684
preference of the creditors of the firm	i. 683-686
where one partner dies, and the survivor becomes insolvent	i. 685
personal representative may compel account and discovery	i. 685, note.
classes of cases where surviving partners may be liable to account	i. 686, note.
marshalling assets of	i. 685

	PAGE
PARTNERSHIP — <i>continued.</i>	
contract of, is several as well as joint	i. 685, 686
where an execution at law for separate debt is levied on the joint property	i. 687
whether equity will restrain a sale in such case by the sheriff	i. 688
where there are two firms, in which some, but not all, are partners in each firm	i. 690
no person can sue himself with others in	i. 690
it is sufficient in equity that all parties in interest are before the court	i. 690
where one party fraudulently releases an action, equity will relieve	i. 690
analogous principles in the Roman, Scotch, and Continental law	i. 691
general inadequacy of law and the necessity of a resort to equity in cases of	i. 691, 692
PART-OWNERS, accounts between	i. 473
contribution between	i. 529
PART-OWNERS OF SHIPS, lien of	ii. 587, 588
(See LIEN.)	
PART PERFORMANCE. (See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.)	
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS,	
remedies in equity for infringing	ii. 236-240
PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND JUDGMENTS,	
when accelerated in equity	ii. 554-502
in cases of elegits	ii. 556
in cases of reversions	ii. 556
PAYMENTS, appropriation of	i. 458-462, 463, note.
PEACE, BILL OF,	
nature of	ii. 172
when it lies	ii. 172-177
when not	ii. 177
analogous cases of relief	ii. 177
PECULIAR DEFENCES IN EQUITY,	
lapse of time	ii. 840-850
in case of specialties	ii. 842, note.
former decree	ii. 853
account stated	ii. 853
purchase without notice	ii. 825-828, 853
want of proper parties	ii. 854
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES. (See FORFEITURES.)	
jurisdiction in equity to relieve	i. 96
relief, when given against	ii. 637-650
liquidated damages, what	ii. 650, 651, note.
distinction between penalties and forfeitures	ii. 652, 653
forfeitures, when not relieved against	ii. 644, note, 653-661
never enforced in equity	ii. 652, 819, 833
bill of discovery, does not lie for	ii. 819, 833
PENDENTE LITE CONVEYANCES, injunctions to prevent	ii. 215
PENDENTE LITE PURCHASERS	i. 411-413

PENNSYLVANIA, how equity is administered there	i. 55
PERFORMANCE, SPECIFIC. (<i>See</i> SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.)	
PERPETUATING TESTIMONY,	
when it lies or not	ii. 830-834
for whom	ii. 832, 833
lies against a purchaser	ii. 833
decree, in case of	ii. 834
publication of testimony	ii. 839, note.
PERSONAL ESTATE,	
primary fund for payment of debts	i. 579
PIN-MONEY, nature of	ii. 705, 725
how far and when husband made accountable for arrears	ii. 725
PLEDGE, account in cases of	i. 531
of assets by an executor, when it is waste	i. 591
how redeemable	ii. 334-338
tacking in case of	ii. 338
POLLUTION OF STREAMS	ii. 230, note.
PORTIONS, when to be raised out of the land, marshalling of assets for	i. 583
how and when payable	ii. 302, note, 303.
on what, primarily chargeable	ii. 303, note.
power to raise, how construed	ii. 384-393
when double or not	ii. 438, 446
satisfaction of	ii. 446-458
	(<i>See</i> SATISFACTION.)
POST-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS,	
when valid or not, between husband and wife	ii. 703, 704
POST-NUPTIAL SETTLEMENTS,	
when valid or not	i. 366, 379, 435
POST-OBIT BONDS, definition of	i. 349, 350
relief against, when given by heirs and expectants	i. 350-352
their validity when sold at auction	i. 354
difference between a sale of them and of a reversion	i. 355
case of tradesmen's extravagant bills, similar to	i. 355
POWERS,	
by implication to sell	ii. 383
who entitled to sell under general power	ii. 383
when a trust	ii. 384, note.
to sell an estate, when a trust	ii. 384
survivorship of joint, when	ii. 386
who to execute in case of death	ii. 384, 386
coupled with a trust, what, and when	ii. 384
coupled with an interest	ii. 384
to executors, distinctions as to	ii. 386
defective execution of	i. 101, 123, 181, 186, note.
distinction between non-execution and defective execution	i. 181
its justice questioned	i. 182, note.

POWERS — *continued.*

	PAGE
when execution in favor of volunteers aided in favor of creditors	i. 182, 188, note.
for what parties defects will be supplied	i. 101, 181, 187, 189
consequences of interference in a case of non-execution	i. 100, 182
when part or defective execution entitles to relief	i. 184-186
distinction between legal and equitable execution of	i. 184
form, when it must be adhered to or not	i. 185-187
in what cases of meritorious consideration, defect supplied	i. 182, 188, 189
where defect arises from informal instrument	i. 185, 187
also from improper execution of proper instrument	i. 185, 186
appointment by an answer to a bill in equity	i. 185
where the instrument selected is not that prescribed by the power	i. 185
execution by will, instead of a deed, and vice versa	i. 185
where the intent, but not the terms, is followed	i. 185
defects in number of witnesses	i. 186
where defect of substance, equity will not interfere	i. 187
where there is an attempt to execute a will	i. 102, 185
no relief, where the equities are equal	i. 187
when deemed assets in favor of creditors	i. 188, 189
defects, when aided in favor of volunteers	i. 101, 106, 188
cases where defects will not be aided	i. 189, 190
no relief where statute requisitions are not complied with	i. 101, 189
fraud in cases of illusory appointments	i. 260, 263
where jointure or portion is to be raised by the execution of a power	i. 583
(See ACCIDENT.)	
under wills, how construed	ii. 384-392
who are to execute	ii. 382-386
what are naked powers or not	ii. 386
when joint and several	ii. 386
to raise portions	ii. 391
PRÆTOR, his equitable jurisdiction in the Roman law	i. 5
effect of his edicts	i. 5
value of precedents in his forum	i. 115
distinction between actions in his courts	i. 33
actiones prætoris et obligationes prætoris, what	i. 33
his equitable jurisdiction grew like that of Chancery	i. 47
complaints in Rome of the abuse of his authority	i. 47, note.
PRECEDENTS, their general value	i. 15
appreciated in the forum of the Roman prætor	i. 15
their authority in equity	i. 15-18
PREFERENCES, to creditors, assignment giving, valid	i. 377
order of, among creditors, legatees, &c.	i. 568-570, 579-584
(See ADMINISTRATION.)	
to creditors of a firm against separate creditors	i. 684-686
secret, when void in cases of assignment	i. 378, 384-386
PREMISES, no relief for rent of, when destroyed by fire or lightning	i. 104
PRESUMPTIONS IN EQUITY,	
when they may be rebutted	ii. 440, 538, 858

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,

	PAGE
effect on principal of misrepresentations by agent	i. 211, note.
their peculiar fiduciary relation	i. 322
where agent confounds his property with his principal's	i. 476, 625

(See AGENCY.)

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY,

their peculiar fiduciary relation	i. 331-337
where undue advantage of the surety is taken by the creditor	i. 334
where stipulations are made between the principal and creditor	i. 334
when surety will be discharged in equity	i. 334
how surety is regarded at law	i. 335, note.
where there is a delay of the creditor	i. 335
where a creditor loses a security of the debtor	i. 336, 337
equity will compel the principal to pay the debt when due	i. 337
will substitute the surety to the place of creditor	i. 334
relief in various cases of	ii. 170, 194

(See SURETIES.)

PRIORITY, when recognized among liens, charges, creditors, &c. i. 567, 569
(See ADMINISTRATION.)

how acquired on assignments of equitable property by notice	i. 426
as to incumbrances, &c., adjustment of	ii. 163, 164, 579
of equitable mortgagee over judgment creditor	ii. 828

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS, what are ii. 821**PRIVITY OF CONTRACT, equity jurisdiction, in cases of account** i. 458
in cases of accounts jurisdiction is not founded in privity i. 466**PROBATE OF WILL, remedy where it is fraudulently obtained** i. 441**PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND PAPERS, bill of discovery for** ii. 812**PROFERT, now dispensed with in certain cases by Courts of Law** i. 89**PROFITS. (See RENTS AND PROFITS.)**

apportionment of rents and profits	i. 481-497
--	------------

PROXENETÆ, who they are in the Roman law i. 266**PUBLICATION OF DEPOSITIONS,**

taken to perpetuate testimony, when	ii. 839, note.
of depositions taken de bene esse, when	ii. 839, note.
of depositions to establish wills, when	ii. 839, note.

PUBLICATION OF MANUSCRIPTS, LETTERS, &c.,

injunction to prevent	ii. 249-255
---------------------------------	-------------

PUFFING, of commodities sold, relief in cases of i. 295**PURCHASE, what is deemed a trust or not** ii. 529-545
(See TRUST.)

in the name of another	ii. 529
in the name of a child	ii. 539
in the name of a wife	ii. 541
joint purchase	ii. 542, 543
by partnership	ii. 544, 545
by trustee, with trust money	ii. 548

PURCHASE — *continued.*

	PAGE
by covenantee	ii. 548
vendor, when a trustee	ii. 550
lien of vendor	ii. 554-576

(See LIEN.)

PURCHASE-MONEY, APPLICATION OF,

when purchaser bound to see to	ii. 466-476
--	-------------

PURCHASERS, BONA FIDE, WITHOUT NOTICE,

in cases of purchase from purchaser with notice	i. 415
protection of, in equity	i. 63, 64, note, 107, 387, 415, 421, 436, 438, 634, 635; ii. 825, 833
in cases of accident	i. 107
in cases of mistake	i. 148, 182, 189
where purchase is from trustee holding legal title	ii. 280, note.
exception as to dower	i. 635
whether plea of, is good against a legal title	i. 634, note.
pendente lite, not protected	i. 412
who is deemed such a purchaser	ii. 825
whether judgment creditor so deemed	ii. 828
how liens and incumbrances discharged in case of different pur- chasers	ii. 579
what priority exists as to discharge of liens and incumbrances	ii. 579

PURPRESTURES, remedy in equity ii. 223**Q.****QUANTUM DAMNIFICATUS,**

when issue of, decreed	ii. 171
----------------------------------	---------

QUIA TIMET, BILLS OF,

general principles which govern	ii. 16, 26, 156
general nature of	ii. 156, 157
receiver, when appointed on	ii. 158
money, when paid into court on	ii. 164
as to present and as to future interests	ii. 157, 166, 169
security, when required on	ii. 167, 168
in case of sureties	ii. 169, 170, note.
to prevent waste, &c., pending a suit	ii. 171
in cases of the actual transfer by husband of wife's property	ii. 168, 259

R.**RAILWAYS AND OTHER COMPANIES,**

injunctions against	ii. 867-869
funds of, how to be applied	ii. 867, 868
restraint of applications to legislature	ii. 869
contracts of, specific performance	ii. 870

RECEIVER, when and how appointed ii. 158

	PAGE
RECEIVERS , appointed to close the business of a firm	i. 678
(See BAILIFFS .)	
how appointed and protected in equity	ii. 159, 160
rights and duties of	ii. 158-164
RECOMMENDATION, WORDS OF ,	
when they create a trust	ii. 405-414
RECORD COMMISSIONERS ,	
their report commented on	i. 45, note.
RE-ENTRY FOR RENT , when relieved against	ii. 645
REGISTRATION, CONSTRUCTIVE , notice by	i. 408
REGISTRY ACTS , object and policy of	i. 400, 408
(See NOTICE .)	
RELEASE , when founded in mistake	i. 123, 162
when obtained through concealment of facts	i. 235
by one partner fraudulently	i. 237, 690
REMAINDER-MAN , when relieved	i. 343
(See REVERSIONERS .)	
REMEDIES , two classes in the English and American law	i. 19
often defective in Courts of Law	i. 20
existence of at law	i. 25, note.
restrained and modelled in Courts of Equity to meet the exigencies of a case	i. 20, 21
RENTS AND PROFITS ,	
where premises are destroyed by fire	i. 104
where there is an express covenant to pay	i. 104
apportionment of	i. 481, 492, note.
(See APPORTIONMENT .)	
the jurisdiction is resolved into matters of account or of multiplicity of suits	i. 531
where party has not established his right to mesne profits at law	i. 531
in cases of tortious or adverse claims	i. 532
account of, where judgment creditor has levied upon real estate	i. 532
from a tenant under an elegit	i. 532
from a stranger, who has intruded on an infant's lands	i. 532, 533
in cases of a cestui que trust	i. 533
in cases of dower	i. 534, 628
in cases of a bond creditor against the heir	i. 533
in cases of an heir or devisee	i. 534
in cases of ejectment and an injunction allowed for a long time	i. 534
against the personal representatives of a tenant guilty of a tort	i. 534
tenant in common, on partition, decreed to account for	i. 663
remedy in equity, when allowed	i. 693
when discovery required	i. 695, 696
when remedy not allowed in equity	i. 695
when equity will decree seisin of rent seck	i. 693
relief, where deeds have been lost	i. 693

REVERSIONERS AND REMAINDER-MEN — <i>continued.</i>	PAGE
doctrines of the Roman law as to	i. 349
apportionment of incumbrances between them and tenant for life	i. 499
(See HEIRS AND EXPECTANTS.)	
REVOCAION , of a legacy, by mistake remedied in equity	i. 192
of voluntary trusts, when good	ii. 272, 345, 364, 529
REVOLUTION , treated as an accident	i. 100
RULES IN EQUITY , how established	i. 54, note.
S.	
SALE of assets by an executor, when valid or not	i. 588
fraud in	i. 588
(See FRAUD.)	
of securities held by lien	ii. 367, note.
when to raise gross sums payable out of rents and profits	ii. 391, 392
of lands, when decreed in equity to pay debts by acceleration	ii. 560
to satisfy liens	ii. 560
(See LIEN.)	
on elegits	ii. 559
on reversions	ii. 559
to execute trusts under wills	ii. 384
trust for, by whom to be executed	ii. 384
by whom power to sell to be executed	ii. 384
when executors are to sell under wills	ii. 384.
SATISFACTION. (See ELECTION.)	
what it is	ii. 438
what raises a question of	ii. 438
matter of presumption	ii. 439
may be rebutted	ii. 440
in cases ejusdem generis	ii. 441
of portions secured by settlement	ii. 446
of portions by will and advancement	ii. 446-458
of legacies, when	ii. 448
when not	ii. 455
of debts by legacies to creditors when	ii. 448, 461, 463
SCIENTER , in misrepresentation	i. 204, note.
forms of	i. 209, note.
of defendants	i. 209, note.
of plaintiffs	i. 215, note.
SEAMEN. (See MARINERS.)	
SECRETS OF TRADE ,	
injunction to prevent disclosure of	ii. 256, 257
SECURITIES , held by lien, sale of	ii. 367, note.
marshalling, and priorities of	i. 579, 637; ii. 164
(See MARSHALLING OF SECURITIES.)	
SEISIN, LIVERY OF , when defect of will be supplied	i. 180

- SEPARATE ESTATE OF WIFE. (*See HUSBAND AND WIFE.*) PAGE
- SEQUESTRATION, effect of in equity ii. 160
- SET-OFF,
- at law ii. 765
- in equity ii. 766
- of mutual debts and credits ii. 768
- of equitable debts ii. 770
- of liability of surety ii. 770, note.
- in the civil law ii. 775
- SETTLED ACCOUNT, when it will be opened i. 541
 (*See ACCOUNT.*)
- SETTLEMENT,
- mistake in, when remedied i. 171
- trust by not revocable when finally declared ii. 529, note.
- underhand agreement to defeat will be avoided in equity i. 269
- secret, of wife in fraud of marital rights i. 273
- post-nuptial, when valid or not i. 379
- equity of wife to a ii. 735
- (*See HUSBAND AND WIFE; MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.*)
- SOLICITOR AND CLIENT. (*See CLIENT AND ATTORNEY.*)
- SPECIALTY CREDITOR,
- marshalling of assets with respect to i. 573, 579
- SPECIFIC DELIVERY OF CHATTELS,
 (*See DELIVERY; CHATTELS.*)
- when decreed ii. 23, 31, note, 35, note, 37, note, 213, 214
- SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS,
- correction of mistake followed by specific performance i. 155
- to enter into partnership i. 673, note, 666; ii. 34, note.
- history of equity jurisdiction as to ii. 27-29
- general grounds of ii. 30, 55-61
- as a primary and as a secondary remedy ii. 30, note.
- of personal property, when decreed ii. 30-39
- when decreed of stock or not ii. 33, 37, notes.
- of personal covenants, when decreed ii. 38-54, 260
- of covenants between landlord and tenant ii. 39, 40
- for a lease ii. 40, 81, note.
- of covenants by husband for acts of his wife ii. 49
- where wife will not release dower and homestead rights ii. 52, note.
- of covenants of indemnity ii. 170
- respecting annuities ii. 41
- respecting boundaries of estates ii. 47
- in favor of sureties ii. 48
- exercise of jurisdiction discretionary ii. 58, 59
- respecting real property ii. 31, note, 60, 64, note.
- respecting lands in foreign countries ii. 60, 62
- other cases ii. 41, note, 60, note.
- contract to build a railroad not decreed ii. 46, note, 60, note, 867
- in whose favor decreed ii. 42, 110

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS — <i>continued.</i>		PAGE
when vendee may insist upon specific performance pro tanto		ii. 104, 125, note.
when remedy mutual		ii. 86, note.
how specific performance decreed		ii. 56
in cases within Statute of Frauds		ii. 66, 68, note, 78, note.
in cases of part performance		ii. 74
in cases where defendant sets up a contract different from plaintiff's, and plaintiff consents to comply with the contract stated by defend- ant		ii. 93, 94, note.
in cases of fraud		ii. 87
distinction between plaintiffs and defendants		ii. 89
effect of laches		ii. 95
in cases not within Statute of Frauds		ii. 106
against assignees and purchasers with notice		ii. 107
against privies and representatives		ii. 110
against corporations		ii. 40, note.
compensation in cases of		ii. 97, 122, 126, note.
of awards		ii. 795
of agreements to refer		ii. 795
of restrictions		ii. 55, note.
of contracts for separation of husband and wife		ii. 53, note.
of foreign contracts		ii. 60, note.
of contracts of railways		ii. 870
SPOILIATION OF DEEDS, frauds by		i. 260-262
STAKEHOLDER		ii. 140, note.
STARE DECISIS, application of this rule		i. 430
STATED ACCOUNT. (<i>See ACCOUNT.</i>)		
STATEMENTS,		
of opinion		i. 206, note.
of value		i. 207, note.
promissory		i. 208, note.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. (<i>See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.</i>)		
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. (<i>See LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.</i>)		
STATUTES OF MORTMAIN. (<i>See MORTMAIN, STATUTES OF.</i>)		
STATUTES, 13th Eliz. as to creditors		i. 359
27th Eliz. as to purchasers		i. 429
(<i>See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.</i>)		
STOCKHOLDERS. (<i>See CREDITOR'S BILL.</i>)		
call upon, not collected, may be assigned		ii. 349, note.
are cestuis que trust of directors		ii. 603, note.
when debts of may or may not be set off against calls		ii. 769, note.
STULTIFICATION, maxim that no man can stultify himself		i. 239-244
SUBPCENA, invention of this writ		i. 43
SUBROGATION,		
in the Roman law		i. 526, 645
in general in English law		ii. 340, note.

SUBROGATION — *continued.*

	PAGE
of sureties to the place of creditors	i. 506, note, 527
substitution to a lien, when legatees and creditors entitled to	ii. 572
when subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers	ii. 572

SUITS, MULTIPLICITY OF. (*See MULTIPLICITY.*)

SUPPLICAVIT, WRIT OF,

when grantable	ii. 804
--------------------------	---------

SUPPRESSION, of deeds, frauds by i. 260

SURCHARGE AND FALSIFY, meaning of these terms i. 544

SURETIES, concealment of facts from i. 234, and notes.

when discharged by conduct of creditor i. 334, 335, note.

rights against reserved by creditor i. 335, note, 512, note.

contribution between i. 504, 509, note, 510, note.

whether on payment of the debt entitled to an assignment of the

security i. 505, 514-520

substitution of, to the place of creditors i. 526, note, 527

entitled to securities held by the creditor i. 514

after-acquired securities i. 515, note.

when entitled to relief against a second mortgage i. 424

doctrines of the Roman law as to i. 506, 525

contribution between, enforced at law and equity i. 508

cases where relief is more complete in equity than at law i. 509

where an account and discovery are wanted i. 509

where there are numerous parties in interest i. 510

where one surety is insolvent and another pays the debt i. 510

where one dies and the surviving surety pays the whole debt i. 510

where there are distinct bonds with different penalties, and a

surety upon one pays the whole i. 511

where there are counter equities between them i. 511

where a second bond is subsidiary to another i. 511

whether a discharge of one discharges the other sureties i. 512

whether sureties have the benefit of the judgment of the creditor

against the bail of the principal i. 517

whether one who pays off a specialty debt succeeds to its priority i. 518

where a surety has a counter bond from the principal i. 527

liability of, when may be set off ii. 770, note.

sureties on debt to crown entitled to be substituted to rights of

the crown i. 527, note.

(*See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.*)

marshalling of securities in favor of i. 637

(*See MARSHALLING OF SECURITIES.*)

relief against creditor and debtor ii. 48

by bill quia timet ii. 48, 169

on covenant to indemnify ii. 170

injunctions in favor of i. 524, note; ii. 194, 213

SURPLUS, in cases of charities, how applied ii. 514

SURPRISE, its meaning as used in Courts of Equity . i. 129, note, 259, note.

where presumptive of fraud i. 129, note, 259, note.

SURPRISE — *continued.*

	PAGE
when mixed up with mistake	i. 260
when a ground of jurisdiction	i. 260
when consent is obtained by	i. 238
where a deed is not read to a party	i. 259, note.
what will avoid a deed	i. 260

T.

TACKING , definition of	i. 417
its hardship	i. 418
grounds on which it is supported	i. 418
called a <i>tabula in naufragio</i>	i. 419
Lord Hardwicke's account of its origin	i. 419
unknown in the Roman law	i. 420, note, 423
confined to bona fide purchasers	i. 421, 424
does not extend to creditors, by judgment, &c.	i. 421
where third mortgagee purchases a prior judgment	i. 421
where money is lent upon the credit of the land	i. 421
where first mortgagee lends to the mortgagor upon judgment or statute	i. 421
or on a second mortgage	i. 421, note.
bond debt cannot be tacked, except against heir	i. 422
party must hold both securities in same right	i. 422
where prior mortgagee has a third mortgage as trustee	i. 423
in case of a mortgagee of a copyhold	i. 422, note.
not allowed in America against mesne incumbrances duly registered	i. 423, note.
in mortgages of personal property	ii. 337

(See NOTICE.)

TENANT. (See LANDLORD AND TENANT.)

TERMS FOR YEARS , on special trusts	ii. 297
nature of	ii. 297
how they follow the inheritance	ii. 297
when charges are primarily on such terms, and when not	ii. 302

TESTIMONY, BILL TO PERPETUATE,

when it lies	ii. 830
when not	ii. 833
for whom it lies	ii. 832
lies in cases of penalties and forfeitures	ii. 833
lies against a bona fide purchaser	ii. 833
decree on	ii. 834
publication of testimony	ii. 839, note.

TESTIMONY, BILL TO TAKE DE BENE ESSE,

when it lies	ii. 834
when witnesses abroad	ii. 834
when witnesses aged or infirm	ii. 837
when a single witness only	ii. 837
in cases of contract and tort	ii. 838
when depositions published	ii. 839, note.

- TIMBER.** (*See WASTE.*)
- TIME, LAPSE OF,** how it affects equitable demands . . . i. 546, 852, note.
 when it is of the essence of a contract or not in equity . . . ii. 99
 (*See LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.*)
- TITHES AND MODUSES,** when apportioned i. 490, note.
 ancient jurisdiction of Exchequer over i. 539
 when jurisdiction of Chancery arose as to i. 539
 account and discovery, the grounds of jurisdiction i. 539
 when right is disputed, it must be settled at law i. 539
 when equity will establish a modus i. 540
 bill brought for, and to fix boundaries i. 623
- TITLE,** where party acts under ignorance of i. 118, note, 128, 137
 cloud upon ii. 11, note.
- TORTS,** bill in equity for account in cases of i. 466, 476, note, 533, 535, 536
 right of action for, not assignable ii. 359
 of agents chargeable in equity upon their estate i. 470, 475
- TRADE, RESTRAINT OF,** contracts in i. 293
 (*See FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE.*)
- TRADE MARKS,** fraudulent assuming trade marks of another . . . ii. 255
 relief by injunction ii. 255
- TRESPASSES,** equity jurisdiction grew out of i. 45
- TRUSTEE AND CESTUI QUE TRUST,**
 relief in cases of concealment by the former i. 237
 their peculiar fiduciary relation i. 327
 distinction between this relation and that of client and attorney . . . i. 319
 relation of, exists between directors and shareholders of a corpora-
 tion ii. 603, note.
 trustee cannot purchase for himself i. 328
 not necessary to show his bargain to be advantageous i. 328
 same rule applies to affect persons in like situations i. 330, 333
 where trustee suffers title-deeds to go out of his possession i. 396
 accounts between i. 470
 mixing up trust funds with his own ii. 616
 not allowed to make profit of trust funds i. 470
 nor to purchase trust estate i. 329
 nor to partake of bounty of cestui que trust unless in special cases . . . i. 328
 compensation to trustees whether allowed i. 331, note; ii. 612
 rights, powers, and duties of trustees ii. 279, 611
 whether, in case grantor and cestui que trust leave no heirs, trustee
 takes and estate does not escheat ii. 529, note.
 liability of trustee on subscriptions for shares in companies in behalf
 of trust estate ii. 619, note.
 (*See TRUST.*)
 Statute of Limitations does not run between in favor of trustee ii. 608, note,
 847, note.
 relief against trustee, when waived or not ii. 629, note.
 remedies against trustees ii. 612-631
 breach of trust, what is ii. 612-631

TRUSTEE AND CESTUI QUE TRUST — *continued.*

PAGE

breach of trust induced by cestui que trust, not to be reimbursed by	
cestui que trust	ii. 609, note.
care of trust money	ii. 614
joint, when responsible for each other	ii. 622, 623, note.
when removed from trust	ii. 523, 630
not entitled to compensation for services unless specially provided for	ii. 612
option of cestui que trust	ii. 609
adverse possession against both may be a bar	ii. 847, note.
TRUSTS, nature of	ii. 266
history of	ii. 266-274
in real property, when they follow the analogies of law	ii. 274
entertained in equity	i. 22
mistake in supposing equity jurisdiction arose from	i. 45, 46, 82
these gave it new activity	i. 46
not exclusively cognizable in equity	i. 58, 550
curtesy, but not dower, in a trust estate	i. 62
have the same effect in equity as legal estates at law	i. 62
executory, susceptible of modifications in equity	i. 63
relief, when they fail of being executed	i. 102
to preserve contingent remainders	ii. 292
rights and duties of the trustees	ii. 292
when enforced against those in possession of the property	i. 549
cases of bailments cognizable at law	i. 58, 550
where jurisdiction of equity is exclusive	i. 550
cannot be enforced in the Ecclesiastical Courts	i. 550
trustees, powers, rights, duties of	ii. 279, 611
responsibility of	ii. 611
care of trust money	ii. 614
deposit with bankers	ii. 614
letting money, on what securities	ii. 616
personal security alone not proper	ii. 619
duty of as to real estate	ii. 619
when chargeable with interest	ii. 620
joint, how far responsible for each other	ii. 622
receipts by joint	ii. 622
powers joint, when executable	ii. 386
(See POWER.)	
debt of, by breach of trust is not a specialty	ii. 630
want of trustees supplied in equity	ii. 383, 384
new, when appointed	ii. 384
trustees when removed	ii. 523, 630
trustees, by implication	ii. 383
trusts, foreign, jurisdiction in equity	ii. 517, 632
trusts in respect to lands	ii. 633
when not enforced	ii. 635
trusts, construction of words of	ii. 386-393
(See POWER.)	
express trusts, what	ii. 283
marriage settlements	ii. 285
terms for years	ii. 297

TRUSTS — *continued.*

	PAGE
mortgages	ii. 304
effect of transfer of mortgage without note and vice versa	ii. 314, note.
assignments	ii. 343
by assignments, when revocable or not	ii. 348
by wills and testaments	ii. 382
powers, when they are trusts	ii. 382
indefinite and vague are void	ii. 281, 405, 408, 410, 495, note, 516
for charity	ii. 491
(See CHARITIES.)	
voluntary, when enforced or not	ii. 273, 281, 289
failure of trusts, effect of	ii. 281, 492, 530
election and satisfaction	ii. 415
charities	ii. 477
implied or constructive trusts	ii. 528
when created because of a charge upon land	ii. 595, note.
charged on land paid for with stolen money	ii. 605, note.
on presumed intention	ii. 528
money paid to one for use of another	ii. 361, 529
resulting trust	ii. 529
election, when it creates a trust	ii. 422
conveyance without consideration, when a trust	ii. 531
when not	ii. 271, note.
purchase in the name of another person	ii. 534
by parent in the name of son	ii. 538
in name of wife	ii. 541
joint purchase, when a trust	ii. 542
purchase by partners, when a trust	ii. 544
when rebutted	ii. 537
executor, when a trustee or not, of residue	ii. 545
executor, who is a debtor, when a trustee	ii. 545
charge for payment of debts, when a trust	ii. 607
purchase by trustee, with trust-money	ii. 548
purchase by party under covenants, when a trust	ii. 548
recommendation, when a trust or not	ii. 405
implied trust from equitable conversion of property	ii. 550
vendor, when a trustee	ii. 551
purchaser, when a trustee	ii. 551
agent, purchasing, is a trustee	ii. 550
purchaser, when bound to see to the application of purchase- money, or not	ii. 280, note, 466
trusts from equitable liens	ii. 555
lien of vendor for purchase-money, a trust	ii. 560
origin of	ii. 562
when lien waived	ii. 566
taking a security, whether a waiver of lien	ii. 566-570
lien extends to and against representatives	ii. 570
lien in favor of third persons	ii. 571, 577
when not	ii. 578
lien against purchasers, in what cases	ii. 574, 578

TRUSTS — *continued.*

	PAGE
lien against general assignees	ii. 575
lien by deposit of title-deeds	ii. 324, 576
lien by deposit of money for particular purposes	ii. 577
lien for repairs and improvements	ii. 580
lien for disbursements, by master of ship	ii. 587
by part-owners	ii. 587
by partners	ii. 589
lien of creditors, by charge for payment of debts in wills	ii. 589
what words create a charge	ii. 383, 589, 590
lien, in what cases a primary charge on land	ii. 302, 595
in what cases not	ii. 303, note, 595
lien in favor of dowress	ii. 601
trust arising from ultimate liability	ii. 601
trust from payments by mistake	ii. 602
trust of corporation funds for debts	ii. 602
trust of joint creditors on partnership property	ii. 603
trusts created in invitum	ii. 273, note, 604
purchase in violation of trust	ii. 604
conversion of trust funds	ii. 606
profits of illegal conversion	ii. 608
sale and repurchase by trustee	ii. 610
arising from frauds	ii. 610
purchase, with notice of a trust	ii. 606
executory trusts, construction of	ii. 286, 403
trusts never fail in equity for want of trustee	ii. 382
power to appointment, when a trust	ii. 382
power when a trust	ii. 392, 409
option of cestui que trust	ii. 609, 617
TURPITUDE, contracts growing out of	i. 299

U.

UNDERGROUND WATER	ii. 230, note.
UNDUE INFLUENCE. (<i>See INFLUENCE.</i>)	
USES: (<i>See TRUSTS.</i>)	
USURY, contracts for	i. 305
abates when	i. 65, note.
	(<i>See FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE.</i>)

V.

VENDOR, when specific performance decreed or not, for or against	ii. 41, note, 60
	(<i>See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.</i>)
when he a trustee	ii. 531
	(<i>See TRUST.</i>)
lien of, for purchase-money	ii. 554
	(<i>See LIEN.</i>)
when his lien is waived, or not	ii. 566
against whom the lien of, exists	ii. 570

	PAGE
VERDICTS, fraud in, remedy in equity	i. 261
VOID AND VOIDABLE, what acts capable of confirmation	i. 309
VOLUNTARY CONTRACTS, when enforced or not	i. 433
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES, rights of subsequent purchasers in regard to	i. 429
(See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.)	
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, when revocable, or not	ii. 272, 289, 361, 529
VOLUNTARY DEEDS AND CONTRACTS, when enforced in equity, or not	ii. 21, 109, 117, 274, 289
VOLUNTARY POST-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS, when enforced, or not	ii. 120, 289
VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENTS, when void or not	ii. 120, 287-290
VOLUNTEERS, when equity will interfere or not in favor of	i. 187, 433
in cases of defective execution of powers	i. 101, 106, 187

W.

WAGER, contracts of, when void	i. 297
WAGER OF LAW, allowed in many actions of account	i. 449
WARD. (See GUARDIAN AND WARD.)	
WARD OF CHANCERY, when an infant is	ii. 683
WASTE, remedy at law	ii. 215
remedy in equity	ii. 215
injunction to prevent, when granted	ii. 218
concurrent jurisdiction of equity, in cases of	i. 536
bill for account sustained against executor and heir for opening a mine and disposing of the ore	i. 536
grounds of jurisdiction in this case	i. 536
whether, when discovery is sought, an account will be decreed	i. 536
cases of cutting down timber	i. 535, note, i. 536
whether, to sustain an account, there must be a prayer for an in- junction to prevent future waste	i. 536, 538, note.
waste by executors and administrators	i. 588
by husband of feme covert executrix	i. 592
WEAKNESS, MENTAL, relief in cases of imposition upon	i. 246
WIDOWS, conditions restraining marriage by or to	i. 275, 276, note, 288, note.
marshalling of assets with respect to	i. 578
(See ADMINISTRATION.)	
WILLS, of personal and real estate differently construed	i. 63, 404, note.
defect in executing power by, when aided	i. 102, 185
cancelled by mistake, supposing a later one executed	i. 103
where a party is prevented from making one by accident, no relief	i. 106
fraud in obtaining, whether remediable in equity	i. 194, note, 250, 441
mistake in the construction of	i. 137

WILLS — *continued*

	PAGE
mistakes in	i. 190
execution of powers by, instead of a deed	i. 102, 185, 186
trusts under	ii. 382
how construed	ii. 383, 394, 414, note.
power to sell under trusts	ii. 384
who are to execute	ii. 384, 406, note.
power to raise portions	ii. 391
how trustees under can raise charge	ii. 393, note.
to maintain children, when obligatory and when not	ii. 386, note.
description of persons to take	ii. 395
precatory words, when construed as legacies	ii. 405
difference of construction of words, as to real and personal estate in	ii. 403, 404, note.
construction of powers in	ii. 384, 388, note.
disposition of fund where power not executed	ii. 385, note.
election between claims under	ii. 415
(See ELECTION AND SATISFACTION.)	
satisfaction, what is, of claims or not under	ii. 438
bill in equity to establish	ii. 779
established when lost	ii. 779, note.
by whom it lies, or not	ii. 780
how established in equity	ii. 780, 785
WITNESSES, rule in equity as to proof by, in opposition to answer	ii. 855
who may be, in equity	ii. 855
not proper parties to a bill of discovery	ii. 823
exceptions to the rule	ii. 823
perpetuating testimony of	ii. 830
WORDS, how construed in wills	ii. 383
different construction of, as to real and personal estate	ii. 403
description of persons, what is good or not	ii. 394, 397
description of property, what is good or not	ii. 411
recommendatory and precatory words, how construed	ii. 405
powers, words conferring, how construed	ii. 384
WRIT, de rationabilibus divisis	i. 619
de perambulatione facienda	i. 619
de dote assignanda	i. 631, note.
WRIT OF INJUNCTION. (See INJUNCTIONS.)	
WRIT OF NE EXEAT REGNO. (See NE EXEAT REGNO.)	
WRIT OF SUPPLICAVIT. (See SUPPLICAVIT.)	
WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS, mistake in, when relieved	i. 166
in whose favor corrected	i. 173, 189

